MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION


1. This history is a departure from the normal chronicle of the annual events that occur at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) and Presidio of Monterey (POM) in that it tells the story of the five-year period that Colonel Daniel D. Devlin served as Commandant and Installation Commander of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and Presidio of Monterey.

2. When he took command, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command realigned DLIFLC and the POM under the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and issued guidance that Devlin’s primary mission was as the Installation Commander and his second mission would be as Commandant.

3. As Installation Commander, Devlin’s major construction achievement was the renovation of the Hayes Army Hospital at the Ord Military Community into a DoD office building that would house several Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, as well as the new DLIFLC Directorate of Continuing Education. Devlin also worked with Congressman Sam Farr to secure funding for two new buildings on the Presidio: a Video Teletraining Studio (building 420) and the BG James Lawton Collins, Jr., general instructional facility (building 611).

4. Devlin also forged partnerships with the cities of Seaside and Monterey that resulted in better and more cost effective public works support for the Ord Military Community and the Presidio, including sports fields at the Price Fitness Center and on Soldier Field. His efforts in the Base Realignment and Closure arena resulted in Fort Ord becoming a showcase for other major installations.

5. As Commandant, Devlin championed the idea that students, faculty, and staff, as well as external defense agencies were “customers.” Academic attrition was reduced through student “re-languaging” or recycling, resulting in more students graduating with higher proficiency results.

6. Finally, under Devlin’s leadership, the Institute accomplished four major recommendations of its accrediting body by developing an academic freedom statement; establishing councils for faculty and deans; implementing the new Faculty Personnel System; and completing the self study that led to the authorization to grant an Associate of Arts degree.

Encl

SUE ANN SANDUSKY
COL, AG
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: A
Preface

This official history of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and the Presidio of Monterey covers the period 1996-2000. During these years, the Institute and Presidio enjoyed a marked period of continuity in leadership under Colonel Daniel D. Devlin who served as commandant and installation commander from 26 February 1996 until his retirement from the United States Army on 1 December 2000.

Circumstances forced Devlin to spend much time, in his role as installation commander, adjudicating issues stemming from the 1994 closure of nearby Fort Ord. Indeed, upon taking command, he was told by his immediate superior, Major General Joe N. Ballard, the US Army Training and Doctrine Center Chief of Staff, to consolidate control over all garrison functions at the Presidio of Monterey that were formerly the responsibility of Fort Ord and to focus effort on working with the local civilian communities surrounding the former base. Unfortunately, Devlin’s role as commandant of DLIFLC was thought secondary to those missions. Nonetheless, Devlin relished being commandant and was constantly concerned about the success of individual students. He instituted reforms to reduce academic attrition rates by “washing back” students who were in academic jeopardy or by “relanguaging” them into easier to learn languages.

Unlike Devlin’s administration of DLIFLC, the Command History Office experienced some discontinuity while this command history was being compiled due to special projects and staffing changes, as discussed in Chapter VI. As a consequence, the report is the product of several historians and other individuals who made various contributions over a period of several years. Historians James C. McNaughton, Stephen M. Payne, Jay Price, and Clifford F. Porter, assisted by archivists Caroline Cantillas and Kurt Kuss, collected the documentation and conducted the interviews that made up the source material for this history. The report itself was drafted by Porter, Payne, and Cameron Binkley, a former National Park Service historian who also took on the massive effort of editing and rewriting the draft as well as the onerous task of correlating and fact-checking numerous source documents to produce a comprehensive and cohesive work.

Inadvertently, this history may have left out some relevant details or contain undiscovered errors for which the authors alone accept responsibility. Nonetheless, this history will hopefully prove useful to those who need to know something about the big events that happened during this period.

Stephen M. Payne, PhD
Command Historian
August 2009
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Chapter I
The Defense Foreign Language Program

From 1996 to 2000, the Defense Foreign Language Program (DFLP) labored under competing challenges of limited resources, the difficult and costly mission to educate and sustain foreign language skills, and the high expectations of those using linguists in the field in support of several contingency operations. During this time, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), located at the historic Presidio of Monterey in California, made advances in cost-efficiencies while faculty increased the proficiency skills of linguists and improved their retention. Despite such gains, the perception remained in some offices of United States Department of Defense (DoD), which oversaw both efforts, that the DFLP required a “get well plan.” This view eventually manifested itself in numerous plans and reports, including the 2000 Army Language Master Plan, aimed at “fixing the language program” that were undertaken from the mid-1990s through the end of the century. As events unfolded, the prescription was easier to make than to fill.

World Political Situation and Impact on DFLP 1996-2000

The demands of the post-Cold War world on the DFLP remained high throughout the 1990s, primarily in the languages of Russian, Arabic, Korean, Chinese, and Spanish. By the year 2000, the DoD utilized over thirty thousand military, civilian, and contracted linguists in eighty languages in areas spanning military diplomacy, coalition building, partnerships for peace programs, peacetime intelligence, and readiness for conflict. DLIFLC taught seventy-one languages in resident and contract programs—an increase of five languages from 1995. The forward deployment of US Armed Forces worldwide, such as the continued peacekeeping support in Bosnia, added considerable challenges to the DFLP, especially in languages simply not foreseen by policy planners.

Contingency operations provided additional challenges to the DFLP. The possibilities of military deployments on short notice was a recurrent theme in the 1990s beginning with the Gulf War, then Somalia, followed by Haiti, and on-going in the former states of Yugoslavia. The list of nations that required or threatened to require US military peacekeeping and humanitarian presence on a smaller scale was quite large: Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Congo, and several other small contingencies. On 12 June 1999, two days after the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo to enforce the peace. General John Craddock, Commander of Task Force Falcon (the US element of KFOR) asked for 150 linguists (primarily Albanian,) but only 12 linguists were available. By 2000, the Army oversaw over a thousand linguists in the Balkans, who provided crucial liaison and translation support, but the Army itself only provided 5 percent of these linguists—the vast majority were hired contractors. Lastly, in 1999 the

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2 Department of the Army, Army Language Master Plan, Phase II, report prepared by Sterling Software for the Army Foreign Language Proponency Office, 2001, p. 3-5, in “Army Mater Plan-Phase II” folder, box
Indonesian Archipelago descended into vicious ethnic and religious disputes. The United Nations authorized a regional security force, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) led by the Australian Defense Force, and sent it to restore order in East Timor as that area moved towards independence. The INTERFET included a small American component that required language support.3

CONTINGENCY SUPPORT HIGHLIGHTS

Figure 1 DLIFLC OPP Contingency Support

In addition to peacekeeping operations, terrorist attacks increased during the latter half of the 1990s. The Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, was bombed on 26 June 1996, killing 23 Airmen and injuring over 100 hundred Americans. The residence housed approximately 2,000 US Air Force personnel from the 440th (Provisional) Wing and 300 US Army personnel from Ansbach, Germany, on a six-month tour in the Middle East.4 On 7 August 1998, the al Qaeda terrorist network bombed the American Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, wounding over 4,000 and killing more than 220 people.5 The attacks brought Osama bin Laden to the attention of the world and on to the Ten Most Wanted List of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) The United States responded to the attacks with Operation Infinite Reach when

25, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. See also http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/about.htm (accessed December 2007).
5 Among the dead was Sergeant Kenneth R. Hobson, Jr., USA, who graduated from DLIFLC in Arabic on 11 August 1994. After leaving the Presidio of Monterey, Hobson attended interrogation training at Fort Huachuca and was assigned to the Army Element Defense Attaché office at the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. The Presidio of Monterey Recreation Center was named in honor of Hobson on 5 August 1999 during a ceremony attended by Hobson’s widow, daughter, and parents.
President William Jefferson Clinton authorized the launching of cruise missiles against suspected al Qaeda sites in Afghanistan. Between 1996 and 2000, in addition to these new threats, Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq continued to challenge the “no fly” zones put in place by the United States and its allies to prevent Hussein from attacking Iraqi Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north.

The decade ended with further terrorist violence when two al Qaeda-affiliated suicide bombers piloted an inflatable boat into the side of the USS Cole on 12 October 2000. The Cole, in Aden, Yemen, for a routine fuel stop lost seventeen US sailors and had another thirty-nine wounded during the attack. This event was a dramatic reminder of the need for linguist support on ships and in ports of call for counter-terrorism and threat reduction activities. The Cole attack, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, and the 1998 bombing of the US Embassies in Africa, turned out to be preludes to al Qaeda’s attacks on New York and Washington, DC, on 11 September 2001.

Shifting Requirements

The events of the world, while not precisely mirroring the language requirements given to DLIFLC on a year-by-year basis, did shape the languages taught at the Institute. Throughout the 1990s, and especially during the latter half of the decade, the Department of Defense and the US Armed Services began moving language training away from “easy” Category I languages, such as French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish, to the much harder Category IV languages of Arabic, Chinese, and Korean. The high point for Category I languages occurred in 1986 with 479 enrolled students. A decade later, in 1996, only 338 students were enrolled in a Category I language and Dutch was no longer taught in residence. Spanish, by far the largest Category I language, had 362 students enrolled during 1986, but only 264 by 1996, and continued to decrease in the number of new students for the rest of the decade. Category II languages, which included only German, fell from a high point of 396 students in 1985 to only 24 new enrollees in 2000. By then, Category II was no longer tracked as a separate category but was merged with Category I languages on proficiency charts.

Throughout the decade, Category III languages were also decreasing as a group, with some notable exceptions. In 1990, the Institute enrolled 1,899 students in Category III languages, with 1,258 Russian students leading the way. However, by 2000, there were only 755 students enrolled in Category III languages and, although still the largest of the Category III languages, enrollments fell to only 458 new Russian students. Within Category III languages, Persian-Farsi jumped from only 49 students in 1987 to 192 in 1997 before declining to 114 new students in 2000. In 1993, due to the Kosovo crisis, the

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Institute re-established Serbian/Croatian with 20 enrollees, which had increased to 80 students by 2000.\textsuperscript{7}

During the 1990s, the major change in language requirements came in the Category IV languages, which grew. Between 1994 and 2000, the requirements for Arabic linguists fluctuated from 801 students starting classes in 1994, declining to 689 starts in 1995, before jumping to 843 new enrollments in 1996, and then declining annually to a low of 704 new students by 2000. Chinese Mandarin also experienced rapid growth with 81 enrollees in 1986, and 284 in 2000. Korean continued to fluctuate in enrollments with 333 students in 1987, growing to 480 in 1989, before dropping to a low point of only 261 new enrollees in 1992, at which point the program began an expansion to 548 new students by 2000.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{Shifting Requirements}
\textbf{1985 - 2000}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{shifting_requirements.png}
\caption{DLIFLC Requirements by Language Difficulty, 1985-2000}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Fill Rate}

During the five years between 1996 and 2000, DLIFLC experienced a sudden jump in the average number of students taking classes per fiscal year from 2,088 in 1996 to 2,509 in 1997 and another increase to 2,663 in 1998 before slightly decreasing to 2,615 in 1999 and 2,597 in 2000.\textsuperscript{9} Although Institute faculty were teaching over five hundred more students annually in fiscal 2000 than they did in 1996, the four services were not

\textsuperscript{7}“Summary of Student Loads by Language [1985-2000],” DLIFLC spread sheet, in “Shifting Requirements” folder, box 58, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\textsuperscript{8}Ibid.
filling all the basic program training seats that they had requested. In fiscal year 1996, the services filled only 87 percent of the training seats requested which resulted in 384 no-shows in basic language program scheduled classes. There were 136 vacancies in Arabic, 10 in Chinese, 9 in French, 32 in Korean, 21 in Persian-Farsi, 45 in Spanish 28 in Russian, 11 in Tagalog, 8 in Thai, and 10 in Turkish. Over the next three fiscal years, 1997–1999, the fill-rate improved. In fiscal 1997, DLIFLC filled 95 percent of the scheduled seats with 101 basic program vacancies in “low-requirement languages such as French, Italian, Japanese, Tagalog and Turkish.” In fiscal 1998, there was further improvement and the overall fill-rate reached 96 percent, although the basic program fill-rate was only 93 percent with 47 vacancies in “non-critical languages such as French, German, Greek, Tagalog, Thai and Turkish.” By fiscal 1999, the overall fill-rate decreased to 93 percent but the basic program fill rate fell to 88 percent with 124 vacancies: 49 in Arabic, 20 in Korean, 7 in Tagalog, 4 in Thai, and 6 in Turkish. Finally, in 2000, the overall fill-rate plummeted to 86 percent and the basic program filled only 87 percent of the available language training seats: 70 in Arabic, 10 in French, 34 in Korean, 33 in Persian-Farsi, 109 in Russian, 4 in Tagalog, and 6 in Turkish.

Over the five-year period running from 1996 to 2000, the basic program had 1,010 vacant seats from a total 1,480 overall unfilled seats. The impact of this loss varied depending upon the organization: DLIFLC, the four services, or the end-use customer.

For DLIFLC the issue of fill-rates correlated to the number of vacancies in a given section. If the service managers failed to inform DLIFLC that they did not have the number of students they had originally asked for during the Structured Manning Decision Review (SMDR) and Training Requirements Army Programs (TRAP) process, then the Institute would have to teach a section with as little as four students rather than the normal section size of ten students. However, when the service managers did their job correctly and informed the Institute that they would be unable to fill the sections they requested space in, then Institute managers could reassign the vacancies to one of the other services or reconfigure the section with another section that had vacancies. Since the school had already been funded for the sections, DLIFLC managers were able to reassign faculty, hired to teach the canceled sections, to other needed projects such as curriculum development or test development.

The long-term harm of low fill-rates came at the expense of end-users, such as the National Security Agency (NSA). The military assigned the overwhelming majority of

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10 For the purposes of this analysis vacancies in the other DLIFLC language programs such as Intermediate, Advanced, Sustainment, Conversational, etc., were not identified as the vast majority of students were enrolled in the basic programs. Additionally, these programs do not have the same impact on the end-user agencies, such as NSA, as a no-show does not necessarily indicate the lack of an operational linguist.


DLIFLC basic language students to cryptological missions run by NSA, so shortages of graduates meant that NSA would eventually face a shortage of qualified linguists. In addition, the military services that did not fill their language student slots would eventually have to promote from a smaller pool of qualified people.¹³

Service program managers tried to anticipate the need for linguists in specific languages, but the SMDR, a process used to match manpower needs with resources, built in some lag time between the need for a specific language and when the school in Monterey could begin teaching it (or when the teaching of an existing language could be greatly expanded). Sudden operational needs of the services were met by combing databases for the few qualified linguists or heritage speakers in low-density languages and by contracting for language support from US and non-US citizens. Contract linguists have always been necessary, but problematic because considerable security problems exist in sensitive linguist positions.

A further challenge for DLIFLC was that field commanders had constant need for linguists in the high operation tempo environments of the “new world order.” Budgetary pressures also contributed to a wide variety of efforts and initiatives made to increase quickly the effectiveness of linguists while keeping costs down. A possible aid, promised for decades, was machine translation. The explosion of technology in the information age offered the eventual promise of computer translations, or at least useful new aids to speed the work of qualified linguists. However, most knowledgeable observers realized that technology would not replace linguists because computers were not yet fully capable of “understanding” human speech and more importantly could not “think” outside programmed parameters. As a result, the hope of machine translation remained under review by the DFLP Policy Committee.

**Defense Foreign Language Program**

The Defense Foreign Language Program remained a cumbersome organization from the viewpoint of its “schoolhouse,” the Defense Language Institute. The primary organization responsible for the DFLP was the Policy Committee consisting of representatives from each of the services and under the overall chair of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I). Prior to 1994, the activities of the Policy Committee were undertaken by the General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). DoD changed this arrangement, however, to reflect the recommendations of a 1993 Inspector General report that sought to more centrally control the DFLP and eliminate competing interests in the overall direction of foreign language education at the schoolhouse level and the utilization of linguists in the field.¹⁴

The Personnel Committee, chaired by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, along with service representatives, coordinated personnel management within the DFLP. The Requirements and Resources

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Coordinating Panel (RRCP) oversaw manpower, resource, and training requirements and was directly responsible to the DFLP Policy Committee. The RRCP was chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Besides DLIFLC and NSA, the Personnel Committee included representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Manpower and Personnel (J-1), the four services, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Army deputy chief of staff for operations, the Army deputy chief of staff for intelligence, the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army Special Operations Foreign Language Office, and the US Coast Guard (from 2000). The action officer for the old GOSC and the new RRCP was Craig Wilson, Director, Intelligence Policy and Training in the ASD/C3I office. George Ostrom, also at C3I, assisted Wilson and took the reins briefly after Wilson retired in December 1995.

The six months following the retirement of Wilson and the resignation of Ostrom in early 1996, found the DFLP essentially rudderless. As discussed in the DLIFLC Command History for 1994-1995, DoD made little progress in solidifying the reorganization of the program due to uncertainty concerning which service would have Executive Agency for the schoolhouse in Monterey. However, prior to leaving the ASD/C3I office, Ostrom completed an update of the 7 April 1988 DoD Directive on the Defense Language Program (5160.41). Unfortunately, the directive lacked an advocate and stalled in the Pentagon.

On 3 June 1996, NSA assigned Dr. Carolyn Crooks to a two-year rotational assignment to replace Wilson and Ostrom in the office of the ASD/C3I. Although Crooks was not a permanent replacement for the Wilson and Ostrom team, she held the DFLP together during a period of turmoil at the directorate level after Army Lieutenant General Emmett Paige, Jr., the ASD/C3I, left his position. Under Crooks, the organization weathered a threatened reorganization in November 1997 under Vice President Al Gore’s “Reinventing Government” campaign. However, this reorganization stalled at the 11th hour when the administration realized that ASD/C3I was

15 MAJ Rusty Shughart, e-mail to Glenn Nordin, OSD/C3I entitled “Background on the DFLP,” 26 March 1999, in “DoD Language Program…E-mail Communications” folder, Glenn Nordin files, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
17 MAJ Rusty Shughart, e-mail to Steven Solomon entitled “DFLP History,” 8 April 1999, in “DoD Language Program…E-mail Communications” folder, Glenn Nordin files, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Approval had to wait several years until the new Defense Language Office began working the issue.
18 C3I had several acting directors: Dr. Barry Horton, Anthony Valetta and later Joan Dempsey; another, Mr. Arthur Money, was not given the title of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD), but was the “Senior Civilian Official” between 1998-1999. Money was confirmed as ASD in 1999 and served in that capacity until 2001. After Horton retired, several of the acting ASDs had little knowledge or interest in the role of foreign languages within DoD. This was further exacerbated during periods when there were gaps with no one at the helm. Hugh McFarlane, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 27 July 2006; E-mail to Stephen Payne, 15 November 2006, in “DFLP—Carolyn Crooks folder, box 53, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 as one of three permanent Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The ASD/C3I had oversight responsibility for both NSA and DIA as well as the DFLP and could not be eliminated without approval of Congress.20

That NSA staffed key positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense concerning foreign language matters was not surprising. NSA utilized 70 percent of military linguists and set the budget for the DFLP. The NSA also chaired or had representation on several committees that had responsibilities in or that influenced the DFLP. In addition to influence exerted by NSA, two non-DoD committees influenced the DFLP: the federal Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) and the Director of Central Intelligence Foreign Language Committee. The ILR developed the official U.S. government Language Skill Level Descriptions in 1985, based on the US State Department Foreign Service Institute scale first used in the early 1950s.21 Although several committees and organizations maintained significant influence on the DFLP, the Army maintained executive agency of the schoolhouse in Monterey, as discussed below.

The rather complex management structure of the DFLP met the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era with mixed results. Consistent budgetary pressures on the Department of Defense, as a whole, and on the DFLP and DLIFLC in particular, ranged from the cost of language training to the demands of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process for final disposition of Fort Ord in Monterey. These pressures exacted a toll.22 The DLIFLC mission and base operations requirements increased beyond the normal marginal increases of budgeting. To overcome budget shortfalls, several innovative initiatives and experiments began with varying results, but culminated in both cost savings and better base operations support.23

Fixing the Language Problem

In addition to efforts within the DoD, other government agencies were increasingly asked about the state of language resources within their organizations. In 1997, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Foreign Language Committee (FLC) completed a study of the language needs throughout the intelligence community. The FLC study was undertaken due to concerns about the foreign language capabilities within the community that were expressed by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the intelligence community’s “Hard Target” working groups. The FLC study reviewed five questions:

1) What are the community requirements for foreign language capabilities?
2) What are the resources available to fill these requirements?
3) If there is a gap between requirements and resources, what is it?

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20 Steven R. Solomon, e-mail to Stephen Payne entitled “Fate of ASD/C3I,” 13 November 1997, in “DFLP Strategy 2000,” folder, box 28, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. The e-mail includes summary of Solomon’s discussion with Dr. Carolyn Crooks and comments by James C. McNaughton on the history and legal authorities behind the OSD/C3I.


22 The BRAC process of Fort Ord was the responsibility of the Installation Commander of the Presidio of Monterey, who was also the Commandant of DLIFLC.

23 BASOPS for DLIFLC is discussed in Chapter VI.
4) What are the real consequences of the gap?
5) What can be done to fill the gap, and at what cost?

The researchers identified a lack of good data to address the questions. One agency simply reduced the “the number of positions assessed as needing language expertise” by two-thirds in order not to show a deficiency. The study reported that about 30,000 of the 80,000 intelligence community employees had some foreign language expertise, but there was no way of assessing their level of proficiency as the different agencies used different methods, or had no method at all, to assess foreign language capabilities. Furthermore, some agencies did not retest employees once they were hired and had no idea of the current proficiency status of their employees. In addition, there was no standard testing procedure or standard tests and no tests at all in some languages. To make matters worse, “one officer confided, ’we send the linguist to fill the position but it is up to command to decide how they employ that person; and we have no way of checking’.”

The CIA FLC study was not unique; during the late 1990s, the NSA was also looking at linguist deficiencies.

The NSA JMRR Language Training and Education Working Group Report

Foreign language issues became a focal point at NSA under Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, the director of NSA from January 1996 to March 1999, and his successor, Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, USAF, who became the longest serving director of NSA, holding the post until April 2005. Both directors realized the importance of developing highly proficient military and civilian crypto-linguists to work for the agency. To this end, the agency began looking at systemic problems in the linguist arena and developing plans to “fix the language problem.”

The Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) was the formal means by which DoD identified, analyzed, and began the process of remedying deficiencies within various programs. The process involved units reporting deficiencies to their intermediate commands, where they were analyzed and, if deemed valid, were forwarded on to higher levels. Eventually, lower units reported the issues to service heads or the Secretary of Defense, who in turn tasked a series of panels to recommend approaches, find funding, prioritize solutions, and send the packages to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for final decisions. Throughout the 1990s, the Joint Planning Process (of which JMRR was an element) became the primary means by which the greater Department of Defense determined which programs to fund.

In December 1995, NSA used the JMRR process to report a language deficiency in the services. By 1997, Lieutenant General Minihan was tasking the Associate Directorate for Education and Training (ADET) at NSA with various projects designed to chip away at the language deficiency. Finally, he determined that these deficiencies were

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25 For a historical overview of this issue from the 1940s through 1995 see James C. McNaughton, “Fixing the Language Problem: A Case Study in Joint Training Management” (DLIFLC, 1995).
26 JMRR was later renamed the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR) when the monthly review process became a quarterly process.
systemic and a comprehensive approach to language issues was preferable to disjointed approaches. The members of the ADET formed a working group and outlined seven areas that needed attention including recruiting, training, and technology. In an unclassified report titled “JMRR Language Training and Education Working Group Report: Issues and Solutions (16 June 2000),” the members of the working group laid out a “strawman” approach to address each area and developed timetables to fix the issue.

The JMRR working group detailed improvements in training and education for military and civilian linguists to achieve over the course of their careers. It recommended five areas for improvement in cryptologic training:

1) Establish centralized direction,
2) Shift primary focus to distributed learning,
3) Develop general professional and specific position or job qualification standards,
4) Implement a comprehensive evaluation program, and
5) Realistically assess the role of military linguists.

The JMRR working group briefed its proposals and turned them over to the NSA Directorate of Operations to implement. At NSA Renee M. Meyer, the Senior Language Authority, took the language issues on and established a task force with working groups for each of the five identified improvement areas. The working groups generated reports and plans of action that informed the overall language transformation effort in the cryptologic community. Hayden followed up with a memorandum articulating the need for linguists with Level 3 and above language skills. The Hayden memo would have profound ramifications throughout the services and lead to major changes at DLIFLC in the early years of the new century.

27 The JMRR working group reports were products of the overall task force that addressed all aspects of cryptologic language transformation. They were focused on improving the various aspects of the cryptologic community's language deficiency (not enough people at the right levels of ability). The training working group was one of the few that looked beyond the immediate cryptologic community, important because the Services and DoD were in charge of many areas needing reform. Hugh McFarlane, e-mail to Samuel Lipsky entitled “JMRR Language Training and Education Working Group Report (16 June 2000),” 5 July 2006, in “Stephen Payne Email” folder, box 58, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

28 The training working group’s recommendations laid out the necessary training a linguist needed over a cryptologic career. The group built budgets, detailed programs, and argued for changes in policies and approaches to training that would be pursued over the next decade. The Joint Monthly Readiness Review is a high-level Pentagon group formed to identify, analyze, and propose solutions to critical deficiencies that may reduce a combatant commander’s performance of assigned missions. In the JMRR, the Services describe current force commitments around the world and the current and projected readiness of their units. They assess different functional areas such as intelligence, of which linguist readiness is a part. Hugh McFarlane, e-mail to Samuel Lipsky entitled “JMRR Language Training...,” 5 July 2006.

29 The working group was co-chaired by Hugh McFarlane, Michael Chinn, and Barbara Deboy.


31 At DLIFLC these changes would bring in a new Proficiency Enhancement Plan (PEP) designed to bring students in the basic language programs to ILR levels of 2+ in listening, 2+ in reading, and 1+ in speaking. To test both military and civilian linguists throughout the Intelligence Community, NSA began funding DLIFLC to develop a new type of DLPT that could be administered using the Internet. Finally, NSA worked with DLIFLC to develop Language Training Detachments (LTDs) at various NSA sites employing
A Reinvigorated DFLP

At the same time that the NSA groups were looking for solutions to the “linguist problem,” organizations within the Pentagon began looking at the task of reforming the Defense Foreign Language Program. The issues raised by the initial JMRR report of 1995 and subsequent NSA working groups, identifying language weaknesses in the intelligence community, were championed in the Pentagon by Glenn H. Nordin. After Carolyn Crooks left in October 1998, Nordin became assistant director for language and training and chair of the RRCP, which reported to the ASD/C3I, Arthur L. Money. Nordin, an NSA employee, had been the executive officer of the Foreign Language Committee for the director of central intelligence in 1996 and 1997.

When Nordin arrived at C3I, he found the DFLP in need of help; in fact, the Policy Committee had not met since October 1997. The Army, as Executive Agent, made budget decisions and carried out practices that did not take into consideration the unique mission of DLIFLC. When military planners realized that the Institute would remain on the Presidio after Fort Ord closed, they shifted the burden of cleaning the Superfund site and the distribution of land on the former Fort Ord to the DLIFLC commandant and Presidio of Monterey garrison commander. These decisions created a fiscal hardship for the institute that led to conflict between the Army, as Executive Agent, and the other three services. The language managers for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps felt that the Army was not paying attention to their needs as resources and the time of senior DLIFLC leaders were increasingly devoted to the BRAC process of Fort Ord.

The problems that faced the DFLP were not all related to the Army’s role as Executive Agent, however. Continuity and the lack of decision-makers on the DFLP Policy Committee was also a major problem. In fact, the other services downgraded their representation on the General Officer Steering Committee and later, on the DFLP Policy Committee to the action officer level.

Nordin set out to learn all facets of his new position and to reenergize the committee. In a series of far reaching meetings beginning on 4 May 1999 and continuing through 2000, the DFLP Policy Committee, guided by Nordin, discussed issues that would eventually transform the DFLP and formed the foundation of a new DFLP Directive and the creation of a new Defense Language Office.

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32 The authors are indebted to the input of Glenn Nordin and Hugh McFarlane for this section.
33 Hugh McFarlane, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 26 July 2006.
34 The DFLP Policy Committee was not active and only met twice in 1997 and before that only once in 1994 when it replaced the General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). The GOSC had held regular meetings, often at the DLIFLC Annual Program Review in Monterey until it dissolved in 1993.
36 E-mail to Stephen Payne, 15 November 2006.
37 The JMRR report was apparently the lynchpin of Nordin’s efforts.
Although the 4 May 1999 meeting was not a decision meeting, Nordin made three proposals designed to strengthen and expand DoD foreign language and areas studies capabilities. The first proposal was the creation of a Defense Academy of Language and Area Studies that would look at the entire spectrum of language and cultural education, including basic and advanced education for career development as well as just-in-time foreign language training and technical support that would shorten the training pipeline while providing career enhancement opportunities. The concept would also promote the “virtual school house” for language training by expanding LingNet, the DLIFLC online language network. The second proposal was the creation of a Defense Language Specialist Corps, modeled on the success of the AT&T Language Line that would provide real-time, on-call, on-line foreign language support to deployed troops anywhere in the world. Nordin’s third proposal was for the development of a system to track and manage linguists and the utilization of linguists throughout the services, including the reserves and National Guard. Finally, Nordin called for the expansion and strengthening of the DFLP by adding members from the Joint Staff and TRADOC. He felt that the only way to ensure language as a readiness factor was for the DFLP Policy Committee to explain the significance of foreign language expertise in future Defense Planning Guidance statements.38

The Policy Committee members learned that the requirements process of the RRCP was limited to the needs of the intelligence community and the Special Forces (including Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations). For several years, the DFLP had not addressed the needs of other DoD language stakeholders, such as the Combatant Commands, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, or the Defense Prisoner Of War/Missing Personnel Office. This was not surprising, as mid-level officers and civilians, as well as noncommissioned officers, had managed the DFLP during this time and although they had done a good job of managing seat allocation for the services, they were not decision-makers and could not address the larger issues facing the DFLP. Furthermore, the Structured Manning Decision Review process, which ran on a three-year validation cycle, was not well adapted to address the rapidly changing requirements of the post-Cold War world.

During the ensuing discussion, members wondered if the DFLP was involved in linking linguist requirements to strategic planning, as linguist requirements were not included in operations plans or in contingency plans. They suggested that a model would “minimize the tendency to overestimate real needs” and that relying on the reserve components, together with the development of a skills database of language assets and an outsourcing plan would be the key elements to such a model. Of note was the report that the US Signals Intelligence Directive called for Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR)

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38 Minutes of the Defense Foreign Language Program Policy Committee meeting, 4 May 1999, in “Defense Foreign Language Policy Committee Minutes” folder, Glenn Nordin files, DLIFLC&POM Archives. During this meeting, Colonel Daniel D. Devlin, the DLIFLC commandant, discussed his concerns for requirements, manpower, and facilities. Devlin stated that the Institute was operating at three-quarters capacity due to funding, “earmarked for DFLP training” being diverted due to the cost of embedded base operations (BASOPS). Susan Schoeppler, the TRADOC representative, stated that between $2 million to $8 million went to BASOPS. Brigadier General James J. Lovelace, Jr., Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, stated that every TRADOC program was taxed, because Congress did not allocate all programmed monies.
skill levels of 3 in listening and 3 in reading but that only a small percentage of crypto-
linguists met that standard. The NSA representative affirmed the need for linguists with
proficiency levels of L3/R3 but was concerned over the lack of funding for intermediate
and advanced foreign language programs at DLIFLC.

In addition to issues concerning proficiency of graduates, Policy Committee
members learned that the BRAC activities of 1993 and 1995 had effectively frozen all
thought of improving the facilities on the Presidio of Monterey leaving the DLIFLC
without enough classroom or barracks space as Army leaders did not want to spend their
limited construction funding on a post that might close. This would haunt the Institute
for a long time as the planning process for new buildings takes many years. Even when
TRADOC, acting as the Army’s Executive Agent, validated DLIFLC projects, it
consistently placed the Institute’s construction needs below other TRADOC schools that
trained Army personnel in combat skills. Nordin also informed the reconvened Policy
Committee that they would soon need to address chronic funding shortfalls at the institute
that inhibited efforts to update curricula and language proficiency testing. The Policy
Committee adjourned after agreeing to meet bimonthly.39

Nordin was successful in keeping the group together working on common issues
and on 15 July 1999, the Policy Committee met again. The July meeting, like the May
meeting, was informational. The agenda included a wide-ranging set of presentations and
discussions including a briefing on linguist shortfalls, as well as overviews of the Air
Force and Navy Foreign Area Officer programs and an update on the actions of the
RRCP. The committee members learned that the Combatant Commanders, four-star
officers in charge of major unified combat commands, had been surveyed for their views
concerning the use of linguists in their theaters. They had four consistent concerns:

1) The DFLP requirements process did not identify the needs of the Combatant
Commanders for linguists by grade, language or proficiency level and did not
include non-intelligence related linguist needs;
2) The Combatant Commanders had no way of estimating linguist requirements
to support various contingency operations that might be found in a particular
theater of operations;
3) There was no tracking system to identify existing foreign language assets
within the military (active or reserve officers and enlisted or civilians working
for the DoD); finally,
4) There was no joint oversight or process to allocate resources or requirements
among the four services.

Six years earlier, in 1993, the DoD Inspector General had validated many
concerns of the Combatant Commanders in a report on the DFLP. Similar conclusions
were reached in a 1995 study by the Center for Naval Analysis on multi-service translator
linguists. Part of the problem in identifying linguists for contingency requirements was
the lack of knowledge as to where or when the next contingency would occur. One
major problem for the services, in terms of “force management issues,” was how to
include low-density languages in linguist planning agendas.

39 Minutes of the DFLP Policy Committee meeting, 4 May 1999; and Glenn Nordin, “Defense Foreign
Language Program,” 4 May 1999, briefing.
The Policy Committee understood that linguist management needed to go beyond the traditional reliance on intelligence community linguists during contingency operations and the committee members discussed the utilization of contractors and host nation support during contingency operations. They noted that there were three significant obstacles in the use of non-military linguists: counterintelligence, reliability of translation-interpretation services, and funding. The committee also discussed the issue of skill atrophy by linguists who used only one language skill (e.g., listening) on the job and the potential tools that could assist linguists to maintain a complete set of skills.\footnote{Minutes of the DFLP Policy Committee meeting, 15 July 1999, in “Defense Foreign Language Policy Committee Minutes” folder, Glenn Nordin files, DLIFLC&POM Archives; See also Captain Tom Crowley, USN, “Joint Readiness,” briefing presented to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on 6 May 1999 and to the DLFP Policy Committee on 15 July 1999.}

**Department of Defense Strategy 2000**

From the DFLP Policy Committee briefings and ensuing discussions, Glenn Nordin argued that DoD directives, memoranda, and instructions governing the Defense Foreign Language Program needed to be updated. He developed a memorandum, dated 16 November 1999, signed by Arthur Money, the ASD/C3I, that tasked his deputy and the DFLP Policy Committee to develop a strategy, together with supporting policy and instructions for the DFLP, that would reflect the “operational requirements, force management and resource oversight processes and procedures that are needed to build and maintain a ready, qualified, and cost-effective language support capability.” To enable a better understanding of the state of language capability and establish a baseline for action to correct deficiencies, Money also requested that the addressees\footnote{Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy); ASD (Reserve Affairs), ASD (Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict); Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Director, National Security Agency; director, Joint Staff; Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve affairs); and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment). Copies were furnished to several other DoD and service agencies including the commanding general, TRADOC, and the commandant, DLIFLC.} conduct six specific actions:

1. Identify a single point of contact for all language matters by 30 November 1999;
2. Appoint an action officer to help develop the strategy, policies, and instructions for the DFLP;
3. Define their respective organizational responsibilities with regard to the DFLP under existing DoD Directives and Instructions;
4. Review and provide comments on each goal and action listed in an attached strategy outline by 15 December 1999;
5. Identify resources programmed and managed, by program element, in foreign language training and education, and services for translation, interpretation, and monitoring by 7 January 2000; and finally,
6. Identify the aggregate number of linguists and language-capable employees within their organizations.
Money identified Nordin as his point of contact for the various tasks and required actions.  

Nordin also moved to improve the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). For a meeting of the DFLP Policy Committee, set for 17 May 2000, Nordin expressed concern about delay in updating the DLPT and the fact that the Army, as Executive Agent, did not provide specific funding for such updates. He provided the Policy Committee with four courses of action:

1) Task the Army, as Executive Agent, the Army Personnel Command, as the provider of testing services, and DLIFLC, as the developer of the DLPT, to develop a five-year plan together with the resources needed to update and expand the DLPT and modernize the test delivery system to accommodate all users and potential users, including non-DoD civilians, starting in FY01;
2) Task, as above, but limit the use of the DLPT to military personnel of the four services;
3) Task the Army to provide resources to allow DoD civilians, as well as the Coast Guard and Public Health Service uniformed and civilian employees to use the existing DLPT tests; or
4) Continue with the status quo. Nordin also identified the funding levels needed to modernize the DLPT and requested OSD funding for a contract “to help us make it happen.”

At its 17 May 2000 meeting, the Policy Committee discussed several issues and goals. The committee approved, in principle, the 2000–2010 Strategic Plan while recommending resources be provided to validate DoD’s foreign language support requirements, to manage policy and funding for defense (military and civilian) foreign language education, testing, and other language services, and to acquire stakeholder and public foreign language awareness and program “buy-in.” In addition, the committee reviewed and provided guidance on several other issues. It tasked the Army, as Executive Agent, together with DLIFLC, to develop a five-year plan with resource requirements to update the DLPT and modernize the test system beginning in fiscal year 2002. Finally, the committee approved, again in principle, to allow DoD civilians to take the DLPT.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviewed the DFLP Strategic Plan, as approved by the Policy Committee. JROC was supportive of the “DFLP Policy

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43 Nordin, Memorandum entitled “Issue Papers for DFLP PC Consideration,” for the DLFP Requirements and Resources Coordinating Panel, 27 April 2000, in “DFLP Requirements and Resources Coordinating Panel” folder, Nordin files, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
45 The JROC is comprised of the vice chiefs of staffs of the four services and is chaired by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provides advice on acquisition matters that apply to the four
Committee efforts to establish a comprehensive defense-wide language strategy.” However, the council did not approve the DFLP Strategic Plan. The overall DFLP still needed a better-coordinated DoD-wide program that could control the various foreign language interests within the services and develop a comprehensive program for foreign languages and foreign area education.46

**Department of Defense Inspector General Report—2000**

The renewed interest and involvement of the DFLP Policy Committee could not have occurred at a better time. In 2000, the Office of Intelligence Review, under the DoD Inspector General (IG), decided to review the actions, if any, that had occurred within the Defense Foreign Language Program as a result of the DoD IG report of 1993.47 Research on the DFLP was conducted from April to August 2000. The 2000 report recognized the significant efforts that were then underway to reform the DFLP and the IG researchers decided not to issue a formal evaluation. However, they did issue a strong recommendation for the revision of DoD Directive 5160.41 concerning the Defense Foreign Language Program, as there was a “continuing lack of guidance” hampering the implementation of the remaining twenty-one recommendations from 1993.48

In 2000, the IG researchers identified three key issues of concern to all the DoD and intelligence community foreign language managers interviewed:

1) Foreign language requirements and shortfalls were determined by a dated billet [Cold War] structure that could not address fluctuating, real-world contingency needs;
2) There existed an “ad hoc” approach to address issues pertaining to the DFLP; and
3) Minimal manning and guidance by functional managers did not meet the requirements of Directive 5160.41.

Evidence for the last point was deduced by the elimination of the language policy position within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, as well as from the fact that there was only one DFLP Action Officer, Glenn Nordin, within the office of ASD/C3I and he was on loan from NSA.49

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49 Ibid., p. 5.
The JMRR report of 1995, the reports of the NSA working groups, and the DoD Inspector General Report of 2000, as well as Nordin’s efforts to revive the DFLP Policy Committee would lead to several improvements in the DFLP that occurred in the first years of the new century. These improvements would include web-delivered sustainment tools; recognition of the need for higher proficiency and funding for the Proficiency Enhancement Program; new assessment tools, such as Diagnostic Assessment; a new DLPT—the DLPT 5—and new delivery methods for the DLPT; the creation of the DoD Language Office, and a new DoD Directive covering the Defense Language Program.  

Executive Agency

Since the establishment of the 4th Army Intelligence Language School on 1 November 1941, the Army has taken a central role in foreign language education. As the largest of the services, the Army maintained a robust language program, so much so that when the Department of Defense consolidated all service language programs in 1963, the schoolhouse at the Presidio of Monterey was the logical fit. As described in the 1994-1995 Command History, after much consideration the Department of the Army remained the Executive Agent for managing the DFLP. Concurrently, the Army deputy chief of staff for operations remained responsible as Executive Agent and manager for DLIFLC through TRADOC at Fort Monroe, Virginia. In other words, while the Army remained responsible for both the DFLP and DLIFLC, the chain of command for the program and the school were different, a fact that would continue to complicate management.

Army Language Program and Evolution of the Army Language Master Plan

The Army deputy chief of staff for intelligence (DCSINT) was the program manager for Army-specific foreign language issues and chaired the Army Language Committee, which among things, oversaw language slots for the Army. In June 1997, Major General Claudia Kennedy, who was then the Army’s Deputy DCSINT but by November 1997 had become a Lieutenant General and the DCSINT, emerged as an important proponent for the Army Language Program. She sought to expand the power of the Army Language Office and, in fact, renamed it the Army Foreign Language Proponency Office (AFLPO) in early 1998. Unfortunately, this new emphasis clashed with DoD responsibility and interpretations of responsibility on matters relating primarily to the RRCP, the DFLP, and the schoolhouse at the Presidio of Monterey. The overlap and conflicting interests of the DFLP and AFLPO were almost inevitable, because the Army, despite being executive agent for the DFLP, did not have a coherent program to balance its own competing interests with those of the larger service requirements facing DLIFLC.

50 The DoD Directive 5160.41E and earlier directives cover the English Language Center in addition to the Foreign Language Center.
52 See, for example, comments of LTG Kennedy recorded in “Executive Summary: Army Language Committee GOSC ‘Language Laydown’,” attached to John Lett, e-mail to COL Eugene Beauvais, et al., 12 November 1997, in “Army Language Master Plan 1996-1999” folder, box 53, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
The AFLPO sought to centralize control and give guidance, and it did provide a centralized office to coordinate efforts to find linguists for unexpected contingency operations, such as in Bosnia, as had been done previously during the Somalia and Haiti contingencies. However, the expansion of responsibility for this office also created a new interest group involved in the decision-making process for language issues within the Army, affecting the DFLP and other agencies with language-related issues, but which were separated geographically three thousand miles from the “schoolhouse.” The temptations were consistently high to find more cost-effective ways to train linguists, whose occupational skills were unlike any others taught in the military but which required tremendous time and human investment to teach and learn in a nation where second language acquisition was not emphasized.

A further dilemma for the Army Language Program was the readiness reporting requirements of field commanders. Updated regulations had added language readiness to the list of items that commanders had to identify on their unit readiness reports. This requirement elevated language readiness as a priority, yet simultaneously added pressure on commanders to maintain languages in their units that did not reflect operational needs. Further, soldiers were required to maintain proficiency in a set language, while tasked with other assignments. For example, during the initial stages of Task Force Eagle, the US-led component of the NATO stabilization force sent to Bosnia in 1995, the Army placed Russian linguists in the “Turbo-Serbo” course at DLIFLC and “re-languaged” them as Serbian/Croatian speakers. This short cut had some success, but upon return to their original units, the soldiers were tested in Russian to qualify for foreign language proficiency pay and their commanders’ readiness reporting.

Kennedy responded to these concerns by directing AFLPO to develop an overarching guidance instrument—the Army Language Master Plan (ALMP), which was written and completed in 1999 by Dr. Ron Carter, an AFLPO contractor. Carter’s emphasis was on recruiting “heritage speakers” to increase the proficient linguists in the field at substantial cost-savings and slow a perceived low retention rate among serving linguists and a high attrition rate among students during training. The focus of the ALMP was “on accessing linguists who are already skilled in the languages required” mainly through recruitment efforts and by screening the records of current soldiers to find those with suitable skills.

By mid-2000, however, this plan had met significant resistance, not only from DLIFLC, but from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence. Heritage speakers often did not know their native

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56 James C. McNaughton, e-mail to Clif Porter, 29 July 2000 (including e-mail incorporated from Daniel Devlin and Glenn Nordin), in “Army Language Master Plan 1996-1999” folder, box 53, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
language at the level of sophistication needed in the field or did not have the English skills to translate critical intelligence accurately. Consequently, if heritage speakers “avoided DLI,” they then went to the field without training in the cultural and social intricacies of their languages and thus lacked critical skill for Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and translator or diplomatic roles.

An additional impact from AFLPO’s emphasis on recruiting heritage speakers was the impression transmitted to recruiters that the Army wanted them to focus linguist recruitment on heritage speakers rather than merely supplementing normal linguist recruiting. Moreover, Christopher K. Mellon, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence, disputed the need for heritage speakers and questioned the reliability of non-US citizens as linguists in sensitive areas. He included this concern in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services on 14 September 2000.\footnote{See US Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, “The State of Foreign Language Capabilities in National Security and the Federal Government,” 106th Cong., 2nd sess. (September 14 and 19, 2000): S. Hrg. 106-801.} Thus, there existed several legal and regulatory obstacles to initiating such a policy. Furthermore, a US Army sergeant of Egyptian heritage had partly aided recent bombings of US embassies in Africa, an example that seemed to indicate the potential consequences of recruiting soldiers from regions of the world with ambivalent or hostile feelings toward the United States.\footnote{The issue of using heritage speakers would resurface in 2004 with the establishment of the Army 09 Lima program to be discussed in a forthcoming DLIFLC Command History.}

A further critique of the ALMP came from the chair of the RRCP, Glenn Nordin, who pointed out that the study failed to include the language requirements in the Army’s non-intelligence areas, especially logistics. This was an area of mad scrambling during Task Force Eagle when logistic contracting desperately needed linguists of any kind to translate contract negotiations in Hungary and Slovenia, as well as in Bosnia. In 2000, Nordin also briefed the vice chief of staff of the Army (VCSA) on the high attrition rate of linguists, another problem not clearly understood or studied within the ALMP. That same year, the Army Research Institute began a study of both attrition and retention of linguists.\footnote{“MI Linguist Readiness Briefing,” Memorandum for Record, 12 May 2000, and attached “Get Well Plan,” p. 6, in “Total Army Language Plan Brief to VCSA” folder, box 28, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

The AFLPO had developed the Army Language Master Plan using cost-saving assumptions that did not reflect the reality of foreign language acquisition. The ALMP caused misunderstandings, because it was neither synchronized with the policy guidance of the DFLP, nor completed with DLIFLC input. Subsequently, a Government Accounting Office report on US government foreign language programs included several of the ALMP’s erroneous assumptions, which again did not reflect DFLP or DLIFLC policies or capabilities.\footnote{US General Accounting Office, Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, report prepared for Congressional Requesters, January 2002, GAO-02-375.} Some of the faults in the ALMP were clear enough that it referred to itself as a “living plan” rather than a regulation.\footnote{Army Foreign Language Proponency Office, Army Language Master Plan, p. 2.}
The overall direction of the VCSA brief in 2000 and the ALMP was to identify several key areas for improvement, at least within the Army. The VCSA wanted the Army to better determine what its actual language requirements were, where and what were proficiency shortfalls within the force, and what changes were needed to improve linguist career management and retention.\(^{62}\) Furthermore, the Army needed to make essential software changes to its linguist database to better document proficiency levels and “unmask” the force-wide disposition of its linguists. It needed to determine whether they were in positions requiring language proficiency and whether they were heritage speakers of their target languages or had acquired the skill through formal education. For example, recruiters neither identified heritage speakers nor consistently tested enlistees for language capabilities. Finally, the desire to make the reserve component a resource for low-density languages was far below expectations because of low recruiting priorities and incentives.\(^{63}\)

Recruiting and Retaining Linguists

Recruiting enlistees with suitable Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) scores to attend DLIFLC and follow-on training in the military occupation skills for linguists was difficult in the late 1990s. Potential recruits were not joining the military but attending college or going directly into high paying jobs in the workforce, if they had marketable skills, such as computer programming. To attract recruits to serve for five years in a linguist billet, the military offered enlistees a $10,000 recruitment bonus, the opportunity for foreign language proficiency pay, and up to $50,000 in tuition benefits at the end of their enlistment.\(^{64}\)

Even with incentives to attract good candidates for foreign language positions, the time to train linguists and get them to journeyman level took up to a decade. Retention of proficient linguists remained the most cost-effective means of keeping the linguist force manned. The services managed their own retention and recruitment programs, with the common incentive being extra proficiency pay (as discussed below in this chapter) and enlistment or re-enlistment bonuses for qualified linguists. By the end of 2000, such bonuses were reaching record levels. In the meantime, DLIFLC continued its efforts to sustain and support linguist skills through distance education programs in the form of video teletraining (VTT), Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Language Training Detachments (LTDs), and Command Language Programs (CLPs) under the overall direction of the dean of the School of Continuing Education (SCE), which was newly organized at DLIFLC in late 2000 (See Chapter 5). Efforts to find savings in distance education programs, however, proved elusive because what technology was available was


\(^{63}\) Kevin McGrath, Chief, ALPO, e-mail to [distribution list] entitled “VCSA Linguist Readiness Briefing Summary,” 12 May 2000; “MI Linguist Readiness Briefing to VCSA,” 10 May 2000, briefing slides; both in “Total Army Language Plan (TALP) Brief to VCSA” folder, box 29, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives; and Department of the Army, Army Language Master Plan.

expensive and did not result in saving training time, as most language learning remained instructor-driven. Several structural problems also made it difficult to retain qualified linguists, including the fact that promotion and career advancement for enlisted linguists required them to move into supervisory positions after a few short years, which limited the return on the military’s investment in their initial language training. Additional reasons for linguist non-retention included the fact that many had obtained sufficient funds by the end of their first terms to finance a higher education, some were wary of being sent to geographically unattractive assignments (such as unaccompanied tours to Korea), and others simply found good jobs in the tight labor-market of the late 1990s.65

Another idea actively promoted during this period, and conjoined with the Army Language Master Plan effort, was to push more languages into the reserve components. By decreasing the core languages needed on active duty, the need to train personnel in so many different languages would also decline. The effort to recruit people already possessing language skills continued to appear to offer tremendous cost-savings whether as heritage speakers in low-density languages or as personnel leaving active duty who could be retained in the reserves. Some efforts showed success by 2000 where the reserve components managed to fill 45-50 percent of their language positions, which was a significant improvement from 18 percent in 1996.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the specific initiatives and policies set forth by the DFLP Policy Committee during 2000 addressed virtually every structural aspect of the DoD language program beginning with language education, testing, sustainment, operational tempo, and operational employment of linguists, as well as the career progression of linguists. Although a decision had not been made by the end of 2000, the Policy Committee was looking at five different alternatives to create a committee or organization to plan, manage, and oversee the overall DFLP, either under the Policy Committee or delegated under the ASD/C3I. The first priority was to determine what were the military’s short and long-term language requirements, how were these determined, regulated, and met. Any long-term strategy needed to respond dynamically to world events, yet be stable enough to prevent institutional chaos each time a language was dropped or added to the regimen of DLIFLC. Consequently, the Policy Committee required two to seven years to plan and program language needs. Changes would nonetheless occur. For example, by 2000, the DLIFLC leadership had transferred low-density Czech and Polish language courses to the DLI-Washington office for contract instruction while Tagalog (Filipino) was being similarly considered.

The quality of DLIFLC graduates remained a constant issue in this period. The VCSA brief and the ALMP both raised the issue while complaints from the cryptologic school at Goodfellow Air Force Base, to which many DLIFLC graduates reported following their initial language training, remained constant.66 An increase in DLIFLC graduation standards from level 2 in listening, 2 in reading, and 1+ in speaking (typically noted as L2/R2/S1+) on the ILR scale for 80 percent of graduates to L2/R2/S2 for all graduates was specifically suggested by AFLPO before the Policy Committee in early

65 “Pentagon Strategy Aims to Improve...,” Inside the Pentagon, p. 1.
Critics felt that leaving the basic graduation standard at L2/R2/S1+ meant setting the graduation goal too far below the 3 in listening and 3 in reading needed operationally by the NSA and military field commanders. Thus, AFLPO supported an increase in the DLIFLC graduation requirement because it hoped to eliminate sub-standard linguists reaching the field. During the Policy Committee meeting of 17 May 2000, NSA opposed the higher standard because it would drastically reduce the linguists available: either they would take longer to train or be washed-out of language education programs entirely and be a loss to the force. NSA language experts recognized that a DLIFLC basic language course graduate with L2/R2/S1+ proficiencies was not fully professional, but they argued that higher proficiency could be acquired through experience and additional education. Therefore, the NSA opposed increasing speaking to 1+ or to 2 because of the time and cost issue along with the fact that NSA cryptologic jobs rarely utilized speaking skills. In addition, Dr. Ray Clifford, the DLIFLC chancellor, maintained that, for the average student, a goal of L2/R2/S2 was unrealistic as speaking was a productive skill and was much harder to master than the receptive skills of listening and speaking. He believed that speaking should be a plus level lower than listening and reading. Because AFLPO had yet to complete an analysis of the consequences of such a change in policy, no change was feasible by the end of 2000.

