Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center

Command History, 2006-2007

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by
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Language Day at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, 2006
U.S. Army photograph, courtesy Strategic Communications

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Command History Office
Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
Presidio of Monterey
Monterey, CA 93944
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION


1. This report chronicles the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) from 2006 to 2007, corresponding mainly to when COL Tucker B. Mansager served as commandant.

2. Mansager commanded from 17 August 2005 to 11 October 2007. He oversaw DLIFLC’s continued expansion prompted by large funding increases to support the Proficiency Enhancement Program approved during his predecessor’s command. Even as critics lamented various failings in military training, the Department of Defense continued to promote foreign language and cultural learning for its personnel. By 2007, DLIFLC provided resident foreign language training in 24 languages to 3,551 students from all military services using 1,724 civilian instructors. Growth also brought scrutiny, but Mansager successfully guided DLIFLC through a special manpower needs assessment, which even allowed him to create a Chief of Information Technology Office.

3. Under Mansager, DLIFLC adopted a new external training focus to support general-purpose forces preparing for deployment. Staff developed short familiarization packages in Iraqi Arabic, Dari, and Pashto and thousands of students passed through DLIFLC’s two-week Familiarization course prior to deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan. An infusion of new technology facilitated the ability of DLIFLC to reach beyond its classrooms while enhancing resident student proficiency results. To support Mansager, Assistant Commandant COL Daniel L. Scott worked to reduce student attrition and moved the bar down by 8-10 percent. Scott’s intimate knowledge of DLIFLC helped on many fronts, especially the transition between commandants and provosts in 2005.

4. Testing was an area of challenge at this time as DLIFLC developed a computerized rendition of the Defense Language Proficiency Test, which drew criticism from the field, while higher Defense Language Aptitude Battery cut-off scores, required for DLIFLC entrance, achieved little gain as recruiters routinely waived the standards. Moreover, under Mansager, relations between DLIFLC and the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, were tested as the pace of Institute growth strained available resources. Finally, with new technology and many new junior instructors, Mansager understood the benefit of supporting faculty development but knew more could be done.

5. Despite challenges, under Mansager DLIFLC continued to meet high academic standards and by 31 December 2007 had granted 2,794 Associate of Arts in Foreign Languages degrees.

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Preface

This command history covers the years between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2007, which roughly corresponds to the period when Col. Tucker B. Mansager served as commandant and installation commander of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), which is located at the Presidio of Monterey (POM) in Monterey, California. The report divides into five chapters with each chapter discussing an important aspect of the function, structure, and management of DLIFLC as well as its relations with stakeholders and supporters. The report includes various appendices, figures, a glossary, and an index to help the reader make efficient use of a document primarily intended to serve as an encyclopedic reference and official history of DLIFLC during this period. Most references cited may be found in the Historical Research Collection of the Command History Office (DLIFLC and POM archives) located in the Chamberlin Library at the Ord Military Community in Seaside, California.

The author of this report is Cameron Binkley, who currently serves as the deputy command historian for DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey. Dr. Stephen M. Payne, who currently serves as the DLIFLC command historian, reviewed this report and contributed a supplemental text found in Appendix D that discusses the development of the Defense Language Proficiency Test during this period. For help in filling in gaps in the historical record, thanks are due the many DLIFLC and Presidio employees who have shared important information, especially by prompt completion and submittal of quarterly historical reports and other accounts of their activities, such as newsletters, comments, photographs, or other means. The Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, provided official review comments on the draft report, which are much appreciated. Finally, thanks are due to former DLIFLC Commandant, Colonel Tucker B. Mansager and Assistant Commandant Col. Daniel L. Scott, both of whom generously gave many insights about the management of the institute during official exit interviews conducted by Dr. Payne in 2007 and 2008 respectively.

Inadvertently, this history may have left out relevant details or contain undiscovered errors for which the author and editor accept responsibility. Nonetheless, this history should prove useful to those who need to know something about the “big picture” surrounding events during this period.

The cover of this report includes a photograph of students and faculty of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center performing on stage at the Presidio of Monterey during the Institute’s annual Language Day festival held on 19 May 2006, which attracted over 3,000 visitors from nearby middle schools, high schools, and colleges. The DLIFLC Office of Strategic Communications produced the photograph, and all other images used in this report, for the U.S Army. Copies of these images can be obtained from the DLIFLC archivist.

Mr. Cameron Binkley
Deputy Command Historian
March 2013
Chapter I

The Defense Foreign Language Program

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) is the largest foreign language school in the United States and typically enrolls more than 3,000 military students at any given time. In 2007, DLIFLC employed more than 2,800 people, of whom approximately 1,700 were native speakers of the languages they taught. Located on the central coast of California at the historic Presidio of Monterey, the institute forms the core of the Defense Foreign Language Program (DFLP), which the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) operates to provide language training and assistance to the defense establishment and other branches of the U.S. government. The institute’s primary mission is to train military linguists who serve with the U.S. Armed Forces. The commandant and senior commander of DLIFLC is a U.S. Army officer who also has responsibility for the Defense Language Institute, Washington D.C. (DLI-W), an affiliate office in the nation’s capital that supplements DLIFLC training through contracts in less commonly taught foreign languages.1 The commandant also serves as the installation commander for the Presidio of Monterey. This “command” history covers the period 2006-2007, which roughly corresponds to the period when Col. Tucker B. Mansager served as commandant. Chapter I provides context to define DLIFLC within the DFLP.

World Situation

The United States remained at war during the period of this report. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military forces and allied states continued to press counter-insurgency campaigns.2 At the same time, the United States continued to deploy large numbers of troops on the Korean Peninsula while maintaining a vigilant stance in East Asia and the Pacific region where the People’s Republic of China was exerting ever more influence as a rising power. Perennial fears about the regional aspirations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the unpredictability of a nuclear-armed North Korea also continued to worry Washington. In Europe, the United States continued to maintain a strong alliance with its traditional European allies through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This was true despite continued stress between some members over differences stemming from the decision of the United States to intervene in Iraq in March 2003. Separately, Europeans continued to forge ahead with imperfect efforts to construct a “European Union,” a hybrid system of supranational independent

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1 Another element of this system is the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC), administered for DOD by the US Air Force. Note, both DLIFLC and DLIELC are part of the Defense Language Institute, but all quoted references to “DLI” in this text refer to DLIFLC.

2 A thought-provoking view of global change driving these wars, including religious divergence among monotheistic societies, which also comments on how demographic and economic change, and the rise of China, may influence U.S. Security and business interest in the next decades, is offered by Herbert Meyer, “What in the World is Going On? A Global Intelligence Briefing for CEOs,” a talk given 12 December 2006, at the Pyramid Club, Philadelphia, in “DFLP” ff, RG 21.24.
institutions empowered by treaty to make decisions as negotiated by member states. The European Union continued to operate a common monetary system (the Euro zone) and to make progress in the adoption of common foreign and security policies, which overlapped with many perceived U.S. security threats and concomitant strategies, again despite pronounced differences over the Iraq war. One potential issue during this period concerned a military capabilities gap between the United States and Europe. The widening gap suggested both continued American dominance in international security policy and continued strains between the United States and its European partners over relative apportionments of national income dedicated to joint security needs.\(^3\) In defense circles, the pace of technological change, including the development of weapons of mass destruction, remained a perennial concern. Officials were also concerned about the growing connectedness of the world’s economic and ecological systems and the rise of asymmetrical forms of combat as illustrated by 9/11 and subsequent U.S. involvement in two counter-insurgency campaigns. One result, to prevent terrorists from gaining a foothold in Africa, DOD began planning to establish a new command there—Africa Command.\(^4\)

These trends drove some national security strategists to ponder and formulate how the very principles of war might be changing. U.S. Navy Vice Admiral James Stavridis was one. As military assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Stavridis wrote in December 2005 about “Deconstructing War” and how the pace and acceleration of war would only continue, how a splintering world would allow small but deadly forces to counter large states using the asymmetrical advantages of terrorism in a variety of forms. The only way for the United States to counter such threats, according to Stavridis, was to adopt what he called “brilliant tool sets” composed of integrated national information systems; networked communication, intelligence, and coalition management systems; media management (vice manipulation), precision destruction, pre-emptive “discovery,” and continued leveraging of scientific preeminence, especially in biology. In the future, the military would have “to operate like a rheostat” said Stavridis, and see the world in multiple shades of gray. He advocated true “jointness” with officers from one service serving extended tours in the ranks of another, or even better, within industry itself in such fields as medicine, biological research, international finance, or information. Young officers would not only need to embrace change and “see solutions sets in entirely different ways,” but would be expected to participate in interagency, joint, international, or combined operations, and they would need “to speak at least one non-traditional language of real import—Chinese, Arabic, Farsi, and Hindi,” for example.\(^5\)

Regarding the Iraq War, it was not really the failure to embrace new modes of thinking that had led to three years of hard sustained combat. Rather, it was the failure to acknowledge the importance of adhering to staid military precepts.\(^6\) Key mistakes made during the initial weeks of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 were making headlines in March 2006. For example, during the “Dash to Baghdad” top commanders had debated the decision by Defense

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\(^{4}\) Col Tucker Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, p. 2.


\(^{6}\) And perhaps the willingness by senior leaders to allow ideology to dictate strategy. See, Col Douglas MacGregor, “Washington’s War,” Armed Forces Journal, October 2007.
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy R. Franks to overrule experienced battlefield commanders like Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, commanding V Corps, who sought to suppress rear-guard actions by Saddam Hussein’s Fedayeen paramilitary fighters before marching on the Iraqi capital. That was not the type of lightning war that Rumsfeld wanted, however. Thus overruled, the generals sent coalition forces into Baghdad where they quickly swept away the government in power. The failure to recognize the considerable threat of Iraqi insurgent forces, however, soon undermined U.S. strategic goals, helping to lay the groundwork for a politically divisive and much longer occupation than was originally planned.7

Figure 1 General William S. Wallace, TRADOC commander, listens to Col. Tucker Mansager during a visit to DLIFLC in 2007.

Further mistakes were now evident as well. The Bush Administration had justified the Iraq War mainly due to the threat posed by its weapons of mass destruction. The failure to find any such weapons was now explained less because of politization of the intelligence services in the United States—many western intelligence agencies had thought Iraq could have such

weapons—but simply because so many analysts were trained only to gauge technical measures while remaining widely ignorant about Iraq’s culture. Collectively, they had failed to understand how the Iraqi state “had fallen apart as a cohesive society,” as one writer put it. When the United States overthrew a Sunni regime that had brutally ruled over a Kurdish and Shiite majority country for decades, then disbanded the Iraqi Army (largely composed of Sunnis), and yet remained unwilling to commit its own forces on a sufficient scale to police a state of seventeen million, it doomed the region to years of chaos. During the mid-term U.S. elections in November 2006, the American public finally weighed in on the Bush Administration’s performance in the Iraq War. Clearly upset over obvious failed planning and preparation, the electorate administered a stinging rebuke to the Republican Party, which lost control of both houses of Congress. On the day after the election, President George W. Bush dismissed Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.9

At any rate, by early 2006 growing sectarian violence and continuous anti-coalition attacks characterized the Iraq War. After insurgents attacked the al-Askari Mosque, a Shiite holy site in the city of Samarra in February 2006, sectarian violence flared dramatically. Homicide rates in Baghdad tripled and the United Nations described the violence in Iraq as a “civil war-like situation.” In late 2007, even Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, could not avoid stating in testimony before Congress, that indeed “2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to unraveling politically, economically, and in security terms.”11 General Barry R. McCaffrey (U.S. Army Ret.), an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, offered an even more frightening assessment. In March 2007, McCaffrey visited Iraq and Kuwait and submitted a detailed after action report of the security operations in both countries in support of U.S. Central Command. Among his findings, the country was “ripped by a low grade civil war” that had “worsened to catastrophic levels” with up to 3,000 Iraqis killed every month and the population in despair. According to McCaffrey, thousands of attacks targeted U.S. Forces while “There is no function of government that operates effectively across the nation…. The police force is feared as a Shia militia in uniform which is responsible for thousands of extra-judicial killings…”. McCaffrey concluded that: “U.S. Armed Forces are in a position of strategic peril.”12

Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army’s deployment in two wars raised persistent questions about its ability to maintain readiness. Reports began to surface, for example, about how the U.S. Air Force was beginning to perform missions in Iraq normally assigned to the Army. Thus, in Iraq by 2006, U.S. airmen, typically responsible only for base security, were now providing convoy security, another thousand were working with detainees, and others were

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9 Donald Rumsfeld’s effort to reform the U.S. military and how this vision undermined successful operations in Iraq are chronicled in Peter J. Boyer, “Downfall: How Donald Rumsfeld Reformed the Army and Lost Iraq,” *The New Yorker*, 20 November 2006.
helping train Iraqis. To allay concerns about Army readiness, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Shoomaker issued a formal statement on 26 July 2006. In it, he affirmed pride in the force and its abilities at the same time urging passage of the Defense Authorization Bill, growth of the Army’s base budget, $17.1 billion in supplemental funding to “reset” the Army in 2007, and $12-13 billion a year for two to three years following the end of hostilities to replenish the force. Congress did remain committed to the president’s priorities, especially with regard to the “Global War on Terrorism” and continued to provide emergency supplemental appropriations to conduct military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major priorities of the Defense Department itself during this period included “winning the long war,” reducing violent extremism, strengthening U.S. combined and joint fighting abilities, countering the persistent threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), implementing force transformation (modernization), and strengthening intelligence collection (especially human).

Even before the mid-term elections, on 15 March 2006, public concern over the course of the Iraq War had prompted Congress to appoint a ten-person bi-partisan panel, co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former U.S. Representative Lee Hamilton. Congress empowered the so-called Iraq Study Group to review U.S. war efforts. In December 2006, the panel completed its report by concluding that “the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating” and that “U.S. forces seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end.” The influential study’s most important recommendation was:

The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move out of Iraq.

On 23 January 2007, President Bush, accepting the main tenet of the Iraq Study Group’s report, announced during his annual State of the Union Address, that he was “deploying reinforcements of more than 20,000 additional soldiers and Marines to Iraq.” To implement this new “surge” strategy for the Iraq War, General David H. Petraeus, an architect of the Army’s new counter-insurgency textbook undertaken while he served as commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was specifically chosen to command the Multi-National Force—Iraq, replacing General George W. Casey Jr., who may have opposed the surge strategy. Thereafter, Casey became the thirty-sixth Army Chief of Staff until his retirement in

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18 Ibid., Executive Summary, p. 16.
2011. From his headquarters on 10 February 2007, Petraeus wrote to rally the flagging spirits of
the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of Multi-National Force—Iraq. Praising their
virtues in discipline, fortitude, and initiative at a decisive moment, Petraeus wished his troops
“Godspeed” and pledged his own commitment as “shoulder-to-shoulder with our Iraqi
companions” the United States began “a pivotal campaign to improve security for the Iraqi
people.”

Although the situation was grim, the United States now began to achieve some progress
in battling the insurgency. First, General McCaffrey found that since the arrival of General
Petraeus to command Multi-National Forces Iraq “the situation on the ground has clearly and
measurably improved.” Petraeus had redeployed joint U.S.-Iraqi units to smaller neighborhood-
style outposts that maximized their security presence while reducing exposure to IED attack.
Perhaps of greater importance, McCaffrey spotted “the real and growing swell of Sunni tribal
opposition to the al-Qaeda-in-Iraq terror formations” that seemed to be shifting the political
alignment of forces in Iraq to the side of the United States and its allies. Second, despite the
growing violence, following a general election in December 2005, an Iraqi National Assembly
approved the creation of a new government to succeed the Iraqi Transitional Government. That
government took office on 20 May 2006 under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Al-Maliki headed the Islamic Dawa Party. It and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council composed
the religious-Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, which had won a plurality of seats in the December
2005 Iraqi election. Thus, progress to establish a democratically elected Iraqi government made
tentative gains. Finally, in June 2006, U.S. forces located and killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the
leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq while deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was himself executed
that December after an Iraqi court convicted him for crimes against humanity.

In September 2007, Petraeus returned to Congress to report: “As a bottom line up front,
the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met.” Petraeus admitted that the
security situation in Iraq “remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating,” but
asserted his believe that U.S. troop levels could be brought back down to the pre-surge levels by
the summer of 2008.

So, after nearly six years at war, the Army remained under stress in 2006 and 2007.
Speaking at a conference in 2007, General Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,
categorized the period as a “most dangerous time” because so many around the world disliked
the United States while the American public did not understand the necessity for a “global war
on terrorism.” Moreover, the United States had too quickly and probably too deeply cut its
military, intelligence, and counter intelligence assets following the end of the Cold War. Cody
noted that between 1950, when the United States maintained 64 divisions, and 1989, when it had

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20 General David H. Petraeus, Memorandum to the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians of Multi-
21 McCaffrey, Memorandum for Colonel Michael Meese entitled “Visit Iraq and Kuwait, 9-16 March 2007.”
“Articles, Reports: Military” folder, Chapter 1, DLIFLC Command History. 2006-2007 files.
28, there had been ten deployments. However, between 1989 and 2006, the United States had deployed forces forty-three times with Army strength of 18 divisions. Insufficient depth during current asymmetrical wars—the likely model for future conflict—had required the Army to deploy National Guard units to compensate. In a volunteer army, fifteen-month-long rotations would lead, he believed, to the loss of captains, majors, and many seasoned non-commissioned officers, capital losses that afterwards would take ten to fifteen years to replenish. Meanwhile, as it continued to fight two separate wars in two different parts of the world, the Defense Department had decided to “transform” the Army’s structure. The combined effects were, according to Cody, “wearing out” the Army.

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24 According to the president’s National Security Strategy, DOD’s mission was to secure the United States from direct attack, maintain global lines of communication and freedom of action, establish an international security environment favorable to U.S. interests, and pursue military “transformation.” See DLIFLC Command History, 2004-2005, Chapter 1, for more information. Transformation sought to develop more readily deployable, medium-weight technology-leveraged combat forces that used fewer troops and were more responsive to civilian policy-makers than military brass.

25 General Richard A. Cody, remarks before the 2007 Conference of Army Historians, 9 August 2007, from notes of Dr. Stephen M. Payne, Command Historian, DLIFLC, who attended the event, in “Military Reports, World” folder, Chapter 1, DLIFLC Command History, 2006-2007, files. After the demise of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon advocacy for a high-tech, stripped down military focused upon air, sea, and space dominance declined. Proponents of a larger standing Army appeared ascendant as near-term threats in Iraq and Afghanistan justified U.S. funding for and doctrine governing counterinsurgency operations. Still, many strategists continued to fret over military modernization, strategy, force structure, and financing with worries about longer term threats posed by a nuclear-armed Iran or a fully modernized Chinese military. Fears also renewed about the possibility of “imperial
National Security and Foreign Language

Congress remained committed to the priorities of interest to the Training and Doctrine Command. Congress authorized an increase in the size of the regular army of 30,000 troops for an end-strength of 512,000 personnel. To meet this demand, TRADOC aimed to increase its retention percentages above baseline levels as well as training to achieve Army goals in FY 2006. Problems in the pipeline, however, remained an issue as far as foreign language training was concerned.

In May 2007, lawmakers in Congress raised criticism about the law known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (Public Law 103-160) after the media reported that the military services had discharged fifty-eight Arabic linguists because they were identified as gay. The lawmakers wanted the Defense Department to explain how it could justify discharging so many expensive to train linguists during a time when U.S. forces were engaged in fighting a difficult counter-insurgency war in Iraq. Democratic lawmakers pushing repeal of the law wrote the House Armed Services Committee chairman that the continued loss of such “capable, highly skilled Arabic linguists continues to comprise our national security during time of war.”

Other than training by the military itself, replacing such losses was not easy. Despite the continuing pressures of globalization, in the United States less than half of all high school children were still not required to take even a single course in one foreign language, compared with other developed states where such studies were compulsory. Added to this perennial concern about the deficiencies of American foreign language education and its security ramifications, journalists revealed in 2006 that the People’s Republic of China was helping to fund the College Board’s advanced placement course in “Chinese Language and Culture.” The prospect that China might have the potential to skew the cultural awareness of those few Americans (less than 50,000) who did bother to study the language spoken by the largest nation in the world was a bit disconcerting.

By 2006, the need for competent linguists had become so severe that the Army had to field about 8,500 civilian contract linguists, most of them in Iraq, but a thousand others found work in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Germany, and even Italy. The Army’s Foreign Language Proponency Office initiated this program in 2002 under the direction of Lynne McCann. McGann asserted the dire need for Arabic and Pashtu (Afghanistan) speakers because there were so few Americans who could speak it. According to McGann, the program was needed because even after a sixty-three-week course at DLIFLC, a novice Arabic speaker would still not be proficient enough, which is why the Army trains some linguists, recruits others that already


27 The situation was similar in Great Britain. Ironically, a series in The Economist pointed out, as English becomes the world’s lingua Franca, it becomes ever harder for native English-speakers to speak anything else, despite the numerous advantages. See multiple articles in The Economist, 16 December 2006.

In an effort to help address the long-lamented “language problem,” President George W. Bush launched the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) in January 2006. This plan by the Secretaries of State, Education, Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence sought to strengthen national security by promoting programs to facilitate Americans learning critical foreign languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Hindi, Farsi, and others through new and expanded school- and workplace-based programs. According to President Bush, “When Americans learn to speak Arabic, those in the Arab region will say, ‘Gosh, America’s interested in us. They care enough to learn how we speak.’” According the president, NSLI would counter those with a limited view of America’s ideas and culture. Its main goals included expanding the number of Americans studying and mastering critically needed languages while starting the learning process at a younger age and attracting more qualified foreign language instructors and resources. According to Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Dr. David S. Chu, the effort would specifically help the Defense Department to increase the number of military and civilian personnel capable of communicating in some two-dozen non-traditional foreign languages essential for mission accomplishment. According to Chu, DOD planned to spend over $750 million over five years to increase the number of service personnel and employees with such skills while supporting the president’s NSLI with another $25 million. The program would increase language instruction at U.S. military academies, increase proficiency pay for service members with language skills, and create a 1,000-member civilian language reserve on call for military operations. A pilot project for this Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps was included in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Section 614). DOD renamed the program “Language Corps” and began to solicit participation and cooperation from other federal agencies in 2006. It awarded the first contract for the three-year pilot project in early 2007. Language Corps represented the first organized national effort by the

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U.S. Government to capitalize directly on the inherent and rich diversity in language and culture of American society to support the nation’s defense.\textsuperscript{34}

As far as DLIFLC was concerned, Chu noted the need for DOD to expand beyond the Institute’s capabilities. DOD planned to partner with universities and colleges through ROTC programs by offering grants to encourage the study of foreign languages considered key for national security.\textsuperscript{35} DOD intended this program, called the National Security Education Program (NSEP), to be a pipeline for moving linguistically and culturally competent professionals into its workforce. In exchange for college tuition support, grantees would incur a national security service commitment. NSEP also expanded the existing National Language Flagship Program, which linked the needs of agency across the federal government with K-12 and university students to promote higher proficiency in foreign languages needed by the government. The Flagship effort now included programs in Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, expanded Eurasian program focused upon Central Asian languages.\textsuperscript{36} Nevertheless, the president’s foreign language initiative earmarked about $362 million for DLIFLC. The Defense Appropriations Bill passed in December 2005 set aside this funding to beef up DLIFLC’s Global Language Online Support System and its online diagnostic language proficiency program, for revision of its language aptitude tests, and, according to Assistant Commandant Col. Daniel L. Scott, “to implement the Proficiency Enhancement Program.” DOD planned to expend the $362 million over a five-year program designed to allow the Institute to increase the language proficiency levels of its own graduates and those linguists already serving in the force.\textsuperscript{37} Overall, the president’s NSLI aimed to produce some 2,000 advanced speakers of Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Persian, Hindi, and Central Asian languages by 2009. The fact that the president identified Hindi for the first time as a language of particular interest to the national security of the United States was noted as a significant event by the Indian media.\textsuperscript{38}

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) also sought to plug some of the gaps in foreign language competence in 2006 and 2007. Laura K. Murray, Senior Language Officer and Director, ODNI Foreign Language Program Office, sponsored a draft “Intelligence Community Foreign Language Human Capital Plan,” which was intended to serve as an Annex to the “Intelligence Community Strategic Human Capital Plan” disseminated in June 2006 and developed by the Foreign Language Executive Committee. This particular foreign language plan sought to establish specific goals, action items, and timelines over a five-year-period to establish

\begin{footnotes}
\item[37] Kevin Howe, “Money for DLI Expands Courses,” Monterey Herald, 6 January 2006.
\item[38] Lalit K. JHA, “US to Now Teach Hindi for National Security,” The Indian Express, 7 January 2006.
\end{footnotes}
a community-wide database of foreign language requirements and available skills to aid as a recruitment and workforce planning and training tool.\textsuperscript{39}

Of related concern, the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR), an unfunded U.S. Government interagency organization established for the coordination and sharing of information about language-related activities at the federal level, completed several notable projects during the 2006-2007 timeframe. These included: development of a new ILR Translation Performance Skill Level Descriptions modeled on the similar Proficiency Skill Level Descriptions, development of the provisional ILR Interpretation Performance Skill Level modeled on the similar Translation Skill Level Descriptions, co-sponsorship with the National Virtual Translation Center of the “Languages of the World” website, co-sponsorship with the American Translator’s Association and others of the 2007 Translation Summit, and continued maintenance of the ILR website (www.govtilr.org).\textsuperscript{40}

Finally, in 2006 and 2007, Congress considered or passed several measures aimed at improving foreign language education in the United States. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Section 616), Congress directed that DOD conduct a study on methods to improve the recruitment and retention of qualified language instructors at DLIFLC. It included incentives for foreign language instructors who were in an alien immigration status and who could be adjusted from a temporary status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Armed Service of the Senate also granted authority to DOD to establish a program dedicated to the advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence committee. The authority included allowing DLIFLC to enter into partnerships with educational institutions such as Concordia Language Village, SCOLA, and the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The committee also expressed disappointment with DOD in that in the FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, it had recommended that DOD establish a research and development function for DLIFLC focused upon the latest technologies and instructional methods related to language learning. The committee applauded DLIFLC’s innovative approaches to meeting amplified demands within DOD for student throughput and expanded off-campus learning modes. In the FY 2005 budget, the committee explicitly directed Secretary of the Army to establish a new research development program and recommended $5 million for that purpose.\textsuperscript{41}

DOD was not proactive in responding to the congressional requirement to do a study examining hiring and retention at DLIFLC, originally intended for completion by December 2005. The issue did not go away, however, and DOD finally hired a contractor that September,


the RAND Corporation, to conduct the study. The first draft became available in January 2006. In February 2006, RAND researchers briefed DOD on the company’s findings. These included that while DLIFLC normally met its faculty hiring goals, in some languages, hiring standards had to be compromised. RAND was unable to report on instructor attrition for lack of data, but did not find immigration restrictions or policy affecting hiring. RAND also found that competition for instructors at peer institutions was not intense, although latent faculty dissatisfaction could drive some instructors away, if such competition increased. In conclusion, RAND found that DLIFLC was not experiencing problems with recruitment or retention of faculty despite a good deal of faculty dissatisfaction. DLIFLC found that the report identified problems about which the Institute itself was already aware.

Taking place one year after President Bush announced the NSLI, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a hearing on 25 January 2007 to review federal efforts to develop a foreign language strategy. Witnesses stated that the NSLI was achieving some success, but that further measures were required, mainly more funding and better programs to involve more students at all levels of education. Public Law 108-447 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005) authorized a special report by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences to carry out an independent review of Title IV international education and foreign language studies as well as the Fulbright-Hays programs. In March 2007, the Academy released its report “International Education and Foreign Language: Keys to Securing America’s Future.” Two of the report’s recommendations included the need for a SenateConfirmed presidential appointment within the Department of Education to oversee Title VI/Fulbright-Hays and other foreign language programs and a biennial report to Congress by the Department of Education listing national needs in foreign language education. The report also expressed the need for program for the United States to pursue a national capacity in both commonly and less commonly taught languages.

In May 2007, Rep Rush Holt (D-NJ) introduced the Foreign Languages Education Partnership Program Act of 2008, a bill intended to create foreign language study programs, funded through competitive grants, from elementary to university study, but the bill was not passed. In August 2007, however, President George W. Bush signed into law the America COMPETES Act (PL 110-69), which included among other provisions support to strengthen

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graduate studies in foreign languages with concurrent teaching credentials. Finally, the president also signed into law a bill that provided for student loan forgiveness to borrowers who had served or were serving in fields of national need, including foreign language specialists.46

Military Education

In June 2006, the Army issued a new training strategy. The Army Campaign Plan directed the Army to develop “an overarching training strategy to guide the training community as it develops training policies, programs, guidance, and makes investment decisions.” The new strategy spoke of the need to train to fight the current war, whose reality was counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, and multi-partnered. However, the strategy also planned to fight the next war, which might be considerably different. Thus, the Army needed “Pentathlete leaders” able to operate along a full spectrum of operations. Those operations might include non combat roles, negotiations, and governance. An important element of this strategy focused upon synchronization with the “ARFORGEN” process, a new troop unit rotation schedule designed to progress units systematically through increasing readiness phases, typically on three cycles.47

To promote leader development as part of this program, the Army explicitly stated the need to train soldiers to be competent in the use of non-lethal skills. Information operations, negotiations, cultural awareness, stability and reconstruction operations, as well as the need for foreign language training that could benefit them all. As are result, the Army encouraged cultural awareness and foreign language training and education throughout its schools, through self-development, and in training at Combat Training Centers. The Army Language Enterprise, composed of Army Staff and senior TRADOC leaders, was to emphasize this training in professional and initial entry training and was to develop baseline standards for leaders and deploying soldiers. The Army’s Training Strategy directed the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center to “continue to implement an extensive plan to raise the basic proficiency of all students” while the U.S. Military Academy was expected to expand and enhance its own foreign language program. Other professional Army training activities were also expected to make such training available to students through the Army’s “distributed learning system.”48 The implications of the Army Training Strategy were important for DLIFLC especially because the Army was beginning to view the lines between training domains and training environments blurring, which meant the need for better integration of the means that Army trainers delivered their product. Training might now take place formally in a programmed school-like setting, or it might be self-directed and take place online, or it might occur in the field wherever the soldier or leader or unit needed it. By 2006, DLIFLC had positioned itself well to address the Army Training Strategy’s training spectrum. The Institute offered formal basic foreign language training programs as well as educational outreach that included both virtual online support, Language Survival Kits (LSKs), Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), and deployed Language Training Detachments (LTDs).

48 Ibid., p. 7.
Overall, the caliber and direction of the military education system was increasingly on the minds of those concerned with the future capacity of America’s armed forces in an increasingly complex and integrated world. One noted authority, Ralph Peters, was especially critical of how the military trained commissioned officers. According to Peters, that system concentrated more energy “on teaching them about Washington than on exposing them to the world beyond our shores; thus they rise through the system better prepared to fight for additional funding on Capitol Hill than to fight our enemies abroad.” Peters had no patience to send officers to civilian schools for advanced degrees, holding that “nothing could be more irrelevant to today’s and tomorrow’s enemies than Western theories of statecraft.”

Taking such criticism rather literally, the U.S. Air Force in January 2005 issued instructions for all officer promotion boards stating that “advanced academic degrees will no longer be a factor in the promotion process.” The new policy was intended to inculcate a new more businesslike “just-in-time” approach to developing the Air Force officer corps, tying promotion to related job performance and technical skills.

If civilian education was on the outs for Air Force personnel, however, cross-cultural training was in. In fact, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General T. Michael Moseley, announced in February 2006 that language training would become part of professional military education for Air Force personnel. “For all of you out there who will go to the senior NCO academies or Air War College,” Moseley told a gathering of the Air Force Association, “you will have an opportunity to take one of four languages [Arabic, Chinese, French, or Spanish], it will not be an option—and you will enjoy it.” The goal was not to replicate the intense offerings of DLIFLC or to required advanced proficiency among senior Air Force leaders, but to increase the level of familiarity of those leaders with the cultures likely important to future operations. In August 2005, the Air Force established its own Foreign Language and Culture Program Office under the direction of Syed A. Karim. The Air Force expected to tinker with the program, but its goal was to develop several tracks to promote higher cross-cultural understanding within the Air Force. For example, the Air Force would seek to bring into the service as new cadets those who already possessed existing basic proficiencies in various foreign languages. It would then seek to enhance those skills over the course of a career. Another track was to teach staffers and commanders the basic skills needed to work effectively with coalition forces or locals.

The new Air Force approach to officer promotions and cultural awareness training had detractors. According to one Air Force officer, Col. Chris J. Krisinger, by de-emphasizing civilian educational experience in promotion, the Air Force was unintentionally undermining the Defense Department’s shifting, but broader policy emphasizing the need for better understanding of foreign cultures, including their histories, politics, languages, and religions. The Air Force’s own International Affairs Specialists (IAS) program counted on advanced academic training to

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49 Ralph Peters, “Learning to Lose,” *American Enterprise* (July/August 2007). While critical of advanced degrees, Peters thought language skill and cultural grasp key to how George C. Marshall, Joseph Stilwell, and Douglas MacArthur had achieved keen analysis of multi-dimensional conflict situations in WWII. He lamented “the widespread dismissal of the importance of language skills for officers in command positions [a]s simply astonishing given the nature of the conflicts we have faced in recent years and will likely face for decades to come.”


enable cross-cultural understanding, even acknowledging that it took years of personal study, formal training, as well as on the job experience to develop. According to Krisinger, by removing academic credentials from the purview of promotion boards, the Air Force was ignoring both the importance of advanced formal education, as well as many incentives, for officers to acquire the type of advanced cultural and regional understanding needed to apply air and space power in future conflicts. Air Force officer, Col. Stephen Schwalbe, authored a critique of Air Force’s International Affairs Specialist program. He cited DOD’s Strategic Planning Guidance for FY 2006-2011, which had directed the services in 2004 to develop comprehensive plans to achieve the full range of language capabilities needed to support 21st Century operations, and the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap designed in response to that directive. According to Schwalbe, the problem with Air Force review boards was that they did not rank demanding assignments by IAS officers to embassy staffs as the same as command experience for normal line officers. Although it took years of training and education to reach this level of performance, the result was that Air Force IAS majors were not competitive against line officers with Joint Staff, Air Staff, or combatant command headquarters, or those with operational experience. Thus, few IAS officers were promoted despite the stated aim of DOD to increase its future combat capabilities by leveraging the cultural expertise of Air Force officers. The Army had resolved a similar problem, according to Schwalbe, by creating a separate Foreign Area Officer branch with quotas for general officers, but the Air Force, with a different structure, could not adopt this approach. To solve the problem, Schwalbe, recommended that the Air Force provide command credit to IAS officers who serve on embassy staffs.

In addition to the type and caliber of education, after several years of increasing deployments and conflict, the Army was now finding it difficult to access and retain junior officers, according to a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Since 2001, the Army had doubled the number of officers it obtained from Officer Candidate Schools due to shortfalls from its academy and ROTC programs, but that strategy was reaching its limits. The Army was experiencing a shortfall in mid-level officers due to the post-Cold War draw down ten years prior and all the services were also finding it a challenge to access junior officers equipped with foreign language competency. To address the shortage and retention problems, GAO recommended that the Army develop a strategic plan. Regarding linguistic deficiencies, the services acknowledged the challenges of improving foreign language training amongst military officers. The challenges included time demands on officer candidates, the inability to control foreign language curricula at ROTC colleges, hurdles to providing foreign language training after commissioning, and serious problems in maintaining the acquired foreign language skills of officers. On the last count, for example, the Army often assigned many officers to positions after learning a language where their language skills were not used, causing them to atrophy. DOD was developing a response to this problem, however, through its Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (discussed further below). The department had already directed the services to attract more university students with foreign language skills and to require junior officers to complete added language training by 2013. GAO was uncertain how

52 Col Chris J. Krisinger, “The Vanishing Education (Record) of an Officer,” Air & Space Power Journal, Summer 2006.
effective DOD would be in implementing the reforms and achieving the goals set out in the roadmap, but because the initiative was only two years old, refrained from offering recommendations. In testimony before Congress in April 2007, Gail McGinn, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Plans and the department’s senior language authority, credited the military services with efforts to prepare members with the type of cultural expertise and awareness that would help ensure mission success. She was pleased they all had incorporated regional and cultural information within the Professional Military Education curricula and by creating Centers of Excellence to oversee standardized training.

In the meantime, TRADOC, to whom DLIFLC reported, issued general training guidance in July 2007. This guidance included the need to face overall manpower shortfalls by focusing education wherever possible upon cross-training, allowing soldiers to capitalize on their field experiences performing missions outside their own Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), and encouragement of DOD civilians and contractors where suitable, including by allowing them to fill available military course slots, where open, to promote professional development. The primary message emanating from this guidance was the need to shorten courses where possible while getting students into field units and service personnel with recent field experience into training units where their current knowledge would be of the greatest training benefit.

Regarding language and cultural awareness training, the services clearly had embraced the idea that these were valuable beyond the specialist level. Still, even though the Army was devising plans to include more cultural awareness materials in the Command Sergeant Major Academy and other senior leader courses, the reality, according to TRADOC Command Sergeant Major John Sparks, was that “we are in the developmental stage of what language specificity we want in the courses.” Sparks, who visited DLIFLC on 3 October 2007, thought it a bit optimistic to think that all enlisted soldiers would eventually receive language training.