Waivers for Follow-On Training

As touched upon above, DLIFLC basic course graduates must complete follow-on training in the skills needed for work in the field. Most graduates reported to Goodfellow Air Force Base to become SIGINT linguists (“listeners”) or Fort Huachuca to become HUMINT linguists (“speakers”). To meet the minimum entrance requirements for the SIGINT school, DLIFLC graduates had to meet DLPT proficiency scores of L2/R2/S1; speaking was not considered a critical skill for radio intercept work. For the type of interrogation work taught at Fort Huachuca, however, the speaking level of DLIFLC graduates had to meet DLPT proficiency scores of L2/R2/S2. Managers at Fort Huachuca complained that DLIFLC was not meeting its own stated goal of 80 percent L2/R2/S2 and suggested making an across-the-board proficiency of Level 2 the DLIFLC graduation requirement. This proposal, however, met resistance.

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68 Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, “DFLP Policy Committee Meeting Minutes and Tasking,” 25 July 2000; and Issue Paper, “Raising DLIFLC Proficiency Goals,” 9 August 2000; both in “DFLP Policy Committee” folder, Box 28, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives; Minutes of the DFLP Policy Committee, 17 May 2000. NSA would change direction in the new century and become an adamant supporter of higher graduation standards provided they were linked to a larger plan to increase proficiency.

69 In an e-mail to SFC Cassandra Woel, USA, Dr. Gregory Krieger of Fort Huachuca wrote, “We (Fort Huachuca) wanted to do away with the waiver policy by year 1999; however, none of the other services would agree to place this wording in the memorandum. We wanted the 2/2 standard to be the graduation criteria [sic]. This would require DLI to remediate students who fail to meet this standard. Our efforts were met with resistance and we are where we are because of a failure to bite the bullet. We either have a 2/2
While Fort Huachuca officials thought DLIFLC ought to raise its graduation standards, the Institute, for various reasons, also allowed waivers for many students who failed to meet the school’s own minimum graduation requirements. This practice generated controversy. Even though Air Force officials were less concerned about the foreign language speaking proficiency of their students at Goodfellow Training Center, they wanted to abolish the granting of waivers by 1999, but were unable to secure the cooperation of the other services. Chief Warrant Officer 5 S. W. Price noted that the Air Force was the Executive Agent for cryptologic linguist training and as such set the requirements to attend such training at the Goodfellow Training Center. The policy was L2/R2, but enforcing it would have caused serious linguist shortfalls because so many DLIFLC graduates of Korean and other Category IV languages scored below L2/R2. Thus, lacking clear guidance from the Air Force Executive Agent, each service at DLIFLC developed its own procedures over the years. In the case of the Army 229th Military Intelligence Battalion, a senior enlisted board reviewed the waiver of Army students judging the merits of each on a series of criteria including their grades, Final Learning Objective tests results, and various motivation factors. The Goodfellow battalion commander agreed to accept the waived DLIFLC graduates, declaring, “the EA has accepted, either explicitly or implicitly, the decision of the services at the DLIFLC to waive [sic] certain individuals at sub 2/2. The 229th’s procedures, lacking formal guidance, are, I believe, sound; given our low washout rate, they seem also to be effective.”

DLIFLC leadership justified the granting of waivers by pointing out that the quality of the Institute’s incoming students was not under its own control but under that of the services. Recruits entering the military took the ASVAB, over which DLIFLC had no control. ASVAB results determined which recruits would take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB), the test that selected those with higher language aptitudes. Although the DLAB was the “gatekeeper” test, the services sometimes granted lower-scoring students waivers to attend DLIFLC. Moreover, the two tests were instituted when the DLIFLC goal was only L1+/R1+/S1+, so even without the granting of waivers, the system was letting in some students who could not be expected to reach the Level 2 goal. In addition, DLIFLC was understaffed. Only one-third of all teams were at full strength (six teachers). The other two-thirds had to make do with five teachers. The admission of students with lower-than-optimal language aptitude combined with the understaffing of the Institute equated to a L2/R2/S2 rate of between 30 and 50 percent—far too low to fill the seats at the follow-on schools without the granting of waivers. Finally, while speaking proficiency was tested by two specially trained testers in an extended conversation with the candidate, reading and listening scores were “converted”

standard or not. It appears we have a goal, not a standard.” Dr. Gregory Krieger, e-mail to SFC Cassandra Woel entitled “98G Waivers for GAFB,” 9 September 1997.

70 Lieutenant Colonel Merilee Wilson, e-mail to Colonel Eugene Beauvais, et al., entitled “98G Waivers,” 10 September 1997. This message includes traffic between SFC Cassandra Woel, Gregory Krieger, and CW5 S. W. Price. Krieger complains to Woel, “We either have a 2/2 standard or not. It appears we have a goal, not a standard.” Price explains how the policy and the actual process differ.

71 Teachers were often pulled from teaching teams to perform collateral duties, including course development, nonresident instruction, proficiency testing, and advancement boards. In a small team, the absence of any teacher weighed heavily on the team’s ability to teach effectively. In fact, average Instructor Contact Hours fell from 38.3 to 34.9 per section per week over the course of fiscal year 1997.
from scores on an array of multiple-choice questions. The conversion process entailed a certain degree of statistical uncertainty: while a score of 40 converted to a proficiency of 2 in reading or listening, experience showed that most graduates who attained a score of 38 or 39 (technically strong 1+ scores) could safely be granted a waiver to attend follow-on training. In fact, most such students brought their proficiency to a solid 2 and performed admirably, both in follow-on training and in their work in the field—a fact administrators at DLIFLC hammered home at every opportunity.\(^\text{72}\)

**Foreign Language Proficiency Pay**

Achieving and sustaining a high level of proficiency required constant work on the part of a military linguist already burdened with normal military duties. An incentive was Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP), a program that DoD used to encourage linguists to maintain their proficiency by paying them an extra $50 per month. However, the services managed FLPP quite differently, usually dependent on budget, test scores, and testing availability. The US Navy, for example, did not offer FLPP to Spanish speakers, because there were so many native speakers in the fleet that FLPP funds would evaporate quickly. The US Army, however, was paying FLPP for all languages designated as a critical language by DoD. The short-come for the Army was DLPT administration—if a testing site was not readily available for soldiers to allow them to demonstrate their proficiency, incentive pay was pointless.\(^\text{73}\)

Until 1 January 1997, the Air Force only paid out FLPP for airmen who maintained DLPT proficiency scores of L2/R2 in Arabic, Chinese, Korean, and Russian, that is, the languages on the “Critical Language List.” Afterwards, the Air Force followed a more liberal FLPP policy, expanded the list of qualifying FLPP languages to encompass all those specified in AFI 36-2605, and opened FLPP to speakers of Spanish and Tagalog as long as they were in a “Language-Designated Position,” a “Language-Inherent Career Field,” or held some other special qualifier for pay. As long as airmen maintained the L2/R2 standard, they were eligible for FLPP. The Air Force even granted retroactive FLPP in some cases.\(^\text{74}\)

Around this time, the Marine Corps also announced a change to its FLPP policy. Previously, Marine linguists only had to obtain a L1+/R1+ on the DLPT to qualify for FLPP, although FLPP was only available for linguists in Category III and Category IV languages. However, effective 1 October 1996, no Marine maintaining less than L2/R2 could begin drawing FLPP, while, no later than 19 May 1997, Marines receiving FLPP under the standards of the old policy would lose FLPP unless they met the new L2/R2 standard. The Marine Corps intended this change to bring its FLPP policy into line with that of the other services who granted it only for minimum DLPT scores of L2/R2.\(^\text{75}\) The Marine Corps announced another important change in December 1997, the creation of an

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\(^{72}\) Stephen Payne, Accreditation Liaison Officer, interviewed by Steve Solomon, 6 July 1999.

\(^{73}\) RRCP minutes, September 2000.


\(^{75}\) Ibid.
additional Military Occupational Specialty (MOS 8611/Interpreter) that would allow eligible Marines to earn up to $100 per month in FLPP.\textsuperscript{76}

Finally, in 1999 Congress increased the FLPP limit to a maximum of $300 per month. To receive the maximum FLPP incentive, however, a linguist needed to maintain level 2 in two languages on the DoD list of critical languages.\textsuperscript{77}

**Center for the Advancement of Language Learning**

Throughout 1996 and 1997, the Center for the Advancement of Language Learning (CALL) continued to coordinate the efforts of US federal agencies in the teaching and testing of foreign languages. CALL maintained a Resource Center and online databases, made Internet accounts available to federal linguists, worked to establish a presence on the Open Source Information System and the World Wide Web, supported the development of courses and supplemental materials (both traditional and computer-assisted), and sponsored conferences for members of the federal language teaching community. CALL’s primary emphasis was on the less commonly taught languages, for which commercial teaching materials were scarce or non-existent.

To make materials available for the teaching of less-commonly taught languages, CALL hosted or supported a “language materials fair” for each of the “key languages” identified by the DLIFLC: Persian-Farsi, Serbian/Croatian, Chinese, and Korean. These gatherings served as opportunities for DLIFLC and the other members of the federal language teaching community to share materials, display instructional software, and participate in roundtable discussions. The materials fairs also provided the basis for a readiness report on the community’s ability to teach each key language. In 1995, CALL hosted fairs for Persian and Serbian/Croatian. The series continued in February 1996, with a Chinese language fair.\textsuperscript{78} Another example of CALL’s commitment to supporting the less-commonly taught languages was the Foreign Language Materials Database that the CALL Executive Committee approved in September 1996. This database was to list not only federally developed materials for self-study and classroom use, but also computerized reference tools such as dictionaries and multilingual word processors and even tools to author foreign language software. CALL planned to put its database online as a reference list with an eventual upgrade to provide direct access to the materials themselves.\textsuperscript{79}

DLIFLC personnel participated in a number of other CALL activities during this period. For example, CALL funded DLIFLC course development projects carried out in the Institute’s schools with the help of curriculum staff.\textsuperscript{80} CALL also worked with

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\textsuperscript{78}Details on the DLIFLC’s role in the materials fairs can be found in Chapter III, “Resident Instruction.”

\textsuperscript{79}“Language Materials Database,” *CALLer* 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996): pp. 1, 8; See also “CALL and OSIS Update,” *CALLer* 4, no. 1 (Fall 1996): p. 9; copies in “Call (Center for the Advancement of Language Learning) 1996-1998” folder, box 25, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. CALL’s Website on OSIS, a government-run, encryption-protected Intranet, went online in September 1996, but is no longer available.

\textsuperscript{80}Information on the DLIFLC’s CALL-supported curriculum development efforts can be found in Chapter III, “Resident Instruction,” and Chapter IV, “Academic Support.”
DLIFLC’s Evaluation and Standardization Directorate through the Foreign Language Testing Board, which played a major role in the Unified Language Testing Plan, a project designed to standardize proficiency testing throughout the federal government.\(^{81}\)

In short, CALL served as a coordinator and catalyst for many of the innovations in foreign language testing and training during 1996 and 1997. Yet despite its obvious contributions, CALL nonetheless faced an austere fiscal environment. The center was twice menaced by the budget-cutter’s axe, first in the fall of 1996 and then during the period from mid-December 1997 through mid-January 1998. As a result experienced staff began to leave the organization. In both cases, CALL was granted a “stay of execution” while the intelligence community studied the merits of its continued existence. However, these reprieves were brief and CALL ceased operation on 1 October 1998.\(^ {82}\)

**Bureau for International Language Coordination**

The Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC) was a subgroup of a NATO organization called Training Group/Joint Services. It functioned as a consultative and advisory body for language training matters for NATO. BILC was responsible for disseminating information on developments in the field of language training to participating countries and convened an annual conference of participating nations to review the work done in the coordination field and in the study of particular language topics. Later, BILC assumed responsibility of the NATO Standardization Agreement for Language Proficiency Levels (STANAG 6001).\(^ {83}\)

The 1996 BILC Conference, held 3-7 June at Lackland AFB, Texas, investigated such themes as “Optimizing Teacher Selection, Training and Development” and “Designing and Conducting Language Training for Special Purposes.” Participants included DLIFLC Provost Clifford and DLIFLC Dean of the Directorate of Curriculum and Instruction Martha Herzog.\(^ {84}\) Clifford participated in Study Group 1, “Instructor Selection, Training and Development,” while Herzog facilitated Study Group 4, “Educational Technology.”\(^ {85}\)

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\(^{81}\) Information on DLIFLC’s contributions to the Unified Language Testing Plan may be found in Chapter IV, “Academic Support.”

\(^{82}\) “Did something happen to CALL?,” CALLer 4, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 1997): p. 1; and Steven R. Solomon, e-mail to Dr. Martha Herzog entitled “CALL’s Fate,” 25 June 1999; both in “Call (Center for the Advancement of Language Learning) 1996-1998” folder, box 25, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. CALL’s website migrated to Lingnet whiles some funds were shifted to DLIFLC to complete projects CALL had started, such as in English language proficiency testing for joint use and conducting research on programs associated with the unified testing program.


\(^{84}\) BILC 1996 Conference Report, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, United States of America, pp. 10-11. Other participants included: Keith Wert, Head of External Training Programs, Peggy Goitia-Garza, Chief, Curriculum Development Branch, Linda Chambers, Chief, Course Design (all of the Defense Language Institute English Language Center), Thomas Molloy, head of the English Department of the Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and Leslie Johnson, Language Program Officer, Headquarters, US Army Europe.

\(^{85}\) BILC 1996 Conference Report, pp. 141, 155.
With the start of the 1997 BILC Conference, held 1-6 June in Copenhagen, Denmark, the responsibility for the standing Secretariat of BILC passed from Germany to the United States and the members appointed Clifford to be incoming Chairman. The Secretariat served as the clearinghouse for BILC member nations. It also printed the minutes and the report of the annual conference. Clifford represented DLIFLC and was joined by Major Arne Curtis, USA, Director of DLI’s Washington Office; Keith Wert and Peggy Goitia-Garza of the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC); and Thomas Molloy and Paula Krage, both of the English Department of the Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Clifford and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Richter of NATO served as co-chairs of Study Group 3, “Intensified Co-operation within BILC,” while Clifford was a member of Study Group 4, “Amplification of STANAG 6001, Including the Role of Interpreting and Translation.” Curtis was a member of Study Group 2, which released a report entitled “Designing Crash Courses and Contingency Packages.”

BILC held its 1998 conference from 1-4 June in Hampshire, United Kingdom. Colonel Eugene Beauvais, USAF, the DLIFLC assistant commandant, led the US delegation. Clifford attended, both as BILC chairman and DLIFLC provost as did Herzog. The theme of the conference was “Co-ordination and Co-operation in the 21st Century” and Clifford’s opening address, entitled “Cooperation in BILC,” stressed the need to defend quality programs against “ill-conceived, budget-driven shortcuts.” To accomplish that mission, Clifford emphasized three factors in language learning: consistency in the use of measurement tools; truthfulness in reporting outcomes; and having a thorough understanding of the nature of second language acquisition. He also stressed the need for BILC members to share their experiences in foreign language acquisition—the failures as well as the successes. Herzog showed a twenty-minute videotape on the development and implementation of the use of technology at DLIFLC. Her presentation on “Improving Performance through Technology” demonstrated how the institute used video teletraining; computer-assisted study, such as multimedia CD-ROMs and the Internet; and the development and use of the Internet site www.Lingnet.org.

That same year BILC also held a seminar entitled “Language Training for Multinational Peace Support Operations and Testing Issues” in Vienna, Austria, from 2-6 November. Clifford again gave the Keynote Address, this time focused upon how to measure language skills, while Herzog, together with Dr. Pardee Lowe of NSA, gave a

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86 BILC 1997 Conference Report, Copenhagen, Denmark, p. 1.
87 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
88 Ibid., pp. 17, 203, 205, 211, 216.
89 The US contingency also included Colonel John Dipiero, USAF, Commandant of the DLIELC; Peggy Goitia-Garza, the BILC Secretary and Chief of the Curriculum Development Branch at DLIELC; and Tom Molloy, the Chairman of the English Department at the Marshall Center.
91 Ibid., pp. 37-39 plus video. Herzog also participated in Study Group 2 “Intensified Sharing of Resources in Testing and Assessment” and was the chair for Study Group 4, leading the discussion on “The Teacher in the 21st Century” (Ibid., pp. 259-260, 265-270); Clifford was a member of Study Group 3, contributing to the topic “Improving Performance through Technology” (Ibid., pp. 261-263).
talk on “testing.”

BILC held its 1999 conference from 30 May to 4 June in Garderen, Netherlands. The conference focused on the history and future of the organization itself. Clifford served as Head of the US delegation. DLIIFLC was also represented by Herzog while Ms. Goitia-Garza represented the DLIELC. Mr. Wert, the Director of Foreign Language Training Center Europe, and Dr. Elvira Swender, Director for Professional Development of the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, rounded out the delegation. Clifford opened the conference by referring to a recent NATO report that concluded: “the single most important problem identified...as an impediment to developing interoperability with the Alliance has been shortcomings in communications.”

He also welcomed participants from the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, nations that became members of NATO two months before the meeting on 12 March 1999. Herzog gave a history of the development of the ILR Proficiency Scale in the United States during the 1950s and the subsequent adaptation of a standard NATO language level description—the STANAG 6001 in 1976, based largely (but not exclusively) on the ILR scale. In a related session, Herzog chaired the Study Group 3 session on Testing and Assessment. Clifford and Swender as well as Goitia-Garza were members of the group. The group, which also included representatives from nine other nations, looked into the possibility of developing common criteria for language standards in test design. The group also analyzed the current STANAG 6001 level descriptions as well as the scale used by the Bundessprachenamt in Germany and the ILR scale used by the US government. The group agreed to meet at the November BILC Seminar and resolve any issues before the June 2000 BILC Conference.

Themes at the 2000 BILC Conference, held in Ottawa, Canada, included task-based approaches in language for operational purposes, instruction, and performance-based testing. Participants discussed how to apply new distance learning methods to operational language training, how technological change influences teacher and student motivation, and how to design and develop teaching and testing materials.

By August 2001, BILC accepted responsibility for the sponsorship of STANAG 6001 at the request of the NATO Standardization Agency. By June 2003, BILC disseminated a copy of a revised STANAG 6001 (Edition 2) as ratified by NATO members. STANAG 6001 allowed participating nations to adopt common language proficiency levels for use in making international staff appointments; to compare national standards through a standardized table; and to record and report, in international correspondence, common measures of language proficiency (converted, as necessary, from national standards). It set forth detailed definitions of the proficiency levels for

93 BILC 1999 Conference Report, Garderen, Netherlands, p. 17.
95 Ibid., pp. 273-274.
commonly recognized language skills relating to oral proficiency (listening and speaking) and written proficiency (reading and writing).\textsuperscript{97} STANAG 6001 (Edition 2) correlated to the US government’s ILR-type standards and reflected the input of DLIFLC.

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The need to resolve “the foreign language problem” became evident to those in key positions throughout the Department of Defense during the last five years of the 1990s. Foreign language acquisition and maintenance, as well as foreign area expertise within the DoD and the Armed Services, were seen as a serious shortcoming to military readiness. The DoD, the intelligence community, and the services published studies, reports, and memoranda all aimed at “fixing” the foreign language problem. Meanwhile, efforts to find budgetary savings were a recurring theme at the DFLP level as heritage speakers, computer-assisted translation, and distance learning became more viable as ways to increase language proficiency at minimal cost.\textsuperscript{98} However, programs to bypass, reduce, or replace DLIFLC proved to be elusive and faulty. Action on solutions had to wait, because funding to enact needed reforms was hard to justify in an era of military downsizing brought on by the end of the Cold War. Budgetary issues and the seemingly overwhelming problem of dealing with foreign language training in a nation that, as a whole, did not emphasize such education continued to frustrate those in DoD who understood the issue as a critical need. Nine months and eleven days into the new century, the hoped for “New World Order” of the 1990s crumbled. When it did, the DFLP would receive much greater priority from policy-makers, but such was the state of affairs at the end of the twentieth century.


Chapter II

Managing the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and Presidio of Monterey

The advent of the millennium marked twenty years of gradual and frequently hard-fought reform of language education at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. The reforms reached fruition in the late 1990s, as witnessed by a remarkable growth in the measurable language proficiencies of Institute graduates. The rise in proficiency levels was all the more remarkable against the backdrop of diminished funding and an increased teaching load in the more difficult Category IV languages of Arabic, Chinese Mandarin, and Korean. Adding to the challenges facing DLIFLC were the language demands of the contingency operations, especially in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, the DLIFLC leadership faced re-occurring challenges caused by the Base Realignment and Closure process of the former Fort Ord, out-sourcing proposals, and risks associated with implementation of the Army Language Master Plan.

This was also a time of major shifts in academic administration and shared governance at DLIFLC. During this period, Institute leadership implemented the Faculty Personnel System, approved a policy on academic freedom, and created an Institute-wide Academic Advisory Council, ancillary Faculty Advisory Councils in each school, as well as a Deans’ Council and a Chairs’ Council. In addition, the Institute gained support from the Army, Department of Defense, Congress, and its accrediting body for the creation of an Associates Degree in Foreign Languages.

Command Leadership

Colonel Ila Metee-McCutchon, USA, assumed command as commandant on 13 December 1995, with the retirement of Colonel Vladimir I. Sobichevsky, USA, with the understanding that she would be replaced by Colonel Daniel D. Devlin, USA, in approximately three months. McCutchon’s stated mission was to keep the Institute on its current course and concentrate her actions on garrison and BRAC functions.99 Devlin, the incoming commandant, had been working at the Joint Staff in Operations (J-3) on three different contingency actions that required he not leave until February. His background included Armor, Infantry, Military Intelligence, and psychological operations, and he had studied Russian at DLIFLC in 1979 as a Foreign Area Officer.100

On 26 February 1996, Devlin assumed command of DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey during a formal change-of-command ceremony held at the Price Fitness Center. With his appointment, the reporting chain of command for the commandant and

other personnel at DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey changed. The Training and Doctrine Center placed DLIFLC under the direct control of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, commanded by Lieutenant General Leonard Holder, USA, whereas previously the commandant of DLIFLC reported to the deputy chief of staff for training at TRADOC, Major General Joe N. Ballard, USA. Ballard wanted to put the commandant in the same rating chain as all the other TRADOC commandants to match Army policy that commanders be rated by commanders. The commanding general of TRADOC, General William W. Hartzog, USA, remained next in the chain of command, as Devlin’s senior rater. This change also meant that the commanding general, Combined Arms Center, Lieutenant General William M. Steele, USA, became the senior rater for the garrison commander instead of the deputy chief of staff for training.

The new rating scheme also applied to the battalion commander of Troop Command, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Dees, USA. Shortly thereafter, on March 21, 1996, Troop Command was redesignated the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion in a move designed to build student esprit de corps and because most Army linguists go into military intelligence upon graduation.

When Devlin assumed command, the assistant commandant was Colonel Robert E. Busch II, USAF, who had been in that role since 1994. On 31 May 1996, Busch retired and was replaced by Colonel Eugene Beauvais, USAF. Beauvais had commanded the 694th Intelligence Group, 67th Intelligence Wing, Air Intelligence Agency at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, prior to arriving in Monterey. Beauvais himself left in August 1998 to take a new assignment at the Pentagon and was replaced by Colonel Johnny Jones, USAF.

After Devlin became commandant and installation commander, Mettee-McCutcheon returned to her assignment as garrison commander until she was succeeded by Colonel David Gross, USA, in June 1996. To speed up the BRAC process at Fort Ord, Metee-McCutcheon became chief of the Directorate of Base Realignment and Closure and of the Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources for one year, until her retirement in 1997. Colonel Peter G. Dausen, USA, succeeded Gross on 8 July 1998, when Gross left to become the executive officer to the commander-in-chief, Eighth US Army, US Forces in Korea, United Nations Command, and the Combined Forces Command, Republic of South Korea. He was later promoted to brigadier general.

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102 Colonel Daniel D. Devlin, End of Tour Interview with James C. McNaughton, 18 September, Part 1, pp. 1-2, in DLIFLC&POM Archives.
Dausen had been an action officer in the commander-in-chief’s Support and Crisis Management Division, Defense Information System Agency.\textsuperscript{107}

Three other command changes during this period related to senior enlisted personnel. Command Sergeant Major Thomas J. Bugary, the first Command Sergeant Major of DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey, retired on 2 April 1997. Bugary had played an important role in coordinating multi-service commands at DLIFLC to ensure that enlisted students and permanent party members received training support, quality of life, and chain of concern priority. Bugary retired in 1996 and was succeeded by Command Sergeant Major Debra E. Smith, who arrived on 2 May 1997. Smith was the first female command sergeant major in TRADOC, the first woman in the Army to serve simultaneously as an installation and institute command sergeant major, and she was also the first female command sergeant major in Army Military Intelligence. Earlier in her career, she was the honor graduate and first female soldier to complete the Cryptologic Course for service supervisors. She served DLIFLC at a time when thirty-five percent of its students were women.\textsuperscript{108} After Smith retired on 11 May 2000, Command Sergeant Major Eugene Patton succeeded her. Patton had been the installation and garrison command sergeant major at Royal Air Force Base, Menwith Hill Station, Harrogate, United Kingdom before coming to Monterey.\textsuperscript{109}

The academic leader of DLIFLC remained Dr. Ray Clifford, the provost since 1981. He was assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Roderic Gale, USAF, the assistant provost and dean of students.

On 20 July 1998, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Hamilton, USA, became the installation executive officer replacing Lieutenant Colonel Jack Isler, who retired. Hamilton previously served as the deputy brigade commander of the 37\textsuperscript{th} Transportation Command in Kaiserslautern, Germany.\textsuperscript{110} Hamilton’s position was later re-titled “chief of staff” and the executive officer position became the Command Group aide, which was staffed by a captain.

\textbf{Mission, Goals, and Accomplishments}

Devlin became the longest serving commandant in the history of the Institute, serving from 26 February 1996 until 1 December 2000. Shortly before his arrival in Monterey, Devlin received guidance from Ballard that his primary mission was to establish better base operations arrangements for the then still relatively new garrison organization. Ballard told Devlin that his first mission was as the installation commander and his second mission would be as commandant.\textsuperscript{111} The dual mission of foreign language education and base operations began in 1994 when the Army established the Presidio of Monterey Garrison, but Colonel Vladimir Sobichevsky, who preceded Devlin as commandant, did not take the job with the understanding that his responsibilities

\textsuperscript{109} Menwith Hill Station has served (under lease to the US government) as a major NSA-administered SIGINT facility used for satellite communications interception since the 1950s.
would include closing Fort Ord and then assuming command of the Presidio as an installation. Devlin was the first commandant to begin his tenure in that dual role with the base operations mission clearly defined.

Devlin found that he was really doing five intertwined jobs, as follows:

1) Commandant of the world’s largest foreign language school;
2) Installation commander;
3) “Quasi-mayor” to a community of 13,500 military and civilian workers and their dependents;
4) Supervisor of community relations for the BRAC process that involved the nine communities surrounding the Presidio of Monterey and the former Fort Ord, the County of Monterey, and various federal and state regulatory agencies and boards; and finally,
5) General Court Martial Convening Authority responsible for administering most military justice cases originating in California and Nevada, and, occasionally, Germany.

All in all, Devlin found that he was only able to spend thirty to thirty-five percent of his time doing the job of DLIFLC commandant.112

As commandant, Devlin championed the idea that DLIFLC students were the “customers” of the faculty and staff. In addition, he put forward the notion that the faculty and staff, as well as the external DoD agencies, were also customers of the Institute. He agreed with Clifford that attrition could be reduced through student rollback, “re-languaging,” or otherwise recycling students to give them a second chance to graduate. During his tenure, attrition rates dropped, more students graduated, and overall proficiency increased. He supported Dr. Martha Herzog, the dean of Evaluation and Standardization, and her efforts to strengthen the Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) process by increasing the number of OPI test trainers and lengthening the OPI workshop to twelve days. Devlin was also a supporter of getting technology into the classroom, signing off on plans that led to computers in the classroom with the long-term goal of getting laptop computers for each student. Devlin was also a staunch supporter of the DLIFLC faculty. He placed able personnel in charge of the effort to implement a new personnel system to manage faculty and served at the Institute long enough to ensure the success of the system during its first years.113 He also worked with Garrison Commanders Metee-McCutchon, Gross, and Dausen, to allow faculty to obtain low-cost rental housing at the former Fort Ord.114

As installation commander, Devlin was involved in renovation and repair projects that led to better classrooms, new language labs, and the general upkeep of buildings dating from 1902. He was also responsible for pursuing the completion of stalled barracks projects on the upper Presidio. Notably, Devlin also oversaw the complete renovation of the Hayes Army Hospital within the Ord Military Community, which became a DoD office building housing the Defense Manpower Data Center and the Defense Finance Accounting Center Monterey Bay (upper floors) and the new DLIFLC

112 Ibid.
113 Note, although called the “Faculty Personnel System,” FPS was a Title X pay system.
Directorate of Continuing Education (first floor). In addition, Devlin worked with Congressman Sam Farr to secure funding for two new buildings: the Video Teletraining Studio (building 420) and a new general instructional facility (building 611). As a community leader Devlin “made DLIFLC the model” for cooperative agreements between military bases and local municipalities. Working with Colonels Metee-McCutchon, Gross, and Dausen, Devlin forged partnerships with the cities of Monterey and Seaside that resulted in better and more cost effective public works support for the Presidio and the Ord Military Community and world-class sports fields on the upper Presidio at the Price Fitness Center and on Soldier Field. Finally, Devlin’s BRAC efforts at Fort Ord also became a showcase for other major installations. He and his staff were able to address the concerns of nine surrounding communities while working with state and federal environmental agencies to develop an acceptable plan to clean up the former base’s Superfund sites and to remove unexploded ordinance from the live-fire training ranges at the closed base.

During Devlin’s tenure, the mission statement for the Institute remained fundamentally unchanged. Only a slight philosophical change in terminology from “training” to “educating” foreign languages occurred to the mission statement. The purpose of the change was to emphasize the profound difference between training soldiers to perform rote skills and foreign language acquisition, which is a cognitive process. Devlin also added “support” to the mission statement, to highlight important DLIFLC services to the field. The Institute had supported field units for decades, but with the advances in technology, DLIFLC leadership saw the opportunity to institutionalize innovative support to on-going military operations. Funding challenges and resistance continued by some in the army who thought the Institute should only be engaged in basic foreign language “training.” Nevertheless, forty military and civilian service program managers, who attended the annual DLIFLC program review in 2000, supported the Institute’s plans to establish a School for Continuing Education to support and sustain linguists in the field as well as plans to create language training detachments at locations where military linguists were stationed.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the academic leadership and faculty of DLIFLC worked to advance the educational capabilities in a number of imaginative ways. Unlike

115 Ibid. Note, Building 611 was later named for a former commandant, Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr., who oversaw the transition of the Army Language School to the Defense Language Institute—West Coast.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Devlin created a Strategic Planning Board in 1996 that developed a new mission statement to reflect the training goals of DLIFLC. The statement was adopted in February 1999 and approved by the Academic Advisory Board. In May 1999, General John N. Abrams, the TRADOC Commander, tasked Devlin to create a new “Command Plan” to use in supporting budget requests and to include a new mission statement. In that statement, Devlin outlined the Institute’s focus upon “education” as opposed to “training.” The AAB had not approved this version by May 2000. See “Evaluation Report—Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center,” a confidential draft report prepared for the Accrediting Commission of Community and Junior Colleges, Western Association of Schools and Colleges, March 6-9, 2000, p. 9, in “Accreditation 2000” folder, box 33, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
other education institutions, DLIFLC demonstrated measurable outcomes of graduates. As a result, the pedagogical philosophy was to focus teaching efforts on general proficiency to allow graduates to meet unforeseen needs—this notion was central to curriculum development, teaching, and evaluation at the Institute. The emphasis on general proficiency also meant that the cultural context of language education was important if students were to reach higher levels of proficiency. Language and culture were seen as intricately intertwined and the academic leadership felt that they could not separate the two. Language skills were developed in a context that included the value systems, behavioral patterns, institutions, geography, and political, economic, and social systems of the areas where the target language was spoken.120

The ultimate mission of DLIFLC remained to educate linguists for military operations. For that reason, beginning in 1995 and continuing through the decade, the Institute developed thirty-three Final Learning Objectives (FLOs) in cooperation with the National Security Agency. FLOs helped to bridge the occasional disconnection between classroom instruction and actual use of language in operational conditions by ensuring students learn language skills pertinent to their future occupational specialities. FLOs also helped to ensure that a DLIFLC education resulted in true proficiency, rather than performance of memorized tasks. FLO skills covered various linguistic tasks and were divided into three areas: Content, Ancillary, and Proficiency. The Content FLOs described cognitive information of the culture and history of the nations that speak the language. The Ancillary FLOs covered language-specific tasks such as using a Chinese dictionary or recognizing different Arabic dialects. Finally, the Proficiency FLOs covered the tasks necessary to read, listen, speak, and write in the target language across a wide variety of communication tasks and settings.121

Along with incorporating the FLOs, DLIFLC continued to test the actual proficiency capabilities of the students based on the ILR scale and worked to improve its OPI and DLPT capabilities. At the same time that the DLPT was being emphasized, there was a renewed effort to prevent classroom time from only being devoted to training for the DLPT, as graduates needed to demonstrate proficiency rather than achievement.

**Resourcing DLIFLC**

As in earlier years, the command faced many challenges in obtaining sufficient funds to support both the mission and the installation. For example, DLIFLC’s mission budget had declined by approximately $11 million over the course of fiscal years 1994-1995 due largely to post-Cold War cutbacks. Nevertheless, this decline leveled off significantly in fiscal year 1996 and actually reversed in fiscal year 1997.

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121 Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, *Self-Appraisal for Federal Educational Institutions Applying for an Evaluation by the US Dept of Education* (DLIFLC, 1999), p. 79. Note, although writing was not tested as part of the FLO test battery, writing was taught in all the language programs.
DLIFLC’s fiscal year 1996 mission budget of $43.73 million represented a drop of $1.21 million relative to the $44.94 million budget of fiscal year 1995, while its fiscal year 1997 budget of $47.67 million constituted a gain of nearly $4 million over the fiscal year 1996 total. Reductions in civilian pay had accounted for almost the entire $11 million drop in mission funding between fiscal years 1994 and 1995. However, during fiscal years 1996 and 1997, civilian pay actually increased, both as a percentage of total mission funding and in terms of real dollars, although other mission-related expenditures shrank. In fiscal year 1996, even as the total mission budget declined slightly relative to the previous fiscal year, civilian pay increased from $36.97 million (82 percent of the total mission budget) to $38.48 million (88 percent). In fiscal year 1997, civilian labor costs amounted to $42.78 million (89 percent). Meanwhile, the Army/TRADOC cut other mission funding nearly in half through the “Command Tax” or “Command Bill,” a fee imposed by higher echelons to cover their administrative expenses. Non-civilian pay funding dropped from $7.97 million in fiscal year 1995, to $5.25 million in fiscal year 1996, and finally fell to $4.89 million in fiscal year 1997. These cuts in overall funding essentially hamstrung efforts to introduce technology in the schoolhouse, update the DLPT batteries, or allow curricula development in languages that had outdated curriculum.

DLIFLC Mission Budget, FY93-97

![Diagram showing DLIFLC Mission Budgets, FY 1993-1997]


123 Some languages taught at DLIFLC had a curriculum two or three decades old. For example, the curriculum in Persian-Farsi, the main language of Iran, still had references to the US-allied regime of the former Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Radical Islamic forces hostile to the United States overthrew the Shah in 1979.
During fiscal year 1998, the Army further reduced funding for TRADOC functions including DLIFLC. The budgeted amount for mission and base operations for fiscal year 1998 represented $3 million less than the previous year. The mission funding during the next two years, 1999 through 2000, remained constant, although the student load was increasing beyond resources. Several times during the latter half of the 1990s, TRADOC tried to cut the operating budget to the degree that the Institute faced the prospect of cutting 10 percent of its teaching load, which, in turn, would cause some two to three hundred required linguist slots to go untaught and unfilled. Still, some offices within Army headquarters routinely floated ideas to shift DLIFLC funding to other projects at the expense of linguists in the force.

Given the growing numbers of students and the increased demands placed on the Institute regarding non-resident training, cutting back on faculty was not a mission-viable option. As noted, for both mission and base operation funding, civilian pay was the major contributor to the overall cost of running the installation. Civilian faculty did the vast majority of language teaching at DLIFLC and civilian pay represented the lion’s share of the mission budget, although that share was still an academic shortfall because all the schools were understaffed. Moreover, curriculum development and DLPT development came to a near standstill. In 1998, there was a $1.7 million unfunded requirement for personnel meant to address a shortfall in Curriculum Development (CD) and Evaluation and Standardization (ES).

Problems faced on the mission side were mirrored on the garrison side of the installation, whose budget also revolved around fixed expenses difficult to trim. Garrison leaders used cooperative agreements with the city of Monterey and inter-service agreements (ISAs) with the Naval Postgraduate School to help defray some costs to operate the Ord Military Community, but these agreements were minor compared to civilian pay and contracts needed to manage base operations. For example, during fiscal year 1998, the Navy ISAs represented only 8 percent of the base operation budget, while 37 percent was allocated to various contracts and 45 percent went to civilian pay accounting. DLIFLC had little leeway in what it could cut back. Some savings were found in miscellaneous expenses such as supplies and equipment, but this account represented about 4 percent of the total budget. Base operations continued to operate under shrinking budgets and staff anticipated another reduction of $5.3 million in funds in fiscal year 1999. On the bright side, by the end of 2000, Devlin, in his role as installation commander, had secured $7.1 million for a new general instructional facility, $1.4 million for the new video teletraining facility, and $4.4 million to revitalize Army family housing. Unfortunately, several other military construction projects had to remain unfunded, delaying construction of a new audio-visual center and an academic

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124 Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998, briefing slides [slide 35], in “Commander’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998” folder, box 57 [Addendum], RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
auditorium, and needed general instructional facility renovations.\textsuperscript{126} Despite lack of support from TRADOC, Devlin did what was needed to accomplish the mission at the schoolhouse and to assist graduates in maintaining and increasing their proficiency.

**Strategic Planning**

Devlin felt very strongly that DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey needed a strategic planning process that would not only meet the TRADOC requirement that all schools have a plan that could be used for funding purposes, but that met the needs of the Institute and its stated mission. In 1997, the Devlin tasked Assistant Commandant Beauvais to develop a farsighted, comprehensive strategic plan for the installation. This effort was actually a continuation of the strategic planning process begun under previous commandants Colonels Donald Fischer and Vladimir Sobichevsky. Beauvais selected a cross-section of academic and non-academic personnel from various organizations within the Institute to form a Strategic Planning Board (SPB). During the data collection phase, the SPB developed a survey to gather staff and faculty opinions on important issues and to solicit their ideas and comments about the mission, vision, and values of the Institute. Key personnel from both the Institute and the Presidio of Monterey Garrison briefed the SPB on a variety of issues, programs, projects and initiatives to be considered in the planning process. The SPB ensured that feedback from the civilian faculty and input from Garrison and Institute organizations were woven into the plan.\textsuperscript{127}

**Accreditation and Degree Granting**

The military and academic leadership of DLIFLC has consistently recognized the positive role of regional accreditation as an important tool for improving the quality of education at the Institute.\textsuperscript{128} Indeed, DLIFLC leaders first obtained accreditation at the junior college level in 1979. In 1994, the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges (ACCJC), of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges reaffirmed its earlier accreditation of the Institute while offering four major recommendations that later became an important leadership focus. The ACCJC advised DLIFLC to:

1) Develop an academic freedom statement;
2) Establish meaningful roles for middle managers (deans and chairs) in shared governance;

\textsuperscript{126} Britton, “Looking Back on a Legend,” pp. 4-8; Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 21 September 1999, briefing slides 28-29; in “Commander’s Staff Meeting, 21 Sept 1999” folder, box 57 [Addendum], RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\textsuperscript{128} In the United States and its territories, accreditation is a process to evaluate and assure quality standards in the academic programs offered by institutions of higher education. Regional accreditation is considered the most highly regarded form of institutional accreditation. Accrediting agencies are organized regionally, apply standards to an entire institution, and require such institutions to offer general education components in all their degree programs. Regional accrediting commissions issue periodic reports on the quality of the entire institution, setting high performance standards that not all higher education institutions can meet. For more information see the website of the Accrediting Commission of State and Junior Colleges, Western Association of Schools and Colleges, at: http://www.accjc.org (accessed 27 November 2007).
3) Work toward degree granting authorization; and
4) Follow through on the 1992 congressional authorization to create a “Faculty Personnel System.”

Although the ACCJC evaluation would not occur until March 2000, the process began in March 1998 with the appointment of a Steering Committee and ten Self-Study Committees, one for each of the ACCJC Standards. Over one hundred military and civilian personnel from throughout the installation participated. The self-study was a thorough look at the Institute using the ACJC standards as the guide. The two-year long self-study was completed and submitted to the ACCJC in December 1999.

While the reaccreditation self-study was time-consuming, DLIFLC leaders were unlikely to fail for they had not rested upon their laurels and had made a serious attempt to address the four major recommendations of the 1994 ACCJC report. Indeed, during the summer of 1996, Clifford had asked the deputy command historian, Dr. Stephen Payne, to serve as the Institute’s accreditation liaison officer and to bring the Institute into compliance with the recommendations of the ACCJC.

Academic Freedom Policy

Payne and an ad hoc group of interested faculty developed the DLIFLC Policy on Academic Freedom in 1997. After sounding out issues concerning the faculty, Payne designed a statement that drew on three major sources, the 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the 1957 Supreme Court decision Sweezy vs. New Hampshire, and a special edition of the Duke University Law School journal, Law and Contemporary Problems, that was devoted to “Freedom and Tenure in the Academy.” Payne’s draft balanced the vision of academic freedom as an individual right that was held by the AAUP with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of academic freedom as an institutional right. The policy recognized the faculty’s freedom of research and publication, teaching, and speech as set within the context of the Institute’s mission and the Institute’s right to determine “who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” The Institute’s leadership and faculty recognized that academic freedom could not exist without academic responsibilities on the part of both the Institute and its faculty.

By February 1998, the National Federation of Federal Employees Local 1263 as well as by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate General, had reviewed and approved the policy and delivered the finished policy draft to Devlin for approval, with the recommendation that it also be approved by the DFLP Policy Committee. The

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132 Ibid.
Institute adopted the policy and implemented it before the March 2000 visit of the accreditation commission to evaluate the school’s accreditation status.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{Academic Advisory Council and Faculty Advisory Councils}

In 1996, civilian (faculty and staff) and military personnel had significant roles on the Strategic Planning Board that developed the Mission Statement, Values, Vision, and Goals for the Institute. However, the faculty lacked an institutionally recognized “voice” in academic issues. The previous academic advisory body was disbanded in 1993 for infringing upon employee management issues that were by law the purview of the union.\textsuperscript{134}

The development of the academic freedom policy defined roles for faculty and management and served as the catalyst to charter the Academic Advisory Council (AAC) and the Faculty Advisory Councils (FACs) in 1997. Working with a group of faculty, Payne drafted a new charter for the proposed AAC and the FACs. Under the charter, the AAC was to act much like an academic senate with the provision that it not become involved in management-employee issues that were reserved for the union. In addition to the AAC, the charter had a provision for establishing FACs. The FACs mirrored the AAC at the school or directorate level by providing academic advice to the deans and equivalent academic directors. In addition, FAC faculty, military and civilian, elected AAC representatives from their respective schools or divisions who represented the individual FACs at the Institute level. By 2000, there were nine FACs at the Institute: one in each of the seven schools, one for Curriculum and Faculty Development and Academic Administration, one for Evaluation and Standardization, and one for Operations, Plans and Programs. The two councils allowed the faculty to give “advice on curriculum, assessment, and other academic matters.”\textsuperscript{135}

Once established, members of the AAC promoted new approaches to academic affairs and provided advice to the provost on academic issues at the Institute level. The chair of the AAC met regularly with the provost or his designated representative and the provost met several times each year with the full AAC.\textsuperscript{136}

Examples of AAC activities included input to the rank advancement process of a new faculty personnel management system, the use of a classroom observation process to assure quality control, and the development of qualification standards for academic leaders, namely deans and chairs. In addition, the AAC was involved in appropriate policy, planning, and special purpose bodies, such as the 1998–2000 reaffirmation of accreditation self-study teams, the Strategic Plan, the Academic Freedom Policy, and the

\textsuperscript{134} Payne, discussion with Cameron Binkley, 4 April 2008.
\textsuperscript{135} See DLIFLC Academic Advisory Council Charter. The original faculty organization was the Faculty Senate, authorized by Colonel Kibby Horn in 1970. In 1994, Provost Ray Clifford let the organization lapse as its members were engaged on union, rather than academic, issues.
\textsuperscript{136} For the first few years, Clifford asked Payne to represent the Provost Organization at meetings of the AAC. Clifford, however, addressed the AAC on an annual basis and received regular updates from Payne.
establishment of Intermediate Program credits. Clifford also asked the AAC to assist with several planning issues, including the revamping of the basic language program courses, the end-of-course and mid-term exams, and the establishment of an associate of arts degree program. The chairperson of the AAC also represented the faculty on the Institute’s working Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC), which was chartered to oversee the budgetary process for the Institute.

The most notable accomplishment of the AAC was the establishment of the first Faculty Professional Development Day on 28 May 1999. The Faculty Professional Development Day was modeled after the annual academic conferences held by the American Council of Teachers of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) and was designed to acquaint faculty, most of whom were educated abroad, with the process of developing and delivering an academic paper. The AAC sponsored conference was so successful that ACTFL asked that the best papers be presented at its November conferences each year.

**Deans’ Council**

With the reestablishment of a faculty council, Clifford decided to tackle another ACCJC recommendation that the Institute’s middle managers be involved in decision-making at the Institute. To this end, the Dean’s Council was established at an off-site meeting held at the new DoD Center Monterey Bay. Clifford and the deans discussed several issues of concern and reached an agreement as to the role of the Deans’ Council in a meeting facilitated by Payne. The Deans’ Council developed descriptions of the roles and relationships for deans, associate deans, academic specialists (formerly academic coordinators), and chairs. The Dean’s Council worked with the Resource Management Directorate, Management Division to incorporate new job descriptions, duties, and responsibilities into the DLIFLC Regulation 10-1, “Organizations and Functions Manual.”

**Associate of Arts Degree**

In December 1998, DLIFLC managers realized that to retain the Institute’s accredited status, they would have to gain approval to grant degrees. Since 1979, DLIFLC had been accredited as a junior college by the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges. However, the Institute did not offer degrees, a fact that became important in 1990 when the ACCJC revised its eligibility criteria to specify that the granting of degrees in “a substantial portion of the institution’s educational offerings” was required to maintain accreditation. In 1989, an ACCJC visitation team recommended that the Institute seek degree-granting status. The issue was problematic, because an act of Congress was required to authorize DoD schools the authority to grant academic degrees.

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137 DLIFLC, *Institutional Self Study*, p. 54. Payne collaborated with the AAC to describe and gain recognition from the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges for fifteen units of academic credit in foreign language and area studies at the 300-level (Junior standing) in all basic programs and 18 units of academic credit in foreign language and areas studies at the 300-level for all Intermediate programs.

138 Ibid.
Fortunately, DLIFLC managers had requested the authority to grant an associate degree in the original proposal for a new Faculty Personnel System. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command, the General Officer Steering Committee, the Department of the Army, and the Department of Defense had fully concurred. Unfortunately, when Congress approved the Faculty Personnel System, it simply added the school to existing legislation and did not take up the matter of the associate degree proposal. Thus, to maintain the Institute’s accredited status, Clifford held discussions with Monterey Peninsula College (MPC) to establish a joint program. The Institute and MPC entered into an agreement in 1994 that allowed DLIFLC students to earn an Associate of Arts in Foreign Languages at MPC by transferring DLIFLC course credit to the college. In addition to DLIFLC courses, students were required to complete or transfer units that satisfied MPC general education requirements and to take a minimum of twelve units at MPC to establish residency. Between June 1994, when the first thirty-two DLIFLC students enrolled at MPC, through June 1999, 502 DLIFLC students graduated with associate of arts degree through this unique program.139

While the MPC program was successful, it did not meet the needs of most DLIFLC students. Students enrolled in a Category I or II program and some students enrolled in a Category III program were not stationed in Monterey long enough to complete the MPC twelve-unit residency requirement. In addition, DLIFLC students were already taking a full load of fifteen DLIFLC units and had a difficult time adding MPC courses.140 In December 1998, to assist DLIFLC students with their educational goals and to maintain regional accreditation, Clifford asked Payne to work on obtaining degree-granting status.

Devlin and Clifford felt that the granting of associate degrees was a way to recognize the accomplishments of graduates during their challenging studies and would help the Institute to continue to attract top-quality applicants from among the pool of those joining the armed forces. In addition, degree-granting status would help the Institute attract faculty who otherwise might not be interested in teaching at a non-degree-granting school and it would help the Institute to improve its educational programs.

In May 1999, the Institute submitted an eighteen-point self-analysis report to the US Department of Education National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI). In September 1999, an evaluation committee consisting of Department of Education staff, NACIQI members, and an ACCJC representative visited the Institute and validated the self-analysis. In December 1999, the NACIQI voted unanimously to support the Institute’s degree-granting application, which was supported by Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley.141 Congress approved the application as part of the Defense Authorization Bill, which became law on 28 December 2001.142 Meanwhile, Payne submitted a Substantive Change Proposal to the ACCJC that

139 Ibid., p. 117.
140 Ibid.
explained all the steps taken and the need for degree granting status. Finally, during its May 2002 meeting, the ACCJC authorized DLIFLC degree-granting authority for an Associate of Arts in Foreign Languages.¹⁴³

Faculty Personnel System

DLIFLC won approval for its long-sought new Faculty Personnel System (FPS) in October 1992 after securing support at every level within the Army and Department of Defense.¹⁴⁴ The idea of exempting the Institute from provisions of the Civil Service System not appropriate to an academic institution arose from a conviction that any attempts to improve the quality of educational programs at DLIFLC would be limited as long as the faculty was trapped within the rigid “rank-in-position” system. The solution was for a process that would reward teaching excellence, improve the ability of the Institute to attract new faculty, permit advancement without forcing instructors into administrative positions and provide a higher level of faculty compensation through a contributions-based merit system that would provide for post-tenure reviews, and establish a formal rank-in-person system that matched the Institute’s academic mission.

While the faculty merit pay system was first proposed in 1986, approval, design, and implementation of that system encountered repeated roadblocks and delays. Congressman Leon Panetta, D-Carmel, submitted and resubmitted the legislation until the FPS was finally approved by Congress and signed into law as a modified amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.¹⁴⁵ By the time the bill became law, however, dramatic events surrounding the closure of Fort Ord, and the near closure of the Presidio of Monterey, sidelined further effort to establish the FPS as DLIFLC leaders negotiated the ongoing Base Realignment and Closure process.¹⁴⁶

Finally, in mid-1995, Clifford, along with the chief of staff, Colonel William H. Oldenburg II, USAF, found time to begin the process of planning for the new faculty personnel system. Fortunately, Ester Rodriquez of the Civilian Personnel Office had been working on the policies and procedures for the new system since it was first proposed. Using her work as a base, Oldenburg tasked a committee of faculty and administrative staff members, working closely with the leadership of the National Federation of Federal Employees Local 1263, to draft the policies and procedures needed to implement the new personnel system. The Institute’s leadership expedited the process by bringing key DoD personnel and pay specialists out to Monterey to finalize the system.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Chartered by Congress in 1992 through an amendment of Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 81, § 1595. The Faculty Personnel System was formerly known as the New Personnel System.
¹⁴⁶ For more on how the BRAC process impacted DLIFLC, see Payne, DLIFLC&POM Command History 1993 (DLIFLC, 1996); and Steven R. Solomon and Jay M. Price, DLIFLC&POM Command History 1994–1995 (DLIFLC, 1999).
The FPS brought DLIFLC faculty pay into line with the pay scales of civilian colleges and universities and created a series of academic ranks (instructor, senior instructor, assistant professor, associate professor, and full professor) to replace the General Schedule (GS) System (GS-5/7/9 Instructors, GS-11 coordinators, GS-12 department chairpersons, and GS-13 deans). The FPS rectified one of the chief failings of the GS system, which paid more for managers than it paid for excellent teachers by limiting faculty to the lower rungs of the GS grades. The new FPS rank structure—along with the merit pay system and provisions for adjunct, tenure-track, and tenured employment status—allowed skilled teachers to advance in rank without leaving teaching for management positions. Barbara Kelly, chief of the Wage and Salary Division of the Civilian Personnel Management Service (ASD/FMP), set pay scales on 30 December 1996 in consultation with the DLIFLC FPS team. The pay scales were based primarily on a salary survey conducted by the American Association of University Professors, with a similar survey by the College and University Personnel Association as a secondary source and was augmented by a survey of local community colleges.

On 25 March 1996, Assistant Secretary of Defense Emmett Paige, Jr., of the Office of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD/C3I), sent a memorandum to his counterpart in Force Management Policy (ASD/FMP), Fred Pang, requesting approval of the FPS and delegation of the implementing authority. In a memorandum dated 15 November 1996, Pang granted his approval, “subject to completion of local bargaining obligations and modification to supporting personnel and payroll data systems.” The bargaining and modifications (including provisions for a “buy-in” for existing GS employees) began the following week.

Negotiations lasted for only four days, from 21 to 24 November 1996. The management bargaining team was led by the Assistant Commandant, Colonel Beauvais, and consisted of Nora Deis, management and employee relations specialist; Dr. Martha Herzog, representing the academic side of the Institute; and Esther Rodriguez, hired as the new FPS Administrator on 30 September 1996. Alfie Khalil, Local 1263 president, led the National Federation of Federal Employees team, which consisted of Valerio Guisi, Dr. Jose Ibarbia, Hiam Kanbar, and Local 1263 Shop Steward, Dr. Philip White.

148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 For more information on the composition and work of the committee that developed the FPS, see the 1994-95 DLIFLC & POM Command History, pp. 31-32.
151 Payne conducted a survey of pay scales at Monterey Peninsula College, Hartnell College in Salinas, Cabrillo College in Aptos, and Gavilan College in Gilroy that resulted in the initial pay scales being set higher than the Wage and Salary Division initially proposed to allow the Institute to be competitive with the local two-year colleges.
153 Faculty Personnel System: Faculty Handbook (DLIFLC, 3 February 2000), Appendix C. Note, the handbook is based upon DLIFLC Regulation 690-1. Note, FPS authority is based upon Public Law 102-484; Title 10, USC, Chapter 81, Section 1595; and Pang’s memorandum as cited in Note 152.
The transition from the GS system to the FPS represented a major culture shift for the Institute, but the negotiations proceeded smoothly. Clifford had been briefing Khalil and White throughout the development of the FPS and Rodriguez incorporated a number of ideas suggested by them into the new system.

On 25 November, DLIFLC Regulation 690-1, Faculty Personnel System, was issued to serve as the FPS Handbook. The FPS Handbook and FPS updates defined for the faculty the need for professional development and the minimum qualifications required to compete successfully for rank advancement. The handbook also stipulated that the commandant would “establish a 30-calendar-day open season” during which eligible employees might freely enter the FPS (without the need to be hired into an FPS position). Devlin declared the entire month of December 1996 to be the FPS “Open Season.” The FPS covered all DLIFLC civilian faculty appointed on or after the implementation date, as well as the faculty who elected to convert to the FPS during the open season in the fall of 1996.

Ironically, the approval of the long-anticipated new system caused considerable anxiety among the Institute’s faculty. Although eager to capitalize on the rewards, many teachers feared that the new system would deprive them of job security by granting administrators expanded authority to release employees from federal service. Another concern was the abolition of locality pay, automatic annual (“longevity”) pay increases, and cost of living adjustments, all of which would be subsumed by merit pay rules under the FPS. For several months prior to implementation, the commandant, provost, and union leadership explained the new system at faculty meetings in every school and at two general faculty meetings. In addition, the CPO staff counseled over five hundred FPS-eligible employees one-on-one. Throughout the month of December, Clifford and Khalil conducted school-wide briefings and Institute-wide question-and-answer sessions. These measures were largely successful in allaying faculty anxieties concerning the new, merit-based system. By the time the open season closed at the end of December 1996, according to Devlin, nearly 80 percent of eligible employees chose to convert to the new FPS system.

The FPS began operation on 1 January 1997. Faculty members who elected to join the FPS moved into academic ranks based on their salary levels under the GS system. Faculty had their first opportunity to compete for rank advancement during that first year when the Professor Rank Evaluation Board evaluated 93 candidates and the Associate Professor Rank Evaluation Board evaluated 163. Early in 1998, Clifford announced that 9 faculty members advanced to the professor rank while 20 faculty members advanced to the Associate professor rank. During 1998, faculty members were offered the opportunity to compete for tenure track appointments and 64 faculty members advanced from adjunct to tenure track. By early 1998, an influx of new faculty, hired

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155 DLIFLC, Institutional Self Study, pp. 45-46
under the FPS (the GS system was no longer used to fill faculty vacancies), brought the number of FPS faculty to 80 percent. Tenure track faculty had their first opportunity to compete for tenure appointments during 1999.

The Institute released the results of the first merit pay process in January 1998. Like rank advancement, merit pay was a competitive process: Supervisors received three merit pay points per faculty member they supervised to apportion according to employee performance. Merit Pay Boards, composed of both supervisory and non-supervisory personnel from outside the language program or academic organization under review, conducted the same procedure as the supervisors, apportioning their own pool of merit pay points based on the same criteria. The dollar value of each point was calculated by dividing available award money by the number of points awarded. Each faculty member was then awarded merit pay equal to this dollar value multiplied by the number of merit pay points he or she had received.

By 1999, the Institute employed approximately 770 civilian faculty members, of whom 85 percent were FPS members. Over the next eight years most of the GS faculty retired and were replaced with FPS members, which, Clifford felt, would greatly assist in the long-standing plan to fully professionalize the faculty.

With the adoption of the Faculty Personnel System, the Institute believed that it had enhanced its ability to produce more proficient linguists by attracting and retaining the best professional faculty available. FPS provided previously impossible flexibility in hiring by allowing its administrators to retain local control of hiring and set academic parameters on the hiring process. Despite early grumblings, the system was widely accepted, although the ACCJC Evaluation Team noted in its 2000 report “a perception that there seem to be greater opportunities for staff who do not have the constraints of the classroom, particularly in the area of specialized education and experience, which is an FPS requirement for rank advancement.” Nevertheless, the team agreed with the Institute’s assessment “that the new system will help attract and maintain qualified faculty” and commended “DLIFLC for its ongoing commitment to and support for its faculty in obtaining advanced degrees.”

Shoulder Patches

At the same time that Devlin took command, on 26 February 1996, TRADOC realigned DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey under the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In addition to a new reporting and rating structure, all Army personnel were required to replace the old TRADOC tri-colored circular shoulder patch with the patch used by the Combined Arms Center. That patch had a chevron, representing the center’s martial character, along with three lamps symbolizing study and

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160 Ibid.
learning in the three-part Army (Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard).\textsuperscript{163}

On 28 October 1999, Devlin presided over a ceremony that established a new shoulder sleeve insignia for Army personnel stationed at DLIFLC and the Presidio. This was the culmination of work initiated in 1998 by Devlin for a unique DLIFLC shoulder patch for the Institute and garrison. The approved patch featured a one-eighth inch yellow boarder surrounding a shield two-and-a-half inches wide and three inches high. The shield was divided diagonally with a blue bar, from upper left to lower right, into two portions. The upper half featured a black griffin on a white background. The griffin was a mythological animal with the head and wings of an eagle and the body of a lion that represented intelligence and strength. It reinforced the idea that DLIFLC was part of the military intelligence community. A silver Rosetta Stone on a scarlet background was in the lower portion of the shield.\textsuperscript{164} The Rosetta Stone was the first evidence that ancient civilizations were able to translate from one language to another and an image of the stone had been featured on the DLIFLC crest since 1954.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{165} The Rosetta Stone tablet was carved in 196 BC, with writing in two languages (Egyptian and Greek), using three scripts (Hieroglyphic, demotic and Greek). It was written in three scripts as there were three scripts being used in Egypt: The first was hieroglyphic which was the script used for important or religious documents; The second was demotic which was the common script of Egypt; and the third was Greek which was the language of the rulers of Egypt at that time. This allowed priests, government officials, and rulers of Egypt to read about the coronation of the pharaoh Ptolomey (or Ptolemy). The tablet was found in 1799, by French soldiers who were rebuilding a fort in a small Nile Delta village called Rashid or Rosetta in French, hence the name for the tablet—“Rosetta Stone.” The discovery led to the deciphering of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs by Jean-François Champollion in 1822.
Change in Command

On 1 December 2000, Devlin retired after thirty-one years of active duty. At Devlin’s change-of-command ceremony, Lieutenant General Mike Steele, USA, the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center and Devlin’s supervisor, decorated Devlin with a Legion of Merit for his tenure as commandant of the DLIFLC and installation commander of the Presidio of Monterey. Steele pointed to Devlin’s accomplishments during his five years at Monterey as a time when more students graduated with higher proficiency rates than had ever been accomplished. Steele also noted the many improvements to the Presidio during Devlin’s time, such as the renovation of the Price Fitness Center and the adoption of conservation measures that reduced installation power usage. Devlin also managed to reshape the handling of base operations by contracting out much work to the city of Monterey. In addition, he made sure that the BRAC process at the former Fort Ord was moving smoothly and approved the creation of a new DLIFLC organization, the School of Continuing Education. Devlin also oversaw the relocation of the new school in the DoD Center on the Presidio’s annex (the former Silas B. Hayes Army Hospital), which was completely refurbished.

Steele turned command of DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey over to Colonel Kevin M. Rice, USA, who became the twenty-third DLIFLC commandant and fourth Presidio of Monterey installation commander since the Presidio became a separate post after the closure of Fort Ord. Rice came to DLIFLC from the US Embassy in Beijing where he was an Army attaché. He was also a graduate of the Chinese program at DLIFLC, the British Ministry of Defense, Chinese Language School in Hong Kong, and DLI-Washington. In his initial talk with the DLIFLC community, Rice commented on the quality of the Institute’s Foreign Area Officer graduates that he saw while on duty in China. “What I have seen personally in the past three years,” he stated, “is DLIFLC producing a good quality product.” Rice felt that, as commandant, “there will be just a few small adjustments made here and there. I don’t foresee any major overhauls of any program—not yet anyway.” Significant overhauls of many Institute programs were to occur within Rice’s first year, however, as events, already set in motion, would rock the nation, its military, and the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center.

Chapter III

Resident Language Training

Between 1996 and 2000, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, the so-called “schoolhouse” at the Presidio of Monterey, retained its status as the premier foreign language teaching facility in the nation and the centerpiece of the Defense Foreign Language Program. As 1996 began, DLIFLC accounted for 96 percent of the military’s resident foreign language training, including 4 percent contributed by the Institute’s office in Washington, DC. DLIFLC taught twenty-one languages to over three thousand students per year. Though most DLIFLC training consisted of basic courses, intermediate, advanced, and specialized programs existed for certain languages. The vast majority of students taught by DLIFLC faculty were US military personnel slated for cryptology work (70 percent) or other intelligence tasks (21 percent); the remainder (9 percent) fell in special categories, including federal law enforcement personnel and even US astronauts who occasionally attended courses through a memorandum of agreement with the National Aeronautical and Space Administration.168

Provost Organization

Dr. Ray T. Clifford continued to serve as the Institute’s chief academic officer, a position he had held since arriving in Monterey in 1981.169 Clifford was also the principal advisor to the commandant and to the DFLP Policy Committee for all academic issues. He represented the school to external academic councils, professional organizations, interagency committees, and national and international fora on second language education and acquisition issues. Clifford was assisted in the day-to-day management of the Institute by an associate provost and dean of students, Lieutenant Colonel Rod Gale, USAF.170 Gale held the position from 1993 until 1999 when he retired and was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel William Astore, followed by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Butler. Dr. Martha Herzog served as dean of Curriculum and Faculty Development until becoming dean of Evaluation and Standardization in 1998, while Dr. Neil Granoien occupied the new post of assistant provost and Dr. Alex Vorobiov acted as dean of academic administration. In 1996, Esther Rodriguez was chosen as the first director of the Faculty Personnel System. That same year, Clifford also appointed Dr. Stephen M. Payne as DLIFLC’s accreditation liaison officer.171 The language schools

169 Clifford’s title was “Academic Dean” from 1981 until the name was changed to “Provost” in 1987.
170 Gail was assigned to DLIFLC as the associate dean of the Middle East School in 1992. In 1993, he became the first associate provost and dean of students. (See Stephen M. Payne, DLIFLC&POM Command History 1993, pp. 38-43); Bob Britton, “Dean of Students Retired after 30 Years,” Globe 22, no. 7 (November/December 1999): pp. 10-11.
171 Payne, the deputy command historian since 1994, began working on accreditation issues in September 1996, as the accreditation liaison between DLIFLC and its accrediting agency, the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges. In 1998, he began working full-time on the Institute’s accreditation
were each headed by a dean, an associate dean, and other military and civilian staff as discussed below.

Between 1996 and 2000, the provost and related organizations accomplished the following:

1) Developed a new curricula for Spanish and Korean;
2) Improved the academic quality of graduating students from 74 percent meeting federal Interagency Language Roundtable proficiency levels of 2 in Listening, 2 in Reading, and 1+ in Speaking (L2/R2/S1+) in 1995, to 80 percent reaching L2/R2/S1+ by the end of fiscal year 2000;
3) Established the School for Continuing Education in July 1999;
4) Established the new Faculty Personnel System; 
5) Reestablished the Academic Advisory Council (Institute-wide academic senate) and established Faculty Advisory Councils in each school and academic directorate; and
6) Successfully completed a self-study for reaffirmation of accreditation status and a self-analysis for degree-granting status.

The organization of the schools remained the same as in previous years, although DLIFLC added one new school, the School for Continuing Education in 2000. Shortly after taking over as commandant in 1996, Colonel Daniel D. Devlin also ordered the re-

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**Figure 5 Provost and School Organization**

The organization of the schools remained the same as in previous years, although DLIFLC added one new school, the School for Continuing Education in 2000. Shortly after taking over as commandant in 1996, Colonel Daniel D. Devlin also ordered the re-

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172 “Faculty Personnel System” is a misnomer for Section 1595, Title 10, US Code, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to create a pay system for faculty of certain DoD schools, including DLIFLC. However, the adoption of this system, when compared to the more common General Service (GS) pay system, created much confusion, given differing personnel provisions in hiring, tenure, and rank advancement that, to eliminate confusion, DLIFLC management elected to call the process by a specific moniker.
designation of East European Schools I and II as European Schools I and II, and of the West European and Latin American School as the European and Latin American School (ELA). 173 He sought to align the names more closely to the languages they taught as well as to reflect that DLIFLC was no longer a Cold War institution. In September 1997, Clifford abolished the academic coordinator positions in the schools to reverse the trend of taking faculty slots away from the classroom and into administration. 174 In addition, during the last years of the twentieth-century, military requirements drove an increased emphasis on the teaching of Chinese, Korean and Arabic while instruction of Russian and other Slavic languages important for the Cold War declined.

In a move to focus on students, Clifford introduced the Consolidated Team Concept (CTC). The CTC was a means of organizing faculty and students by allocating six classrooms to each team. The six-member teaching team could then reallocate the designated classrooms in any combination that would facilitate a good working and learning environment. However, few schools were able to comply with the CTC due to space constraints. The School for Continuing Education was the only school designed as a CTC facility from inception as Clifford managed to influence plans being developed for the first floor of the DoD Center Monterey Bay (formerly the Silas B. Hays Army Hospital) on the Ord Military Community. This facility’s design incorporated pods of six classrooms around a central room used for meetings or informal gatherings. By 2000, ELA had managed to rearrange its offices and classrooms to comply with the CTC, but with declining enrollments in Spanish, the largest language in ELA, the school soon had to move from Munakata Hall to Pomerene Hall. Asian II, in need of more space for its rapidly expanding Korean program, switched places with ELA and moved into Munakata.175

**Final Learning Objectives**

DLIFLC educates students according to standards and goals set out in the Final Learning Objectives. The FLOs were created in 1987 by the military service and intelligence agencies, led by the National Security Agency to improve the job performance of DLIFLC graduates. Hugh McFarlane, representing the Cryptologic Training System (CTS), Associate Provost Roderic Gale, and a small team of DLIFLC faculty and staff, updated the FLOs in 1992 with input from the Defense Intelligence Agency training manager. DLIFLC first published the FLOs in a 1994 booklet. In 1995, a working group at DLIFLC headed by McFarlane further redefined the FLOs. By 1997, the sub-skills, the specific skills military linguists required to do their jobs, were renamed “Performance FLOs” and some of the tasks that a linguist was expected to perform were

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clarified. However, as the preface to the September 1997 *Final Learning Objectives* booklet stated, “the objectives have not changed.”

The FLO skills covered thirty-three linguistic tasks divided into four areas: Content, Ancillary, Performance, and Proficiency. The Content FLOs described cognitive information of the culture and history of the nations that speak the language; the Ancillary FLOs covered language specific tasks such as using a Chinese dictionary or recognizing different Arabic dialects; the Performance FLOs dealt with sub-skills needed by the linguists when using military language on the job; finally, the Proficiency FLOs covered the tasks necessary to read, listen, speak, and write in the target language across a wide variety of communication tasks and settings. Only Proficiency FLOs were tested through the Defense Language Proficiency Test, which at that time students had to pass at a level of L2/R2/S2 to graduate.

The FLOs represented the language skills required by linguists in the fields of Signals Intelligence and Human Intelligence, by linguists in the Special Operations Forces, and by those serving as Foreign Area Officers. The DFLP placed linguists in the field primarily through CTS and its counterpart, GITS, the General Intelligence Training System, in four major Military Occupational Specialties, namely, translator, interpreter, crypto-linguist, and interrogator. Although most DLIFLC linguists trained for specific duties through CTS or GITS, frequently the Army pressed them into service as interpreters during unexpected contingencies, such as the Gulf War and various operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo.

With the development of the non-proficiency FLOs, DLIFLC faculty began to teach the entire FLO spectrum: Proficiency, Performance, Content, and Ancillary. As early as 1994, to help the faculty understand how to teach the FLOs, Dr. Maurice Funke began writing *Bridges: A Publication Dedicated to Teaching the Final Learning Objectives*. *Bridges* explained FLO-centered classroom activities to faculty who were struggling with proficiency-oriented activities, yet had to begin integrating performance-related activities in their teaching. During 1996 and 1997, the *Bridges* publication came into its own. Two issues appeared in 1996 and four the following year. The June 1997 issue of *Bridges* became large enough to abandon its early “corner-stapled” format. The December 1997 issue was forty-two pages long. Funke also conducted FLO

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177 For more information on the four different types of FLOs, see Solomon and Price, *DLIFLC&POM Command History 1994–1995*, pp. 29-30.

178 Follow-on training for 70 percent of all linguists occurs either at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas as cryptolinguists (CTS), who are usually employed by the NSA. GITS follow-on training for another 20 percent is held at the US Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca (USAIC), Arizona.

179 The title “Bridges” came from the work of Dr. Earl Stevick of Georgetown University.

workshops for the faculty. By August 2000, Bridges had fifty-one pages of articles focused upon classroom practices, the ILR proficiency scale, Web instruction, faculty as lifelong learners, and the integration of culture and language learning. \(^\text{181}\)

To determine student outcomes in the non-proficiency FLOs, \(^\text{182}\) the Test Division of the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization developed sixteen FLO sub-skill tests in 1994. \(^\text{183}\) These tests determined a student’s ability to use the language in job-type settings; however, unlike the DLPT, these sub-skill tests were never validated. Instead, they were given at the end of the language program along with the DLPT. The tests were useful in helping to determine if a student, who did not pass the DLPT, could be utilized as a linguist and “waived” onto Goodfellow Air Force Base for cryptologic training or to Fort Huachuca for interrogator training. Due to technical issues in the DLIFLC test laboratory, two of the tests were discontinued in 2000 (the computer program used to deliver the tests could not recognize non-Western fonts). The FLO sub-skill test became known as the Performance Test. As detailed below, neither the Content nor the Ancillary tests were ever developed. \(^\text{184}\)

To link the FLOs to the needs of the intelligence community, Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, the director of NSA and chief of the Central Security Service, issued a memorandum on 7 July 1997 stressing the importance of the FLOs. Minihan’s memorandum specified that cryptologist training needed “to deal with the enormous challenges and opportunities of the Information Age.” Minihan’s vision was that a professional linguist could not be developed solely out of the basic, intermediate or advanced foreign language programs at DLIFLC as “[p]rofessional abilities and knowledge are acquired through additional training, education, and experience.” \(^\text{185}\) Nonetheless, the school had a particular role to play in the development of a linguist at all three levels of training offered at Monterey. In particular, Minihan wanted the objectives of basic foreign language courses to teach

- free-flow conversational language, transcription of such material, translation of those transcripts, summarizing conversations, reading handwriting, understanding language conventions of contemporary modes of communication such as e-mail and fax; and, basic understanding of issues in a variety of topic areas, including military, politics, internal stability, trade, international relations, and trans-national issues such as narcotics trafficking and organized crime, particularly as they affect

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\(^\text{181}\) See [Funke], Bridges..., no. 4-9; 14, copies in DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\(^\text{182}\) The Proficiency FLOs had been tested since 1958, when the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence had the Army Language School develop a true proficiency test to replace the old Army Language Tests, which did not give discrete proficiency scores. Dr. Martha Herzod, e-mail to Stephen Payne entitled “Original text,” 1 August 2006.
\(^\text{183}\) “Final Learning Objectives for Basic Language Programs in the Defense Foreign Language Program,” (DLIFLC, 2004).
\(^\text{184}\) Mark Markiewitz, telephone conversation with Stephen Payne, 4 April 2008.
\(^\text{185}\) LTG Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 7 July 1997, in Final Learning Objectives (1997), pp. 5-6.
relations between the culture or nations being studied and the United States.\textsuperscript{186}

At the intermediate level, Minihan wanted DLIFLC graduates to

increase [their] general proficiency to at least 2+ in listening, reading, and speaking; focus on integrating and enhancing performance in the subskills; provide more depth in understanding the context in which communication takes place in the topic areas…; and emphasize the ancillary objectives of colloquial speech, manner or tenor, and text processing.\textsuperscript{187}

Finally, Minihan stressed that DLIFLC advanced students should reach levels 3 in listening and reading with

continued attention to colloquial as well as more formal usage. Social, political, economic, and defense issues affecting the culture or geopolitical climate of nations and our own national interests should provide the primary contexts in which the language material is presented.\textsuperscript{188}

During 1996-97, the Institute’s leadership weighed two options in the ongoing implementation of the FLOs: revamping the Performance FLOs or beginning development of the Content FLOs. The Institute embarked on the latter course and decided to begin with one of the Korean Content FLOs, because Dr. Martha Herzog was currently serving as dean of both Asian II and Curriculum and Faculty Development and could thus effectively marshal and coordinate the needed resources. Also, a completed Korean Content FLO meant “more bang for the buck” than developing a similar FLO for a smaller program while it avoided the complication of addressing the many cultures or countries associated with Arabic or Spanish. The FLO curriculum was to be delivered on CD-ROM and was to be more than just a collection of available facts: it was to include interactive exercises to help the students absorb the material. The prototype was to be reviewed by the school deans and then sent to Evaluation and Standardization to serve as the basis for a Content FLO test. The test, to be delivered on CD-ROM, consisted of a random selection of sixty items out of a bank of several hundred questions (to minimize the likelihood for test compromise). The completed curriculum and test were then to serve as templates for development in nineteen other languages. Unfortunately, the design process bogged down by 1998, due to disagreements over how much depth and breadth of coverage was desirable for a given topic.\textsuperscript{189} Nonetheless, testing of the Proficiency and Performance FLOs continued unabated.\textsuperscript{190}

The chart below demonstrates the difficulty in developing a student outcome standard for the Performance FLOs, an issue that would plague the Performance FLO tests from the onset. Other than in Category I and II languages, far fewer than 80 percent

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{189} Gale, interview, 1 July 1997.
  \item \textsuperscript{190} The Proficiency FLOs in listening, reading, and speaking were covered by the Defense Language Proficiency Tests (DLPTs). The fourth Proficiency FLO, writing, was not tested in and of itself, but was an enabling skill for some of the Performance FLOs. Performance FLO tests were in place for all languages except Serbian/Croatian.
\end{itemize}
of students were able to pass the tests. Yet, as demonstrated in Figure 7 below, by 1999, 79 percent of graduates scored 80 percent on the DLPT and in 2000, students reached the long-sought goal of 80 percent reaching ILR scores of 2 in listening, 2 in reading, and 1+ in speaking or L2/R2/S1+. Since students who scored L2/R2/S1+ were successful in their language-related military jobs, there appeared to be a disconnect between the scores achieved on the Performance FLO tests and the DLPT—that is, 10 percent of students who passed the DLPT were unable to pass the Performance FLO tests. Associate Provost Gale believed that a lack of understanding and/or acceptance of the Performance FLOs on the part of the teachers, partially due to a lack of FLO emphasis by the Command Group, led to students not being fully prepared for the Performance tests, which also contributed to declining scores on the DLPT in 1997 and 1998. Gale felt that the deans did not emphasize the Performance FLOs whose test results were not being briefed or reported during the annual program reviews. Gale also thought some teachers were frustrated because there was practically no refinement of the Performance FLOs after their introduction. Another possible factor was the inherent unwieldiness of the Performance FLOs vis-à-vis the Proficiency FLOs.  

![Performance FLOs Average Scores](image)

**Figure 6 DLIFLC Average Performance FLO Scores, 1996-2000**

With the introduction of the Performance FLO tests, NSA requested that all DLIFLC graduates attain scores of 80 percent on the new tests. Thus, the Research Division of the Evaluation and Standardization Directorate collected and analyzed data for all sixteen Performance FLO tests. However, there was no agreed-upon understanding of what an 80 percent score meant for these tests. Unlike the 80 percent L2/R2/S1+ Proficiency FLO goal as measured by the DLPT, the Evaluation and Standardization experts felt that they could not validate the Performance FLOs as they had the Proficiency FLOs. This led the academic leadership to conclude that the 80 percent standard was meaningless. Furthermore, data correlating the Performance FLO

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scores with the job performance of DLIFLC graduates demonstrated that students who attained scores below 80 percent performed well in their military jobs.\textsuperscript{192}

During the 2000 Annual Performance Review, a great deal of conversation went back and forth concerning the FLOs from the CTS, the GITS representatives, and the military service representatives. The Navy’s program manager was concerned that the four military services were not given an opportunity to be a part of the coordinating process that approved the FLOs and that the Institute had no mechanism in place to determine their validity.\textsuperscript{193} In addition to the basic content of the FLOs, Hugh McFarlane observed that the test performance content had changed. For example, one test developed by the Test Division of Evaluation and Standardization was unlike anything described in the FLOs, yet the expectation of an 80 percent pass rate was still in effect. Although the test content was probably very close to being realistic, if test content had changed, might the Performance FLO standards need to change as well?\textsuperscript{194} Finally, all concerned agreed to a proposal by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Chastain, USA, the director of Operations, Plans, and Programs at DLIFLC, that the DFLP Requirements and Resources Coordinating Panel would review FLO testing and update requirements and provide recommendations for a periodic systematic review process at the next RRCP meeting.\textsuperscript{195}

**Proficiency Standards**

To increase linguist capability during this period, DLIFLC focused its effort upon improving language education. The DLPT graduation requirement for linguists from DLIFLC basic programs remained at level 2 in listening, level 2 in reading, and level 2 in speaking as measured on the ILR scale of 0 (no proficiency) to 5 (educated native speaker), that is, L2/R2/S2, until 2000. At that time, Provost Ray Clifford reduced the Proficiency FLO requirement in speaking from an ILR level 2 to 1+ for all basic program graduates to depict more accurately what students could reasonably attain in speaking. Clifford reasoned that speaking was a performance skill and would normally lag behind the receptive skills of reading and listening in the time allotted to a basic course, thus the new graduation requirements for the DLPT were set at L2/R2/S1+. The same rational prevailed in the intermediate and advanced programs and graduation standards were reduced to L2+/R2+/S2 and L3/R3/S2+.\textsuperscript{196} The Institute expected higher proficiencies in each of the modalities from all linguists as they gained experience over the course of their careers and returned to DLIFLC for additional education in the intermediate or advanced programs.

The light bars in Figure 7 below depict the percentage of students attaining the basic program graduation goal of L2/R2/S1+ from 1985, when the goal was introduced, through 2000. The darker bars show the percentage of students who exceeded the basic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{192} Dr. Darius Hooshmand, e-mail to Steve Solomon entitled “RE: Reporting FLO Test Results,” 16 July 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{193} Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, *Annual Program Review 2000 Minutes* (DLIFLC, 6 March 2000), in Annual Program Review files, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\item \textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{196} Stephen Payne, recollections.
\end{itemize}
program goal and graduated at the 2+/2+/2 level expected from an intermediate program student. The various lines show the results of all graduates in the individual modalities of listening, reading, and speaking. The individual modality lines also help explain which area needed attention. For instance, listening consistently lagged behind the other two tested modalities of reading and speaking and the decline in speaking from 1997 through 1998 was the cause of the overall proficiency decline during those years. However, since the chart depicts the results from all basic language programs, neither the bars nor the lines give enough information as to which language programs were successful and which needed attention. As detailed later in this chapter, the declining student learning outcomes in Arabic, Spanish, and Russian from 1996 through 1998 led to the overall decline in the Proficiency FLO results at DLIFLC for these years.197

Proficiency FLOs  
DLI OVERALL

Figure 7 DLIFLC Proficiency FLO Scores, 1985-2000

In 1999, the proficiency scores began to climb and in 2000, for the first time ever, the overall proficiency goal of L2/R2/S1+ was finally attained. DLIFLC staff could point to a variety of reasons behind why some students attained the hoped-for proficiency goals. Those involved with the schools and with curriculum development pointed to improved teaching techniques, updated curricula, the better use of technology, and an array of teacher training programs. Individuals who worked with the service units found that the practice of “recycling” students was paying off with higher scores, taking a little extra effort to build on the skills that students already had. Colonel Devlin believed that

part of the answer lay with the maturity of those students who were willing to put in the
hard work and study to achieve their language goals.\textsuperscript{198}

\textbf{Attrition Rate Concerns}

In 1995, Lieutenant Commander George T. Arthur, a student from the Naval
Postgraduate School, studied the academic attrition rates at DLIFLC based on gender and
ethnicity at the request of the DLIFLC Accreditation Liaison Officer, Dr. Stephen Payne.
Payne wanted the study to respond to equality concerns regarding the treatment of
women and minorities raised by the Institute’s accrediting agency, the Accrediting
Commission for Community and Junior Colleges of the Western Association of Schools
and Colleges. The ACCJC had brought the topic to the attention of all the schools it was
accrediting, not the Institute in particular, but it was important to provide an adequate
response. Arthur’s study, revised as his master’s thesis, showed no attrition problems
 correlated with ethnicity. He did find, however, an overall attrition rate for enlisted
women seven percent higher than their male counterparts. Arthur explained this result as
a factor of the relatively greater number of female service members in higher risk
categories for failure. In other words, Arthur found that there were more junior grade
defense enlisted students at the Institute taking more difficult languages than was the case
with their junior graded male counterparts, a situation most pronounced among Air Force
students. Therefore, the attrition rate of female DLIFLC students was a factor of their
junior grade and enrollment in higher category languages, not their gender.\textsuperscript{199} Arthur’s
study helped to allay ACCJC concerns and moved the Institute closer to reaffirmation of
accreditation.

As a result of the attrition study, Major Cindy Baker, USAF, formed a “Smart
Start” program for all Air Force students prior to beginning their foreign language
program. The Navy also funded the enrollment of its students in the new program. By
1999, the Air Force and Navy experienced significant success through the Smart Start
and the assistant commandant, Colonel Johnny Jones, USAF, wanted to expand the
program to the Army students.\textsuperscript{200} Unfortunately, because there was no Army
requirement for the program, Smart Start was not listed in the Army Training
Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) and without a listing in ATRRS, there
could be no Organizational Maintenance Activity (OMA) funding. Furthermore, the
Army was reluctant to enroll students in a two-week course that reduced enlistees’ time
on the job. It would take several more years before the Institute was able to add the
Smart Start program to the ATRRS.

\textsuperscript{199} George T. Arthur, “The Effect of Gender on Attrition at the Defense Language Institute Foreign
Language Center” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1996); Available online at:
\textsuperscript{200} Historian’s Notes; information paper in \textit{Annual Program Review, 8-10 February 2000} (DLIFLC, 2000),
p. 11. Jones felt that the Marine students would probably not enroll as they had low attrition rates.
The Schools

Between 1996 and 2000, the Defense Foreign Language Institute Foreign Language Center was composed of several schools: Asian I, which included the languages of Chinese, Japanese, Thai, and Vietnamese; Asian II, which focused upon Korean; Middle East I and II, both of which focused on Arabic, although Middle East I also included a Multi-Language Department; European I and II, which focused upon Russian and other East European languages plus Persian-Farsi; and finally the school of European and Latin American Languages, which focused mainly upon Spanish and other Western European languages. During this period, the European schools were reorganized to reflect post-Cold War security concerns.\(^\text{201}\)

**Asian School I**

Mr. Peter J. Armbrust continued to serve as dean of the Asian I school. His associate deans from 1996 until 2000 were Lieutenant Colonel Alan McKee, USAF, until 1 October 1997, when McKee became associate dean at the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization. Captain Paul Clarke, USAF, became acting associate dean until he was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Patrick O’Rourke, USA. After O’Rourke became director of Operations Plans and Programs, Major David Tatman, USA, became associate dean for Asian I. Also assisting Armbrust was Claudia Bey, who served as the school’s academic coordinator until September 1997, when Clifford abolished all academic coordinator positions. At that time, Bey was reassigned to Faculty and Staff. The school offered basic courses in five languages: Filipino (Tagalog), Thai, and Vietnamese (Category III languages requiring forty-seven weeks of instruction); and Chinese (Mandarin) and Japanese (Category IV languages requiring sixty-three weeks). Growth of Asian I, especially in Chinese, necessitated several movements of personnel and classrooms. In 1997, the school relocated to the old “Buffalo Soldier” barracks in buildings 450 through 453.\(^\text{202}\)

Chinese remained the largest language in Asian School I throughout the latter half of the 1990s and would continue as the dominant language in that school for years to come. In 1999, the Chinese program added a third department due to increasing enrollments.\(^\text{203}\) By 2000, another increase in section loads, as well as the addition of new faculty members, resulted in a severe classroom shortage, forcing the renovation and conversion of basement space into classrooms and offices.\(^\text{204}\) Unfortunately, the basements were prone to water intrusion during the rainy months.

Under Armbrust’s leadership, Asian I faculty took advantage of a number of opportunities for professional growth and for the improvement of their curricula during

\(^{201}\) Note also that after 2000, for administrative reasons, all schools began to place the Roman numeral in their formal titles before the term “School,” such that, for example, Asian I School became Asian School I.  
\(^{202}\) Asian School I Historical Summary Reports, 1st–4th Quarters, 1996, and 1st–3rd Quarters, 1997, all in box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. The “Buffalo Barracks” occupy the historic zone of the Presidio of Monterey and were partially constructed by African-American cavalrymen stationed at the Presidio from 1902 to 1904.  
these two years. The entire Thai faculty attended the FLOs Grading Workshop in the spring of 1996. In February 1996, the Center for the Advancement of Language Learning hosted a materials fair for instructors and managers of Chinese language programs in the federal foreign language community. In the summer of 1996, all instructors attended training entitled “Avoiding Monotony in the Classroom.” Later that year, thirteen instructors participated in a Bridges workshop conducted by Funke, as discussed above. All branches participated in Internet training in early 1997. In addition, Armbrust started several in-house initiatives to improve instruction in the school: In June 1997, he created a prototype generic syllabus for basic courses to focus and organize efforts to teach to the FLO requirements and to make sure that all FLOs were addressed;205 He directed faculty to the new syllabus and asked them to cull outdated or irrelevant materials from the existing course; Ambrust also pushed for the establishment of archives of supplemental materials to reduce duplication of effort and forbade the use of any supplements that did not target the FLOs.206 The following September, Armbrust explained the rationale for collecting student feedback and how it could be used to improve teaching at DLIFLC. He gave the faculty a “Teaching Traits Profile” outlining typical comments generated by positive and negative teacher behaviors and attitudes. The comments were broken into categories such as “Preparation,” “Conduct of Instruction,” and “Correction Techniques – Feedback,” and were intended to serve as instructive examples of good and bad teacher characteristics.207 At the same time, Armbrust issued a set of Level 1 speaking tasks “to provide additional impetus to integrating FLO-related topics and activities” and encouraged the faculty to work together and share materials in accordance with the prototype syllabus.208

Chinese

In February 1996, CALL hosted a materials fair for instructors and managers of Chinese (Mandarin) language programs in the federal foreign language community. Participants from DLIFLC demonstrated the Chinese Computer-Assisted Study Project, designed to accompany the Institute’s 63-week Chinese Basic Course. The project, developed on a Macintosh computer system, consisted of listening and reading materials ranging from Level 0+ to Level 2. Representatives of the NSA’s National Cryptologic School and the CIA’s Language Training Division were also in attendance. The National Cryptologic School and CALL’s own Foreign Language Training Laboratory demonstrated projects. The gathering, one in a series of materials fairs designed by the Director of Central Intelligence/Foreign Language Committee to assess US readiness to

205 Armbrust drew on the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) proficiency level descriptions, the elicitation aids used by speaking proficiency testers, existing compilations of Performance and Content FLO requirements, and the “Scope and Sequence Chart” (on which the new Spanish course was based) to create his FLO-centered syllabus.


207 Armbrust, memorandum entitled “Student Feedback,” 26 September 1997 with enclosure entitled “Teaching Traits Profile.”

teach crucial languages, also served as a venue for discussion and as the basis for the Chinese readiness report.209

In June 1997, Armbrust drew on the ILR proficiency level descriptions, the elicitation aids used in oral proficiency testing, existing compilations of sub-skill and content FLO requirements, and the “Scope and Sequence Chart” on which the new Spanish course was based, to create a prototype generic syllabus for basic courses. Armbrust wanted to focus and organize efforts to teach to the FLO requirements and to make sure that all FLOs were addressed. He directed the faculty to inventory the lessons of the existing course for conformity with the new syllabus and to cull outdated or irrelevant materials. He also pushed for the establishment of a school archive of supplemental materials to reduce duplication of effort and forbade the use of any supplements that did not target the FLOs.210 In 1999, Armbrust organized a team of five faculty to develop a new basic course with standardized tests. His concept was to have the new program focused on proficiency and performance FLOs.211 Armbrust had faculty provide the developers with suitable, tried, and tested materials to the course development team. He felt that this would speed up the development time and the involvement of the teaching faculty would assure the maximum “buy in” of the finished curriculum.212

The Chinese faculty enhanced the existing curriculum by using the Internet, SCOLA213, and the International Channel.214 In 2000, after many years of working with sub-standard audio equipment, three new language labs were built.215

The program continued to grow and was the most successful in terms of student proficiency. Armbrust’s emphasis on curriculum development and his philosophy in hiring faculty brought results. He had sought out “English as a Second Language” graduates who were teaching Chinese in American colleges and universities. This brought about a major change in the ability of the Chinese faculty with the result of ever increasing proficiency scores in the latter half of the 1990s.216 In addition, academic disenrollment continued to decline dropping to 9 percent in 2000.217

Another indication of the success of the Chinese program was the accomplishments of DLIFLC students at the annual Chinese Language Teachers Association Mandarin Speech Contest. Each year, DLIFLC students earned many of the top awards as they competed against college Chinese majors. In 1998, ten of twenty-seven DLIFLC students won awards at the 23rd Annual Mandarin Speech Contest, held at Washington High School in San Francisco. The students were awarded three first place

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213 SCOLA is a non-profit organization that uses satellites to broadcast educational programs in multiple languages.
216 Armbrust, “Chinese-Mandarin Language Program,” 2000, p. 2; Author’s notes.
awards, three second place awards, one third place award, and three honorable mentions.\textsuperscript{218} In 2000, nine DLIFLC students won prizes, including three first places and two second places.\textsuperscript{219} In addition to the resident language program, the Chinese departments continued to support the field with video-teletraining offered to Kunia Joint Language Center, Goodfellow Air Force Base, Fort Meade, Fort Huachuca, and the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office at the Pentagon. Chinese instructors also deployed as members of Mobile Training Teams to Goodfellow; Kadena Air Base, Japan; and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.\textsuperscript{220}

\textbf{FLO PROFICIENCY CHINESE}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chinese_proficiency.png}
\caption{DLIFLC Chinese Proficiency FLO Scores, 1985-2000}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Japanese, Thai, and Vietnamese}

Japanese, the first language taught at DLIFLC and its service school predecessors, continued to experience success with a general increase in proficiency.\textsuperscript{221} The Japanese Branch assisted the Test Development Division of Evaluation and Standardization Directorate by validating DLPT IV forms C and D. Additionally, the Branch implemented a familiarization test, and instructed two of the Institute’s six civilian students. The first student, David Riggi, attended Japanese classes from 18 November 1996 until 2 May 1997.\textsuperscript{222} The second Japanese Basic Course student was Emily

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{219} Armbrust, “Chinese-Mandarin Language Program,” 2001, p. 2
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{221} Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 17 March 1998, in box 57, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\textsuperscript{222} Armbrust, Historical Summary Report, Asian School I, 4\textsuperscript{th} Quarter, 1996, in box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\end{footnotesize}
Buchbinder, who enrolled on 11 August 1997 and graduated with her class on 2 February 1998.\textsuperscript{223}

Although students in the Chinese program of Asian School I had experienced success in the annual speech contest, the small Japanese program was also successful in 1999, when Lieutenant Christopher Sharman, USN, placed third at the 26\textsuperscript{th} Annual Japanese Speech Contest in San Francisco against twenty-one contestants.\textsuperscript{224}

The entire DLIFLC Thai language teaching faculty attended the FLOs Grading Workshop.\textsuperscript{225} Separately, faculty members Jamlong Busadee and Rapipan Trail and DLIFLC students provided interpretation support to the multinational “Balance Torch” exercise in Thailand.\textsuperscript{226} Thai faculty also supported Mobile Training Teams in Draper, Utah, from 29 July to 9 August 1996. Because of the efforts to revise the courses in Japanese and Chinese, little progress was made to revise and develop courses for Thai and Tagalog during this period.\textsuperscript{227}

In 1996, Vietnamese instructor Margarita Thao received the Kiwanis “DLI Instructor of the Year” award.\textsuperscript{228} Faculty in Vietnamese Branch completed homework exercises for Semester II of the Basic Course and began translating and recording the Rosetta Stone Language Project, the product of DLIFLC’s first Cooperative Research and Development Agreement.\textsuperscript{229} The agreement allows a government agency and a private group to develop products and share the profits of what they created.

As was the case in Chinese, Armbrust focused on hiring to turn around language programs. To this end, he initiated a push to bring aboard qualified teachers in Vietnamese going so far as initiating a recruiting drive in Los Angeles. However, the program began experiencing a decline in students and as senior faculty retired only a few were replaced with new faculty. Nonetheless, Vietnamese proficiency progressed in spite of a loss in personnel.\textsuperscript{230}

\textbf{Asian School II}

The Korean program saw numerous changes in leadership between 1996 and 2000. In August 1996, Dr. Martha Herzog, dean of the Directorate of Curriculum and

\textsuperscript{223} Armbrust, Historical Summary Report, Asian School I, 3rd Quarter, 1997, in box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives; Pam Taylor, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 1 August 2007.
\textsuperscript{225} Armbrust, Historical Summary Report, Asian School I, 1\textsuperscript{st} Quarter, 1996, in box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\textsuperscript{226} Armbrust, Historical Summary Report, Asian School I, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Quarter 1997, in box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\textsuperscript{227} Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 17 March 1998, slides, in box 57, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\textsuperscript{228} Armbrust, Historical Summary Report, Asian School I, 3rd Quarter 1996, in Box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\textsuperscript{229} DLIFLC signed this CRADA with Fairfield Language Technologies in August 1996 under the terms of the Technology Transfer (T2) Program. For more information about T2 and other activities related to DLIFLC’s status as a federal laboratory, see “Evaluation, Research, and Testing” in Chapter IV, Academic Support. Background information can also be found in Solomon and Price, DLIFLC&POM Command History 1994–1995, pp. 56-57.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid.
Instruction, took on another hat as dean of Asian II replacing Dr. Neil Granoien. The single language taught at the school was Korean. Andy Soh became the school’s Academic Coordinator until September 1997. In October 1996, Captain Timothy Ockerman, USA, replaced Major Cindy Baker, USAF, as associate dean. Ockerman was replaced by Major Steve Tharp by May 1998. Herzog remained dean until August 1998, then she became the director of Evaluation and Standardization and Dr. Thomas S. Parry became the new dean. Prior to coming to DLIFLC, Parry worked at the Center for the Advancement of Language Learning, where he managed the contract with the SCOLA Program. In July 2000, Provost Ray Clifford established the School for Continuing Education and hired Parry as the inaugural dean. In August, Dr. Jielu “Jim” Zhao, who chaired both Chinese Department C and the Academic Advisory Council, was appointed acting dean while Parry began the startup process at Continuing Education. In December 2000, Parry officially left Asian II and Zhao then became the new dean of Asian II.

Known as the “Korean School,” Asian School II grew considerably during the late 1990s. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remained high with incursions by North Korean agents into South Korea, the continuing development of a North Korean Nuclear program, and potential instability due to famine. In December 1996, growth of the school’s student body by approximately one hundred students necessitated an expansion into Building 632. During the third quarter of 1997, the school hired eight new teachers, which increased the faculty to 140. In September 1997, the school created Korean Department D to teach advanced, intermediate, and refresher training. The Semester III Development Project Team, discussed below, also became a part of Department D. During the second quarter of 1998, expansion forced the movement of Department C into Munakata Hall. In January 1999, the school created a fifth teaching department to house twenty-five new Korean teachers and associated students. Finally, by January 2000, the school had expanded to six departments and hired seventeen new faculty members.

Major changes in Asian II during this period actually began three years before. Specifically, in 1993, Asian II lengthened the Korean Basic Course from forty-seven to sixty-three weeks in the hope of increasing the percentages of students attaining DLPT proficiency levels of L2/R2/S2 and L2/R2/S1. By early 1996, the 63-week Korean class garnered proficiency results of 36.1 percent L2/R2/S2 and 50.8 percent L2/R2/S1, approximately 2.5 times the results in the 47-week class (14.3 percent L2/R2/S2 and 21.4 percent L2/R2/S1) and a striking demonstration of the importance of “time on task” in

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234 Jim Zhao, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 17 May 2007. Payne recommended Zhao to Clifford.
attaining learning goals. The new Korean Basic Course, however, was not to be a mere lengthened version of the old course.

First in 1993, Dr. Alex Vorobiov, then dean of the Korean School, issued an important policy letter advocating an increase in “task-based communicative activities” in small groups. This change increased speaking proficiency level by 12 percent over the previous two years. Second, and even more important, Asian II sought a new curriculum all together. Vorobiov began the process, after consulting with faculty, students, and key personnel, by eliminating the existing but ten-year-old core curriculum, which had been based upon a 33-volume set of textbooks. He replaced these materials with a two-volume commercial textbook. To help augment the new text the school produced the first four volumes of Korean Proficiency Enhancement Exercises and seventeen Korean School Proficiency Tests in listening and reading. Third, Clifford asked Dr. Neil Granoien to head a curriculum development program along with Dr. Patricia Boylan that would provide text and materials appropriate for military training. Clifford assigned Granoien as the school dean and Boylan as one of two academic coordinators. The Korean Basic Program was to be designed from the ground up and intended to focus upon the FLOs and around authentic materials with the goal of producing linguists capable in all the FLOs. Each unit in the course featured a “bridge” to the next unit that synthesized the topics, vocabulary, and grammar into a task-based, job-related scenario. In addition, the proficiency FLOs, as well as the sub-skill FLOs (note-taking, “gisting,” transcription, translation, and interviewing) were integrated into the curriculum. The third semester included comprehension bridges, activities built upon the FLO content areas that students completed using the Internet and other authentic material sources.

Granoien and Boylan spent several months observing classes and talking to faculty and students as the first steps in overhauling the Institute’s Korean program. The pair discovered that the Korean teachers were using outdated teaching techniques and the teaching process in the school was not well defined; nonetheless, the instructors were receptive to change and willing to adapt. Granoien and Boylan concluded that the curriculum needed a complete rewrite. The expectations for Korean graduates had changed and the approach to teaching technology had also changed. Granoien and Boylan approached the command group with their findings and requested funding to restructure the Korean course over eighteen months. This was an unprecedented plan—most previous programs had taken curriculum development up to five years from start to finish, which meant that a lack of cohesiveness was automatically built into the finished product. However, Granoien and Boylan argued, if a large enough team was assembled they could accomplish the goal in a fraction of the time. The command group accepted

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240 Joe Kwon, the other academic coordinator, worked to improve the program by developing the final FLO test. Normally, only one academic coordinator was assigned per school.
the proposal, freeing resources for ten civilian faculty members and two Military Language Instructors.243

The development project continued throughout 1994 and into 1995.244 The task of writing a communicative Korean textbook targeted at American learners turned out to be more formidable than expected, however. By spring 1995, the staff had been increased from ten to fifteen and Granoien reported that the project’s deadline needed to be expanded by almost two years.245 In April 1996, DLIFLC was able to demonstrate parts of the new Korean Basic Course to representatives of the NSA’s National Cryptologic School and the CIA’s Language Training Division at CALL’s Korean Materials Fair. The gathering allowed participants to profile their Korean programs and exchange materials for classroom and immersion training.246 Finally, by the beginning of September 1996, Asian II had integrated the first two semesters of the new Korean basic course, Korean in Context, into the Korean program.247 The new curriculum included a mini-bridge at the end of each chapter with a major bridge after every four chapters. In addition, the new course also targeted all FLO categories (Proficiency, Performance, Content, and Ancillary) with a goal to produce linguists rated at L2/R2/S2.248

During 1996, Asian II began to emphasize training and faculty development to assist the usefulness of the new curriculum as it came online. All faculty including chairs took a 12-hour workshop on teaching listening comprehension from Dr. Pardee Lowe of the NSA. Dr. Suk Moon Youn, also of NSA, assisted Lowe with Korean-specific training while the DLIFLC Faculty Development Division provided training in task-based instruction and helped prepare teams to teach the new textbook. In addition, Grazyna Dudney of Faculty Development trained all chairs in classroom observation techniques early in 1996. The chairs put such techniques, used to evaluate teaching, immediately to use. The school also created its own faculty training programs. Herzog provided workshops on FLO-related instruction and held a weekly forum to answer faculty questions about academic issues and to listen to their ideas.

In 1997, the faculty worked on the third Semester of the Korean basic program (the Semester III Development Project), adding FLO Content areas and stressing the use of Korean in the classroom with English being used only when FLO sub-skill instruction required it. That year, the faculty also began revising the testing system and homework track of the first two semesters that they completed a year or so later.249

244 1993 DLIFLC Annual Command History, pp. 58-60.
246 “Korean Materials Fair,” CALLer 3, no. 4 (Summer 1996): p. 5, in “Call (Center for the Advancement of Language Learning) 1996-1998” folder, box 25, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Participants expressed the need for more North Korean materials in a roundtable discussion. CALL promised to attempt to meet this need by working through FBIS and SCOLA to coordinate the collection of such materials, to use its Resource Center to conduct Internet searches, to seek out and demonstrate new Korean software, and use its OSIS homepage to post links to Korean resources.
248 Dr. Patricia Boylan, interview by Steve Solomon, 19 August 1997.
Between November 1997 and June 1998, Dr. Maurice Funke developed five area studies units on North and South Korea. The project consisted of content, interactive self-tests, graphics, and instructions for computer programmers. The five units consisted of approximately one hundred hours of task-based self-study in reading and listening. Andy Soh and Jay Kim were to translate the materials into Korean to be placed in a computerized format. By July 1999, however, the project languished as the Institute did not have a computer programmer available to complete it.250

The Korean course was a complete course covering every hour of the first two semesters. As the project grew in size and complexity, the assistant commandant, Colonel Eugene Beauvais, advised Granoien and his team to move out of Asian II and report directly to Clifford. Herzog replaced Granoien as the Korean dean while still retaining her directorship of Curriculum and Instruction. Stretched too thin, Granoien’s team was unable to develop the final semester and by early 1999 Herzog put together a new team under Andy Soh to complete it. Granoien devised an implementation plan for Sahie Kang, the principal course developer, to train the faculty on how to teach the course. However when the new deadline to implement the course arrived, Kang was still writing and did not head the implementation team.251

Figure 9 DLIFLC Korean Proficiency FLO Scores, 1985-2004

In September 1996, while Semester III was still under development, Korean Class KP0996 became the first class to use the new course materials. When they graduated from the course in December 1997, they achieved higher scores than the benchmark and the mandated achievement levels. The following classes showed progressively higher

250 Dr. Maurice Funke, e-mail to Steven R. Solomon entitled “Area studies,” 19 July 1999.
scores. One Korean class, KP0397, had 58 percent of its students graduate with L2/R2/S2 or higher, a rate that Commandant Devlin noted was one of the best Korean classes to ever graduate from DLIFLC. By spring 1998, a total of 161 students had graduated from this new program. Of these, 70 percent scored Level 2 or higher in listening comprehension, 96 percent scored Level 2 or higher in reading comprehension, and 61 percent scored Level 2 or higher in speaking. The percentage of students meeting the goal of Level 2 in all three skills was 48 percent, a substantial improvement over the overall score of 34 percent achieving levels L2/R2/S2 in FY1997.252 These positive initial results were all the more impressive because they were attained despite the inevitable turmoil and disruptions of routine caused by the school’s rapid growth during this period.