Transforming Army Intelligence and Training

To grapple with manifold shortfalls in Military Intelligence (MI) operations made plain by combat since 9/11, the Army continued to transform its organization, training, and techniques in 2006 and 2007 to enable improved acquisition and use of “actionable” battlefield intelligence. The focus of this effort was increasing the capacity of Army intelligence sections at the battalion and brigade combat team levels, improving integrated access to intelligence information, increasing intelligence force readiness through training, and improving Army human intelligence gathering. A large part of this transformation was simply increasing the size of Army intelligence. To beef up the intelligence sections of tactical units, the Army planned to add some seven thousand new MI soldiers by 2013. This would also enable the creation of four Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center battalions to support theater and/or joint task force human

intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. This emphasis on increasing the capacity of Army HUMINT necessarily drove higher requirements and new collaboration between the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s HUMINT Management Office. At Fort Huachuca, the Army established a new “Joint HUMINT Training Center of Excellence.” All soldiers are potential providers of HUMINT. Thus, the Army implemented the “Every Soldier is a Sensor” program to help cultivate a sense of “tactical curiosity” in soldiers at all levels. In support, USAIC developed new cultural awareness training to help soldiers understand the complexities of foreign societies, religions, and regions.58

USAIC’s role in cultural training may have started as a result of a briefing to the chief of staff of the Army on 14 December 2005. Afterwards, the TRADOC commanding general directed the Combined Arms Center “to develop the situation with regard to establishing cultural understanding and language proficiency requirements for Army leaders.” As a result, CAC carried out an effort to advise the chief of staff of the Army on recommendations defining cultural understanding and language proficiency standards across all Army leadership categories (officer, warrant officer, NCO, and civilian). The intent was to detail how to prepare such leaders to perform successfully in expected operational environments and to plan to develop further implementation plans, if directed.59

Eventually, USAIC secured designation as the TRADOC Culture Center. USAIC then offered its cultural awareness training to all TRADOC schools and was potentially available across the Defense Department. The center’s mandate included cross-cultural training, education, research, and collaboration among military and civilian scholars with training provided onsite or virtually. By charter, the TRADOC Cultural Center focused upon developing cultural products related to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, developing training standards and proficient trainers, and building both a virtual presence and partnerships with other stakeholder institutions.60

In early February 2007, Lt. Gen. Petraeus, still commanding CAC, asked his boss, General Wallace, commanding TRADOC, to seek approval from Army Headquarters to designate TRADOC as the proponent for Cultural Awareness training within the Army. CAC assumed responsibility to shape the proposal and to develop an appropriate Concept Plan to identify the resources, staffing, synchronization, and integration needed to perform that mission within TRADOC organizations, especially capitalizing on the expertise available from USAIC and DLIFLC. Wallace agreed and requested that authority from the Army. His justification was that “the future success of our land forces is contingent upon our ability to effectively operate within diverse and multi-cultural environments” and that “a single empowered authority [was] warranted to determine a warfighter’s cultural awareness training needs and requirements.” On 18 April 2007, Lt. Gen. James J. Lovelace, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, designated TRADOC

as the proponent for Cultural Awareness (Army-wide) with authority to redesignate a specified subordinate organization as that proponent and to determine how best to meet the needed requirements for cultural awareness training.  

In lieu of its success in moving TRADOC forward as the Army Cultural Awareness Proponent, CAC distributed a draft white paper in April 2007 focused upon developing a language training strategy for non-language professionals. The effort was part of a larger Army tasking TRADOC to integrate “the contemporary operational environment” into Army training. Essentially, the Army wanted to take lessons learned from current operations, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, about the importance of cultural understanding and move those lessons quickly into the training regime of troops expected to deploy into those conflict zones as well as for long-term needs in developing and sustaining effective and culturally attuned expeditionary forces. The strategy was broad, far ranging, and intended to diffuse basic language and cultural understanding across all levels and phases of officer and enlisted training. It included a special role for DLIFLC at all these levels. DLIFLC’s reaction to the white paper was favorable, despite the fact that it failed to identify the new resources required to meet what would be substantial new requirements. DLIFLC also recommended that the Institute should be “explicitly identified as the Army’s Proponent for Language” by the white paper, but if the Army did not, then DLIFLC recommended that the Army establish a DLIFLC TPIO-Language Office (TRADOC Program Integration Office), to enable the Institute to build the required training support programs.  The Institute also argued against CAC or USAIC being designated as the proponent for Tactical Iraqi. This idea apparently made sense to some because DLIFLC lacked a “Combat Developments Division.” If made the proponent, DLIFLC stated that it would simply create the necessary division and use it to gain a stronger voice across DOD.

Unfortunately, the Army divided culture and language proponency. It designated USAIC as the center for cultural training and DLIFLC as the center for language training. DLIFLC Assistant Commandant Daniel Scott viewed that decision as a shortcoming in the sense that many Army leaders and staff officers did not understand how much the Institute had transformed and was able to perform both missions. “I understand why they would want to focus culture on professional military education,” he stated, “and think that Fort Huachuca is better suited to develop those kinds of products and have that better interface, because DLI hadn’t done that in the past. But I believe our associations now with Quantico, with the Air University and with Fort Leavenworth demonstrate that we are in fact very capable of doing so and we have already made the cultural paradigm shift at DLI to be able to do that.” He encouraged the Army to re-look its decision.

The Army debated who should champion language and culture training but there was no doubt it realized their importance for its mission. Indeed, in its new counterinsurgency manual, the Army referred to language and culture many times. And, although DLIFLC did not help to

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write that manual, it did collaborate with the National Virtual Translation Center to translate it quickly into Arabic and other languages for Lt. Gen. Petraeus (its lead author) and USAIC.

While DLIFLC lost out to USAIC on cultural training, Scott was quick to note that the Army’s decision to divide culture and language training made DLIFLC no less important than it had been. According to Scott, documents such as the language transformation roadmap and the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* made frequent reference to language and culture. Moreover, DLIFLC received funding to develop materials and programs for language and culture due to references in the *QDR*. Thus, said Scott, “the Army is right in line with the department. There’s obviously some disagreement in the details but the spirit is the same.”

Another TRADOC organization, CAC’s Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), also focused effort during this period to fix shortcomings in cultural knowledge and foreign language capabilities evident in Army forces fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. FMSO was attempting to develop a “human terrain system” or HTS specifically designed to address cultural awareness issues at Army operational and tactical levels. HTS sought to combine social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political data about the people in an area of Army operations to allow commanders to see more clearly the real issues affecting their mission. HTS was essentially a five-person social science research team available to conduct immediate research to support military decision-making of forward deployed brigade-size units. Unlike the hard technical intelligence needed for high intensity combat, counterinsurgency conflict required sophisticated use of the “hearts and minds” data that HTS was geared to provide. The team’s purpose was to conduct on-the-ground research while using global military communications and information networks to tap into external data and subject matter experts located anywhere within DOD or academia (a feature similar Vietnam-era programs lacked). The teams would also assist handovers of authority by transmitting institutional memory to relief units, helping to avoid the loss of cultural knowledge and relationships previously developed. The first HTS teams deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq in late 2006. If the FMSO concept proved successful, the Army planned to provide one HTS team to each deployed brigade or regimental combat team.

Lastly, an issue with Army counterintelligence arose during this period, possibly stemming from previous decision to outsource some Army intelligence functions. In February 2007, a U.S. citizen who had served as a contract interpreter for the U.S. Army in Iraq plead guilty to espionage after passing classified information to insurgents, possibly thus leading to the deaths of hundreds of Americans and Iraqis. L-3 Communications-Titan Group, a company that earned billions in contract services supplied to INSCOM, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, recruited the individual to work with the 82d Airborne Division. The case in the U.S. Eastern District Court in Brooklyn highlighted multiple problems with the company and its methods in providing translation and intelligence support services to the Army, including numerous past SEC investigations about bribery charges and the company’s role in the Abu

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64 Scott, Exit Interview, 4 March 2008, pp. 6-7. Certainly, the fact that DLIFLC’s budget had almost tripled during this period and was both hiring new instructors and deploying language training detachments was proof that DOD took the Institute’s language training mission seriously.

Ghraib prison scandal. The major problem, however, was the company’s lax standards in recruiting local personnel to work alongside U.S. service members in Iraq. As a result, the company provided opportunities for infiltration of U.S. intelligence, according to some critics.\textsuperscript{66} The case illustrated the inherent risk of using contract interpreters that was a major justification for the in-house training of military interpreters by DLIFLC.

At any rate, renewed Army emphasis on HUMINT and cultural awareness training drove continued emphasis and examination of the role played by DLIFLC in DOD. At the end of 2007, it appeared that DLIFLC would face still further opportunities and increased requirements as the primary supplier of trained military linguists and military language training, both essential in the process of collecting and interpreting HUMINT and increasing cultural awareness. To support such training, DLIFLC supplied foreign language instruction for troops preparing to deploy using mobile language training teams, video tele-training sessions, and expanded formal instruction tailored for wartime needs.\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{Defense Language Program and Transformation}

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center formed the major component of the Defense Language Program by providing foreign language training to the military services


\textsuperscript{67} Kimmons, “Transforming Army Intelligence,” pp. 69-72. Where DLIFLC lacked the capacity, Army Forces Command supplemented this training by hiring native contract instructors for troops at their home stations.
or other government agencies, either in residence at the Presidio of Monterey or through contractors coordinated through DLI-Washington. Another element of this program was the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas, which specialized in teaching English, mainly to military personnel from foreign forces allied with the United States. This command history, however, focuses upon the foreign language component of the program generally referred to as the Defense Foreign Language Program (DFLP). In addition to DLIFLC, the DFLP included the Command Language Programs of some 270 active and reserve units with large numbers of military linguists. DLIFLC supported these programs technically, but military units organized and funded these programs independently. DFLP also included the Foreign Area Officers Program that trained officer area specialists who often served as military attachés in U.S. embassies overseas. DFLP also included the Foreign Language Proficiency Pay program that paid qualified military linguists for maintaining their proficiency. Finally, DFLP included various contractors or DOD research projects seeking to develop technical aids to foreign language translation.68

Through 2007, the “primary functional sponsor” or proponent of DFLP was the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I (OSD/C3I), which oversaw DFLP actions, policies, and program quality; represented the program to Congress; served as the voice of DLIFLC within DOD; and chaired the DFLP Policy Committee and the Resource and Requirements Coordinating Panel (RRCP). Senior DOD DFLP members staffed the Policy Committee to provide policy guidance and priorities. The RRCP helped to match resources to requirements and served as a forum for the services program managers on DFLP issues. OSD/C3I did not directly oversee DLIFLC. Instead, the Army provided administrative control and mission funding through TRADOC. TRADOC’s main focus was serving the needs of the institutional Army, but DOD Directive 5160.41 provided that the DLIFLC commandant was to exercise technical control over the DFLP.69 To provide broader input into DFLP management, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S. Chu, created a Defense Language Steering Committee (DLSC) chaired by Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Plans Gail McGinn as the head and senior language authority for DOD. Each of the services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, etc., appointed a representative to sit on this board, which established the broad policy.70 McGinn created a Defense Language Office (DLO) to manage DOD language policy, and tasked DLIFLC to implement it. Nancy Weaver became DLO’s first director.71

During this period, DOD considered major programmatic changes in the DFLP and the way DLIFLC was governed. As the Quadrennial Review reported in February 2006, the Department “must overcome a legacy of relatively limited emphasis on language and continue to expand efforts to place linguistically capable individuals at all levels of the military—from the

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69 As discussed in Chapter 1, DLIFLC Command History, 2004-2005.
70 Col Tucker Mansager, Exit Interview, 19 September 2007, p. 3.
tactical to the operational commander.”\textsuperscript{72} The plan to address this noted deficiency was known as “language transformation.”

Begun in 2004, DOD’s language transformation team was under the direction of Gail McGinn, who set out to develop solutions for DOD’s language skills shortfalls and to build upon recommendations found in an earlier report by Dr. Jerome “Jerry” F. Smith, Jr. (see \textit{DLIFLC 2004-2005 CH}) and further research.\textsuperscript{73} This team developed the \textit{Defense Language Transformation Roadmap} (DLTR), which was signed on 14 February 2005 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The DLTR sought to strengthen the overall Defense Language Program by designating specific steps for DOD to take to develop and sustain essential foreign and English language skills needed by the force. In June 2006, as part of that effort, Undersecretary of Defense Chu asked McGinn to form a “Defense Language Program Integrated Concept Team” (ICT) to review the current organizational structures of DLFLC, DLIELC, and their training detachments. The goal was to reconsider the mission, roles, responsibilities, functions, relationships, and resources of the program and recommendations on how to improve the Defense Language Program.\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{2005_Defense_Language_Program.pdf}
\caption{Senior proponents of Defense Language Program, 2005-2007.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{72} DOD, \textit{Quadrennial Review}, 6 February 2006, p. 15.
As a result, a core group of senior staff and experts from DLO, DOD agencies, hired contractors, DLIFLC staff, and others met repeatedly to debate various issues relating to the organizational structure of the Defense Language Program, beginning on 23 August 2006.

After an extensive review of previous reports,\textsuperscript{75} the ICT created a draft “Framework for Analysis” that identified eight organizational options, ranging from maintenance of the status quo, to creating a new agency to manage the program, placing it under an existing institution like the National Defense University, or fully outsourcing the program to a non-U.S. Government contractor. Perhaps the easiest or most viable option, given likely funding restraints and organizational preferences, was known as Option 1b, which focused upon revising the authorities of the existing executive agents, the Air Force for DLIELC and the Army for DLIFLC. This approach responded to identified program shortcomings, allowed for modest organizational changes, but prevented the ICT from drifting too far from its charge to review the governance and authority of DOD’s language training.\textsuperscript{76} Option 1b was the preferred option chosen by DLIFLC. Under this option, the Army retained responsibility for DLIFLC, but revised and clarified certain functions, roles, responsibilities, and relationships. A foremost concern for DLIFLC at the time was that the relationship between the mission and budget for language training reflect the true cost including the necessary infrastructure. According to DLIFLC, “ideally, resources for both mission and BASOPS [base operations] functions should be ‘fenced’ to ensure adequate funding to meet all mission requirements.” To avoid coordination problems, given the joint organization of the Institute, DLIFLC wanted to see a single office in charge of all issues related to DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey. The growing level of responsibility of DLIFLC also warranted a review of its command structure and a “complete rewrite” of AR 350-20. The complexity of DLIFLC was sufficient to warrant a commandant with flag officer rank, a status comparable to similar military schools.\textsuperscript{77} Aside from these problem areas, according to the Assistant Commandant, Col. Daniel Scott, DLIFLC’s imperatives during any organizational restructuring needed to account for military command and control over the largely “initial entry trainee” student population and the protection of DLIFLC’s academic accreditation as an institution granting Associate of Arts degrees. Scott also said such restructuring should extend the existing training requirements process to new military communities to allow DLIFLC to continue to capture effectively the final learning objectives needed by instructors for adapting courses to meet the changing needs of customers.\textsuperscript{78}

In November 2006, the ICT recommended clearer roles for both the Defense Language Steering Committee and DLO as well as a more defined role for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The ICT saw the need for more clarity on the role of the Executive Agents’ responsibilities with regard to the governance, management, and oversight of the Defense Language Centers and DLIFLC’s Language Training Detachments. In


considering Option 1b, the ICT queried whether the Executive Agents should “remain in charge of the Defense Language Centers or the Defense Language Programs”? While agreeing that Option 1b would address many existing concerns about management of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Program, the ICT felt that the recommended changes under this option were not truly transformational, unlike Option 4, which sought to establish a new agency to govern DOD language training despite the option’s likely much higher costs.

As a practical matter, McGinn focused attention in December 2006 on developing a “game plan” for the “Stronghold and Emerging Languages,” building organic expertise, a surge capability, and identifying a cadre of highly proficient linguists in the force for which there was an especial requirement to make available tests for all languages on the Strategic Language

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79 After DLIFLC was placed under TRADOC in 1973, the relationship between the Institute, the Army, and DOD, became confused. For example, the Army proponent for the Army’s Language Program has claimed responsibility for DLIFLC although the DLIFLC commandant is directed by DOD Directive 5160.41 to have technical oversight of all foreign language education in DOD as the “Foreign Language Proponent,” creating ambiguity in authorities. Ultimately, the goal of the ICT was to reduce such problematic arrangements. See “Background on the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center” in “DLP Organizational Structure Study” ff, RG 21.24.

DLO began to receive requirements from the Combatant Commands, which it provided to the DLSC, for foreign language needs. Speaking was the “modality” most desired with demand growing for ILR Level 1. Unfortunately, as of September 2006, the Marine Corps was the only service that provided Foreign Language Proficiency Pay at this low level. On the other hand, military promotion board guidance established foreign language capability as a factor in promotion while the Irregular Warfare Roadmap working group had established pre-deployment training standards for incorporation into the Defense Readiness Reporting System, further helping to institutionalize notions about the salience of foreign language expertise within the profession of arms.

In response to the Transformation Roadmap, the Army Foreign Language Proponency Office, in the office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, commissioned a contractor to determine the Army’s actual requirement to establish a cadre of professional linguists at the ILR scale of L3/R3/S3. Battelle Memorial Institute found that DOD was “handicapped by a lack of language and cultural understanding” resulting from its lack of a comprehensive strategy to integrate the appropriate training, the absence of cultural insight among planners, and the lack of a common and systematically applied process to determine the necessary requirements for linguists and at what level. Specifically, the study, reported in early 2007, found that the Army had a requirement for 6,115 linguists in 13 military occupational specialties at the L3/R3/S3 level while it only issued authorizations for 77 L3/R3/S3 linguists and most of them were for teaching at Army schools. The study found that human intelligence required the highest percentage of L3/R3/S3 linguists, that 50 percent of tactical SIGINT positions required the same level, and that while NSA determined that it needed 88 percent of its linguist positions staff with L3/R3/S3 linguists, only half of Cryptologic Linguist (98G) billets were coded at the level. To close the gap indicated by the study in the number of linguists needed by the Army at the L3/R3/S3 level and the number available, the Army would have to dedicate 63 weeks training time for each Category IV language per soldier and some $284 to $364 million in training dollars. The report found that the Army did not have the force structure to support that training requirement, which is why it hired 11,000 contract linguists to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with the resultant and well-known problems. Meanwhile, the study noted, 30 percent of the tasks conducted by these L3/R3/S3 contract linguists could be done as well by simply training enough soldiers to the 0+ level. Among its suggestions, Battelle recommended that the Army increase its L3/R3/S3 linguist billets from 77 to 1,115, reduce its contractor positions supporting low level language needs, and deploy a fifteen-week language enabling course to train 30 percent of its deploying soldiers to the 0+ level.

In February 2007, DOD issued its Fiscal Year 2007 Emergency Supplemental Budget Request to help fund ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cueing to President Bush’s National Security Language Initiative, the request sought extra funds for foreign language needs to support four DOD goals for language transformation. These goals were:

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81 Protocol Office Agenda for Gail McGinn visit, 4-6 December 2006, with historian’s notes in “DFLP” ff, RG 21.24.
(1) Create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks,
(2) Create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house abilities,
(3) Establish a cadre of language specialists possessing a level L3/R3/S3 ability in reading/listening/speaking, and
(4) Establish a process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers.

Specially, DOD sought funds to sustain two contractors in the DLO. These would manage a central program to screen and test military recruits using computerized technology. It wanted funds to support continued development of the new DLPT5 so that DLFILC could field a web-based version—the first DOD language test delivered over the Internet. It sought funds to support curriculum development for the so-called “Stronghold Languages” on the Strategic Language List so that DLIFLC could pre-prepare materials for use by Special Operations and General Purpose Forces on short notice. Finally, DOD requested money to help to help expand the number of qualified Oral Proficiency Interview testers in languages critical to DOD’s operational commitments, which would also help relieve the strain on DLIFLC because most of DOD’s certified OPI interviewers were Institute faculty.84

Following much discussion and review by the ICT, DLO hired a contractor, SYColeman, to evaluate the organizational structures of both DLIFLC and DLIELC. In October 2007, SYColeman visited DLIFLC to interview key leaders.85 In an out-brief that it gave on 9 November 2007, SYColeman made a number of preliminary observations. A few of these included that, indeed, a number of inefficiencies existed in the current DLIFLC management structure affecting the Institute’s and DOD’s language transformation process. SYColeman basically agreed with earlier assessments that the rank structure of DLIFLC needed elevation, especially that the commandant should be a flag officer. SYColeman also found that the Army as Executive Agent had also not proven effective in furthering language transformation as envisioned by DLO and Undersecretary Chu. A particular sore spot was the poor logistical support emanating from the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, administered by an entirely separate Army chain of command than that of DLIFLC and which had proven unresponsive to the Institute’s rapid growth. However, SYColeman also found that no significant advantage or cost savings would result by changing DLIFLC’s Executive Agency, by casting the Institute off as an independent DOD agency, by realigning it as a university or military lab style organization, or by moving it from Monterey.86

During this period, the Defense Language Steering Committee met on several occasions. In September 2006, the committee emphasized, on the basis of the reported requirements of the

Combatant Commands, that the speaking modality was the most important, especially at the ILR level 1 category, which also emphasized the need for better speaking tests. Unfortunately, not all agencies or services were reporting their requirements. DLPT implementation and various technical issues were preventing effective adoption of the new test, especially via the web. DLSC members agreed that the Test of Record date for the DLPT5 would be the date the test was deployed, beginning in January 2007, while 1 January would remain the Test of Record date for those tests issued in FY 2006. Service secretaries, however, had the option to certify individuals proficient temporarily on the basis of their last DLPT score for up to one year after the DLPT5 was issued as the Test of Record for a given language. At DLIFLC, however, DLSC decided that the Test of Record date for all students beginning their study after 1 October 2006 would be when the commandant certified that the new test for any given language was synchronized with the curriculum for that language.87 Other issues of concern to DLSC in 2007 included service preparations for force-wide transition to the DLPT5 as the test of record, the success of DOD’s Flagship language program in St. Petersburg in promoting level 3 proficiency results, tracking retirees with language skills for possible recall, and methods to enhance language study by future officers. In late 2007, Gail McGinn scheduled a requirements conference during which the Combatant Commands would help chart a way ahead for identifying and prioritizing DOD language and regional proficiency requirements. Finally, on 13 September 2007, the DLSC determined that DLIFLC had met its full operational capability to establish “crash” or “survival” courses for deploying forces.88

While McGinn was working these issues, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England was carefully polling the service secretaries and other senior DOD officials to develop a list of the twenty-five most important “DOD Transformation Priorities.” Number thirteen on the list was to “Strengthen cultural awareness and language capabilities.”89

Foreign Area Officers Program Reform

In April 2005, in line with the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz directed the military departments to revise their programs for training officers as regional experts, known generally and by the Army as the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program. He re-assigned program management to Undersecretary Chu to work with the services to beef up these programs.90 In July 2005, the Department revised its FAO directive and created a special pan-DOD working group to advise the DLSC on achieving greater clarity, standards, and specific procedures for increasing regional expertise within DOD.91

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The FAO Program emphasized that foreign language proficiency and detailed knowledge of the regions of the world gained through in-depth study and personal experience was key to defeat terrorism and to maintain essential military-diplomatic relations with foreign governments. The staffs of the Combatant Commands, DOD agencies, and military-diplomatic offices within U.S. embassies needed commissioned FAOs with appropriate regional expertise and linguistic skill. At the same time, as Gail McGinn testified before Congress in April 2007, all 1,600 Service FAOs had to qualify first in a principal military specialty.92

In addition to the FAO Program, however, in 2006 the Army formally established a unique new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)—the 09L Translator Aide—as a permanent military occupational specialty after the success of a pilot program begun in 2003. The program essentially sought to recruit and train individuals already possessing significant language abilities stemming from a heritage background in an Arabic, Dari, or Pashto community. The new MOS provided a career path for these professional linguists from recruit to sergeant major and was highly popular with commanders, prompting the Army to expand the program. DOD provided $50 million to support the program between FY 2007 and FY 2011.93

Advances in Translation Technology

Since at least March 2003, Glenn Nordin, Assistant Director for Language for DOD, had promoted corporate interest in supporting the federal language community, especially given the U.S. Government’s continuing keen interest in finding and implementing technologies that increased the productivity of human translators. Despite Nordin’s enthusiasm and willingness to provide practical information to companies interested in doing such business, the actual results continued to be mixed.94

As reported in 2006, however, statisticians working with linguists made advances in the long-sought goal to develop a type of “Universal Language Translator,” although implementation remained mostly a goal. These advances relied upon a new technique rather than adherence to the standard approach that relied upon linguists who tediously coded the rules of language into applicable software packages. The new approach relied instead upon statistical methods and required no linguistic knowledge or expert understanding to operate. Although the approach was not fully developed, it offered the long-term prospect that research might one day be able to create a universal language translator device as depicted in numerous science fiction novels and films. Language translation using statistical methods relied upon large databases of comparable texts in two languages where it was possible to sort, group, and associate words based upon their patterns and frequencies of distribution. This technique obviated the difficult-to-solve problem in rule-based translation approaches of translating metaphors, bad grammar, and idiom. New players in this field might include the search-engine Google, because of its huge existing database of language translation texts. The approach was promising enough that the

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93Ibid., pp. 13-14.
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was pursuing it to develop a hand-held device combining speech-recognition, machine translation and voice-synthesis software. For example, Carnegie Mellon University developed a project called “Babylon.” It was reportedly able to perform two-way translation between spoken English and Iraqi Arabic. The technology was an advance beyond existing devices already in the field that allowed U.S. soldiers in Iraq to speak set phrases into a device that translated them into Arabic allowing Iraqis to respond by nodding or shaking their heads. Babylon allowed soldiers to speak novel phrases. Unfortunately, more advanced machines required the processing power and associated equipment of small supercomputers. Moreover, to date, hand-held devices were limited to specific topics of conversation, but researchers hoped to allow portable devices “to be trained in the field.” A big problem with the statistical approach was that it did not work well for languages with limited bodies of high-quality “parallel texts,” often the obscure languages of national security interest. If researchers could overcome this problem, however, it might theoretically be possible to translate hereto date untranslatable languages whether ancient or even alien. Researchers had tried the technique on “Klingon,” for example, while others were conducting serious research to understand “Dolphin.”

As reported to Congress in April 2007, to support the acquisition of advanced language technology within DOD, Gail McGinn, as Senior Language Authority, coordinated with the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics “to establish a coherent, prioritized, and coordinated DOD multi-language technology research, development, and acquisition policy and program.” The purpose of the effort, however, was not to replace the need for service members to possess adequate language capabilities, but to bridge the gaps when that capability is lacking. DOD policy now required military units deploying, or in transit through foreign territories to be equipped with an appropriate capability to communicate in the languages of the area whenever possible, a posture that new technology could aid.

One item associated with this effort was project Sequoyah, which began in 2001 when the U.S. Pacific Command issued a statement of need to TRADOC identifying language translation problems. The Army took the lead with TRADOC, the Joint Forces Command, and DLIFLC partnering to develop requirements for a translation technology that could meet the needs of the services. Following McGinn’s policy announcement, in April 2005, military commanders in Iraq issued an urgent need for language translation capabilities while U.S. Army Center for Military Intelligence concluded that significant shortfalls in the number of available linguists continued. Sequoyah was a large-scale multi-year Army program intended to address this shortfall by developing machine translation technologies in languages of DOD interest both to enhance linguist capabilities and to supply some form of translation capability in the absence of any translator. The role of DLIFLC was important if limited to helping evaluate the technology and define its data requirements.

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97 Michael W. Emonts, email entitled “Historical Input: Sequoyah,” 1 August 2006, in ff 1, RG 52.01-02.
Slowly, technology did make advances. In September 2007, Chief of Staff of TRADOC General William Wallace S. used for the DLIFLC Iraqi Headstart program and machine language translation devices. Wallace expressed amazement at the advances made since he had been a student in two DLIFLC preparatory courses for Vietnamese. “We had nothing like I saw today being used, such as iPods or laptops. The ability to see your voice patterns and compare it to that of a native speaker’s is all important for learning,” he told participants in a demonstration. Nevertheless, Wallace also remarked that although technology was useful, it would not benefit the Army by “Just giving everybody [students] an iPod and locking them in a room for six months.” According to Wallace, it was the “human interaction that the faculty [of DLIFLC] give them and more importantly [expose them to] the cultural aspect.” While the Army had fielded a number of simple hand-held translation devices since 9/11 with an ability to translate simple programmed phrases, these have steadfastly remain incapable of translating random, especially non-military, phrases. “Machines,” Wallace stated, “may be able to say the words but they don’t say the words in context.” Or, he added, offer a smile or the firm handshake of a service member.98

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Language Proficiency Pay and the DLPT5

In August, the Army raised the amount it paid soldiers who scored well on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). The new limits became $1,000 per month for active-duty soldiers and $500 per month for National Guard and Army Reserve troops. Previously, the maximum per month for soldiers who qualified by scoring 3s in two of three categories of the DLPT was $400 for the toughest languages, such as Arabic, Chinese, Korean, or Persian-Farsi. However, to achieve the top pay rate of $1,000 per month for Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) soldiers had to qualify by rating well in two foreign languages on DOD’s list of eligible languages. The most important change was that the new pay levels applied to non-linguist soldiers as well as linguists, excluding those soldiers who spoke a language “dominant” in the force, mainly Russian and Spanish, unless the soldier occupied a language dependent position. The revised FLPP program focused upon 52 languages, but included some 345 others ranked into three lists according to the priority placed upon them by DOD. The changes became effective on 1 June 2006 as authorized by the FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act.99

The program also offered a $6,000 per year bonus for National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers. Enhancing the foreign language capability of the force was a key goal of the Defense Language Transformation initiative.100 Certainly, added emphasis on the importance of a linguistically skilled force had steadily helped to raise the amount of pay a linguist could receive from a mere $100 per month, the rate paid twenty years before.101

On 27 November 2006, Undersecretary of Defense Chu, directed that the Defense Language Proficiency Test 5 (DLPT5) be used solely as the official test to establish the standards required for service members to qualify for FLPP, effective on 1 January 2007. His directive, therefore, made earlier versions of the DLPT obsolete on 31 December 2006 for several languages with existing DLPT5s in service.102 However, on 1 December 2006, Gail McGinn, as DOD’s Senior Language Authority, signed a follow-up directive establishing a transition period, due to concerns about the difficulty of the newer DLPTs. The transition period all authorized service members and civilians to use their last valid DLPT score for qualification if that score were higher than their newer score on the DLPT5 for a 1-year period following implementation of the DLPT5. Her memorandum emphasized that “every effort must be taken to ensure that language training is updated to meet the rigors of the DLPT5…so members and students are better prepared for the more accurate and comprehensive DLPT5.”103

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Concurrent with the fielding of the DLPT5, McGinn asked the Director of Training, Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7 Army Staff, to provide a plan and timeline to certify that each of DLIFLC’s language programs had implemented the necessary instructional improvements to prepare students to meet the requirements of DLPT administration as soon as possible. Implementation of the new DLPT5 had raised several problems in the field, including lower linguists test results than on previous tests, DLIFLC students were not meeting their graduation requirements, while too few military test sites were ready for web-delivered DLPT5s while technical difficulties beset others.

Bureau of International Language Coordination

The Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC) is a NATO organization that sponsors discussions among member states regarding foreign language issues of common concern. DLIFLC has traditionally been a strong supporter and participant in this organization, which holds an annual meeting at rotating venues within member states. During the 2006-2007 timeframe the United States remained responsible for the BILC Secretariat while the two annual meetings were held in Budapest, Hungary, and San Antonio, Texas, respectively. Dr. Ray T. Clifford, who retired as chancellor of DLIFLC in 2005, remained the BILC chairman in both 2006 and 2007.

In 2006, one of the major issues discussed by BILC was how to organize and ensure continuity of command and control at the secretariat level. Clifford had raised this issue in 2005, concerned because his term expired in 2007. The BILC Secretariat lacked a permanent staff element to perform many important tasks. Members therefore accepted a draft proposal to create a “Language Office focal point office.” In 2006 and 2007, BILC members discussed which nations would be able to assume the secretariat, according to the current BILC constitution and rules, once the United States ceded responsibility at the end of its term in 2007. Canada reported that it was available to assume the secretariat in 2008 with specific times and duties to be discussed. BILC passed this motion by a unanimous vote in favor in 2006 and reaffirmed that vote in 2007 after which Canada began to shadow the BILC Secretariat. Also in 2006, BILC approved new “plus level” descriptions of language levels for use by nations at their own discretion. In 2007, BILC members voted to revise STANAG 6001, the NATO Standardization Agreement that establishes and allow comparison of language proficiency levels between various languages. A major reason to revise the document was to reflect the new plus level descriptors developed by BILC.

Another concern to new BILC members during this period were certain language proficiency requirements for deployable forces. On BILC’s behalf, the Director, International Military Staff, wrote to HQ Allied Command Transformation recommending lower language proficiency requirements for deployable forces. That organization decided, however, to maintain

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the current language skill requirements, but did agree to tailor implementation timelines to be consistent with the target dates set for particular nations’ deployable forces.

One of the final issues in 2006 and 2007 was that the United States volunteered to evaluate and help upgrade the BILC website, a task undertaken by Col. Stephen M. Jones, a U.S. Air Force officer commanding DLIELC.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{106} All information from BILC, “Minutes of the Steering Committee Meetings,” 29 May—1 June 2006 and 21—24 May 2007, in DLFILC Digital archives.
Chapter II

Managing the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center

Managing the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center remained a complex activity during the tenure of Army Col. Tucker B. Mansager. Even the Institute’s chain of command was complex. Although DLIFC was a joint-service school of the Department of Defense, the Army administered the Institute as DOD’s executive agent through its Training and Doctrine Command. The DLIFLC commandant thus reported to the TRADOC commanding general, although indirectly through the Combined Arms Center located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. At the same time, the Defense Language Office was deeply involved on a programmatic level in managing DLIFLC under the authority of Dr. David Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. As previously detailed, in the period preceding this command history, Chu and DLO had devised the Language Transformation Roadmap to upgrade DLIFLC training and graduation proficiency results by pouring resources into Institute programs. This chapter focuses upon the major activities required by the DLFILC command to manage the Institute’s mission.

Command Leadership

On 17 August 2005, Col. Tucker B. Mansager became the twenty-fourth commandant of DLIFLC, succeeding Col. Michael R. Simone, during a change of command ceremony held on Soldier Field at the Presidio of Monterey. An Infantry officer and U.S. Military Academy graduate, Mansager held a master’s degree in Russian and East European Studies from Stanford University. As an officer, Mansager had studied both Russian and Polish at DLIFLC, had pulled a tour at the Polish Command and Staff College as part of the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers, and later served as the Assistant Army Attaché in the Defense Attaché Office in Warsaw, Poland. Among other assignments, he came to DLIFLC following service in Afghanistan, where he had a chance to see how useful language training was there, and after completing a year as the Army’s National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution. The presiding officer for the Masanger’s assumption of command ceremony was Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, Combined Arms Center, the same V Corps Commander who had recently led the Army’s drive into Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Wallace, incidentally, later made a return visit to DLIFLC in March 2007 as TRADOC commanding general where he emphasized to students how “people around the world, regardless of culture, appreciate that you can speak their language” and asserted that “DLI is the best language institute in the country, perhaps the world.”

Gail McGinn, in charge of the Defense Language Office as deputy undersecretary of defense for plans, chose Mansager after rejecting a slate of more senior colonels provided to her from Wallace’s office. She rejected them, Mansager thought, precisely because he was a junior...

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colonel and might bring a bit more verve to the job than someone facing near-term retirement. When Wallace offered him the job, Mansager jumped at the chance. He would serve as commandant until 25 September 2007.\textsuperscript{108}

The assistant commandant of DLIFLC during this period was Col. Daniel L. Scott, a U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officer as well as a Foreign Area Officer for Russian and Latin America. Scott graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy, obtained his master’s degree in Russian East European Studies from George Washington University, and attended the University of Miami as a National Defense Fellow. Before assuming his responsibilities at DLIFLC, Scott first served as deputy director of intelligence at U.S. Central Command where he directed targeting during Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.\textsuperscript{109} Scott arrived at DLIFLC in June 2004 and remained until his retirement in early 2008. Scott came to DLIFLC with the mission to help the Air Force address its shortage of cryptologic linguists and to streamline the administration of Air Force elements at DLIFLC.\textsuperscript{110} He had a major influence on daily operational matters, such as dealing with faculty, while Colonel Mansager focused more on providing an overarching vision and DLIFLC external relations.

The Installation Command Sergeant Major during this period was Nickolas Rozumny, who enlisted in the Army in 1979 as a 96C Interrogator. Rozumny graduated from DLIFLC as a German linguist and later re-enlisted to become a Russian linguist as well. He also studied

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[110] Col Daniel L. Scott, Exit Interview, 29 February 2008, p. 2.
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Serbian/Croatian at DLIFLC. Prior to his return to Monterey in 2005, Rozumny served as the command sergeant major for the 101st MI Battalion, 1st Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom II. He assumed his position on 30 March 2006 with the retirement of Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Michael P. Shaughnessy after thirty years in the Army. Shaughnessy, a veteran of several combat tours, began his military career after graduating from DLIFLC’s Arabic program.111

Dr. Donald C. Fischer, Jr., a retired Army officer and former DLIFLC commandant, was selected to serve as Provost, or chief DLIFLC academic officer, in 2005, replacing Dr. Ray T. Clifford. Dr. Fischer completed his doctoral thesis at the University of New Mexico in 2004 in the field of Organizational Learning and Instructional Technologies with an emphasis in distance learning. He remained Provost throughout this period.

Lt. Col. Deborah L. Hanagan became the Chief of Staff, DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey, effective 9 January 2006. She succeeded Lt. Col. Richard E. Coon, who retired and thereafter became the first DLIFLC Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Logistics.112 Hanagan, a U.S. Army Military Intelligence officer, was the first woman to serve at DLIFLC in this position. She never intended to serve as a career officer, but after graduating from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, she found so many opportunities she never left. Hanagan studied French at DLIFLC and held the equivalent of a Masters of Arts degree in French Military History. Later, Hanagan served at DLIFLC as a company commander, where she picked up another Master in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies before becoming a Foreign Area Officer.113

Hanagan remained at DLIFLC until July 2007, when Marine Corps Lt. Col. John F. May became the new chief of staff, serving briefly until his retirement on 11 October 2007. May first arrived in Monterey in August 2005 to serve as Associate Vice Chancellor, Directorate of Continuing Education. He previously served a the lead for the Marine Corps international education and exchange program where he coordinated the manning of sixty overseas training sites and monitored the officers participating in them. He also served as Marine Corps lead for the development of the Defense Transformation Roadmap. At DLIFLC, May helped oversee a range of foreign language training requirements.114 May was succeeded in turn by Lt. Col. Steven Sabia and then by Lt. Col. Richard Skow.