While all of this was going on, field commanders in Korea had articulated a near-term requirement. Unfortunately, because of delays, and the fact that the Korean course was sixty-three weeks long and required additional follow-on training at Goodfellow AFB or Fort Huachuca, the first linguists to benefit from the revised Korean training would not reach the field until mid-1998. The Institute thus developed the Korean Language Enhancement and Assessment Program (LEAP) to fill the gap. LEAP was devised by DLIFLC Command Sergeant Major Thomas J. Bugary, Provost Clifford, and Sergeant First Class Richard Applegate who traveled to the Republic of Korea for discussions with field commanders about their requirements in August 1996. With input from linguists and Colonel Charles Alsup, the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade Commander, and others close to the action, Clifford, Bugary, and Applegate, designed a “model” course. LEAP involved additional emersion-style training for linguists immediately upon their arrival in-country and following their graduation from their military technical training courses at Goodfellow Air Force Base and Fort Huachuca. Soldiers en route to their new assignments were to spend five weeks in Seoul at Yonsei University where they would interact with a wide variety of native Korean faculty and students. After Bugary briefed Lieutenant General Paul Menoher, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, the major commands were directed to staff and fund the program.253

There were other changes and developments in the Korean program in the late 1990s. In 1997, the computer lab was equipped with thirty Pentium computers with Internet connectivity and automated supplementary materials were converted from the old laser disk format to CD-ROM. This material included approximately sixty hours of video and comprehension activities together with another forty hours of video used for transcription and gisting.254 There was also work on a CALL-funded computer-assisted program that studied the role of computers in teaching language. Early in 1998, Asian II opened a new evening computer study lab to aid with the implementation of the new Korean Basic Course. The evening lab was supervised by military language instructors

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252 Overall FY98 Korean Proficiency FLO results (including classes using the former curriculum as well as those using the new materials) stood at 38 percent L2/R2/S2, up 4 percentage points from FY97. *FY98 DLIFLC Program Summary*, December 1998, Revised 8 February 1999, p. 49; See also “Korean Proficiency FLOs,” *DLIFLC Annual Program Review, 24-25 February 1999* (DLIFLC, 1999), slide.  
and remained open from the end of the instruction day at 1530 until 2130 Mondays through Thursdays.  

In 1999, in another effort to increase proficiency, Parry, by then the dean of Asian II, had the basic program faculty increase “split sessions” and had the Diagnostic Assessment Team review the progress of individual students in all skill modalities.  Also, after reviewing feedback from the field and conducting an internal analysis of the intermediate and advanced programs, Parry “concluded that those programs had become the repository of the most undesirable faculty who had essentially ‘retired in place.’”

He then established a separate department for non-basic programs headed by Dr. Moo Su Ahn who reported directly to him. As part of the reorganization, Parry had the new division develop curriculum for the intermediate program and work with the Education Technology Division to develop online interactive web-delivered lesson modules. Parry’s work in Asian II set the pattern he followed when establishing the School for Continuing Development in late 2000.

During this period Asian II implemented a new curriculum that led to an upward trend in proficiency scores and emphasized FLO-centered materials, instruction, and testing. From FY95 to FY97, the Korean program was the only of the Institute’s major programs to make improvements in all three FLO measurements: L2/R2/S2 and L2/R2/S1 proficiency percentages (up 11 and 13 points, respectively) and average performance FLO scores (up 2.5 points). The first class taught with the new curriculum graduated with proficiency results ten percentage points higher than were achieved in the past. In 1999, the proficiency FLO test results were comparable to previous years with 64 percent of students reaching the L2/R2/S1 level. There was, however, a dip of 4 percent in L2/R2/S2 levels, but this was balanced by lower attrition rate, falling from 23 percent in 1998 to 14 percent in 1999. In 2000, Parry maintained attrition at 15 percent while increasing the percentage of graduates at L2+/R2+/S1+ from 51 to 55 percent. Nevertheless, the decline in L2/R/2/S2 scores continued, falling another 8 percent in 2000.

Middle East Schools I and II

With the dramatic slowdown in Russian in the early 1990s and the after effects of the Gulf War, Arabic became the largest of the languages taught at DLIFLC. The Institute managed the program in two schools—Middle East School I (MEI) and Middle East School II (MEII). The two schools consisted of seven departments. During the mid-point of the 1990s, MEI consisted of three Arabic departments: A, B, and C, plus a multi-language department that oversaw the teaching of Greek, Hebrew, and Turkish. MEII

255 Middle East School I, Quarterly Historical Report, 1st Quarter 1998, in “Academic (Provost/Schools)” folder, box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
had four Arabic-only departments: A, B, C, and D. By the end of 2000, MEI had added one additional Arabic department while MEII still had four. In 2000, 409 students graduated from the Arabic program as compared to 353 in 1996.

Dr. Mahmood Taba Tabai left Middle East School I to become dean of European II in December 1997, and was succeeded by Mr. Charles Cole. On 26 December 1998, Cole was replaced by Dr. Christine Campbell, who had served as the Director of Test Development in Evaluation and Standardization. At the request of Clifford, Cole worked on a special Russian grammar development project until he retired. Lieutenant Colonel Alan McKee served as associate dean of Middle East School I until he moved to Asian School I in April 1996 and was replaced by Captain Hunter. Hunter was replaced in 1998 by Captain Wenger who was replaced by Major Matthews in 1999. The Chief Military Language Instructor remained Master Sergeant Fitts who was replaced by Sergeant First Class Timothy Mason by March 2000.

Middle East School II was headed by Ms. Luba Grant. She was assisted by Major Michael Makovitch, USAF, later by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Patterson, USAF, and finally by Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Jewitt, USAF, who was in place by August 1998. Master Sergeant Roger Swift, USAF, served as the Chief Military Language Instructor for the school until he was replaced by Sergeant First Class Doud in 1998. Doud was replaced by Sergeant First Class Lyonais by March 2000.

The number of students graduating from the two Arabic schools fluctuated between 310 in 1997, to a high of 445 in 1998, with an average of 369 annually. In addition, the schools continued to support mobile training teams and video training requirements in Modern Standard Arabic and in the Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian dialects. The constant growth of the Arabic program remained a challenge through the rest of the 1990s, as both schools struggled to find qualified faculty to bring aboard with enough lead-time to pass them through the Instructor Certification Course, which was required if instructors were to be effective in the classroom. In 1997, the two schools fell behind in hiring due to increased needs for faculty and problems with recruiting qualified candidates. Hiring would be further exacerbated after the attacks of 11 September 2001, as DLIFLC saw even greater requirements for Arabic faculty.

Working with an outdated curriculum continued to plague the Arabic programs in both schools throughout the late 1990s. Curriculum Review Teams in 1991, 1993, and 1996, identified deficiencies and the Arabic Curriculum Task Force and Curriculum Development personnel discussed various proposals for a new Arabic curriculum and submitted their ideas to Clifford. Unfortunately, funding was not available to address the

261 Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and Presidio of Monterey, Staff Directories, (DLIFLC, 2000 and 2002), pp. 9-11; and pp. 8-9 respectively.
263 Campbell had worked in Evaluation and Standardization since November 1987, and returned to ES in April 2006. She became Associate Provost for Language Science and Technology on 12 January 2009.
problems. Instead, the two schools developed a master schedule to insure that the programs were not diverging from one another. The two schools also launched a training effort to ensure that the faculty understood the final learning objectives and were able to bring them into the classroom. Finally, the faculty developed and used supplemental materials to work around the ageing curriculum. Another team completed the materials development for a new sixteen-week Arabic Refresher Maintenance Course. Students for the course, the first of its kind at DLIFLC in Arabic, arrived on 30 May 1996. In addition, the Arabic Curriculum for Semester III was reorganized in 1996, and the Semester I curriculum update project was launched in the summer of 1997, and completed the following summer. During 1996, the new Sound and Script introduction to the Basic Course was also implemented. In an effort to strengthen the Arabic grammar portion of the curriculum, acknowledged by all to be the weakest part of the program, the two schools, working with the Curriculum Division, began working on a two-year computerized Introductory Grammar Track project, in 1998. The completed project was envisioned for use in both basic programs and to be available for learners outside of class and in field units.

During 1996, most of the Arabic oral testers received “Back to Basics” training from Evaluation and Standardization and were re-certified. They began using the training with graduating classes in October 1996. In March 1997, the Arabic FLO test development project, which had been underway since 1995, was finally field tested, revised, validated, and ready for use.

During Calendar year 1996, the leadership of Middle East School I began a concerted push to integrate technology and to increase e-mail connectivity for each of the teaching teams. In September, the department chairs were placed on remote e-mail. The following month, the installation of wiring to hook up the local area network on the first floors of Buildings 619, 621, and 623 began. In 1996, the two school deans successfully articulated the need to upgrade the computer labs to take advantage of available software. New Pentium computers were installed in the computer learning centers of both Middle East Schools during 1997. The schools supported a contractor-run project of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to develop a computerized interactive program to assist interrogators and others needing advanced speaking skills.

The two Middle East schools worked together on several issues related to the growing joint Arabic program. In 1999, the schools strengthened classroom instruction by compiling additional authentic instructional material. They also developed exercises to reinforce the Performance FLO skill areas. In 2000, the schools introduced Arabic in Action, a 35-hour program designed to give students the opportunity to do job-related tasks within a military context. In one course, they even implemented a new Performance FLO textbook, “Introduction to Job-Related Skills in the Foreign Language.” The schools even developed and implemented computer-assisted studies.

materials, including the Standard Arabic Technical Transliteration System, a computerized program to improve students’ transliteration skills. Another computer-assisted study project was placed on CD-ROM in October 1996. The project consisted of 200 hours of Area Studies instruction with listening and reading exercises. Finally, the schools introduced new FLO-related tests to measure student progress in using numbers and technical transliteration.  

In 1999, the schools placed additional emphasis on special assistance for faltering students, as well as the evening study hall program. The following year, the two schools carefully monitored and evaluated performance by conducting diagnostic interviews/evaluations with each student. The schools also tackled grammar, which had been a long-time problem for the program, by introducing grammar clinics and developing a computerized grammar track. In 2000, the schools asked the students to sign pledges requiring the exclusive use of the target language. Additionally, the schools organized evening study halls to allow students access to faculty as they did homework. Finally, Language Training Exercises, initially held at the Weckerling Center, were introduced into the curriculum in 2000. The Language Training Exercises were quasi-immersion daylong practical exercises that used a variety of job-related scenarios requiring students to develop quick and accurate language responses in specific situations. In the next few years, these daylong exercises became the impetus for the on-site immersion programs held at a special facility on the former Fort Ord, as well as for the in-country programs whereby students were immersed in the language and culture of the language they were studying for up to a month at a time.

These initiatives led to a rise in proficiency in the Arabic program. DLPT results rose from 32 percent of the students reaching an ILR score of 2 in listening, 2 in reading, and 2 in speaking (L2/R2/S2) in fiscal year 1998, to 50 percent in fiscal year 1999. At the same time, the percentage of students reaching L2/R2/S1 rose from 68 percent in fiscal year 1998 to 81 percent in fiscal year 1999. The following year, 2000, the Proficiency FLO scores reflected Clifford’s modified new standards. The percentage of Arabic graduates attaining L2/R2/S1+ increased from 78 percent to 81 percent, while 28 percent of the graduates in the two schools scored L2+/R2+/S2.

Although the curriculum and testing development centered on Arabic in Middle East School I, there were changes in the other languages as well. On 1 August 1998, for example, Dr. Nickolas Itsines, the chairperson of the Multilanguage Department and head of the Greek Branch, implemented Term I of the new Greek Basic Course and the Greek faculty began writing tests for the course. The Greek Basic Course development project was revived by obtaining the services of a new contractor. Itsines and Dr. Gisele Yonekura, the Academic Coordinator for MEI, collaborated in developing FLO sub-skill

276 Ibid.
content themes for each of the ten modules of Term II. However, the retirement of Itsines, meant that work on the Greek Basic Course was never completed.

PROFICIENCY FLOs
ARABIC

Figure 10 DLIFLC Arabic Proficiency FLO Scores, 1985-2004

During 1998, the Hebrew Branch revised a number of its biweekly tests and revised its final semester tests. That year, the Turkish Branch embarked on an ambitious program to revise the area studies tests for all three semesters, all biweekly and final tests, and departmental FLO tests. Middle East School I contributed to language related activities outside of Monterey, in addition to resident classroom training as several Arabic military language instructors supported the United Nations Special Commission inspection team in Iraq.²⁷⁸

Finally, among the major issues that the faculty of Middle East School II dealt with was increasing the number of split sessions, which by the end of 1998, accounted for 44 percent of instruction. The use of cohesive teams and individual assistance appeared to make a difference in the outcome of the students. Other initiatives included creating a study hall and a computer lab. The school also created a student progress review committee to monitor the progress of its students. Under this program, the chairs from the four departments were brought together to discuss student performance.²⁷⁹

European Schools I and II

Effective 5 April 1996, the Commandant, Colonel Daniel D. Devlin, redesignated East European I School and East European II School as “European School I” and “European School II” respectively. Although there was no change in mission, the

²⁷⁸ Quarterly Historical Report, Middle East I, 2nd Quarter (April-June) 1998, in box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives; Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 21 Apr 98.
²⁷⁹ Historian’s notes, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 18 Aug 98; Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 20 Jan 98.
redesignation reflected the reality of a changed geo-political situation. With the Cold War over, the prominence of East European languages taught at DLIFLC was in decline.\textsuperscript{280} Russian was still the largest language in European Schools I and II, was still one of the largest programs at DLIFLC, and was still only one of two languages managed by two school deans. However, DoD requirements for Russian graduates fell in the early 1990s, reaching a low of 237 in 1995, before climbing again to 424 in 1998. In 1999, the two schools enrolled 560 in the Russian Basic program and graduated 414 linguists. The following year, 2000, saw the beginnings of another decline in Russian students and the two programs graduated only 405 students. The number of graduates continued to fall in the early years of the new century.\textsuperscript{281}

Faculty in European School I also provided instruction in Czech, Polish, Russian, Serbian/Croatian, and Ukrainian in 1996. European I had three Russian departments, lettered A, B, and C and a Multilanguage Department that taught Czech, Polish, Serbian/Croatian, and Ukrainian. The Polish and Czech programs were transferred to the European and Latin American School in September 1997. There were no Ukrainian graduates in 1997, and by 2000, the Ukrainian and Polish programs were transferred to the DLI-Washington office. Czech followed in 2001.\textsuperscript{282}

From 1996 until 2000, European II remained responsible for the teaching of Russian, Persian-Farsi, and a special Russian course for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which had twenty-four advanced level students in 2000. The school contained three Russian departments, lettered A, B, and C, and two Persian-Farsi departments, lettered A and B. The DTRA program was fairly self-sufficient with its own curricula and tended to keep faculty for many years.\textsuperscript{283}

In September 1996, the dean of European I, Charles Cole, moved to Middle East School I and was replaced by Benjamin De La Selva, who had been the dean of European School II. Cole and De La Selva were assisted by Major S.J. Collins who was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Denise Travers, USAF, by August 1998. The academic coordinator for European I was Dr. Maurice Funke, who remained in the position until Clifford abolished all academic coordinator positions in 1997.\textsuperscript{284} De La Selva left European I to become dean of European and Latin American School in December 1999. He was replaced by Deanna Tovar, former chair of the Serbian/Croatian Department and one of the chief architects of the highly successful Spanish program developed in the West European and Latin American school in the early 1990s. Tovar was assisted by Travers and in 2000 by Major John Mummert. De la Selva remained dean of European II until September 1996, when he left to become the dean of the European I. De la Selva was replaced by Dr. Mahmood Taba-Tabai, a native speaker of Persian Farsi, who ran the

\textsuperscript{280} Meyer, Memorandum entitled “Organizational Change,” 15 April 1996. At the same time, the Western European and Latin American School was redesignated the “European and Latin American School.”

\textsuperscript{281} See DLIFLC FLO Proficiency charts for number of graduates for each fiscal year. Statistical data compiled from \textit{Annual Program Reviews} (DLIFLC, 1997-2001).

\textsuperscript{282} Pam Taylor, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 22 June 2007. The last Czech class graduated with one student on 25 July 2001.

\textsuperscript{283} Deanna Tovar, “Russian Program,” information paper in \textit{Annual Program Review, 8-10 February 2001} (DLIFLC, 2001), p. 6. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency was formerly known as the On-Site Inspection Agency.

\textsuperscript{284} Quarterly Historical Report, Asian II, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Quarter 1997, in box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
school until he left to head up the Global War on Terrorism Task Force in December 2001.  

**Russian**

In February 1996, a pilot project that used commercial Russian texts, *Golosa* (“Voices”), began and in August 1997, European I graduated the first class that used *Golosa* during the first two semesters.  

Unfortunately, the proficiency results were somewhat lower than the average for other classes that graduated in fiscal year 1997. These results were possibly caused by an overall drop in speaking proficiency, from 90 percent of students reaching level 2 on the DLPT in 1995, to only 45 percent in 1996. This dramatic decline correlated with the introduction of the “Back to Basics” oral proficiency interview scorer training program initiated in the Russian schools.  

The Back-to-Basics program led to changes in the Russian program. Faculty began working with students on sustained, free-flow conversations of the type they would encounter when taking the oral proficiency interview. Rather than continuing to use the older multiple choice tests, the program adopted constructed response tests. These measures were designed to get students used to working actively with language and began showing results during the last quarter of calendar year 1998, and continued through 2000. Additionally, academic attrition dropped from 25 percent in fiscal year 1996 to 14 percent in fiscal years 1997 through 1998. It rose slightly to 16 percent in 1999, but dropped back to 14 percent in 2000.  

The Russian schools adopted the end of course tests developed by the Evaluation and Standardization Directorate. The new tests had the effect of further consolidating the teaching programs of the two schools as the joint Russian Curriculum Task Force worked on the creation of standardized core syllabi for the programs in both schools.  

During the late-1990s, the deans of the Russian program placed an emphasis on faculty training at the school level and authorized faculty to attend the Master of Arts in Teaching a Foreign Language (MATFL) program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The schools also focused on helping teachers learn to use computers effectively and to develop Computer Aided Study programs to improve Listening and Performance FLOs skills.  

Proficiency scores in Russian dropped from a highpoint of 96 percent of students graduating with scores of 2 in Listening, 2 in Reading, and 1+ in Speaking (L2/R2/S1+) in 1995, to a low of 64 percent achieving L2/R2/S1+ in 1997. Then, as the changes mentioned above began having a positive impact, the scores rose through the rest of the decade, with over 80 percent of graduates receiving L2/R2/S1+ by fiscal year 2000.  

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287 Ibid. For more information on the Back-to-Basics training, see Chapter IV.  
European School II also taught Russian. Although the Basic language program accounted for the majority of Russian students, the school provided two follow-on courses in Russian: the twenty-week LeFox program and the 33-week OSIA program. In 1996, OSIA agreed to have a dedicated OSIA program of ten instructors at all times. The OSIA faculty developed a Grammar Review and Enrichment course book that included terms related to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty); START II, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty; Cooperative Threat Reduction; Chemical Weapons Agreements; the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; and the Open Skies Treaty. OSIA sent two faculty members to Washington, DC, to collect materials for curriculum development in 1996.

![PROFICIENCY FLOs RUSSIAN](image)

**Figure 11 DLIFLC Russian Proficiency FLO Scores, 1985-2004**

In addition to the Basic program, faculty from the two Russian schools supported the non-resident mission. During 1996, European I provided interpreters who served in Moscow, Ukraine, and at Fort Leavenworth and Newark AFB. The school also sent MTTs to Fort Lewis and Fort Devens. In 1997, European I was responsible for a score of Russian and Ukrainian translations for various Department of Defense agencies. European I also provided translators and interpreters to the US Secret Service in support of training trips to the former Soviet Union. At the end of July 1997, European I hosted a one-week Ukrainian orientation course for a delegation of general and senior field grade officers from the California Air National Guard. Faculty in European II also taught 27 Russian advanced students under contract for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, formerly the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). European School II Russian faculty also taught an average of sixty to ninety VTT hours per week while also participating in eighteen MTTs.²⁹¹ In July 1999, the Russian non-resident program faculty moved to the

School for Continuing Education. Since then, the schools continued to support nonresident requests which could not be met by SCE staffing alone.\(^{292}\)

**Serbian/Croatian**

During the latter part of the 1990s, events in the former Yugoslavia focused attention on the instruction of Serbian/Croatian, at the Presidio of Monterey and throughout the Defense Foreign Language Program. In December 1995, CALL hosted a Serbian/Croatian materials fair as a part of a DCIFLC language-teaching readiness initiative. Representatives from DLIFLC, the NSA National Cryptologic School, and the CIA Office of Training and Education/Language Training Division showcased and exchanged materials in several media and participated in a roundtable discussion of their programs’ strengths and weaknesses. CALL provided the participants with a variety of videotaped Serbian television programs. DLIFLC and CALL’s Federal Language Training Laboratory demonstrated their joint “Serbian/Croatian Conversion Course Supplemental Exercises” CD-ROM, of which thirteen out of a projected sixteen modules were complete and available for use at the Command Language Programs on CD-ROM by March 1996.\(^{293}\) The exercises were designed to improve listening and reading comprehension at Levels 1 through 3. The Federal Language Training Laboratory also developed a computer-based supplement to the DLIFLC “survival language kits” for Serbian/Croatian.\(^{294}\) The program fit on two floppies readable on any sound-equipped 386 (or better) PC or laptop and featured audio and simple graphics. The program was developed in under two weeks and could be easily and quickly adapted to meet other contingency language needs. The Materials Fair series was also the foundation for a series of readiness reports for the DCIFLC and for the federal language teaching community at large. The reports listed the community’s instructional materials and courses, DLIFLC management comments, and lists of reference materials maintained in CALL’s Language Materials Database.\(^{295}\)

For the greater part of fiscal year 1997, the Serbian/Croatian Department graduated most students from its “Conversion” program, a sixteen-week course to retrain Russian linguists in Serbian/Croatian. In early 1997, there was a surge in such training and the Department established three contract courses to fulfill the requirement. DLI-Washington even conducted one course for forty students in Monterey using four contract instructors. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) conducted the other two courses at Fort Hood, Texas in November 1996 and February 1997, using one contract instructor and one DLIFLC instructor on a rotating basis. Additionally, two groups of students graduated from the first basic course classes taught in Serbian/Croatian at DLIFLC since 1989, the year the original program was discontinued. The first group graduated in June 1997 with 26 percent of the students achieving the goal of Level 2 in Listening, Reading, and

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\(^{294}\) Language survival kits included a phrasebook, cassette tape, and 100-word “Command and Control” or “C2” card intended to fit in a soldier’s pants pocket.

Speaking. Of the second group, which graduated in September 1997, 67 percent achieved Level 2 in all three skills.\(^{296}\) When the program was reestablished in 1996, DLIFLC hired faculty but had no curriculum as no one could locate the Serbian/Croatian materials last used in 1989. After searching for appropriate materials to teach, the department procured an old audio-lingual course still in use by the Canadian Defense Forces. Unfortunately, NSA reviewed the course and found it to be out-of-date although the school continued to use the program as curriculum revision began in December 1997. In 1998, due to the growth of faculty and students, the Serbian/Croatian program changed from branch status to department status and Dean Tovar appointed Team Leaders and began working on team building. She also held weekly meetings with student leaders to help adjust the program to student needs.\(^{297}\)

In 1999, the department hired eight faculty as more students were assigned to the Serbian/Croatian Department. In 2000, three new instructors were added to the program, although five left the department; two began working on end-of-course tests in the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, two transferred to Curriculum and Faculty Development to work on a new curriculum for the program, and one left to work in Continuing Education on Diagnostic Assessment. By the end of 2000, of the eighteen faculty, half had been hired since mid-1999.\(^{298}\) In an effort to help the program academically, Dean Deanna Tovar hired Claudia Bey as the chair of the Serbian/Croatian department in December 1999. Bey had extensive faculty development experience and Tovar brought her into the program to focus on this issue.

Faculty were divided into four programs: Basic, Conversion, Refresher, and nonresident support. As the services struggled to find qualified linguists for the Kosovo mission, they enrolled Serbian/Croatian heritage speakers in the Conversion program. As noted above, the Conversion program was meant to convert existing military intelligence linguists, with proficiencies in Russian or other Slavic languages, to Serbian/Croatian in a short amount of time. This effort was possible because the military linguists had already been through a DLIFLC Slavic language program and had a good foundation in Slavic language structure. The same was not necessarily true, unfortunately, for heritage speakers. The department found that these speakers had a limited, at best, understanding of grammar and were quickly overwhelmed in the classroom. Dean Tovar recommended that Conversion training be restricted to trained linguists.\(^{299}\)

The Serbian/Croatian faculty also supported nonresident programs for linguists and non-linguists. Faculty conducted a sixteen-week Conversion course for a Civil Affairs Reserve unit in Texas on a temporary duty status. They also conducted three one-


week VTT refresher programs. In addition, they conducted a six-week course in Oregon and a four-week course in Rhode Island for non-linguists.  

The program used task-based events, such as car-searches and job interviews, and added new ones focused on elections. In 2000, a military science course (MS 120) was developed to provide additional lab hours for students in their first semester. Faculty also revised several other courses, including Area Studies (AS 140), Introduction to Foreign Language Culture, and History and Geography of the Foreign Language Region (AS 240). While working to improve the Basic Program, faculty also began developing an intermediate level curricula for students slated to arrive in October 2001.

The Serbian/Croatian FLO tests were an area of special concern. Because the curriculum was so new, only Proficiency FLO tests existed; other FLO tests had yet to be developed. On 25 November 1997, Dr. Carolyn Crooks, DFLP director, related the findings of a DFLP review of the Institute’s basic Serbian/Croatian language course. In a memo addressed to the DLIFLC commandant, Crooks reinforced the need for the teaching of all FLOs and stated that requests to emphasize certain FLOs especially crucial to current mission requirements did not constitute permission to ignore the other FLOs. DLFP reviewers were also concerned that both students and faculty be correctly prepared – students for the task of learning a new language, faculty for the task of teaching. This preparedness required that students receive “language awareness training” focused upon such issues as how languages work and how to study. Additionally, faculty were to be instructed in other topics, including ILR level descriptions, methods of providing feedback and follow-through, teamwork, and the FLOs themselves. Moreover, the DFLP reviewers were insistent that students master both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets; that authentic materials be used wherever possible; that Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian be seen as dialects of a single language; that “potentially sensitive material [be] presented in appropriate contexts and [have] a purpose clearly related to the appropriate learning task at hand”; and, finally, that “[i]nflammatory material … not be presented.” This guidance was to begin the following month for new courses and was to be phased in with the completion of the current course module for classes already in session.

The reason DFLP managers insisted that “inflammatory material” be avoided was simply because the program hired faculty from all the ethnic groups of the former Yugoslavia, which resulted in tensions as conflict escalated in the Balkans between 1996 and 1999. Some faculty especially complained about the devastation that was occurring in their homeland by US-led NATO air strikes against Serbia in 1999. As a result, those who could not accept the political and military position of the United States quit teaching at the institute, while others received counseling from the department chair and school dean. DLIFLC continued to teach students throughout the turmoil. Each year, fewer were lost due to academic attrition and more graduated with higher proficiency scores.

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301 Ibid.
302 Director, Defense Foreign Language Program (C. S. Crooks), Memorandum to Commandant, Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), entitled "Basic Serbian and Croatian Language Course," 25 November 1997.
Despite these events, student proficiency results increased each year between 1997 and 2000. In 1997, 39 percent of Serbian/Croatian graduates reached ILR levels 2 in listening, 2 in reading, and 1+ in speaking (L2/R2/S1+). In the following year, 1998, 49 percent of graduates reached levels L2/R2/S1+. Between 1999 and 2000, the pace of improvement began to level off as 69 percent and 70 percent of graduates, respectively, obtained proficiency scores of L2/R2/S1+. The key to increased proficiency was the professional development of the faculty, weekly meetings with the chairperson, the use of authentic materials, and the computer laboratory, as well as weekly student meetings and the development of a student database that allowed the military language instructors to keep track of student performance on a weekly basis.304

**Persian-Farsi**

In 1997, European II had 100 civilian faculty (sixty-four in Russian and thirty-six in Persian-Farsi). There were nine MLI’s in Russian and four in Persian-Farsi. The school had approximately 420 students, of whom 260 were taking Russian and 160 Persian. Enrollment in the Persian course rose to 192 in 1998, declined to 165 in 1999, and declined again to 158 in 2000. Ninety percent of the Persian-Farsi students were in Basic Persian Course with the remainder in short courses ranging from 2 to 36 weeks.305 In addition, two British Navy personnel were enrolled in the Persian-Farsi Basic Course and the faculty taught a special Persian-Farsi course to CIA students.306

The dean of European School II, Dr. Mahmood Taba-Tabai, adopted a number of administrative policies designed to support faculty members in the performance of their teaching duties. Taba-Tabai and the department chairpersons conducted extensive class visits and provided feedback to teachers that emphasized positive aspects and constructive criticism. The administration initiated breakfast/roundtable discussions with the faculty and coordinated faculty input with input from students in the form of the Interim Student Questionnaires and Automated Student Questionnaires to insure that problems were resolved and student needs were met. European II teachers received training in teamwork and conflict resolution and in making the most efficient use of existing materials while supplementing those materials with information from the Internet. The elimination of English from all classes and all phases of instruction was also a priority for Taba-Tabai, who called instruction in the target language the greatest “untapped source of increased productivity.” Taba-Tabai stressed the use of integrating all the FLO skills and Internet-based materials in the basic program and the training of the faculty.307 Taba-Tabai also appointed a new chairperson and assigned four new team leaders to serve on the seven teaching teams.308

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307 Ibid.
In 2000, Taba-Tabai implemented several other specific academic reforms. For example, he started a joint project with Evaluation and Standardization to develop “an entirely new” testing program. He stressed the use of Performance FLO tests while increasing the use of speaking tests “to provide a greater emphasis in that skill.” In coordination with the NSA National Cryptologic School, Taba-Tabai also initiated a FLO-oriented “Transcription” project. As demonstrated in the chart below, Taba-Tabai’s initiatives led to an increase in proficiency in Persian-Farsi. Between 1996 and 2000, proficiency varied from a low of 74 percent of graduates reaching the ILR goal of 2 in listening, 2 in reading, and 1+ in speaking (L2/R2/S1+) in 1996, to a highpoint of 89 percent of graduates reaching levels L2/R2/S1+ in 1999. In addition to raising proficiency, the Persian-Farsi departments cut academic dis-enrollments by half in 2000 to a low of 6 percent.\(^\text{309}\)

**PROFICIENCY FLOs**

**PERSIAN-FARSI**

**Figure 12 DLIFLC Persian-Farsi Proficiency FLO Scores, 1985-2000**

*European and Latin American School*

Ms. Grazyna Dudney became dean of the Western European and Latin American School in March 1996, replacing Dr. Alex Vorobiov, who became dean of Academic Administration.\(^\text{310}\) In December 1998, Dudney became dean of Curriculum and Faculty Development and Mr. Benjamin De La Selva left European I to become the dean of the school, which had changed its name to “European and Latin American School” or ELA in April 1996 as directed by the commandant.\(^\text{311}\) Major Kevin Brown, USA, served as

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\(^{309}\) Ibid., p. 4.


\(^{311}\) European and Latin American School, Quarterly Historical Report, 3rd Quarter 1997, in “Academic (Provost & Schools) 1996-1st QTR,” folder, box 12, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Benjamin De La
the Associate Dean for the school until he was relieved by Major Michael Markovitz, USA. Markovitz also worked on the Korean Basic Course Development project. Markovitz was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Crane, USAF.

Instruction at ELA included four Category I languages: French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish. Spanish remained the largest language in the school, with three departments. The school also taught one Category II language, German, as well as two Category III languages: Polish and Czech, which were added in late 1997. During 1996, the German Department was reduced to a branch in the Multilanguage Department while the Dutch Branch was closed.

During fiscal year 1997, the Spanish faculty completed a translation project for the Department of Energy. At the request of Congress, it completed another for the US Army’s School of the Americas, the program at Fort Benning, Georgia, that instructs Latin American soldiers in the arts of war. The school began a follow-on translation project in 1998. The Spanish program also supported the video teletraining and Mobil Training Teams, scheduled by the Operations Plans and Programs Directorate.

Development of a new Spanish Basic Course to replace the twenty-year old curriculum began in 1995, and was completed in August 1997. All the work was done by an in-house team of Spanish faculty, headed by Deanna Tovar and consisting of Dr. Raul Cucalon, Cecilia Barbudo, Gudelia Adams, and Ariel Perez. Barbara Darrah helped edit the material. During 1996, the Spanish faculty also worked on the Spanish Interactive Videodisk Project. By December 1996, the faculty had reviewed the first three exams for the new basic course and in October 1997, the Spanish program implemented the “Back to Basics” Oral Proficiency Interview testing program.

Validation of the Spanish Basic Course started in summer 1997. It was not complete until March 1998, but faculty began using the new course as soon as August 1997. The curriculum provided twenty weeks of instructional materials, a set of Form A tests, and a partial set of Form B tests. Administrators expected faculty to obtain or develop authentic materials to use in the last five weeks of the course, which was student-centered and utilized authentic language and cultural information. After initial student results using the new curriculum came in at only 54 percent of the first class and 59 percent of the second class reaching the proficiency goal of 2 in Listening, 2 in Reading, and 2 in Speaking (L2/R2/S2), the department chairs and team leaders held a series of
meetings to determine what the problem was. They concluded that the course was not the issue, rather during the validation process, the department had sacrificed teaching quality and the students did not have enough time to assimilate the language, especially grammar. Additionally, the faculty had not developed new audio lab exercises and the old exercises did not reinforce what was learned in the new course. Finally, the new teams waited too long before introducing the students to the video component of the new course. As a result, the program reorganized the syllabus to lengthen the time spent on difficult grammar topics. The program also developed a new audio-lab manual and began the video component at the mid-way point of the program rather than waiting until the third semester. The changes had the desired impact and in fiscal year 1999, 80 percent of graduates reached L2/R2/S2. With the switch to the new proficiency goal of 1+ in speaking in 2000, 87 percent of graduating students achieved at least a L2R/2/S1+ in the Spanish program. In 2000, the Spanish faculty added new teaching material and tests to the Military Science 120 course.

**PROFICIENCY FLOs**

**SPANISH**

![Graph showing proficiency scores from FY85 to FY00](image)

**Figure 13 DLIFLC Spanish Proficiency FLO Scores, 1985-2000**

In addition to increased proficiency results, academic attrition dropped from 14 percent to 9 percent in fiscal year 1997 and was down to 7 percent the following year. This was the result of 95 percent of the Spanish faculty completing workshops in diagnosing and remedying learning problems in 1996 and 1997.

In September 1997, ELA gained the Polish and Czech programs as the result of a reorganization of DLIFLC’s schools. ELA also conducted a heavy off-site training and

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translation load in addition to the on-site mission. For example, in June 1997 the ELA staff completed a large-scale translation of School of the Americas lesson plans mandated by the Defense Department’s Inspector General to satisfy a congressional requirement.  

During this period, the faculty reviewed the entire battery of French tests and began new test development. In December, they developed a series of four French cultural tests. The Italian Branch began using a commercial textbook entitled Crescendo. By 2000, the Portuguese faculty revised the European Portuguese Interim Tests and taped fifty European Portuguese lessons. The German faculty produced and put into use a unit on the environment for German coursework.

As discussed earlier, the school relocated one-third of its classrooms (teachers and students) to build the Consolidated Team Concept (CTC) in all languages. The CTC kept faculty and students within the same language program in close proximity. This allowed students easier interaction with their faculty to receive counseling and individual attention. The school used every available space to cope with the influx of new students. Instructors even conducted split sessions on the third floor (a covered terrace) of Munakata Hall, the conference room, the auditorium, and faculty offices. These efforts paid off, as student proficiency rose from 17 percent in 1998 to 80 percent in 1999. In addition, attrition dropped from 15 percent in 1998 to 13 percent in 1999 and fell to only 8 percent in 2000.

Recruitment of Spanish faculty remained problematical during 2000, as the school could not find qualified instructors and the teaching teams remained seven instructors short. Part of the reason was due to the high demand in the civilian economy for Spanish faculty, interpreters, and translators. People with these skills found ample employment in colleges, businesses, government, the legal system, and other fields where Spanish and English skills were at a premium. To overcome the shortfall, the school and the Faculty Personnel Office contacted several college Spanish programs. The need for additional faculty was temporary, however, as in 2001, the services sent fewer than expected Spanish students and Dean De La Selva began working with other directorates, Curriculum, Faculty Development, and Evaluation and Standardization to identify areas where excess Spanish faculty could be utilized.

De La Selva brought an expertise in the use of computers in foreign language education. When he moved European I to the European and Latin American School in December 1999, he immediately began working with the Directorate of Information Management to get the computer lab operational. By 2000, De La Selva had obtained a Pentium computer for every faculty office as well as e-mail for every faculty member who wanted it. He also obtained software to standardize the input of student grades.

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325 Ibid.; and De La Selva, “Spanish Language Program,” Annual Program Review, 7-8 February 2001, p. 7. Split sessions allowed faculty to focus on specific problems with a small group of students.
De La Selva also encouraged the practice of multi-media instruction with audio cassette, video cassette, CD, and DVD sources. During 2000, the Spanish program completed course materials and tests for the Military Science 120 course and validated a listening comprehension component to augment the Performance FLOs. Spanish faculty also began a dialect recognition program to identify speaker variants in the Spanish language as well as a dictionary usage system to aid in restoring of words and meanings based on listening cues. The FLO results in 2000 matched those of 1999. L2/R2/S1+ remained at 87 percent, while L2+/R2+/S2 stayed at 59 percent. Academic dis-enrollments also matched the 1999 low of 8 percent. Accomplishments on the Performance FLO-test battery remained at 78 percent. There was a general feeling that, as the Proficiency and Performance FLO results were significantly higher than in 1998, the two-year old Spanish Basic Course was yielding the expected dividends.328

Washington Office

Major Arne Curtis, USA, served as director of the DLI-Washington office and was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Griffith S. Hughes by May 1998,329 who was later replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Terrance Sharp, USA. The office consisted of a staff of nine civilians and military personnel, officer and enlisted, from the Army, Navy and Air Force. Its mission was to represent the DLIFLC commandant in the National Capital Region, manage the Contract Foreign Language Training Program, and conduct the training and certification program for the Russian translators assigned to the Moscow-Washington Direct Communication Link (MOLINK) and to the White House Communications Agency. During 1999, DLI-Washington assisted 394 military students from the four services, as well as from the Defense Attaché System and a few civilians working for federal agencies who completed training in fifty-one languages. In 2000, the office assisted 337 students in forty-six languages. Of these, 131 were enrolled in a Basic program, 78 took an abbreviated Basic course, another 78 took a language familiarization course, 43 students were in a refresher program, and 7 were enrolled in a conversation class. Most of the students were enrolled by the Defense Attaché System (175) including dependents. Unlike the students enrolled in DLIFLC language programs in Monterey, where the vast majority of students were in their first term of enlistment, at DLI-Washington slightly more than half (172) of the students were officers with grades of O4 to O6 with only a few junior enlisted.330

Language education at DLI-Washington was conducted at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute and by five contract foreign language schools within the Washington metro area. The results were not as high as obtained by DLIFLC, but were respectable when considering that the Defense Attaché students were simultaneously engaged in attaché training while enrolled in language courses.

FY93 - 00 DLI-W
OVERALL PROFICIENCY RESULTS

Figure 14 DLIFLC Overall Proficiency Results, 1993-2000

NOTE: Speaking (S) attainment recomputed starting FY99 to align with DLIFLC in-house data collection.
Chapter IV

Academic Support

As in years past, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center continued to rely heavily upon academic support and could not educate military linguists without the dedicated efforts of both military members and civilian employees. DLIFLC faculty, military instructors, service unit cadre, test and curriculum developers, faculty trainers, as well as technology and administrative experts, formed a seamless weave of interconnected strands that enabled Institute students to learn and perform at their maximum capacities.

DLIFLC Faculty—Civilians

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center employed 832 civilian faculty members as of 30 November 1999. Of these, 448 held advanced degrees and forty civilian faculty members were enrolled in the Master of Arts in Teaching Foreign Language program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS). The faculty provided resident instruction in twenty-four languages and several dialects administered through seven schools and twenty-six language departments.

Approximately 85 percent of the faculty belonged to the merited-based Faculty Personnel System and the remainder were in the excepted civil service General Schedule system. As of 19 June 2000, 556 or 67 percent of the faculty were in the 50 to 70 or over age group. Fully 266 faculty had already met the minimum requirements for retirement and most remaining GS faculty were expected to retire over the next decade to be replaced with FPS members. Thus, DLIFLC leadership felt demographic changes were assisting the long-standing plan to fully professionalize the faculty. Managers expected new instructors to be hired at the assistant professor rank and to hold at least a masters degree in foreign language education, Teaching English as a Second Language, or in a closely related field, such as linguistics, language, literature, or education.

DLIFLC Faculty—Military Language Instructors

In addition to civilian faculty, the Army authorized the institute to maintain a small contingent of Military Language Instructors or MLIs, who were assigned by the four services on a proportional basis based on the number of students each service had in

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the basic programs. By early October 1999, there were eighty-one MLIs serving at DLIFLC (41 Army, 27 Air Force, 8 Navy, 5 Marines). By late September 2000, the number of MLIs remained eighty-one (37 Army; 29 Air Force; 11 Navy, and 4 Marines).\textsuperscript{334} Five MLIs held a MATFL degree from MIIS while fifteen others were enrolled in that same program.\textsuperscript{335} The MLIs were enlisted non-commissioned officers or petty officers who were experienced linguists selected for this duty from field assignments to enhance the language programs with their job-related experience. The MLIs built their own language and teaching skills by serving in roles analogous to those of graduate teaching assistants. However, they served not only as vocational subject matter experts and language teachers, but as mentors and key role models for young enlisted personnel. Moreover, while the civilian faculty provided the bulk of the foreign language and area studies teaching, the MLIs provided training in specific military language terminology.\textsuperscript{336} The MLIs were also active in the development and integration of the FLO performance skills.\textsuperscript{337}

The MLI program manager in 1996 was Army Master Sergeant Ron Solomonson. He was replaced by Sergeant Major Ron Anderson, who served in the position until 1999 when Sergeant Major Norman Zlotorzynski arrived and served as the chief MLI through 2000. Solomonson reported a correlation between the presence of MLIs in the classroom and the rate of Initial Entree Trainee attrition and argued for more MLIs during the 1997 Annual Program Review. Anderson felt that the ratio of one MLI per thirty students, or one per class, would lead to “significantly lower attrition and raise FLO subskill scores.”\textsuperscript{338} Nonetheless, the services did not increase the number of MLIs, rather the number decreased from ninety-two in 1996, to eight-one by 2000. At the same time, however, MLIs were increasingly pulled from the classroom and deployed to support operations in Bosnia, Egypt, Honduras and Iraq.\textsuperscript{339} They also made numerous trips for the “Total Army Involvement” program and served on Mobile Training Teams to support law enforcement agency training missions.\textsuperscript{340} The loss of MLIs and other permanent party military personnel due to deployments would become even more acute after 11 September 2001.

\textsuperscript{336} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{338} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{339} SSG Raymond Criswell and SSG Omar Kalai became the first and second DLIFLC MLIs to deploy with the UNSCOM inspection team in Iraq. Criswell was the first Army Linguist of the Year. See “Arabic instructor named Army Linguist of the Year,” \textit{Globe}, August 1996, p. 19; ATFL-SMA-AD, Quarterly Historical Report April-June 1998 (2\textsuperscript{nd} Quarter CY), 28 July 1998; Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 21 April 1998.
Students in Resident Training

The vast majority of DLIFLC students were unmarried enlisted soldiers who lived in nineteen barracks on the Presidio of Monterey. Students who were married or had families lived in housing on the Presidio’s annex on the former Fort Ord. The annex was home to 5,500 officer and enlisted DLIFLC students, Naval Postgraduate School students, their spouses, and their children. Officers who were unmarried or were geographically separated from their spouses were given housing allowances to find living arrangements in the community. Military students reported to one of the four service commands: the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion, the Marine Corps Detachment, the Naval Security Group Detachment or the 311th Military Training Squadron.

Colonel Devlin’s priority was to ensure that the students and their families were taken care of and that they received the best possible instruction. Devlin’s philosophy was that students were customers who should not be treated as products by the Institute, Garrison, and service units. As he met with service unit commanders and garrison personnel he asked them to reassess their attitudes toward students.

Devlin had a more difficult task in convincing Institute faculty to adopt his educational philosophy. He realized that it would take some time for an organization teaching twenty-two different languages with faculty from over fifty different cultural backgrounds to accept the concept of student as customer. Initially, faculty felt Devlin was putting them in a subordinate position to the students they were teaching. He tried to convince everyone to think in terms of the students being the “focus of their work, and that their success in teaching was determined by the success of the students, their customer.”

Troop Command to 229th Military Intelligence Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Dees, who assumed command of Troop Command in June 1994, presided over the decommissioning of the command and its redesignation as the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion on 21 March 1996. The unit was redesignated as a military intelligence unit, and allowed to unfurl guidons with the striking blue “MI color,” because most Army DLIFLC graduates received military intelligence assignments upon finishing their coursework and the change was intended to help build esprit de corps. Dees was subsequently reassigned to Washington, DC, on 1 July 1996, and was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Jason Ploen. Ploen arrived in Monterey from the Architecture Directorate, Office of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers in Washington, DC. Ploen served as the

341 Briefing Slides, Command Briefing, 26 August 1998.
342 Permanently assigned non-student personnel who were not assigned to assist the management of one of the service units were assigned to the Army Headquarters Headquarters Company or to the Air Force Element and are discussed in Chapter VI.
344 Ibid.
commander of the 229th MI Battalion until 1 July 1998, when he was reassigned to the US Army Liaison Office, National Security Agency. Lieutenant Colonel Steven Rundle then took command of the battalion. Before coming to Monterey, Rundle served as the chief of the Army Division of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand.\textsuperscript{347}

The 229th MI Battalion had the largest group of students at DLIFLC with 1,448 students enrolled in language programs during fiscal year 1996.\textsuperscript{348} By the beginning of October 1999, the unit had 1,587 soldiers in language training. Of these, 1,483 were in a language class and 104 were on casual status, either waiting for a class start or awaiting orders for a follow-on assignment. Although the 229th was still the largest of the military services at the Presidio of Monterey, by the end of September 2000, the number of soldiers assigned to the battalion had fallen to 1,345 with 1,250 in class and 95 on casual status.\textsuperscript{349}

The soldiers of the 229th MI Battalion were organized into six companies, A through F. Five of the companies were dedicated to initial-entry soldiers who, in addition to language training, had to complete their soldierization training while at the Presidio of Monterey. Alpha Company consisted of students studying Korean, Chinese, and the languages of South East Asia. Bravo Company was for students studying Arabic, Hebrew and Turkish. Charlie Company consisted primarily of soldiers studying western European languages. Delta Company was diverse, containing students studying thirteen different languages. Delta Company had platoons of soldiers from Middle East II, Middle East I, the European and Latin American School, and European II as well as a platoon for officers and NCOs. Echo Company contained students from Asian I, Asian II, and European I schools. Soldiers who were in casual status were assigned to 4th Platoon of Echo Company as well. Foxtrot Company contained Russian students.

In 1998, the Department of Defense launched a new initiative regarding the separation of the sexes in the barracks, a dramatic reversal from earlier policies. The new policies demanded that quarters for men and women be in different barracks, be separated with barriers, or at least be placed on separate wings. Visitation between men and women in the barracks was limited as well. To adapt to these new rules, the 229th had to reorganize its barracks arrangements. Of approximately 1,600 soldiers\textsuperscript{350} in the 229th MI Battalion during 1998, 35 percent were female. By the end of fiscal year 2000, only 374 or 28 percent of the soldiers assigned to the 229th were female. Most of these soldiers lived in the barracks, and the new policy thus directly impacted their lives. DLIFLC


\textsuperscript{350} 1,025 soldiers were initial entry trainees who came directly from basic training.
received $700,000 from the Army for “gender separation” renovations in the barracks in fiscal year 1998 and $3,500,000 for gender separation in fiscal year 1999.  

**Marine Corps Detachment**

Major Todd Coker, USMC, remained in command of the Marine Corps Detachment (MCD) until 2 July 1996, when he was assigned to the Second Radio Battalion, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina as the executive officer. Coker was replaced by Major Fred H. Sanford, USMC. Sanford came to Monterey from Headquarters, Marine Forces Europe, Stuttgart, Germany, where he was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Sanford, a former Arabic graduate of DLIFLC, relinquished command on 24 July 1998, to Major Thomas Sparks, USMC, and retired in September. Prior to taking command of the MCD, Sparks had served in Washington, DC, where he had served as the Marine Corps foreign language officer and manager of its Defense Attaché Program.

During 1996, there were 154 Marines attending classes at the Presidio of Monterey. By 1998, the number of Marines more than doubled with 331 in the detachment. Of that number, 300 were assigned to a language program, 15 were on casual status prior to starting class, and 18 were casuals awaiting orders after completing a program. By October 1999, the number of Marine students fell to 245 of whom 225 were in class and 20 were carried as casuals. By September 2000, the number of Marine students or casuals had declined to 242 with 220 assigned a seat in a language program and 22 were on casual status.

The Marines, like the other services, was concerned about attrition. To address this issue, Sparks focused on the process that determined which students would be placed in which language program. Like the other services, the Marine Corps used the Defense Language Aptitude Battery scores as a central part of the process. Sparks, however, questioned whether DLAB scores alone were good indicators of performance in languages. In particular, he wanted to identify a student’s strengths and weaknesses before they began a language program.

Soon after taking command, Sparks adapted a learning style assessment developed by his father, Dr. Richard L. Sparks, that was created to profile and match firefighters and police officers with appropriate jobs and used it to assess learning styles for different languages. For the rest of 1998, the MCD became a test-bed for this new approach. By the end of the year, attrition rates were down to three percent and on 14

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354 Historian’s notes, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 17 November 1998.
356 Historian’s notes, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 18 August 1998.
August 1998, Dr. Sparks met with the commandant, Colonel Daniel Devlin, and gave him a briefing on the project. The new assistant commandant, Colonel Johnny Jones, also took an interest in the project and asked if the procedure could replace the DLAB in accepting and placing students in language categories at DLIFLC. The Army told Jones to study the validity of the new procedure before making any changes. By 30 March 1999, Lane Aldrich, a retired army chief warrant officer and an action officer working at the Army Foreign Language Proponency Office for the deputy chief of staff for intelligence, had sent $200,000 to DLIFLC to test the validity of the “Sparks Profile.”

Dr. J. Ward Keesling of the Research and Analysis Division of the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization accepted the task of evaluating the Marine Corps assessment tool. The evaluation did not look at Marines but tried to replicate the Marine results using Army students without success. In his final report, Keesling reached the conclusion that the counseling the Marine students received may have had some positive impact, “but were not statistically significant” to justify the expense of undertaking the same type of counseling experience throughout DLIFLC. Keesling’s results did not indicate that the Sparks learning style assessment would be of use at DLIFLC for the selection or placement of students in language programs.

**Naval Security Group Detachment**

Commander Gus Lott, Jr., remained in command of the Naval Security Group Detachment (NSGD) through 12 November 1996, when he departed DLIFLC to become an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. Lott’s replacement, Lieutenant Commander Barry Phillips, was well prepared for his new job having served as Lott’s assistant officer in charge since June 1995.