State of DLIFLC

During this period, DLIFLC’s core mission remained unchanged. It was to provide foreign language education, training, evaluation, and sustainment for DOD personnel to ensure success of the Defense Foreign Language Program. DLIFLC continued to seek recognition as


the “acknowledged leader in all aspects of defense foreign language education” in all these areas. Between 2001 and late 2006, the Institute’s student load had grown by over 50 percent. In 2007, the Institute provided foreign language training to 3,551 students from all four military services in its basic resident program. DLIFLC taught twenty-four languages in Monterey by employing civilian 1,724 instructors, most of whom were educated native-born speakers of the languages they taught. Faculty numbers had also grown rapidly since new funding to increase proficiency by reducing the student to teacher ratio. During this period, the eight languages that constituted the core of the DLIFLC Basic Course program were Arabic, Korean, Chinese, Persian-Farsi, Spanish, French, Russian, and Serbian/Croatian. DLIFLC also continued to maintain a Student Learning Center to provide pre-course training and study skills.¹¹⁵

To support and sustain language capabilities beyond DLIFLC, the Institute provided distance learning and extension-like courses. In 2007, 1,258 students received language training in sixteen languages through video tele-training or by mobile teaching teams who conducted training at some twenty external sites. DLIFLC maintained its Global Language Online Support System (GLOSS) and delivered language instruction in twelve languages using this method. Its Field Support and Special Programs division also aided over 260 Command Language Programs (CLPs) in 2006-2007. Hundreds of additional students even received instruction at their own posts worldwide through DLIFLC’s Language Teaching Detachments. Finally, DLIFLC taught

several iterations of its 09L Heritage Speaker Translator/Interpreter Course at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, which graduated 115 native-speaker or heritage-language students in 2007. The biggest change in DLIFLC’s training regime during this period was its external focus to support the military’s general-purpose forces preparing for deployment. While neither the Army nor DOD issued a specific mandate directing the Institute in that direction, Mansager felt he had sufficient support from Generals Caldwell, Wallace, and Petraeus, if not the Army’s G-3 training staff, to field short familiarization packages for Iraqi Arabic, Dari, and Pashto. Thousands of students thus passed through DLIFLC’s two-week Familiarization course prior to deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan during this period. Meanwhile, the vast majority of language students who graduated from the Institute’s resident programs met minimal proficiency standards (78 percent in 2007), received required follow-on training at other military schools, and then deployed for their assignments. About 70 percent went into the field of signals intelligence while 21 percent went into the field of human intelligence. The remaining graduates went to work in various special DOD programs or for other federal agencies.

In addition, DLIFLC had begun an ambitious effort to improve the proficiency of its graduating students with a long-term goal to raise basic course graduates to the ILR levels of L2+/R2+/S2. This program, known as the Proficiency Enhancement Program or PEP, sought to raise standards by reducing the student to teacher ratio, increasing isolation-immersion events, and updating basic course materials. PEP is further discussed in detail below. Colonels Mansager and Scott also continued efforts to reduce student attrition, which they successfully moved downward by 8-10 percent (combining both academic and administrative causes).

Another area of particular concern to many during this period was the development of a new Defense Language Proficiency Test—the DLPT5. Challenges the test posed were not only the ability of DLIFLC to meet production schedules, but the ability to educate test-takers and stakeholders in the field about the basic differences between the DLPT5 and past tests while preparing students for computerized testing by helping them to develop new skills. Push-back from the field over the new test forced DLIFLC to adapt its approach as discussed below.

During an August 2006 command and staff update, a discussion took place when the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion commander noted that the ESQs (student questionnaires) indicated complaints about military training versus language training. Mansager did appear to de-emphasize Simone’s approach to this issue during his tenure as commandant, which was possibly also a factor influencing attrition. Certainly, under Mansager, DLIFLC maintained its academic accreditation. During 2006, it graduated 505 students who not only qualified as linguists but also received the coveted Associate of Arts in Foreign Languages degree. Another 611 DLIFLC graduates earned the same degree the following year so that by 31 December 2007 2,794 DLIFLC graduates had earned their associate degree from the Institute.

116 Ibid.
117 Col Tucker B. Mansager, Exit Interview, 19 September 2007, p. 6.
118 Ibid.
120 Dr Robert Savukinas (DLIFLC Registra), email to Cameron Binkley, 19 December 2012.
In assessing DLIFLC’s overall health in early 2008, Colonel Scott felt that he was leaving the Institute better off than when he first arrived as assistant commandant. Nevertheless, Scott noted the importance of continuing efforts to implement PEP and to mentor the 900-plus teachers hired within the past five years so that these developed into better teachers who could then generate better performing students. According to Scott, that was the biggest challenge. DILFLC products, such as GLOSS, were healthy with the exception of DLPT development about which Scott remained concerned. Finally, Scott thought that DLIFLC relied too much upon a group of deans and senior staff who had been in their positions for many years doing good work, but without necessarily developing able deputies to succeed them. Too many middle managers and subject experts were “stovepiped into just one concept or product line,” said Scott. “We need to groom them, given them opportunities and move them around...we have a good team,” he concluded after more than four years at DLIFLC, “but it needs to be strengthened.”

Managing DLIFLC

Colonel Mansager assumed responsibility for DLIFLC in August 2005, the same year that long-time Provost/Chancellor Dr. Ray T. Clifford resigned. Clifford had exerted enormous influence upon the management of DLIFLC because of his long tenure as chief academic officer, his high standing in the academic world, and his frequent trips to represent DLIFLC in Washington, DC. According to Mansager, it was “a pretty earth-shattering thing” for the

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121 Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2008, pp. 7-8.
Institute to see both the provost and the commandant move on in the same year. Fortunately, Colonel Scott was able to assist Mansager greatly due to his understanding and ability to take the lead on some substantive issues until Mansager was fully up to speed. It was Scott, for example, who successfully briefed the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to sell DLIFLC’s need for funding provided by Presidential Budget Decision (PBD) 753 in November 2005.

To help address DLIFLC’s need for change and the overarching impact of PBD 753, Mansager outlined for his staff how he planned to operate and what he saw as the key priorities. Laying the groundwork and initiating development of a new version of the DLPT was his first concern. However, Mansager believed that DLIFLC also needed organizational change, although not necessarily change in its organization chart. For several decades, all previous officers selected to command DLIFLC were senior colonels who had retired from that position. According to Mansager, however, after PBD 753, the Institute was no longer “a $50 million Sleepy Hollow, go-there-to-retire organization.” During his tenure as commandant, funding for DLIFLC was to triple while the number of instructors nearly doubled. Mansager thus set about to transform the Institute’s business practices and grow the staff to accommodate transformation. For example, a five- or six-person resource management shop might be able to manage a $50 million budget, but it could not manage a $200 million budget. Similarly, a ten-person DCSOPS could not handle the activity generated by such a load. Mansager also understood that having more resources would also mean more scrutiny and he planned to ensure that DLIFLC could withstand that level of scrutiny.

As 2006 ended, Colonel Mansager issued first quarter command guidance. He began by congratulating everyone for successfully completing the DLIFLC 65th Anniversary celebration during the past quarter. “It was a truly memorable event,” said Mansager. Mansager’s new focus was to prepare the Institute for a forthcoming review by TRADOC of DLIFLC’s manpower needs and its current staffing, a complex exercise with potential to result in reduced staffing if not carefully managed. Equally important, he wanted key leaders to focus on implementing the Proficiency Enhancement Program and fielding a new Defense Language Proficiency Test. He used the Commanding General’s Task List as his roadmap to generate and track a similar DLIFLC Task List for subordinates to follow. He emphasized the team nature of many tasks, such as safety and energy conservation for which all were responsible.

During the second quarter, Mansager was concerned with the Annual Program Review (APR), providing input for the FY2007-2011 Master Plan, and continuing to document “workload drivers” for the now impending TRADOC Manpower Assessment Study, which was “absolutely critical to our future manning. He emphasized the need to justify each position and to show how its impact on the mission was relevant. He also expected all leaders to speak with

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122 Mansager, Exit Interview, 19 September 2007, pp. 7-8.
123 Mansager, Exit Interview, 19 September 2007, p. 9. Individual congressmen did contact DLIFLC about the adequacy of Institute efforts to impart sufficient foreign language training. For example, Rep Ike Skelton asked in June 2006 about the sufficiency of language training needed to prepare soldiers and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Faith Chisman, Congressional Response ID 0614517, sent to Denise Johnson, 10 July 2006, in “Defense Language Program” ff, RG 21.24. However, the number of these inquiries appears routine.
one voice and “to be personally involved in the preparation and execution of an event that will affect us for years to come.”\textsuperscript{125}

One point of note was military training, which had keenly concerned Colonel Simone as commandant. In his command guidance, Colonel Mansager refined this emphasis by asserting that “we will pay particular attention to initial entry soldiers who will be assigned immediately to a combat unit upon departure from DLFILC.”\textsuperscript{126}

During this period, DLIFLC developed two successive Strategic Plans to cover FY 2005-2010 and FY 2007-2011. Mansager also called these Action Plans or Command Plans. He hoped the Strategic Plan would provide ready and ongoing access to current data about DLIFLC operations located in one place to help with resourcing, budgeting, briefings, and data calls. Managers became responsible for periodically updating these plans, which then also helped the command to develop quarterly guidance.\textsuperscript{127}

The Strategic Plan outlined the Institute’s mission essential tasks as defined across its basic foreign language teaching functions and in accordance with the strategic vision outlined by the Language Transformation Roadmap. The four goals of the roadmap were:

(1) create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks of both active and reserve forces,

(2) create the capacity to “surge” language and cultural resources beyond those foundational and in-house abilities,

(3) develop a cadre of military language professionals possessing an ILR level of proficiency of R3/L3/S3, and

(4) establish a process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of linguists and Foreign Area Officers.

Mansager intended the Strategic Plans to serve as a capstone document for all planning at DLIFLC and as a reference for yearly and quarterly command guidance and mid-point re-accreditation strategy.\textsuperscript{128} Mansager intended them to link the Institute’s budget to the final output of trained linguists and allowed senior DLIFLC leaders to communicate their vision while imposing a degree of accountability.

More specifically, the DLIFLC Strategic Plan emphasized key language training initiatives, such as the Proficiency Enhancement Plan goal of obtaining R2+/2+/S2 proficiency on the ILR scale and curricula not older than eight years. It also sought to prepare students to meet the rigors of a newly revised DLPT5 by implementing accurate and timely diagnostic assessments to identify student strengths and weaknesses in time to provide instructors the information needed to adjust their training regimes, which necessarily required them to have


\textsuperscript{126} Command Guidance, FY07 Command Guidance, 13 September 2007, DLIFLC Digital Archives.


greater curricular flexibility nearer the end of a course than the beginning. Finally, the plan focused upon how DLIFLC would continue to move forward in adopting improved instruction technology, especially the development and expansion of wireless networks and the equipping of more students with iPods and tablet computers.129

The FY 2007-2011 Strategic Plan saw some changes over the previous year’s plan. The format now included a deliberate attempt to “brand” the document with the distinctive colors and formatting of DLIFLC. The document was also more clearly laid out and published using higher caliber printing methods. The broad goals also remained the same, although the earlier document placed more attention on coping with rapid expansion, hiring many new teachers, and managing an infusion of funds stemming from the new focus of DOD leadership both to increase the proficiency of DLIFLC graduates while meeting the foreign language requirements generated by two simultaneous counterinsurgency campaigns. In the FY 2007-2011 plan, Mansager emphasized some of the accomplishments of 2006 to include meeting previous foreign language education goals, adopting new technology, and implementing several PEP enhancements, such as an in-country immersion program and a stand-alone isolation immersion facility. The new plan also left the important task of military training to the responsibility of DLIFLC service units.

Overall, Mansager was pleased by Institute efforts to develop the DLIFLC strategic plans for FY 2007-2011.130 Nevertheless, in July 2007, he asked Institute leaders to review the Mission Essential Task List (METL) that formed the basis of the strategic plans. The effort involved a senior leader off-site meeting on 26 June 2007 and a survey of DLIFLC personnel who helped refine the METL used to forge the 2008-2012 DLIFLC Command Plan. At the same time, the Institute also revised its vision statement, becoming:

The acknowledged leader in all aspects of culturally based foreign language education, DLIFLC is an innovative and continuously adapting organization, on the cutting edge of language instruction, research and technology.131

The changed vision statement reflected added emphasis on the “culturally based” nature of language training, a term so keyed to modern military concerns with counterinsurgency warfare that it could nicely replace the previous term “defense” entirely. The term “research” was also added, no doubt to help emphasize that the cognitive nature of language training required sophisticated evaluative methods and frequently renewed curricula. The off-site METL review included focus group discussions on several topics that generated specific action items for follow-up. The FY 2008 METL “Task Matrix” also reflected changes arising from the off-site METL review.132 One concern that managers expressed to Mansager during the preparation of the FY 2008-2012 plans was the long-term sustainability of DLIFLC’s new focus on external training programs. “The problem with going outside of what we are paid to do,” said one report referring to resident basic language instruction, “is that someday our funding will be reduced to

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129 Ibid.
more historic levels and we will have overcommitted ourselves.” Staff worried that the current DLSC members who had supported the Institute’s expansion would sooner or later depart. Moreover, because the DLSC had chosen not to act as DLIFLC’s advisory board, it might have no power to back up DLIFLC when its growth into these new areas was eventually challenged. A corollary to this problem was the fact that the best faculty tended to be absorbed into the new programs, undercutting the basic course efforts.  

In October 2007, Mansager issued his final command guidance for FY 2008. In an era of persistent conflict, he asserted that “robust foreign language and cultural awareness are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting multi-national missions.” The nation, he offered, would continue to rely upon DLIFLC to produce proficient language professionals while providing foreign language training to forces currently deploying. At the same time, DLIFLC needed to continue planning to expand DOD capabilities in other strategic languages on short notice. Basic language instruction thus remained his priority with post-basic instruction second, although he emphasized the need to monitor the growth of that mission to ensure the quality delivery of language training. While the core DLIFLC mission had not changed under his command, he did note that “it is increasingly evident that language and culture have become essential ingredients to the success of all our service members.” DLIFLC had thus expanded its military familiarization and professional military training missions considerably. The METL, he explained, both emphasized the core DLIFLC function “while reflecting the importance and urgency of equipping our troops with the necessary language and cultural skills.” Finally, the new METL for the first time included “Professional Development and Support to Students, Faculty, and Staff,” which emphasized Mansager’s believe that the Institute’s “greatest asset is our people.”

One aspect of DLIFLC management that seemed essential to senior leaders during this period was the need to travel to Washington, DC, to brief Pentagon officials and to meet and greet personally with key leaders who had multiple other responsibilities besides language training. As Colonel Scott put it, “as far as the Pentagon is concerned, you simply have to be present to win.” It was not sufficient to hold a weekly video teleconference. The enormous travel burden placed upon the commandant and assistant commandant generated talk about DLIFLC posting a full colonel at the Pentagon to represent it, but Scott rejected the idea, stating that such an officer would either become irrelevant at DLIFLC or find something else to do. It might be useful, Scott agreed, to post one or more staff action officers to assist the command in getting things done, but in his view travel to represent the Institute in Washington was simply a requirement of the job of running DLIFLC.

The Proficiency Enhancement Program

Under Colonel Mansager, the Institute continued to implement the Proficiency Enhancement Program (PEP) as programmed by the Defense Language Transformation

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136 Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2008, p. 7.
Dr. David S. C. Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, had authorized the PEP effort and intended it to be transformational for DLIFLC and it was. The Defense Language Office sponsored the program under the auspices of Mrs. Gail McGinn, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Plans. Dr. Chu funded the program through Presidential Budget Decision (PBD) 753, which brought $362 million to DLIFLC over five years to improve the foreign language proficiency of DLIFLC graduates and to provide better training support to linguists in the field. PEP was a multi-faceted program that exerted influence on every major area of the Institute’s operations. PEP aimed to improve the graduating proficiencies of DLIFLC students by reducing the student-to-teacher ratio, introducing improved technology, and adopting proven proficiency enhancement approaches, such as immersion. Ultimately, PEP sought to raise DLIFLC graduation standards, as measured on the Interagency Language Roundtable or ILR scale, from L2/R2/S1+ up to L2+/R2+/S2 and eventually to L3/R3/S3.

Colonel Mansager continued to focus the Institute upon PEP’s main strategies, namely:

(1) Lower the student to teacher ratio;
(2) Enhance the curriculum, especially via immersion events at DLIFLC and abroad;
(3) Train faculty with an emphasis on PEP;
(4) Adopt cutting-edge technology, including iPods, wireless networks, and tablet PCs;
(5) Maximize the benefits of diagnostic testing; and
(6) Raise DLIFLC entrance standards through higher DLAB cut-off scores.

DLIFLC used various measures to track the results of its PEP enhancements. It planned to implement PEP in phases so that by FY 2010, all basic course class starts were to include a full range of PEP strategies.

One of the most important aspects of PEP was the hiring of new faculty. PEP funded the addition of some 800 new instructors. By the end of Mansager’s tour as commandant, he had hired about 660 new instructors. The increase in faculty, to be clear, authorized and funded by PBD 753 was not to increase the student throughput, but to increase the face time students had with faculty. For FY 2007, DLIFLC reported reduced class sizes for 285 sections with 1,602 students, which it achieved by hiring 337 new teachers and by adding 135 classrooms through new construction and renovation. Smaller class sizes did appear both to raise graduation rates and the percentage of graduates achieving the PEP goal. However, PEP also appeared to have only a marginal impact on raising the number of students achieving the minimum graduation standards of L2/R2/S1+, at least in FY 2006 (see figure below). Still, one of the efforts

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139 To improve performance, PEP might also have included a measure to lengthen courses, but the military services objected with sufficient vehemence to this proposal that it was never seriously considered.
140 Cutter, “DLIFLC to Receive $362 Million for Language Proficiency Enhancement.”
141 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, p. 1.
championed by the command was to reduce attrition rates. Spearheaded by Assistant Commandant Daniel Scott and apparently aided by smaller classes, DLIFLC reduced attrition rates from a baseline 30 percent to 23 percent. The impact of reduced attrition rates was significant and continued into FY 2007, when PEP classes saw roughly a 10 percent disenrollment while non-PEP classes saw a 14 percent disenrollment. That year DLIFLC also reported an 11 percent increase in graduates obtaining L2+/R2+/S2 proficiency test results. To support the small classes, DLIFLC brought its Faculty Staff and Development Directorate to full staffing. During this period, the student to instructor ratio moved from two teachers for every ten students (team teaching) to two teachers for every six students in the more difficult languages and two teachers for every eight students in the less difficult languages.

Admittedly, early results on the effectiveness of reduced student-to-teacher ratios were tenuous. DLIFLC put a lot of work into preparing for and justifying the PEP program, but according to Mansager, there was little scholarly literature testifying that the program was scientifically valid. Moreover, it was simply hard for senior Institute leaders to explain to Washington-based officials how the impact of the millions in funding they were providing could not show results until after the first students took their graduation tests, which meant waiting at least eighteen months because 74 percent of DLIFLC students were in Category IV languages, meaning the longest courses.

As DLIFLC increased staffing and decreased teacher-to-student ratios, it inexorably faced a new challenge—constrained space requirements at the Presidio of Monterey. By 2007, DLIFLC was operating at 156 percent of the original design capacity of its classrooms. In early January 2007, to accommodate further expansion and forecast growth according to PEP plans, Mansager requested additional funding to support military construction of two new additional company barracks and three new general instructional buildings (GIBs). Originally, DLIFLC had hoped to get the funding sooner in the PEP program, but construction funds come through a separate channel while water rights had to be negotiated without which construction on the Monterey Peninsula was not allowed. Thus, start dates slipped early on.

Despite the issues, by September 2007 Mansager was certain the Army would break ground for the first of three new GIBs by May 2008. During the interim, as DLIFLC increased its staffing and prior to the opening of new classrooms, school officials simply had to manage the space crunch. This in part, Mansager accomplished by ensuring that he turned every extra space on the Presidio capable of holding six to eight students and an instructor into a classroom. He also leased a vacant nearby public school building (Larkin School) to expand the European and Latin American School and leased another vacant facility (Monte Vista School) to move almost all non-basic course teaching functions off the Presidio. Despite delays, the Army designed the new GIBs purposely to match the needs of the PEP expansion and included substantial input

142 Scott, Exit Interview, 4 March 2008, p. 2.
144 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, pp. 1-2. Specifically, the Joint Readiness Oversight Council and the Battlespace Awareness Functional Control Board.
from faculty working with architects to implement the “consolidated team configuration concept.” 146 In other words, the new facilities would be better suited to language training than any previously built on the Presidio. PBD 753 designated a sum of $80 million for the three new GIBs that would provide an additional 200 new classrooms with a completion date of 2012. 147

A second major thrust of PEP was the use of new language-learning technology. The Chief Technology Office distributed over 1,900 tablet PCs for resident courses and issued iPods (portable language devices) to all students. The program also allowed DLIFLC to build wireless computing in DLIFLC’s schools and the DoD Center on the Ord Military Community, which required new servers and upgraded bandwidth capabilities. Most classrooms were also fitted with new interactive blackboards called Smartboards. Immersion efforts included both in-house multi-day training events as well as actual overseas courses piloted at first in Russia, China, and France, later in Korea, and then other countries, that yielded positive results when the students later achieved higher DLPT 5 test results. Having himself learned Polish in this fashion, Mansager was enthusiastic about the plan. 148

146 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, pp. 3-4.
147 Cutter, “DLIFLC to Receive $362 Million for Language Proficiency Enhancement.”.
In implementing PEP, some important issues developed. The problem was first a factor of having so many factors. As Mansager stated, “No scientist in the world would do this where you change all these variables at once and expect to come out with some kind of comprehensive progress, but we did it for various reasons.”\(^{149}\) The most straightforward issue was infrastructure. Somewhat unexpectedly, efforts to upgrade DLIFLC technologically ran into the problem that many campus buildings dated to the early 20\(^{th}\) century. DLIFLC had always used the most advanced technology going back to the 1940s when it manufactured its own long-play 78-rpm language records. However, the older buildings could not accommodate the kind of electrical loads expected by the installation of new computers and wireless routers. It was not until the waning days of Mansager’s command that Garrison officials issued the contracts to resolve these problems. Less unexpectedly, DLIFLC suddenly had to hire many native speakers, especially in Arabic, but most new instructors were not trained foreign language teachers, nor even trained as teachers at all. Mere fluency was not a measure of one’s ability to teach a foreign language, which is why DLIFLC had conducted some form of faculty development since at least the early 1960s, but Mansager raised the profile of this function and for the first time placed faculty professional development on its mission essential task list.\(^{150}\)

The most complex issue, and truly a key difficulty, was the measurement of progress in meeting PEP goals. First of all, DLIFLC changed the tool it used to measure progress in implementing PEP. Namely, it adopted a significantly revised version of the DLPT, the test used to qualify DLIFLC students for graduation, before the program could be evaluated using the mostly tried and true older DLPTs. By the time Colonel Mansager arrived as commandant, DLIFLC had only fielded a few of DLPT5s in low density languages, such as Norwegian or Albanian, not the high density languages, such as Arabic, Chinese, Korean, or Russian.\(^{151}\)

Ironically, the first DLPT challenge Mansager actually faced, soon after assuming command, did not stem from DLPT 5 implementation, but from recently fielded Korean DLPT IV. Many taking this test considered it significantly more difficult than previous versions and after DLIFLC was “excoriated for our scores dropping,” DOD authorized Korean linguists to “double test,” that is, to take both the old and the new version of the DLPT and to qualify on whichever test had the higher score. Mansager thought that was “nonsense” and directed DLIFILC to move from double testing in Korean to single testing on the listening comprehension test during the fall of 2005. Mansager believed that managers would always see a sudden drop following implementation of a new test or program. Thus, when the Korean linguists could choose which version of the test they were scored on, about 86 percent reached the L2/R2/S1+ cut-off. After double testing ended, Mansager acknowledged, scores did drop to 70 percent. This fact did not surprise him, however. In late 2007, Mansager was satisfied to point out that Korean scores were going up again. “It’s been holding steady within a percentage point,” he stated, “and it will continue to get better.”\(^{152}\)

\(^{149}\) Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, p. 8.
\(^{150}\) Ibid, 26 September 2007, pp. 2-3.
\(^{151}\) Ibid, 26 September 2007, p. 5.
\(^{152}\) Ibid, 24 September 2007, pp. 7-8.
DLIFLC’s trouble in fielding the Koran DLPT IV was a harbinger for how well military linguists would embrace the DLPT5. Indeed, as soon as DLIFLC introduced the new test to Arabic linguists and students in 2006, a new round of complaints began.

Mansager’s first issue in fielding a new DLPT version was how to deliver the test. DLIFLC had developed the DLPT IV in a pre-Internet era at a time with much less access to authentic material than could be readily accessed in the 2000s. From the start, developers planned to incorporate more authentic material and to allow the DLPT5 to be computer-delivered. However, DLIFLC advised DOD that the test should be sent to test-givers throughout DOD via compact disc rather than attempt to deliver it directly over the Internet. DOD directed web-based delivery, but so many agencies had erected security firewalls around their classified computer systems that this proved to be an impossible task, which placed the Institute in the position of having to say “we told you so” when initial efforts failed. As a result, DLIFLC had to deliver the test on CD, at least to the National Security Agency (NSA). NSA officials were upset about the time and resources they had committed to the project, given the results obtained, and made their complaints known to Deputy Undersecretary of Defense McGinn.153

A second and more important issue was the fact that the first DLIFLC students to take the new DLPT5s in Chinese, Russian, and Spanish saw their results fall from previous and earlier tests. This brought immediate “push-back” from the services who wanted DLIFLC to reinstitute use of the older DLPT IVs instead of accepting the new DLPT5 as the test of record. This criticism stung because, according to Assistant Commandant Daniel Scott, DLIFLC had adjusted its course teaching and, after six months, the results for the Russian test-takers were back to the 80 percent pass rate with Chinese climbing. Scott claimed that DLIFLC had moved quickly and had responded flexibly to service requirements despite barriers to hiring, contracting, and mission execution. He was critical of their lack of support in supplying needed MLIs and for continuing to set low minimum DLPT standards. It did little good, Scott argued, for NSA and DLIFLC to set higher standards (L3/R3/S3 and L2+/R2+S2 respectively) if the services set lower minimum DLPT scores (L2/R2). Students, he said, knew exactly what their service requirements were and despite a few high achievers, the majority would only strive to pass the minimum bar. Moreover, DLIFLC leadership was challenged to meet PEP goals because of continued lack of funding support for Garrison operations and for the diversion of leadership effort into the faculty hiring process or drawn-out discussions on the merits IT investment when effort should be focused upon faculty development and technology integration. Finally, he told McGinn that it remained a challenge in 2006 to motivate faculty when existing government pay bands compensated PhD-qualified team leaders less than gate guards and E-6 technical sergeants. Nevertheless, despite such challenges, Scott assured McGinn that DLIFLC would “proceed smartly to review all our courses and begin a formal process of certification.” He hoped to implement DLPT5 use in all DLIFLC courses by the fall of 2007 at the latest.154

Despite DLIFLC’s assurances and objections to service complaints, McGinn elevated decision-making on DLPT issues to DLO, a decision that effectively diminished the

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153 Ibid., 26 September 2007, p. 5. In draft comments, Dr. Stephen Payne noted that the military services received the test over the Internet. DLIFLC delivered CDs only to NSA.

154 Col Daniel L. Scott, email to Gail McGinn and Nancy E. Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006, in ff 1, RG 52.01-02.
commandant’s traditional authority. In making that decision, according to Scott, McGinn sought to ensure faster implementation of DLIFLC tests, especially the DLPT5, and to accelerate the delivery of foreign language proficiency pay. Right away, DLO imposed upon DLIFLC a production schedule to speed test delivery. Unfortunately, the schedule left out a time-consuming step—external evaluation of the DLPT5s. In Mansager’s opinion, “the artificial drive to meet an artificial timeline caused us to drop these things out without that final step in many cases.” Mansager thus had to work with DLO to slow down the release of new tests. Test delays did not affect linguist ratings or unit readiness, he felt, but a flawed test did. Unfortunately, by the time he made that decision, DLIFLC had already released several DLPT5s, the test for Modern Standard Arabic being the most important.

Similar to the Korean DLPT IV, Arabic DLPT5 test-takers achieved consistently and much lower scores on the new test than the previous one. Like their Korean counterparts, these Arabic linguists also expressed “concern and dissatisfaction” with their test results. Under-secretary of Defense Chu took their complaints seriously. He issued a memorandum in 2006 stating that military and civilian personnel could use their previous year’s qualifying DLPT score for one calendar year after they had taken the new DLPT5 if that test score was below the previous score. Clearly, the test was generally viewed as much harder than previous versions and provoked a negative reaction. DLIFLC officials maintained that even if the test was more challenging, it was also a more accurate reflection of true proficiency that older tests had failed to capture. “We are convinced that the DLPT5 series is a valid and credible test. The increased rigor is by design, and requires that all linguists study and prepare for the exam,” said Col. Sue Ann Sandusky who served as DLIFLC commandant during the 2007 APR conducted in 2008.

Unfortunately, lacking an external review, DLFILC’s case was hard to make. In September 2007, DLIFLC withdrew the Arabic DLPT5 from field use and began extensive internal and external reviews. Analysis determined the need to delete eleven items from the test, but most of the test held up to scrutiny and a new issue date was set for early 2008. DLIFLC again advised test-takers to study before taking the new DLPT. As DLIFLC replaced only a few items on the DLPT5, said Mika Hoffman, dean of test development. DLIFLC cautioned testers not to expect dramatically different test results. Following concern about the Arabic DLPT5, the Evaluation and Standards Directorate put into place an external review program to evaluate all new DLPTs.

Finally, PEP also raised the cut-off scores required by applicants seeking entrance to DLIFLC, who had to pass the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). This test measured the test-taker’s expected potential to succeed in foreign language training. Under PEP, DLAB cut-off scores were set to rise ten points for each of the four levels of language difficulty. For example, cut-off scores for Category IV languages, such as Arabic, Chinese, or Korean, rose from 100 to 110. DLIFLC expected this change to help raise the overall proficiency of DLIFLC

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155 Scott, Exit Interview, 4 March 2008, p. 3.
156 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, p. 5.
158 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
159 Ibid., pp. 5, 30.
graduates by increasing the percentage of high language aptitude students admitted. The new DLAB requirements became effective on 1 October 2006.\textsuperscript{160}

Unfortunately, by raising entrance standards, PEP created a greater challenge for recruiters and the services, particularly the Air Force, which had resisted the proposal fearing an inability to achieve recruitment goals.\textsuperscript{161} The services already faced marginal deficits in recruiting language school applicants with scores above the DLAB cut-off, which had resulted in waivers. For example, in FY 2006, 2 percent of Navy students and 1 percent of Air Force students entered DLIFLC below the established DLAB cut-off score while overall 1 percent of DLIFLC students fell below the DLAB cut-off. In FY 2007, after PEP imposed higher DLAB cut-off scores, the number of Army students at DLIFLC with sub-par DLAB scores rose from 0 percent to 3 percent while the Navy rose from 2 percent to 3 percent. The Marine Corps also experienced an increase of 1 percent while the Air Force remained at 1 percent. Overall, in FY 2007, the number of students attending DLIFLC with sub-par DLAB scores doubled to 2 percent. Apparently, the services addressed an insufficient pool of applicants scoring above the higher cut-offs by continuing and even increasing the number of waivers they issued to fill their language student quotas.\textsuperscript{162}

In theory, DLIFLC could painlessly improve its graduation proficiency results simply by raising DLAB cut-off scores. In reality, raised DLAB standards meant fewer new recruits were eligible to enlist for training in large part because the highest demand languages were also the most difficult. As a result, the services predictably increased their waivers for the required DLAB scores. This practice mitigated the desired proficiency improvements officials originally expected by raising DLAB cut-off scores.

Mansager accepted this reality and delegated his authority to service recruiters. “I’d rather have somebody in the chair who can give me a chance to teach them than nobody in the chair at all,” he concluded, while anticipating that recruiters would meet DLIFLC entrance requirements without waivers in the future.\textsuperscript{163} Assistant Commandant Col. Daniel Scott, on the other hand, was not entirely convinced that recruiters were really trying to recruit to the new standards, which he knew they did not like, but he himself was uncertain whether the DLAB was any better an instrument for predicting student success at DLIFLC than any given student’s high school record or SAT scores.\textsuperscript{164}

Despite early hang-ups, revised testing and assessment methods would eventually provide DLIFLC with a more accurate means to track PEP progress. Mansager was certain that progress would be detectable after a lag time to implement the several elements of PEP. Indeed,

\textsuperscript{162}DLIFLC, Program Summary FY06, p. 11, and Program Summary FY07, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{163}Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, p. 3. Mansager did not know whether the Institute tracked the performance of students admitted with DLAB waivers, a useful statistic for explaining PEP results.
\textsuperscript{164}Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2008, pp. 5-6. In review comments, Dr Stephen Payne noted that DLIFLC’s Dr. John Lett conducted research on the utility of DLAB that defended it as a predictive instrument.
by early 2008, his successor as DLIFLC commandant, Col. Sue Ann Sandusky, confidently claimed that a “tipping point” had been reached whereby motivated students with higher language-learning aptitudes and greater self-awareness and readiness to be adult learners was combining synergistically within smaller class sections that employed ever better technology, fresh curriculum, and well-trained instructors to produce higher proficiencies. 165  Certainly, in Scott’s opinion, motivation, providing opportunities, promoting innovation, hiring the right people, and rewarding them was the “what we have to do as an organization.”  DLIFLC would never “control our way” to higher standards, Scott believed.  Managing a language school with 2,000 instructors, many not stationed in Monterey, was a challenge that relied upon motivated faculty and students.  Students did not necessarily need more homework, but exciting and more relevant homework.  That, Scott thought, was what made a difference to the student. 166

Reducing Attrition

Reducing the dropout rate from DLIFLC courses was not officially part of the PEP program, although certain PEP measures, especially reduced faculty to student ratios, seemed to help lower the rate.  It was probably more debatable as to whether having a lower attrition rate, however, helped raise proficiency.  For Colonel Mansager, reducing attrition was an issue onto itself and was despite clear guidance from his own boss, TRADOC Commander General Wallace who frankly told Mansager: “I don’t care about attrition.  Maintain the standard and let attrition fall where it may.”  To Mansager that was clear guidance to accept in everyone who came to DLIFLC and to drop anyone who could not qualify.  After all, for both the Army and Air Force, attrition at DLIFLC meant reclassification of junior enlisted into a non-language dependent job specialty.  Whatever the soldiers and airmen felt about this transition, their service still expected them to complete their tours and they always had other job occupation specialties to fill. Mansager’s own goal, however, remained to get linguists into the field and attrition negatively affected that goal.  Thus, Mansager was more than willing, for example, to accepted “re-languaging” those students who failed in Arabic, but who might still handle Spanish as long as there continued to be an unmet requirement in that language. 167

With Mansager’s support, Colonel Scott looked deeper into the problem.  Scott began thinking about attrition when the rate was about 30 percent combing both administrative drops as well as those students failed for academic cause.  He started with a basic premise: “people don’t join the military to come to DLI to fail.”  Although some students might become ill, or have family problems, and some simply were not capable of learning another language, Scott felt that much of the attrition problem was motivation-based.  He wanted to solve that problem and looked at the management structure that might be contributing to it rather than abetting it.  What he soon realized was that DLIFLC faculty and managers placed less attention on reducing attrition than they spent on placing blame for it. 168

166 Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2008, pp. 9-10.
Scott found that for any given unit commander, the job was made easier when instructors failed students for academic reasons with a clear record of failed tests and counseling rather than for an administrative cause. The faculty, however, believed that their merit pay was tied directly to student outcomes, so they preferred to see students administratively discharged from the program because administrative attrition did not count against their own performance. What made that matter worse when faculty identified weak students early on, predicted their ultimate failure even before a string of failed tests, and insisted that they be administratively dis-enrolled. Scott, when he discovered this practice, banned it outright. He wanted every student to have the chance to graduate. Then he sought to address the structural issues contributing to attrition. According to Scott, the military leadership in the schools, both officer and enlisted MLIs, did not focus sufficiently upon the students. A major reason was that they were given too many collateral duties, such as safety officer, building lock-up duty, property accountability, and computer technology officer. Scott acted to free the associate deans, operations officers, chief MLI, and MLIs from these duties and to refocus their attention on student outcomes. He had them counsel every student every week and notify the student’s unit if an issue arose. He wanted the unit enlisted leadership to forge closer bonds with the schoolhouse MLIs and the schoolhouse officers to forge closer ties with the unit operations and executive officers. Scott held meetings to get the military duties reduced and to ensure good communication between all parties. He directed that the school chairs, team leaders, MLIs, faculty members, and unit representatives attend meetings together and “to walk through the students one by one.” It took some time, but attrition losses declined from 29 percent in 2004 to 22 percent in 2006 and remained lower thereafter. This represented a 25 percent reduction or over 200 more students who graduated than would have otherwise. When the services came down hard on DLIFLC because of lower test results after implementation of the DLPT5, Scott was disappointed that they failed to balance that fact with the reality that DLIFLC was still producing more graduates even with poorer test results because of effective management intervention to address attrition.

Scott also took issue with the “recycling” of poor performing students into classes that were not as far along in a program. This process shifted accountability from one teaching team to another without addressing the student’s fundamental problems. Instead, Scott wanted to focus on providing extra one-on-one training for the student, but that was a resource issue and Scott was not able to implement his ideas before leaving DLIFLC.