Students of NSGD were the third largest group at DLIFLC. In fiscal year 1996, the Navy had 282 officer and enlisted students enrolled in language programs. Two years later, NSGD ranks grew to 482 students with 54 awaiting assignment to a class. By the beginning of fiscal year 2000, the number of seamen assigned to the detachment dropped to 332 of whom only 6 were on casual status. However, by September 2000, the naval detachment had expanded to 410 students assigned with 372 in class and 38 on casual status.

The Navy sent approximately 85 percent of its DLIFLC students directly from recruit training or from the fleet under a conversion program. The remaining students included personnel en route to certain commands that required language skills, On-Site Inspection Agency teams, Naval Special Warfare Command SEAL teams, and other officers and specialists.

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357 John Lett, Jr., Memorandum for Record, “History of Sparks Profile Project and ‘LAMP’ to Date,” 5 April 1999; Historian’s notes, Assistant Commandant’s Staff Meeting, 31 March 1999.
NSGD’s responsibilities included enlisted billeting, personnel administration, Navy and general military training, academic development, administration, and educational services. It was also responsible for the assignment of initial entry training students to instruction courses.

NSGD operated with the support of other organizations in California. The Personnel Support Detachment at the Naval Support Activity, Monterey Bay, provided personnel support and the Navy Legal Services Office in San Diego provided legal support. During 1998, NSGD reorganized its administrative procedures to resemble a shipboard quarterdeck. For example, shipboard protocol was followed and visitors surrendered their identity cards when they entered the main NSGD building.\textsuperscript{362}

\textbf{311\textsuperscript{th} Military Training Squadron}

Lieutenant Colonel Janet J. Escobedo, who took command of the 311\textsuperscript{th} Military Training Squadron in February 1995, retired on 28 February 1997, and was replaced with Lieutenant Colonel (select) John R. Diggins. Diggins, a DLIFLC Chinese and French alumnus, served as interim commander of the 311\textsuperscript{th} Military Training Squadron from February to July 1997. His assignment as commander became permanent the following August.\textsuperscript{363} Diggins, III, remained in command until 12 July 1999, when he was assigned to the Army War College and Lieutenant Colonel Patrick L. Smith assumed command. Smith, a heritage Italian speaker, came to Monterey from an assignment in Italy where he served as an assistant air attaché from April 1996 until June 1999.\textsuperscript{364}

Air Force students were the second largest body of students at DLIFLC. The Air Force presence at DLIFLC was 686 in fiscal year 1996.\textsuperscript{365} By 1998, its squadron stood at about 950. By October 1999, however, there were 816 airmen assigned to the 311\textsuperscript{th} with fifty-four on casual duty awaiting orders or the start of a language program. By the end of September 2000, the number had again declined to 756, but with 105 on casual duty.\textsuperscript{366}

Within the 311\textsuperscript{th}, students were grouped into flights, lettered from A to J, based on their gender and their phase in the program (how far along they were in their course of study). Students began in phase 1 status when they arrived and ended in phase 5 at graduation. Flights ranged in size from sixty to ninety personnel, depending on the number of students in the phase of their language training. All prior service enlisted students were assigned to the Training Support Flight while officer students were assigned to the Command Support Staff.

Among the issues facing the 311\textsuperscript{th} was how to track and deal with airmen who were in academic jeopardy. As of 10 August 1998, 102 out of 763 Air Force students

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\textsuperscript{362} ATFL-NSGD, Quarterly Historical Input, 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Quarter FY 1999, 9 July 1999; ATFL-NSGD to Director of Naval History, 1998 Command History, 15 March 1998; Historian’s notes, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 18 August 1998; Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 17 March 1998.
\textsuperscript{363} “Presidio Portrait of Lt. Col. (Select) John Diggins, Commander, 311\textsuperscript{th} Training Squadron, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey,” \textit{Globe} 20, no. 7 (October 1997): p. 2.
\end{flushright}
were in academic jeopardy. The 311th’s Academic Training Flight coordinated the efforts related to this issue by reviewing each airman’s case to identify problem areas early on and to come up with solutions and remedies.

In May 1998, the 311th TRS sponsored the DLI World-Wide Language Olympics, with Master Sergeant Lisa A. Meyer serving as coordinator. Personnel from the 311th oversaw the set up and running of both the resident games and the video teletraining games. In November 1998, the Air Force element was awarded the Air Force Organizational Excellence Award for exceptionally meritorious service.367

**Student Activities**

Students from all four services participated in a variety of activities. These included sporting events, training and recreation activities, and volunteer work. For example, in 1998 the Institute sent two teams of soldiers to compete in the “Army 10-miler,” an annual running competition involving mixed teams of active duty personnel held in Washington, DC. DLIFLC teams came in 10th and 19th out of 105 competing teams. That same year more students were able to participate in the annual DLIFLC soccer championship held annually on Soldier Field on the Presidio of Monterey against students from the Naval Postgraduate School—NPS won that year. DLIFLC Russian student Specialist Joseph Kruml also took first place in the 1998 All Army Chess Championship held at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.368

Community and volunteer activities included participation in the search for Christina Williams, a twelve-year-old girl who was abducted from the Presidio of Monterey’s annex.369 Students also volunteered in community events such as Christmas in the Adobes in Monterey. Others volunteered to help cleanup activities at the Presidio of Monterey, its annex, and Asilomar State Beach in October 1998.370

DLIFLC students are, for the most part, members of the Armed Forces and may be called upon for a number of military duties. The majority of Army students in the late 1990s were also required to complete their basic entry training after they arrived in Monterey. Thus, in addition to language training, soldierization and professional development training were key missions of Troop Command and later the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion. On 10 February 1996, Alpha Company, under the command of Captain Douglas Mastriano, participated in Operation Dragon Thunder on the Presidio Annex at the former Fort Ord. The training, focused upon military operations in urban terrain, allowed soldiers to use both their newly acquired military and language skills in a realistic combat scenario. Soldiers put on camouflage face paint and used Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment, which registered “hits” with a loud


369 See Chapter VI for details on the kidnapping of Christina Williams.

audible squeal. The exercises included traditional urban combat against opposing forces, use of AT-4 anti-tank weapons, practice of first aid, deployment of Claymore mines, and conduct of operations under nuclear, biological and chemical warfare conditions. The soldiers also used their target languages—Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Tagalog, Thai, and Vietnamese—to work through scenarios involving “partisans.”

The next time Operation Dragon Thunder was repeated, Saturday, 22 June 1996, Mastriano enlisted the help of Dr. Neil Granoien, dean of Asian II. Granoien and a few faculty members, including Bo Yang Park, Mi Kyong Kim, and Tom Coleman, volunteered to assist about one hundred students. Granoien and Coleman played casualties and the other faculty acted as friendly or hostile forces. The soldiers again ran through standard squad tactics in an urban environment while employing their target languages in encounters with opposing force partisans speaking Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Thai, Tagalog, and Vietnamese. One task was to determine friend from foe among the wounded, assist them, and obtain information about the enemy including their weapons and the direction they were headed. According to Mastriano, the training was “a complete success” and was a first in DLI history because it involved a school, Asian II, and a military unit, Alpha Company, combining to make the exercise happen. Such training, said Mastriano, reminds soldiers of “why they are here” and that “they are members of the best army in the world.”

Although the students enjoyed Operation Dragon Thunder and were more than willing to give up a Saturday, Mastriano faced opposition to continuing the exercises. “The battalion was not supportive, saying that the company commander wasted resources such as smoke grenades, artillery simulators and blank rounds.” It would be another two years until there was a renewed emphasis in soldierization under Lieutenant Colonel Rundle.

Military exercises confined to the Presidio or the former Fort Ord were not the only opportunities for student linguists to practice their new skills. On 24 April 1996, DLIFLC sent seven students and staff members to San Francisco International Airport to take part in a drill covering the Airport Emergency Procedures Manual (Air Piracy), the Airport Emergency Plan, and other airport emergency procedures. For added realism, the San Francisco FBI office, the Federal Aviation Administration, and airport staff asked that DLIFLC provide six Arabic linguists who could pretend to “hijack” an international flight.

The six DLIFLC Arabic linguists played the role of a group of Islamic religious radicals who, after hijacking a United Airlines DC-10, faced over one hundred FBI agents and SWAT Team members. The goal of law enforcement and airport officials was to save the passengers, played by airport personnel, and get the plane back safely.

374 Historian’s notes, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 17 November 1998; Historian’s notes, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 18 August 1998.
while negotiating in Arabic. The successful exercise let the six DLIFLC linguists use their language proficiency in a manner not contemplated in normal classroom exercises.  

**Foreign Area Officer Program**

Lieutenant Colonel Gary E. Walker remained director of the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program until 10 August 1997 when Lieutenant Paul S. Gendrolis assumed command. Gendrolis was a Middle East specialist who came to DLIFLC from Turkey where he was the chief of the Joint Programs Directorate, and the political military officer for the Office of Defense Cooperation-Turkey. Gendrolis was reassigned to Ankara, Turkey on 10 August 1999. In his place, the Army assigned Colonel Manuel Fuentes, the first full colonel to serve as director of the Institute’s FAO Program.

The FAO Program invited guest speakers from academia and US and foreign government officials on a monthly basis. The program also hosted the FAO Course. In 1996, the FAO Program expanded its mission “to provide oversight and mentoring for the FAOs through all phases of their training.” To that end, a database was developed to track the progress of each FAO student from language training to graduate school to in-country training. The FAO director also gave an in-briefing to new Foreign Area Officers assigned to DLIFLC on the importance of their language studies and the follow-on graduate school education and in-country training.

In July 1996, Walker, as FAO director, taught a summer course in African studies for the Naval Postgraduate School. From 20-28 September 1996, he also traveled to Chad to teach a weeklong course on the demobilization of armed forces.

Major General Howard J. von Kaenel, Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, gave the keynote talk at the 15-19 December 1997 FAO Course. His talk was entitled “The Army in the 21st Century and the FAO.” Ambassador Edward Peck, the former US Chief of Mission in Iraq and Mauritania and former embassy official in Sweden, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt, also spoke on “US Foreign Policy and the FAO” and “The Country Team and the

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CINC.” In addition, Gendrolis invited fourteen universities to the first University Fair to highlight opportunities in graduate education. The university fair was such a success, with other schools asking to attend, that it became a permanent feature of the FAO Course.

In 1998, the FAO Office worked with the Presidio of Monterey garrison commander to secure an office and meeting space in the Weckerling Cultural Center for the Monterey World Affairs Council. The council held monthly meetings with national and internationally known speakers that FAOs as well as other DLIFLC students, faculty, and staff were able to attend at little or no cost.

**Non-DoD Students: US Government and Foreign Military Students**

Devlin’s emphasis on treating students as customers coincided with an effort to allow civilians not associated with any government agency to attend DLIFLC language courses on a space-available and cost-reimbursable basis. The two-year pilot program, sponsored by local Congressman Leon Panetta, was enacted into law with the fiscal year 1995 Defense Authorization Act. Between 1996 and 1998, a small number of non-government civilian students attended DLIFLC under this demonstration legislation.

Only seventeen non-government civilians requested admission applications. These potential students, like military students, had to qualify for their stated language by passing the DLAB with an appropriate score. Of the thirteen civilians who took the DLAB, ten qualified for their preferred language. Four other applicants, who requested intermediate language training, also passed the DLAB. After passing the DLAB, an applicant had to wait almost for the start of a language class to see if openings or seats were available. Military students had first priority for up to two weeks before the start date. At that time, if the seat was still available, a potential civilian student had just twenty-four hours to confirm their intention to take the course. If admitted to a language program the successful candidate had to agree to pay a tuition fee of $397 per training week. The students were overseen by the DLIFLC Directorate of Operations, Plans and Programs, functioning somewhat as their sponsoring agency.

By January 1997, 574 individuals had requested information about the program, however only 6 civilian students actually enrolled. The first was Mary Lou Politi Ziter who began Italian on 3 October 1996 and graduated on 31 March 1997. The second civilian student to graduate was Emily Buchbinder who enrolled in Japanese on 11 August 1997 and graduated on 2 February 1998. Finally, Anna M. Chavez enrolled in Spanish on 18 August 1997 and graduated on 5 March 1998. The 3 other civilian students...

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students who were enrolled failed to graduate. One Japanese student studied for five and one half months before dropping the course, another studied Italian for three months, and the final civilian student was in German for only eleven days. With such limited demand, Congress did not extend the two-year pilot program past 30 September 1997.

In addition to military students, the Institute had a small number of foreign civilian and military students in residence in any given year. For example, in 1999 Masahiro Takehana of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was enrolled in Russian while in 1998 Royal Navy Chief Petty Officers Steve Gough and Christopher J. Haley were enrolled in Persian-Farsi.

**Evaluation and Standardization Directorate**

Dr. John L.D. Clark, dean of the Evaluation and Standardization Directorate (ES) since 1986, retired in December 1996. Beginning on 1 January 1997, Dr. John Lett, director of the Research and Analysis (ESR) Division, served as the acting dean while continuing in his ESR position. Lett continued to serve as acting director of ESR until Dr. Martha Herzog, the dean of Asian II (Korean), was appointed dean of ES in August 1998. Dr. John Neff was acting director of the Evaluation Division and later became deputy director of the Test Development and Standards Division. Deniz Bilgin took over as director of Evaluation by 2000. Captain Brian Hinsvark, USAF, was director of the Test Management Division, although Captain Thomas Gallavan, USAF, led the division through most of 1997. In March 2000, Captain Joseph Slavick was staffing the position. Dr. Dariush Hooshmand continued to direct the Test Development Division, until March 2000 when he was reassigned to teach Persian Farsi. By then, ES had also added a small Tester Training and Education Division directed by Ms. Sabina Atwell.

The dean, division directors, and staff members of ES remained proactive and responsive to the teaching side of the Institute and to other major customers in seeking ways to improve assessment procedures. An example of the direct correlation between research findings and program improvements included the decision to lengthen selected cross-training courses.

**Test Development**

The Test Development Division of the Evaluation and Standardization Directorate completed the review and revision of the Final Learning Objective test batteries in

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386 Pam Taylor, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 1 August and 24 August 2007. There is no indication that the four students interested in intermediate language training ever attended DLIFLC.

387 According to Command Historian Stephen Payne, the Army was not a strong supporter of the program because the inclusion of non-government civilians in the same classrooms with military students who were shortly to work in highly classified environments posed a potential security problem.

388 In 1996, DLIFLC had 43 civilian or foreign students enrolled, in 1997 there were 26, in 1998 there were 30, in 1999 there were 24, and in 2000 there were 20. Della LeMire, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 31 December 2007; Pamela M. Taylor, e-mail entitled “Foreign students” to Stephen M. Payne, 2 January 2008, in “Stephen Payne Email” folder, box 58, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.


thirteen languages in the second half of 1996.391 In 1997, the division also completed the Serbo-Croatian DLPT IV batteries; the initial DLPT IV batteries in Vietnamese, Arabic, and Thai; an update of German and Persian-Farsi DLPTs; and the validation of Czech, Japanese, Polish, Spanish, French, Hebrew, and Tagalog DLPT IV forms.392

In September 1997, DLIFLC awarded a contract to Alpine Media, Inc., to help it convert several paper-and-pencil DLPT IV batteries to CD-ROM format.393 Student responses were to be entered via keystrokes or mouse clicks and analyzed in a central scoring station. Scores would be printed and/or sent to the appropriate database. Although the pilot stopped short of “computer adaptive testing,” the contract was to generate relevant knowledge and experience for future testing initiatives designed to “move in that direction.” During April 1998, ES developed a Russian prototype of a computer-delivered DLPT for testing reading and listening. ES completed the DLPT computer conversion in Russian and Brazilian Portuguese in 1998 while Arabic, German, and Persian-Farsi were in progress. Computer-delivered tests for the twenty other languages with conventional DLPT IV batteries were to be completed in November 1999.394

Unfortunately, by 2000 it had become apparent that the contractor could not deliver a satisfactory product. In a summary report, “Problems Encountered with the Alpine Media Products,” DLIFLC evaluators found numerous problems with the computerized tests. Nevertheless, the product was accepted without a pilot test. It was functional for use on individual workstations, despite a tendency to freeze, but did not work in a network environment. ES continued working to develop an electronic scoring system and began an in-house project to convert Russian, Brazilian Portuguese, Arabic, German, and Persian-Farsi DLPT IVs to compact disk format.395

During 1999, work began on a new generation of the Defense Language Proficiency Test—the DLPT 5. Development of tests in the new format began in Chinese, Korean, Russian, Serbian/Croatian, and Spanish. In addition, ES began experimenting with developing the programming necessary for web-delivery of the DLPT 5. The Test Development Division also worked on an upper range Russian DLPT at the request of the National Security Administration. Development and delivery of the DLPT 5 would consume the division for the next decade and will be discussed in depth in


393 For the languages of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Thai, Turkish, Hebrew, Czech, Polish, Tagalog, Spanish, and French.


a later DLIFLC Command History. Plans were also underway for testing listening comprehension in three Arabic dialects in addition to Modern Standard Arabic.  

Beginning in 1994, DLIFLC testing officials were involved in two initiatives to standardize and improve the testing of speaking proficiency, one in the federal language community at large (the Unified Language Testing Plan or ULTP) and one at the institute (the Oral Testing Task Force). Successful validation of the ULTP’s interagency test led DLIFLC testing personnel to integrate the interagency procedures into the Institute’s own “Back-to-Basics” training program, which was designed to retrain testers in strict accordance with the Interagency Language Roundtable performance standards. To accomplish this, the ES Oral Proficiency Interview training branch developed a two-week training program for all testers. The training was designed to show testers how to “push” the test-taker, in a natural and nonthreatening way, until they could no longer sustain the conversation. At that point the tester would have the test-taker sustain the highest level of performance until the tester was satisfied that they knew the test taker’s level of sustained performance as measured by the ILR. ES tester training staff, then followed up the initial training with integrated professional development support consisting of periodic meetings, discussions and individualized assistance. DLIFLC started retraining its proficiency testers to the new standards in March 1996, beginning with the Russian testers. The Arabic testers were retrained in October of that year, followed by English testers in May 1997 and Spanish testers in October 1997. These were followed by Korean, Persian-Farsi, and Chinese testers in 1998.

In 1999, ES made further progress in the effort to retrain and enhance the skills of all Oral Proficiency Interview testers. All testers for Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Japanese, Russian, Serbian/Croatian, Thai, and Vietnamese successfully completed a new 96-hour workshop. ES also implemented a Master Tester program to help with language-specific materials, training, and issues. Finally, a strong quality control program was established to ensure maximum objectivity and reliability in the tests conducted by over three hundred certified testers.

For several years, graduating students had completed the Automated Student Questionnaire (ASQ) that allowed DLIFLC administrators to capture student perceptions about their overall experience at the Presidio of Monterey. These automated questionnaires were networked so that reports could be rapidly compiled for managers of the academic programs, the service units, and the garrison support activities. The reports

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396 Martha Herzog, “Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) Status,” information paper in Annual Program Review, 7-8 February 2001 (DLIFLC, 2001), p. 15. Note, since development of the DLPT 5, an Arabic numeral, not a Roman numeral, has been used to classify the test series.
397 For an account of DLIFLC’s efforts to reform the testing of speaking proficiency, see Steven R. Solomon and Jay M. Price, DLIFLC&POM Command History 1994–1995 (DLIFLC, 1999), pp. 53-55.
identified strengths and weaknesses in the language learning programs and academic materials at DLIFLC, as well as the living conditions found on the POM, to allow immediate correction of any problems. Questionnaires were also administered to students in the nonresident program receiving language instruction by video teletraining or mobile training teams. A variety of analyses and trend reports were provided to assist managers in improving DLIFLC language teaching. In 1996, the Evaluation and the Test Management Divisions coordinated the administration of an Interim Student Questionnaire (ISQ) in Category III and IV languages. The two divisions wanted to see if there would be any benefit to having students comment about their perception of the quality of instruction, academic materials, and living conditions before they graduated. The experiment was successful and in 1998 Test Development put the ISQ into permanent service. The division also revised the ASQs, which became known as the End-of-Course Student Questionnaire (ESQ). Finally, the division developed a special ISQ for students who failed to complete their language program.401

Evaluation

During 1996, the Program Analysis Branch of the Evaluation Division conducted Training Assistance Visits (TAVs) for European II, Asian I, Middle East I, European and Latin American, European I, and Middle East II schools. The visits were designed to help school deans and directors to address teaching and learning priorities. The TAV teams observed teaching teams and discussed management policies, procedures, and operations issues with school managers as they related to ASQ evaluation reports, the Goodfellow Air Force “Feed-forward/Feed-back” system, and curriculum reviews. After modifying its procedures to reflect a mission support organization, PA even conducted a TAV for ES, its own directorate. Any lessons learned from this exercise were to be used while conducting TAVs for other non-teaching directorates.402

During 1998, ES worked to further refine the speaking test procedures generated by the Unified Language Testing Program. A workshop on the refined procedures was planned to start in June 1999 featuring enhanced training materials for all testers. Other plans include a comprehensive orientation for managers and for non-testing faculty members and the institution of a system of “master testers” to ensure quality control of the proficiency testing process.

The Evaluation Division developed questionnaires for participants in the resident and nonresident programs, CLP manager’s Workshops and Seminars, the Language Olympics, and teacher training courses. Evaluation personnel planned to perform a systematic analysis of trends identified in questionnaires and create a “Decision Matrix” to regularize and monitor the awarding of waivers that allow students not attaining the L2/R2/S2 proficiency goal to proceed to follow-on training. The Evaluation Division maintained contact with follow-on training sites to determine student success after leaving DLIFLC.

In the spring of 1997, DLIFLC Arabic students were to begin field-testing a voice-driven interrogation program in Arabic (Iraqi) developed by Interactive Drama, Inc., under a DoD contract. On 28 January 1997, the Center for the Advancement of Language Learning showcased the product, which allowed students to interrogate one of four computerized characters in either Modern Standard Arabic or Iraqi. In early 1997, CALL played host to almost fifty representatives from the federal language community at the first Cyberlearning Summit, convened “to discuss the feasibility of developing a unified distance learning program.”

ES participated with CALL on several proficiency testing projects before the later organization was closed down. During fiscal year 1998, ES handled $247,000 in CALL funds, representing 75 percent of CALL’s disbursements that year. One project involved expanding an advanced level listening test prototype. In another project that year, ES conducted analysis in the merits of different forms of speaking tests, including face-to-face, telephonic, desktop video, and tape-based. ES received $100,000 from CALL for converting DLPT tests to computerized versions. As part of the tester training program, ES developed familiarization videos for a number of languages. Moreover, ES participated in an interagency tape, tester, trainer, and trainee exchange with the FBI and CIA.

**Research and Analysis Division**

Between 1996 and 2000, the Research and Analysis Division published eight reports. Five ESR reports were contracted with Litton/PRC, Inc., a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman. One project was called the “Language Skill Change Project—Relook,” which consisted of two interim reports, *LSCP Relook: Interim Report* and *LSCP Relook: Second Interim Report*, completed in 1996 by Gordon L. Jackson and Victor M. W. Shaw. The final report was contracted for $62,800 in funding from the CIA’s Foreign Language Committee. When published in 1997, it updated ten-year-old data regarding the patterns of language skill change that occurs in students between the time when they leave DLIFLC and when they complete their follow-on training. The 1996 reports looked at results from SIGINT graduates only while the 1997 report included SIGINT and HUMINT graduates.

In 1997, ESR bid another contract to PRC, Inc., for $152,600 with funding from the CIA Foreign Language Committee. The project described the benefits of different kinds of immersion programs and provided tools for selecting and evaluating immersion

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The following year, PRC, Inc., conducted a project to describe the principles to be used when cross-training linguists.\textsuperscript{408} In 1999, Dr. Gordon Jackson of ESR reviewed the validity of scores given by testers using the Speaking Proficiency Test developed by the Center for Applied Language Learning in three different testing procedures: face-to-face, telephonic, and desktop video. The study concluded that the testers were “within one step of each other,” but because they “crossed a major, level boundary about half the time in Russian and in the Arabic TME [tape-mediated test]” decision-makers had to “be prepared to tolerate some degree of ambiguity and to exercise caution in making important decisions based on single ratings of oral proficiency.”\textsuperscript{409} In 2000, Dr. J. Ward Keesling, a contractor with Litton/PRC, Inc., conducted an analysis of proficiency results when the DLIFLC, CIA, and FBI rated Russian and Spanish speaking test tapes from other agencies. Keesling found that the CALL-developed Speaking Proficiency Test was not as reliable as the Oral Proficiency Interview developed by DLIFLC and the project was abandoned.\textsuperscript{410}

From 29-30 August 1996, ESR hosted the initial planning conference for the Proficiency Evaluation Project at CALL’s center in Washington, DC. The project compared the performance of civilian college students and DLIFLC graduates on the DLPT by testing over nine-hundred college and university students on the DLPT in six languages although only a subset received speaking tests.\textsuperscript{411}

In addition to projects done within ESR or contracted, division staff worked with students from the Naval Postgraduate School who were completing their master’s degrees in Operations Research. The students were encouraged to undertake “real world” research projects that would benefit the military. Dr. Richard E. Rosenthal, chairman of the NPS Department of Operations Research, contacted Dr. John Lett, Jr., at the Institute to see if DLIFLC had topics that could be worked into master’s theses. As a result, students completed four theses between 1996 and 1999 on DLIFLC-related issues.

In 1996, Dr. Stephen Payne, the deputy command historian and accreditation liaison, asked Lett if there were any studies of the relationship of gender and success in DLIFLC language programs. Payne wanted to address concerns by the Accreditation Commission for Community and Junior Colleges, on how women and minority students, faculty, and staff were treated by member institutions. Because the only such study to date was conducted in the early 1970s, Lett arranged for Lieutenant George Arthur, a graduate student in the Operations Research Division at the Naval Postgraduate School, to take on the topic for his thesis. Arthur’s study revealed that females had both a lower


academic attrition rate and a higher administrative attrition rate than males. Arthur also showed that the higher attrition rate for Air Force women was due to the high percentage of junior grade enlisted Air Force women in the most difficult Category IV languages. As a result of the Arthur’s attrition study, the Air Force established the “smart start” program for all Air Force students prior to beginning their foreign language program as detailed in Chapter 3.

In 1997, Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Anderson, USN, worked with Dr. Gordon Jackson on a study called “Initial Entry Student Attrition from the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center.” Anderson analyzed the results of placing students dropped from Category III and IV language courses, such as Russian or Arabic, into Spanish, a Category I language. Anderson’s thesis showed that students who entered the Spanish course after failing a more difficult language were academically successful in Spanish although some were still dropped due to administrative reasons.

Dr. John W. Thain, also with ESR, worked with Lieutenant Johnna M. Marchant, USN, to study how student scores on the performance portion of the Final Learning Objective (FLO) tests related to student success on the DLPT and whether there was a correlation of the scores on both assessments to success in follow-on cryptology training at Goodfellow Air Force Base. Marchant’s findings revealed positive relationships and correlations in some languages but not in others and she recommended that DLIFLC validate the FLO tests against expected DLPT results.

In 1999, Thain had Lieutenant Nicole L. DeRamus, USN, conduct a detailed look at relationships among semester grade point averages (GPAs), major test grades, and end-of-training outcomes. DeRamus found that semester GPAs were the most predictive variable of overall DLPT performance in Arabic and Persian-Farsi.

**Curriculum and Faculty Instruction**

In the mid-1990s, the Directorate of Curriculum Instruction (DCI) supported the teaching process in three ways. First, its Curriculum Division guided and facilitated course materials development, including both traditional media and computer software. Second, its Faculty and Staff Division provided training and other opportunities for faculty professional development. Finally, its Technology Integration Division facilitated the use of suitable educational technology by both teachers and students.

Since the 1980s, every curriculum review conducted by outside agencies, such as the NSA Cryptologic Language School, has reported that the DLIFLC language “materials [were] outdated in both content and methodology [and were] a pervasive
problem.” The Curriculum Division, according to DLIFLC policy, “establishes policy and quality standards for development of all course materials, provides advice on projects during the development process and ensures materials developed conform to current policies and standards.” Nonetheless, DLIFLC faced two key obstacles that prevented revision of the curricula. First, the institute had no funding to hire new faculty to replace any removed from the classroom and used to develop curricula in-house. Similarly, it had no funds to contract out curriculum development. Second, most faculty did not come to DLIFLC with knowledge of current trends in teaching methodology and curriculum design.416

The Korean Curriculum Development Project

During 1993, Dr. Alex Vorobiov, the dean of the Korean School, issued an instructional process policy letter. Vorobiov sought an increase in “task-based communicative activities” in small groups. This change led to speaking proficiency level increases of 12 percent over the previous two years. In addition, after study and consultation with faculty, students, and key personnel, Vorobiov eliminated the ten-year-old core Korean curriculum, a 33-volume set of textbooks. These were replaced with a two-volume commercial textbook called Myungdo.417 To help augment these materials, the school produced the first four volumes of Korean Proficiency Enhancement Exercises and seventeen Korean School Proficiency Tests in listening and reading.418 Although the faculty was serious about improving the curriculum, Provost Ray Clifford felt the process needed extra attention and asked Neil Granoien to head the program and the curriculum review process.

Initially, the Korean basic course development was a school project. Along with Granoien, Clifford assigned Dr. Patricia Boylan to Asian II as one of two academic coordinators focused upon curriculum development.419 Clifford tasked Joe Kwon, the other academic coordinator, to develop the final FLO test, an important aspect of the program improvement process. Kwon spent the rest of 1993 and most of 1994 on that project. Meanwhile, Granoien and Boylan spent several months observing classes and talking to faculty and students as the next steps in overhauling the Institute’s Korean program. The pair discovered that the Korean teachers were using outdated teaching techniques, and that the teaching process was not well defined. However, they also discovered that the instructors were receptive to change and willing to adapt. Granoien and Boylan reached the conclusion that the curriculum needed to undergo a complete rewrite. The expectations for Korean graduates had changed and the approach to teaching technology had also changed. Granoien and Boylan asked the command group to fund a project to restructure the Korean program over eighteen months. This was an unprecedented plan as most previous programs had taken curriculum development up to

417 Note, the Myungdo course was developed by missionaries and contained numerous liturgical references.
419 The other schools received only one academic coordinator, but Korean was given two in an effort to help the school. However, Kwon’s services were needed to help develop the final FLO tests and he was reassigned for the rest of 1993 and most of 1994 to that project.
five years from start to finish. That scenario, however, insured the final product would lack cohesiveness. However, Granoien and Boylan argued, if a large enough team was assembled they could accomplish the goal in a fraction of the time. The command group accepted the proposal, freeing resources for ten civilian faculty members and two MLIs.420

Granoien and Boylan’s first job was to teach the new curricular development team members the process of writing a text. This was no simple task. None of the members had formal language textbook writing experience. In addition, there was no tradition of textbook writing for Korean as few foreigners attempted to learn the language prior to 1950 while available commercial textbooks lagged behind in instructional approaches. Furthermore, a lack of consensus among scholars in describing Korean resulted in there being no set grammar that was accessible to learners. Granoien and Boylan went beyond presentation of vocabulary and grammar and trained the writing team to adapt learning psychology to the classroom. After an introduction to the process, the team members began work that they would complete in July 1996. In addition, Granoien worked with department chairs to shift the focus of their jobs from administration to teaching, encouraging them to become role models for the rest of the faculty.421 The development project continued throughout 1994 and into 1995.422 The task of writing a communicative Korean textbook targeted at American learners turned out to be even more formidable than expected. By spring of 1995, the project’s deadline was extended from eighteen to twenty-two months and the staff was increased from ten to fifteen.423

Between November 1997 and June 1998, Dr. Maurice Funke developed five area studies units on North and South Korea. The project consisted of content, interactive self-tests, graphics, and instructions for computer programmers. The five units consisted of approximately one hundred hours of task-based self-study in reading and listening. Andy Soh and Jay Kim began translating the materials into Korean so that they could then transfer these to a computerized format. Unfortunately, by July 1999 the project had grown in size and complexity and then languished. At least part of the problem was that the Institute did not have a computer programmer available.424

Granoien was unable to complete the third semester of the three-semester-long Korean course and Martha Herzog replaced him as the Korean dean while still retaining her position as director of Curriculum and Instruction. Herzog put together a new team under Andy Soh to develop the final semester. Delays in completing the course also led to delays in training faculty in how to teach the course.425

The Spanish Curriculum Development Project

During the first years of this period, significant effort went into improving the Institute’s Spanish program. As background, from 17 February through 4 March 1993, a board of seventeen civilian and military Spanish language experts evaluated the Spanish

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420 Historian’s Notes, Interview with Dr. Neil Granoien, 29 November 1994.
421 Ibid.
424 Maurice Funke, e-mail entitled “Area Studies” to Steven R. Solomon, 19 July 1999.
425 Martha Herzog, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 21 March 2007.
program—the Spanish Curriculum Review. The board reviewed several key components of the program, focused upon the basic Spanish Program, and gave comprehensive feedback to the School of Romance Languages, which later folded into the European and Latin American School.426

As a direct result of this review, Vorobiov, the dean of the European School, formed a Faculty Advisory Committee and a Spanish Executive Steering Committee. The existing Spanish course originated in the 1970s and featured outmoded methods such as cognitive code, dialogue memorization, and heavy use of transformation and pattern drills. Despite faculty efforts in the mid-1980s to adapt the curriculum to proficiency-oriented instruction methods, the course was badly outmoded. Vorobiov estimated that school faculty would need four years to devise a new curriculum.

Development began in early 1995 and continued until 1997. Deanna Tovar led the project as the academic coordinator for the new European and Latin American School. Because the faculty was both enthusiastic and competent, Tovar decided to limit the formal development of each day’s activities to four hours. The Curriculum Division helped by reviewing course materials and keeping the project on schedule. Tovar’s guiding principle was to create a curriculum different from and far superior to any commercial materials (for military purposes) by targeting the special needs of DLIFLC’s students. FLO sub-skills, such as gisting, summarizing, and reading authentic handwriting, were incorporated from the very first chapter. Every fifth chapter included both a traditional review and a “bridge.” All bridges in the new course were tied to military life, and the military emphasis became stronger and more explicit as the course progressed. The new curriculum was to consist of two volumes covering the first two semesters with video-based materials used for the third semester.427 The Spanish faculty reviewed the products and made suggestions for improvement and the final product was implemented with assistance from the developers. The course was readily accepted as the Spanish faculty was involved and took “ownership” of it.428

Reorganization

On 3 September 1997, Colonel Devlin, authorized an organizational change to the Directorate of Curriculum Instruction. Devlin intended the new organization to emphasize faculty as much as curriculum development and so DCI was renamed Curriculum and Faculty Development with Martha Herzog remaining as dean. Simultaneously, the directorate’s subordinate divisions were reorganized and renamed:

426 John Neff, “Board Holds Spanish Curriculum Review at Romance School,” Globe 16, no. 6 (7 May 1993): pp. 8, 10. Reviewers identified seven areas of need within the Spanish language program: (1) Faculty development, with emphasis on classroom instruction, faculty appraisal, and incentives for faculty who improve instruction; (2) Curriculum development, with emphasis on Final Learning Objective (FLO) requirements; (3) Establishing a permanent committee within the School of Romance Languages to provide for continued improvement in testing and technology; (4)Establishing a permanent committee within the School to monitor the quality of materials and the testing and evaluation procedures developed for Spanish; (5) Developing a mechanism to integrate the efforts of the Testing, Curriculum, and Educational Technology Divisions and the School of Romance Languages; (6) Development of a centralized multimedia resource center within the School of Romance Languages for the instructors and; (7) Establishing two-week breaks between classes to provide faculty time for planning and self-development.
428 Martha Herzog, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 21 March 2007.
Faculty and Staff Development became the Faculty Development Division. The Curriculum Division and the Technology Integration Division merged and were renamed the Curriculum Development Division, housing the development of traditional and computer-based materials under one roof. Because curriculum development stayed in the schools, the Curriculum Development Division assisted the schools by consulting on course design and conducted reviews of completed materials.429

In late-spring 1998, Dr. John L.D. Clark retired as dean of Evaluation and Standardization and was succeeded by Dr. Martha Herzog that August. Grazyna Dudney, dean of European and Latin American Languages, moved to Curriculum and Faculty Development (CFD) in December and began developing an eight-year cycle for course development designed to bring all language programs up-to-date. After the initial period, curriculum development would move to a ten-year replacement schedule. Dudney’s plan was to have the seven large language programs in continual course development starting with basic, then intermediate, advanced, and finally concluding with other requirements, such as contingencies, sustainment courses, etc. In addition, the schools were to develop the smaller languages with CD oversight. Dudney’s plan included a timeline for the development process that laid out, by month, each of the major phases of course development.

The validation of the new Spanish basic program was completed in March 1998. The program covered twenty weeks of instruction, two forms of tests, and five weeks of faculty developed authentic materials.430 In addition, the Korean curriculum project was fully integrated into the Korean school, although work on the third semester continued into 1999.431

During 2000, Curriculum Development teams worked on several major projects. A focus on content FLOs required a revision of the Arabic Area Studies components of the basic program, namely AD140 and AD240: Foreign Language Culture I and II; and AD340: Foreign Language Area Studies III. In addition, Semester I basic program projects were underway in Chinese, Russian, and Serbian/Croatian as was a Serbian/Croatian Headstart program and an introductory Albanian course.432

**Instructional Technology**

From the mid-1990s on, DLIFLC has sought to incorporate computers in both teaching and student homework assignments, and also to help sustain field linguists. In March 1997, DCI produced validation copies of the Serbo-Croatian sustainment program on computer diskette produced under contract from CALL. The Institute made these diskettes available to Command Language Programs willing to help with their validation. The new program was designed for use on home computers at Level 1 proficiency in both

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429 DLIFLC Memorandum entitled “Organizational Change, DRM-M (10-5a),” 10 September 1997; and historical files, Curriculum and Faculty Development.
listening and reading comprehension. CALL also provided $405,000 to develop sustainment materials in Chinese, Korean, and Persian-Farsi.

In fiscal year 1998, Deniz Bilgin and his technology team worked with the Middle East Schools to develop a computerized “Introductory Grammar Track” for Arabic. The two Russian schools were also using computer-adapted study programs to improve listening and performance skills in the language labs and were planning a computer-adapted study program to help students learn to translate from Russian to English. Additionally, the Serbo-Croatian program developed two interactive programs to provide authentic materials and comprehension tasks. Bilgin and his team also established procedures for foreign language courseware development using Microsoft Windows and worked with CALL on language software. Finally, Bilgin led the effort to salvage the Special Operations Forces Project by reprogramming software and developing procedures for quality and copyright control.

**Academic Administration**

From March 1996 on, Alex Vorobiov served as dean of the Directorate of Academic Administration (DAA), which provided academic support to the Institute and its students. DAA consisted of three divisions: Academic Records, Program Management, and the Foreign Language Resource Center. Academic Records functioned in a role similar to that of a registrar in a civilian college by managing and maintaining student records, transcripts, and certificates. It generated about seven thousand transcripts a year. Program Management coordinated data and statistics on academic matters such as faculty, budget profiles, academic programs, and on student composition and performance. The Foreign Language Resource Center was responsible for the operation of the SCOLA TV system. It also operated Aiso Library, which received 120,000 patrons a year, contained 90,000 books, and subscribed to 500 periodicals.

In March 1999, the Library Acquisition Advisory Board was formed. Membership of the board included library staff and representatives from the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, Curriculum and Faculty Development, and the schools. The board met once a month to discuss and coordinate library acquisitions. In

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434 Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 21 April 1998.
435 Luba Grant, “To Provide Information about DLIFLC’s Arabic Program,” information paper in *Annual Program Review, 24-25 February 1999* (DLIFLC, 1999), p. 5. Herzog brought Deniz Bilgin into CFD due to his background working on technology projects. Although he started his career at DLIFLC as a Turkish instructor, Bilgin had worked for three years writing software programs as a Technology Specialist and had also worked for the Directorate of Information Management as supervisor of the Technical Support Division for the previous five years.
440 Historian’s notes, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 15 December 1998.
addition, library staff actively incorporated new ways to maintain and organize the collection development process using standard Army procedures. Staff maintained collection currency, facilitated electronic data access for students and staff, and employed a new automated library management system. They also aligned budget resources with collection development by target language and monitored library use to help determine recommend additions to equipment and media resources. Finally, in July 1998 DLIFLC absorbed the Chamberlin Library located on the Presidio’s annex. When the 7th Infantry Division moved out of Fort Ord, oversight of the Chamberlin Library was transferred to the Presidio of Monterey Garrison. The Army had decided to keep the library open as a service to military families who would continue to reside in the annex housing areas nearby. However, it made more sense for the small library to be administered by the Institute, which already had a professional library staff to manage the Asio Library.  

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Chapter V

Sustainment, Support to the Field, and Operational Contingencies

The main mission of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center focused primarily on providing basic language instruction to initial-entry military linguists and Foreign Area Officers in residence. However, the school also provided foreign language training and sustainment and operational support to outside military and US government organizations. These functions are outlined in the following chapter.

Operations, Plans, and Programs

Between 1996 and 2000, DLIFLC maintained an Operations, Plans and Programs division known as OPP. The function of OPP was to advise the Command Group and to coordinate planning and operational support for DLIFLC. OPP also directed the Institute’s non-resident training programs. As noted in the 1994-1995 Command History, the commandant, Colonel Vladimir Sobichevsky, established OPP in 1993 to support all three missions of the Institute, those being to train, sustain, and evaluate military linguists. Moreover, Sobichevski intended that OPP meet a specific DoD Inspector General recommendation that DLIFLC develop “a comprehensive plan for supporting Command Language Programs.”442

By the fall of 1996, OPP had fielded more than two hundred requests from federal agencies seeking foreign language support and military contingency needs. Support was given to actual operations, such as Cobra Gold ‘96 and Peace Shield II, to training exercises, such as the San Francisco Airport Anti-Terrorist Hijacking simulation, and even coordinated language interpretation needs for the Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia. Two years before, DLIFLC sent interpreters to help with the Northridge Earthquake near Los Angeles. “There’s never a dull moment at OPP,” said Richard Savko in 1996, an OPP staffer in charge of emergency operations. “We aggressively pursue the development of all language materials for all languages and if there is something that we can’t do, then we turn to DLI-Washington [for contracting]. That doesn’t happen often.”443

From 1996 until about August 1998, OPP was divided into two major divisions—the Programs and Proponency Division and the Plans and Operations Division. By April 1997, the director of OPP, Lieutenant Colonel Marilee Wilson, USA, had also authorized the formation of a formal Emergency Operations Center or EOC in the Plans and Operations Division to focus upon emergency and contingency support. The creation of EOC, necessitated by the closure of Fort Ord, helped drive a further reorganization of the Plans and Operations Division. By August 1997, it was subdivided into separate planning, contingency, and language support branches. According to Major Wes

Andrues, USAF, the planning branch had the task of developing DLIFLC’s strategic plan and “coordinating the execution of supporting plans with real impact.” Later that year, OPP was reorganized a final time to separate the language-related and contingency support activities. Staff were then divided into one of four areas: programs and proponency, plans, operations, and scheduling.

Scheduling involved working closely with the services to provide the Institute with accurate information about linguist requirements and to adjust programs accordingly. Scheduling also managed the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, enrollments, reimbursable training, and the various databases. The new Planning Division demonstrated DLIFLC’s increased reliance upon OPP in planning activities, especially to maintain the Institute’s Master Plan, among other responsibilities. The remaining divisions continued to provide material support to more than 250 CLPS in the field, oversaw contingency support for the field, and provided crisis response support closer to home. Operations also continued to manage such non-traditional support as translation services for other government agencies and coordinated the language training of law enforcement agencies across the nation through the “Joint Task Force 6.” Throughout the period OPP continued to manage the DLIFLC Worldwide Language Olympics, the CLP and Linguist of the Year Award programs, the web-based “Linguist’s Network” (known as LingNet), and the video teletraining and Mobile Training Team programs, all of which provide additional support and motivation to linguists in the field.

By late 1999 planning was underway to create a new School of Continuing Education or SCE to consolidate and better coordinate DLIFLC’s field support and sustainment activities. The purpose of the new school was to “relieve the pressure on DLIFLC schools by incorporating all the DL [distance learning] instruction and other services into one school.” The intent was thereby to reduce basic program disruptions by the frequent need to pull teachers for unplanned support or sustainment activities. When the school was established in 2000, several important functions managed by OPP, including VTT and MTT, were transferred to the new school. However, OPP continued to provide other key mission support functions, especially through its Emergency Operations Center.

**Staffing of OPP**

Wilson, a graduate of the DLIFLC Italian and French programs and was a senior aviator qualified in both rotary and fixed wing aircraft, arrived at the Institute in July 1996. On 2 December of that year, she became director of Operations, Plans, and

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445 Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998; DLIFLC Staff Directories, 1996-2000, track these organizational changes in OPP and are available from the DLIFLC&POM Archives.
Programs. She succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Maria Constantine, USAF, the first director of OPP. In January 1998, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Chastain, USA, became the head of OPP, succeeding Wilson. Prior to coming to DLIFLC, Chastain served as brigade executive officer for the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light). Chastain served as chief of OPP through March 2000.

Within OPP, Captain Matt Austin, USAF, was Chief of the Plans and Operations Division from 1996 until succeeded by Captain Amy Gant, USAF, in August 1998. Grant later served as temporary Chief of Scheduling. On 30 June 1997, Captain Clint Nussberger, USMC, replaced Lieutenant Colonel Ken Lasure, USMC, as chief of OPP’s Programs and Proponency Division. Nussberger was a May 1988 alumnus of DLIFLC’s Arabic and Syrian dialect courses. Nussberger headed the division until Joe Betty took over as acting chief in August 1998. By early 2000, as noted above, management had reorganized OPP into four divisions under Chastain. The first division was Programs and Proponency, which was already subdivided in two main branches: Programs and Proponency. Joseph Betty served as chief of Programs and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Joseph “Mac” McDaniel, USA, served as chief of Proponency, succeeding Chief Warrant Officer 4 Fred Runo, USA, who had held the same position since 1996. The next division was Operations, which included translation, interpretation, and law enforcement support under Technical Sergeant Bruce Nobles, USAF, and an Emergency Operations Center under Richard Savko, a retired Air Force major (who had flown with the Thunderbirds) and former assistant dean of both Russian School II and Distance Education. OPP’s Plans Division was headed by Major Paul Clark, USAF, while Scheduling was headed by Clare Bugary a civilian. Bugary succeeded Art Gebbia, who was chief of the Scheduling Division in August 1997, when he took a position with the Army in Hawaii. The reorganization of OPP increased the profile of each section. By 1999, Chastain was traveling to Washington, D.C on a regular basis and Clark became the Deputy Director of OPP. The deputy position was recognized as an Air Force billet on the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) during the TRADOC manpower assistance visit in 1999.

**Command Language Program Support**

Between 1996 and 2000, OPP provided support to over 250 Command Language Programs throughout the Department of Defense. CLPs were unit-based efforts.

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450 DLIFLC&POM Staff Directories (DLIFLC, 1996-2000).
453 DLIFLC&POM Staff Directories (DLIFLC, 1996-2000).
dependent upon the interests and resources of their commanders. CLPs functioned to sustain the competencies of military linguists assigned to field units and were thus key to efforts to maintain the readiness of military intelligence units. OPP’s Programs and Proponency Division exercised technical control over and monitored the management of the Department’s CLPs and also served as the main advocate of linguist life-cycle management.455

In mid-1997, Programs and Proponency was reorganized to separate its general support and CLP linguist programs and to serve as liaison between each of the service program managers, the Foreign Language Committee of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the major commands.456 The CLP Support Department thus became responsible for “day-to-day support to CLPs, including materials distribution, advice and guidance to CLP Managers on the administration of their programs, collection and dissemination of information on training in less commonly taught languages, and support of contingency operations.” The Support Department also published the CLP Newsletter, maintained the CLP database, and conducted “sustainment briefings to graduating students.” Finally, Support tracked feedback on the Army Correspondence Course Program for then-currently offered courses. Master Sergeant Martin Dooley was the first chief of the new department.457

The Linguist Programs Department became responsible for the CLP Managers’ Seminar and Course, the Commanders’ CLP Orientation Briefing program, the CLP of the Year incentive program, the DoD Military Linguist of the Year Program, and the DLIFLC Worldwide Language Olympics. These programs are discussed in more detail below. Senior Master Sergeant Mike Scalia served as first chief of the Linguist Programs Department.458

In practice, CLPs relied upon various techniques to sustain military linguist readiness, including computer-assisted learning labs, SCOLA, foreign language periodicals, and other methods. DLIFLC’s VTT and MTT programs, its CLP Managers’ Course and Commanders’ CLP Orientation, and its annual CLP Seminar supplemented those efforts. Occasionally, OPP required command intervention to resolve CLP issues, such as was necessary after sustainment problems with the Korean program came to light.

In 1998, OPP supported 258 CLPs. That same year it also completed a field assistance visit to the Fort Gordon Regional SIGINT Operations Center, which included a site survey for a Language Teaching Detachment and a “Diagnostic Profile Project.” In addition, OPP had begun to offer “sustainment briefs” to graduating DLIFLC classes, which were intended to familiarize future military linguists with the type of sustainment programs and opportunities that they could expect to utilize once working full-time in field assignments. OPP conducted twenty-three sustainment briefs to 987 students in

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458 Ibid.
In 1999, OPP completed twenty-seven such briefs, providing sustainment information to 921 students. By then as well, Joe Betty of OPP could claim that the directorate supported some twenty-three thousand linguists worldwide through 260 command language programs.460

**Video Teletraining and Mobile Training Teams**

DLIFLC supported several non-resident military linguist sustainment events and programs during this period, but focused mainly upon its video teletraining and Mobile Training Team programs. VTT involved linking electronically classroom facilities around the country with a main teaching site based at the Presidio of Monterey. In fact, DLIFLC was one of the largest users of the technology that enabled individuals in different locations to see and talk to each other and OPP has aggressively pushed the Institute into this high technology arena. By 1997, nearly seven thousand hours of foreign language instruction were being logged per year by DLIFLC instructors. The school had seven large studios devoted to VTT broadcasts to twenty-one sites set up at various Command Language Program field sites.461

The VTT system offered major advantages in training over distance but the facilities needed to support the system by the typical CLP were expensive and many CLPs could not participate as a result. In 1997, OPP began experimenting with loaned equipment and taking advantage of a CIA effort to develop a desktop VTT program intended “to introduce VTT to a broad student populace and acquaint the language community with the special properties of desktop VTT.” The hope was that technological improvements in connectivity, hardware, and software could make it possible to use desktop systems as VTT platforms for CLPs. These new desktop systems were composed of Pentium-based computers with onboard cameras and an advanced video card that converted a user’s video image and sent it on to the receiving party. the goal for OPP was to purchase and distribute a block of such systems among the 250 registered CLPs for use in foreign language instruction. By early 1998, sixteen systems were in place in such locations as Germany and the Capital Region, while others were being set up. OPP hoped that positive early reports from field units meant that the system could also be useful for language proficiency testing.462

While VTT technology continued to advance, VTT instruction itself experienced a few bumps. In September 1997, Fort Meade, Maryland, informed DLIFLC leadership that its Command Language Program was terminating its contract for Russian VTT in favor of local contract instruction. Fort Meade officials noted that the Institute’s Russian

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459 Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998, briefing slides in “Commander’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998” folder, box 57, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
462 MAJ Wesley Andrues, “Video TeleTraining,” Globe 21, no. 4 (April 1998): pp. 6-7. The new systems operated over the so-called Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), as opposed to the Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), provided by commercial telephone companies. OPP chose to go with ISDN due to the systems’ reliability to date.
VTT instructors were unresponsive to complaints, had refused to update materials or adapt instruction to their students’ needs, and that statistics showed that local contract Russian instruction garnered greater increases in student proficiency. This news was in stark contrast to VTT instruction provided by DLIFLC to Fort Meade in other languages (especially German), which got high marks. Nevertheless, Provost Ray T. Clifford agreed. “The bottom line,” he stated, “is that we were not responsive to one of our best customers, and we have lost that business.” He sent an action plan to all school deans that would involve school, OPP, and CFD personnel in a review of and improvement plan for each VTT program offered by DLIFLC.463

By the end of fiscal year 1999, the Institute’s VTT network had transmitted 7,100 hours of foreign language instruction to thirteen dedicated VTT stations (excluding six at DLIFLC), which were all part of TRADOC’s Army Training Support Center Training Network system. The sites were located at:

- Ft. Huachuca, AZ (1)
- Goodfellow AFB, TX (1)
- Ft. Gordon, GA (1)
- Kelly AFB, TX (1)
- Ft. Bragg, NC (1)
- Camp Lejeune, NC (1)
- Ft. Meade, MD (3)
- Kunia RSOC, HI (1)
- Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ (1)
- OSLA, VA (2)464

In addition to six VTT studios at the Presidio of Monterey, the Institute was designing a new $1.5 million VTT facility, which it planned to have in operation by the summer of 2001. This facility would allow for continuous broadcasting expansion of DLIFLC’s VTT capability.465

MTTs were the second key element of how the Institute sought to sustain linguist proficiency in the field. Teams of language instructors made up the MTTs. These traveled to various sites around the world to provide language training to language students in the field. Although Command Language Programs bore primary responsibility for sustaining linguists, “occasionally the field units need...a booster shot from the schoolhouse so they can refine and hone their skills for unit readiness,” or so stated Art Gebbia in February 1996. Gebbia was a senior program analyst for OPP’s Plans and Operations Division. That year, OPP managed such inoculations by coordinating with the field and the various schools of DLIFLC, balancing funding needs, and finding the right instructor, with the right support, to dispatch directly to units needing specialized training to sustain the readiness of their military linguists. Through 1996, Rich Savko coordinated and scheduled MTT activities. According to Savko, half of the units receiving MTT education were reserve components. Savko had doubled MTT hours of assistance to the field in 1995 by aggressively promoting the program with field commanders. The task was difficult, however. While commanders were responsive, the program had to draw upon the Institute’s limited teaching resources, whose primary focus remained resident training. Nevertheless, according to Savko,

463 LTC Marilee Wilson, e-mail to Stephen Payne entitled “FW: Ft. Meade’s cancellation of Russian VTT,” 13 September 1997. The plan was to be completed by 3 December 1997.
465 Ibid.
from the provost to the deans to the teachers—they have made the program succeed and recognize the importance of language sustainment training and unit readiness.”

DLIFLC also used its Mobile Training Teams to support an interagency group known as “Joint Task Force 6” or JTF-6. The purpose of JTF-6, located at Fort Bliss, Texas, was to coordinate the provision of military assistance to law enforcement agencies engaged in counter narcotics operations. The Institute’s role was to provide language training for law enforcement agents. When these students were able to achieve even a survival level of foreign language ability, the safety of both officers and civilians was increased in the field. Instructors from DLIFLC’s European and Latin America School provided training in Spanish at several sites throughout the country using MTTs although the earliest courses were taught at the school itself. The European and Latin America School has also offered courses in Russian, which was a language law enforcement agencies needed to have proficiency in to help combat Russian mafia operations on the East Coast. In 1996, DLIFLC instructors taught twelve MTT classes for JTF-6. In 1997, the course load doubled and MTT training took place at such cities as Boston; El Centro, Los Angeles, Redding, Red Bluff, Sacramento, and San Diego in California; Hillsboro (Oregon); North Manhattan and New York City; Phoenix; and Meriden in Connecticut. Participants were successfully trained in basic terms used in “street Spanish” on topics related to search and seizure, interrogation, and medical emergencies. By 1998, DLIFLC was sending thirty-four MTTs to support some three hundred law enforcement officers involved in JTF-6 activities with some thirty-seven such MTT courses scheduled for 1999. Classes focused upon Spanish, Vietnamese, and Russian.

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469 “Commandant’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998” folder, Box 57, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
CLP Managers’ Course and Commanders’ CLP Briefing

During this period, OPP offered two special courses to help educate field units about the Command Language Program. The first course was actually an orientation for commanders created in response to repeated CLP manager requests for a presentation able “to give commanders an appreciation for language and its role as a force multiplier in meeting unit combat readiness.” The essential purpose of the orientation, therefore, was to demonstrate to commanders the importance of their support for sustaining military linguists in their units. OPP designed the orientation to be flexible and adaptive to the intended audience. It overviewed the essentials of DLIFLC’s foreign language training program, including the Interagency Language Roundtable Skill Levels and the basics of running a CLP. The orientation was provided upon request. Brigade or battalion commanders could take a resident two-day orientation at DLIFLC or a one-day course of instruction concurrent with service commanders’ seminars, etc. OPP also planned to develop a two-hour video for CLP managers to use as a marketing tool to help elicit commander support for their programs.470 One such orientation was held in July 1997 at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, at the request of Master Sergeant Michael Taylor, CLP Manager for “Det. 2, 67 IG.” After the briefing, Taylor stated that “we enthusiastically recommend this course to other units who are either just beginning to establish programs or whose key leaders are unsure of the need for a dynamic CLP.”471

OPP intended the other CLP course to be for CLP managers. Instead of a one- to two-day course for commanders, the CLP Managers’ Course was a one-week course conceived to train new and future CLP managers in how to operate a unit-level CLP. Offered in residence at the Institute four times per year or through MTT presentation, the new course touched upon such topics as applicable regulations, the ILR skill levels, and how to conduct a training needs assessment, recognize good teaching, develop a training plan, or conduct linguist counseling. There were also blocks on budgeting, how to market CLPs to commanders, and an open forum to discuss issues.472 By September 1996, the CLP Managers’ Course had become a part of the Army Training Requirements Resource System.473 By fall 1997, OPP had taught some twenty iterations of the course to over three hundred CLP managers, training coordinators, and support personnel.474

During the August 1996 CLP Managers’ Course, held at the Presidio of Monterey, the CLP Manager for the Army, Ray Lane Aldrich, visited DLIFLC. He discussed his job and several CLP issues, including foreign language proficiency pay, but was especially concerned about the need to increase foreign language proficiency levels.

474 Nelson, “Command Language Program... Recap,” CLP Newsletter (September 1997).
especially for the Korean program.\textsuperscript{475} Historically, noted Aldrich in an interview with the \textit{Globe}, Korean was the most troublesome language faced by DLIFLC managers. Most of the positions requiring knowledge of Korean were overseas and this resulted in constant rotation of military linguists to the Republic of Korea on one-year unaccompanied tours causing marital stress for the linguists and their families. Upon completing their enlistment, the young linguists often opted out of the service for that reason alone. It was also difficult to find time to send Korean linguists, whose initial training was over two years of a four-year tour, for additional normal military training, such as non-commissioned officer schools. Sustainment of Korean linguists was an issue that was beyond the ability of OPP to resolve. Indeed, DLIFLC had to revamp its entire basic Korean course in 1996. The effort and expenses spent on the new Korean program were “unprecedented,” stated Aldrich. Programming the needed reforms, however, would take eighteen months during which time linguists still under the old system would need additional training to meet field requirements. For those still being taught under the old system a stopgap or temporary program was developed. The temporary program involved a five-week refresher course taught at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, called the Language Enhancement and Assessment Program or “LEAP” course. LEAP was scheduled to begin after these linguists completed their Advanced Individual Training and immediately upon their arrival in Korea.\textsuperscript{476} To set up this temporary program, Provost Ray Clifford, DLIFLC Command Sergeant Major Thomas J. Bugary, and Sergeant First Class Richard Applegate traveled to South Korea to talk with field commanders about their concerns, to gather data to better plan DLI programs, and to develop the LEAP stopgap effort.\textsuperscript{477}

\textbf{Command Language Program Managers’ Seminar}

For several years, the Defense Language Center Foreign Language Institute has sponsored an annual Command Language Program Managers Seminar at the Presidio of Monterey. The seminar was actually a regular conference attended by interested CLPs managers from around the world who gathered to discuss issues of mutual concern.

The Institute held the 1996 meeting between May 13 and 17 at the Weckerling Center on the Presidio of Monterey. Colonel Robert E. Busch II, Assistant Commandant, succinctly explained the motivation behind the seminar to 120 attendees in his opening remarks: “We need to recruit quality individuals, bring them to DLI, train them well and send them out in the field to you. You have to sustain their language skills and proficiency. That’s the life cycle of linguists as I see it.” Then, he added, “our retention

\textsuperscript{475} Bob Britton, “Army Command Language Program Manager Speaks at DLIFLC’s Command Language Course,” \textit{Globe} 19, no. 7 (September 1996): p. 9. Incidentally, Chief Warrant Officer 5 Bruce Ohnesorge assisted Aldrich as Service Program Manager for the Department of the Army’s Command Language Program. He was fluent in five languages and had graduated from multiple courses at DLIFLC.

\textsuperscript{476} “Lane Aldrich Discusses the Future of Language Programs,” \textit{Globe} 19, no. 7 (September 1996): p. 10. According this article, the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence also asked the “Personnel community to investigate the recruitment of native speakers. Personnel Command (PERSCOM) has attempted in-service recruiting of personnel with proficiency in Korean and continues to study ways to harvest this resource.”

rates will go up if we continue to challenge those individuals you have out there for training sustainment. They all want that and it’s good for your mission. Field linguists welcome that extra training. Command language programs are very important for you and your units’ missions.” CWO 4 Fred Runo, chief of OPP’s Proponency Branch, coordinated the meeting. Runo explained that the seminar’s theme was “joint-service language opportunities,” which was an effort to improve communications, coordination, and resource-sharing between some 250 CLPs. One major feature of the seminar was the recognition of the second annual CLP award winner. The idea for the award originated with Ron Nelson, a training specialist in the OPP Programs and Proponency Division, and was authorized by DLIFLC Regulation 351-1. The first winner of that award was the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade, Seoul, South Korea. To prepare for the 1996 seminar, OPP produced a 540-page handbook and coordinated the involvement of outside commercial vendors who displayed the latest foreign language teaching aids not available from DLI, but that might benefit field CLPs. The technology fair attracted 46 more vendors than the first year, which attracted 14 vendors.478

In 1997, the CLPs were judged on the basis of their training opportunities, instructional methodology, testing procedures, and linguist incentive and retention programs. OPP made one significant change for the 1997 competition after staff assessed after-action reviews for the 1996 competition—it decided to adopt a fiscal year rather than calendar year timeline for the event. More than two hundred CLP managers attended the annual DLIFLC seminar, held 12-16 May 1997. Colonel Daniel Devlin emphasized the need “to help linguists in the field by providing them with new computer-based training.” A highlight of the event was the naming of the winner of the annual Command Language Program of the Year Award, which was presented to Colonel James Hilliard of the Air Force’s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations Center. In his acceptance speech, Hilliard noted the need “to raise the level of basic language training.” Of course, he wanted every linguist to reach a “3” level in all categories and that after fourteen years in the business of using military linguists he wished “he could have 100,000 more of them.”479 In addition to the seminar, a special vendor exposition was held on 14 May that included 43 commercial firms and more than 250 attendees. According to one account, “a vast quantity of information concerning commercial language training materials and overseas training opportunities was disseminated.”480

OPP hosted the 1998 CLP Manager’s Seminar at the General Stillwell Community Center on the Presidio of Monterey Annex. There were 193 attendees, 72 percent of whom were from the Army, most of whom were DLIFLC graduates. During the seminar the CLP of the Year Award was given to the Army’s 704th Military Intelligence Brigade, Fort Meade, Maryland. Major General Michael Dunlavey, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, presented the awards and commented that CLP managers “must educate your commanders all the way up the chain. You’ve got to let them know that those young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, are a very

precious commodity with a very short shelf life.” Ongoing cutbacks in defense spending drove home his point. Seminar attendees discussed such topics as the Defense Reserve Language Plan, the National Security Agency Career Program, and the Defense Linguist of the Year competition. Attendees also received a copy of the new Army Regulation 350-16 titled “Total Army Language Program,” which outlined the policies and procedures of the Army’s CLPs.481 Among the main issues to emerge during the 1998 seminar was the need for database support for many CLP program managers. A common concern was the desire to obtain a standardized database and/or guidelines to use in developing such databases. Many CLP managers also wanted improved facilities. OPP organized a Language Training and Technology Exposition at the Weckerling Center in conjunction with the CLPM seminar. Over thirty commercial firms and 150 linguists visited the exposition.482

Staff of the OPP Programs and Proponency Division organized the 1999 CLP Manager’s Seminar, held 10-13 May at the Monterey Beach Hotel in Monterey, California. The event included nearly 200 representatives from CLPs belonging to units stationed around the world. By 1999, according to Colonel Devlin, the total number of such programs was more than 260. The annual CLP of the Year Award was awarded for the second time to the Army’s 501st Military Intelligence Brigade of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Seoul, South Korea. Representatives of the schools presented information about their programs, as did CLP managers. The Language Training and Technology Exposition for the seminar, by now an annual event, was set for the final day of the seminar.483

Approximately two hundred CLPs attended the 22-24 May 2000 CLP Manager’s Seminar, held again at the Monterey Beach Hotel. Devlin prodded participants to speak their minds because “you have to identify to us your requirements so we can figure out how best to help you.” Devlin noted that while the mix of languages had changed over the past few years, increasing in emphasis on the more difficult Category IV languages, test scores had actually improved. Rather than relax its standards, DLIFLC had increased its emphasis upon speaking skills, which Devlin said improved both listening and reading skills, and which he attributed to the continued success of the Institute. Devlin also noted another more subtle shift in Institute pedagogy, an emphasis upon cooperation over competition among students. Among CLPs, however, Devlin saw the opposite. In 2000, as in previous years, the annual CLP of the Year award was presented during the annual CLP meeting. The award went this time to the Air Force’s 694th Intelligence Group of Fort Meade, Maryland. Having noted fierce competition between the CLPs during the 1999 selection process, Devlin decided that the CLP competition could no longer be judged merely on the basis of submitted applications. Instead, he had OPP send a team to conduct a comprehensive on-site assessment of all finalists in the 2000 competition. The more rigorous approach had side benefits, including an increase in the visibility of DLIFLC to field units and familiarity of DLIFLC staff with field unit operations.

482 Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998, briefing slides.
Nevertheless, the new approach also assured “a thorough, fair and accurate assessment” and put “teeth in the selection process and meaning in the award.” During the seminar, Glenn Nordin, assistant director of language training of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, urged CLP managers to solve the difficult problem of low linguist retention rates, a problem for all the services. One way to do that, he suggested, was to allow linguists to use their language skills has much as possible. Linguists like to work in their language,” he noted. Once again, the Language Training and Technology Exposition was held in conjunction with the seminar.

**Worldwide Language Olympics**

In addition to the CLP Manager’s Seminar, DLIFLC also hosted an annual Worldwide Language Olympics for Department of Defense Linguists. The contest gave DoD military linguists an opportunity to demonstrate their linguistic proficiency. A number of contests were held in each language, such as Jeopardy, Speedword, Draw Me a Picture, Get-the-Point, Verbal Relay and Handcopy. Listening, reading, speaking, and writing skills were all tested by these events.

The 229th Military Intelligence Battalion sponsored the fifth annual Worldwide Language Olympics, which were held 6-10 May 1996 on the Presidio of Monterey. For the first time, Persian-Farsi joined Arabic (Modern Standard Arabic), Chinese (Mandarin), Korean, Russian, and Spanish on the roster of represented languages. A total of 272 competitors from fifty-eight federal agencies and military services came together from as far away as Alaska, Japan, South Korea, Hawaii, Germany, and even Panama and the United Kingdom. Dan Albert, mayor of the city of Monterey, opened the games by declaring “Welcome to Monterey—we’re glad you’re here!” Sergeant First Class Richard Warring, a Russian linguist, was the coordinator of the Worldwide Language Olympics. Two tactical units won two of the top prizes—the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which took second place, and the 224th Military Intelligence Battalion from Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia, which took third place. The first place award went to the On-site Inspection Agency from Washington, DC, whose Russian linguists monitored the US-Russian strategic arms treaty obligations. As done for the first time in 1995, the 1996 Worldwide Language Olympics also included a VTT portion held for those CLPs that could not send personnel to Monterey. Staff Sergeant Brian Lange coordinated the VTT games, which took place from April 30 to May 3. The top-ranking team in the VTT games was the Goodfellow Training Center team from San Angelo, Texas, whose team was composed of linguists from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Of note that year was a lack of complaints about technical glitches.

Members of the Naval Security Group Detachment coordinated and sponsored the sixth annual Worldwide Language Olympics in 1997, which drew over three hundred

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military linguists from approximately seventy units and federal agencies around the world. The resident games were held 5-9 May. As in 1996, students competed in events in Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Persian-Farsi, Russian, and Spanish. Units unable to travel to the Presidio of Monterey were able to compete long-distance via the VTT network. The nonresident events took place 14-25 April. The 3rd Military Intelligence Battalion, Seoul, South Korea, took the first-place trophy for best overall unit performance as well as the first- and third-place trophies in Korean. Another Military Intelligence battalion from Seoul, the 741st, captured second place overall and first place in the Persian-Farsi competition. The third-place overall trophy went to the On-Site Inspection Agency, Washington, DC, which again took first place in Russian.487

In 1998, the resident games took place on 4-8 May while the VTT games took place 20-30 April. During the games teams competed in six languages: Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Persian-Farsi, Russian, and Spanish. In 1998, the resident games saw 308 participants compete while the VTT games coordinated eight sites and ninety-two participants, triple the number who played the previous year. In 1998, linguists from the On-Site Inspection Agency in Washington, DC, once more took first place at the resident games. Team Goodfellow from Goodfellow AFB came in first in the VTT competition. Master Sergeant Lisa Meyer of the USAF 311th Military Training Squadron was the Language Olympics coordinator. Among the changes that she implemented was the rule that each team had to have at least one DLIFLC graduate on it, which hampered some Reserve Component units that only recruited native speakers. She was also developing a “comprehensive continuity book” based upon lessons learned from previous Worldwide Language Olympics to help future coordinators of the complex event. Finally, Meyer noted that the games were particularly difficult that year due to the emphasis placed upon them by Lieutenant Colonel Roderic Gale to include the Institute’s final learning objectives.488

In 1999, the Worldwide Language Olympics were held 3-7 May with teams convening from duty stations in Japan, Korea, Hawaii, Germany, Russia, and several bases in the United States. Altogether, 330 linguists, divided into two-person teams, competed in various rounds of Jeopardy, Intel Triathlon, Get the Point, Hand Copy, and Impromptu in the languages of Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Persian-Farsi, Russian, and Spanish. The first place for the best unit overall was taken by linguists, entered in Arabic, Russian, and Spanish, from the 300th Military Intelligence Company from Austin, Texas. The 1999 Olympics were coordinated by Sergeant Major Norman Zlоторынски, the MLI Program Manager. Zlоторынски felt the games were better organized than those of the previous year. “It’s better to have different language schools run the language events in their target languages,” he stated. Moreover, Zlоторынски made an effort to get

participants’ scores posted at the Weckerling Center within two hours of an event, which had been a point of frustration by previous contestants.\(^{489}\)

The 10\(^{th}\) Annual Worldwide Language Olympics were held 15-19 May 2000 with 344 people in 172 two-person teams convening from duty stations all over the world. The annual event was again coordinated by Zlotorzynski with help from Sergeant First Class John Whipple, a Russian linguist working for the 229\(^{th}\) Military Intelligence Battalion, and Staff Sergeant Lou Schnake, a Chinese-Mandarin linguist in OPP. The 300\(^{th}\) Military Intelligence Brigade from Utah won first place as the best overall multi-team unit, having performed well with several different foreign language teams. As was expected, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency from Travis Air Force base near San Francisco captured first place. Prior to the games at the Presidio of Monterey, additional linguists were able to compete in the non-resident portion using the Institute’s VTT network. According to Zlotorzynski, the 2000 games saw “more teams and competitors than ever before.” One change made over the previous year’s games was to move the “Intel Triathlon” to the Price Fitness Center “for better coordination, efficiency and to show off the new facilities at Price.”\(^{490}\)

**Computer-Assisted Study and the Linguist Network**

Beginning in the 1980s, DLIFLC pioneered the development of software products intended to promote the language skills of linguists working for the US government. The Institute accomplished this task by closely working with other government agencies, universities, and commercial organizations to evaluate the use of new technology and mediums for providing effective computer-assisted foreign language studies programs.\(^{491}\) By 2000, the School of Continuing Education could report the existence of a robust web-based course of instruction with many hours of instructional material available in the major languages taught at the school, including Arabic, Chinese, Korean, and Russian, all of which was available to help sustain DoD and US government linguists worldwide. Among other achievements, SCE had also converted some thirty hours of CD-ROM-based instructional material to a web-based format to support Serbian/Croatian linguists.\(^{492}\) An important key to DLIFLC’s success in promoting computer-assisted learning is LingNet, DLIFLC’s computer network for linguists.

Between 1996 and 2000, LingNet, grew both in number of users and in content. In March 1996, LingNet staff announced the existence of a toll-free telephone number (1-888-363-5464 or DoD-LING).\(^{493}\) As the effort expanded, so did its complexity and after July 1996 LingNet moved under the Plans Division of OPP because of its important coordination needs. For example, the teaching input of multiple languages had to be

coordinated with curriculum development while connectivity issues required supported by the Directorate of Information Management. By 1997, LingNet provided global access to some 6,500 military linguists, each of whom had a personal account. The portal supported linguist sustainment in twenty-four separate foreign languages. Still, data transmission restrictions were an important limiting factor upon the types and amount of material that DLIFLC could offer over LingNet. Planning to upgrade the system using new audio and video inputs as well as computer interactive techniques proceeded.494

By September 1996, the LingNet Systems Operator, Technical Sergeant Red Lloyd, returned to Korea. He was replaced by Staff Sergeant Keith Willsey, a Hebrew MLI from Middle East School I with extensive computer experience in the civilian world. Willsey actually had to move LingNet’s office to accommodate its growing hardware needs. By 20 November 1996, Willsey had migrated LingNet’s systems software onto state-of-the-art servers, which brought new functions and capabilities. For example, staff added the ability to download electronic versions of CLP-related forms, posted several Internet mailing lists of interest to foreign language teachers and students, improved LingNet’s File Transfer Protocol (FTP) function to make downloading files easier, designed client software with a “graphic user interface” (instead of a text-based interface) and distributed it for beta testing, and began converting resource lists to databases to make user access quicker and more convenient.495

Early in 1997, LingNet was serving as a mirror site for SCOLA’s Insta-Class transcript and translation service. By summer of that year, the transcripts were available in Arabic, Chinese, Czech, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish.496 In March 1997, all LingNet services became web-accessible, and some services were available only in this way. LingNet added a search engine to help users quickly find documents they needed. The academic journal Applied Language Learning was posted to LingNet in 1997, as was the newsletter Bridges, followed by the CLP Newsletter.497 LingNet boasted over 6,500 users with accounts and maintained more than 1,800 files in twenty-four languages by September 1997498 and in early 2000, LingNet was serving some 15,000 active users and handled some 61,000 requests each week.499

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In 1997, the assistant commandant, Colonel Eugene F. Beauvais, proposed an expansion of LingNet so that it could be integrated into the intelligence community’s intranet (that is, the Open Source Information System). Beauvais wanted better access to DLIFLC’s online products for the entire intelligence foreign language community. A grant in fiscal 1998 allowed DLIFLC to make the necessary technical changes to improve LingNet’s “interconnectivity.” Also, with the demise of the Center for Applied Language Learning, DLIFLC inherited some of CALL’s functions. Among these were the Virtual Resource Center/Foreign Language Database (for less commonly taught languages) and the CALL Website. The latter, though no longer being updated, was assumed by LingNet on 30 September 1998.

Gradual improvements in the functionality of LingNet factored into the commandant’s planning agenda. Although not quite achieved by his retirement in late 2000, Colonel Devlin had long sought “to get homework exercises converted to computer programs and to issue a laptop computer to each student.” Devlin hoped students could do their homework on computers while attending DLIFLC and then be able to take the computers with them upon graduation. This plan would allow students to communicate directly with the Institute via LingNet, regardless of where they were assigned, without having to find a computer lab. Devlin’s goal was not to replace teachers using technology, however. He insisted that “replacing instructors with computer has NO support in the foreign language academic world” and that the best way to learn a foreign language was with an instructor and from interaction with other students. Still, he was a booster of the use of technology as an enabler of language learning and actively supported LingNet, VTT, and other computer-assisted language-learning technologies. Clifford, as provost, approached the computer issue from a slightly different angle. He believed that, “Computers would not replace teachers but teachers who could not use computers would be replaced.”

By late 2000, OPP was partnering with a civilian contractor Booz-Allen Hamilton “to make LingNet the web portal of first choice for foreign language education and support resources.” The new School for Continuing Education was producing on-line courses in Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Russian, and Serbian/Croatian in addition to a module on world religions and cultures, although resources were available on LingNet to support over fifty languages with survival kits, dictionaries, tutorials, and cultural guides. OPP had also begun to survey LingNet’s primary users and content providers to help assess what additional educational products and services it should support. For example, OPP began considering how to make the network available to those working in classified information facilities. In 2000, faced with continued success and technical change, OPP also was once again planning to migrate LingNet to a new hardware architecture.

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502 Recollection of Stephen Payne.
School for Continuing Education

By 1999, Provost Ray Clifford had concluded that ever increasing reliance on Mobile Training Teams and video teletraining had created an enormous strain on the basic language programs in DLIFLC’s language schools. The success of these projects meant that faculty were constantly being pulled on short notice from their resident teaching duties to help sustain the language proficiency of field linguists. To combat this problem, Clifford and others proposed a new school of distance learning that would incorporate distance instruction and other language services into one organization.\(^504\) In function and design, this new school would be similar to a university extension program.

In early 2000, with the approval of Devlin, Clifford established the School for Continuing Education (SCE). Devlin described the problem in similar terms as had Clifford as an effort to relieve the schools of the constant and often short-notice burden of supporting long distance training. However, he also saw it as an opportunity. Through SCE, DLIFLC would be able to determine the exact requirements for distance learning and the associated costs of these services, which were previously buried in the general programs of the schools. After all, when instructors were suddenly pulled out of a school to provide distance learning support, perhaps to provide short-notice survival language training to a brigade on its way to Bosnia, there was no way to account for the costs to the school. The missing instructors were somehow covered but it was a reality that pulling instructors from their resident courses meant ultimately reducing the resources available for resident training. The new school would clarify the costs and increase the efficiency of the Institute in providing distance instruction. It would also forge a vehicle to attract new funding, which Devlin suggested was “a solution” to the problem of supporting field units who purchased what training they could afford from DLIFLC rather than what training the needed for their specific requirements. SCE would allow more tailored training to field units, provide better overall coordination of sustainment efforts, and promote DLIFLC’s continued leadership in the distance education field.\(^505\)

Clifford appointed Dr. Thomas Parry, who had served as the dean of the Korean school, as the new school’s first dean and charged him with the mission of developing a pedagogical plan for distance learning. Besides working to relieve the pressure on the DLIFLC resident language schools, Clifford intended SCE to be the Institute’s major outreach program. It would combine existing DLIFLC support for distance learning in such areas as diagnostic assessment, VTT/MTT instruction, external oral proficiency interviews, translation and interpretation services, and contingency support with “emerging distance learning services,” including “Dial-A-Language Interpreting,” language-specific 97L education, Language Teaching Detachments, web-delivered instruction, and a linguist helpline.\(^506\) On all counts, Institute officials lauded the accomplishments of Parry and his team at SCE. For example, at the annual program review in early 2001, Parry noted that during “the past year SCE has significantly reduced disruption to resident program teaching teams and established a number of


\(^{505}\) Colonel Daniel D. Devlin, “Finally, a School Dedicated to Worldwide Linguist Support,” Globe 23, no. 3 (Summer 2000): p. 3.

\(^{506}\) Ibid.
productive strategic alliances with universities and government agencies as part of its outreach efforts.”

During its first year of operation, Parry created a Distance Learning Branch directed by Brigitta Ludgate. The branch trained and certified distance learning faculty and provided sustainment and enhancement instruction to non-resident linguists in seven languages. The faculty included three language instructors each for Arabic and Russian, two each for Korean and Spanish, and one each for Chinese, Persian-Farsi, and Serbian/Croatian. Together, SCE instructors delivered 7,710 hours of VTT instruction in fiscal year 2000, an increase of several hundred hours over the 7,129 VTT hours taught by resident schools in fiscal year 1999, or the 7,158 VTT hours they taught in fiscal year 1998. Moreover, due to increased contact with Command Language Programs, Parry even projected a VTT requirement of 15,158 hours for fiscal year 2001, a twofold increase. VTT programs included sustainment courses (approximately 30 instructional hours), refresher courses (30-40 hours), and enhancement courses (78-100 hours). SCE faculty taught most of the VTT programs from the six full-size VTT studios on the Presidio of Monterey plus the three desktop VTT rooms in building 420. When these facilities were full, VTT instructors taught classes out of the three Army-funded Digital Training Facilities (Labs 1-3) in Building 630. Parry also deployed mobile training teams who provided 10,028 hours of additional instruction in fiscal year 2000, compared with 9,804 in fiscal year 1999. SCE faculty provided MTT instruction in survival, refresher, intermediate, advanced, immersion, and even conversion courses for existing military linguists. Special programs for other customers, such as the FBI, were also made available and could last from one to sixteen weeks. Any VTT and MTT training requests that could not be accommodated by SCE were still referred to the appropriate schools. The long-term goal, however, was to fund and staff SCE to handle all training requests from Command Language Programs and other field linguists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VTT</th>
<th>MTT</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>Fort Gordon, GA</td>
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<td>Camp LeJeune</td>
<td>Ft Huachina, AZ</td>
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<td>Davis Montain AFB</td>
<td>Fort Irwin, CA</td>
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<td>Defense POW</td>
<td>Fort Lewis, WA</td>
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<td>Draper, UT</td>
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<td>Goodfellow AFB</td>
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<td>Chula Vista, CA</td>
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<td>Corpus Christi, TX</td>
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<td>Camp LeJeune, NC</td>
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<td>Fort Irwin</td>
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<td>Kadena AB</td>
<td>Langley AFB, VA</td>
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<td>Kelly AFB</td>
<td>Fort Devens, MA</td>
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<td>Kadena AFB, Okinawa</td>
<td>Little Creek, VA</td>
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<td>Kadena RSOC</td>
<td>Fort Bliss, TX</td>
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<td>NSGA, San Diego</td>
<td>Fort Bragg, NC</td>
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<td>Offutt AFB</td>
<td>Langley AFB, VA</td>
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<td>Washington, DC (FBI)</td>
<td>Fort Devens, MA</td>
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Figure 16 School of Continuing Education distance learning sites in 2000

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Besides distance learning, Clifford and Devlin made the School for Continuing Education responsible for conducting DLIFLC’s intermediate and advanced foreign language programs. To carry out this mission, school officials had to transfer faculty teaching in the upper level school programs to SCE, which caused some concerns. Clifford and Parry feared that the existing schools would seek to retain the best of the faculty who taught in their non-basic programs. The challenge was thus how to establish SCE with a balance of faculty talent. In 1999, Assistant Provost Stephen M. Payne froze all instructors teaching Intermediate or Advanced programs in their current assignments. Locked in place, this faculty had to move to the new school. The freeze decision caused some “consternation” among the deans of the schools affected, but it allowed SCE to start out with faculty who had significant experience in teaching higher-level programs. Eventually, Parry recruited new faculty, which allowed some of the original faculty to return to their schools of origin.\(^{510}\) In a similar move, the school picked up responsibility for conducting advanced training for the MOS 97L, which refers to Army Reserve and National Guard translator/interpreters. The school began to offer the 97L introductory course in two phases of two weeks each, which accommodated the training schedules of Army Reserve and National Guard units. SCE quickly eliminated the backlog of reservists waiting to complete this training.

In the meantime, Parry hired a diagnostic coordinator and several diagnostic assessment specialists and began a Diagnostic Assessment Program. The mission of this program was to “provide recommendations on linguists’ language development in all skills.”\(^{511}\) The program began with a pilot project in 1998, using the Arabic language, to study the utility of diagnostic assessment and learning plan support for linguists in the field.\(^{512}\)

The diagnostic assessment group sought to expand its list of diagnostic customers by offering a wide array of diagnostic products and services and by facilitating access to those services through Internet desktop-to-desktop video teleconferencing technology. During 2000, SCE staff administered diagnostic assessments to linguists stationed at numerous bases or federal agencies as well as to linguists enrolled in DLI resident programs. SCE staff also prepared diagnostic profiles and learning plans for 31 Russian Foreign Area Officers bound for follow-on training at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and even trained Russian faculty at that center to implement diagnostic recommendations.\(^{513}\)

SCE diagnostic assessment staff assisted the efforts of DLIFLC and the National Foreign Language Center by developing learning strategies for “LANGNET,” a database

\(^{510}\) Recollections of Dr. Stephen M. Payne, who was at the time serving as Assistant Provost; and Thomas Parry, e-mail to Stephen Payne, 26 April 2007, in “Creation of CE [SCE]” folder, box 43, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.


\(^{513}\) Mohsen M. Fahmy, “Diagnostic Assessment Program,” information paper in Annual Program Review 2001, 7-8 February 2001 (DLIFLC, 2001), p. 21. SCE hired two Arabic and two Spanish assessors, three Korean and three Russian assessors, and one Persian-Farsi assessor, all of whom were trained by DLIFLC and NSA diagnostic trainers.
of diagnostic tools and resources. They also worked on a joint DLIFLC-NSA machine translation project by collecting and rating authentic reading materials in five languages and at all proficiency levels to assist in the evaluation of the reliability and functionality of machine translation products.\footnote{Fahmy, “Diagnostic Assessment Program,” p. 21.}

Finally, SCE diagnostic assessment staff applied their diagnostic assessment techniques outside of SCE. They established diagnostic profile assessment as an integral component of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency curriculum at DLIFLC and trained its Russian teachers and supervisors in applying and implementing the recommendations of diagnostic assessments. They also assisted European I School in its effort to improve Russian speaking scores through diagnostic feedback while providing familiarization training on the relevance of diagnostic assessment to teachers in the Arabic, Chinese, Russian, and Serbian/Croatian resident programs. SCE also assisted Evaluation and Standards school in validating the Korean DLPT IV by conducting more than two hundred interviews and by selecting and rating a large number of listening and reading passages.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Language Teaching Detachments**

Another tasked assigned to SCE was the supervision of DLIFLC’s Language Teaching Detachments or LTDs, whose function was similar to a university extension program. Basically, the Institute established “branch campuses” in the field to provide highly tailored foreign language instruction to specific military units or other government agencies on a year-round basis. The main accomplishment of the effort was simply the establishment or acquisition of five LTDs in 2000. Several additional LTDs were being planned for 2001.\footnote{Dr. Thomas Parry, “Language Training Detachments (LTDs),” information paper in Annual Program Review 2001, 7-8 February 2001 (DLIFLC, 2001), p. 20.}

The project actually began in 1996, when Devlin considered an OPP proposal to launch a pilot “Language Training Detachment” program, the goal being to support Regional SIGINT Operations Centers (RSOCs) by supplying resident DLIFLC teachers who would help the centers to obtaining a greater number of linguists scoring at 3 in listening and reading on the DLPT. The problem revolved around various restrictions, including funding, that made it difficult to enhance the capabilities of field linguists at several key operations centers. One issue in this regard was that DLIFLC was set up to provide resident basic language instruction whereas the regional SIGINT operations centers needed linguist life-cycle or sustainment training and training for more advanced linguists. These centers were also operational and could not afford to lose their linguists for long periods, but still needed skilled language training to improve linguist performance. If approved, the pilot program was scheduled to begin in June 1998 by which time a Memorandum of Understanding between DLIFLC and the regional SIGINT centers would need to be in place. The pilot program was to run for three years.\footnote{“Decision Briefing-Language Training Detachments (LTDs),” commandant’s briefing in “OPP-LTDs...1996,” box 43, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.} As proposed the LTDs would support refresher training for up to one thousand intermediate
and advanced linguists by shaving costs associated with transferring linguists to Monterey while providing a higher level of training than might be expected from local contracting. The high concentration of linguists at the regional SIGINT centers made the proposal feasible. Academic experts warned, however, that the program would still require “a substantial investment of [training] time” and put pressure on the Institute to show significant increases in the number of linguists obtaining 2+ and 3 ratings on the listening and reading sections of the DLPT. Any pilot program would therefore have to include important measures of success mutually agreed upon by DLIFLC and the RSOCs and would present an opportunity to incorporate diagnostic tools.

The regional SIGINT centers were NSA operations and because NSA was the largest consumer of DLIFLC linguists, meeting its needs was a priority. The proposed LTDs would allow DLIFLC to impact the intelligence mission directly by beefing up the capabilities of working linguists in several key languages, mainly Arabic, Chinese, Persian-Farsi, and Russian. In other words, another benefit of the proposal was that it would help tie DLIFLC more closely to the field. For DLIFLC, the establishment of remote campuses meant that the regional SIGINT centers had both to support and help fund the effort and be “committed to achieving the goal of enhancement.” For DLI staff, this meant a coordinated effort between the RSOC commanders, the Joint Language Center manager, and service unit commanders “to ensure positions are still covered and linguists are made available for training.” An effort merely to sustain current linguist readiness, as opposed to increasing capability was considered an inappropriate goal for establishing LTDs given the cost involved. Moreover, it was believed, there would be “little incentive for RSOCs/NSA to support this financially” unless the goal was consistent with the NSA director’s expressed goal of creating a “3/3 linguist corps.”

In July 1997, the Institute held a seminar with the RSOC Joint Language Center directors in Monterey. The RSOCs thereafter proposed to staff the Fort Gordon RSOC with one Arabic and one Persian-Farsi instructor, the Medina RSOC with a single Russian instructor, and the Kunia RSOC with a single Chinese instructor.

Funding was proposed for a three-year/three site pilot program at $367,000 per year or $1.1 million for three years. The existence of the LTDs would also support satellite training for surrounding units. In the short-term the goal was to extend DLIFLC training assistance through a mix of formal course work and “just-in-time training.” The long-term goal was to formalize the arrangement by establishing school codes for the LTDs, which would enable LTD funding “under the Institute’s MDEP.”

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518 Handwritten notes on “Decision Briefing-Language Training Detachments (LTDs),” commandant’s briefing in “OPP-LTDs...1996,” box 43, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
519 “RSOC LTDs,” undated notes in “Language Training Detachments” folder, box 43, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
520 “Decision Briefing-Language Training Detachments (LTDs),” commandant’s briefing in “OPP-LTDs...1996,” box 43, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
521 “RSOC LTDs,” undated notes in “Language Training Detachments” folder, box 43, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
Various obstacles hampered this initial proposal and by February 1998, Richard Chastain, director of OPP, recommended only that one LTD be established at the Fort Gordon RSOC for Arabic and Persian-Farsi following a site survey to determine its specific needs. According to Chastain, this facility had a dense enough linguist population and “operations tempo” to support an LTD and was not able to train more than 50 percent of its own Arabic linguists. (The Fort Gordon RSOC was also the most enthusiastic supporter of the LTD notion.) At the same time Chastain recommended not establishing a Russian-oriented LTD for the Medina Regional SIGINT Operations Center because its operations tempo did not support such efforts. Finally, he advised that the Kunia Regional SIGINT Operations Center was satisfied with the level of support provided by DLIFLC’s VTT and various local (contract) instructors.523

The hope to establish the three pilot RSOC LTD programs stalled. In priority order, the top three issues that had to be addressed were requirements (which varied between active and reserve units and for specific languages), diversity (meaning units could be geographically split up over hundreds of miles or “have linguists from skill levels from 0/0+ to over 3 in any one language and among languages”), and funding (meaning units could not simply divert training funds to cover the costs of an LTD; the DFLP and the services would have to “come to grips with the need and means” to establish “on a selective basis” the subject LTDs).524 Additionally, LTD costs had to compare favorably to out-sourced instruction, but funding appeared to be the main obstacle. However, the NSA directors, Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, and Lt. Gen Michael V. Hayden, USAF, continued to support the effort and, by June 1999, the Fort Gordon LTD was looking feasible for a start date that fall. By then the Marine Corps was also interested in establishing an LTD at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.525 Advocates hoped that once the Fort Gordon LTD was up and running, additional LTDs could be brought online as they became feasible.

The support at NSA for the DLI proposal helped to sustain the initiative. By February 2000, several “satellite campuses” were finally underway, including the three original pilot sites, one at Camp LeJeune, and an existing quasi-LTD arrangement at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, where a DLIFLC instructor was already providing Russian language training for staff of the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) involved in cooperative space efforts with Russia. (See table below.) While these efforts got underway, DLIFLC recommended that the DFLP Policy Committee flesh out service interest and commitment to the effort.526

Location and Language of DLIFLC LTDs (#=DLI Faculty Assigned):
1. Camp LeJeune, North Carolina; Spanish (2)
2. Joint Language Center, Ft. Gordon, Georgia; Arabic (1), Persian-Farsi (1)

524 “Language Training Detachments (LTDs),” undated position paper in “OPP-LTDs...1997” folder, box 43, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
525 LTC Roderic Gale, email to Steven R. Solomon entitled “RE: LTDs,” in “OPP-LTDs...1999” folder, box 43, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
526 “Issue: Intermediate and Advanced Language Training at RSOCs,” position paper in “OPP-LTDs...2000” folder, box 43, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
3. Joint Language Center, Kunia, Oahu, Hawaii; Chinese (1), Korean (1)
4. Joint Language Center, Medina, Texas; Russian (1), Spanish (1)
5. NSA Johnson Space Center, Huston, Texas; Russian (1)

Figure 17 DLIFLC Language Training Detachments in 2000

As established the LTDs were brought under the jurisdiction of the newly created SCE. They provided “tailored instruction at field sites on a year-round basis.” The LTDs were staffed by DLIFLC faculty assigned for three-year periods to provide instruction in refresher, maintenance, enhancement, intermediate, and advanced foreign language training. They specifically did not teach basic language instruction, the purpose of the LTDs being to sustain and enhance existing military linguist capabilities. By the beginning of 2001, SCE was planning an additional LTD for the George C. Marshall Center in Garmish, Germany, for Russian, which was to include four instructors and a program director, and was preparing a new Spanish LTD for the “High Intensity Traffic Agency” in New Jersey. The RSOCs at Medina, Texas, and Kunia, Hawaii, were also being expanded.

Contingency Operations Support—EOC, Bosnia and Beyond

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center continued to provide support for Department of Defense and other federal, state, and local agencies as needed during contingencies including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, accidents, and high-level meetings. Normally such assistance came in the form of supplying foreign language support by qualified linguists who could conduct real-time interpretation or translation.

Before the closure of Fort Ord, DLIFLC did not maintain its own permanent “Emergency Operations Center” or EOC, an organizational function previously the responsibility of the Fort Ord commander. Although all TRADOC installations must have an EOC, the Institute was able to rely on Fort Ord for most contingency operations support with key DLIFLC personnel, such as Chief Robert L. Higgins, working on EOC issues out of their offices on an ad hoc basis. With the closure of Fort Ord, the departure of the 7th Light Infantry Division, and the transition of DLIFLC from tenant to installation status, the Institute had to establish its own EOC. Nevertheless, DLIFLC did not immediately stand up a formal EOC with installation status. Instead, the ad hoc nature of emergency operations persisted for some time. Eventually, a number of world and local events, including the Northridge Earthquake and the “Chinese Boat People” episode, helped underscore the seriousness of the Institute’s need for a permanent, formal

530 Historian’s Notes, Interview with Rich Savko, 4 September 1997 and with Lieutenant Colonel Maria Constantine, USAF, 21 November 1997.
531 Historian’s Notes, Interview with Savko, 12 December 1997.
EOC. Most importantly, the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia, with its requirements for immediate assistance in obscure languages, compelled DLIFLC to establish an EOC.

The Institute hired Rich Savko to head up the new organization from his position as an MTT scheduler in OPP. Savko applied to be the first EOC chief after working on contingency operations during the Carmel River Flood of 1995. Although established in 1995, the Emergency Operations Center first appeared upon DLIFLC’s official office directory in April 1997 as a component of OPP.

Savko’s first major activity came with Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, which began in December 1995. The Army asked the Institute to provide language support for US units participating in NATO led forces operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the former Yugoslavia. The United States was to send some twenty thousand American soldiers to help implement the Dayton Peace Accords that had signaled an end to civil conflict in the area. Joint Endeavor was also historic in being the first operational commitment of NATO peacekeeping forces.

Under Savko’s direction, OPP provided translation support, language survival kits and trained linguists in the primary languages spoken in Serbia and Croatia (Serbian/Croatian, which is essentially the same spoken language, but which uses either Latin script, as in Croatia, or Cyrillic, as in Serbia, in written form). Linguist training included a special sixteen-week cross-training course in Serbian/Croatian taught at the Presidio of Monterey to existing military Slavic linguists (rated at L2/R2 or above), a VTT short course taught to Marines at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, and another eight-week refresher Serbian/Croatian class completed at DLI-Washington in January 1996. MTT workshops were also held at DLI-Washington. By March 1996, OPP had also shipped 18,600 Serbian/Croatian language survival kits to troops serving in the field.

Meanwhile, the Institute was planning further refresher and cross-training courses in Serbian/Croatian, to be contracted out through DLI-Washington, while DLIFLC was preparing a basic course to start in June 1996. Eventually, the Institute provided cross-training in Serbian/Croatian for hundreds of military linguists trained in Russian, a linguistically similar language then in less need after the end of the Cold War. In December 1996, the NATO implementation force mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina successfully concluded and Operation Joint Guard began. An ongoing stabilization effort, Joint Guard continued to December 2005. Requests for language survival kits declined after the transition to Joint Guard and the initiation of more routine operations. By the end of 2000, the total number of kits shipped had surpassed 20,000.


the need to supply survival kits declined, DLIFLC’s support for US operations in Bosnia continued with the provision of Serbian/Croatian basic courses taught at the Institute.

After the beginning of Operation Joint Guard, several Institute MLIs in MOS 97 Echo (interrogator), who were proficient in Serbian/Croatian, also served in Bosnia. The duty was challenging, requiring the linguists to innovate and go beyond their training manuals to find ways for interrogators and counter-intelligence elements to cooperate. The MLIs felt they were doing excellent work and bringing insights back to DLI that would make them better language instructors, but they also encountered a number of administrative difficulties because they were deployed to Bosnia on Temporary Change of Station (TCS) status (as opposed to Permanent Change of Station or PCS). The interrogators soon found their deployments automatically extended from 179 to 364 days and then their efforts were diverted from intelligence missions to various details, including guard duty, kitchen police, and vehicle painting. As “TCSers,” unit commanders denied the interrogators leadership opportunities and school attendance, access to promotion boards, and sometimes even the most essential supplies. The MLIs also found their standard thirty days per year of leave cut to fifteen days because of their non-permanent status.

Aside from Serbian/Croatian, the Institute maintained complete kits (phrasebook, cassette, and C2 card) of linguist materials available to support contingency deployments of US forces in such languages as Albanian, Armenian, Arabic (Iraqi/Kuwaiti and Syrian dialects), Ukrainian, Korean, Haitian-Creole, Spanish, Dutch, French, Hungarian, Swahili, Kinyarwandan, and Somali. It also maintained some materials (not complete kits) for a dozen more languages/dialects or could provide topical materials, such as Korean C2 card for nuclear inspections, Haitian-Creole medical C2 cards, and a book/cassette in Spanish to support civilian law enforcement activities. Linguists could also order materials from OPP’s Programs and Proponency Division or could simply download them from LingNet. Savko had wanted EOC to anticipate potential global trouble spots and stockpile survival kits in up to forty-five different languages, which could be shipped to the field within hours of a request. By January 1999, OPP reported a library of forty-two such language survival kits with six more in development.

EOC contingency support for other causes included Coast Guard search and rescue efforts; Justice Department investigations in the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing; activities relating to Joint Task Force Bravo, an ongoing US military mission in Honduras since 1983, and Southern Watch in Iraq, a post-Gulf War operation near Iraq. EOC also supported local authorities. For example, in July 1996, it

536 “TCS status complicates Army NCOs’ Bosnia Service,” *Globe* 20, no. 2 (February/March 1997): pp. 24-25.
participated in an air piracy exercise held at San Francisco International Airport. During that event, Savko served as the chief exercise planner for the foreign language portion of the exercise, and six DLIFLC Arabic-speaking linguists played the role of Islamic terrorists in hijacking an international flight preparing to depart. Master Sergeant Martin Dooley, USAF, was the Arabic Team Chief. According to the DLIFLC students, their “language-speaking ability exceeded the expectations of the civil authorities.” According to Savko thought the planning of the exercise, which involved numerous federal and air port officials, “was an excellent cooperative effort.”

During 1998, DLIFLC’s language-oriented operational support included interpretation activities at Lowry Air Force Base in Colorado, the National Training Center at Fort Irwin and Camp Pendleton in California, the CIA in Washington, DC; and as far afield as Warsaw, Poland, and St. Petersburg, Russia. In addition, DLIFLC supported a language exercise at RSOI in Korea as well as the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspection operations in Iraq. The UNSCOM support included seventeen missions and twenty-four linguists. After the bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, DLIFLC linguists aided Department of Justice agents investigating the attacks. In March 1999, Savko coordinated military and civilian involvement in a Marines-controlled training exercise named “Operation Sea Dragon” that simulated a Marine landing and assault on the Presidio of Monterey. The exercise tested participants and provided them with training in advance urban warfare techniques. Some three-hundred DLIFLC military and civilian personnel participated, including Arabic and Korean language instructors and students in role-playing exercises.

In October 1999, the EOC responded to an urgent request from the US Air Force Rescue Coordination Center at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, to assist in a medical emergency taking place onboard a Panamanian-flagged, Singapore-based freighter 700 miles off the coast of California. A member of the crew, which spoke only Chinese, had had a stroke. The Air Force needed a Chinese linguist to fly with the mission to coordinate communications between two US rescue aircraft and the vessel. According to Staff Sergeant Michael Wight, the DLIFLC Chinese MLI who flew with the mission, “I was impressed with the coordination between the Air Force and the Emergency Operations Center at DLIFLC. The mission was a complete success and would make an excellent scenario for final learning objectives.”

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542 Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998, briefing slides.
These examples of DLIFLC’s contingency support operations were only the highlights. By early 2000 “increasing demands for contingency operations and support to contingency operations” for non-linguists (e.g., combat troops deploying on a peace-keeping missions) were placing stress upon DLIFLC faculty and staff and causing management concern. During the Annual Program Review in 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Butler pointed out that “clear guidance does not exist on the appropriate role of DLIFLC in the support of non-linguists.” He noted that while the Institute had tried hard to meet every request for support, doing so caused teacher shortages in the resident programs. Because of such problems, DLIFLC officials moved to establish a School of Continuing Education, which Butler fully endorsed. However, he also recommended that the Defense Foreign Language Program provide better guidance “as to the responsibilities, priorities and funding sources of support to non-linguists.”

Other Operations Support: Reserve Training and Linguist Proficiency Pay

In August 1996, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for C3I established the Defense Reserve Language Program Working Group under the Defense Foreign Language Policy Committee, which was composed of language program administrators from across the Defense Department and the intelligence community. The group evaluated DoD’s Reserve Component linguist accession, retention, and language enhancement needs in order to make policy recommendations to improve reserve linguist capabilities. Among the problems were the lack of any reserve foreign language program, an 82 percent failure rate in meeting reserve component foreign language

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546 “Commandant’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998” folder, Box 57, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
requirements, and the high cost of contracting linguists to support unanticipated contingency operations. With the end of the Cold War, new threats meant that the reserves faced new language requirements. The working group proposed to meeting over 60 percent of reserve language requirements by 2002. The group proposed to validate all requirements, then increase linguist incentives, enhance training, recruit native speakers leaving active duty, increase virtual training capabilities, establish a Joint Reserve Language Center to manage the effort, and include a Defense Reserve Language Plan in the Defense Resource Management process.  

Devlin and his staff evaluated the proposal of the reserve component working group, but found major problems, as Devlin carefully pointed out to the director of intelligence policy, plans and programs. Devlin lauded the overall objective “to more efficiently recruit, maintain and retain proficient linguist assets” and was willing for DLIFLC to host the proposed Joint Reserve Language Center. However, the commandant had a number of important criticisms and strongly stated his opposition to the reserve proposal as constituted in 1997. Devlin thought that the proposal “clearly builds yet another bureaucracy in an environment where we are being asked to consolidate administrative efforts, increase efficiency and reduce overhead costs.” Moreover, he continued, “military service requirements have not been documented to justify the ambitious initiatives outlined” in the reserve language program proposal. Devlin acknowledged the important problems of training, utilizing, and retaining competent reserve linguists, but found the proposed solution completely off base. Perhaps underlying many Institute criticisms of the proposal was Devlin’s further complaint that the working group had failed to engage DLIFLC or sought “to find solutions for these issues in a coordinated manner that seeks advantage of efficiencies wherever possible.” Indeed, Devlin emphasized, “the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) would like to participate in developing and implementing practical solutions to these challenges.” In other words, the proposal to seek some $81.7 million to support reserve linguist activities had largely excluded the major DoD effort to train linguists—DLIFLC—and, given a declining resource base, was possibly a threat to the Institute’s own efforts to meet DoD’s linguists needs. Devlin had no choice but to “strongly non-concur.” Another problem with the proposal was that it appeared to duplicate the mission of DLIFLC—training military linguists. According to Devlin, the published plan had also failed to include input by DLIFLC and the executive agent for the DFLP.