Relations with the National Security Agency

During this period, the commandant worked with the various stakeholders, mainly the services, including the Army Foreign Language Proponency Office (AFLPO), and similar offices of the other services established to determine the Institute’s routine training requirements. Under Colonel Mansager, Air Force requirements for training seats at DLIFLC actually exceeded the Army’s for the first time. Mansager had no doubt that strong Air Force influence at DLIFLC was in direct relationship to the fact that the Air Force had designated a full colonel to serve at

170 Col Daniel L. Scott, email to Gail McGinn and Nancy E. Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006, in ff 1, RG 52.01-02.
171 Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2008, p. 2.
DLIFLC as assistant commandant—Col. Daniel Scott. The highest ranking officers appointed to DLIFLC by both the Navy and Marine Corps, on the other hand, was a major equivalent. Thus, when those services needed special support, Mansager was frank in saying they had to go back through their separate chains of command, because a major simply could not outweigh two full colonels. Within the Army, the authority that exerted the most influence over DLIFLC, particularly in the budget arena, was not AFLPO, but the Army G3 Directorate for Training. However, if there was any “500-pound gorilla” that had a decisive impact upon the management of DLIFLC, it was the National Security Agency, the single largest stakeholder and largest recipient of trained military linguists. NSA directly expressed its influence through the auspices of its Senior Language Authority, Renee Meyer, who Colonel Mansager described as “very dynamic” and “very vocal in the need to improve our language capabilities.” Before Mansager arrived at DLIFLC, NSA had been influential in lobbying to obtain real funds to improve Institute training and assessment methods, especially regarding DLPT development. It was vital for the Institute’s growth and plans for proficiency enhancement, but the reach of the NSA could extend deep into the daily operations of the school as when NSA officials directly dialed non-Command Group staff, which under-cut at times the chain of command and potentially threatened the validity of DLPT development itself. NSA was a key DLIFLC stakeholder, being a major employer of its graduates and a major consumer of its tests and language materials. However, Mansager also found that “we had too close of a relationship with the National Security Agency.” NSA concern with DLPT development especially had led the agency to push for more involvement in the process, which Mansager felt was a direct conflict of interest. “We can’t allow the people who are going to be taking our tests to help write our tests,” he clearly asserted. So, in late 2006, he ended the practice of allowing NSA to review questions being developed for testing purposes. NSA interventions were also problematic because DLIFLC developed linguist tests for DOD to government-wide, not just to suit the needs of NSA. The tests had to measure test-takers who might be in General or Special Forces units at one end and professional linguists at the other end, but not skewed to measure one over the other, which was a possibility with too much NSA involvement and interest in raising the proficiencies of existing professional linguists. At any rate, NSA staffers with a keen interest in student test results were directly calling DLIFLC staff for information, which Mansager felt was a violation of the military principle to use the chain of command to request official information. It was for this reason, in fact, that NSA had assigned a liaison officer directly to DLIFLC. Mansager thus worked with the NSA, its local liaison Sam Lipsky, and DLO to diminish NSA’s daily operational influence while maintaining the support of the new NSA senior language authority.172

Relations with Installation Management Command

The relationship between DLIFLC and the newly created Installation Management Command (IMCOM) continued to evolve during this period. The Secretary of the Army chartered this organization in 2002 to serve as the sole authority—separate from the senior mission commander on a post—to operate Army bases across the globe.173 The Army created the IMCOM, known until 2006 as the Installation Management Agency, from an existing Army

172 Mansager, Exit Interviews: 19 September 2007, pp. 6-7; and 26 September 2007, pp. 5-6.
173 As reported in the DLIFLC Command History 2001-2003.
base management structure subordinate to the senior mission commander previously in charge of any given post. Numerous responsibilities formerly organic to that senior mission command, therefore, were carved out and transferred or duplicated in the new garrison commands subordinate to IMCOM. On the Presidio of Monterey, Colonel Mansager inherited much of the continuing task of dividing responsibilities between DLIFLC and the now separate U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, regarding “who owns what, who should own what and what the standard levels of support should be.” 174 Certainly, there were merits and detriments to the decision, which took years to implement.

During this period, the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, was commanded by Col. Jeffrey S. Cairns, a Special Forces officer who arrived at the Presidio on 9 July 2003. Cairns remained until 30 June 2006. 175 He had no language training or experience. Col. Pamela L. Martis replaced Cairns as Garrison commander for the remainder of the period. Martis, an artillery and military police officer, was a graduate of DLIFLC courses in French and Russian and had served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. She was also a 1985 classmate of Col. Tucker Mansager at the U.S Military Academy, West Point. 176 Her senior enlisted advisor was Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Brett Rankert, an MI soldier trained as a 96R Ground Surveillance Systems specialist. 177 The Deputy Garrison Commander was Pamela von Ness, a civilian Army employee.

To create IMCOM, the Army required that installations and missions carefully sort out mutual or discrete responsibilities for various functions and resources, creating a degree of confusion and uncertainty that was strong in 2006 and 2007 and has continued to linger to the current day. For example, under Colonel Mansager, DLIFLC lost its safety office to the Garrison, which then chose to address safety issues solely for the Garrison. Similarly, DLIFLC lost its Public Affairs Office, although the only news made by Garrison, Mansager noted, had to do with the Base Realignment and Closure Office addressing former Fort Ord issues, mainly prescribed burns. That mission, however, was declining while DLIFLC’s mission was indefinite. Thus, to manage its own safety and public affairs issues, the Institute had to regenerate funding and recreate these offices from scratch. As Mansager was keen to point out, the only reason the Army kept the Presidio of Monterey open when Fort Ord closed in 1994 was to support DLIFLC. Except for a ten-person ROTC Brigade, no other unit on the Presidio existed but to support DLIFLC, including the dental and medical units stationed there. Nevertheless, the Army split the post into separate organizations with separate chains of command, a decision made more problematic because DLIFLC commandants after Mansager tended to be more junior than colonels appointed to Garrison command. Moreover, while the Army accepted that the DLIFLC commandant was the “senior colonel” on the post, that officer was not chosen by an Army selection board, which many Army officers perceived as lower in the pecking order. Finally, as Mansager arrived, the Army redrafted a regulation that formerly made the senior mission

174 Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, p. 1. Note: Dr Stephen Payne conducted an exit interview with Col Jeffrey S. Cairns in 2006, but Cairns was reluctant to speak in detail about his command. Col Pamela L. Martis declined requests by the DLIFLC History Office for an exit interview in late 2008.
175 Col Jeffrey S. Cairns biography in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
commander on a post also its “installation commander.” Thereafter, such authority could not rest in a colonel, meaning the DLIFLC commandant could not be the post installation commander. Effectively, these changes removed the Presidio Garrison commander from the rating scheme of the DLIFLC commander. In other words, Mansager had no direct authority to influence the Garrison commander. He called the situation “dysfunctional.”

One of the major sticking points between DLIFLC and IMCOM was construction management. PBD 753 had assigned over $80 million for new construction to support DLIFLC expansion, but the U.S. Army Garrison managed these funds. Because the relationship between DLIFLC and IMCOM was poor during this period, it tended to hamper progress in achieving results “and that causes problems in the coordination of these things,” Mansager explained. Again, he lamented, “Instead of working hand-in-glove to get these buildings built, oftentimes we’re in conflict with each other.” According to Col. Scott, the problem was IMCOM’s lack of funding support for essential base operations. During Scott’s tenure in Monterey, he had seen the Garrison cut gate guards and dining hall hours, reduce food selections in the dining halls, fail to replace barracks furniture, respond slowly to repair bathrooms or even to clean them as often, and he was certain that medical care was in decline. Scott said that faculty had a harder time accessing the post at a time of increasing requirements while troop quality of life was going down. He called the situation a “train wreck in progress.”

On the Garrison side, according to Colonel Martis, certain unique issues made garrison management challenging. For example, the physical separation of the Presidio and the Ord Military Community (OMC) created various logistical issues because many Garrison support offices were physically located at OMC. Moreover, OMC itself was complicated being composed of 771 acres and having concurrent jurisdiction with seven civilian agencies. Perhaps more importantly the Garrison faced the difficulty of matching its management to the continuous growth of DLIFLC, which Martis asserted resulted in resource and manpower challenges to Garrison operations. Indeed, a shortage of space became a growing concern for both DLIFLC and Garrison staff during this period. Officials even considered implementing a shift work schedule, but appeared to avoid such a drastic measure by DLIFLC carefully monitoring and scheduling section loads and by the Garrison installing two portable buildings, reutilizing the Tin Barn, and by expanding the usage of cubicles wherever possible in existing buildings, including in the DLIFLC headquarters building. Other space options included use of DOD Center Monterey Bay, where Mansager did transfer some DLIFLC staff elements. Unfortunately, according to the Army Corps of Engineers, there were no adequate commercial leasing arrangements within thirty miles of Monterey.

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178 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, pp. 9-11.
179 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, pp. 3-4.
180 Note, all welcomed the opening of a new dental clinic at the Presidio of Monterey in 2008.
181 Col Daniel L. Scott, email to Gail McGinn and Nancy E. Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006, in ff 1, RG 52.01-02.
Mansager regarded the DLIFLC/IMCOM divide as “the single biggest problem I’ve had with my command.” Indeed, he felt: “Instead of being concerned about how to push PEP up and do all the things we’ve got to do with language, we’ve been having to deal with uncooperative folks in the garrison. Rather than working with us and supporting us, it’s always been very contentious.” Mansager acknowledged personality conflicts might have played a role in the unhappy state of affairs that characterized DLIFLC-Garrison relations during his command, but he asserted his fundamental belief in the motto “one team, one fight,” whereby the team was led by one “team captain” in line with the military principle of unity of command. He discussed the issue with several generals in his chain of command, who suggested, he claimed, that the Presidio Garrison commander should hold the rank of lieutenant colonel.\(^{184}\)

It was a moot point debating that last issue by 2006-2007, as IMCOM was unlikely to appoint a lieutenant colonel as Garrison commander knowing with certainty the result would be to lessen IMCOM authority over the Presidio. On the Garrison’s side, the unexpected increases in student load during this period placed increased stress on Garrison resources, or so found the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency in 2007. The long duration of student courses translated effectively into the equivalent of a stationed force of the same size. DLIFLC required more Garrison support, per se, than a typical TRADOC school of similar size simply because the students were there so long and that load was intensifying.\(^{185}\)

The Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, to whom DLIFLC reported, tried to resolve the continuing strain in the relations between the DLIFLC commandant and the Garrison commander over priorities, at least in part. In May 2007, CAC transmitted guidance to clarify the duties and responsibilities of the installation commander/DLIFLC commandant with regard to the Presidio Garrison. CAC’s memo specified that the DLIFLC commandant was the installation commander and the senior Army spokesperson to the surrounding community. The memo noted that the “Installation Commander/Commandant will request my assistance, if necessary, to obtain additional resources from IMCOM and/or TRADOC.” It also specified the duties of the Garrison commander. Importantly, the CAC commander served as the rater for the DLIFLC commandant and the senior rater for Presidio of Monterey garrison commander. The problem remained that the latter’s direct rater was an IMCOM official. The memo provided greater clarity to govern relations between DLIFLC and the Garrison. However, the divided command arrangement continued to require that DLIFLC elevate serious conflicts over priorities with Garrison officials to higher authorities for adjudication whenever the commandant could not resolve these differences locally, which it turned out, he often could not.\(^{186}\)

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184 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, p. 10. Apparently, the Army originally slated the commander of the US Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, to be a lieutenant colonel, but under Col Vladimir Sobichevsky, DLIFLC Commandant from 1993 to 1995, the rank was elevated to full colonel to help the DLIFLC commandant manage the closure of Fort Ord. According to Mansager, Sobichevsky regretted the decision.


186 Brig Gen Mark E. O’Neill, Memorandum entitled “Clarification of Duties and Responsibilities,” 17 May 2007, in “Misc” ff, RG 21.24. One unique duty bestowed upon the DLIFLC commandant was general court martial convening authority (GCMCA). As installation commander, Colonel Mansager exercised UCMJ authority over all active Army personnel on the Central Coast, including Camp Roberts and Fort Hunter Liggett as well as the Presidio of Monterey and the Ord Military Community.
CAC also considered the possibility of elevating the DLIFLC commander to the status of a general officer. Mansager felt the responsibilities of the position and its budget had so increased that the Institute compared favorably with other TRADOC schools administrated by general officers. Moreover, DOD’s senior language authorities and many of the officials commonly briefed by Mansager were generals or in the Senior Executive Service; in dealing with these officials, it would benefit DLIFLC to have a higher ranked commandant. Unfortunately, Mansager noted, because there was only a fixed number of generals allowed by Congress, getting one at DLIFLC would mean eliminating the slot from somewhere else in the Army, which was a challenging proposition. Meanwhile, DLIFLC had been able to shine with only a colonel in charge, so the situation was not ripe for change.  

One issue that the DLIFLC commandant and the Garrison commander certainly agreed upon was the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list—neither wanted the Institute or the Presidio of Monterey on it. In 2005, without much warning, the BRAC Commission once again placed the Presidio suddenly on the list of bases facing possible closure, even though policy makers had extensively debated the issue in previous BRAC rounds and determined not to close the Presidio. Apparently, some in Washington, DC, wanted to “anchor,” as Mansager put it, the Naval Postgraduate School, which was on the list, to DLIFLC. The notion was that if DLIFLC had previously survived several BRAC rounds, then associating NPS with DLIFLC might strengthen the chances that NPS also would survive a BRAC review. Mansager felt these policy

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187 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, p. 11.
makers probably had limited understanding of the two geographically close military educational institutions for their missions were quite different and unrelated. At any rate, according to Mansager, the Army’s chief of staff, who also saw the Army War College on that list, acted quickly to challenge the merit of the BRAC list, and the BRAC Commission soon removed all three schools. It was a reminder, however, that key, well respected, and even well BRAC-vented posts and missions were always subject to budget-cutting politics and leaders had to keep their antennae up. Despite this episode, Mansager was confident that the Presidio would not face another BRAC threat for the near future. On the other hand, if BRAC ever did force the closure of the Presidio and relocate DLIFLC, Mansager was clear that it would survive as an institution and could even apply the opportunity to pare back and re-staff. He suggested, for example, that many long-term employees might retire rather than sell homes and relocate whereas the most dedicated language instructors, and most junior instructors, would probably pick up and move with DLIFLC, given the cost of housing in Monterey, which could actually be a benefit.  

The Garrison command also still had responsibility for overseeing the long-term process stemming from the BRAC-mandated closure of Fort Ord in 1994. Most such issues impacted DLIFLC indirectly, for example prescribed burns required to clear former firing ranges of munitions prior to their transfer to civilian authorities. Mansager saw one prescribed burn completed successfully and without incident on his watch and relations between DLIFLC and Garrison officials appeared to remain effective and sufficiently cooperative on such matters.

Relations with Labor Union

During the years that Dr. Ray Clifford served as provost and later chancellor of DLIFLC, he exercised the role of negotiating with the Institute’s labor union, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Local 1263. Clifford had exercised sole control over this function, according to Colonel Scott. One of the major changes Scott most wanted to make after Clifford’s departure from DLIFLC was the transfer of this function back to the military command. He worked on the issue in late 2005 and 2006. Scott felt that Clifford, who had made major contributions to DLIFLC, had at times made unilateral decisions regarding the union and had “cut some deals that were quite frankly not in the best interests of the Institute and had not been coordinated with the commandants.” Apparently, Clifford stated during his final address to the faculty concerning the result of the 2004 merit pay process, or in a side conversation, that DLIFLC would give charter members of the Faculty Pay System (FPS) an automatic promotion once their pay hit the top of their pay band. Normally, they would only receive an end-of-year bonus, which as a one-time award did not affect long-term pay or retirement benefits. Interim Chancellor Dr. Stephen Payne challenged the union to prove that Clifford had made this promise, about which no one in the command knew anything, and Colonels Simone and Scott determined that the union’s claim was not justified. When the JAG office further determined that Clifford had not had the authority to make such a promise in the first place, because the commandant was in charge of the FPS, the union took DLIFLC to court over unfair practices—and the court ruled in favor of the union. DLIFLC lost the lawsuit because the court found that Clifford had always represented DLIFLC previously during the annual merit pay review meetings and thus the union

188 Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, pp. 5-6. Perhaps somewhat tongue-in-cheek, Mansager hoped the Navy would give DLIFLC some credit for helping to save NPS from a negative BRAC finding.
had no reason to doubt that he lacked the authority to make promises. Scott therefore worked to redefine the role of the provost in DLIFLC-labor relations and to establish a trail of policy letters and authorities to re-establish the commandant’s authority on matters pertaining to the union. Going forward, Mansager, as Commandant through his representative the deputy chief of staff for personnel and logistics, negotiated with the union and established policies, not the provost.189

Despite the occasionally adversarial nature inherent in union-management relations, everyone at DLIFLC held the head of AFGE Local 1263, Alfie Khalil, in deep respect. It was with great sadness, therefore, that Institute faculty and staff met the news of Khalil’s unexpected death on 18 November 2006. An Arabic language instructor, Khalil had headed the union at DLIFLC since 1988. Khalil’s major accomplishments included helping prevent the closure of the Presidio of Monterey, creating cooperative conditions between the faculty and the command to allow effective implementation of the Faculty Personnel System, and arguing successfully to gain Monterey County federal employees locality pay equivalent to the San Francisco area. In recognition of his accomplishments and community standing, over 400 people, including several former commandants and Dr. Clifford, attended Khalil’s memorial service on 30 November 2006. Congressman Sam Farr also memorialized Khalil on the floor of Congress ensuring that an account of his accomplishments was recorded in the Congressional Record.190

DLIFLC Command Initiatives

One of the most important issues potentially impacting DLIFLC during this period was a proposal to create an Army Language Center of Excellence. Borrowing business terminology, TRADOC develop the “Center of Excellence” concept to group together and co-locate similar programs. By sharing resources and capabilities, a Center of Excellence would thus generate efficiency and synergy. In May 2006, DLIFLC learned that TRADOC G-3 was considering creating an Army language Center of Excellence. The issue arose during an Army chief of staff briefing that identified DLIFLC as the language center of excellence but Fort Huachuca, home of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), as the cultural center of excellence. The question asked was “why are they at two different places? Shouldn’t they be at one?” Apparently, the Army G-3 became interested after a visit to the 10th Mountain Division, which had its own language and cultural awareness center. DLIFLC had to provide a response. One response was to argue for why it alone should be the Army’s language and cultural awareness center. It was unclear why For Huachuca had become the Army Cultural Center of Excellence. According to Provost Donald C. Fischer, the intelligence mission was much broader than the USAIC interrogator training mission (which had a cultural component) while the Army’s need for foreign language training was much broader than the intelligence mission, but inseparable from cultural awareness training. Fischer suggested the DLIFLC emphasize the joint nature of its training and its many links to various constituents and propose to be DOD’s linguist and cultural umbrella for everything beyond the introductory level, moving DLIFLC closer to par with the Service academies.191 Certainly, no one could deny that DLIFLC was the center of gravity for

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189 Scott, Exit Interview, 4 March 2008, pp. 2-3; review comments received from Dr Stephen Payne.
foreign language training. If the Army chose anyone else for that mission, it would bring about a rift with OSD, according to Assistant Commandant Col. Daniel Scott, but it was possible that DLIFLC would end up with “two bosses,” as he put it, by having a separate center for culture somewhere else in the Army. “We need to get in front of this train,” Scott concluded.192

During this period, the deputy secretary of defense authorized funding for a special language and culture initiative announced in the “QDR” or Quadrennial Defense Review. The approved funding allowed DLIFLC to produce or update twelve familiarization packages per year for five years in a variety of relevant languages for pre-deployment training and operational language modules. These operationally focused language instruction modules or courses were in addition to existing language survival kits already produced by DLIFLC and would cost approximately $17 million. No similar modules focused upon military training existed commercially and these packages would remain government property, not requiring continuous re-licensing. The cost estimate for the packages had assumed $152,000 per familiarization package: $100,000 for contracted content development (using a new Memorandum of Agreement between DLIFLC with “co-labs” and universities) and $52,000 for DLIFLC labor to edit text and audio and to develop compact disc and web-delivered products.193

Tied to this new emphasis on training general purpose forces, Colonel Mansager approved a Headstart program for Iraqi. The eighty-hour or so computer-based course allowed service personnel to log on to the Internet, download the course, and use it to teach themselves Iraqi. Headstart was designed to teach basic phrases relevant to typical military tasks, such as manning a checkpoint or conducting a convoy or organizing people to take them into a base hospital. The course also provided some basic instruction in what behaviors were not correct in a culture and what ones were correct, the kind of information useful riflemen, tank drivers, pilots, sailors or cooks.194 DOD had contracted with a company called Rosetta Stone to provide this basic language familiarization, but experience had shown that this type of commercial program did not address the types of military situations and issues required for military personnel. Mansager later authorized DLIFLC to develop a similar Headstart program for Pashto and Dari. According to Colonel Scott, DLIFLC’s intent was to press on to produce similar Headstart programs for additional languages.195

Late in his tenure as Assistant Commandant, Colonel Scott sought to reform the Institute’s Faculty Personnel System or FPS. FPS included a merit-based pay system but was primarily a “rank and person” concept, similar to the military pay structure, where one’s rank determined one’s pay level, not one’s position. By contrast the General Service pay system was tied strictly to function. Under the GS system, promotions occurred when existing employee competed successfully for open positions, sometimes losing out to other applicants. Under FPS, managers could assign faculty to any job, for example, a dean could go back to teaching, if that was their better skill, and not be demoted in pay, which is what prevented senior employees from

194 Scott, Exit Interview, 4 March 2008, p. 7.
teaching under DLIFLC’s old GS-style system. The newer FPS system was widely seen as a
great improvement for faculty and management alike, but it had a few flaws. One of these was
that the system required DLIFLC to hold periodic academic advancement boards, which allowed
faculty opportunity to compete for higher academic ranking. According to Scott, however,
DLIFLC was negligent in that these review boards were only held once in every three years or so
instead of annually. Infrequent boards translated into less opportunity to advance and faculty
discouragement. The reason for this perplexed Scott, because the military was able to hold
promotion boards for thousands of soldiers in a timely manner while at DLIFLC it took over a
year to review a mere 180 applicants. At the same time, Scott felt that the 15 percent of FPS pay
that was merit-based was afforded by lower level managers on the basis of peer equity and not
faculty achievement, which defeated the purpose of merit pay. Thus, DLIFLC began looking at
how it could apply techniques adopted from how the military did promotions to make DLIFLC
promotion and tenure selection boards more efficiently and give credit to the faculty who
deserved it. Scott hoped DLIFLC would eventually take greater control and centralization of the
merit pay to ensure that it was rewarding outstanding performers and not just providing an
additional pot of money for everybody to share.196

In early 2007, the Department of the Army decided that all foreign nationals working for
it and using email had to have a mandatory identifier added to their email address specifying
their status as (1) a foreign national and (2) their country of origin. The issue raised immediate
concern among many DLIFLC faculty who did not such identifying information about them
listed for fear that they or their families might be targeted for reprisal in their home countries.
Colonel Mansager therefore sought an exception in February to this broad policy (AR 25-2,
Information Assurance). He was partially successful. On 2 April 2007, Lt. Gen. Steven W.
Boutelle, Chief Information Officer/G-6, issued a memorandum authorizing DLIFLC an
exception to policy to prevent the display of an employee’s country of origin, although the status
as a foreign national was retained.197 To decrease actual physical threats to the Presidio,
Mansager created an Intelligence Fusion Cell whose purpose was to collect, analyze, and
disseminate threat intelligence through daily and weekly updates to support the installation anti-
terrorism program. The effort was limited to providing information about potential terrorist
threats to the Presidio law enforcement departments only. Mansager was careful to direct that
the Intelligence Fusion Cell comply with specific regulations focused on collecting intelligence
for guard against either domestic criminal or foreign military threats.198

In the spring of 2006, Mansager visited Hawaii and Australia and returned enthusiastic
about the possibility of collaboration with Australian Forces who provide their own forces with
three-hour cultural awareness training to as much as a two-week course on language and culture.
Meanwhile, from his visit to Hawaii, the commandant learned about problems the DLIFLC
Language Training Detachment was having. He heard complaints about the lack of
administrative support for this LTD, for example, eighteen-month waits for travel

196 Scott, Exit Interview, 5 March 2008, pp. 5-7. Scott gives a detailed account of problems with FPS merit pay
practices and promotion boards in this interview.
197 Lt Gen Steven W. Boutelle, Memorandum entitled “Exception to AR 25-2 Policy for Affiliation Display,” 2
198 Charter for Intelligence Fusion Cell, no date, in “Misc” ff, RG 21.24.
reimbursements, and other issues. The commandant suggested possible solutions such as a Memorandum of Understanding with Schofield Barracks for support or reinforcing DLIFLC staff (from Continuing Education) as necessary to provide better support, etc. According to Mansager, “care for our folks on LTDs is one of my enduring and top concerns. He wanted the issue addressed “first, soon and correctly.” Another issue was how to insure that LTD instructors, who might have to do more curriculum development than their counterparts at DLIFLC, were evaluated fairly compared to their peers at DLIFLC. In other words, were the evaluations deficient in equity points?  

Similarly, Colonel Scott traveled to Almaty, Kazakhstan, in 2006 to meet with officials of the Kazakhstan Defense Institute of Foreign Languages. The Kazakhstan school offered a five-year course for officer candidates who graduated as language and culture experts and were expected to serve in Kazak embassies. The school had already forged a cooperative agreement with the Defense Language Institute English Language Center and was interested in exploring areas of mutual interest with DLIFLC as well. Personnel from the Kazakhstan institute toured the Presidio of Monterey in April 2006 and Col. Scott later made a reciprocal visit, expressing the desire to “send some of our teachers there, as part of an annual visit.”

Another Mansager initiative was his decision to establish a DLIFLC Hall of Fame. Mansager believed that any organization with as prestigious a background as the one belonging

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to the Defense Language Institute ought to recognize some of the individuals who had proven themselves above and beyond the average. He was surprised to find that there was no such hall of fame at DLIFLC before he arrived. He modeled the idea on a similar hall of fame located in the entryway to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, an element, like DLIFLC, subordinate to the Combined Arms Center. The hallway contains perhaps hundreds of plaques with images and biographies of important Army leaders, most of whom had graduated from CGSC, but dating back to the beginning of the Army in 1775. The kickoff event for the Institute’s Hall of Fame took place on 28 August 2006 when the DLIFLC Hall of Fame Selection Board met to deliberate over thirty-eight nominations. The board chose ten nominees, all of whom had made outstanding contributions to language training or linguist employment within the Department of Defense. Among the first inductees were Shigeya Kihara, Col. David McNerny (Ret.), Glenn Nordin, and Leon Panetta. Kihara was an original instructor and long time supporter of the school. McNerny was a former DLIFLC commandant who had successfully pushed a major DLIFLC expansion program. Nordin was a senior DOD official with much responsibility and impact upon the department’s foreign language training program. Panetta was a former U.S. Congressman who had long represented the Monterey area and was a strong supporter of language training. Significantly for DLIFLC, Panetta later served as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and in 2011 became Secretary of Defense.

DLIFLC held the dedication ceremony in conjunction with its 65th Anniversary Ball on 8 November 2006. Plaques similar to those at CGSC were hung in the entryway to DLIFLC’s Asio Library. Part of Mansager’s goal was that publicity about the event would help get “DLI’s story” out to constituents and senior leaders, many of whom had no understanding of DLIFLC’s role or contributions to DOD. Mansager was particularly successful in bringing in the former Secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey, and U.S. Special Operations Command commander, General Bryan Brown, for the dedication and ball. He was less satisfied by the caliber of effort put into drafting the nominations and for a lack of former DLI instructor nominations, but he expected the process would improve over time and continue as an important new DLIFLC tradition. Secretary Harvey addressed DLIFLC students assembled on Soldier Field, and following the recent resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, remarked that his designated successor, Robert Gates, would bring a fresh approach to global military policy. “The president said it best,” Harvey stated about Gates. He will “put a new set of eyes on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

The Institute chose a second round of Hall of Fame inductees and honored the five chosen with a ceremony November 2007. The new inductees were George X. Ferguson, Sr., Benjamin De La Selva, Ingrid Hirth, Col. Thomas Sakamoto (U.S. Army retired), and Maj. Masaji Gene Uratsu (U.S. Army retired).

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201 Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, pp. 2-3.
203 Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, pp. 2-3.
204 Kevin Howe, “New Eyes on War on Terror,” Monterey Herald, 9 November 2006, B1, B2.
Mansager had also hoped to establish a DLIFLC Foundation on his watch, but this effort proved elusive. Government officials cannot legally direct any effort to create such foundations, which must be undertaken by self-motivated outsiders who work to support the agency but are not paid or directed by it. Typically financed by former graduates, many schools and other government entities, such as national parks, have these 501(c)3 tax exempt organizations that are independent of the government but that work on its behalf. Unbound by federal ethics rules, foundations can lobby political leaders, raise funds for alumni events, or provide stipends to reimburse government officials to allow them to attend expensive fund-raisers to promote their programs. Even with a colonel’s salary, Mansager accepted few invitations to speak at $250-per-plate dinners. He encouraged his successors to pursue—carefully—a DLIFLC foundation.  

Manpower Survey

In 2006, the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency conducted an assessment of the workload and staffing of DLIFLC. Essentially a functional audit, the purpose of the manpower assessment was to determine if the Institute was properly staffed according to the authorizations allowed by its formal Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and whether assigned staff were properly configured according to their described positions.

The manpower assessment determined that DLIFLC’s actual strength was 1,846 positions, combining 152 military, 1,614 civilian, and 80 personnel from other services. These figures included 248 civilians considered excess or overhires, but who were hired to address the large increase in student load in FY 2006. These overhires were scattered among the command and staff organizations, namely, the Judge Advocate’s Office, the Chancellor’s Office, and the Resource Management Office, while the rest were distributed to the schools to support increased student loads.

One problem faced by DLIFLC was scheduling the upsurge in students, especially on the main campus at the Presidio of Monterey. The problem was noted by the Manpower Analysis Agency, which identified through interviews with staff that “there is a lag time between student load demands and instructor acquisition” that led to “an increasing casual population (308 on the last report), with over 70 percent of them consisting of people awaiting classes.”

The manpower analysis team was small (two persons) so it focused upon the command and staff and the relationship of DLIFLC to the Garrison. The methodology employed by the team was simply to compare the structure of DLIFLC to a TRADOC “Center of Excellence” school model. Then, where staffing departed from that model, the analysts recommended

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206 Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, p. 3.
207 Historically, the Army divided units into “staff and line,” the essential difference being that staff elements were not deployable and usually included civilian employees while line units were tactical. The Army developed tables allocating personnel for both types of organizations, the TDA evolving to define staff elements, like DLIFLC, in the 20th century. A table of organization and equipment (TOE) determines the configuration of a line unit.
209 Ibid., p. 5.
Manpower Assessment for DLIFLC showing overall organization strength and variances to authorizations permitted by the existing TDA, ca. 2006.

Organizational Chart of DLIFLC as existed in 2005 and retained under U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency recommendations, ca 2006.

Changes to bring the staff organization in line with the TRADOC model either by increasing or reducing the number of authorizations.

Specific recommendations addressed the DLIFLC Public Affairs Office, the Safety Office, the Historian’s Office, and the office of the Chief Information Officer, which are discussed separately in Chapter V. Recommendations regarding the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion are found in Chapter IV.

In general, the manpower assessment matched the military command and control positions found in the structure of DLIFLC to those pre-established by the Army for the TDA design of TRADOC Center of Excellence schools, re-numbered DLIFLC’s positions according to those matched against the TRADOC TDA design, and recommended a revised DLIFLC TDA organizational structure. The recommendations were not drastic and the assessment retained the same general organizational structure as then existed.
Global Studies Initiative

In June 2006, a defense authorization bill passed the House of Representatives to provide $1.5 million to DLIFLC for a bachelor’s degree in a global studies program. The funding was to allow DLIFLC to work with the so-called Consortium for Foreign Language, Area and Global Studies to offer students the opportunity to earn the BA degree in global studies using distance-learning technology. The bill also provided opportunities for staff and faculty development.

Based on this legislation, in 2007, DLIFLC attempted to expand its academic offerings to resident and non-resident students and faculty by offering a Bachelor’s degree program in a digitized, web-based format. DLIFLC placed an announcement through contracting for bids by organizations that could design and implement such a program. A consortium of California State Universities, including San Jose State University, California State University Monterey Bay (CSUMB), and San Diego State University, responded. They proposed to pool their respective strengths, allowing CSUMB as the closest school to serve as the lead contractor, and to tailor a program suited to DLIFLC’s need no matter where its constituents were located. They proposed to offer a SJSU accredited Bachelors degree program in Global Studies through its online division (eCampus) as well as a minor program directly accessible to DLIFLC staff and students via transfer of web-based materials to DLIFLC computers.

Strategic Language List

In December 2006, DLIFLC completed a draft concept of operations plan to meet the requirements of the Strategic Language List (SLL) for a surge capability. The report met SLL requirements as published by the Secretary of Defense on 26 October 2005. The SLL was a list of foreign languages, which DOD had determined were critically needed to meet current and projected military requirements. Some SLL languages met near-term needs while others were of enduring character. The SLL, updated annually, was a part of several DOD reforms that also included the Language Transformation Roadmap and the creation of senior language authority positions with the services, joint staff, combatant commands, and defense agencies to evaluate and plan military language requirements.

DLIFLC compared its capabilities to the SLL and defined the areas that most needed attention. DLIFLC found that it needed to develop further capabilities in nineteen languages or dialects, divided into two subcategories of Immediate Investment Languages or Stronghold Languages. The plan outlined an effort over five years involving the hiring of two subject matter experts per language to develop the basic curricula that would be needed to teach that language with one program leader for every three languages. DLIFLC conceived the project as a long-term planning effort. Thus, in the event that any language on the list required immediate teaching, more staff would need to be hired, while new language added to the list would require the hiring of additional subject matter experts to develop the curricula for those languages. Faculty experts could not be co-opted into teaching as that would undermine the effort. Gail McGinn and Nancy Weaver of DLO met in December 2006 with DLIFLC staff to review the concept document. McGinn questioned whether a full basic course was needed for all the

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languages and suggested that DLI-Washington could be the first choice to turn to for some of the languages. Moreover, she felt that the requirements of the SLL might be met by drawing upon the current force, although to do that required sufficiently developed DLPTs/OPIs and good feedback from the services. She noted that the Navy had found a number of heritage speakers already serving at the required proficiencies.212

Capt. Angi Carsten, Associate Dean of the DLIFLC Emerging Languages Task Force, made important contributions to the development of the SLL, according to DLIFLC officials. Carsten, who retired from the U.S. Air Force and DLIFLC in 2007, managed the Defense Strategic Language Surge Capabilities program and authored the Concept of Operations that created the DoD framework to build the Institute’s capabilities in twenty-one languages that were incorporated into the SLL. She essentially built the courses for this group of key, but low-density, high demand languages and dialects, according to Bob Winchester, the Army’s Intelligence Liaison to Congress.213

Board of Visitors

Until 2005, DLIFLC relied upon an Academic Advisory Board to provide external review and advice on governance issues. DLIFLC had created the Academic Advisory Board as part of a series of reforms during the 1990s aimed at garnering accreditation from the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges (ACCJC) of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges. One ACCJC requirement was that an academic institution had to possess an external advisory board to promote good governance. It was also an essential component needed by DLIFLC to be accredited to confer an Associate of Arts degree in Foreign Languages. Unfortunately, as DOD’s Senior Language Authority, Gail McGinn determined in 2005 that the Academic Advisory Board as constituted was in violation of U.S. Government regulations (as described in the DLIFLC Command History 2004-2005). Thus, DLIFLC disbanded its Academic Advisory Board.

Soon, a discussion began about what to do to replace the board. This discussion continued into 2006 by which time the outline of a new body was under development with command emphasis upon proactively winning accreditation and resolving the problem. After much debate over various options, DLIFLC decided to establish a new advisory body to be called the Board of Visitors. Institute leaders began considering procedures to vet and approve candidates to sit on this new board of advisors. In 2007, the Provost Office compiled a list of individuals with stellar biographies and ties to DLIFLC or the language teaching world who might be willing to help provide expert external input into the management of the Institute.214

After carefully considering the list of candidates, a task that took several months, DLIFLC recommended several individuals to the Army Education Advisory Committee, a body established under terms of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The advisory committee met on 13 December 2007. It decided to allow DLIFLC to proceed to establish a Board of Visitors to

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provide independent review of DLIFLC operations. The first Board of Visitors would be composed of ten individuals under the general guidance of Dr. Irvine Rokke.\textsuperscript{215} The product of the board would be a report furnished formally to the Army Education Advisory Committee.

According to Col. Sue Ann Sandusky, who took over the reins as commandant of DLIFLC in October 2007, “the Board’s primary role is to serve as an advisory panel and independent sounding board, furnishing constructive input to our Institute’s leadership through the Army Education Advisory Committee.” She also hoped the board would be able to help advocate for the Institute within DOD and outside it among other academic organizations. Indeed, according to new board member Dr. Nina Garrett, who had an extensive academic background in computer-assisted learning, language pedagogy, and second-language acquisition, “there is this perspective that the government language learning world and the academic language learning world have been at odds,” which she felt was totally unnecessary and a problem that the board could help overcome.\textsuperscript{216}

Critically, the process used to establish the Board of Visitors and its composition met the standards of outside review necessary to maintain academic accreditation. DLIFLC advised the Accrediting Commission President Dr. Barbara Beno and Commission Chair Dr. E. Jan Kehoe on 19 October 2007 with regard to the Board of Visitors, its nomination process, and the

\textsuperscript{215} As they appear in the figure, members of the 2007 Board of Visitors were from Top L: Dr Richard Brecht, Dr Galal Walker, Dr. John Petersen. From Bottom L: Dr Deborah LaPointe, Dr Nina Garrett, Dr Irvine Rokke, Dr Robert Gard, Dr James Keagle, and retired Vice Adm Lowell Jacoby. Dr Rokke, a retired US Air Force lieutenant general, served as chair. Kenneth Nilsson is not pictured.

\textsuperscript{216} Spec Kenneth Thomas, “DLIFLC Host Board of Visitors,” \textit{Globe} (Spring 2008): 5.
establishment of the Board’s parent committee. The first schedule meeting of the Board was set for 12-13 December 2007.\textsuperscript{217}

**Change of Command**

Col. Tucker B. Mansager turned over command of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center to Col. Sue Ann Sandusky during a ceremony on Soldier Field at the Presidio of Monterey on 11 October 2007. The ceremony was presided over by the commanding officer of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, who told the assembled audience that “one of the most important elements of being an adaptive leader is being culturally attuned.” “Leadership in this War on Terror,” he expanded, “requires leaders who are culturally attuned to making political-military decisions that literally have strategic implications.”

Mansager moved on to his next assignment, which was to serve as the executive officer to General Bantz J. Craddock, head of the Supreme Allied Command, Europe. Sandusky came to DLIFLC as a practiced Foreign Area Officer, a fluent French-speaker, and an Africanist. Notably, Sandusky was a former world champion in international rifle shooting and had served as the Director of African Studies at the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania. Before that assignment, Sandusky had served as Defense and Army Attaché in U.S. Embassies in Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria. She was also a 1992 graduate of DLIFLC’s French basic program.\textsuperscript{218}


\textsuperscript{218} Elizabeth D’Angelo, “DLIFLC and Presidio Welcome New Commander,”*Globe* (Fall 2007): 8.
Chapter III

Language Training Programs at DLIFLC

Overview
The core function of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center remained its resident Basic Foreign Language and Continuing Education programs taught in classrooms at the Presidio of Monterey or at facilities nearby on the former Fort Ord. In Monterey, DLIFLC taught some 23 languages through 35 academic departments while in the nation’s capital, it taught another 84 languages in low volume courses through contract arrangements by its branch office. The aim of all language instruction was the acquisition of functional language skills required by military and government employees to perform their work successfully. During the period, there were more than 1,100 civilian foreign language instructors teaching at DLIFLC, the vast majority being native speakers of the languages they taught. Most held bachelor’s degrees while 40 percent held master’s degrees. Only a few faculty members held doctorates, but about 55 percent of the faculty did hold degrees in foreign language education. Another 350 service members directly supported the language instruction mission, a few as military language instructors, while another 530 military and civilian personnel staffed the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, primarily to support DLIFLC’s mission.219

By 2007, as a result of ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, the DLIFLC student population had grown more than 50 percent from the same level in 2001. “We have basically doubled the size of our faculty, staff and student load, while our budget has tripled,” said Warren Hoy, Chief of Mission Support for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.220 In 2001, the DLIFLC student load was 2,484, while in 2007 it was 3,806. Similarly, DLIFLC’s budget, which was $77 million in 2001, had reached $197 million in fiscal year 2006. At the same time, the percentage of students learning the harder Category III and IV level languages had increased to 94.5 percent of the total student population. Over 70 percent of DLIFLC students were studying the hardest languages, namely Arabic, Korean, and Chinese, while another 24 percent were learning Dari, Pashto, Persian and Russian.221

Office of the Provost
The chief academic officer of DLIFLC directly administered the Institute’s language training programs and all other major academic functions. Dr. Donald C. Fischer, continued to hold this distinguished position after coming on board in 2005 to replace Dr. Ray T. Clifford. Like Clifford, Fischer also held the title of senior language authority. Officially, Fischer was

known as chancellor with Deniz Bilgin serving as senior vice chancellor. Bilgin replaced Dr. Stephen M. Payne, who became the command historian in 2006.\footnote{222}

On 1 October 2006, the Commandant, Colonel Tucker B. Mansager, reorganized the Chancellor’s Office and renamed it the Provost Office. By taking this action, Mansager returned the name traditionally used for the office and the title that Clifford had actually held for most of his tenure. This important change became effective on 5 February 2007. At the same time, the decision also caused the renaming of all vice chancellors positions, which were relabeled associate provost positions while those positions titled associate provost became assistant provost positions. The purpose of this action was “to more accurately reflect their levels of authority and responsibility.”\footnote{223} In other words, Mansager believed that the title “chancellor” was not in step with the scope and mission of DLIFLC and that there needed to be a clearer distinction between the academic responsibilities of the chief academic officer and the command responsibilities inherent in the position of the commandant. The title of provost was held by Dr. Susan Steele, who also served as vice chancellor of undergraduate education, until she resigned from DLIFLC in 2006 to become dean of humanities at Monterey Peninsula College.\footnote{224}

Changes to the new organizational Table of Distributions and Allowances (TDA) are described below.

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Figure 16 Changes to DLIFLC academic titles effective on 5 February 2007.

Annual Program Review

Traditionally, DLIFLC holds an Annual Program Review (APR) for its academic programs in accordance with DOD Directive 5160.41 (paragraph 5.5d, 5.9i). As the period began, DLIFLC enacted major changes in the way it conducted the APR, most importantly, the 2006 APR (held in 2007) restricted the number and status of participants. The APR held in 2005 included the participation of some 250 to 300 individuals, many of whom were also participating in other DLIFLC sponsored conferences, including one for Command Language Program managers. In planning for the 2005 APR, held in 2006, the Assistant Commandant, Col. Daniel Scott, grew concerned about the size of the conference, its audience, and its focus. Too many of

\footnote{222} DLIFLC Directory (2006).
\footnote{224} Bob Britton, “DLIFLC Provost Keynotes Women’s History Month Event,” Monterey Military News, 7-20 April 2006, p. 9; and comments on draft by Dr Stephen M. Payne.
the individuals attending were lower ranking whereas Scott wanted the APR to showcase DLIFLC activities to senior officials who set policies that impacted DLIFLC as it ramped up for its expansion under the Proficiency Enhancement Program (PEP).\footnote{Col Daniel L. Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2012, pp. 3-4.}

According to Scott, the Command Language Program Managers (CLPM) conference was to assist post-level managers in supporting the training needs of their own linguists. It was not possible to plan simultaneously a mass event for this group and one for senior officials whose responsibility was to formulate policy. Although he encountered resistance—the Institute had held large springtime APRs for many years, Scott decided to make the change and only invite a few senior DOD officials to attend the 2006 APR. The point of the APR, according to Scott, was to learn what the services and agencies wanted from DLIFLC and in turn Institute leaders needed to tell them what they needed in terms of programming and advocacy. Scott saw the APR as an important opportunity with a senior officials, who would never have more than a few minutes to spend with the commandant or provost at the Pentagon, but who in Monterey could spend several hours focused on DLIFLC and its issues.\footnote{Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2012, pp. 3-4.}

Indeed, the 2006 APR brought with it the attendance of Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Dr. David Chu as well as Gail McGinn and the Defense Language Steering Committee (DLSC). The DLSC attended the 2007 meeting to review and consider various Institute activities over the past fiscal year and to offer guidance. DLIFLC focused its briefing on PEP, including resource issues stemming from the allocation of funds from Presidential Budget Decision 753 (PBD 753), faculty hiring and development, language aptitude testing, the Student Learning Center, in-country immersion, and information technology (IT) planning and implementation. The APR also covered issues such as DLIFLC efforts to support general-purpose forces through language familiarization training (especially Iraqi Headstart), professional military education, O9L MOS training, as well as the development of Language Survival Kits. It also reviewed ongoing linguist sustainment efforts focused on DLIFLC’s deployed Language Training Detachments, the implementation of a new Defense Language Proficiency Test, the use of Oral Proficiency Interviews, and the Strategic Language List.\footnote{DLIFLC Annual Program Review, 25 April 2007, briefing slides in “Mission, DLIFLC Leadership” ff, RG 21.24.}

As Scott revamped the APR, folding it into DLSC meetings, he also worked to cut down the number of briefing slides, aiming eventually to ensure that only a few key high profile issues were brought forth for the governing board’s input. Scott wanted to avoid senior policy-makers becoming bogged down in too many details while it was their overarching insight and assistance on broad policy issues that he felt their assistance was most needed. Scott did get the agenda paired down.\footnote{Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2012, pp. 4-5.} Mansager, applauding as success the 2006 APR, specifically noted the difficulty of compressing a year’s work into a few hours of briefings, but was satisfied that Institute leaders were able to reflect upon DLIFLC’s accomplishments and share its successes with senior DOD officials.\footnote{Command Guidance, Fourth Quarter, FY07, 15 July 2007, in “Command Guidance 2007” ff, RG 21.24. See also AR 350-20, paragraph 1-5, c (13).} Unfortunately, for that APR both McGinn and DLO Director Nancy Weaver were
called to testify before Congress at the last minute and thus were not able to attend. Scott himself was not as sanguine as the commandant about the meeting’s success. Fortunately, the 2007 APR (held in 2008) was again attended by McGinn and Weaver along with the senior language authorities, representatives from the intelligence agencies, and others from OSD. This APR marked the second full year of DLIFLC’s efforts to implement the PEP program, discussed more broadly in Chapter II.

Scott thought the discussion good and the APR “put some solid topics on the table for the steering committee to work” although he was still frustrated by the fact that the committee tended still less to help DLIFLC than to task it more. Nevertheless, according to Scott, the new APR provided DLIFLC several hours to spend focused on DLIFLC issues with senior DOD officials. The APR gave these leaders an opportunity to provide “some vectors of guidance” and “to shape events at DLI before they get too far down the road.” As Scott concluded, “it’s very valuable to be able to brief your board of directors and convince them you’re doing the right thing.”

**Academic Affairs and Accreditation**

The Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges (ACCJC) of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges first accredited DLIFLC in 1979 to offer junior college credit for its own courses. Graduates could then earn up to forty-five units of college credit. In March 2002, after approval by Congress, DLIFLC began to offer Associate of Arts degrees in Foreign Languages and awarded its first such degrees in 2003. On 14 September 2006, DLIFLC awarded its 2,000th Associate of Arts degree, an event marked at the post theater when a graduate of the Arabic Basic Language Program accepted a diploma. “Students are given an amazing opportunity to earn an AA degree in a foreign language from such a prestigious institution as DLIFLC,” said Kalyn Shubnell, AA Degree Program Advisor, after the event. In FY 2007, DLIFLC awarded another 560 AA degrees. To maintain accreditation DLIFLC had to comply with a list of requirements determined by the accrediting commission. Accreditation and reaccreditation have become a high priority activity of the Institute because of the role accredited status has in attracting both student enlistees and high quality faculty.

In 2006, DLIFLC engaged in an accreditation “self-study” to help maintain its accreditation to award Associate of Arts degrees to DLIFLC students who pass its graduation requirements and transfer sufficient general education requirements from other colleges or by taking CLEP tests. The Provost Office and Colonel Mansager also worked together to align this academic process with the DLIFLC Five Year Command Plan to facilitate synergism between

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230 Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2012, pp. 3-4.
232 Col Daniel L. Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2012, pp. 3-4.
the two. Following the self-study and a visit by a team of evaluators representing the ACCJC, DLIFLC was successfully reaccredited.

The DLIFLC Directorate of Academic Affairs (DAA) played an important role in maintaining the Institute’s academic accreditation, processing its records, awards, and transcripts, and certifying student credentials. DAA also maintained the Student Database System and supported the schools by installing and maintaining the system’s programs on approximately eighty computers and ensuring its data integrity. Another system that DAA operated was the Student Training Administrative Tracking System, which both the schools and the military units used to track their students’ progress. DAA provided data integrity while Military Language Instructors (MLIs) did data entry in the schools. Dean Alex Vorobiov oversaw DDA while the registrar and accreditation liaison was Dr. Robert Savukinas.

Academic Advisory Council/Academic Senate

The Academic Advisory Council at DLIFLC was a faculty organization designed to promote the professional development of school faculty while facilitating the flow of information between schools, divisions, and directorates horizontally. Its mission was to promote professionalism, identify initiatives, propose new ideas, and provide advice to the chancellor or provost on academic issues, including with regard to the selection of senior Institute academic officials.

DLIFLC first established an Institute level academic advisory body in 1998. As constituted in early 2006, the Academic Advisory Council included a chair, a vice-chair, a secretary, and twenty-three regular members who represented its schools, divisions, and directorates. Its executive committee also communicated and met regularly with the faculty advisory panels formed at the school, division, and directorate level.

In September 2004, DLIFLC faculty elected a new Academic Advisory Council for a three-year term running from 2004 to 2007. In October 2004, the council elected its executive board, which included Anto Knežević as chair, Shelly Smith as vice-chair, and Natalia Antokhin as secretary. Senior Vice Chancellor Dr. Stephen Payne supervised the election.

In early 2006, faculty member Božo Džakula from Curriculum Development published an article about the Academic Advisory Council. In his article, Džakula explained how the council contributed to improving learning outcomes at DLIFLC. His research, focused upon communication, concluded that successful communication created and promoted a shared vision. According to Džakula, the council achieved a shared vision by adhering to key principles of internal communication, including the use of two-way communication and both horizontal and vertical information flow processes. Džakula found that successful internal communication helped to identify and resolve problems. Importantly, because reorganizations were frequent at DLIFLC, the Academic Advisory Council had kept abreast of change and maintained successful

236 Extensive documentation on the reaccreditation process is located in RG 21.24.
238 Academic Advisory Council Newsletter (Spring 2005): 2.
communication by amending its own by-laws following reorganizations and by holding new elections so that the council reflected new organizational structures properly while also applying the by-laws to prevent other problems.\textsuperscript{239}

The Academic Advisory Council Executive Board assisted the chancellor on accreditation issues in early 2006 and throughout the year worked to increase its visibility and role within DLIFLC. For example, Chair Knežević obtained email access to all DLIFLC faculty while council representation grew on a number of important committees, such as the Program Budget Advisory Committee.\textsuperscript{240} At some point in 2006, a decision was made to change the name of the council, which became the Academic Senate. As a result, instead of being called a chairman, Knežević became president of the Academic Senate.\textsuperscript{241}

The Academic Senate held an election in August 2007 in which the majority of its representatives were newly elected. On 27 September 2007, faculty members elected new officers to sit on the Academic Senate Executive Board. Dr. Mahera Harouny was elected president from Curriculum Development, Feras Fanari was elected vice-president from Middle East II, and Dr. Amal Johnson was elected secretary also from Middle East II. With new leadership in place, the Academic Senate convened anew on 24 October 2007. The senate’s goal for the coming year was to improve communications with Faculty Advisory Council members and the DLIFLC Board of Visitors.\textsuperscript{242}

**Basic Course of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center**

During this period, DLIFLC organized its Basic Language Program into eight separate schools. These schools fell under the direction of the Associate Provost for Undergraduate Education, Dr. Jielu Zhao. Rather than focus upon each school individually, this section will focus attention on issues common to all.

There were three Middle East Schools focused upon Arabic; three Asian schools focused mainly upon Chinese and Korean; one Multi-Language School focused mainly upon Serbian/Croatian and Persian-Farsi; and one European and Latin American School focused upon languages more familiar to Americans such as French, German, Russian, and Spanish. In addition, a special teaching unit called the Emerging Languages Task Force served as an incubator for developing teaching methods and curriculum for various infrequently taught languages of strategic interest, especially those languages relating to the conflict in Afghanistan. All together, DLIFLC taught twenty-four languages in its basic resident program.

DLIFLC’s Middle East School III was the newest school. It opened just before Colonel Mansager arrived as commandant in August 2005. As the newest school, Middle East School III at first also contained the newest and least experienced faculty. Thus, DLIFLC transferred

\textsuperscript{241} “By-Laws; Academic Senate/Faculty Advisory Councils,” 25 October 2006, in ff 8, RG 20.12-04.
\textsuperscript{242} Mahera Harouny, “An Overview of the DLIFLC Academic Senate’s Accomplishments September 2007 – December 2008,” no date [January 2009], in DLIFLC Digital Archives; and memo in “Academic Senate 2007” (ff 9), RG 51.01.10-06.
several instructors from Middle East Schools I and II to the new school, which resulted in some temporary disruption stemming from this larger reorganization and the new hiring. This disruption lingered on until after Mansager arrived.\textsuperscript{243} 

![Figure 17 Associate Provost, Undergraduate Education, Dr. Jielu Zhao (center), pictured with Dr. John Lett, Grazyna Dudney, and Dr. Alex Vorobiov (in background), in December 2007.](image)

Also prior to Mansager, the three Middle East Schools had worked together over many months to develop an improved Arabic curriculum that incorporated the requirements of the Proficiency Enhancement Program (PEP), which “had a tremendous impact on the faculty and staff” and directly involved some thirty Arabic civilian and military faculty and staff across the three schools. This working group compressed the existing three-semester curriculum into two semesters by weeding out ineffective or outdated material and then supplemented it with new more “authentic, learner-centered materials” to help students reach the higher proficiency standards. The biggest change affected the final Arabic semester, which sought to incorporate numerous new activities that required higher level thinking skills. The curriculum now included forty-six four-hour bridges focused upon real life situations, task-based language activities, and two-hour integrative lessons. Students also had to complete group projects, participate in debates, read short stories, write essays, and give oral presentations. The schools also began to grade writing assignments, including daily homework assignments, a technique, they claimed, never before used at DLIFLC. To enhance PEP implementation, Middle East School I piloted the first student iPod trials, which was necessary to determine their effectiveness and to find glitches. After several pilot trials ended in success, the school recommended to DLIFLC to

\textsuperscript{243} \textsuperscript{243} Col Tucker B. Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, p. 8.
adopt the technology for all students. The new PEP curriculum was fully implemented in all three schools with the beginning of classes in January 2006.  

During FY 2007, DLIFLC graduated 2,061 Basic Course language students, many of whom also earned an Associate of Arts Degree in Foreign Language from DLIFLC. The Arabic Program had the largest number of graduates with 577 completions. Chinese Mandarin students were second at 300 completions while Korean came in third with 295 completions.

One major change in the Basic Program was the introduction of the “4+2” concept. The 4+2 innovation involved adapting the standard six hours of classroom instruction to allow students to choose two hours of instruction per day as their own electives. During their first four hours instruction students continued to work from their textbooks as normal but during the afternoon, for the first time, they could decide which classes would best suit their own needs. Instructors hoped that by allowing students this option, it would empower their sense of control over their own education. The first 4+2 concept class was held in Asian School II, Department C under Chairperson Dr. Rachel Tsutagawa.

**Asian Schools I-III**

Luba Grant continued to manage Asian School I, a position she obtained in January 2003. The school was organized into five Chinese Departments (A-E) and one Multi-Language Department (Japanese, Tagalog, Thai) with from twenty to twenty-four instructors each and twelve MLIs for the entire school. The school added several new Chinese instructors and by the end of 2006 consisted of six Chinese and one Multi-Language Department. In 2007, the school’s Tagalog program doubled. Grant therefore removed the program from the Multi-Language Department and formed instead an independent Tagalog Department effective from October 2007. The school continued to upgrade its technology and by early 2007, all students and some faculty were equipped with iPods while many students had received tablet PCs. At the same time, Grant ordered that long distance phone service be suspended on faculty phones, apparently to curb misuse. In 2007, Asian School I took over Building 220, the former post bowling alley, as well as Building 235, and initiated redesign efforts to make each suitable for a “PEP-sized department.”

Asian School I sent sixty-five Chinese language students to participate in the 31st Annual Chinese Mandarin Speech Contest in San Francisco on 29 April 2006. The event attracted 712 registered students, a record-breaking number representing several major universities in northern California. Six DLIFLC students took first place, five won second, three won third, while

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246 Asian School I 2nd and 4th Quarter Historical Reports (CY06), in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
247 Asian School I 3rd Quarter Historical Report (CY07), in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
248 Asian School I 1st Quarter Historical Report (CY07), in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
249 Asian School I 2nd and 3rd Quarter Historical Reports (CY07), in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
nine earned fourth place or honorable mention. In all, twenty-three outperformed rivals from civilian schools including Stanford University and UC Berkeley, a demonstration of the effectiveness of their training. The school also held its annual recreational holiday performances, in 2007 at the Price Fitness Center, where Chinese language students and faculty sang, danced, and performed skits to highlight their cultural knowledge.

Figure 18 DLIFLC students pose with trophies won during Chinese speech contest held in San Francisco in 2006.

Asian School II consisted of five basic program departments. These programs included four Korean and one Hebrew Department for part of this period. The departments were further sub-divided into teaching teams. The deans of Asian School II continued to be Dr. Jielu Zhao until 2 April 2007 when Dr. Sahie Kang assumed the position after transferring from Middle East School II. In 2006, although it was responsible for Korean language and culture training, effective from 1 January 2007, Asian School II inherited the Hebrew Department from the Multi Language School. This change caused the school’s 2005 structure to grow from four to five departments. Later on 14 June 2007, the Hebrew program was relocated to European and Latin American School, which apparently had more space to juggle an eighth department and

252 Holiday Performance flyer, 19 December 2007, in “Asian Schools” ff, RG 52.01.
allow DLIFLC to consolidate space in the 630 series buildings and eliminate use of a portable office. Asian II was then occupying Buildings 610, 611, and 637.255 Facilities upgrades required the school to relinquish control of the back wing of Building 637 to Language Science and Technology during the final quarter of 2007 and to relocate several offices and classrooms in Building 610 to the Multi Language School.256

School students remained competitive in Korean. In October 2006, students from the Department A Translation Club won the grand prize for the 37th Annual Korea Times Literature Translation Award.257 In November 2006, nine DLIFLC students from Asian School II won the grand prize ($2,500) for their translations of Korean poetry during a contest co-sponsored by the Korea Times and the Korea Exchange Bank. The students participated in the contest at the suggestion of their teacher, Juhn Hye-jin, who thought it would encourage development of their translation skills, which was also a stated policy goal of the Provost Office. Three of the students traveled to South Korea to accept the award, which the students donated to charity.258

In 18 August 2007, Asian School II participated in a Korean folk festival in Union Square, San Francisco. A group of fan dancers and volunteers comprised of students at Asian II went to take part in a city parade as well as perform in front of a live audience. Approximately twenty-five students attended the event, which was organized by Kate Hwang, Dr. Hyun-Soo Hur, and Young O. Park.259 In early October, a group of Asian II instructors volunteered and spent a weekend observing Alpha Company, 229th MI Battalion, soldiers during a Joint Leadership Training Exercise at Ft. Ord.260 On 26 October 2007, Asian School II celebrated Hangul Day, or Korean Alphabet Day, the date that marks the creation of the Korean alphabet in 1446 by King Sejong. Before that time, Koreans who could write used classical Chinese characters. During the event 240 DLIFLC students in Asian School II submitted essays they had composed in Korean to be judged in a contest from which thirty-one entries were later chosen by instructors to be entered in a school-wide competition. From this group, a panel of DLIFLC judges chose eight essays to compete for three special awards. Students Nathan Meier took the Provost’s award, Ashleigh Pipes, took the Dean’s Award, and Javaise Vezia took the Commandant’s Award.261

Like Asian School II, Asian School III taught the Korean Basic Course under Dean Dr. Hiam N. Kanbar. In 2006, Asian School III operated three Korean departments.262 In 2007, it operated four Korean departments. One of this school’s major events in 2007 was to plan and

administer a four-week overseas immersion course at Sogang University for selected students of two classes. More students also participated in the multi-day off-post immersions exercises.263

Figure 19 Korean poetry translation contest winners with their DLIFLC instructors, 2006.

Emerging Languages Task Force

The Emerging Languages Task Force (ELTF) continued to serve as an incubator for the development of teaching methods and curricula for new languages instead of simply dropping a sudden language-teaching requirement into an established school. Dr. Mahmood Taba Tabai administered the task force. DLIFLC established ELTF to better grapple with the process used by the Army, called the Structure Manning Decision Review/Training Requirements Arbitration Panel (SMDR/TRAP) that assigned classroom seats requested by the various services at DLIFLC. Before the creation of ELTF, for the planning, resourcing, hiring, and training cycle to react to a large increase in a new language requirement it might take five years. ELTF shortened the cycle. Even so, the choice as to what languages to develop with ELTF was not up to DLIFLC. DLO intended the new Strategic Languages List to help manage that problem, so the Institute could prepare sufficient materials in advance rather than from scratch. The list divided languages into those where an immediate investment was necessary and those that might be necessary over the longer term. ELFT instructors not only taught the language, but also worked to develop its curriculum. If DOD found a sustained need for a given language, then the commandant would decide when the program was sufficiently mature to move permanently into a regular school.264

264 Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, p. 5.
ELTF languages included Hindi, Kurdish-Kurmanji, Kurdish-Sorani, Urdu, Uzbek and two programs, Dari and Pashto, which relocated between January and March 2006 to the Multi Language School. Colonel Mansager made the decision to move Dari and Pashto into the normal teaching program after consulting with the assistant commandant, the provost, and the dean of ELFT. He did not move the programs, however, because they had reached a state of maturity, but rather the opposite. Mansager was unhappy about the state of curricular development for these languages in particular and decided to move them into the schools in the hope that further evolution could take place there. Later, Mansager placed Indonesian into ELTF, which was a new requirement. Although DLIFLC had once taught the language, no one could find any previous DLIFLC Indonesian training materials, which meant the program had to start again from scratch. Fortunately, it began to regenerate the curriculum using materials provided by the Australian Defence Force’s Indonesian Program. This sharing was facilitated, no doubt, by Mansager’s recent visit to Australia. ELTF was also able to employ a still existing, if outdated, DLPT II to test the first students. The first students did well on the test after studying the language within ELTF, but Mansager was disinclined nevertheless to keep Indonesian within ELTF because of his perception that ELTF was reluctant or lacked the needed structure to ensure adequate curricula development. ELTF had been important in DLIFLC’s early response to military requirements stemming from 9/11, but Mansager was also frank in assessing that “it’s time to rejuvenate that program in some regards and that’s something I haven’t been able to do since I’ve been here.” Ironically, after ELTF participated in the TRADOC Manpower Survey during February and March, ELTF was included on DLIFLC’s official organization chart for the first time. Previously, DLIFLC listed some or all of its billets under other Institute organizations, mainly the Multi-Language School.

In April 2006, staff, faculty and students began moving into recently renovated portions of Building 618, Munzer Hall. Contractors moved all ELTF offices and classrooms from Buildings 637A/B and 636A/B. The school’s supply and information technology functions moved from Building 634 (its server was absorbed by CIO at a new location). During the last week of May, twenty-five faculty members in two open-bay offices received new modular workstations. During the transition, instructors continued with their normal teaching and class preparation activities despite the fact that construction continued in several rooms in Munzer Hall and other organizations began transitioning out of the building. By late June, however, ELTF was the sole occupant. By early 2007, ELTF reached full capacity with nineteen classrooms in use and had to convert two break rooms for the temporary use of two post-DLPT sections. At the same time, ELTF developed procedures for conducting evening study in Munzer Hall. It accommodated students on probation or needing special assistance or those just wanting to come to the school for self-directed study. Munzer Hall became available to students for non-

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265 ELTF Quarterly History, March 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
266 Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, p. 5.
267 ELTF Quarterly History, July 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
268 Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, pp. 5-6.
270 ELTF Quarterly History, July 2006.
directed study four nights a week. A problem at Munzer Hall was that it lacked an auditorium. Thus, it was difficult for ELTF to gather its faculty. To facilitate group gatherings when no venue was available, ELTF purchased a portable screen, projector, and folding chairs, which allowed the school to accommodate groups of thirty to forty faculty members in the large foyer area of the building for bi-weekly training. Meanwhile, in Building 634, to decrease noise crossover from one classroom to the next, ELTF had to remove three interior doors between classrooms and replaced them with dry wall and insulation. By early July 2007, all ELTF classrooms in Buildings 634, 618, and 632 were equipped with wireless internet capability.

In the summer of 2007, the provost requested Faculty and Staff Development assist ELTF by providing a special team intervention workshop for the Hindi language teaching team, which was experiencing challenges. As a result, Faculty and Staff Development held special workshops to help the Hindi Department team define problems, collect data on the state of the team, learn how to collaborate as a team, and make decisions to resolve team issues.

During the third quarter of 2007, following the successful graduation of several classes, enrollment in ELTF declined from 81 students to just 50 students. However, ELTF expected new enrollments to rise soon. Of greater concern was ELTF’s Urdu course. This program did not have a complete curriculum and lesson materials had to be developed on a “just-in-time” basis by fourteen instructors during non-teaching and overtime hours.

One of the stars of ELTF was Air Force Capt. Angi Carsten. DLIFLC officials credited her with helping convince a congressional commission to remove the Presidio of Monterey from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list of facilities to be closed, although as previously noted the BRAC Commission was not seriously considering closing the Presidio. In ELTF, Carsten served as the associate dean, administered eight ELTF languages programs, and managed the Defense Strategic Language Surge Capabilities program. She retired from the Air Force and DLIFLC on 5 April 2007 after twenty years of service.

**European and Latin American School**

The European and Latin American School was located in the historical cavalry-era buildings on the lower Presidio, across from Soldier Field (specifically Buildings 204 through 207 and 212 through 216). In 2006, DLIFLC rented the former Larkin Elementary School, located just across the Junipero Serra Creek from the Presidio, and also added Buildings 210 and 218 to the European and Latin American School. To mark the remodeling and opening of the Larkin School in February, DLIFLC held an open house, hosted by Colonel Mansager, for local residents and Monterey Mayor Dan Albert, who attended. Dean Deanna Tovar remained the dean of the European and Latin American School throughout this period.

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272 Report to the Historian Third Quarter FY07, in DLIFLC Digital Archives. This building was part of a complex of award-winning structures built in 1967 (and once known as the “Russian Village”), but have been the source of frequent classroom complaints for their acoustic properties.
273 3rd Quarter Historical Input Report for Faculty Development, 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
274 Report to the Historian Third Quarter FY07, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
There were two significant changes to the structure of European and Latin American School in early 2006. Following its renovation, the Larkin facility became home to the French and Serbian-Croatian Departments effective 10 January 2006 while the Multi-Language Department moved to Building 210 effective 15 March 2006. The European and Latin American School held an open house for the public on 15 March 2006. In early 2006, the school included two Russian Departments, two Spanish Departments, one French Department, one Serbian-Croatian Department, and one Multi-Language Department. This amounted to 105 instructors and 7 department chairs supplemented by 19 MLIs.276 In June 2006, Tovar divided the Russian program into three departments, apparently to prepare for increased student load or new hires. She appointed two new Russian chairs and conducted interviews for applicants in the Russian, Spanish, German, French, and Italian programs. She reported 116 instructors and 8 chairs with 20 MLIs and 156 students graduating in July 2006.277 By early 2007, the school had grown to 141 instructors with 7 department chairs but only 13 MLIs.278 The Russian program was the school’s largest with 75 instructors by fall 2007.279 In late 2007, the school received the Hebrew Department with 16 instructors, which helped to raise the schools total instructors to 168 with 8 department chairs. Tovar also acquired an assistant dean, Dr. Rosemary Kauffman.280

In 2006, the European and Latin American School conducted its first overseas immersion when eight French language students traveled to Bordeaux, France, from 12 February through 3 March, where they studied at the Bordeaux Language School. The students and instructors did much of the planning for this pilot program.281 The school conducted a second overseas immersion during the second quarter of 2006 when five Russian students and MLI M. Sgt. Lisa Christy went to Petrozavodsk, Russia, from 20 June to 16 July.282 In 2007, following an exploratory site visit to St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kiev by Dean Tovar, Irene Krasner and Leonid Slutsky, eight students from the Russian Department completed four-week immersion training in Kiev.283

Middle East Schools I-III

During this period, DLIFLC operated three Middle East Schools focused upon basic Arabic language instruction. These three schools, numbered I to III, contained the Institute’s largest language training program.

276 European Latin American School Quarterly Historical Report (1st QTR, CY06), 16 April 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
277 European Latin American School Quarterly Historical Report (2nd QTR, CY06), 28 July 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
278 European Latin American School Quarterly Historical Report (1st QTR, CY07), 27 April 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
279 European Latin American School Quarterly Historical Report (3rd QTR, CY07), 30 September 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
281 European Latin American School Quarterly Historical Report (1st QTR, CY06), 16 April 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
On 17 April 2006, Dr. Christine Campbell assumed the position of associate vice chancellor of the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization and stepped down as dean of Middle East School I, a position she had held for seven years. Dr. Raul Cucalon, Assistant Dean, then became the acting dean. A new dean arrived in early 2007, Dr. Clive Roberts. Roberts transferred to the school from the Faculty Development Directorate. After eight months as acting dean, Dr. Cucalon then returned to his former position as assistant dean. The school was divided into four Arabic departments, which were located in Building 621, Nakamura Hall.

In 2006, the school established its first Information Technology Center that employed four individuals plus a director. It coincided roughly with the graduation of Middle East School I’s last “non-iPod” class in May 2006. The center supported the deployment of the school’s iPods and provided technical expertise for student laptops, the Multi Media Language Lab, and the Multi Use Labs. In early 2006, the school revamped its immersion program by creating a new three-day program, expanding its one-day immersion program, and by beginning work on a five-day program. Lead by Mrs. Salwa Halabi, the immersion team began to conduct 100 percent of its immersions in the new immersion center on the former Fort Ord, including the first three-day immersion to be held at the new facility. The school also successfully deployed its first two students to an Arabic country in 2006 to conduct a multi-week immersion training. The trip was part of a combined group of twelve sent by the three Middle East schools to the International Language Institute in Egypt. The most significant mission milestone for Middle East School I in 2007 was the introduction of the new Arabic Basic Course curriculum instituted in Department C. Middle East School I was the first school to introduce this new curriculum and its progress was closely monitored by the other Middle East schools, the Associate Provost Office, Curriculum Development Division, and the Testing and Evaluation Division. The school continued to validate the new course into the summer. Other projects in 2007 included the need to comply with and complete a manpower assessment and TDA review, implementing new study hall procedures, and preparation for Language Day. During the first part of 2007, the school also prepared to expand from four to five departments. Its Department E became operational on 20 April with commencement of its first class.

In 2006, Middle East School II had 4 departments with 14 teaching teams divided into 41 sections with a combined total of 84 civilian instructors and 8 MLIs. The school was led by Dr. Sahie Kang. Middle East School II launched its first PEP class on 19 January 2006 and continued to participate in a PEP taskforce involving all three Middle East schools during this period. Begun in July 2004, the deans in Middle East Schools I and II launched a PEP Taskforce, which Middle East School III joined after its own creation at the end of 2004.

284 Middle East School I, 1st Quarter CY 2006 History and 2nd Quarter CY 2006 History, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
285 Middle East School I, 1st Quarter CY 2007 History, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
287 Middle East School I, 1st Quarter CY 2006 History and 2nd Quarter CY 2006 History, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
288 Middle East School I, 1st Quarter CY 2007 History, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
289 Ibid; and Middle East School I, 2nd Quarter CY 2007 History, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
taskforce consisted of over 30 civilian and military faculty and staff across all three Arabic Schools who worked to adjust the existing curriculum for each of the three semesters aiming for the higher proficiency levels of L2+/R2+/S2. In January 2006, Middle East School II implemented the new curriculum.  

![Figure 20 DLIFLC instructor Najla Al-Saadi teaching Arabic during a summer class in 2006.](image)

To support academic achievement, Middle East School II also strengthened its three different study hall programs (mandatory for first eight weeks, special assistance and probation, and enrichment) by adding speaking program for students in the MOS 97E, who were also receiving one hour of one-on-one speaking practice during the academic day. The school also supported the PEP program by continuing its one- and two-day off-site immersions at the Weckerling Center and by planning to offer three-day over-night immersions at the new overnight immersion facility set up on the Ord Military Community. In fact, Middle East School II launched the grand opening of the new facility when it held the first overnight immersion from 17-19 April 2006. Middle East School II also participated in the combined

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291 Middle East School II Annual Historical Report from 1 January 2006 to 31 March 2006 and DLIFLC Directory (2006), in DLIFLC Digital Archives.

overseas immersion exercise to the International Language Institute in Egypt in 2006 by sending four students. Finally, it participated in ongoing exercises at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, by sending small groups of students and teachers to participate in realistic military training scenarios for combat forces where authentic foreign language use enriched the training for all participants.293

Dean Dr. John Shannon led Middle East School III through 2006 until he resigned on 14 September 2007. Madlain Michael served as acting dean until a new dean, Dr. George El-Hage joined the school on 17 December 2007. Prior to his acceptance as dean of Middle East School III, El-Hage has served as the academic specialist for Middle East II.294 During this period, the school was planning to relocate to a new academic building to be known as Khalil Hall. As with the other Middle East schools, several students from Middle East School III participated in a one-month overseas immersion in Egypt in 2006. Meeting a tight deadline in the last quarter of 2006, the school completed a new Department of the Army approved 0207 TDA that superseded its old TDA, a task that included completing a complicated and detailed fact finding analysis of its employee positions.295

Multi-Language School

DLIFLC re-designated the Multi-Language School as the Undergraduate School of Multiple Languages (UML) in early 2006. UML supported five language programs: Persian-Farsi, Dari (which arrived in December 2005 from the Emerging Languages Task Force), Pashto (which joined the school in March), Hebrew (which transferred to Asian School II in early 2007), and Turkish. Dean Dr. Shensheng Zhu led the school.296

The school’s largest program was Persian-Farsi, which hired 14 new instructors by early 2007 and contained three departments with 70 instructors. In 2006, the Pashto and Dari Departments both employed 26 instructors while the Hebrew and Turkish Departments combined totaled 19 faculty. Of particular note in the Pashto Department was that Pashto teachers and course developers developed and validated the first semester of Pashto Basic Course materials in early 2006.297 This new Pashto curriculum, which the school developed in-house using a team of four Afghan developers under Project Manager Masako Boureston, was fully adopted by September 2007. The Pashto program also continued to grow and included 39 instructors by mid-2007.298

UML enrolled ten special students in its Pashto Basic Course in April 2007. The ten students were officers from the Danish Army and Navy preparing for deployment to Afghanistan where Denmark was supporting the U.S.-led International Assistance Force Afghanistan.