549 Daniel D. Devlin, Commandant, Memorandum to Director, Intelligence Policy, Plans & Programs, 13 August 1997, copy in “OPP, Programs & Proponency Division, CLP, Reserves (RC) 1995-1997” folder, box 43, RG. 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
551 “Defense Reserve Language Plan (DRLP) Proposal—Coordination Visit of Mr. Jim Hemenway (OASD/C3I) to DLIFLC,” 29 July 1997, meeting minutes in “OPP, Programs & Proponency Division, CLP, Reserves (RC) 1995-1997” folder, box 43, RG. 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. See also “Defense
In August 1997, Devlin notified the DFLP Policy Committee about his decision to oppose the Defense Reserve Language Plan. He noted that Office of the ASD/C3I had acknowledged his and the concerns of other organizations and would prepare a new plan “to clarify the contentious issues of the Proposal and move toward developing a consensus on ways to address RC linguist issues.” Devlin assured the DFLP Policy Committee members that they would have DLIFLC’s “full support in the effort to develop a plan to better identify, manage and utilize Reserve Component linguists.” Indeed, he concluded, “we are now participating as equal partners in the development of a refined [Defense Reserve Language] plan.” The commandant urged all the committee members to become more engaged in the process as well. Devlin assigned Lieutenant Colonel Marilee Wilson the director of OPP, to work with the Defense Reserve Language Plan working group in addressing Institute concerns.

Another activity that OPP was responsible for was tracking Foreign Language Proficiency Pay, important for sustainment purposes because it provided a meaningful incentive for military linguists to maintain their proficiency. Those linguists able to pass the DLPT with scores of L2/R2 or above were eligible for the incentive, which was typically $50 per month.

Effective 1 January 1997, the Air Force liberalized its policy on the awarding of FLPP, making more personnel eligible and even granting retroactive FLPP in some cases. The Critical Language List, which restricted FLPP to airmen maintaining L2/R2 proficiency in Arabic, Chinese, Korean, and Russian, was abolished, expanding the list of qualifying languages to encompass all those specified in AFI 36-2605. The new policy also removed the condition that first-term airmen must be proficient in a critical language (or assigned to a language-designated position) to apply for FLPP. However, airmen proficient in Spanish or Tagalog would not qualify for FLPP unless they were serving in a language-designated position or language-inherent career field or held a “Reporting Identifier” or “Special-Duty Identifier.” The Marine Corps also announced a change that would bring its FLPP policy into line with that of the other services: L2/R2 would be the minimum qualifying proficiency level. Earlier USMC policy had awarded $50 per month to Marine linguists maintaining L1+/R1+ in Category III and IV languages. Per ALMAR 177/97, effective 1 October 1996, no Marine maintaining less than L2/R2 could begin drawing FLPP. Moreover, no later than 19 May 1997, Marines receiving FLPP under the standards of the old policy would lose their FLPP. A more positive development was noted in December 1997, however, when the USMC Service Program Manager, Captain Tom Sparks, informed OPP personnel that a new MOS, MOS 8611/Interpreter, would be an additional MOS for Marines with critical language skills. Once their proficiency was
certified by taking the DLPT, these Marines would be able to earn up to $100 per month in FLPP.\textsuperscript{555}

Concerning the last item, Lane Aldrich, of the Language Branch of the deputy chief of staff for intelligence, stated that total funding would not increase, but that plans were under consideration to raise the minimum qualifying score from L2/R2 to L2+/R2+. This measure would raise FLPP to between $200 and $400 monthly and would presumably increase the incentive for linguists to attain and maintain a higher level of proficiency.\textsuperscript{556} Of course, those linguists previously receiving FLPP but unable to meet the new higher standards would simply lose their FLPP, which would negatively affect their morale.


Chapter VI

Installation and Garrison Support

Between 1996 and 2000, the organizational structure of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and the Presidio of Monterey remained stable, with some minor changes. Limited resources, however, as well as continuing high mission demands and the ripple effects from the closure of Fort Ord, impacted installation and garrison support during these years. Although the first priority of DLIFLC and Presidio leaders was to execute the mission of the Institute, the installation management team was constrained with a severely limited budget for base operations (known as BASOPS) and Army family housing. To ease the budget pressures, the garrison staff developed several innovative programs and partnerships, initially with the Naval Postgraduate School and later with the City of Monterey.

Garrison Command

On 13 December 1995, Colonel Ila Mettee-McCutchon, USA, took command as the installation commander and commandant of DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey. She held the positions until Colonel Daniel D. Devlin assumed command on 26 February 1996. Mettee-McCutchon then returned to her position as garrison commander until succeeded by Colonel David Gross, USA, in June 1996. Due to her experience, Mettee-McCutchon retained control of the Directorate of Base Realignment and Closure.
(DBRAC) and Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR) until her retirement in 1997. Colonel Peter G. Dausen succeeded Gross in June 1998 when Gross was assigned as the 8th Army chief of staff in Korea. Devlin remained commandant and installation commander until his retirement when he turned the flag over to Colonel Kevin M. Rice, USA, in December 2000.

The DLIFLC chief of staff, known as the executive officer in 1996, was Colonel Oldenburg, USAF. Colonel Sobichevsky had intended for Oldenburg to retain control over some mission related garrison activities after Fort Ord closed, but TRADOC would not allow an Air Force officer control over an Army installation. When Oldenburg was reassigned to Washington, D.C. as military liaison for President William J. Clinton’s second inauguration, the executive officer was renamed chief of staff and down graded to an Army lieutenant colonel position. The installation executive officer was recreated as an O-3 position and became an aide to the command group.

**Installation and Garrison Activities**

The installation and garrison support activities were a wide variety of organizations, directorates, and offices supporting DLIFLC and the Presidio and several tenant units, such as the Defense Finance and Automation Service (DFAS), ROTC, and medical and dental detachments. Supporting organizations fell under the authority of either the garrison commander or the installation chief of staff (see the TDA organizational table above).

**Public Works**

The Directorate of Public Works (DPW) remained under Jerry Abeyta who managed the oversight and maintenance of the facilities at the POM and on the Ord Military Community. The most difficult management issue for DPW related to the maintenance of historic buildings and real property management. The task was always difficult with limited funds because, to use Dausen’s phrase, it amounted to “brinkmanship,” to guess to what level maintenance could be lowered before reduced care essentially ruined the property. Consequently, DPW sought to demolish as many old buildings as possible within the constraints of limited funds and historical preservation status. The desire to maintain the character of the historic district, with its turn-of-the-century charm, conflicted with the high maintenance demands of older buildings. Another incentive for DPW to support demolition of older buildings was that any new construction funds would come from the Department of the Army and would not drain from DPW’s budget. Preservation of the historic Presidio of Monterey, however, was a great concern to the city of Monterey, because the Lower Presidio and the US Army had been integral parts of Monterey’s long and colorful past. The leadership of the City of Monterey was concerned about the historic aspect of the older Presidio buildings and requested that several not be demolished. The city had incorporated the Lower Presidio into its Historic Master Plan, which was also part of its tourism plan. Consequently, city

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557 Note, Mettee McCutchon was elected to the Marina city council in 1998 and became mayor in 2002. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger later appointed her to the Monterey Board of Supervisors to fill a vacancy, although she lost her election bid for a full term in June 2008.
officials frequently asked DPW to maintain the historic older buildings despite DPW’s assertion of higher maintenance costs. Of course, any Army plan to alter those Presidio structures listed on the National Register of Historic Places also required consultation with state officials under terms of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966.

At the same time, DPW faced a requirement to demolish 242,000 square feet of World War II wooden structures as part of a TRADOC program to upgrade installations called the “War on Infrastructure.” Because of the crowding on the Presidio, carrying out this plan would entail the demolition of many structures still in use as classrooms and office space, including the chapel, four classroom buildings, and the Women’s Army Corps or WACS barracks of World War II. The initial demolition plan also included an Army-owned building in downtown Monterey that had been the local YMCA for two generations. The sensitivity of the historic district was highlighted in September 1999 when archaeological evidence of Indian/Native American remains and artifacts were uncovered. Devlin and a representative from the Essalen Nation participated in a re-burial ceremony on the Lower Presidio in May 2000.

In 1998, DPW found itself once again tasked with many previous caretaker and BASOPS functions, even though there was continued pressure to work under reduced budgets. Work that was contracted was hard to supervise with a small staff and several projects had to be redone because of poor workmanship. The contractor Brown and Root was probed over its billing for work done by subsidiaries on the Presidio and at Fort Ord from 1994 to 1996.

Maintenance of the Presidio was a constant challenge for DPW. DPW frequently used PBAC allocations to fund general repairs. For example, there were problems with the heating systems of several buildings in the 600 series, ultimately requiring $400,000 in boiler repairs. In addition, many buildings needed to have their electrical systems updated to be in compliance with energy efficiency standards. Storm damage from 1998 El Niño storms caused nearly $1 million in damage to roads, roofs, and drainage systems on the Presidio and OMC.

Inter-service Support Agreements

In 1996 some in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) were still considering the transfer of base support and Executive Agency functions (including funding and manpower) from the Army to the Navy. The idea was to consolidate all garrison support activities in the Monterey area under one service, which had been a recommendation of the 1993 BRAC Commission. Eventually, the Army retained Executive Agency for DLI, but had to use Inter-service Support Agreements with the Navy for its BASOPS activities. In March 1996, TRADOC’s Commander, General William Hartzog, reassured the Institute’s commandant and installation commander, Colonel Daniel Devlin, that any thoughts of closing the installation or moving the school were dead issues. Indeed, Secretary of the Army Togo West, Jr., announced in August 1996 that the school would

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558 Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 16 June 1998, in folder 8, box 57, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
stay in Monterey. Even so, the cost of BASOPS remained a major issue because of the possibility of future BRAC rounds. Another drain on BASOPS resources actually came from within TRADOC as TRADOC “taxed” the budgets of its installations to offset the cost of overseeing them. Following intervention by NSA in 1999, the tax on mission funding stopped, but TRADOC still taxed BASOPS funding.\textsuperscript{559}

The POM staff developed three main ISAs with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to economize BASOPS expenses. The first was an ISA contract (“OMA Fire” in the resourcing chart) for fire protection and prevention at the Ord Military Community (OMC), a military housing area in Seaside, California, also known as the Presidio of Monterey Annex. The second was a public works ISA (“OMA M&R” and “AFH M&R”) in which the Army paid the Navy to be a public works center for the Presidio and its annex. The third, so-called “caretaker” ISA (“OMA Caretaker”) stipulated that the Army pay the Navy for caretaker functions of mothballed buildings and facilities on the former Fort Ord that were awaiting transfer to other entities.\textsuperscript{560}

Originally intended as money- and job-saving measures, the ISAs encountered serious problems, namely their intended savings never materialized. The Army ended up funding a supervisor-heavy workforce with little money left over for supplies and equipment. As BASOPS funding declined, the rationale for the arrangement became less tenable. Furthermore, Devlin and the garrison commander, Colonel Ila Mettee-McCutchon and later Colonel David Gross, became increasingly frustrated at the lack of budget information available from the Navy’s Directorate of Public Works detailing how such funds were being spent. Friction between POM and NPS staff erupted and was exacerbated by differing and even conflicting staff procedures and service regulations. Although the public works ISA was renegotiated in early 1996, garrison staff believed that the NPS was insufficiently managing the Presidio of Monterey and Ord facilities. Maintenance improved when activity-based costing was enacted, a procedure that required charging per activity rather than by flat fee, and the Presidio gained some rebates. Activity-based costing put pressure on NPS staff to improve facility support on the POM, but the POM staff sought further improvement.

There were additional concerns related to the caretaker ISA. The closed areas of Fort Ord were low on the Navy’s list of priorities for maintenance and, as a result, facilities quickly fell into disrepair. By September 1997, the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) and staff from the Presidio’s BRAC office were so dissatisfied with the Navy’s oversight that the ISA was canceled. Thereafter, the Marina Coast Water District


\textsuperscript{560} The ISAs initially negotiated in 1994 were partly to find jobs for former Fort Ord employees.
assumed responsibility for the operations and maintenance of the water and wastewater systems while Marina, Seaside and Monterey County took responsibility for the remaining functions via cooperative agreements in 1999.561 This, coupled with the poor maintenance of facilities at the POM caused the garrison staff to consider how to contract with local municipalities for BASOPS support using the special demonstration legislation enacted in 1994 for this purpose. In November 1997, the Army duly notified the Navy that it was reducing the scope of the public works ISA, and that the cities of Monterey and Seaside would be taking on these responsibilities beginning in May 1998.562

The most successful aspect of the demonstration legislation involved the city of Monterey, which assumed responsibility for public works on the Presidio beginning in late October 1999. The maintenance and repair support for the Presidio became so successful, saving $2.4 million in the first year, that it became known within the DoD as the “Monterey Model.” The city, for example, renegotiated the paving contract at such a savings, that the contractor built a new parking lot near the Franklin Street gate for no additional cost.

Although the NPS union opposed the demonstration project, funding cuts made privatization and the Monterey Model necessary to keep the Presidio as a viable installation within DoD. Further BRAC rounds were expected in 1998 or 1999. The fear of high BASOPS costs made the union grudgingly accept the loss of the ISA, which did bring subsequent reductions-in-force to the naval school’s public works directorate.

For the POM, the switch in facility support to the city of Monterey was a success. Nonetheless, there was concern that the ISA would not be renewed for 2000. To make the point that the ISA was not only beneficial in terms of facility maintenance but was


cost effective, an audit by the installation auditor, Dwight Johnson, showed a savings of $2.9 million for the Presidio of Monterey. Congress finally stepped in, and the demonstration legislation was extended an additional year. Nevertheless, the issue was unresolved into 2001, which left the problem as one of the outstanding issues for the garrison commander, Colonel Peter G. Dausen.

In addition to the concern over the potential loss of the ISA, a TRADOC requirement that each installation review all of its functions for possible replacement with commercial activities placed extra pressure on the POM staff. Each garrison office had to explain what legal restrictions prevented a contractor from assuming that office’s mission. By 2000 two directorates were undergoing outsourcing studies, known in federal parlance as “A-76 reviews,” to determine if they could become commercial activities. In summary, DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey Garrison remained organizationally stable between the years 1996 to 2000. However, there were also serious threats of job and funding cuts.

The other significant partnering relationship with the city of Monterey was property leases. The city wanted to take control of all of the Presidio and then lease it back to the Army. The objective was to give the city a greater voice in future BRAC rounds and prevent both closure of the Presidio and then loss of control over the land to uncontrolled development. The city had actually raised the issue of Presidio ownership as far back as 1945, but dropped the matter after the Army relocated its language school to the Presidio the following year.

Monterey already provided DLI with some services, such as fire protection. Now, the city offered a complete lease-back transfer, but settled for a series of smaller leases. In mid-1995, the Presidio negotiated with the city to lease Soldier Field and a 23.5-acre section below the Sloat Monument known as the “Lower Presidio.” The Presidio was not using Soldier Field enough to make its upkeep cost effective. Meanwhile, the city needed more public recreation space.

On 16 August 1996, Secretary of the Army Togo West, Jr., on a visit to Monterey, signed an agreement authorizing the city to lease the ball fields and the Lower Presidio. Final details were worked out over the next several months. Under the proposed agreement, the city operated the field as a softball park and agreed to maintain the property. The Army retained ownership of the land and, in case of national emergency, could retake possession and remove the ball diamonds. As a consequence, no permanent changes, such as ball field lighting, were permitted. Soldier Field became a visible and successful example of Army-city cooperation. Construction of softball facilities began in early July with the city footing the $450,000 for the construction. The ball fields opened on 31 October 1997. Additionaly, the city leased the Lower Presidio and began to

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transform that area into a historic park. It planned to reopen the Presidio of Monterey Museum, which the Army had closed in 1994 during the BRAC process, and hoped to restore the area’s cavalry-era stables and gun sheds. The city manager, Fred Meure, planned to integrate the Lower Presidio and entire Historic District, including its many pre-World War I buildings, into the overall Monterey Historic Master Plan.

**Housing and Quality of Life**

The Presidio of Monterey footprint on the former Fort Ord included not only housing, but the post exchange, commissary, and some garrison support functions. The footprint was initially known as the Presidio of Monterey Annex, but was renamed in 2000 as the Ord Military Community. The Army’s family housing on OMC was actually in need of major renovation, and housing maintenance was one of the top complaints among students by 2000. The cost of renovation was complicated by lead-based paint and asbestos flooring in many of the units. The OMC footprint was located around the PX and commissary as a cost saving measure, but if the Army had chosen the newer housing at the north end of Fort Ord a new PX and commissary could have been built for less than the maintenance and repair costs on the older housing.

Housing at OMC also suffered due to high turnover rates among students at both DLIFLC and NPS. The average tour length was only 20 months compared to 36 months at other TRADOC installations. The shortened turnover period added an estimated $900,000 to maintenance cost each year. Additionally, the shortage of BASOPS funds led to a decline in the maintenance of housing, which in turn caused the quality of life for dependents to deteriorate. Another related issue for initial entry trainees (IET) students was that junior-ranking, married students could not afford to live off the POM in the Monterey area. The Army classified most language students as on permanent assignment, that is, Permanent Change of Station (PCS) to Monterey, even though most were still in IET status. Thus, when these students went to Goodfellow AFB or Fort Huachuca for MOS-specific follow-on training, they were considered to be on temporary assignment (TDY) while their families remained the responsibility of the Presidio.

There were signs of near-term improvement by 2000. DoD-wide housing privatization was mandated in 1995. In late 1997 the garrison commander, Colonel David Gross, sought to implement a major housing privatization initiative, known initially as the Capital Venture Initiative, but then more appealingly renamed the Residential Community Initiative (RCI). The RCI caused terrific concern among the Navy’s Public Works employees, because they would lose both their mission and jobs as the Navy provided support for the Army’s family housing area. After considering options Gross felt that privatization could quickly raise capital to fund badly needed housing renovation without adding to the cost of the budget. The plan was to give a fifty-year lease to a contractor who, in turn for building, maintaining and managing the


564 The name was changed on 12 August 2000 to preserve the historical association with Fort Ord. See “Ord Military Community” folder in box 1, RG 5E, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
military housing, received the military housing allowance (BAH) rate, guaranteeing revenue. This model worked well for the city of Marina’s lease of former Fort Ord housing, turned over by the Fort Ord Reuse Authority, which made it available for municipal, county and federal employees (see chapter 7.) Garrison leaders successfully pressed TRADOC for OMC housing to be included in the initial privatization effort, which was scheduled to start in 2002.

Figure 20 1st Lt. Isabella Ord, great great granddaughter of General Edward O.C. Ord, Fort Ord’s namesake, and Colonel Daniel D. Devlin rename the Presidio of Monterey Annex on 12 August 2000.

Other Cost Savings Initiatives

In addition to privatizing housing, the Army was moving across the board to privatize utilities to reduce BASOPS costs. By 2000, the Presidio of Monterey had turned over its gas and electric utilities to PG&E while the California-American Water Company (Cal-Am) had taken over its water utilities. There were some issues, including the cost to meter individual housing units and buildings at OMC. In the end, PG&E absorbed the metering, because military service members do not pay for utilities. Still, the garrison commander monitored power usage, and the highest energy consumers were notified and warned to reduce consumption. For example, one family unit drove up its utility bill to $600 in one month, well over twice the normal usage. Privatizing water at OMC proved a little more challenging because the Marina Coast Water District was to take over the infrastructure of Fort Ord, which had to be approved by the Department of Health and Human Services. After the latter disapproved the transfer, the turnover scheme had to be re-routed through the Fort Ord Reuse Authority, but was set to be complete in 2001 (see chapter 7).
Along with the decline in BASOPS funding, garrison officials had to counter the persistent belief that the Presidio of Monterey had been closed along with Fort Ord in the early 1990s. This perception led to the cancellation of all military construction. The Presidio finally overcame the BRAC cloud and began to receive military construction funding in 1998, but only with congressional add-ons to the budget. The Army had allocated no new construction projects on the Presidio since the mid-1980s; although there were needs for more classrooms, an audio/visual center for video-teleconferences, and more barracks. The most important for the mission for DLI was completing construction of the General Instructional Facility (GIF III). Barracks, classrooms, and offices remained crowded and required careful management, but relief would be underway at the beginning of 2001.

Barracks had to be allocated carefully between the services because each of the component troop commanders debated what were minimal standards of space and what luxuries the enlisted should expect. In other words, each service had different standards, which complicated the allocation of space and funds for renovations. The Army, of course, applied its own standard to the Presidio, which was an Army installation, but this standard did not always suit the other services. The Army supplied the first construction funds of $700,000 in the 1998 fiscal year allowing garrison officials to start renovating barracks to better accommodate female students. This amount was insufficient to remedy many other problems, and DPW had to maintain a crowded installation until new building construction funds became available in 2001.

Top-down cost-savings initiatives were frequent throughout the 1990s. The quickest way to save money, albeit not usually the best, was to cut the number of personnel. Nevertheless, the Department of the Army and TRADOC tried several times to cut costs by cutting personnel. The so-called “Dorn Reductions,” named after Edwin Dorn, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, simply mandated less people. The Presidio’s share of the reductions accounted for 23 staff cuts in 1998, 14 in 1999, and 13 in 2000. Reductions came in BASOPS so that the DLI mission was impacted as little as possible. TRADOC also used modeling systems to determine what a garrison required so that it could limit the size of civilian staffs: the Standard Levels of Service (SLOS) and the Army Performance Improvement Criteria (APIC) were two models used to improve the cost-effectiveness of BASOPS.

The idea behind SLOS was to give clear guidelines for staffing levels. A problem with this model, however, was that each installation differed much by region and function such that SLOS was somewhat arbitrary for predicting the required levels of service. The model’s bias, it seemed, was in always recommending below what was needed for adequate staffing. Nevertheless, TRADOC was trying its best to work with limited funds. The reduced staffing levels hurt the Presidio greatly because the education mission of DLIFLC was unique and the garrison was the newest within TRADOC. Unfortunately, the Presidio of Monterey also had the highest civilian to military ratio in TRADOC. The Institute’s faculty was 95 percent civilian while the faculty at other TRADOC schools was 90 percent military. Consequently, civilian pay came out of the school’s operating budget, not the Army’s military personnel account, which served to

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make DLI look far more expensive than other schools. (In other words, military pay was hidden from operating budgets.) In contrast to SLOS, APIC was an attempt to improve the quality of support services to match the “Force XXI” concept of continuous experimentation and transformation. However, since there were no fundamental changes to regulations governing civilian personnel management, no fundamental policy changes could be made either, other than to demand better work. In general, personnel cost-savings initiatives frequently came down to cutting staff.

Garrison Staff

Resource Management

The Directorate of Resource Management (DRM) had the responsibility of managing limited BASOPS funds for all of DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey. Mettee-McCutchon put DRM under the garrison command when she was interim commandant, where it remained until the establishment of the Installation Management Agency. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Lang, USA, was director until April 1996, when he became deputy garrison commander. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Mason, USA, succeeded Lang as director. Lieutenant Colonel Kay Moore, USA, became the director in 2000.

DRM’s main role was ensuring that DLIFLC operated as efficiently as possible, making the best use of limited resources. Its mission included assessments of manpower, budget, and organizational issues. DRM was divided into two divisions. The Budget Division’s main duty was to prepare the Command Operating Budget and the Midyear Review. The staff also prepared the financial portion of the installation’s Five Year Plan and the Mobilization Budget. Finally, the Budget Division was also responsible for policies and procedures related to the distribution of funds and resources. The Force Management Division produced monthly summaries that detailed the number of student, faculty, and staff positions at DLI. These reports also documented changes in the organization. For example, Force Management was involved when the Directorate of Community Activities (DCA) had to consolidate its childcare centers, youth centers, and libraries. Faced with severe budget reductions in fiscal year 1999, the Presidio of Monterey had to look at ways of reducing expenses. At this point, DRM became involved in this process and found that the ISA with the Navy cost more than the value of the services obtained and Devlin and Dausen supported the termination of the caretaker ISA in September 1997.566

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Figure 21 Chart showing resource trends for DLIFLC & POM, FY 1996-2001

Civilian Personnel Office/Civilian Personnel Advisory Center

The Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) underwent two profound changes between 1996 and 2000. First, most of the DLI faculty joined the Faculty Personnel System (FPS) in January 1997 (see Chapter 2). Second, the CPO was reorganized as a smaller Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC) and many personnel functions were realigned and moved to Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Throughout 1996, CPO, with input from the union and the faculty, worked on many of the system’s unresolved details that had to be completed by the first week of 1997. By 2000, two former CPO employees, Esther Rodriquez and Marion Kopmann, moved to the Provost’s office to manage the recruitment and hiring of fifty to one hundred new faculty each year, with very positive results.

Regionalization of CPO functions in 1998 and the FPS in 1997 made much of the CPO office redundant and obsolete. Under the old system, each CPO was a relatively autonomous entity and answerable to the Installation Commander. Under the new plan, most personnel functions took place in regional Civilian Personnel Operations Centers (CPOCs) outside of the chain of command. What remained at the individual installations were the CPACs that had small staffs and served liaison and customer service roles.

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initial proposals included placing the CPAC’s outside of the installation chains of command, but commanders at all levels successfully resisted that innovation. The consequence for the Presidio’s CPAC was that it was required to down grade the GS classifications of some of its own positions; yet, CPAC retained as many of its employees as possible, despite being over-strength. The Western CPOC was located at Fort Huachuca, despite local leaders efforts to have it located at the former Fort Ord. Fortunately, for the CPAC at the Presidio, the efficiency of the FPS administration office allowed the CPAC to proclaim itself one of the most efficient in TRADOC.

Management of workers’ compensation was another important function of CPAC. With the closure of Fort Ord, the Presidio of Monterey assumed responsibility for nearly $2 million worth of claims and the installation commander, Colonel Sobichevsky, ordered a review. Over the next several years, many workers’ compensation claims were revealed to be exaggerated or had gone unsupervised, wasting hundreds of thousands of dollars.

**Environment and Natural Resources**

At the start of 1996, the Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR) was part of the garrison as was the BRAC office. After Colonel Gross became garrison commander, the former garrison commander, Colonel Mettee-McCutchon, stayed on for one year in a specially created position—chief of the BRAC/Environmental Directorate. The purpose of this directorate was twofold: (1) to oversee the transfer and disposal of property on the former Fort Ord and (2) to manage the environmental cleanup related to those transfers. In principle, this directorate was under the garrison, but in practice, Mettee-McCutchon worked directly with the installation commander. The reorganization did not significantly affect the structure or personnel of the two directorates and only lasted until Mettee-McCutchon’s retirement in late 1997, after which the directorates returned to the control of Gross.

James M. Willison, who had worked on environmental issues at Fort Ord since 1984, remained director of DENR. DENR consisted of two divisions: Environmental Management oversaw such issues as air pollution, asbestos, underground storage tanks, water, wastewater, environmental restoration, unexploded ordnance, and wildlife. DENR was also responsible for Hazardous Waste Management and handled such issues for both the Presidio of Monterey and OMC. (For DENR’s extensive involvement in BRAC, see Chapter 7.)

One of the largest environmental issues on the Presidio was the landfill dating from the cavalry era of the 1920s. Located in the hills of the installation’s interior, erosion had deteriorated the site and its contents were slowly being exposed and washed down the hillside into New Monterey. The main problem was groundwater contamination. DENR contracted for the placement of a clay cap over the site to prevent more deterioration, a process that began in early 1995 and cost $2 million. However, this cap proved to be faulty and experienced considerable erosion during the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 rainy seasons. In spring 1997, work began to repair the cap. All of the

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trees on the cap had to be cut down and re-seeded with the help of local Boy Scout troops. Apparently, the vegetation layer had not taken root before the rains eroded it.  

DENR also oversaw historic preservation issues on the Presidio of Monterey, a legal requirement of the NHPA. Although DPW maintained the historic buildings on the Presidio, DENR’s cultural resources officer served as liaison between the Army, who needed to utilize the installation and its facilities, and the California State Historic Preservation Office, which was interested in maintaining the historic integrity of the Presidio. Historic preservation issues during this period included the fate of Stilwell Hall, the YMCA building in downtown Monterey, the ownership of East Garrison, and TRADOC’s mandated demolition of World War II wooden buildings. (See DPW section above.)

**Base Realignment and Closure**

Lieutenant Colonel William E. Jones, who had headed BRAC since 1994, retired on 28 June 1996. Adrian Nakayama, who had been deputy director, then served as director until 1998, when he left because CPO would not re-classify his position as a GS-13. The position was re-classified later, and Will Koon took over the directorate. The Directorate of Base Realignment and Closure initially consisted of three divisions: the Personal Property Division, the Real Estate and Infrastructure Division, and the Presidio of Monterey Annex and Real Property Division. During the second quarter of 1996, the Personal Property Division, which had largely completed its mission of transferring 96,000 items of Fort Ord personal property, was disbanded. From then on, the directorate only had two divisions. The Presidio of Monterey Annex and Real Property Division handled issues related to residual government property still owned by the Army on the former Fort Ord, but leased or used by another organization. The Real Estate and Infrastructure Division handled issues related to the disposal of Fort Ord property. It frequently coordinated with the Army Corps of Engineers, FORA, and the garrison commander.  

**Information Management**

The Directorate of Information Management (DOIM) was assigned the task of providing, maintaining, and upgrading existing computer systems to meet the unique requirements of language education while also responding to the challenges of chronic shortage of technicians, the “Y2K” scare, and an A-76 review at the end of 2000. The
high tech boom of the 1990s drained DOIM of qualified people and those who remained had to work hard to keep pace with constant technological change while protecting the Institute’s computer networks from such evolving threats as virus attacks.

From the perspective of DLIFLC’s language schools, the biggest responsibility for the DOIM staff was to field updated automated equipment, primarily personal computers, for computer-assisted study with language software. This was a slow but necessary struggle to keep pace with educational trends. Further DOIM support was needed for the School of Continuing Education (SCE). Distance education software and compact discs (see SCE section in chapter 3), were developed by faculty rather than technical experts as it was determined that teaching faculty technical skills was easier than teaching computer technicians the complexities of language education. Other innovations and challenges included the development of voice recognition software (a joint endeavor with Carnegie-Mellon University), and the inability of existing computer systems to display Chinese, Korean, and Japanese characters.

DOIM supported the creation of language laboratories for distance education. The language labs included computers and other electrical equipment set up in six buildings on the installation. DOIM also completed four major projects during the period, including increasing underground cabling, upgrading the interior wiring in older buildings to accommodate the new garrison offices, upgrading the telephone system, particularly the switching system, and installing a “Campus Area Network” system.

A unique problem facing DOIM during this period was the Y2K problem. The problem stemmed from the fact that most older computers were configured to recognize only the years of the twentieth century. This made the year 2000 appear as 1900 in most older computers. Anticipation about the problems that could result from this simple confusion increased as the year 2000 approached. Computer experts feared everything from mere software “hiccups” to complete system shutdowns of the world’s infrastructure. To remedy the situation, DOIM had to check every computer on the installation to see if it had the problem. If the system indicated any problems, DOIM then fixed the computer with a “Y2K patch.” A Y2K emergency operations center was established and drills practiced in the event the worst occurred. When the calendar did finally turn over just past midnight on 1 January 2000, few problems actually resulted.

Despite its accomplishments, in 2000 DOIM was subject to an A-76 commercial activities review. The A-76 review required DOIM to compete with outside contractors for its own existence. DOIM began its self-evaluation to determine what services it provided, how many personnel it required, and at what pay level. The Provost’s office, fearing the worst, had the instructional material production coordinator (curricula materials) transferred under Academic Affairs, so that DLI would not lose control of the production of education material to an outside contractor. Final determination of the fate of the review would not be until 2001, but the prognosis was not positive because the Army had privatized all other TRADOC installation DOIMs that had experienced A-76 reviews.

**Morale, Welfare, and Recreation**

The Directorate of Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR), which changed its name to the Directorate of Community Welfare Activities (DCA) in 2000, continued to offer the
same wide array of services, with the added responsibility of former Fort Ord assets. The
greatest challenge in this period for the staff of DCA was re-organizing to support the
Presidio of Monterey and the Naval Postgraduate School. It also had to recover from a
significant funding loss resulting from the transfer of Fort Ord’s golf courses to the city
of Seaside, California.

DCA programs and activities consisted of the following: Administration, Alcohol
and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program, Community Services Branch, Auto
Crafts Center, Child Development Services, the Monterey Road Center, Common
Support Division, Education Division, Outdoor Recreation, Presidio of Monterey
Recreation Center, Sports Branch, Youth Services Branch, Presidio of Monterey Youth
Center, Teen Center, Thrift Shop, and Veterinary Clinic. DCA also coordinated with the
Army Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), the veterinary clinic, and billeting. To
publicize events such as these, DCA used a regular newsletter, Community News, with
assistance from the public affairs office.

Besides housing, childcare was one of the most significant challenges for working
parents on the Monterey Peninsula. The childcare facilities for the Presidio of Monterey
and OMC also suffered several challenges during this period. The Presidio closed its
childcare center in 1997, because of a drop in enrollment attributed to very high rates.
Nevertheless, local communities still needed affordable child-care facilities, and the city
of Monterey and Presidio staff worked to reopen the Presidio’s childcare center in 2000.
Unfortunately, by the time that the Presidio of Monterey reopened its childcare center,
vandals had entered the facility and caused some $200,000 in damages.

The childcare facility on OMC also suffered three arson attacks in 1998 and 1999.
One of the fires caused minor injuries to three babies. One of the former managers was
charged and put on trial in 2000, but the evidence was circumstantial hindering the jury
from reaching a clear decision, thus a hung jury and no conviction. The trial and other
documents pointed to a pattern of poor managerial oversight that was also evident in low
morale. Ron Graddy took over Child and Youth Services in 2000, significantly
improving morale. Staffing, however, remained a challenge for Graddy because he could
not reclassify his employees at competitive salaries due to CPAC restrictions.

**Contracting**

In 1996, the Directorate of Contracting (DOC), which managed all outsourced
work projects for the Presidio of Monterey, launched the International Merchant Purchase
Authorization Card (IMPAC) credit card system for use by installation personnel. Under
IMPAC, each office could make purchases of under $2,500 without having to make a
requisition through DOC first. This streamlined purchasing process made DOC’s
mission significantly easier and shifted supply away from the Federal Supply Service and
the General Services Administration (GSA) and onto the local economy. Up to 80
percent of local military purchases fell under the $2,500 limit. Although many purchases
could still be done somewhat less expensively through GSA and as mandated by federal
laws and regulations, consumers preferred the convenience and often better quality of
products purchased from local merchants. The process also significantly reduced

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571 Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 17 February 1998, in folder 4, box 57, RG
21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
paperwork. There were problems with IMPAC, but these were viewed generally a result of poor oversight by approving officials.

During fiscal year 1997, DOC awarded nearly $20 million in contracts. Its major contracts included landfill services, various BRAC and environmental projects, DPW projects, language training, the hiring of Catholic priests for the Chaplain’s Office, the Fort Mason Officers’ Club, food services, roofing projects, copier services, and the purchase of computers.

During this period, a series of changes to contracting policy and procedure required considerable training for DOC staff members. One change related to introduction of the Standard Automated Contracting System, a computerized contracting system based out of Fort Gordon, Georgia. DOC was the first TRADOC site to connect to this system and therefore served as the command’s “guinea pig.” As such, the staff spent a considerable amount of time and effort in 1996 working the bugs out of the system, which had been set up in late 1995. That year DOC also began using the Electronic Data Interchange system to process contracts electronically, greatly speeding up payments and services.

**Logistics**

Tom De Vilbiss remained director of the Directorate of Logistics (DOL) until August 1996, when he became deputy garrison commander. De Vilbiss was succeeded by G. Foletta, who served first as acting director and then director until Vilbiss returned as director in 2000 for a short tour before he was replaced by John J. Robotti.572

DOL primarily administered contracts for various goods and services. These included for taxi service, storage facilities, movement of household goods, and the operation of the dining facilities and news kiosk. DOL also administered the warehouses and storage facilities on the POM and at OMC. In April 1996, DOL staff oversaw the transition of fueling of vehicles from a bulk fueling system to one supported by government credit card purchases, made necessary by the closure of Fort Ord’s bulk fuel facilities. The Presidio of Monterey also acquired its first alternate fuel vehicles (compressed natural gas) in 1997. The DOL Transportation Office coordinated the travel of personnel and equipment. In addition, DOL oversaw the administration of the installation’s monthly inventories and also transitioned the supply system from SAILS (Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply) to SARRS (Standard Army Retail Supply System).573 The Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and Commissary, whose customer-base was 70-80 percent retirees from Monterey County, was also part of DPL

Management of the dining halls was a problem at the beginning of this period. In particular, students generally berated Combs Hall as dirty, over-crowded, and serving poor quality food. By the end of 2000, faculty and staff regularly ate at the other main

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dining facility, Belas Hall, which was opened to DoD civilians that year to increase its customer base and improve cost efficiency.

**Presidio of Monterey Police**

Mr. Alexander Kerekes became Director of Law Enforcement (DLE) in 1996. He soon renamed DLE “the Presidio of Monterey Police” and acquired a new police force patch prominently depicting the Sloat Monument, the memorial that stands in the Lower Presidio to honor Commodore John D. Sloat who seized California for the United States during the Mexican-American War in 1846.

Crime rates for the Presidio and OMC remained consistently low, although transients were increasingly attracted to the boarded up barracks around Fort Ord, and sought entry to buildings as widely separated as Stilwell Hall, overlooking the Bay, and East Garrison, overlooking Salinas Valley. The relative serenity of life on OMC was severely fractured, however, by a single and tragic incident: the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Christine Williams, the young daughter of one of the military staff at DLI. Williams went missing 12 June 1998 and her remains were discovered 12 January 1999. It is impossible to determine if this crime, which was never solved, was due to the downsizing of the OMC police force, but the perception that it had persisted, dramatically raising the fears of service members and dependents. As a result, the size of the OMC police force was greatly increased.\(^{574}\)

In another incident, a “deranged” attacker shot at the DFAS building and killed Gerald David “Joe” Lloyd, an NPS maintenance worker on 11 June 1997. The final crime that Presidio police investigated during this period was when an ex-soldier murdered his wife on military property in Seaside. Despite these tragic crimes, the overall crime rate under military jurisdiction was very low. The most common problems were traffic and petty theft. The most persistent annoyance was the difficulty keeping transients out of abandoned Fort Ord buildings. The Army nearly doubled the number of police officers in 1999 and gained further aid when it obtained “concurrent” jurisdiction in December 2000. Concurrent jurisdiction allowed local municipal constabularies onto Army property for law enforcement purposes. This was a logical arrangement considering that both the Presidio of Monterey and OMC were essentially within the city limits of four different communities.

**Counterintelligence and Security**

Steven W. Comerford, remained the director of the Directorate of Counterintelligence and Security (SEC) until the end of 1999, when SEC was reorganized as the security branch within the Police Department. The office staff carried out a variety of duties such as conducting security background checks, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) briefings, overseas travel briefings, conducting security inspections of various schools and directorates, security briefings, and processing security clearances for civilian employees. In early 1997, the first ever Security Assistance Visit of TRADOC staff from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

for Intelligence took place and found only minor discrepancies. In 1997, the office reassessed the security status of 325 civilians when the Department of Defense revised security regulations. Given the large number of foreign-born instructors at DLIFLC, many of whom traveled back to those countries for visits, international security issues played an important part in SEC’s responsibilities.575

SEC investigated a few miscellaneous bomb threats in 1997, however they did not find any explosives. SEC also conducted a force protection exercise in 1998. It was a counter-terrorism exercise conducted by the Marines using the Weckerling Center as a mock scenario for a hostage rescue. During the NATO aerial bombing campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999, SEC increased its security awareness, fortunately there were no incidents.

Medical/Dental Care

Both the medical and dental facilities suffered chronic understaffing. This understaffing resulted in slow service and patient frustration. The lack of a VA clinic for the high number of retirees in the region added additional stress to an overtaxed medical staff. This problem was partly solved, however, when the VA reopened a regional clinic, the original one having been closed along with Fort Ord.

Chaplain

Installation Chaplain Lieutenant Colonel Larry J. Hebebrand retired in 1998 and was succeeded as chaplain by Lieutenant Colonel C. David Reese, who was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas K. Kinder on 11 July 2000. The chaplains were involved in family and service member support and, unique to DLIFLC, were involved in the curriculum as one chaplain was assigned to the World Wide Religions Program. The chaplains sponsored language education with interfaith and cross-cultural programs. These programs were of operational significance for military linguists and especially Foreign Area Officers who would serve in all parts of the world (see Chapter 4). The support to families and service members was perhaps the most important role played by the chaplains, who provided comfort and guidance during such painful events as the Christina Williams episode as well as the natural deaths of loved ones.

Installation Command Group and Staff

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

The Army Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) was a separate organization from the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion discussed in Chapter 4. HHC

supported all Army non-student permanent party personnel on the installation from the installation commander down and including Army military language instructors. Captain Susan Myer was in command of HHC from February of 1997 until December 1997, when she transferred to the Army Reserves and was selected to head the Military Personnel Division as a civilian, replacing Mrs. Charlotte Hendrickson who retired. Afterwards, Captain Kai Lee took command of the unit, which reported to the Command Group’s chief of staff. The purpose of HHC was to provide command and control, language training, military training, and administrative support to the various missions of DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey. HHC was also responsible for a wide variety of activities and events. HHC coordinated contingency support for Army linguists in the field in areas such as Bosnia, Korea, and the Middle East. HHC also sponsored such training as land navigation exercises.

Air Force Element

The Air Force Element, commanded by the assistant commandant, provided support to Air Force personnel who were not students. It served a similar role as that of the HHC for the Army. Air Force Element personnel numbered between sixty and seventy and included Air Force staff who supported the installation as well as MLIs who taught in the classroom.

Adjutant General

The Adjutant General (AG) handled support functions for DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey. Captain Susan Meyer served as the AG until until 14 February 1996, when she left to take command of HHC and was replaced by Captain Dawn Rodeschin. In 1998, Captain Tracy Emond replaced Rodeschin as the AG. In December 1998, Captain Emond left to attend classes at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. His replacement was Captain Robert Smith. By March 2000, Captain Guevarra was serving in the position. The office continued its mission of providing personnel services and support to the installation’s Army personnel. For example, AG oversaw in and out-processing of soldiers, the issuing of awards, and conducting of training programs. For example, AG oversaw in- and out-processing of soldiers, the issuing of awards, and conducting of training programs.

Staff Judge Advocate

The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) spent most of its time and energy on the myriad of issues related to BRAC, such as the disposal and clean up of Fort Ord and litigation over burning the chaparral (see Chapter 7.) Other major legal issues were reviewing utility transfers, constabulary jurisdictions with the cities, and the practical implications of the demonstration legislation with the city of Monterey. Criminal cases, primarily

576 Briefing slides, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 17 March 1998; Historian’s notes, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 17 November 1998; Historian’s notes, Installation Commander’s Staff Meeting, 18 August 1998.
577 DLIFLC Regulation 10-1.
relating to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, were generally routine with no more than one or two courts-martial a quarter, except in 2000 when there was an “ecstasy” drug problem among two dozen students. The military subsequently court-martialed several of these students: five were given Bad Conduct Discharges, averaging 18 months of confinement, and twenty received Article 15s, which forced them into MOS reclassification because they thus lost eligibility to hold a security clearance. However, most interactions with SJA were positive for students. For example, unique to DLIFLC was a SJA program that allowed a small number of students each year to become second lieutenants.

Inspector General

The Inspector General (IG) kept busy with a variety of complaints often found on federal installations, such as the misuse of government phones, IMPAC cards, or vehicles used for personal use. More importantly, however, the IG’s emphasis was on the management of problems among DLI’s unique faculty and students. Researching complaints varied with command emphasis. In 1996, the IG looked at why IET payroll actions for soldiers at DLIFLC were extremely slow, 6-12 months in several cases. The most frequent IG complaints split roughly into four areas: Housing, Personal Conduct, Personnel Management (pay and promotions), and Health Care. Military and civilian complaints were about the same in number; military service members tended to complain more about health care and housing, whereas civilians tended to complain about personnel management issues. In 1997, there was an increase in sexual harassment complaints reported and the IG responded with sensing sessions, due in part to the expanded definition of sexual harassment and problems occurring elsewhere in the military, such as at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland where a number of drill instructors were indicted for abuse in a widely publicized scandal. At DLIFLC, the Korean departments became subject in 1997 to a formal AR 15-6 investigation concerning nepotism and gift-giving in hiring practices and promotions. There were a few cases of reprimands as a result.

Internal Review

Dwight Johnson remained as the auditor. Among the issues he reviewed was the oversight of DCA’s Non-Appropriated Funds. Johnson’s main mission was to investigate various matters at DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey for cost effectiveness. As detailed above, Johnson investigated the effectiveness of the ISAs with the Navy, noting a serious waste of resources stemming from the agreements. Johnson made several studies of the ISAs that showed a cost savings of over $3 million in any one-year period could be obtained by working with the City of Monterey in lieu of the Navy.

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**EEO/EO**

Elvira Robinson became the director of Equal Employment Opportunities (EEO) in 1997, and several NCOs served as the military equivalent Equal Opportunity (EO) representative. The extremely diverse nature of DLIFLC faculty and staff, combined with the highest percentage of female service members of any other TRADOC installation (26 percent vs. 12 percent average), made EEO and EO a great challenge for the Institute. For example, a *Globe* article in early 1997 discussed a linguist field exercise that seemed to equate Arabs and Muslims as terrorists.\(^{581}\) As a result, several dozen faculty members from the Middle Eastern schools wrote a letter of protest expressing their outrage to the commandant.\(^{582}\)

The main efforts of the office were working through complaints using mediation and preventive training with the faculty. The high cost of litigation, and the fact that outcomes rarely differ significantly from mediation, made it important to employ preventive measures. Although policy guidance and interest by command was important, the active supervision by first line leaders, whether team leaders, chairs, or commanders, created a better EEO environment. The major area of complaint was overwhelmingly religious prejudices between faculty members. For example, Arabic departments often contained several Muslim and Christian sects within the same teaching team. Sexual harassment was also a constant danger in a multi-cultural environment. The reason was that many cultures have simply not recognized the issue as a problem while younger female instructors were often viewed by male counterparts as infringing on their (male) profession.\(^{583}\)

During this period, two national EEO issues impacted the military. One was the treatment of military homosexuals and the effectiveness of the so-called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. The other was the abuse of recruits at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, described above. Both subjects prodded EEO to increase awareness at DLIFLC by implementing a “TRADOC Sexual Harassment Taskforce” to determine the extent of the problem among recruits. EEO did not find DLIFLC policies to be at issue, but it did note that the lack of supervisor oversight or supervisor unresponsiveness was a potential cause of problems.\(^{584}\)

In 1998, Robinson submitted a letter to the federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission stating why there could not be an Affirmative Employment Plan for DLI. Simply stated, the Institute was by necessity extremely diverse due to the need to hire civilian faculty instructors with native foreign language proficiency. Thus, an affirmative action plan, requiring the Institute to reflect national labor percentages,

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583 See various folders in box 7, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
584 Ibid.
would hinder the mission and could not possibly serve to make DLIFLC any more diverse than it already was.\footnote{See Daniel D. Devlin, Colonel, USA, Commanding, Letter to Michael A. Baldonado, District Director, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 23 January 1998, in “EEO 1996-200” folder, box 7, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

**Protocol**

Pierrette J. Harter remained the director of Protocol, but a military officer occasionally oversaw her position. The office scheduled and supported the visits of VIPs coming to the Presidio. Averaging over two thousand VIP’s each year from Ambassadors and flag officers, including the secretary and chief of staff of the Army.

**Public Affairs Office**

On 1 January 1996, the Public Affairs Office (PAO), like Protocol, switched from being under the assistant commandant to being a function of the chief of staff. Mr. James F. Davis III continued as public affairs officer until 16 February 1996, when Michael Murphy took over the position. The office contained three sections. Command Information covered a variety of Presidio of Monterey and OMC events in various editions of the *Globe*, the garrison’s *Community News* for DCA/MWR, the Public Affairs Home Page on the web,\footnote{The DLIFLC web site came online on 1 November 1995 with the address www.dli.army.mil. The Presidio of Monterey web site came online on 1 November 1996. The two were combined on 1 January 1999.} and the Command Information Channel on the Coastwise Cable network. In June 1996, Devlin established the Boss Line program, administered by PAO. This program was a vehicle for military and civilian personnel to bring their comments and concerns to the installation commander. Media Relations handled the publicity for DLIFLC events such as the opening of Soldier Field and emergencies such as a shooting incident at the Silas B. Hays Federal Building in June 1997. Community Relations coordinated volunteers with a variety of community programs ranging from the historical “Sloat landing” ceremonies to volunteer support for the AT&T Pro-Am Tournament at Pebble Beach each year.\footnote{ATZP-PAO, Quarterly Historical Report April-June 1996, n.d.; and ATZP-PAO, Quarterly Historical Report October-December 1996, n.d.; both in “PAO” folder, box 9, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives; ATZP-PAO, Quarterly Historical Report, April-June 1997, n.d., in “Public Affairs” folder, box 59, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives; Briefing slides, installation commander’s staff meeting, 17 June 1997, in folder 8, box 57, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

**Safety**

At the start of 1996, David Larose continued to serve as safety officer. Richard Otto served as safety officer from early 1996 until early 1997, when Win Macklin took over the position. When the chief of staff left, the office fell temporarily under the authority of the garrison commander and later became part of command group. Staff in the Safety Office handled complaints about safety issues, including those related to personal injuries or about potentially unsafe situations. They surveyed the installation and its annex for safety violations and issues. The office was also responsible for overseeing the installation Safety and Occupational Health Advisory Council and worked...
An ergonomics review started in 2000 to forestall the potential of lawsuits from employees claiming repetitive motion injuries.

**Historian**

In 1996, Congress gave the Command History Office a challenging new mission when it directed the Army to review Asian American and Pacific Islander soldiers in World War II for possible upgrades of the Distinguished Service Cross (DCS) to the Medal of Honor. After receiving almost $500,000 in funding from the Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), the US Army Center of Military History assigned this task to Dr. James C. McNaughton, DLIFLC Command Historian, who hired research assistants, contractors, and support staff. The office grew to eight full-time staff, including Dr. Stephen M. Payne, who had initially been hired to fill-in for McNaughton during his Secretary of the Army Fellowship in fiscal year 1995, but who remained as interim command historian and assisted in hiring the Monterey based DSC research staff. In 1997 and 1998, McNaughton’s staff identified over a hundred Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders who were eligible for the Medal of Honor and provided the results to the PERSCOM Military Awards Branch. The Senior Army Decorations Board recommended twenty-two soldiers to be upgraded, and as a result President William Clinton awarded twenty-two soldiers the Medal of Honor in a White House ceremony on 21 June 2000.

With the completion of the medal upgrade project during the summer of 1998, McNaughton returned to researching the Army’s official history of the World War II origins of DLIFLC and its first graduates, the Japanese-American Nisei linguists in the Military Intelligence Service. Shortly thereafter Payne moved to the Office of the Provost to work on accreditation issues. Dr. Jay Price, a member of the DSC team, filled the deputy position until he left Monterey to direct the Public History Program at Wichita State University.

Other missions continued apace. In 1996, the historical research collection moved from the Tin Barn (Bldg. 518) into Bldg. 274. Caroline Cantillas, a former librarian, joined the office as the Institute’s first archives technician. During spring 1996, the Command History Office also worked with the 51st Military History Detachment, a


589 Dr. James C. McNaughton and Dr. Stephen M. Payne wrote drafts of this section, which was edited by Cameron Binkley.

590 The DSC research team consisted of Dr. Karen Dunn-Haley, Dr. Kristen E. Edwards, Dr. Jay M. Price, Scott D. Welch, as well as James L. Froelich who served as the administrative assistant for the entire history office. In addition, McNaughton hired Dr. William T. Bowers, a retired army colonel who worked in the National Archives as a contract historian.

591 The manuscript, *Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II*, was published in 2006 by the Center of Military History.
reservist unit from the 63rd Support Command stationed at Moffett Field in Mountain View California. The mission of such detachments is to “collect and preserve information of historical value related to the mission” of active duty units. The detachment was collecting information on DLIFLC support for US military operations in Haiti and Somalia.592

During this five-year period, routine historical support to the command was provided three deputy command historians: Dr. Stephen M. Payne (September 1994-August 1998), Dr. Jay Price (September 1998-July 1999), and Dr. Clifford F. Porter (July 2000-April 2004). Steven R. Solomon, a German faculty member on loan from the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, was also detailed to assist with the command histories for two years (July 1997-August 1999).593

In 1996, Payne completed the annual command history for calendar year 1993. In 1999, Price and Solomon published a two-year command history for 1994-1995. In July 2000, Porter replaced Price as Deputy Command Historian and that fall began working on a five-year catch-up command history to cover 1996-2000. However, Porter, an Army Reservist, was mobilized from January 2003 until January 2004, and was unable to complete the project. During this time, the Command History Office did complete important end-of-tour oral history interviews with Colonels Vladimir Sobichevsky, Ila Mettee-McCutchon, Daniel Devlin, and other key staff, but the congressional projects and staff turnover caused a long delay in completing the 1995-2000 command history.