293 Middle East School II Annual Historical Report from 1 January 2006 to 31 March 2006; DLIFLC Directory (2006).
294 Middle East School III Quarterly Historical Reports, 1 July to 1 October-31 December 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
295 Middle East School III Quarterly Historical Reports, 1 January-31 December 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
DLIFLC provided the training because of its expertise in teaching the Pashto language, which is offered by qualified instructors almost nowhere else in the world. Denmark funded the officers’ training, who were expected to deploy to Afghanistan immediately upon completion of their training at DLIFLC.\footnote{Spc Kenneth Thomas, “DLIFLC Hosts Pashto Class of Danish Military Students,” \textit{Globe} (Fall 2007): 20-21.} Despite such recognition, however, some of the school’s Pashto and other language instructors struggled with English and developing the lesson plans required for every hour of instruction within the school. To address these problems, the school worked with the Student Learning Center to conduct twice-weekly English grammar classes and with the Faculty and Staff Development Division to conduct workshops for new instructors unable to attend the four-week long Instructor Certification Course until months after their arrival.\footnote{MLS Quarterly Report-Summer 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.}

During this period, UML upgraded its technology and by early 2007 had issued laptops and iPods to all students and instructors and provided ongoing training sessions to learn how to use them. The school’s listening lab was upgraded as well as a wireless facility and construction for a high-tech language lab called Classroom XXI was completed and fully operational with numerous faculty certified to operate it in 2007.\footnote{MLS Quarterly Report-Spring 2006; MLS Quarterly Report-Winter 2006-2007.}

\textbf{Immersion Language Training}

During this period, DLIFLC brought together independent immersion language training activities originating within its schools into a coherent DLIFLC-wide immersion language training program under the leadership of former Russian language instructor Andrie Pashin, who had promoted the idea and became first dean of the DLIFLC Immersion Language Office. “In the spring of 2005, in connection with a Department of Defense directive, we decided to look at both domestic isolation and OCONUS isolation immersion programs,” said Pashin, speaking about both the Monterey-based and overseas immersion programs.\footnote{Natela Cutter, “DLIFLC Launches Overseas Immersion Program,” \textit{Globe} (Spring 2006): 16-17.}

The effort enhanced the Proficiency Enhancement Program. One of the first priorities was to establish a dedicated isolation immersion facility and DLIFLC decided to employ an unused building on the former Fort Ord—Building 3199. The Institute put the new facility to good use by expanding the immersion program, now known as the Immersion Language Office (ILO). Immersion exercises lasting one day, three days, or up to five days were now conceivable and ILO also began planning to “take on a field training exercise format to assess where students are in preparing for the language tasks that will face them when they reach their field units,” according to Dr. Fischer.\footnote{\textit{Annual Program Review 2007} (DLIFLC, 2008), pp. 5, 7.} Adjacent to the new ILO building, DLIFLC soon erected three prefabricated structures, two for use as student sleeping quarters and one set up as a shower facility. With overnight capabilities, ILO could accommodate up to eighty students at one time conducting two simultaneous immersions.\footnote{Cutter, “DLIFLC Launches Overseas Immersion Program.”} In August 2006, Asian School III became the first
DLIFLC school to sponsor student overnight stays at the immersion facility. Between then and 2007, 3,437 students participated in 152 “isolation immersion field exercises.”

The other major component of the immersion program involved sending small contingents of students abroad to live for several weeks in countries where their target language was spoken. The first overseas DLIFLC immersion trip took place in September of 2005 and was fully under way in 2006 when the program successfully conducted over twenty trips lasting four-weeks. An important issue developed that year, however, when concern grew about the need to evaluate the potential security clearance problems for linguists participating in in-country immersions. DLIFLC brought the matter to the attention of the Defense Language Steering Committee and the matter was eventually resolved. By November 2006, ninety students had conducted immersions in China, Russia, Egypt, South Korea, and France and ILO was programming similar events for future years.

Staff had to overcome a variety of additional hurdles to program success. Budgetary restraints were foremost, tempered somewhat by program requirements. For example, would DLIFLC teachers need to accompany in-country immersion students after the piloting phase of the program was completed and would additional staffing support for the in-country program be necessary or available? Managers also had to draft special rules of student conduct during immersions, for example, regarding the use of cell phones or English. Additional issues concerned security and U.S. State Department visa rules. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, DLIFLC had to establish a priority for in-country immersions and the minimum required rank for an in-country group leader. Eventually, DLIFLC determined not to send teachers with groups on overseas immersion trips and to avoid sending FAOs as they normally took up in-country assignments after leaving DLIFLC.

The selection of which students to send was a more vexing conundrum. At first, DLIFLC sent the best students. Two problems quickly developed: First overseas immersion training became an award for achievement, which was not a program goal. Second, measuring the effectiveness of the training on proficiency was problematic because high-achieving students might achieve high end-of-course marks regardless of their participation in overseas trips. In theory, the highest performance gains would accrue if DLIFLC selected only average performance students, those who would likely benefit the most from an overseas immersion experience. DLIFLC’s Research and Analysis Division reviewed the situation and, by mid-2007, ILO elected “to temporarily suspend the selection of the very best students for an immersion course event, and to instead randomly select students from within a pool of qualified candidates.”

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307 Nikolina Kulidzan, email to Cameron Binkley, 19 July 2011.
Despite the necessity of this decision, it was unfair to penalize high-achieving students by eliminating their participation, and so ILO balanced fairness with performance by selecting ten to twenty students at random (in concurrence with recommendations by the teaching team and the student’s unit) after ruling out underachievers or those with less than a 3.0 average.\textsuperscript{311} The success of the immersion program became apparent in FY 2006 after the completion of sixteen overseas immersions where students later completed proficiency tests. Although the cost per student was roughly $5,500, the resulting increases in proficiency were significant in demonstrating the effectiveness of the method.

In FY 2007, ILO conducted another twenty-six in-country immersions for 243 students from the four services, although Army and Air Force students made up the bulk with 72 and 132 students respectively. The countries involved included Egypt and Jordan, China, France, Korea, Russia/Ukraine, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and Turkey.\textsuperscript{312}

The in-country isolation immersion facility was less problematic than the overseas program and faculty sensing sessions revealed no major problems with the chosen facility. However, to set up the new facility, staff had to address a number of miscellaneous issues related to food, transportation, and supplies. For example, no food was available at the facility and

\textsuperscript{311} Kulidzan, “DLIFLC’s In-country Immersion Program: Two Years of Exploring the Unexplored.”

student meals had to be provided and delivered by the Army dining facility. Faculty, on the other hand, had to leave to eat and there could be no discussion over meals, a concern particularly to faculty in the Middle-Eastern schools. Fortunately, the facility was equipped with two kitchens and ILO eventually put a plan in place to allow onsite cooking. 313 A related issue was the desire by some of the language schools to allow nighttime visits by select family members (of teaching staff) to the immersion facility, which they believed was an effective alternative to more usual evening activities. Unfortunately, Provost Donald Fischer determined that the situation was too fraught with liability issues and the potential for favoritism to authorize. 314 During FY 2007, the immersion facility hosted 153 immersion events, the vast majority being multi-day affairs where students lived and cooked in the facility. 315

National Training Center Joint Language Training Exercises

In 2004, DLIFLC began long-term cooperation with the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, to participate at that location in language training activities for units rotated through the desert post to conduct combat simulation drills. By 2007, DLIFLC had deployed some five hundred students and faculty twenty-seven times. These participated in training along with the combat units to simulate local nationals speaking native dialects in life-like scenarios. In early 2007, two additional rotations of DLIFLC students and staff also participated in similar training at Fort Gordon, Georgia, with the 3rd Infantry Division. 316 DLIFLC continued to assist the NTC in training rotational units throughout the remainder of 2007 when the number of students and instructors sent doubled with each visit to become twenty-four students and twelve instructors. With this change, DLIFLC could provide training from brigade combat team commander to the platoon level. In recognition of the important role played by DLIFLC at NTC, Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, NTC Commander, visited the Presidio of Monterey on 26 October to tour DLIFLC facilities and to receive a command briefing. “We welcome and look forward to bringing [DLIFLC’s] institutional knowledge, classroom instruction, technology, and students to the NTC to further our efforts on training Brigade Combat Teams,” said Pittard. 317

Military Language Instructor Program

DLIFLC has long used Military Language Instructors to facilitate language-learning and military linguist acculturation. These uniformed enlisted DLIFLC graduates are both knowledgeable in their target languages and have had actual military linguist job experience. When they return from operational units for duty in Monterey, they help teach students, serve as role models, and provide a liaison between the Institute’s schools and the military service units who are responsible for student oversight while at DLIFLC. The Institute had long held that the higher the MLI contact hours per student, the lower became DLIFLC’s attrition rate, thus obtaining the specified number of MLIs each year remained an important management function.

313 Ibid.
Moreover, MLIs were an integral part of DLIFLC’s teaching team methodology for in addition to classroom teaching they also served as liaison between the schools and the students’ units. Ideally, there would be enough MLIs to have one per teaching team. 318

In 2006, DOD authorized 106 MLIs for the DLIFLC, but the services only assigned 71. Similarly, in 2007, DOD authorized 134 MILs for DLIFLC, but the services only assigned 85. The Assistant Commandant, Colonel Scott, appealed to the services and Gail McGinn, as DOD’s Senior Language Authority, for better support, 319 but to meet the continuing shortfall the Institute chose to supplement it uniformed MLIs through a special contract program to hire qualified retired military linguists. Unfortunately, only eight civilian MILs could be arranged during this period. Ironically, while the Army was the Executive Agent for DLIFLC, it was also the major problem, assigning only 55 percent of the authorized total in 2006 and 59 percent in 2007 while Air Force supplied 129 percent of its requirement in 2006 and 78 percent in 2007. The Navy and the Marine Corps were also deficient in supplying MLIs. 320 Additionally, the Navy assigned its MILs to the schoolhouse for only half a day; the rest of the time they served as Navy unit cadre. 321 Thus, DLIFLC continued to face a shortage of qualified MLIs.

According to Colonel Mansager, the situation whereby the Navy and Marine Corps failed to provided MLIs sufficient to match the number of training seats they filled at DLIFLC was not fair. One way to solve a problem, he explained during an exit interview, was by developing a “joint manning document,” which could specify the number of MLIs the services had to supply and that they were full-time positions, not the collateral duty of a platoon sergeant. Basically, said Mansager, the basis of MLIs assignments to DLIFLC was nothing more than a handshake agreement between agencies. If a service failed to provide its share of support, Mansager said, there was no one to call, and he was unwilling to harm the mission by reducing the number of that service’s linguist seats. “Once you get something on the joint manning documents,” he asserted, “and it becomes joint, I think the fill gets to be a little higher priority.” 322 Otherwise, DLIFLC simply had to absorb the cost of contracting civilian MLIs.

DLIFLC maintained an awards program to honor outstanding MLIs. For example, Cryptologic Technician Interpretive 1st Class Brandace Martin of the U.S. Navy, received the MIL of the Quarter award on 25 July 2006 for her contributions as a Chinese language instructor and helping the Proficiency Enhancement Program achieve better results. 323

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319 Col Daniel L. Scott, email to Gail McGinn and Nancy E. Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006, in ff 1, RG 52.01-02.
321 Draft comments by Dr Stephen M. Payne, December 2012.
322 Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, p. 1.
The Student Motivation and Retention Training (SMART) program relocated to Building 221, formerly the “Edge Club” in 2005, in part to help make room for expanded classrooms under PEP. SMART, which itself began in 1996, attempted to “prepare DLIFLC students for success in their language studies by strengthening their knowledge of English grammar, equipping them with course survival skills, and introducing them to the peoples and countries of their target language.” The one-week program involved familiarizing students with three topics of immediate application in preparation for language study. These topics were grammar terminology, language learning tools (including such things as learning styles, language study strategies, and the meaning and importance of Foreign Language Objectives and the DLPT), and background knowledge on the culture behind the languages they were scheduled to learn.\textsuperscript{324} After the arrival of the program in Building 221, the SMART program became known simply as the Student Learning Center.\textsuperscript{325} At DLIFLC, the program had gained credit for reducing student attrition rates through its original SMART course.\textsuperscript{326}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Military_Language_Instructors.png}
\caption{Chart showing the benefits of sufficient Military Language Instructors, FY 2002-2005.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{325} For more on the program, see Leah Graham, “The Student Learning Center: \textit{Vive la Différence!}” \textit{Globe} (Spring 2007): 20.
\textsuperscript{326} SSgt Michael L. Martinez, “Students get first class treatment at new Student Learning Center (SLC),” no date, unpublished article in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
Under a new director, Capt. Chuck St. Pierre, the Student Learning Center continued to refine its mission and “forward momentum as if strapped to a rocket.” The center’s offerings included standard pre- and post-language study courses, such as “Introduction to Language Studies: Area Studies,” “Autonomous Language Sustainment,” “Language Learning after DLI,” and various workshops. Reflecting these distinct mission areas, Pierre divided the center included four distinct departments: Introduction to Language Studies Department, Workshops & Seminars Department, Autonomous Language Sustainment Department, and the Individual Study Management Department. The last department allowed students to take advantage of academic advising, either by individual request or by the request of a faculty member. In either case, students received one-on-one assistance to help them identify methods to improve their language learning processes. For student-initiated requests, the advising session was not be reported to the schoolhouse or to the unit to ensure discrete assistance. On the other hand, if the request for advising originated from either from the schoolhouse or the unit, an advising report was then given to both the requesting staff member and the student as a record of performance.

Beginning in October 2006, the introductory language studies course became mandatory for all DLIFLC students as the first week of their training, a change that required the Institute to lengthen all language courses by one week. The center also taught a four-hour segment in the last week of student’s classes to familiarize them with how best to maintain and improve their language skills after leaving DLIFLC. In FY 2007, the center trained over 2,700 students.

In late 2006, to help address widespread concern over the difficulty of DLIFLC’s newly revised proficiency test, the DLPT5, the Student Learning Center designed a DLPT5 Familiarization and Test Preparation Workshop. The workshop taught students how think strategically about test-preparation and test-taking, problem-solving, and critical thinking. While not a silver bullet, the new workshop appeared to help students ease their testing anxiety. Test-takers both within DLIFLC and outside it welcomed the new workshop. Indeed, in late August 2007, one outside agency requested that a SLC team travel and deliver the DLPT5 workshop on site to working linguists preparing to take the test. DLIFLC sent Alan Dudley and Eric Robinson to conduct eight workshops over four days. During this period, requests for the SLC DLPT5 workshop rose 71 percent.

In August 2007, the center began to publish its own newsletter called Linguist Letters that contained brief stories written by center staff. The purpose of the newsletter was “to provide a forum for both faculty and students” at DLIFLC. The center encouraged faculty to share research, teaching methods, or solutions to common class room problems while students and

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327 Student Learning Center Quarterly Historical Report, 2d Quarter CY 2006, 26 July 2006, in ff 4, RG 52.01-02.
328 Student Learning Center Quarterly Historical Report, 2d Quarter CY 2007, 27 July 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
329 SSgt Michael L. Martinez, “Students get first class treatment at new Student Learning Center (SLC),” no date, unpublished article in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
linguists were encouraged to share their experiences. The center hoped to publish the newsletter at least once per month.333

**Study Hall Program**

Traditionally, DLIFLC allotted evening hours for students to do their homework or to participate in extra study and tutoring for those with special academic needs. During this period, a debate arose between the school and the service units over the best policy to manage study hall time. In May 2007, the Dean’s Council under Chair Dr. Hiam N. Kanbar met with the assistant deans and chief MLIs to review the existing study hall policy. They met to consider various options for modifying that policy to appease unit concerns. The schools wanted to limit any impact on their students and had concerns about how changes might affect instructors. The basic three options were to decentralize the control over study hall by allowing the schools to determine the basic timeframe and management, standardize study hall timeframe between 6:00 pm and 10:00 pm to optimize unit training, or incorporate study hall into the normal duty day to simply the logistics of managing study hall hours. The provost argued for the need to decentralize control over study hall because he felt it would maximize student assistance by leaving it to the faculty to determine which students needed study hall and how much time they needed. This approach tailored available faculty to specific student needs. It also optimized the time faculty had to participate in training and class preparation. On the downside, this option failed to meet service unit desires for standardized study hall periods so that they could more readily schedule military training requirements and various administrative appointments. Maintaining the current policy, the provost acknowledged, would little impact the larger language programs that could joggle the participation of many instructors, but could burden the smaller programs who did not have the staffing to readily support late night study hall participation. The existing negatives of the policy also included travel time for off-post students, a lengthy day for them all, and tired teaching staff, which is why reviewing the policy options was a worthwhile endeavor. The third approach required less administration and night duty, allowed more flexibility to tailor the program to specific student needs and while it did challenge the scheduling of courses and faculty training, was more amenable to service unit concerns. In the end, service unit objections and provost concerns about communication and management undermined any decentralization of study hall, despite its being favored by many deans. The choice was thus whether to continue the current policy with minor adjustments or build study hall into the duty day, which the provost recommended.334

**Language Day and Other Major Activities**

Language Day, DLIFLC’s annual open house, was held 19 May 2006 at the Presidio of Monterey. The event featured Institute faculty and students who were able to break from class to demonstrate their language training while presenting the cultures of their programs through music and dancing, dress, food, and cultural displays. According to the Monterey Herald, the event “had the air of an opening day at Disneyland” as a fleet of school and charter buses rolled onto the normally closed post that quickly filled with thousands of teenagers, nearly doubling the

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attendance figures for the same event in 2005. Most of the students came from California, but some were from as far away as New York, Michigan, Louisiana, and Arizona. All together, somewhere between three and four thousand visiting students were able to watch over thirty stage performances featuring Arabic, Pashto, Dari, and Kurdish dances, Korean fan dancing, and a Japanese martial arts demonstration known as Seibu-kan Jujutsu. To orchestrate Language Day, DLIFLC coordinated security issues to allow local students and their teachers to travel to and access the Presidio. Colonel Mansager found the event “highly successful” and record-breaking and was pleased with the good feedback from all he encountered. Mansager told visitors that language skills that might take four years of training in a university program could be obtained at DLIFLC in six months.

In 2007, Language Day was held on 18 May and again bus-loads of school children and students from local colleges teamed onto the Presidio to participate in faculty- and student-run demonstrations featuring cultural displays and foreign language demonstrations relating to twenty-four languages taught at the school. Many younger children from local elementary and middle schools attended Language Day than in past years. “We felt that having younger student attend was great. It really gives the event a more community feel,” said Chief Warrant Officer Matt Riggs, who helped organized the event. For example, a class of 6th graders from Walter Colton School attended, including student Itana Avdalovic who especially appreciated the opportunity to receive a henna tattoo from a DLIFLC Urdu language instructor. One of the many exhibits included DLIFLC French language students who recreated a Parisian bistro where visitors heard only French spoken while another event explained to educators how DLIFLC tests the language skills of students using Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) techniques. For its annual 2007 Globe Language Day publication, DLIFLC featured a group of DLIFLC Korean language students who won a Korean poetry translation contest, traveled to South Korea to accept the

Figure 23 Faculty and Students dressed and shown performing for Language Day, May 2006.

prize, and donated the cash award of $2,500 to an organization promoting better ties between the United States and Korea.  

With high student and teacher interest in learning basic greetings, DLILFC decided that more classrooms would be needed for Language Day in 2008. All together, over 4,500 visitors attended Language Day in 2007.

The DLI Alumni Association presented the Institute with a special plaque in 2006 to use for commemorating graduates fallen since 2001 in the line of duty. DLIFLC unveiled the plaque on Memorial Day 2006 with a special ceremony commemorating thirteen alumni who had fallen in the line of duty since the events of 11 September 2001. Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Nicholas Rozumny read aloud each name on Soldier Field, which was followed by a three-gun salute from a military honor guard. The Alumni Association, headed by President and retired faculty member Benjamin De La Selva, raised the funds through donations and memorabilia displays. Unfortunately, in 2006 five more DLFILC graduates were killed in action in either Iraq or Afghanistan and their names had to be similarly read aloud at the Memorial Day ceremony for 2007.

One, Cpl. Bernard Corpuz, was a Watsonville native killed in action in Ghanzi Province, Afghanistan on 11 June. Corpuz was a 2005 graduate of DLIIE’s French program and his family specifically requested his service to be held in the post chapel of the Presidio of Monterey on 22 June. Corpuz was serving as a 97E Interrogator with the 303rd Military Intelligence Battalion, 504th Military Intelligence Brigade, when he was killed. In July 2007, another Monterey-born graduate of DLIIE, Sfc. Sean K. Mitchell who earned an Associate of Arts in Russian and Serbian/Croatian in 2002, was killed in the West African country of Mali. Mitchell was the only fatality when an Army tent blew over during a sand storm that also injured several other soldiers. The soldiers were participating in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program run by the U.S. Department of State in several African countries. The Alumni Association also sponsored the DLIFLC alumni ball in 2006 and 2007, the first marking the Institute’s 65th Anniversary.

Finally, DLIFLC also specially honored S. Sgt. Gene Arden Vance, Jr., a 38-year-old Persian-Farsi linguist killed in action in Afghanistan in May 2002. On 25 August 2006, distinguished guests, including family members and political leaders, gathered with military and civilian employees of DLIFLC and the Garrison to dedicate a newly constructed barracks in memory of Vance (Building 829). The featured event took place when Colonel Mansager and

Lisa Vance, S. Sgt. Vance’s window, unveiled a bronze plaque that was to be placed on the barracks.  

**Continuing Education Directorate**

The mission of the Directorate of Continuing Education was to provide post-basic foreign language instruction to DOD and other U.S. Government personnel, both through resident and non-resident means. The directorate enabled language maintenance and sustainment training for professional linguists, and language and cultural familiarization training for general purpose forces preparing for deployment. It was housed in the DOD Center, Monterey Bay, on the former Fort Ord. Continuing Education was established in 2000 to relieve pressure on DLFILC resident language teachers by incorporating distance learning instruction and other language services into one school. In 2002, it was reorganized as one school and three divisions.

The directorate was overseen by Vice Chancellor (Associate Provost) Dr. Thomas S. Parry from 2000 until 2006 when Dr. Betty Lou Leaver took over. Leaver conducted talks with staff and then mapped a major reorganization of the directorate.  

In August 2005, Lt. Col. John F. May arrived at DLFILC from the U.S. Marine Corps to serve as Associate Vice Chancellor, Directorate of Continuing Education. He previously served a the lead for the Marine Corps international education and exchange program where he coordinated the manning of sixty overseas training sites and monitored the officers participating in them. He also served as Marine Corps lead for the development of the Defense Transformation Roadmap. At DLFILC, May helped oversee a range of foreign language training requirements and served briefly, from July 2007 until 11 October 2007, as the DLFILC chief of staff.

**Re-organization**

Continuing education included four main functional areas until June 2006. These areas were the (1) School for Continuing Resident Education, which taught intermediate and advanced foreign language courses; (2) the Distance Learning Division, which managed Video Tele-Training (VTT), Mobile Training Teams (MTT), and Online Learning (OLL); (3) the Extension Programs Division, which oversaw DLFILC’s growing number of LTDs; and (4) the Training Support and Special Programs Division, which managed various special projects. In June 2006, however, DLFILC reorganized the Directorate of Continuing Education in accordance with Leaver’s plan. The directorate’s School for Continuing Resident Education became the School for Post-Basic Instruction, which retained the mission of resident continuing education but subsumed the Distance Learning and the Extension Programs Divisions. The old Training Support and Special Programs Division was renamed the Field Support and Special Programs Division and a new division was created called Educational Support Services, which was headed by Dean Mohsen Fahmy. This division included an Academic Support Center, which created or helped produce instructional materials for post-basic courses; a Diagnostic

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348 CE Command History 2006, in DLFILC Digital Archives.

Assessment Center, which was intended to improve diagnostic assessment processes, tools, forms, rubrics, and teaching manuals; and an Educational Technology Center, which was not fully operational in 2007.  

**School for Post-Basic Instruction**

The School for Post-Basic Instruction included the Division of Resident Continuing Education, the Division of Distance Learning, and the Division of Extension Education. Each of these entities was headed by an Assistant Dean who reported to Senior Dean Michael Vezilich, formerly dean of the Division of Distance Learning.

**Resident Instruction**

The Division of Resident Continuing Education was responsible for intermediate and advanced language training for career military students attending DLIFLC. It also provided refresher and sustainment instruction, diagnostic assessment, and managed the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Russian Language Program until this unit moved in June 2006 to the Field Support and Special Programs Division. Resident Continuing Education was under the leadership of Acting Assistant Dean Luis Martinez in 2006.

The school taught eight languages: Arabic, Chinese Mandarin, Hebrew, Korean, Persian Farsi, Russian, Serbian/Croatian, and Spanish. In FY 2006, there were over 110 students taking intermediate, advanced, or refresher language training at DLIFLC from fifty-two instructors. The school planned to build strong teaching teams while expanding diagnostic assessment, continuing immersion training, and coordinating in the development of new curricula. The school also planned to develop in-depth area studies courses taught in the target language and to establish a visiting lecture program.

**Non-Resident Instruction**

In addition to resident instruction, the School for Post-Basic Instruction administered DLIFLC’s non-resident language survival, sustainment, and enhancement language training provided through VTT, MTT, LTD, and OLL mechanisms. During FY 2007, overall growth in non-resident language-training demands for professional military linguists generated over 104,000 hours of instruction to over 3,000 students through LTD, MTT, and VTT instruction. The instruction was basically available on short notice for students from any service located almost anywhere.

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350 DLIFLC, *Program Summary FY06*, pp. 116-119; and CE 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr CY07/CE 4<sup>th</sup> Qtr CY07 reports, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
351 CE Command History 2006.
352 Ibid.
353 Ibid.
354 DLIFLC, *Program Summary FY06*, pp. 120-122.
Distance Learning

The Distance Learning Division was responsible for DLIFLC’s video tele-training, mobile training, and online learning efforts. In FY 2006, it succeeded to raise the proficiency of nearly 800 students who participated in a 173 separate courses. The Distance Learning Division was led by Acting Assistant Dean, Dr. Wendy Tu, who had over thirty faculty and staff.

Video tele-training technology provided the most cost-effective form of live foreign language training to remote locations with small linguist populations. The training required both the use of DLIFLC VTT facilities at the DOD Center Monterey Bay and similar facilities available at various U.S. military posts. Resident DLFILC instructors taught the courses remotely using two-way video cameras and internet connectivity, which was somewhat limited. In 2006, efforts began to upgrade to a new method called the Broadband Language Training System that would allow participants to sign in from multiple locations, but the method depended upon the remote unit’s technology. When VTT means were not available, DLIFLC instructors could also deploy, generally on a cost-reimbursable basis, as part of a mobile training team. MTTs were deployed teaching assignments for instructors normally assigned to the Presidio of Monterey that last from two to four weeks.

MTTs were commonly used to help selected units prepare for deployment by providing language and culture familiarization training. According to Colonel Mansager, “the expansion of our support to deploying forces carried out by the Directorate of Continuing Education is, in my mind, a paradigm shift.” DLIFLC sent teaching teams into the field only rarely in the past, for example, to help manage involvement with Haiti or interventions in Somalia. But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had generated a new understanding within DOD about the importance of the need to provide survival-level language training to deploying forces. Besides MTTs, DLIFLC provided this support through its language survival kits or pocket guides that it had started for Afghanistan and Iraq. Later, these guides, called Language Survival Kits (LSKs), evolved into more refined technical guides for maritime or aircrew situations and finally DOD realized a requirement for DLIFLC to prepare these in advance for a variety of potential scenarios. Thus, through the last Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD provided funding to program the development of various language kits through FY 2011. Some of the languages were obscure, but they were selected on the basis of the appearance upon the Strategic Language List.

MTTs, however, remained the most important approach to provide language and cultural familiarization training to deploying forces. In FY 2006, MTTs provided almost 10,000 hours of instruction at thirty separate sites while training 14,441 deploying personnel from all four services. This mission was accomplished using ninety-six MTTs designed to provide a two-week sixty-hour course for the languages of Iraqi Arabic, Persian-Afghan, and Pashto.

356 DLIFLC, Program Summary FY06, p. 125.
357 CE Command History 2006.
359 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, pp. 7-8.
360 DLIFLC, Program Summary FY06, p. 125.
However, dramatic increases had occurred in the duration of regularly scheduled MTT courses. According to Senior Dean of Post-Basic Instruction Mike Vezilich, since 2011 MTT courses had moved from one or two weeks duration to four or five weeks duration. The need for higher proficiency levels had also concentrated MTT teaching not just on maintenance of existing skills, but their enhancement. By 2007, MTTs provided about 75 percent of DLIFLC’s distance learning instructional hours.\(^{362}\)

In addition to VTTs and MTTs, the Distance Learning Division worked to develop special online training modules for its Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) program. This training provided tester support and maintenance and the online modules became a pre-requisite for all OPI-workshops by 2007. The division further worked to develop computerized OPIs to aid the testing and evaluation of individuals’ abilities to speak in various foreign languages and to reduce the physical labor demands on DLIFLC faculty.\(^{363}\) It also continued efforts to complete an eighteen-month pilot project for a Broadband Language Training System, which would expand DLIFLC VTT capabilities and provide online language support to linguists worldwide. Finally, the division trained teachers to apply diagnostic assessment tools to all non-resident programs.\(^{364}\)

Language Training Detachments

The Extension Programs Division, led by Dean Brigitta Ludgate, remained responsible for DLIFLC’s Language Training Detachment or LTD program until a reorganization incorporated the division within the new School for Post-Basic Instruction in June 2006. Similar to mobile training teams, LTDs were distinct as permanent deployments of DLIFLC faculty who resided and taught at facilities with high concentrations of linguists where there existed a continuing need for face-to-face language sustainment or enhancement training. The division was responsible for establishing LTDs worldwide; coordinating with host-site NSA directors and staff; hiring, developing, and managing faculty; conducting site visits; and collecting student enrollment and performance data.\(^{365}\) DLIFLC continued to expand its LTDs during this period owing to the success of the training effort and DOD’s demand for linguists of higher proficiency. LTD funding was both programmed and reimbursable.

By 2006, DLIFLC had assigned nearly seventy LTD language instructors on three-year tours and that number was rising. The instructors taught Arabic, Chinese, Dari, Georgian, Korean, Pashto, Portuguese, Russian, Serbian/Croatian, Spanish, Tagalog, and Tausug to some 700 students.\(^{366}\) The LTD that the Institute established at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska, in 2005 typified the type of advanced language training provided by LTDs. Called the Offutt Language Learning Center, DLIFLC specifically designed this LTD to support the tough teaching environment of the air base’s deployment schedules. By the end of FY 2007, with nine instructors and a branch chief who also taught part-time, DLIFLC reported that the Offutt LTD


\(^{363}\) Ibid, p. 5.

\(^{364}\) DLIFLC, Program Summary FY06, pp. 124-125.

\(^{365}\) DLIFLC, Program Summary FY06, p. 130; CE Command History 2006.

was running smoothly and had completed training for numerous service personnel and civilian agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, in several languages, mainly Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Persian-Farsi, Dari, and Pashto.\textsuperscript{367} DLIFLC believed, on the basis of post-class language testing, that the training had increased the competency of those trained.

On 19 July 2007, DLIFLC opened a new LTD at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and held a ribbon-cutting ceremony at its LTD facility on that day. Institute faculty had actually worked at the site since 2003 when the DLIFLC began participating in a special program to train heritage speakers as military linguists. Because it supported the Army's 09L program, the LTD was atypical from the normal LTDs operated by the Institute, which decided to make a permanent commitment to it rather than continue to rotate mobile teaching teams to the site, which was hard on instructors and provided less continuity. With the establishment of a permanent LTD, instructors could now live in the area for several years.\textsuperscript{368}

\textbf{Figure 24 Organization of Continuing Education Directorate and Extension Programs, 2007.}

In September 2007, DLIFLC announced that it had even deployed a new LTD onboard the U.S.S. \textit{Rushmore}, a naval vessel of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Four instructors

\textsuperscript{367} CE 1st and 4th Qtr CY07 reports in DLIFLC Digital Archives.

were assigned to teach Iraqi Arabic in preparation for participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.369

In 2007, DLIFLC operated eleven permanent LTDs located on military bases throughout the continental United States and Hawaii. Of note, however, the Institute transferred four small LTDs (one or two instructors each) from Extension Programs to Field Support and Special Programs in 2006. Combined, the eleven LTDs provided instruction in thirteen languages using ninety-eight instructors who together taught 1,900 students during some 67,000 hours of classroom instruction. With ongoing success, DLIFLC fully expected to establish additional LTDs in the future.370

Field Support and Special Programs

In FY 2006, the Directorate of Continuing Education established a new office called Field Support and Special Programs. The commandant charged Field Support with the responsibility for overseeing several language-training outreach programs. Dean Charles Carroll led Field Support until 25 September 2006 when he was succeeded by Steven Collins.371 Field Support was staffed by fifty-four faculty and three military personnel.372

Sustainment

With more than 35,000 professional linguists serving in the field, DLIFLC had long had an opportunity to meet a major requirement for sustainment, but without funding support this was difficult. However, after the National Security Agency, which employs a large percentage of DLIFLC graduates, decided to increase its linguist career-goal proficiency level requirements to L3/R3/S3, it asked DLIFLC to devise a plan to allow each linguist to participate in an annual six-week training with up to four hours per week devoted to on-duty language study.

With funding provided by various Presidential Budget Decisions, Field Support responded to NSA’s need. It developed four-hour on-line language training modules that could be tracked by a special Learning Management System, by creating six-week modularized intermediate and advanced language training courses for the most high-demand languages, and by beefing up its Language Training Detachments, which could provide up to 40 percent of the annual linguist training requirements for linguists assigned to major operations centers. DLIFLC also developed diagnostic assessment capabilities for each of the high demand languages to allow linguists to received tailored feedback on their training progress.373

Under Field Support, DLIFLC continued to support the various Command Language Programs (CLPs) of the individual services. For decades, local military commanders with large linguist components had organized their own command level language training programs to help

371 CE Command History 2006.
372 CE 4th Qtr CY07 report in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
maintain the skills and readiness of their personnel. In 2006, the program contained more than 300 CLPs serving with units stationed worldwide.374

DLIFLC has long encouraged such programs by training local language CLP managers through its Command Language Program Manager course. Field Support conducted four manager’s courses at the Presidio of Monterey in 2007 and offered another twelve conducted via Mobile Training Teams. In total, 191 CLP managers graduated from the course in 2007. DLIFLC also began to conduct Field Assistance Visits in FY 2008 in response to specific requests from Command Language Program managers for help. The first such field assistance visit was scheduled for January 2008. Field Support also supported CLPs by producing on-line tutorials for the weekly training of linguists in the field. CLP managers could assign these four-hour tutorials to their linguists each week without having to remove those linguists from their ongoing mission activities. In FY 2007, DLIFLC finished fifty such tutorial packages in several languages and developed material for the six-week annual linguist training. CLPMs could download these materials directly from DLIFLC’s Language Materials Distribution System.375

For many years, DLIFLC held a CLPM conference in Monterey usually in conjunction with DLIFLC’s Annual Program Review, but Colonel Scott decided that it was necessary to separate the traditional linguist-training event from the policy-oriented APR in 2006, so the two events were thereafter delinked. Timing for the event fluctuated in 2007 and 2008, but DLIFLC finally decided to hold the 2009 CLPM in May to coincide with Language Day to allow a better opportunity for linguists to come to DLIFLC when it normally show-cased its language programs and to offer more time to hold the annual DOD-wide Linguist of the Year competition.376

Indeed, DLIFLC continued to encourage and acknowledge CLP and individual linguists with achievement and competitive awards. In 2006, the Command Language Program of the Year Award went to the 116th MI Group, Fort Gordon, Georgia.377 CLP Manager Sfc. Todd Amis of the 1st Special Forces Group (ABN), Fort Lewis, won the 2007 Command Language Program of the Year Award. According the award, “the 1st SFG showed tremendous flexibility in the program and tremendous initiative in servicing over 1,000 Special Forces personnel” in need of language training. Finally, the Linguist of the Year Award for 2007 went to S. Sgt. Jody K. Hildrich, 704th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Meade. S. Sgt. Hildrich maintained an ILR rating level of L3/S3 while serving two tours as an Arabic interpreter/translator in Iraq.378

Another important sustainment program run by Field Support during this period was the DTRA Russian Arms Control Speaking Proficiency Course for military linguists, transferred from the School for Resident Education in June 2006. DTRA supported U.S.-Russian arms control treaty compliance. The course saw 25 students graduate in FY 2006 and 15 in FY 2007.

374 Anna Kordecki, “Command Language Program Managers Keep DLIFLC Students ‘up to speed’,” Globe (Summer 2006): 16.
376 Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2012, pp. 3-4.
377 DLIFLC, Program Summary FY06, p. 144.
above the 2+/2+/2 graduation requirement. According Lt. Col. John F. May, Associate Vice Chancellor, Directorate of Continuing Education, the success of the faculty of Continuing Education to support the DTRA program prompted DLIFLC leadership to consider using the course as a model for other language programs or domains. He cited specifically the creation of a branch within the directorate called Interpretation and Translation for Military Operations that was one direct result of the successful course. The course, considered by many to be the premier foreign language-training program offered to the U.S. military, lacked an immersion component. In 2007, DTRA headquarters and DLIFLC began discussions aimed at adding this educational dimension to the DTRA course. Immersion training was already well established in DLIFLC’s Basic Course program. However, according to Dean Steve Collins, any immersion element could not distract from ongoing DTRA mission requirements. Thus, DTRA course leaders determined that any immersion component had to be limited to two weeks and required a successful pilot to test how well the immersion worked before it was incorporated into the curriculum. Still, Collins felt that even a shorter version of the overseas immersion experience would provide students with an important level of confidence in the use of their language skills. DLIFLC scheduled the pilot immersion for 2008. Meanwhile, current students continued to conduct one-day immersions by visiting San Francisco, which has Russian Orthodox churches, Russian restaurants, and even a Russian bookstore. Also in 2007, after noticing a slight but years-long decline in the preparedness of students for the DTRA Russian Arms Control Speaking Proficiency Course (and associated proficiencies on the ILR scale), DLIFLC instituted a new Refresher Listening Comprehension Course. The purpose of the course was to boost the training of DTRA course students during the first eight weeks by refreshing skills in understanding all forms of spoken Russian as well as listening fluency.

Language Familiarization and Professional Military Education Support

During this period, Field Support created the Language Familiarization and Area Studies Training (LFAST) program to send teachers to locations where large numbers of troops were preparing for deployment and in need of essential survival level cultural awareness skills. According to Christina Manuel, Iraqi Familiarization Project Manager, the “program has been a vital step in bridging cross-cultural communications between soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines and the Iraqi people.” In FY 2007, LFAST was composed of twenty-three faculty for the languages of Persian Dari, Pashto and Iraqi Arabic. These instructors provided language and cultural familiarization training to over 21,000 service members as they prepared for overseas deployment. This marked a 33 percent increase over FY 2006. To accomplish such results, the

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379 DLIFLC, Program Summary FY06, p. 145; DLIFLC, Program Summary FY07, p. 156.
381 Steve Collins, “Integration of In-Country Language Immersion as Part of the Russian Arms Control Speaking Proficiency Course,” On the Edge (DTRA Russian Arms Control course newsletter), no. 4 (September 2007): 3-4 (and students comments on trip to San Francisco, pp. 22-23), in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
The average LFAST teacher had to spend 180 to 220 days on the road. At the same time, Field Support began offering a self-paced interactive online program called Headstart in the languages of Iraqi Arabic, Dari, and Pashto, which was also available on CD.  

In May 2006, Field Support began to operate another new program called Professional Military Educational Support, which provided instructors for senior officers attending military schools around the country. This program focused upon providing about thirty contact hours of instruction in seven languages, mainly Arabic and the Iraqi dialect, Afghan Dari and Pashto, Spanish, French, Chinese, and Korean. Samir Sallam was the first program manager and the first classes were taught at the Command and General Staff College located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. "The Army now understands how important culture and language familiarization are. It is crucial to learn a bit of the language because it maintains the authority of the leader—this is the motivation behind this idea," said Matthew Broaddus, an assistant professor of Military Leadership in the Department of Command Leadership at CGSC.

Indeed, the genesis of this effort was a 2006 decision by General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Combined Arms Center, which oversaw the Army’s Command and General Staff College, who directed the college to incorporate language training as a requirement for all officers about to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. College officials contacted DLIFLC for help and the Institute responded by setting up an LTD effective from 2 May 2006. The first instructors taught Modern Standard Arabic and Pashto, which later changed to Iraqi Arabic and Persian Dari. Later, Field Support sent instructors to the U.S. Air Force’s Air University to teach short familiarization classes for officers enrolled in Professional Military Education courses and who, again, expected near-term deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Field Support also assigned one instructor to teach Iraqi Arabic to officer students attending the Naval Postgraduate School, located near DLIFLC’s home base at the Presidio of Monterey.

In FY2007, the Professional Military Educational Support program graduated 599 officers with training six different languages. According to Broaddus, most of the DLIFLC CGSC students were very enthusiastic about their studies. “Some 95 percent say that they plan to continue studying the language because they feel it is important,” he said.

Field Support launched yet a third familiarization-type program at Fort Riley, Kansas, specifically tailored to assist multi-service Military Transition Teams (OEF/OIF). Field Support provided forty-two hours of training in Arabic or Persian Dari over the course of sixty days by rotating DLIFLC instructors on short assignments similar to the MTT model. Several DLIFLC

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389 DLIFLC, Program Summary FY07, p. 156.  
390 Cutter, “Continuing Education Directorate Helps Prepare Service Members for Deployment.”
instructors rotated to the installation on short two-month assignments to teach Iraqi Arabic and Persian Dari (Afghanistan) in 2006.391

Following upon these successes, the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Hood, Texas, made a special request to DLIFLC for Field Support to develop a specialized twenty-three-week long course in Iraqi Arabic for combat soldiers being deployed to Iraq and who would serve as cultural advisors to their command. The soldiers volunteered for the difficult duty of learning Iraqi Arabic, the program’s goal being to attain exit DLPT scores of 1+/1+ in speaking and listening. DLIFLC’s Bill Alwahab, LFAST program manager, spearheaded the effort to develop the new course using a team of volunteer teachers from Middle East Schools I and II. The course included elements drawn from existing language familiarization courses, LSKs, and DLIFLC’s basic program in Modern Standard Arabic, and involved a lot of paring and feedback from the 3rd Brigade soldiers who piloted the first course. The class was to take the DLPT in December 2007 while its members expected to deploy to Iraq in 2008.392

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In total, in FY 2007, Continuing Education taught over 21,000 service members survival level language and culture familiarization courses while it taught a further 1,258 students in 253 separate distance learning courses.\[393\]

Finally, Field Support distributed a total of 264,000 Language Survival Kits (LSKs) in FY 2007 while thousands of online users downloaded similar material from Field Support’s website www.LingNet.org.\[394\] LSKs were pocket-size phrasebooks with CDs designed to provide handy expressions for non-linguists in the field and were available in over fifty languages by 2007.\[395\]

**09L Program**

To support the development by the Army of a new Military Occupational Specialty or MOS called 09L, Heritage Interpreter, DOD authorized DLIFLC to establish a Language Training Detachment at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The severe lack of Arabic speakers in DOD was realized by Dr. Paul Wolfowitz as Deputy Secretary of Defense after the Iraq war did not end as quickly as he had expected.\[396\] Working with Dr. David Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Wolfowitz decided that the best solution was to enlist native Arabic speakers in the U.S. Army and train them to become interpreters and translators in the languages of Arabic, Dari, Farsi and Pashto and then send them to Iraq and Afghanistan. A year after the fall of Bagdad, the Army began a pilot program to train heritage speakers of Iraqi and Afghan languages to serve as interpreters in the U.S. Army. And, someone did have to train these soldiers, not just in common military tasks, but in the professional skills necessary to employ their native languages effectively. “Just speaking a language does not mean that one knows how to properly interpret, especially in a military setting or war zone,” said Lt. Col. John May, explaining why DLIFLC became involved in the 09L program that put native speakers through both an Advanced Individual Training program focusing on interpretation and translation as well as military skills and battle drills.\[397\] Because the program had high-level visibility in the Pentagon, DLIFLC’s role required careful attention. To get the program started, said Colonel Mansager, “we cannibalized a lot of stuff from our former translator programs that we were doing back in the 60s.” Technically, DLIFLC was not in charge of the program, but due to the Institute’s long experience in working with foreign languages and foreigners, it ended up having to get the program off the ground.\[398\] DLIFLC hired a program manager and five Arabic (Iraqi dialect) faculty who were moved to Fort Jackson. DLIFLC developed entrance

\[394\] Ibid., pp. 4, 11-12. Iraqi Headstart went online in FY 2006.
\[396\] Wolfowitz and other senior US officials relied upon a great deal of false or unsubstantiated information about Iraq in the run up to the war, including from Iraqi exile opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi. According to Col Daniel Scott, Chalabi promised that he could supply the United States with one thousand Iraqi linguists to help the Army as it marched into Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. That promise did not turn out to be true but the notion of incorporating already fluent or native speakers into the US military did apparently encourage Wolfowitz to create the 09L program. See Col Daniel L. Scott, Exit Interview, 5 March 2008, pp. 3-4. Scott gives a thorough and compelling account of the origins of obstacles encountered in establishing the 09L program in this interview.
\[397\] Carroll, “Continuing Education Provides Field Support through Distance Learning Initiatives.”
\[398\] Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, pp. 3-4.
tests for recruitment and curricula in Arabic, Persian-Farsi, Persian-Dari, Kurdish, and Sorani. It also collaborated with the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to develop tests sufficient for promotion of 09L soldiers up to enlisted grade 6 (E-6). The program graduated 150 students in Arabic, Turkish, Persian-Farsi, Dari, and Pashto in 2005. By September 2006, DLIFLC had provided training in Arabic and Iraqi to over 300 09L graduates and had conducted more than 2,000 OPIs during the recruitment process. By April 2007, the program was operating at Fort Jackson with seven faculty in place.

The difficulty in all of this was that the existing DLPT was useless to measure a heritage speaker’s proficiency because the DLPT measured the proficiency in a foreign language of an English speaker. Thus, the Institute had to develop different tests to see whether the 09L soldiers really knew the language they purported to know. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca became the main proponent for this effort, which involved the need to provide English language training for many of those in the 09L program. Despite fluency in their native language, many were nevertheless functionally illiterate and often came from a rural background, meaning they lacked sophisticated vocabularies. Thus, as it evolved, 09L training had to support English language training, heritage language reading skills development, and the teaching of certain vocabularies, including military terminology, even before DLIFLC could train the soldiers in standard translation and interpretation skills. It was obvious to Mansager that the program was a useful adjunct to U.S. efforts to infuse better language and cultural knowledge into the force, but it was not a panacea.

Still, reports from the field told Mansager the program was useful. Unlike contract linguists, 09L soldiers went everywhere soldiers went. Subject to U.S. military training and discipline, 09L soldiers were uniquely informed about the cultural environment and able to provide commanders with important insight that Americans would not necessarily detect. For example, who was really the person in charge at a meeting; it might not be person talking to U.S. officials. Mansager actually felt that the 09L model was one that DLIFLC could itself use in the future to provide language instruction on a contingency basis. Rather than try hurriedly to train a “kid” from the mid-West to speak, Chinese-Uyghur, for example, it was wiser to teach heritage Uyghur-speakers their own language better and deploy them as a stopgap until DLIFLC could train enough recruits from Iowa to speak basic Uyghur. The military used this model, of course, to train Japanese Americans during World War II—the original basis for DLIFLC—and now DOD was looking at it once again.

Brig. Gen. James Schwitters, the Fort Jackson installation commander, praised DLIFLC’s 09L efforts: “I am proud of the way we do this here,” he stated for the record in July 2007. “This

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401 Col Daniel L. Scott, email to Gail McGinn and Nancy E. Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006, in ffr 1, RG 52.01-02.
403 Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, pp. 3-4.
404 Ibid.
is a seamless process from the reception of the soldiers through Basic Training into the language training. DLI has done a great job here and its training program is excellent.” With the backing of Errol Smith, the 09L program manager from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, DLIFLC made permanent its 09L mission on 19 July 2007 by holding a ribbon-cutting ceremony at its Fort Jackson training site. Thereafter, DLIFLC permanently assigned faculty to Fort Jackson rather than the Presidio of Monterey. Staff no longer had to rotate back and forth, which was hard on instructors and provided less program continuity.405

In FY 2007, the Fort Jackson LTD graduated 156 students who participating in the Advanced Infantry Training course. During this course, these students also received training in interpretation and translation with instruction in the Iraqi dialect added for those deploying to Iraq. The presence of a dedicated teaching unit allowed Fort Jackson to increase the number of Advanced Infantry Training courses from five to six reducing the downtime for 09L soldiers awaiting training. To support other 09L language needs at Fort Jackson, DLIFLC continued to rotate MTTs for Kurdish, Pashto, Dari, and Farsi, among others.406

Educational Support Services

In FY 2006, Continuing Education fielded a new division called Educational Support Services under Assistant Vice Chancellor, Lt. Col. John F. May. The new division included three components: the Diagnostic Assessment Center under Director Bella Cohen, the Academic Support Center under Acting Director Sofya Alexander (from Oct. 2006), and the Educational Technology Center.407 Each center had a specific mission. The Diagnostic Assessment Center provided diagnostic assessment services to both resident and non-resident continuing education language programs and trained the diagnostic assessment specialists. It’s main achievements during this period were to revamp the center and to convert it to a training focus. It established two workshops to train all DLIFLC staff in diagnostic assessment. The Academic Support Center was designed to coordination and support for all Continuing Education faculty both on- and off-site. It conducted 110 workshops in FY 2007. Finally, the Educational Technology Center was designed to provide technical assistance to Continuing Education staff, to coordinate with DLIFLC and Presidio of Monterey technology managers, and conduct strategic technology planning.408

Defense Language Institute—Washington

The Defense Language Institute—Washington (DLI-W) is a subordinate division of DLIFLC located in the Washington, DC, area to provide contracted language support to DOD in low volume foreign languages, typically only a couple hundred students per year in some sixty languages. It also arranged foreign language training for officers in the Defense Attaché System.

407 CE Command History 2006.
408 DLIFLC, Program Summary FY07, pp. 144-153.
assigned to U.S. embassies overseas for military liaison and attaché purposes. Basically, DLI-W provided instruction that DLIFLC did not offer in Monterey in languages ranging from Afrikaans to Vietnamese. DLI-W continued to facilitate the establishment of interagency requirements and resource needs by working in Washington with other groups interested in foreign language education, such as the Center for Advanced Study of Language at the University of Maryland, the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR), and other organizations. DLI-W also continued to manage the Russian language program supporting the Moscow-Washington direct communication link or “hotline.” It also offered a short series of annual orientation seminars to explain the Institute’s mission to other Washington, DC-based organizations.409

In 2006, DLI-W updated its website to provide better support for current and past students.410 DLI-W also used its contracting authorities in early 2006 to provide assistance to DLIFLC Curriculum Development Division to gather content for Arabic sustainment training. Finally, DLI-W represented DLIFLC on matters concerning the Defense Foreign Language Program (DFLP), primarily through participation in a newly formed body called the Defense Language Action Panel, a subordinate panel of the Defense Language Steering Committee.411

In FY 2006, DLI-W graduated 161 students. In FY 2007, it graduated 172 students, the largest sections being from courses in French, Dutch, Indonesian, and Spanish.412

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410 Ibid.
411 DLI-Washington, 1st Qtr. CY06 report, in DLIFLC Digital Archives. Note: no other quarterly reports available for DLI-Washington for this period.
Chapter IV

DLIFLC Academic Support

The following chapter discusses all non-teaching, or academic support functions of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. Areas covered here include those related to academic affairs; language technology and libraries; curriculum development; faculty and staff development; testing, research, evaluation, and standards; military service unit and student activities; and Foreign Area Officer program training.

Directorate of Language, Science, and Technology

The Language Science and Technology (LST) Directorate was responsible for a number of DLIFLC mission essential areas, including curriculum and faculty development, DLIFLC resource centers (labs, online support, libraries, learning center), and language technology developments. The Directorate was overseen by Vice Chancellor Dr. Neil Granoien.

One of the Institute’s most important areas was the application of new technologies to the mission of teaching foreign language. In 2005, DLIFLC set forth a new strategic five-year plan intended to use some $83 million to revolutionize how basic program students acquire their target language skills. The initiative made a great impact on all the schools of DLIFLC. In five years, teachers went from using erasable whiteboards and lugging around portable CD players to play language audio clips in class to having immediate live access to unlimited array of authentic foreign language audio and video content made readily available by using Internet-connected Smartboards. Using supplemental war-related funding, DLIFLC installed over 600 versions of this high technology alternative to the old-fashioned blackboard/whiteboard in classrooms. PEP funding also assisted DLIFLC in developing a completely wireless campus and enabling it to provide Tablet PCs and iPods to every student. Chief Information Officer Lt. Col. Jorge Serafin expected DLIFLC to achieve full wireless capability in all Presidio buildings in FY 2008. Other technology innovations included increases in the Institute’s storage and data transfer capacities with the use of upgraded servers and increased bandwidth. These measure not only allow the processing of higher volumes of audio and video material, but support information backups and the use of new management software such as SharePoint and an E-learning management system called BlackBoard. For needed technical support, DLIFLC contracted a private firm, Trofholz Technologies, Inc., for on-call support to faculty, staff, and students.  

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a report published by the deputy secretary of defense every four years, emphasized language training much more so than in

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previous editions. One result was that DLIFLC became responsible for a $59 million contract to
manage SCOLA. SCOLA, the Latin term for school, was a non-profit organization that recorded
foreign language broadcasts from around the world and then made these accessible for a fee to
educational institutions by video streaming via satellite. DLIFLC had long participated in
SCOLA as a subscriber to provide authentic and current language materials for use by students
and teachers to support military language training. DOD as a whole only spent one or two
million dollars per year on the activity, but after the QDR, the deputy secretary issued a directive
and allocated $59 million to make SCOLA available to DOD personnel between 2006 and 2011.
DLIFLC was put in charge of the DOD-wide contract, which significantly increased the capacity
of SCOLA (and made DLIFLC a major sponsor of the organization). The contract allowed
SCOLA to move heavily into the area of African channels, which was a DOD interest. Through
LST, DLIFLC developed new features for SCOLA, including a search function, and moved
SCOLA into the realm of podcasting. The contract also allowed DLIFLC to archive programs
digitally and thus to abandon the decades-old technique of using VCRs to record and archive
programs.414 In 2007, DLIFLC modified the SCOLA contract to add a sixth channel to cover
Middle East programming in twenty-one languages.415

Faculty and Staff Development

The mission of this division was “to train and support the multi-cultural resident and non-
resident faculty by assessing professional development needs, adopting best practices, and
designing and implementing an effective, customized Foreign Language Teacher Education
program for DLIFLC and CLP requirements.”416 Dean Grazyna Dudney was in charge of the
division.

In early 2006, a major issue was time spent relocating offices from the Presidio of
Monterey to the DOD Center in Seaside, California, which was completed by the end of June
2006. The division’s new facilities included nine classrooms, storage areas, and a curriculum
design and development room plus two classrooms and a computer lab retained at the
Presidio.417 In early 2007, the Faculty and Staff Development reorganized after Dr. Clive
Roberts, Academic Associate Dean, departed to become the dean of Middle East School I.
Dudney split his responsibility between two program managers, Dr. Janette Edwards and Dr.
Ravi Singh, who began jointly to manage the pre-service and in-service programs of Faculty and
Staff Development.418

In FY 2007, DLIFLC updated the Faculty and Staff Division professional development
program by including professional development for the first time within its “Mission Essential
Task List” or METL, thus formally placing the activity on the Institute’s required “to do” list.
Faculty and Staff Development experienced rapid growth during this period. The division
started with just twelve faculty development specialists, but more than doubled in size in just one

415 DLIFLC, “Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Major Accomplishments for Fiscal Year
416 Faculty and Staff Development briefing slides, FY 2007, in “FSD” ff, RG 21.24.
417 Faculty and Staff Development, Quarterly Historical Report, April-June 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
418 1st Quarter Historical Input Report for Faculty Development, 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
These employees provided approximately 16,000 hours of professional development instruction per year in courses ranging from the formal Instructor Certification Course to the more relaxed professional development days. In October 2006, the division published a Concept of Operations for FY 2007-FY 2013, whose purpose was to describe the plans, procedures, policies, and resource requirements needed for faculty and staff professional development across that period and in line with its greater emphasis. The division also published an extensive list of courses and workshops in its 2007 course catalogue.

PEP was, of course, a major impetus for raising the profile of instructor training—the sure number of new instructors hired by DLIFLC required a commensurate increase in the size of Faculty and Staff Development if it was to continue performing its mission. However, problems encountered in DLPT5 development also spurred staff increases. Thus, while Faculty and Staff developed a new “Training Improvement Certification Plan” to help address PEP

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422 Faculty and Staff Division 2007 Course Catalogue, 2007, in “FSD” ff, RG 21.24.
needs, it also developed a new mandatory faculty orientation on the DLPT5, its development, and the Interagency Roundtable Scale (ILR) that set the standard for DLPT scores.423

The Training Improvement Certification Plan, noted above, brought some change to the schools. It directed them to group students in classes upon the basis of their ability while instructors, on the other hand, were to be more deliberately grouped in teaching teams to balance those with more by those with less experience. The plan also set up a task force to coordinate student needs between DLIFLC’s academic and military service unit elements.424 During this period, Faculty and Staff Development also introduced a new course on second language acquisition theory, which ran twenty hours, and revised its Instructor Certification Course (ICC) to help meet PEP goals, including by adding a special ICC session for Pashto teachers in May 2007 with tailored post-ICC mentoring in the department afterwards. To reach faculty serving in permanently deployed LTDs and language learning centers, the division organized Faculty and Staff Development MTTs to travel as needed to provide abridged versions of its faculty training courses.425

According Dr. Clive Roberts, Faculty and Staff Development planned to support PEP using a multi-pronged approach. As early as fall 2004, FSD began to design and develop a three-and-a-half day Team Building workshop for the new PEP teaching teams. This workshop was implemented in November 2004. The purpose of Team Building was to optimize teaching teams by enabling them to work with increased autonomy and to focus on improving student proficiency. The division also conducted one-day team integration workshops to assist teams in assimilating new team members, and conducted “Enhancing Problem-solving Capabilities” workshops to assist teams in overcoming internal issues and challenges.426 This capability was put to use in the summer of 2007 after the Dr. Fischer requested Faculty and Staff Development to deliver a special team intervention workshop with the Hindi language teaching team. Division staff facilitated the development of a team process helping the Hindi team members define problems, collect data on the state of the team, learn how to collaborate as a team, and make decisions to resolve team issues.427

Building upon the apparent success of its team-building workshops, Faculty and Staff Development led and reviewed proposals for an institute-wide professional development project and received a new training contract for $360,000 for FY 2008. Under this contract, the division would offer workshops in Management Leadership Training (MLT), Conflict Resolution (CR), Team Building (TB), and Executive Coaching. At the end of 2007, the division conducted two iterations of the MLT course, one of the TB, and one of the CR.428

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424 Ibid.
427 3rd Quarter Historical Input Report for Faculty Development, 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
428 4th Quarter Historical Input Report for Faculty Development, 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
As suggested by its new course on second language acquisition, Faculty and Staff Development also responded to PEP requirements by focusing on the “hows” of language teaching. It developed a “Task-Based Instruction” workshop for chairs and academic specialists. The main objective of the workshop was to develop skills to enable participants to mentor their faculty in incorporating the task-based approach into their teaching. The division also planned additional courses in educational technology to use in improving the ability of teachers to select material and integrate technology at the appropriate classroom level.429

In FY 2007, DLIFLC hired 337 new instructors, who required teaching orientation. Faculty and Staff Development also had to train new Military Language Instructors. In the less commonly taught languages, the Institute recruited most instructors from outside the teaching world and so it was important that they receive some formal instructor training. Due to the intense hiring under PEP, 64 percent of the instructors at DLIFLC had less than five years teaching experience. The division had thus developed a backlog in its Instructor Certification Course that was 160 hours in duration. However, after the Institute placed professional development on its METL, the ability of the division to eliminate its instructor certification backlog improved. The first problem, after all, was to get new instructors released long enough from their teaching to complete the certification. The division then overcame the backlog by doubling its course offerings. To further aid in the development of new instructors, Faculty and Staff continued to maintained close relationships with several local educational institutions, mainly the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), California State University Monterey Bay (CSUMB), Monterey Peninsula College (MPC), and the for-profit Chapman University, which all offered various courses aimed at foreign language education.430

Colonel Mansager strongly supported faculty professional development, if for no other reason than he realized that DLIFLC would never be able to hire teaching staff who already had master’s of arts degree in teaching a foreign language. “We’ve got to invest in those guys, both with time and money,” he said. Those investments would raise teaching abilities and buy a stronger commitment to the organization. Moreover, Mansager believed professional development would help insure that teachers made appropriate use of new technology and did not leave it to languish because no one could make it work.431

Between 2006 and 2007, eight faculty received Masters of Arts in Teaching Foreign Language acquisition and teaching while thirty-three others received Masters of Arts in Instructional Science and Technology. The division also supported staff working to improve to pursue doctoral degrees in foreign language instruction or even their own English language skills.432 For example, during spring 2006, DLIFLC collaborated with MPC to re-establish a languishing English as a Second Language (ESL) program that originally began at MPC in 1986. Mansager boosted the program, which had faced obstacles, when DLIFLC administrators selected thirty-one instructors to attend ESL courses at government expense after their own

431 Col Tucker Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, p. 7.
432 Col Tucker B. Mansager, “From the Top,” Globe (Summer 2007): 3; See also various documents in “Academic Degrees for Faculty and Staff 2007” ff, RG 21.24.
teaching day at the Institute was finished. Most participants wanted to be able to communicate better with their own students: “My dream is to speak right, I mean correct English,” said Shahanz Amir, a DLIFLC Dari instructor.433

With Mansager’s support, that of previous commandants, and the efforts of Assistant Commandant Daniel Scott, DLIFLC provided full tuition for faculty to attend MIIS, CSUMB, MPC, and Chapman University. The amount dedicated to the program grew substantially under Mansager’s command. Under Colonel Simone, DLIFLC spent about $50,000 a year to send faculty to the MIIS or MPC. By early 2008, DLIFLC was committing about $1.7 million, with a goal of spending one percent of its budget every year to support faculty education and development.434 In 2006 alone, twenty DLIFLC instructors received their masters degrees in higher education while one completed a bachelor’s degree and subsequently enrolled in a Masters program for Instructional Science and Technology at CSUMB. “When our faculty attend programs and courses offered by MIIS, CSUMB, Chapman and MPC, they bring their newly-acquired knowledge and skills back to their work here,” said Lt. Col. Jean MacIntyre, DLIFLC dean of students.435 According to Scott, DLIFLC also invested heavily in conferences for the faculty as a way to train and broaden their capabilities.436

In addition to the Training Improvement Certification Plan, in FY 2007 Faculty and Staff Development began a recertification process aimed to bring 20 percent of veteran faculty members up to speed in the latest educational technologies and teaching methods. This requirement stemmed directly from the infusion of new technology into DLIFLC’s teaching program due to PEP funding. It focused on the use of iPods, Smartboards, and tablet PCs and taught 364 teachers in Educational Technology.437

Finally, the Faculty Development Division continued to publish its journal, Bridges, which focused upon “great ideas about foreign language teaching and learning” as defined by papers or articles contributed by various programs and departments of DLIFLC and selected by a competitive review process. In September 2007, the division published its first online version of the journal.438

Curriculum Development

The mission of Curriculum Development was as its name implied to develop curricula for the foreign languages that DLIFLC instructors taught. The division was administered by Dean Steve Koppany. In June 2007, Curriculum Development physically relocated over sixty staff members to the Monte Vista School. The division took over space previously occupied by the Evaluation and Standards Division, which moved to the DOD Center Monterey Bay. Due to

436 Scott, Exit Interview, 4 March 2008, pp. 2-3.
438 See Bridges, no. 21 (September 2007), in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
space and coordination problems, however, some staff had to work from home while their offices were prepared.\textsuperscript{439}

As Colonel Mansager came onboard at DLIFLC, the Institute was still trying to update its Persian Farsi curriculum, including by outsourcing the development to the Monterey Institute. The DLIFLC Persian Farsi curriculum was decades old and contained contemporaneous references to the Shah of Iran, whose government fell to Islamic revolutionaries in 1979. Unfortunately, the task of revising this curriculum proved overwhelming for MIIS, and DLIFLC lost both time and money without beneficial result.\textsuperscript{440} Curriculum development was difficult, Mansager acknowledged, citing the example of ELTF. He felt it too much a burden and too much a time commitment for teaching staff within DLIFLC schools. Of course, DLIFLC had created the Curriculum Development Division originally to resolve such problems. Unfortunately, as Mansager soon realized, even after Curriculum Development had created an acceptable curricula, faculty might still offer such resistance to its actual use that the result was dubious. For example, when the division handed its newly completed Russian curriculum to the Russian faculty, they as a body essentially rejected it. Mansager was incredulous that a subordinate organization could get away with that, but upon investigation realized the situation was complicated. Faculty buy-in was a key determinant for how well instructional staff received and used any curricula. To achieve buy-in, Curriculum Development needed to work with the schools, because some faculty were developing good products on their own that the developers could use with more effective integration thus achieving better buy-in.\textsuperscript{441}

Mansager clearly felt Curriculum Development was the natural lead to develop teaching materials, but it was faltering in not collaborating or aggressively seeking out the input of the teaching faculty. There were no serious obstacles to such collaboration because everyone was in Monterey while technology made whatever distance separating the stakeholders irrelevant. The lead-time of two or three years to develop curriculum was too long, Mansager held, and such collaboration might cut that down. He was frustrated enough by this process by the end of his tour as DLIFLC commandant that he wanted to fire someone. That probably did not happen because of the conundrum that many faculty, despite resisting use of Curriculum Development products, also resisted handing over their own ideas and materials for fear of not getting sufficient credit for the work. Mansager acknowledged having no solution to this problem, except to emphasize at every opportunity that the work of DLIFLC mattered and could save the lives of soldiers and civilians in places like Iraq and Afghanistan and the work was too important to set back over minor personal grievances.\textsuperscript{442} Perhaps to help allay these concerns, Curriculum Development produced a high quality video presentation in 2006 that described the process of developing DLIFLC Basic Course materials. It intended the recorded portion of the briefing for use as a “kiosk” package for mobility and increased exposure. Division staff hoped this presentation would help others to understand and perhaps better appreciate the time and complexity involved in producing quality digital and printed curricula as well as how the

\textsuperscript{439} Curriculum Development Division, Quarterly Historical Report (2nd Qtr.), 26 July 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives. Note, this is the only quarterly report on file for Curriculum Development.

\textsuperscript{440} The issue is discussed in the DLIFLC Command History, 2004-2005.

\textsuperscript{441} Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, pp. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{442} Ibid.
division’s new modular development approach was aimed to increase students’ language competency and proficiency.\footnote{\textit{CDD}, vol. 2 no. 1 (2006): 3, departmental newsletter in DLIFLC Digital Archives.}

During this period, Curriculum Development made a deliberate effort to digitize all basic course materials so that its courseware could easily download from DLIFLC servers onto computers, iPods, MP3 players, and other devices. The goal was also to eliminate some of the annoying incompatibility problems that had long plagued developers using Microsoft Word (the wordsmith program) and Adobe InDesign (a publishing program). By moving to craft its products directly in a digital format (through a method called Learning Object Generator or LOG), Curriculum Development aimed to eliminate an entire an unnecessary development step. This method, in turn, sped up production, which, as noted above, was a concern for Mansager.\footnote{Megan Lee, “DLIFLC’s Digital Conversion Project Team Changes Nature of Course Writing,” \textit{Globe} (Summer 2006): 24-25.}

Curriculum Development was also responsible for the Global Language Online Support System—GLOSS. GLOSS was an Internet-based system that provided on demand language training to help linguists maintain and enhance their language proficiency. GLOSS received $1.68 million from Presidential Budget Decision (PBD) 753 in 2006. PBD 753 funding helped expand the program by increasing the repository of on-line materials available in the ten existing languages and by adding six new languages. “The impact and benefits of GLOSS in helping field linguists without regular access to formal classroom instruction, as well as DLI students striving for higher proficiency, cannot be overstated. The system not only provides a convenient, easy to navigate, and non-threatening environment for self-study, but it also offers high-quality content, carefully calibrated to suit the needs of individual users,” said Dean Steve Koppany.\footnote{Natela A. Cutter, “DLIFLC to Receive $362 Million for Language Proficiency Enhancement,” \textit{Globe} (Spring 2006): 4-5.}

Congressman Sam Farr originally funded the GLOSS program as a congressional add-on, according to Colonel Scott, but after several years the Army agreed to put $1.6 million for GLOSS into DLIFLC’s base funding, allowing Curriculum Development to program new GLOSS items annually. Prior to that DLIFLC received up to $500,000 a year or so to produce specific GLOSS products, such as Albanian or Serbian/Croatian elements developed during the Balkans crisis.\footnote{Scott, Exit Interview, 5 March 2008, p. 3.} Thus, another benefit of PEP was permanent funding for GLOSS.

In FY 2007, Curriculum Development created 692 new GLOSS “objects” (or lessons) in seventeen languages. For 2006 and 2007, DLIFLC logged 192,107 total language lessons while the majority of some 1,953 GLOSS learning objects were used by linguists. The ability to note such statistics was another important upgrade to GLOSS during this period and made possible by the use of a learning management system. Such technology allowed students to track their own progress or units commanders to follow the training and readiness status of their troops. DLIFLC could also use counters for its online training programs to get some idea of their usage figures, which would allow managers to tailor online content and to make better funding
decisions. Through GLOSS, DLIFLC also produced several weekly training events focused upon the ILR Levels 2, 2+, and 3.\textsuperscript{447} These training activities were PEP-funded.

Begun in 2006, Curriculum Development was able by fall 2007 to offer an online diagnostic assessment program, through Lingnet, to test students who were studying Arabic, Chinese, or Korean. The online assessment aimed to develop “a fully automated web-based language proficiency diagnostic tool that identifies learners’ strengths and weaknesses and provide feedback and learning plans.” The project team had to design and develop the assessment tool, the technological framework, and the assessment content. Afterwards, students of the three languages could test themselves from numerous sites around the work and receive immediate feedback on their strengths and weaknesses.\textsuperscript{448}

That year, Curriculum Development also finally completed its basic course curriculum developed for Persian Farsi. It also delivered a new Serbian/Croatian basic course in September and expected to complete final work on two other basic courses for Arabic and Chinese by


December 2007. Some of this courseware still required classroom validation. The division was also completing several post-basic curriculum projects.  

On other matters, Curriculum Development completed Iraqi Headstart in January 2007 and Dari Headstart in November 2007. These self-paced courses covered over 750 key phrases needed in the field. The courses were distributed by Continuing Education through its field support site and the Iraqi Headstart was downloadable from http://fieldsupport.lingnet.org. The most curious feature of Iraqi Headstart was its advanced computer software that used human to avatar interactions and games to attract the student’s attention and guide them through ten or so lessons to the point where they could read street signs and understand basic greetings and some simple questions and answers. The project began in August 2006 and was completed in lightning time, less than five months instead of the normal twelve. Enthusiastic soldiers at Fort Benning helped to beta test the program after their return from Iraq and even contributed useful phrases used in the final version. Curriculum Development’s Educational Technology Director, Pamela Combacau, led the team effort. In March 2007, Combacau and the team received an award from the Army Training Support Center for producing the Iraqi Headstart program in record time. As important, comments from leaders requesting Iraqi familiarization products for their units were glowing and Curriculum Development used feedback from the field to improve its products. For example, it redesigned its existing Medical Language Survival Guide by adding two hundred phrases collected from medics in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The division completed several other major language familiarization packages by the end of October 2007, including for the countries of Kashmir, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as an update for Afghanistan. It also began working on a rapid response Bengali Familiarization kit due for completion in March 2008 and intended for the Pacific Fleet and Seventh Fleet staffs. Additionally, Curriculum Development completed several Language Survival Kits (LSKs) developed to support these and other languages as part of the broader DLIFLC language familiarization program. These kits came under such topics as Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, Weapons, Force Protection, Military Police Medical, Cordon Raid and Search, Air Crew, Navy Command, and a Basic guide. Funding support for LSK develop stemmed from the 2006 QDR and DOD interest in upgrading DLIFLC support for the general purposes forces.

Finally, the division capitalized on DLIFLC’s existing inventory of curricular language materials and converted many for use on student iPods. Some materials were extracted from Iraqi Headstart or LSKs already completed for several countries. DLIFLC had many LSKs in stock and was able to ship 264,795 to various DOD users worldwide in FY 2007.
Libraries

Under Chief Librarian Margaret J. Groner, the Aiso Library continued to serve the academic information needs of the DLIFLC community of students, faculty and staff, while focusing upon building its emerging language collections. In April 2006, the library installed a DSL service that allowed wireless access for the first time to students or staff with wireless devices. Aiso Library also remained responsible for the Chamberlin Library at the Ord Military Community (OMC), which could now help support the School of Continuing Education, which had relocated to the DOD Center Monterey Bay, as well as military families and retirees living in the OMC housing areas. According to Groner, by the last quarter of 2006, library usage statistics marked quarterly attendance at 33,728. In 2007, usage statistics declined somewhat, reaching a low of 28,067 during the final quarter of 2007. However, staff redesigned the library’s website, made an effort to acquire additional furniture and equipment for both libraries, and established contracts to allow Aiso to make additions to the library collections and services for the next fiscal year.

Language Learning Technology and Machine Translation

In August 2007, DLIFLC published an Institute-wide plan for language technology research and development. The plan divided its topic into three main components: Language learning technology, language testing technology, and machine translation. The plan built upon previous visions for the technical evolution of DLIFLC as expressed in the 2004 Language Transformation White Paper and other documents. Continuing Education successfully tested tablet PC and iPod hardware in a pilot program in 2005 and DLIFLC field these devices across the Institute in 2006, replacing the more bulky CD-ROM players previously used. Implementation of new technology was not just about funding and product distribution, but required training, technical support, network access, increased digital storage requirements, and new software. Fortunately, familiarity with tablet PC-style technology did not pose significant training challenges for DLIFLC students, according to research conducted by Evaluation and Standards Division. DLIFLC introduced the first 500 tablet PCs in the Multi-Language School in 2006 for Dari, Persian Farsi, Pashto, and Turkish students with positive results although experience seemed to show the best results when instructors were issue the same devices as their students.

To implement this new learning technology, DLIFLC had to purchase software licenses for such programs as CL-150 Transparent Rapid Note, a program to facilitate development of instructional lessons installed on about 95 percent of DLIFLC student-use computers. The complexity of using this software included the need for non-resident and distant-learning students to have access to it as well. DLIFLC’s learning technology plan also included

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continued support for SCOLA broadcasting and the Global Online Studies as discussed elsewhere in this report.459

Logically, DLIFLC’s growing requirement during this period to use language-learning technology meant a growing need to institutionalize the process of how it evaluated such technology as well as the need to dedicate additional resources to evaluate it. Moreover, DOD relied upon DLIFLC to help make such evaluations, so planners factored this need into the new plan as well. One major example of this situation was a request for DLIFLC to evaluate a program called Tactical Iraqi. The Director of Language Technology organized a pedagogical assessment provided by DLIFLC Arabic instructors, Curriculum Development, and Continuing Education while DLIFLC Arabic instructors and the TRADOC Culture Center made a cultural assessment and contractors helped by collecting data using questionnaires. The interactive program usefully employed advanced voice recognition and discourse modeling technology to facilitate dialogue practice and the learning of tactical phrases but lacked the ability to impart grammar or help learners develop global language proficiency.460

DLIFLC also used technology for language testing purposes and thus conducted studies on the effectiveness of various new commercial products, such as the Versant automatic Spanish test and English and Spanish versions of an oral proficiency test developed by Ordinate, a subsidiary of Harcourt Assessment. The ultimate success of programs such as these could usefully be applied to rate DLIFLC students mid-course or to screen large numbers of candidates in the field.461 The greatest commercial interest in language technology, however, has long been in the area of machine translation.