In 1999, the TRADOC Manpower Agency validated workload requirements for the Command History Office as being two permanent historian positions and three additional temporary positions to handle the backlog of command histories and archival processing. However, by the end of 2000 the office had only two historians and one half-time archivist.

In the meantime, McNaughton left Monterey for Hawaii in mid-2001 to become Command Historian for the U.S. Army, Pacific, and Dr. Harold Raugh was hired as the command historian in 2002. Raugh primarily worked on gathering material for the 2003 command history until he took the command historian position with V Corps in Germany in April 2006. At that time, Payne, who had served in various positions within the provost organization, returned to the history office as command historian and, together with Kurt Kuss, who replaced Cantillas as archivist in 2006, and Cameron Binkley, who became the deputy in September 2007, finally completed the 1996-2000 command history, that is, the report the reader is now holding.

**Military Personnel Division**

The Military Personnel Division (MPD) was responsible for personnel support for all assigned and attached Army personnel and tenant units for all of central and northern California, not just DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey. It consisted of three branches. Personnel Management handled assignments and reassignments of Army personnel. Personnel Services oversaw such issues as evaluation reports, medal review boards, in

593 The deputy position was vacant from August 1999 until June 2000 while Dr. Porter, a military reservist, was activated for several months in 2003, effectively ending his support for the office during that time.
and out-processing, pay, records, and identification cards. The third branch had two sections, the Transition Center, which assisted soldiers in matters such as retirements, separations, and transitions, and Casualty and Mortuary Affairs, which handled casualty operations and funeral details.\textsuperscript{594} Like DOIM, MPD was subject to an A-76 commercial activities review in 2000, and it was unclear by the end of the year what the future held for MPD.

Chapter VII

BRAC and Disposing of Fort Ord

Between 1917 and 1994, the US Army used Fort Ord near the Monterey Peninsula as a training area for infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and from 1974 to 1993 it provided a home for the 7th Infantry Division. After the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the US government decided to deactivate and close the base, which took place formally during a ceremony on 30 September 1994. At its height, over thirty thousand people lived on Fort Ord, which required the support infrastructure of a small city, and for seventy-five years army units conducted various live fire exercises, using everything from simple lead bullets to artillery high explosives. Consequently, the process of cleaning up and disposing of the property and buildings at Fort Ord became the largest and most complex installation deactivation ever conducted by the Department of Defense. 595

Historical Summary

In 1991, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission gave the military until July 1997 to close Fort Ord. Technically, the Army closed the base well before that deadline. However, it was unrealistic to expect to be able to clean up and fully dispose of a nearly thirty thousand-acre base within six years. Fort Ord established a BRAC office before the base closed. The BRAC office, which was responsible for disposing of the installation, eventually became the responsibility of the Presidio of Monterey Garrison. Despite its name, this office was not a part of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, a congressionally chartered organization whose commissioners were appointed by the president to make independent recommendations about the validity of military base closure decisions. 596 With the closure of Fort Ord on 30 September 1994, the Department of the Army, primarily through the US Corps of Engineers and the Presidio of Monterey, acquired the mission of distributing the land and facilities of the former Fort Ord, which proved more time-consuming than expected. The requirement for a multiplicity of federal and state agencies, municipalities, private interest groups, and activists to be involved in the distribution process contributed to the difficulty of closing the post by restricting the Army’s ability to dispose of the property quickly. A variety of laws and regulations, some of them conflicting, as well as litigation by both public agencies and private activists necessarily slowed the process.

595 Primary materials relating to the Fort Ord closure are located at the DLIFLC&POM Archives, while BRAC, FORA, and CSUMB also hold records.
596 According to the commission’s website (www.brac.gov; accessed 29 February 2008), “the BRAC Commission was created to provide an objective, thorough, accurate, and non-partisan review and analysis, through a process determined by law, of the list of bases and military installations which the Department of Defense (DoD) has recommended be closed and/or realigned.” BRAC was established by Congress through the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (PL 101-510), as amended.
By the end of 2000, the military had cleaned and transferred approximately half of Fort Ord’s acreage, but was still ten to fifteen years away from final disposition. Not all of the lands on the former post were to be transferred out of Army hands. The Army retained the Ord Military Community, the section of Fort Ord containing housing units, but shrank the community’s size from 6,400 housing units to 1,588. The Army also maintained a limited support infrastructure for the OMC, including the post-exchange, commissary, and an AAFES service station. This 812-acre “footprint” remained under the Presidio of Monterey’s control as an important component of the garrison’s housing infrastructure.

The Presidio’s Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources was deeply involved in the closure process because environmental cleanup was one of the two most significant challenges to disposing of Fort Ord. The other challenge was creating, with little prior guidance, procedures to transfer property to the Fort Ord Reuse Authority, the local community organization established for that purpose and which in turn had to create a workable and realistic reuse plan.

The BRAC and DENR offices had to work with what often seemed to be competing or contradictory demands, regulations, and laws of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the California EPA. Ultimately, the assistant chief of staff of the Army for installation management held oversight for Fort Ord’s closure, but TRADOC, as the command overseeing the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and Presidio of Monterey, was in charge of the process through its BRAC office in 1994. The Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento District, exercised technical responsibility for most of the investigations, mapping, and clean up, but contracted out much of this work, particularly investigative work, to such private companies as CMS Environmental, International Technology Corporation, Dames and Moore, Uribe and Associates, and especially Harding Lawson Associates (later renamed Harding ESE.) County and local agencies also claimed oversight and jurisdiction over air and water quality. Many local government and private organizations sought parts of the former Fort Ord. Property transfers could be accomplished using two different methods, either a Public Benefit Conveyance (PBC) or an Economic Development Conveyance (EDC), as explained by the table below.

While most of the former Fort Ord went to public entities, there were nearly five thousand acres scheduled for sale through an EDC to FORA. Once transferred to FORA, the EDC parcels could then be sold to private interests to help generate development in surrounding communities economically affected by the base closure process. FORA, the primary local redevelopment authority, submitted its final application for the EDC on 30 October 1997, which started a complicated process by which the Army and FORA

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597 The Ord Military Community was called the Presidio of Monterey Annex until 2000.
598 See Chapter 6, Installation and Garrison Support, for details of leadership and organization.
worked out the details of the agreement. This property consisted of sixty-four different parcels and sub parcels and fell under several competing municipal jurisdictions including Del Rey Oaks, Marina, Monterey, Seaside, and Monterey County. Also included were housing areas adjacent to Marina and Seaside, several sections of World War II-era barracks, and the former prison. Among the issues brought up were the boundaries of the EDC, whether it would include an area known as East Garrison, the cost of the EDC, its utilities and easements, and the status of ordnance cleanup.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Benefit Conveyance (PBC)</th>
<th>Economic Development Conveyance (EDC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who Qualifies?</strong></td>
<td>States, local governments, tax supported entities and some qualified non-profit groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who Qualifies?</strong></td>
<td>An officially recognized Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA) is the only entity to receive property under EDC. Secretary of Defense recognizes LRA’s through the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Does it Cost?</strong></td>
<td>Allows conveyance of surplus government property at up to 100 percent discount for various public benefit uses, including schools, public parks, public health, historical monuments, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Does it Cost?</strong></td>
<td>Permits DoD transfer base property to LRA (such as FORA) at or below Fair Market Value (FMV) to stimulate job creation and economic activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How is the Property Transferred?</strong></td>
<td>Application for PBC’s is made through a federal sponsoring agency (e.g., to the DOI for parks, DOE for schools, etc.) The Army assigns the property to the sponsoring agency, which in turn, deeds the property subject to restrictions listed below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How is the Property Transferred?</strong></td>
<td>For EDC’s from the government by quitclaim deed. An approved EDC poses no restrictions on reuse other than those in the formally adopted reuse plan and application environmental regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Restrictions?</strong></td>
<td>PBC’s come with strings attached. Deed restrictions require continuation of specified public benefit use. Subject to reversion to government if use changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Restrictions?</strong></td>
<td>None. An approved EDC allows the LRA to gain ownership of large, mixed-use parcels with ability for re-sale to help leverage redevelopment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How is the Property Appraised?</strong></td>
<td>Because the PBC may allow conveyance at up to 100 percent discount, fair market values are not considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How is the Property Appraised?</strong></td>
<td>The price payable to DoD may vary; it can be at or below FMV, depending on how much weight is attributed to job creation and economic recovery. The market plan, however, must be economically feasible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 22 Table comparing PBCs vs. EDCs

During the early BRAC process, all that seemed necessary for a proposed transfer was a Finding of Suitability to Transfer (FOST) that described the condition of the proposal as acceptable for the identified reuse. Optimism ran high in early 1996, and most stakeholders hoped to complete all BRAC processes by 1997. However, inter-agency disagreements, local conflicts over desirable real estate, and litigation by public and private organizations stalled the process to the point where the end was not in sight by the end of 2000. Indeed, it began to appear as if several decades might be needed to dispose of Fort Ord.

The goal of the Fort Ord Reuse Authority was to create a plan that allowed for the development of the former Fort Ord. FORA also had to comply with a Habitat Management Plan (HMP) that was the result of the US Fish and Wildlife Service issuing a biological opinion calling for efforts to mitigate impacts from the base’s closure and reuse. FORA submitted a draft of the reuse plan to the public for comment in May 1996. After several subsequent drafts, FORA approved and submitted a Final Fort Ord Reuse Plan and Environmental Report in October 1997. The plan envisioned a

600 The other local LRA was California State University (CSU), which acquired a large section of Fort Ord to establish its Monterey Bay branch campus (CSUMB).
redeveloped community of about 37,000 residents by 2015 with as many as 71,000 by 2055. Roughly one third of the population would be students at the proposed new California State University, Monterey Bay (CSUMB). The plan, however, was not clearly funded; FORA hoped that the rapid sale and lease of lands with a one-time tax on all property when transferred would finance the revitalization plan. FORA also received $16 million from the Department of Commerce to help adapt Fort Ord’s military infrastructure for the needs of a modern civilian economy.

![Figure 23 Fort Ord Base Reuse Plan, ca. 1998](image)

FORA’s reuse plan received national recognition from the American Planning Association. Unfortunately, it also came under considerable criticism from Monterey Peninsula residents demanding either more or less development. Many local residents believed that FORA’s planned growth would be too great for the roads, water usage, and infrastructure of the region and frequently criticized the BRAC process. Conflict over Fort Ord’s reuse led to environmental litigation beginning in 1997. Public controversy and formal litigation ensured that the Army could not dispose of its former base in a timely manner. Moreover, FORA quickly found the plan to be too expensive to carry out on its own and estimated that $538 million would be needed to convert the base to civilian uses.

In addition to negotiating the complexities of a highly political process, BRAC and DENR sometimes had to cope with limited guidance or policies on how to dispose of DoD installations, an insufficient budget for BRAC’s work (especially environmental clean-up), and even criminal jurisdiction over transients in moth-balled buildings. Because there were few precedents for closing bases, BRAC and DENR created their

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own innovative policies. These innovations were the PBC and EDC procedures, procedures for groundwater remediation and ordnance cleanup, and the drafting of cooperative agreements and guidelines on such issues as criminal jurisdictions and caretaker functions until the property was properly transferred. The success of some of these policies made Fort Ord’s closure process a model followed by many involved in later DoD base closures.\textsuperscript{604}

The July 1997 deadline for closing and disposing of Fort Ord property also marked the end of Army funding for the local BRAC office. Although the Army continued to fund environmental cleanup, the Presidio became responsible for stewarding the land until it was transferred to FORA or elsewhere. Consequently, the BRAC and DENR offices and their staff salaries had to be supported through the base operations funds of the Presidio. Care-taking costs and maintenance of Army property were estimated at $1.2 million per year and were paid “out of hide,” as it was commonly described. Consequently the cost to continue BRAC through the end of FY 97 required $1,323,000. However, only $362,300 was available through Army BRAC funding. Consequently there was a shortfall in funds amounting to $960,700 which was paid for out of funding meant to maintain the facilities on the Presidio of Monterey and at the Ord Military Community.\textsuperscript{605}

After 1997, the Presidio contracted with the cities of Seaside and Marina for routine maintenance and tree trimming of areas on the former post that were still under Army control. These costs totaled just over $1 million. Security at Fort Ord, however, remained the responsibility of the Presidio of Monterey Police.

Estimated Total Costs from 1991 to the end of 2000 were:

- $85 Million Soil Investigation and Clean Up.
- $20 Million Miscellaneous Clean Up.
- $75 Million OE Investigation and Clean Up.
- $50 Million Groundwater Investigation and Clean Up.
- $230 Million Total

By January 2001, the Army was estimating the total cost to cleanup, close, and transfer all land to be about $332 million.\textsuperscript{606} Later, that figure was revised upward to $370 million.\textsuperscript{607}

**Community Involvement**

Community involvement was an important part of the BRAC process and the Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) was created in February 1994 to provide access to cleanup information to the public. RAB included citizen representatives selected from the communities affected by Fort Ord’s closure as well as private interest groups. These supplemented professionals from the Army, the US Environmental Protection

\textsuperscript{604} “Ord Still Stands as Model of Base Conversion,” \textit{Monterey County Herald}, 31 March 1997.

\textsuperscript{605} Garrison Briefing to BG Hennessee, 19 February 1997, in “Briefing Slides” folder, box 9, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.


\textsuperscript{607} BRAC office comments on draft Chapter VII, \textit{DLIFLC&POM Command History 1996-2000}. 
Agency, and the California EPA. RAB’s purpose was to be a forum where different community entities could discuss a host of cleanup issues and have input to the cleanup. Unfortunately, RAB meetings descended into contentious accusations of conspiracies and cover-ups. Local environmental organizations criticized Army cleanup efforts as insufficient and, therefore, property could not be transferred or developed. There was further fear that cleanup would stop when funding for the BRAC office ended and the Army would then leave the clean up to the local communities. Local Army officials were personally accused of willfully allowing damage to the environment and exposing residents to toxins. Additionally, RAB member attacked each other, leading to lengthy meetings focused on procedural matters. What had been intended as a forum for discussion became a catalyst for mistrust.

To help straighten out the situation, the US EPA hired a special team of San Francisco Urban Institute facilitators. In October 1997, these facilitators filed a report in which they highly criticized a “small faction” of advisory board members who caused repeated disruptions and who “consciously and deliberately wasted taxpayers’ money.” “We recommend,” the facilitators concluded, “that the Army, EPA and California-EPA suspend the operation of the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board. It’s not serving its purpose.” Shortly, thereafter, Colonel Daniel Devlin, commander of the Presidio of Monterey, cancelled the next scheduled meeting. According to Gail Youngblood, environmental coordinator of the BRAC office, “the Army is taking the recommendation seriously.”

RAB dissenters decried the Army’s decision. Patricia Huth of Monterey, for example, argued that any “disruptive members” were so labeled because of their criticism about “the Army refusing to act on any issues brought up by RAB members on behalf of the community.” Some, concerned about scheduled prescribed burns needed in advance of munitions cleanup at Fort Ord, petitioned the EPA in protest. In late August 1998, Devlin honored a resulting request from the Superfund Division Director Keith Takata to delay such burns until after another public meeting on the topic, but protested EPA’s willingness to hold a 6 August 1998 meeting “with certain Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) members” while excluding everyone else involved in the process. “An open meeting,” Devlin explained, “would have provided EPA a more balanced and complete representation of public opinion regarding the prescribed burn program.” “In spite of our best efforts,” he concluded, “there will always be some members of the

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609 Ibid. See also Akeman, “Ord Review Board in Limbo,” Monterey County Herald, 11 November 1997, pp. B1, B2. The facilitator’s report was the third in a row calling for RAB members to cooperate to allow the free exchange of information about the Fort Ord cleanup, which prevented it from serving as a forum for the exchange of information. Therefore, the Army suspended its participation in further RAB meetings. Later, the Army reinstated its participation in RAB meetings, but in so doing also implemented regular public information sessions independent of RAB, a strong indication of significant continuing lack of support for it. These independent sessions began in February 1998. See, DENR, Quarterly Historical Report for October-December 1997, in “DENR Historical Reports 1997” folder; and “DENR Historical Reports, 1st Qtr., 1998” folder; both in box 3, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

community who oppose our programs or disagree with our decisions.” Devlin asserted his intent to resume the delayed burn program, after the next public meeting, encouraged EPA participation, and promised to continue closely working with EPA staff.611

On 12 May 1999, the Army finally disbanded the RAB board.612 Over time RAB found itself isolated, with declining member participation, and unable to serve as an effective conduit for public input in the cleanup process.613 Before its disbandment, the Army substituted a “Fort Ord Technical Review Committee,” to which many organizations flocked in lieu of participating in RAB. At the same time, the Army set up an informal “community involvement workshop,” which facilitated communication and scientific information about cleanup procedures with the public independent of RAB.614 Both organizations were probably intended to prevent disgruntled groups from hijacking control of public meetings in the way demonstrated by RAB.615 After the disbandment of RAB, the Army backed the creation of a new body called the Strategic Management Analysis Requirements and Technology Team or SMART. SMART was composed of representatives from all public agencies involved with Fort Ord cleanup, including Congressman Sam Farr. A signing ceremony was held in August 1999.616

The SMART team was created by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Environment, Safety, Occupational Health) after a trip to Monterey “where he saw the challenges of the land transfer first hand.” According to the Army, the team’s purpose was “to assist with solving land transfer challenges thus helping to ensure safe and timely and transfers of Fort Ord property containing military munitions or unexploded ordnance.” The team was tasked to find “innovative approaches or solutions to regulatory or technological issues hindering the transfer process” and to “explore alternative actions to address specific issues or concerns.” The team’s consensus

611 Daniel D. Devlin, Colonel, USA, Commanding, Letter to Keith Takata, Superfund Division Director, USEPA, 24 August 1998, in “BRAC DENR Correspondence/Col Delvin 1998” folder, box 14, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
613 As an example of its inability to function, even despite repeated interventions by hired facilitators, in November 1998, James M. Willison, Director of DENR, wrote to castigate Scott Allen, who was serving as the chair of the RAB citizen selection committee about his group’s failure to follow up on its own advertisement for applications to the RAB. RAB fail to respond to any of many applicants, several of whom contacted the Army for an explanation. James M. Willison, Director of DENR, Letter to Scott Allen, 2 November 1998, in “DENR Historical Repts, 4th Qtr Nov 1998” folder, box 4, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
614 By May 1998 the Army’s alternate Technical Review Committee was being attended by “a significant number of local and regional agencies which have ceased their participation in the RAB.” “Quarterly Historical Reports for April-June 1998,” in “DENR Historical Rpt. 2nd Qtr. 1998” folder, box 3, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
615 The Army, however, made its own mistakes in setting up and overseeing the RAB process. According to Larry L. McGuire, in a master’s thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School, conflict between citizens and bureaucrats is inherent and requires careful military attention and mitigation starting before a RAB is even created. See Larry L. McGuire, “Case Analysis of the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board 1995-1999” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2001).
616 Daniel D. Devlin, Colonel, USA, Commander, Letter to Edwin F. Lowry, Director, Department of Toxic Substance Control, 22 September 1999, in “SMART Team 1998-1999” folder, box 19, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. After the demise of RAB, direct citizen participation in Fort Ord cleanup was more limited.
recommendations were then to be forwarded to the appropriate agency and/or decision-makers for action, but without circumventing existing processes or ceding any agency’s legal authorities.617

Utilities and Housing

The Base Realignment and Closure Commission originally intended to close the Presidio in 1993 along with Fort Ord. The Presidio successfully argued to remain the home of DLIFLC and also to retain control over the family housing area and a few other facilities at Fort Ord for garrison and mission support. FORA, however, only wanted to leave an annex for the Presidio consisting of the Hayes and Stilwell Park housing areas and water supplies of 1410 acre/feet, adding that any extra water needs the Army might have could be addressed through “conservation measures.” As commandant, Colonel Daniel Devlin successfully doubled the housing area (1,588 housing units), kept 50 other buildings for garrison support, and retained 1,729 acre/feet of water rights. He reasonably concluded that if the Army gave up too much water, it would find it near impossible to increase water rights should DLIFLC continue to grow or a national emergency require expansion. Furthermore, the Presidio’s and OMC’s water usage was insignificant compared to the fundamental problem the Peninsula communities’ had long had with an outdated infrastructure that leaked up to 50 percent of its potable water in many areas. Some estimates held that if water loss were stopped, the Peninsula could grow for another generation before running out of water.618

The question was open as to how to address the remaining infrastructural issues on the former Fort Ord, namely, the provision of electricity, gas, and water/wastewater systems. The problem was that much of the base’s infrastructure was outdated and could not be easily transferred or integrated into the civilian infrastructure. The Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) offered to take over the installation’s utilities, but wanted the federal government to pay $49 million for upgrades needed to comply with state guidelines. The Army did not have the resources to pay that amount and negotiations continued over cost and control of the easements for metering to each building (metering was not necessary on military installations.) Easement control also raised a corresponding issue: in transferring control of public property to a private company offering a public service, was the transaction a PBC or an EDC? Ultimately, negotiators worked out the details of the complex transfer, and in March 1997 the Army agreed to the transfer granting PG&E easements. For its part, PG&E agreed to upgrade the utilities to buildings when they were transferred to new owners. It was the largest and most successful transfer of its kind and considered by many a model to follow.

A related but separate issue involved the transfer of Fort Ord’s government-owned telephone system to Pacific Bell. In 1996, Pacific Bell agreed to take over the operation and maintenance of that part of the phone system still in use. The agreement

remained in place until a new phone infrastructure could be built. In the meantime, the phone system infrastructure was sold off in pieces to the owners of the various parcels.

The Army was obligated to transfer the water, waste-water, and storm-water systems to a company that the FORA board selected. The storm-water drainage system emptied into the Monterey Bay, but one “outfall” had failed, pouring storm-water run-off into the sand dunes near Stilwell Hall, eroding the dunes and causing severe coastal erosion at the outfall site. The repair costs were estimated at $5 million. Despite these problems, the Marina Coast Water District, Cal-Am, and California Water Service made bids for the systems. Cal Am offered to integrate them into the larger network of water systems of the Central Valley, guaranteeing a nearly unlimited supply of water to the Monterey Area. FORA, however, selected Marina Coast Water District because it was a local provider.619

Housing was the most visible sign of the sluggishness of the BRAC process. Originally, BRAC had hoped housing transfers would help abet the region’s housing shortages. By 1997, however, it was clear that the transfer of most of the housing on the closed base, which was part of the EDC, would be a long and slow process. By the end of 2000, the Army had completed all major decisions and negotiations regarding the housing areas, but not all of the bureaucratic processes and details had been worked out.

The earliest transfer of housing took place in 1996 under the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (PL 100-77), which required federal agencies to identify and make available surplus federal property, such as buildings and land, for use by states, local governments, and nonprofit agencies to assist homeless people. The Army transferred over one hundred housing units in Abrams Park and Preston Park to various housing and shelter organizations through the US Department of Health and Human Services. The largest of these transfers, fifty-six housing units in Abrams Park, went to the Housing Authority of Monterey.620

From 1996 to 2000, much additional housing was transferred or leased to CSUMB and the cities of Marina and Seaside. The Army first transferred Schoonover housing area to the control of CSUMB, which leased or provided “lease-to-own” opportunities to CSUMB staff and faculty as well as other public employees, including DLIFLC and Presidio of Monterey civilian employees.

Other transfers were not as laudable. Five hundred derelict units on 110 acres in Hayes Park were deemed too small for most families and contained asbestos and lead-based paint. These units, clearly visible from Highway 1 and with prime ocean views, were eventually transferred directly to Seaside from the Army through special legislation that bypassed FORA sponsored by Representative Sam Farr. The idea was to get the land redeveloped quickly, and Seaside did. After buying the property for $5.2 million, the city sold it to developers KB Homes and Danny Bakewell for $6.8 million. The developers told city officials in the late 1990s that they would build a mix of homes priced between under $200,000 to over $500,000, but instead none of the 380 homes built was priced

below $568,000 when the homes first became available in 2003.621 Low-income housing advocates had feared Seaside would use the property to build high-cost houses to gain higher real estate taxes and that is what happened.622

The Army also leased the mobile home park in Brostrom to private companies, which in turn rented the units to the general public. The Abrams Park and Preston Park housing units had been leased by the Army to non-DoD personnel, but when the Army announced the closure of Fort Ord, the leases were terminated by US Army Forces Command, which was the responsible authority at the time. Many of these units remain unoccupied attracting the forces of decay and vandalism.

The Army eventually realized the value of leasing land awaiting transfer (transfers had been halted due to litigation in 1997, discussed in detail below.) Leasing enabled the housing to be refurbished and immediately put into use. The reuse of the Preston Park housing area east of Marina was one such arrangement. It was, however, an extremely complex deal. Refurbishing was estimated at $15,000 per unit, and climbed higher as bureaucratic delays turned the process from months into years. In June 1997, the Army agreed to lease 354 homes to FORA for a period of two years. FORA, in turn, subleased units to the Mid-Peninsula Housing Coalition through the city of Marina. A percentage of the homes would go to those who qualify for affordable housing, and the rest were to be rented at market rates. The original plan was to have both Abrams Park and Preston Park as part of this agreement, but the Army would retain the right to reoccupy the housing for national emergencies. This latter requirement, however, undermined commercial underwriting of the project, and it was dropped. The final lease version covered only Preston Park and was signed on 17 June 1997. The project was a success. The units were filled shortly after Preston opened later that year.

By the end of 2000, the transfers were not complete, but disposition was well under way, despite the bureaucratic delays and higher costs that resulted. Eventually, the Army did transfer to Marina the Abrams Park and also the Patton Park areas of the former Fort Ord. Thereafter, Marina conducted extensive negotiations with developers over plans for how to use the land. By 2002, a project called Marina Heights had plans to put 900 housing units in what was Abrams Park, while Cypress Knolls was to put a large-scale 480-unit senior housing development in Patton Park.623

Habitat Management Plan and Bureau of Land Management

Balancing efforts to clean up the former Fort Ord with the need to preserve habitat was a challenge through the cleanup process. Adding to the complexity of cleanup on the

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622 A law suit was filed against KB Home alleging that the city “grossly undersold the 107-acre property” which had an estimated worth of between $94 million and $115 million. The suit also argued that KB Home had promised city officials that it would provide low-cost housing, but failed to do so. Laith Agna, “KB Home/Bakewell Settles Highlands Property Suit; Housing Fund Gets $1.1M Boost,” Monterey County Herald, 6 March 2008, p. B1.

coastal dunes, for example, was that the small arms ranges west of Highway 1 were part of a parcel scheduled to go to the California Department of Parks and Recreation with development restrictions. Moreover, the Army and the US Fish and Wildlife Service signed off on a revised version of the Fort Ord Habitat Management Plan in April 1997. The plan required the protection of the environment and outlined the types of flora and fauna in the former Fort Ord and the impact of certain remediation measures on their habitat. The plan further outlined the planned burns required to maintain the health of the chaparral. The protected species listed in the plan were the Smith’s Blue Butterfly, the Western Snowy Plover, the California Red-Legged Frog, the Sand Gilia, and the Monterey Spine Flower. Several other species were also proposed to be added.

Fort Ord’s once-prized field training areas and firing ranges equaled over half of the total size of the base. These lands were considered unsuitable for future development and were intended to be returned to a natural state and transferred to the control of the US Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Transfers began in late 1996, but over half of the allocated properties were held up due to pollution concerns compounded by litigation. The remaining parcels, amounting to over 7,600 acres, required considerable ordnance cleanup. It would be years before these parcels were clean enough to transfer. Slowing down the process even more were the limits placed on the amount of brush-burning that the Army could conduct at any one time. Brush had to be cleared prior to efforts to locate and remove unexploded ordnance and the preferred method was the so-called “prescribed burn.” Creating large-scale fires was problematic, however, near the highly populated areas surrounding the base. Clearances had to be handled with extreme care to avoid air pollution and the possibility of a prescribed burn getting out of control. The process involved much public input, became entangled by participation of the RAB as discussed above, was the subject of litigation, and the state of California debated and closely monitored the Army’s brush-clearing activity. Such obstacles severely delayed the progress on all other EDCs and PBCs for years. During the long delays in transfers, a few scofflaws took the opportunity to use the pristine land for vehicle “off-roading.” The off-roading was both damaging to the natural chaparral and dangerous – one driver was killed when he rolled his vehicle at high speed on unimproved dirt roads.

Cleanup Efforts

BRAC officials faced two major long-term environmental issues before they could transfer Army property on the former Fort Ord to local communities. The first issue was soil and groundwater contamination, which was caused primarily by three plumes of groundwater contaminated by solvents. The second issue was the disposal of unexploded ordinance on lands formerly used by the Army for rifle and artillery training. Excluding ordnance-related cleanup, there were 43 contaminated sites that demanded remediation or “remedying.” These sites included 2 “operable units,” 9 “Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study” sites, 13 interim action sites, and 19 other sites not requiring remediation, only investigation and documentation work. Cleanup of

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625 Illegal off-road vehicle use continued under BLM control, but the bureau, with Army help, cracked down on such behavior.
contaminated soil, mostly from hydrocarbon and lead contamination, was successful overall and came in $15 million under budget and five years ahead of schedule.626

The primary contamination requiring long-term remediation related to plumes in groundwater aquifers. A “plume” is an area of contaminated water in an aquifer, which starts at the source of contamination and spreads out into the aquifer in a sort of a feather- or plume-like shape. During remediation the Army pumped out the groundwater, filtered it through activated carbon, then re-pumped the filtered water back into the aquifer. Over three hundred wells were installed to monitor the contamination and remediation process, which was estimated to require anywhere from five to forty years and to cost $5 million per year to clean in full.627 In 2000, the primary sites were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Location &amp; Probable Origin</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OU 1</td>
<td>Firefighting Pit at Fritz sche Airfield</td>
<td>Concentrations decreasing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OU 2</td>
<td>Fort Ord Landfill, Imjin Road</td>
<td>Concentrations decreasing, but plume still moving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site 2/12</td>
<td>Motorpool, 12th Street and Highway 1</td>
<td>Concentrations and size of plume shrinking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 24 Status of underground contamination sites on the former Fort Ord, 2000**

However, a new contamination plume was identified in September 2000, which extended from off Fort Ord into Marina from a light vehicle training area where solvents were not used. This plume was composed of low concentrations of carbon tetrachloride, a dry cleaning chemical commonly used in the 1950s. The plume may have originated from a 55-gallon drum illegally dumped decades earlier. The plume was in shallow aquifers and not deep enough to impact Marina’s drinking water supply wells, but did contaminate a private well to 5 parts per billion (well above the California standards of 0.5 parts per billion). The private well was used only for irrigations.628

The waste from all of the cleanup operations had to go somewhere. In late 1996, the Fort Ord landfill, known as “OU 2,” became the site to consolidate waste collected during the Fort Ord cleanup. All of the agencies involved agreed to designate the landfill as a “Corrective Action Management Unit” or CAMU. As a CAMU, the site received the hazardous waste from other cleanup activities on the installation, including soil contaminated with hydrocarbons and lead. When filled, the site would be capped with an engineered polyethylene layer, manufactured specifically for landfill closures, and then covered with clean soil and planted with an appropriate native seed mixture to prevent erosion. The capping system was designed to prevent water infiltration, which in turn was to prevent chemicals in the waste material from being carried to groundwater.629

Another cleanup effort involved the removal of all underground storage tanks from the former Fort Ord that would not meet modern standards.630 In March 1997, the

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627 Ibid.
628 Ibid.
629 Ibid.
630 This regulation impacted USTs nationwide. For example, gas stations throughout the nation had to remove their old USTs as part of the same standards. ATZP-EP, Quarterly Historical Report, January - March 1997, in “Historical Reports” folder, box 3, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
last known tank was removed, but several undocumented tanks were located in the following years. Eventually, the Army removed 300 tanks.631

A significant success story for clean up efforts was the cleanup of the Fort Ord sand dunes, which began in 1996. This ocean beach area was the location of several firing ranges. As a result the dunes were filled with lead bullet fragments one to two feet deep and minute particles of lead fragments had contaminated the sand. A Harding-Lawson Associates study demonstrated that solid lead bullet fragments did not enter the food chain, but lead contamination in the soil posed a health risk. Approximately 63,000 cubic yards of bullet fragments and lead contaminated soils needed to be removed.632

By the middle of 1998, the cleanup of the beach ranges was completed with the removal of 125 tons of lead.633 The beach ranges were cleansed, but expended lead bullets could still be collected by hikers and beach-goers in some locations. Sand sieved of lead from the beaches was used to form the grade of the landfill, which saved the government $10 million as it did not have to buy new sand or dirt for the cap.634 All that remained was the re-contouring of the dunes and the restoration of indigenous plant life.

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632 Ibid.
633 Ibid.
634 “Fort Ord Superfund Project,” tab 1, in “Unidentified Binder, Pt 2 of 3” folder, box 52, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
635 “Fort Ord Superfund Project,” tab 1, in “Unidentified Binder, Pt 2 of 3” folder, Box 52, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
Ordnance and Explosives Removal

Ordnance and explosives (OE) removal – frequently referred to as unexploded ordnance (UXO) – was the primary reason disposal of Fort Ord slowed to a crawl by mid-1997. After completing a FOST for land intended for BLM, fifty-five sites were identified as requiring OE removal. During 1996 and 1997, while some removal work was on-going, the Army worked to finalize two Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA) plans to establish the depth to search for and remove OE, depending on the severity of the contamination and the planned reuse for the sites. However, some local activist groups, especially the Fort Ord Toxics Project, objected strenuously to the Army’s plans and sued over the process used to reach a decision on UXO cleanup.

The Fort Ord Toxics Project v. US Army suit was filed in the US District Court for the Northern District of California in 1997. It charged that the Army was obligated to cleanup OE under the same guidelines as it used for soil and groundwater contamination. In other words, the Fort Ord Toxics Project wanted the Army to treat OE as hazardous material and specifically wanted ordnance removed to a greater depth than the Army had plan to do. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), more commonly known as the Superfund Law, established the guidelines for handling hazardous material. At the same time, the Army was also sued by the Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District in objection to Army plans to conduct prescribed burns at suspected OE sites on the former Fort Ord. These burns, which can cause extensive smoke, provoked widespread community concern, especially after the first prescribed burn in August 1997 got out of control, burned 700 acres instead of the planned 300, and spread an orange smoke plume throughout the Salinas Valley. The goal of the second suit was to force the Army to use a more restrictive burn plan.

Facing significant local opposition to its OE cleanup plans, the Army decided to settle both cases to avoid setting national precedents. On 31 October 1998, the Army advised the court that it would begin a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) for OE as required by CERCLA and as was already using it for groundwater and soil

640 Akeman, “Lawsuit Opposes Army Burning,” Monterey County Herald, 21 June 1999, pp. B1, B3, in “Newspaper Articles 1999” folder, box 18, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Some groups feared that burning would release toxic clouds from exploding ordnance, although several studies indicated that Fort Ord chaparral burns did not release measurable traces of air-borne toxins (than what would otherwise be present). The Army closely coordinated its burn plans with the community, but the program remained controversial.
contamination remediation at Fort Ord. The EE/CA process that the Army had been using was an abbreviated form of the RI/FS process it would begin to use. There were two main differences between the RI/FS and EE/CA processes. First, the RI/FS process required community acceptance and input whereas the EE/CA process did not. Second, while DoD could oversee the EE/CA process, the EPA oversaw the RI/FS process.

In the first case, by settling, the Army agreed to complete an RI/FS as required under CERCLA. However, unlike under CERCLA, the Fort Ord Toxics Project agreed to allow the Army to remain in charge of the cleanup, not the EPA. In the second case, the Army agreed to a more restrictive burn plan, and the Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District dropped its suit. In June 1999, however, the air pollution district filed a new suit to stop all burning for cleanup purposes, which was temporarily granted in 2001 when the federal judge ruled that the burns conducted in 1997 were part of a “remedial action” versus a “removal action.” In response to this second suit, Devlin noted that the Army had followed the procedures designated by the district. He expected the Army to fight the second suit. “I want to do what’s right for cleaning the land and making it safe,” he told a reporter. “We think controlled burns are the best way to do that,” noting that to turn a base over to civilians after decades of military training required OE removal. He also explained that Army methods were to some extent caught up in the local political debate between “growth-vs.-no-growth” advocates. Devlin thought that some activists hoped to stop development of Fort Ord property altogether. As long as the property was not transferred from the Army, then no development could take place.

Whatever their motives, legal actions by activists and environmental organizations were basically successful in changing the procedures applied by the Army in OE cleanup at Fort Ord. By achieving settlements during this period, protesters convinced the Army to place a greater emphasis upon the adequacy of plans to adjudicate human safety concerns in the disposition of Fort Ord property. Consequently, all future transfers of property required the additional RI/FS for UXO on top of the FOST’s already completed, which necessarily slowed property transfers (under both EDC and PBC modes), in some cases by years.

Further aggravating emotional fears, two “Chemical Agent Identification Sets” were found during cleanup activities at Fort Ord in March 1997. The sets were issued from the 1920s until the 1950s to soldiers to use for training against chemical warfare attacks. However, the Monterey County Herald erroneously reported the sets as

643 BRAC office comments on draft Chapter VII, DLIFLC&POM Command History 1996-2000. Both the Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Board and the Army appealed the ruling.
645 Devlin interview with DLIFLC Command Historians, 18, 21, 23 September 2000.
containing mustard gas, which raised the specter that World War I chemical warfare agents might be buried at the base. The sets actually contained very small levels of lewisite phosgene and chloropicrin, agents that caused irritation and tearing to soldiers not properly using their protective gear. Fear that the finds and subsequent reporting might cause a panic led Commander Daniel Devlin to issue a statement published in the Monterey County Herald to set the record straight and allay any public concerns. Devlin’s commentary was apparently effective as the issue did continue to be a problem.\(^\text{647}\)

Its cleanup plans not withstanding, the Army planned to close permanently some 800 to 1,500 acres at the center of the artillery range impact area. The Army believed that fencing and signage would be adequate to keep the curious out of an area where UXO was likely to remain. The curious were, nonetheless, an additional problem, especially children who were particularly attracted to ranges 44 and 45 to collect old expended 40mm training grenades as souvenirs. In April 1999, a surface sweep of all ranges was conducted to remove visible attractions to souvenir collectors. Nevertheless, in 2000, souvenir hunters still managed to find a training Claymore mine and a 90mm recoilless rifle round in Seaside.

Away from the beaches, heavy chaparral made locating UXO difficult. To find ordnance, the Army had to remove vegetation manually, mechanically, or by burning it off. In the Army’s favor, most biologists believed that the maritime chaparral covering the area required periodic fire for natural maintenance and rejuvenation; so, the Army intended to use fire for habitat management as well as uncovering UXO wherever possible. The mechanical alternative technique was bulldozing or the use of a large chipping machine known colloquially as the “brontosaurus.” Mechanical techniques, however, potentially violated the Habitat Management Plan and endangered species legislation because flora and fauna habitats would be more permanently damaged by machines than fire, which occurs naturally. Furthermore, mechanical means could take fifteen to twenty years to clean the sites and could cost as much as $100 million.

Along with the OE controversies, activists had other concerns, including doubts that the Fort Ord landfill (OU2) would adequately protect groundwater, thereby causing additional contamination. In July 1997, the Fort Ord Toxics Project filed suit against the state of California for allowing the Army to designate the landfill as a Corrective Action Management Unit (CAMU), which made it possible to use for consolidating waste from other cleanup sites at Fort Ord.\(^\text{648}\) Another issue involved the transfer of some seventy acres to the city of Marina near the former Fritzsche Army Airfield, which led to a court-ordered injunction to stop the transfer in late 2000.

As litigations moved through the courts, no transfers of property could proceed and with little to do but wait, the director of BRAC departed for another position. The Army proceeded to search for alternatives to burning to make progress and even

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considered the use of goats as a means to eat away the brush. Several alternative OE detection survey methods were used such as STOLS (Surface Towed Ordnance Locating System) that detected metals below the surface, but cost $1,000 per acre. Another method, known as “the EMG1 system,” detected the shapes and sizes of objects. For $25,000, seventy acres could be surveyed over three or four days.

Ironically, because the Army was prevented by a court injunction in June 1999 from conducting further prescribed burns, it was unable to fulfill the terms of its Habitat Management Plan. Thus, the US Fish and Wildlife Service ordered a halt to property transfers in November 2000. The plan required the Army to conduct prescribed burns to maintain the health of the maritime chaparral habitat. By refusing to sanction more transfers, the Fish and Wildlife Service hoped to force the Army to resume burning. Nevertheless, in December 2000, the land management agency agreed to allow the Army to transfer 350 acres to the city of Del Rey Oaks provided that burns resumed in 2001. The EPA agreed to go along if the community’s reaction was positive. With this understanding, burns were planned for the following year.

Publicity raised by the OE and burns controversies caused concern for some students and faculty of CSUMB, who upon arrival at the school were issued a pamphlet providing information on how to recognize OE. Again to allay fears, the Army rechecked sites ready for transfer that it had once concluded were clean. This action delayed the transfer process for several sites, impacting FORA’s EDC.

Late in this period, to advance progress on property disposal, the Army began to use two new processes called the “Finding of Suitability for Early Transfer” and the “Covenant Deferred Request.” Early transfer was permitted by the CERCLA and allowed the Army to transfer property to public entities before final cleanup as long as it was in a condition that was safe for the intended reuse. However, the Army was still required to clean up the property.649

In conclusion, by agreeing to follow CERCLA process for OE, the Army obligated itself to costly remedial studies and cleanup measures. Controversy over prescribed burns further hindered property transfers to the point where the process was all but halted during 1999 and 2000. On the other hand, when the Army was forced to transfer property too hastily, as when Hayes Park was turned over to the city of Seaside, other problems developed. There probably is no perfect way to close down a decades-old infantry and artillery training base.

Other Transfers

Nowhere more did the BRAC process evoke the symbolism of “beating swords into plowshares” than by the transfer of Fort Ord land to educational institutions. Many regional higher academic organizations sought parts of Fort Ord for research and satellite campuses. The largest institution to do so was California State University (CSU), which sought to establish a new branch campus at Monterey Bay in 1995. Officials expected CSU Monterey Bay to achieve full accreditation by 2003. Regional leaders hoped the campus would eventually generate $48 million in revenue for local communities through

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salaries and public investment, although it might take fifteen years to achieve that peak.

Five Fort Ord primary schools were also transferred to the Monterey Peninsula Unified
School District, which is where the military dependents of DLI and NPS faculty, staff,
and students now attend.

The education-related transfers were not without controversy, unfortunately. One
case not directly involving the Army developed after the Army completed its PBC
transfer of property to CSUMB. Because of the high cost to support the new university,
the city of Marina decided to sue the state for costs associated with developing the
infrastructure necessary to support a new CSU branch campus. State regulations had
exempted state universities from paying costs to local communities, especially for
developing roads, water-related services, and fire protection. Thus, in developing its
master plan for CSUMB, CSU refused to reimburse FORA for such impacts, a decision
that caused the cities of Seaside, Marina, Monterey, Pacific Grove, and Salinas to
object. The case was in litigation for several years. Finally, in 2006, the State
Supreme Court unanimously refuted the defense by CSU trustees that state law and
previous court rulings barred payments to other governments to mitigate the impacts of a
new campus. Instead, the court found that state law required that infrastructure costs
“will be borne by those who benefit from them” and also that state agencies were
required to budget funds needed to protect the environment from damages caused by their
own activities, including when such effects fell outside the boundaries of the agency’s
own property.

On another front, in 1994 BRAC agreed to a PBC transfer of one thousand acres
of seacoast dunes to the California Department of Parks and Recreation. The site was
then renamed the “Fort Ord Dunes State Park” and became one of the BRAC office’s
largest and most successful projects. In 1996, California State Parks outlined an
ambitious plan that included constructing a 40- to 80-room lodge and restaurant complex
and refurbishing the historic former enlisted men’s club, Stilwell Hall, as a visitor center.
Discussions over the reuse of the site continued for the next six years.

The Army could not actually transfer the property until it had cleaned up the
dunes and installed a groundwater treatment system to address contamination in the
area. Indeed, in June 1997 state officials asked the state parks commission to rescind
approval of Fort Ord Dunes State Park’s general plan over concerns expressed by citizens
and outside experts that the Army’s cleanup plans were insufficient. According to Dr.
Richard Clapp, an expert on lead poisoning, “the proposed cleanup does not go far
enough and I wouldn’t bring my kids here. It’s a bad deal and should be stopped.”
While efforts to revise the general plan would not necessarily stop the transfer of Fort
Ord land to California State Parks, it did mean that future public use of the beaches might

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650 Jennifer Hong, “Ford Ord Reuse Authority Accepts Criticism of CSUMB Plan,” Salinas Californian, 20
651 Richard Brenneman, “Court Orders State Universities to Pay for Impacts,” The Berkeley Daily Planet, 4
652 “For Ord Dune Park Hearing Scheduled,” Monterey County Herald, 13 June 1997, in “Newspaper
Articles 1997” folder, box 18, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
have to be significantly curtailed. In the course of addressing these concerns over several years, the Army would remove many tons of lead from the beach firing ranges. Complicating matters, the city of Marina threatened to sue California State Parks over how it planned to reuse and develop the beaches, which further hindered the transfer.

As noted above, state park officials wanted to rehabilitate Stilwell Hall, the original Fort Ord Soldiers’ Club, which had significant historical value, but first required extensive and expensive renovations. The key issue, however, was that the Army had located the club on a bluff near the ocean beach. The bluff was now experiencing severe erosion that was gradually undermining the structure. Concrete revetments were needed at the base of these bluffs to slow the advance of the ocean, which had closed a distance of several hundred feet since the 1940s. Roof repair was also needed to stop rain run-off that was causing point erosions from the top of the bluffs.

Demolition, estimated to cost around $3 million, was less expensive than repair, but was extremely unpopular. It was possible to move Stilwell Hall, but this solution would have cost at least $12 million. Unfortunately, no one wanted to foot the bill for any of these courses of action. The Army’s goal was to transfer the site “as is, where is” to California State Parks while the installation commander, Colonel Daniel Devlin, refused to pay for temporary revetments to prevent further erosion without a commitment from the state to take it. He was, however, able to convince the Army to agree to a state request to make available the $3 million set aside by the Army to demolish Stilwell Hall instead for use to relocate the structure. State park officials wanted to relocate Stilwell Hall, but could not pay for its rescue unless the balance of funds to do so was raised from non-state sources. Furthermore, state officials wanted the Army to remove five large storm drains that jutted several hundred feet out from the beach on large trestles and emptied into the Monterey Bay. The failure of one drain was causing further erosion of dunes and shoreline, but the appearance of the structures was not in keeping with a natural state beach setting.

Meanwhile, the community, particularly the veterans’ community, made efforts to save Stilwell Hall, but struggled to come up with a reuse plan and the needed funds. Unfortunately, the ocean did not wait, and by 1999 a series of bad storms had eroded so much of the bluff beneath the old clubhouse that its southwestern corner ended up only a few feet away from the cliff’s edge. In fact, part of the concrete patio that surrounded the building fell onto the beach below. Another threat to Stilwell Hall was vandalism, which

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655 Contractors cleaning the beach actually estimated that between 3,000 and 4,000 tons of metals would be recovered from decades of rifle practice at the site, although such figures proved too high. Akeman, “Army Gets the Lead Out of Ord Dunes,” Monterey County Herald, 2 July 1997, pp. A1, A10, in “Newspaper Articles 1997” folder, box 18, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
657 Daniel D. Delvin, Colonel, USA, Letter to Rusty Areias, Director, Department of Parks and Recreation, [DRAFT]; and John Areias, Director, Department of Parks and Recreation, Letter to Colonel Daniel D. Devlin, Commander, DLIFLC&POM, [DRAFT]; 19 November 1999; Rusty Arias, Director, Department of Parks and Recreation, Letter to Colonel Daniel Devlin, Presidio of Monterey, 28 July 1999; all in “Stilwell Hall 1999” folder, box 51, RG 21.20, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
prompted the Army to remove some artwork, murals, and other items from the location. In 1998, and again in 1999, vandals caused extensive damage to the interior of the structure with vagrants even building a fire in the center of the ballroom’s parquet floor. By the end of this period, state and BRAC office officials were discussing whether the dunes could be transferred independently of Stilwell Hall. By the end of the period, however, the southern-most portion of the building was on the brink of falling into the ocean, which prompted the installation commander to order that the entire wing be removed, which task was completed by the Army Corps of Engineers.658

Through 2000, the fate of the main garrison’s World War II-era barracks also remained unresolved. These barracks, constructed with lead-based paint and asbestos, were intended for light-industrial, mixed use development, but the outdated buildings had limited utility. The estimated cost for demolition was $150 million. A FORA pilot project was thus developed to determine if building components, such as lumber, plumbing, and various metals, could be recycled with the proceeds being used to offset the costs of demolition.659

Another complicated matter was disposition of parcel E11B, better known as East Garrison, a cluster of well-built and durable red clay-tile buildings constructed by the Works Progress Administration as a Depression-era work-relief project and intended originally to support a troop tent encampment.660 The structures were eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. The desirable structures caused controversy between FORA, Monterey County, and Monterey Peninsula College, because the Army had agreed to give MPC the land before Congress directed that local agencies make all land reuse decisions.661 As a result, Army plans to transfer this property quickly were undermined.

The controversy over the East Garrison evolved from a 1993 proposal by MPC for approximately two hundred acres to set up a regional law enforcement training center that was to educate police candidates in a wide variety of skills including weapons, high-speed chases, crime scene investigations, and explosives usage. However, Monterey County wanted to use the same facilities for a food and culinary school, a place for Native American gatherings, an equestrian center, and as the site of an art colony with spaces for studios and performances, which would prove to be a highly popular proposal. Representative Sam Farr attempted to mediate the dispute after it became a hotly debated tug-of-war between Monterey County, expressed through FORA, and MPC with the

658 BRAC office comments on draft Chapter VII, DLIFLC&POM Command History 1996-2000. Of course, no resolution was ever found and the Army demolished the entire structure, which story will be recorded in a future command history.


Army in the fall of 1997. Ultimately, FORA and MPC agreed to a compromise that divided the property between the two organizations and required them to share the land, but not all issues were resolved by the end of 2000. The Presidio police continued patrolling the area for transients and vandals.

Since the early 1990s, Monterey County’s Parks and Recreation Department had requested land adjacent to Laguna Seca Raceway, a well-known venue for motor racing. The county needed more space for overflow parking and to allow for raceway modifications, especially reconfiguring “Turn 11.” Environmental assessments, however, indicated the presence of UXO at these sites, which required cleanup and remediation efforts that continued through the period and that prevented a rapid transfer of the lands. In early 1996, the Army did agree to lease the parcel with Turn 11 to Monterey County for use until environmental cleanup had verified that the parcel was suitable for an official transfer. Despite some frustration on the part of raceway officials, the matter was close to being settled by late 2000.

Other land small transfers took place during this period. For example, the city of Marina created a sports complex that included an equestrian center, Goodwill Industries established an education and employment center, and the California Army National Guard received four buildings.

The two Fort Ord golf courses were sold to the city of Seaside after lengthy negotiations. Like many area veterans and military retirees, the Army wanted to retain the golf courses, which were lucrative operations, to support military morale and welfare activities, but the sale was mandated under BRAC rules. A public ceremony to transfer the property took place on 2 November 1995 although it was not until January of 1997 that Seaside officially purchased the site for $11 million with the stipulation that veterans and military personnel were guaranteed a number of passes at a set rate.

Finally, the Army agreed to transfer Fritzsche Army Air Field to the city of Marina early in the BRAC process, but the surrounding area and facilities were subject to the same types of slowdowns as occurred in the other transfers described above. Marina wanted the area for an industrial park to stimulate job growth, a particular concern in a city that had lost 40 percent of its businesses due to the closure of Fort Ord. The project to transfer the air field to Marina was proceeding without major complications toward the end of 2000.

**Conclusion**

The Army had hoped to dispose of its excess Fort Ord property completely by 1997. By 2000, however, only half of that amount had been cleaned up and transferred, primarily because of litigation and the difficulties imposed by cumbersome bureaucratic 

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processes. From the middle of 1997 to the end of 1999, the BRAC process looked hopelessly adrift. Nonetheless, by the end of 2000, sufficient progress had been made to allow better low-cost housing to become available to both military families and Peninsula residents. The issue of OE removal and controlled burns was still unresolved with the Army in the middle of disputes between local and federal agencies that were both for and against controlled burns. Despite initial promises about base reutilization, the costs to cleanup and prepare Fort Ord property for transfer to various public entities had exceeded $200 million and would cost tens of millions more.
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