In 2005, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap mandated that DOD develop rigorous testing standards for new translation technology. This new Mission Essential Task required DLIFLC to cooperate with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Army program office called “Sequoyah” to help in assessing machine translation. Long range, the goal of such efforts was to use language technology to replace human interpreters and translators for a variety of tasks both on and off the battlefield, which would certainly make the mission of DLIFLC less relevant. As Assistant Commandant, Col. Daniel Scott took a pragmatic view on this perennial question. Not only a key leader in the Defense Foreign Language Program, Scott was a graduate of DLIFLC and had used his language skills in the field. According to Scott, “machine translation is in the walking stage of the crawl-walk-run-jump analogy. Translation devices are good for some phrases and are generally better one-way than two-way.”462 In other words, by the end of 2007, a person was able to look up a phrase on computer and have it reply with a recorded phrase in Arabic, for example, but one could not expect a computer to have a two-way conversation translating back and forth between an English speaker and an Arabic speaker.

DLIFLC had only a marginal role in the development of machine translation technology and was not responsible for actually testing speech translation devices, which was the mission of

459 Ibid.
460 Ibid.
461 Ibid.
the Army Test and Evaluation Center. However, DLIFLC retained a keen interest in understanding the impact of such technology, its utility, and its limitations. The real reason to be involved in evaluating commercial technology was to understand when they were truly effective, robust, and a benefit, and to help prevent DOD from purchasing poorly conceived or ineffective devices, which could be worse than having nothing at all. Moreover, DLIFLC needed to understand how technological changes might affect the Institute’s mission.

In 2007, DLIFLC crafted a set of criteria to validate machine translation devices.\textsuperscript{463} Thus, once someone developed a new device, Institute staff could use their own criteria to evaluate the translation algorithms to see and assess the capability of that machine. They scored the technology to see what percentage of the translations from the machine were correct. Involvement in this process also gave DLIFLC a good idea about how well the technology was progressing. According to Scott, translation technology was getting better quickly. “In about twenty-five years,” he said, “we should have translation devices for many of these languages so we may not need as many students at DLI.” In the meantime, DLIFLC needed to have a role in assessing the technology to advise DOD on foreign language issues and to plan for potential changes to the language-teaching mission brought about by advances in technology.\textsuperscript{464}

To help DLIFLC fulfill its role in evaluating machine translation technology, Colonel Mansager authorized DLIFLC to cooperate with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), through an Air Force contract, to develop a device to use to query more systematically and objectively commercially made handheld translation devices. The intent for this device was that it would apply the same standards and the same test to every new device, thus reducing the cost and reliance upon DLIFLC faculty while increasing objective evaluation. Of course, some of the obstacles to develop machine translation devices also applied to any device aimed at their evaluation. For example, the evaluation device had to test how the machine translation worked when applied to male or female voices or the variety of American accents found in a military organization. Under new DOD guidance, according to Scott, DLIFLC had the authority to evaluate the effectiveness of machine translation devices, whether they were translators or speech-to-speech interpreters, but it lacked the base funding to do so. That meant the Institute could only dedicate two employees to the work. As Scott said, if the technology was walking, DLIFLC was crawling in its ability to assess them. Still, there was a hunger in the field from all levels for DLIFLC to evaluate every new device. Scott wanted DLIFLC to embrace this mission, because too many commanders simply bought industry-pushed products without any evaluation of their linguistic virtuosity. Even, if the technology held up in the heat and mud, Scott noted, “too many of them end up in junk piles in Iraq or Afghanistan because they really aren’t very effective.”\textsuperscript{465}

\textsuperscript{463} See DLIFLC Plan for Language Technology Research and Development, 20 August 2007.
\textsuperscript{464} Scott, Exit Interview, 5 March 2008, pp. 8-9.
\textsuperscript{465} Scott, Exit Interview, 5 March 2008, pp. 8-9. Funding for evaluating machine translation technology was ad hoc and not programmed by DLIFLC. Past funding, for example, came to DLIFLC from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which provided about $100,000 a year to pay overtime or travel expenses for faculty to participate in conferences. What Scott wanted was a methodical program that produced reliable, repeatable results to assist DOD systematically in the adoption of machine translation technology.
General David Petraeus asked DLIFLC to evaluate several commercial translation-type products, for example, an IBM laptop interpreter, a product called “SpeechGear,” and another device by SRI. DLIFLC formed a team and a process, evaluated those systems, and provided the data back to Petraeus, to the Army as a whole, and to the companies. Another example was a product called “Ranger Jones” involving a machine that was supposedly going to do amazing feats of translation. DOD wanted an independent party to evaluate the project. DLIFLC thought the product worked well, particularly in translating the English into Arabic, but it was not going to eliminate the need for human linguists. In general, these types of technology, according to Mansager, might allow, for example, the National Security Agency (NSA) to better conduct data-mining by looking for key words more efficiently. Machines could conduct such tasks more efficiently than humans, but even the finest programs could only process a percentage of a script before it inevitably had to be read by a linguist to re-edit it to make good sense of it. “Speech,” said Mansager, “whatever language it’s in, is an incredibly complex thing and it’s not like chess where there are a set number of moves and combinations. It’s much more artistic in many ways, much more creative in that regard and the computers just aren’t there yet.” Mansager acknowledged that if the machines got good enough, DLIFLC might not have to crank out a thousand linguists at the L2/R2 level. Instead, it might focus intensively on training linguist to the L3/R3 level, but, like Scott, Mansager had no immediate fear that technology was going to supplant the purpose of DLIFLC.

General William Wallace, Commander of TRADOC, in a visit to DLIFLC in March 2007 expressed the same sentiment that technology cannot replace human interaction and understanding on the battlefield. Wallace noted that “the culture one learns is as important as the language itself,” and thought that DLIFLC faculty provided students with an understanding of culture that cannot be gleaned by “just giving everybody and iPod and locking them in a room for six months or a year.” Wallace was impressed by DLIFLC’s voice recognition software used in the Iraqi Headstart program to allow students to record and match their voice patterns with that of the native speaker. As training aides, such devices were very useful, he suggested. On the other hand, “machines may be able to say the words, but they don’t say the words in context. They can’t detect the significance in a smile or firm handshake.” If he had his wish, he told staff, he would want every officer commissioned in the U.S. Army to be able to speak a foreign language with some degree of proficiency, because that with some cultural understanding was the key to breaking down barriers and saving lives.

**Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization**

The mission of DLIFLC’s Evaluations and Standards Directorate was perhaps easy to explain but difficult to carry out. The directorate developed the tests that measured the progress and success of foreign language students while also setting the standards and evaluating the capabilities of foreign language teachers. Test development was demanding work, made more

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467 Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, pp. 4-5.

challenging by the need to adapt testing instruments to the latest Internet-based delivery methods. Evaluations and Standards was administered by Dr. Thomas Parry during most of this period. He assumed his position in February 2006, taking it over from departing Acting Vice Chancellor and Director of Test Automation, Deniz Bilgin, who stepped in after the retirement of Dr. Martha Herzog in 2005.\footnote{“Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization Quarterly Report, 1st Quarter, January-March, 2006,” in DLIFLC Digital Archives.} In April 2006, Dr. Christine Campbell became Associate Vice Chancellor responsible for coordinating projects such as the creation of the FY 2007 budget, the release of the new generation of web-delivered DLPT5s and the implications for the Test Management Division, hiring efforts, the directorate’s contract with the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, and administering the directorate’s relocation.\footnote{“Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization Quarterly Report, 2nd Quarter, April-June, 2006,” in DLIFLC Digital Archives.}

Through 2006, the Directorate of Research and Standardization consisted of four main divisions. These included the End-of-Course Test Division, the Evaluation Division, the Proficiency Standards Division, and the Research and Analysis Division.\footnote{“Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization Quarterly Report, 4th Quarter, October 1-January 31, 2006,” in DLIFLC Digital Archives.} Parry had decided early in 2006, to divide the Research and Evaluation Division into two separate parts. Dr. John Lett remained the dean of the Research Division while Dr. Richard Seldow became the director of the Evaluation Division.\footnote{“Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization Quarterly Report, 1st Quarter, January-March, 2006.”} In 2007, Parry reorganized the directorate twice more by first creating the Test Management Division and then the Testing Division, the latter apparently in

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Figure 28 Organization of Evaluation and Standards Directorate, 2007.
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response to emerging difficulties in development of the DLPT5.\footnote{The Test Division completed development of DLPT5 in Persian-Farsi and Japanese in 2007, initiated external review of the MSA lower-range DLPT5, and began development of DLPT5 MC in Pashto. “Second Quarter, Historical Report Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, April 1–June 31, 2007,” in DLIFLC Digital Archives.} By the last quarter, he had also created a Test Review and Education Division.\footnote{“Fourth Quarter Historical Report Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, October 1–December 30, 2007,” in DLIFLC Digital Archives.} The directorate’s organizational structure in mid-2007 is shown in the figure above.

**Defense Language Proficiency Test**

In the early 2000s, the Evaluations and Standards Directorate embarked upon a major overall of the U.S. Government’s main foreign language test instrument—the Defense Language Proficiency Test or DLPT. The government used the test to gauge how well native English speakers could speak another language. Plans to field the newest iteration of the DLPT, known as the DLPT5, began even as DLIFLC was fielding the last versions of the DLPT IV. Ultimately, the DLPT5 would replace older and outdated versions of the test in numerous foreign languages. Doing well on the test was important for professional linguists to remain qualified in their jobs and because it defined eligibility for Foreign Language Proficiency Pay.

On 16 November 2006, to fund development of DLPT test products, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld authorized DLIFLC $42.7 million for efforts over the FY 2008-2013 timeframe. He intended this funding to support the generation of new DLPTs in forty-eight languages with a new requirement to test above the ILR skill level 3 (long the highest obtainable score on the test), as mandated by the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. The initiative also provided funding to convert existing DLPTs to a new Internet-based format by February 2008, including some that followed a new “constructive response” format.\footnote{DLIFLC Annual Program Review, 25 April 2007, briefing slide 83, in “Mission, DLIFLC Leadership” ff, RG 21.24. Note, additional discussion about DLPT development can be found in Chapter II.} The constructed response format, in which examinees supplied short written responses to questions, contrasted with the traditional multiply choice format and was for use in testing students in languages with small numbers of linguists, such as Hindi, Dari, Pashto, or Albanian. For languages with large numbers of linguists, such as Arabic, Chinese, or Russian, the DLPT 5 would still employ the multiple-choice method (because it could be validated statistically). Both test versions employed materials that were more authentic and were designed for easier use by test-takers, although examinees might not like some changes, as the decision to allow examinees to hear higher-level listening questions only once. “People in the field are not going to slow down for your benefit,” said Dr. Mika Hoffman, the Dean of Test Development. To prepare for this change, test developers suggested that test-takers expose themselves to authentic materials found on TV, radio, and the Internet, or in newspapers and magazines. DLIFLC’s GLOSS network was also a tool for linguists to use in preparing for new test. The goal of these new tests was to force examinees to “go beyond translation and think about what the writer/speaker really means,” as routinely stressed by DLIFLC instructors and MLIs.\footnote{Natela A. Cutter, “DLIFLC to Receive $362 Million for Language Proficiency Enhancement,” Globe (Spring 2006): 4-5.}
In February 2007, DLFILC sent a new request for funding assistance to NSA to allow the Institute to procure a content management system to automate DLPT5 production and to move to computer adaptive testing, suggesting the original DOD authorization was at least slightly underfunded. 477 On 26 September 2007, Colonel Mansager announced that a contract for a content management system was in place to move DLFILC towards computer-adaptive testing, something he had wanted to see happen before leaving. A content management system would allow test designers to construct each test effectively “on the fly” for each test-taker. Meaning, the software would be set up and loaded with enough questions to populate a test for an individual no matter their level. Once the program determined that level was higher than the current questions, it moved the test-taker to the next level. When the program determined a test-taker could not advance further, the test simply ended. Computer-adaptive testing eliminated the need for testers to continue to answer questions either below or above their level, reducing time and frustration. Mansager expected such tests would be available within two years and that they would be a great boon. However, he noted that as it reworked DLPT5s into a computer-adaptive format, DLFILC needed to ensure that the tests could evaluate the full spectrum of the ILR scale from level 0+ all the way to level 3. 478 By the end of FY 2007, the Evaluations and Standards Directorate had converted twenty-one older DLPTs for delivery over the Internet. It had also

478 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, pp. 6-7.
begun contract test development in Azerbaijani, Uighur, Cambodian, and Malay while pursuing in-house development for Pashto, Korean, and Kurmanji tests.479

In 2007, the National Security Agency asked DLIFLC to evaluate some of that agency’s self-developed language tests and to assign proficiency levels to them. NSA used the tests, which were mostly translation exercises, to check employees upon hiring or to validate their job performance. According to Colonel Scott, DLIFLC approved two NSA tests and disapproved two. They were designed for singular purposes and did not test global language proficiency like a DLPT, but DLIFLC was interested to see if it were possible that some of the tests could be used to fill holes in its own inventory. Scott felt that the Institute “shouldn’t expend funds on creating a new test if we already have one that’s legitimate.” On the other hand, the problem with evaluating someone else’s test was the cost and the possibility that it might cause delays in other projects and also the need to apply criteria equally and fairly to each test.480

**Diagnostic Assessment and OPIs**

Another innovation begun during this period was the Diagnostic Assessment Center (DAC). PEP funding made it both necessary and possible for the Institute to establish and staff this special function that was designed to help teachers and managers of linguists to be able to assess the training needs of their students and from an earlier point, which led to better learning plans. DAC instructors received the training they needed to be able to conduct diagnostic assessments in the languages commonly taught at DLIFLC. These instructors could then fan out to train DLIFLC instructors serving in various LTDs, such as at Fort Gordon, Fort Bragg, or Fort Meade. Although useful, diagnostic assessment was labor-intensive, so in FY 2007 the Curriculum Development Division began developing a “fully computer-adaptive task-based Online Diagnostic Assessment (ODA) tool.” It completed reading and listening ODA tools for Arabic and Korean in 2007 and put these into service after both were “beta-tested” within DLIFLC’s resident programs. At the same time, development of Chinese, Persian Farsi, and Russian ODA tools began in 2007 with scheduled completion dates in 2008.481 PEP funding provided $1 million to develop this tool, which could be used by DLIFLC instructors as well as students learning on their own through GLOSS.482

Meanwhile, the Proficiency Standards Division worked to train selected faculty to conduct Oral Proficiency Interviews (OPIs) in the languages taught at DLIFLC. The division used twelve-day workshops to certify these OPI testers, who were then able to evaluate a test-taker against the ILR proficiency standards. The division administered an annual recertification program for OPI-certified instructors (about 450 faculty in forty languages) and conducted three-

480 Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2008, p. 6. NSA also displayed interest in the possibility of DLIFLC certifying “test-writers,” a concept that Scott had difficulty supporting for various reasons.
482 Cutter, “DLIFLC to Receive $362 Million for Language Proficiency Enhancement.”
to five-day workshops for all DLIFLC faculty on the ILR standards. During this period, it also began to offer *Level 3 and How to Get There* and *Speaking: Crossing the L1+/2 Border*.483

To alleviate the manpower heavy OPI-testing requirement, Proficiency Standards began a project to develop a computer-administered OPI called VERSANT. The Spanish computer-administered OPI test, which recorded the test-taker’s oral responses, showed “a high correlation with the more labor intensive OPI.” By 2007, an Arabic computer-administered OPI was also available and Proficiency Standards began to develop an online version of the OPI that used faculty to evaluate and score the tests.484 A more advanced version of VERSANT was intended to be fully automated and to use the computer alone to rate a tester’s recorded responses up to level 2 proficiency.485 To facilitate these efforts, DLIFLC began working with the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) to craft computerized OPIs in Arabic, Persian Farsi, Chinese Mandarin, Korean, French, Russian, Bengali, and Cambodian.486 With increasing requirements, DLIFLC also employed the ACTFL in FY 2006 to conduct 528 contract OPIs (at $140 per test). This capability was limited to a small number of languages, however. In FY 2006, Proficiency Standards had 398 certified OPI faculty testers (as an additional duty) in over fifty languages and dialects. It trained 110 of these that year. Together, OPI testers conducted over 5,000 OPIs in FY 2006. The tests were used to rate O9L recruits, DLIFLC faculty hires, and to evaluate DLIFLC students.487

In January 2007, DLIFLC submitted a proposal to the Defense Language Office to put before the Defense Language Test Requirements Board (DELTRB) asking it to distinguish between three types of OPIs depending upon the situation and requirements. In some cases, an automated OPI would be sufficient and cost-effective (e.g., to screen self-reported linguists) while in other cases a two-tester OPI model would be necessary (e.g., DLIFLC faculty hiring).488

**Other Testing Issues**

Under Dean Dr. John Lett, Research and Analysis continued to play an important role in the Evaluation and Standards Directorate by helping to inform managers and faculty on the efficacy and efficiency of DLIFLC language teaching strategies. In FY 2007, the division hired eleven full-time researchers, analysts, and program evaluators and continued to collaborate with the National Center for Language and Culture Research and the Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL), an NSA-funded but university-affiliated organization. Five of the new hires were dedicated specifically to evaluate PEP efforts, especially the effect of reduced class sizes, new technology, both isolation and overseas immersions, and teaching methods. This team completed five of fifteen scheduled program evaluations in FY 2007 and DLIFLC contracted through CASL for an external review of the team’s work. CASL planned to submit reports on its

484 Ibid.
488 Ibid., briefing slide 92.
external reviews of the division’s evaluation methods as well as the effects of PEP to reduce class sizes and introduce new technology in 2008.  

Research and Analysis was also responsible for managing the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) used by Military Entrance Processing Centers to screen the linguistic aptitude of potential DLIFLC applicants. In 2006, PEP funding provided $1 million to automate the current test and to begin research on a replacement test (DLAB II)—the existing one was over thirty years old. Research and Analysis began to work with CASL in developing four new versions of the existing test while continuing to explore the need for a completely new test. In FY 2007, as planned, it introduced an automated DLAB to the entrance centers (by working with the Defense Manpower Data Center). Research and Analysis also worked this period to fabricate a new pre-screening aptitude test called DLAB-Lite, which the Defense Language Office wanted to help recruiters cast a wider net in finding qualified prospective DLIFLC students. As discussed in Chapter 2, of course, DLIFLC also implemented a PEP-approved plan to raise DLAB test requirements by ten points for prospective DLIFLC students with intent of raising the percentage of the Institute’s high aptitude language learners.

While DLIFLC was revising the DLAB and attempting to persuade the services to recruit to higher DLAB scores, others, including Assistant Commandant Col. Daniel Scott, were growing skeptical that the DLAB was even necessary any longer. According to Scott, while the DLAB correlated well to DLIFLC graduation statistics, so too did high school language course grades, SAT and ACT scores, and even the services’ own ASVAB. Scott noted how the service academies had developed algorithms using a variety of factors to predict candidate success fairly accurately. Scott pointed out that everyone can learn a language, that nearly six billion people do it all the time, and the issue was being able “to predict who can succeed quickly in languages without investing time and money into yet another aptitude exam.” After all, once at DLIFLC, the best predictor of student outcomes was their GPA. Scott understood that two-thirds of students who failed at DLIFLC also had poor DLAB scores, but likewise another third succeeded because they were motivated. Scott’s musings about the relevance of the DLAB were provocative, but did not affect the state of the test during this period.

Beyond testing, the directorate undertook other data-gathering tasks, such as surveys, when required. For example, DLIFLC decided in early 2006 to survey the supervisors of DLIFLC graduates to determine their level of satisfaction with DLIFLC methods as well as the weaknesses. The directorate also helped evaluate the effectiveness of an on-line, self-study, foreign language learning tool called Rosetta Stone, which the Army had made available to anyone with an Army Knowledge Online account. Such work was commonly done by the Evaluation Division under Director Richard Seldow, whose mission was to produce in-depth evaluations of instructional programs and related services pertaining to both resident and non-resident learners.  

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490 Natela A. Cutter, “DLIFLC to Receive $362 Million for Language Proficiency Enhancement.”
492 Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April, pp. 5-6.

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resident programs. In mid-2007, the Evaluation Division completed its Online Reporting System, a new digital means to distribute its key reports to DLIFLC officials using a computer accessible and secure online structure, that is, the DLIFLC SharePoint system, intended to speed delivery and reduce the volume of filed reports. Afterwards, the division abandoned hardcopy distribution of ISQ and ESQ reports. In 2007, the Evaluation Division began a newsletter called The Evaluation Times, whose purpose was to support the division’s mission of providing “valid and reliable evaluative information in a timely fashion to DLIFLC faculty, staff and administrators.” The first issue featured comments by Director Seldow, staff profiles, and information on its new electronic reporting system.\(^495\) In the second issue, Seldow discussed the creation of a strategic partnership between the DLIFLC Evaluation Division and Evaluator’s Institute of the George Washington University, which taught advanced coursework in the field of scientific evaluation and awarded the Master Evaluator’s Certificate. Evaluation Division staff could benefit by the partnership to obtain educational and professional training.\(^496\)

As DLIFLC training and testing needs surged, the Institute also had to maintain valid and reliable program evaluation strategies using trained program evaluators to design, implement, and oversee such work. In September and October 2007, the Evaluator’s Institute provided three on-site, short-term professional development courses exclusively to DLIFLC personnel. According to the Evaluation Division, which designed a survey to collect the results, DLIFLC personnel response to the three courses, which focused on translating concepts into daily practice, was “overwhelmingly positive.”\(^497\) As the year ended, the Evaluation Division announced that it was planning a future survey to obtain data from students, which is what it normally did, except that this student survey would involve those who had not succeeded in graduating from DLIFLC. The goal behind the project was to help determine why some students were unsuccessful. Going forward, dis-enrolled students would have to complete the survey before leaving Monterey.\(^498\)

The Evaluations and Standards Directorate relocated during this period from the Presidio of Monterey to the DOD Center on the former Fort Ord, although this included a transition period that required a temporary relocation at the Monte Vista School while awaiting renovations of new office space in the DOD facility. The directorate held an open house for community residents in March 2006.\(^499\) The relocation was undertaken to maximize classroom space on the Presidio in accordance with DLIFLC master development plans.\(^500\)

**Service Support Units and Programs**

Most students at DLIFLC reported to their respective service units that provided the necessary soldier care and maintenance as appropriate for the student’s military training and experience. The service units maintained tight control over junior enlisted personnel, but

\(^495\) *Evaluation Times*, vol. 1, no. 1 (July/August 2007): 1-4, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.

\(^496\) *Evaluation Times*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 1-4, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.

\(^497\) Ibid.

\(^498\) Ibid., 4.


\(^500\) See *Evaluation Times*, vol. 1, no. 1 (July/August 2007): 1-4.
gradually reduced restrictions in phases as long as the students maintained good academic performance and created no discipline problems. A typical student began the day at 05:30 with physical training, chores, breakfast, and an accountability formation. Class began at 07:55 and lasted until 15:30, after which students reported back to their units physical training, dinner, and then mandatory study time until 21:00. During this period DLIFLC still issued students a foot-tall stack of paper textbooks and dictionaries as well as cassette tapes for their course, although these were being phased out in lieu of iPods. Life, but not class, was a little easier for prior enlisted students, and married students could live off post after reaching the appropriate phase. When housing on the Presidio was tight due to increased student load, housing absorbed by a National Guard MP unit assigned to gate duty at the Presidio, or other issues like construction, qualified students were encouraged to find housing off post. Most junior enlisted lived in DLIFLC barracks in adequate two-person rooms. The more well regarded a student, the more likely they were to receive more responsibility. Because students spent so much time in training status at DLIFLC, they were readily encouraged to volunteer for community events by participating in local parades, helping to organize marathons and golf tournaments, or assisting disabled veterans in an annual wheelchair derby. These activities not only supported local citizens but aided students in seeking promotion or in assuming other leadership roles. The prominence that the military played through its volunteer contribution to such events was a well-established and well-recognized tradition that continued to assist the relatively small Monterey-area community during this period.

**Headquarters & Headquarters Company**

Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC) provided administrative and training support to DLIFLC and Presidio of Monterey Army cadre, including senior officers. Effective 21 June 2006 the HHC Commander was Capt. Joshua Drinkard, who replaced Capt. Victoria McKenzie. Drinkard received his commission in 2003 in Military Intelligence, and had served in Korea and Afghanistan. Before becoming HHC commander, he had served in other positions at DLIFLC in the 229th MI Battalion. Drinkard departed on 23 April 2007 and was succeeded by Capt. Michele Barksdale, who arrived 30 April 2007. Barksdale, a 2000 graduate of Georgia Tech, received her commission in the Finance Corps. Her assignments included tours in Korea, Germany, and at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The commander of HHC reported to the chief of staff for DLIFLC.503

Organizationally, HHC included in its ranks a number of diverse elements, including both DLIFLC and Garrison staffs, Military Language Instructors, staff of the Staff Judge Advocate, Inspector General, Installation Retention NCO, Installation Equal Opportunity Advisor, and Unit Ministry Team.504

501 “The Defense Language Institute,” About.com, ca. 2006, accounts of life at DLIFLC by students, in DLIFLC Digital Archives. Lists of various student volunteer activities are specified in 229th MI Battalion quarterly reports.

502 Biographies of Cpt Joshua W. Drinkard and Cpt Michele A. Barksdale and Headquarters & Headquarters Company Quarterly Historical Report, 2nd Quarter, CY 2007, 2 August 2007, in “HHS” ff, RG 52.01.

503 HHC is discussed here because its principal responsibility, as with other service units at DLIFLC, is to manage and account for its assigned military personnel.

504 Headquarters & Headquarters Company Quarterly Historical Report, 1st Quarter, CY 2007, 13 April 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
The unit also provided support to the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, when on 30 June 2006 it provided the troop formation for the change of command ceremony between outgoing Garrison Commander Colonel Jeffrey Cairns and incoming Commander Col. Pamela Martis. HHC spearheaded such activities as the annual Memorial Day Ceremony and helped organize the annual local Army Ball.\textsuperscript{505}

229th Military Intelligence Battalion

The 229th Military Intelligence Battalion (MI) supported and accounted for all Army students attending DLIFLC. Lt. Col. Michael J. Chinn served as commander of the 229th MI Battalion until Lt. Col. Donald G. Sohn took command in on 14 July 2006 during a ceremony on Soldier Field and remained in charge until August 2008.\textsuperscript{506} Chinn had held the position from June 2004. His new assignment was as an intelligence officer for Army G-3. Sohn became the seventh commander of the 229th MI Battalion since it was founded in 1996. Sohn reported to the Presidio of Monterey from a tour in Iraq with the CVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.\textsuperscript{507} In 2006, the battalion consisted of seven training companies and support elements.\textsuperscript{508}

The 229th MI Battalion experienced much staff turnover as many of its cadre continued to rotate into or out of war zones, but organizationally little change took place this period, owing in large part to major restructuring in 2004 and 2005.\textsuperscript{509} Additionally, during its overall review of DLIFLC in 2006, the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency reviewed the structure and manning authorizations for the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion, but found no issues requiring attention. Because the unit was already organized as a school and not a military unit and because the few military staff and faculty personnel were already assigned to a headquarters company, in compliance with TRADOC directives, there was no need for change. The Manpower Analysis Agency merely renumbered its TDA positions in accord with a TRADOC Center of Excellence model.\textsuperscript{510}

In 2006, 229th MI Battalion companies provided classified country briefs to help clarify the soldier-linguist’s purpose, worked to maintain and improve coordination with the schools to conduct language training during Urban Operations FTXs, and developed an SOP for out-of-country immersions (treating them more as deployments) in response to the commandant’s desire to improve coordination with the Immersion Language Office. Minor platoon-level reorganizations were conducted and routine soldier care and training activities continued to be planned and executed. According to the “CSM assessment,” 229th strengths included motivate

\textsuperscript{505} HHC, DLIFLC & POM Unit History from 1 April 2006 through 30 June 2006, 26 July 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.

\textsuperscript{506} Change of command invitations, in “Students/Military Units” ff, RG 21.24.

\textsuperscript{507} Shannon Marchall, “229th Welcomes Its New Commander,” PAO news article, 28 July 2006, pp. 1, 5, in news clippings, DLIFLC Archives.

\textsuperscript{508} Recall Roster, 229th MI Battalion, Quarterly Historical Report, First Quarter, 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.

\textsuperscript{509} For details, see \textit{DLIFLC Command History 2004-2005}, pp. 136-139.

student NCOs serving as squad leaders, trainers, and testers the unit was efficiently using student
time. Challenges included balancing academic, administrative, and military requirements, high
cadre turnover, and cadre language maintenance.511

In early 2007, the battalion conducted marksmanship training at Camp Roberts,
mandatory driver training for soldiers under 26 years of age, subordinate unit organizational
inspections, and sent a few soldiers on temporary status to assist in JLTxs at Fort Irwin,
California, and Fort Stewart, Georgia, among other activities.512

On 25 June 2007, DLIFLC held a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a special training facility
that would allow 229th MI Battalion soldiers to practice marksmanship skills. The training
facility was known as the Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 (EST 2000) and the Army relocated it
from the former Fort Ord area to make it more available for military students and staff at the
Presidio of Monterey, thus reducing travel time and logistics.513 On 5 October, Alpha Company
of the 229th MI Battalion conducted a special Language Training Exercise (LTX) involving
Korean language military students and DLIFLC Korean teachers, who role-played civilians
cought on a battlefield. About 130 additional DLIFLC instructors also attended the LTX as
observers. The exercise was held at “Impossible City,” an urban military training site located on
the former Fort Ord in Seaside, California. The exercise allowed 229th soldiers to practice
combat skills while interacting in Korean with DLIFLC instructors. It also allowed DLIFLC
instructors to know the types of situations that their students might encounter on the job.514

On 23 October 2007, three 229th MI Battalion soldiers helped save a man’s life after he
suffered a severe asthma attack at the Price Fitness Center on the Presidio of Monterey. S. Sgt.
David Goldberg, Sgt. Dustin Waite, and Cpl. Ryan Bickel all earned a commendation award for
stepping in with their military first aid training, which paramedics later attributed as key to

Figure 30 DLIFLC Korean instructors observe an FTX where soldiers interact with native-speakers
in life-like scenarios, in October 2007.

511 229th MI Battalion, Quarterly Brief, 24 February 2006, in “Students/Military Units” ff, RG. 21.24.
512 229th MI Battalion, Quarterly Historical Report, First Quarter, 2007, 1 April 2007, in “229th MI Battalion” ff,
RG 52.01.
saving the injured man’s life.\textsuperscript{515} Four other 229th soldiers received national recognition when a story about them appeared in \textit{USA Weekend}, a magazine published by more than six hundred newspapers. The magazine awarded the soldiers one of its ten annual “Make a Difference Day Awards” for their efforts to provide home improvement services to retired Army mess steward Eddie Jones. The award included a $10,000 donation to the charity of the soldiers’ choice.\textsuperscript{516}

\textbf{Air Force Element}

The Air Force Element (AFELM) was a specially tailored organization designed to represent U.S. Air Force Headquarters at DLIFLC, but as an integral part of the Institute. AFELM provided command guidance, language instruction, course evaluation, school administration, and staff support to joint military and interagency civilian linguists. The Air Force intended AFELM to be an active partner in helping the Army to administer DLIFLC and to produce military linguists in the quantity and quality demanded by its mission requirements.

The Air Force Element was under the command of Col. Daniel L. Scott as DLIFLC Assistant Commandant. Scott arrived at DLIFLC in June 2004 and remained in charge of AFELM until his retirement in early 2008. In 2004, the Air Force re-subordinated AFELM from the Air Staff and placed it under the command of the Air Education and Training Command, 17th Training Group and 17th Training Wing at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas. AFELM supported the assistant commandant, but was not part of DLIFLC’s TDA.\textsuperscript{517} Ch. M. Sgt. Hogan was the AFELM superintendent and the DLIFLC Provost Ch. M. Sgt. in 2007. AFELM included fifty-one other officers and NCOs who carried out missions all across the Institute.\textsuperscript{518}

The Air Force approved new NCO billets for both AFELM and the Air Force training squadron at DLIFLC, which brought more Air Force MLIs to DLIFLC, but Scott still found himself short of 20 Air Force MLIs while the Air Force also decided to supply him with six fewer officers in 2006.\textsuperscript{519}

On 31 July 2006, AFELM held a retirement ceremony for Lt. Col. Jean MacIntyre, Dean of Students. MacIntyre began her career as U.S. Air Force Academy graduate, served as an intelligence officer and FAO for Russia and Ukraine, and held positions in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.\textsuperscript{520}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{516} “Soldiers Studying Language Say ‘We Care’,” \textit{USA Weekend}, 13-15 April 2007, p. 6
\item \textsuperscript{517} Scott, Exit Interview, 29 February 2008, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{518} Air Force Element 3Q07 History Report, DLIFLC Digital Archives.
\item \textsuperscript{519} Col Daniel L. Scott, email to Gail McGinn and Nancy E. Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006, in ff 1, RG 52.01-02.
\item \textsuperscript{520} Retirement ceremony invitation and flyer, in “Students/Military Units” ff, RG 21.24.
\end{itemize}
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311th Training Squadron

Between 2004 and 2006, the Air Force added 700 additional students to the 311th Training Squadron, which was responsible for all Air Force airmen students at DLIFLC. In 2006 the squadron reported an average of 1,200 language students. As it began 2007, the unit reported 1,575 students. By the end of 2007, the number of students had grown to 2,000. In fact, in 2006 and 2007, the number of Air Force students in residence at DLIFLC exceeded the number of students maintained by the Army for the first time, although this rate later moved back down. Still, the rapid growth of Air Force seats at DLIFLC would eventually prompt the Air Force to create the 314th Training Squadron in Monterey in 2008.

In 2006 and 2007, Air Force Lt. Col. Marilyn Rogers commanded the 311th. She began her military career after a brief stint as a police officer in a department not ready to integrate females. She joined the Air Force instead and made a career, first attending DLIFLC in 1990-1991 to study Russian, followed by work in Soviet and East European studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Rogers had opportunities to use her Russian, especially while stationed in Bosnia to communicate with Russian United Nations forces. On 21 June 2007, she turned over command to Lt. Col. Paul Issler during a ceremony held on Soldier Field. Issler served previously as an Information Operations Planner at U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, in Florida. During the same ceremony, Col. D. Scott George, Commander of the 17th Training Wing, recognized the 311th for its achievement of becoming the 17th Training Wing Unit of the Year.

The 311th implemented two new initiatives during this period, the first being a program to mentor newly arrived Air Force students using airmen already engaged in language studies. The mentors worked with these students in the period prior to their class start dates. The second initiative involved the establishment of a designated driver program to help mitigate incidences of drunk driving. During this period, 311th airmen put in more than 40,000 hours of community service, including through performances by the 311th Training Squadron band.

Continued increases in the number of Airmen students at DLIFLC forced the Air Force to consider the need for an added training squadron at the Presidio of Monterey. While planning began this period, formal activation of the new unit, to be called the 314th Training Squadron, did not take place until August 2008.

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521 Scott, email to McGinn and Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006.
522 311th TRS, Quarterly Historic Report, Q1 2007, 20 April 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
523 Scott, Exit Interview, 29 February 2008, p. 2. See also Appendix B.
The Center for Information Dominance Detachment (CIDD) remained responsible for Navy enlisted and officer students attending DLIFLC during this period. Lt. Cdr. Duane Alan Beaudoin commanded the detachment from 6 January 2005 until Lt. Cdr. Leonard Wayne Caver relieved him as commander during a change of charge ceremony on 18 January 2008. In 2006, the detachment included 7 officers and 46 enlisted cadre with 28 officers and 402 enlisted students attending DLIFLC.

In May 2006, CIDD students who dropped out of DLIFLC for academic reasons faced a new Navy policy stating that such students had to report directly to the fleet in a general detail status rather than being allowed the option to attend another “A” school. Fortunately for some, testing in the new DLPT 5 was suspended that summer due to a high failure rate of test-takers in comparison with historical DLPT averages and only resumed again once DLIFLC completed the certification of the curriculum supporting each language.

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530 CIDD, Command History for CY06, Second Quarter, 25 July 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
531 CIDD, Command History for CY06, Third Quarter, 25 October 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
In 2006, CIDD drew attention for the several reasons. On 25 July, U.S. Navy Cryptologic Technician Interpretive 1st Class Brandace Martin received the MIL of the Quarter award for her contributions to improve student proficiency results as a Chinese language instructor. On 14 September 2006, CIDD, along with Colonel Scott, hosted Admiral Gary Roughead, Commanding the Pacific Fleet, and his staff during a site visit to DLIFLC. The admiral received an operations briefing and then chatted with CIDD students and staff. Finally, the unit’s musical abilities were much appreciated by many. The CIDD Monterey Choir sang at 31 events in 2006, including Chief Pinning Ceremony, Naval Postgraduate School Battle of Midway Event, Monterey County’s Memorial Day Ceremony (televised), CIDD Monterey’s 231st Navy Ball, NPS Navy Day Ball, Christmas in the Adobes (City of Monterey), and Special Forces Association Holiday Ball.

According to Assistant Commandant Col. Daniel Scott, the Navy was a strong advocate of DLIFLC’s mission. The Navy Staff had demanded more language training for their sailors and more from DLIFLC in terms of special pre-deployment training as well as routine basic course language instruction and cultural familiarization training. During Scott’s time at DLIFLC, he was especially proud to see DLIFLC faculty deployed to naval vessels to teach Spanish and Portuguese. The naval presence at DLIFLC, however, was relatively small in terms of numbers and funding, but Scott felt the highest levels in the Navy paid attention to DLIFLC, supported its mission, and had a vision for language. The Navy had adopted a L3/R3 goal for its professional linguists and had drafted its own language white paper and sailors made good use of DLIFLC’s web-based materials and classes. The Navy had also made it a requirement for petty officers to rate at L2/R2 on the DLPT to achieve promotion to petty officer second class (E5).

Marine Corps Detachment

The Marine Corps Detachment at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), Presidio of Monterey was responsible for all U.S. Marine Corp students attending the language training at the Institute and officers attending the nearby Naval Postgraduate School. Traditionally, it was the smallest student service unit stationed at the Presidio of Monterey. Still, since 2004 the number of Marine students attending DLIFLC grew by 122—53 percent jump. At the same time, as the Assistant Commandant, Colonel Scott, noted, the Marine Corps did not supply the Institute with any additional MLIs to help mentor the increased number of Marines at the Presidio. The Marine Detachment did, however, establish its own Learning Resource Center in 2007, to help increase graduation rates of Marine students assigned to DLIFLC. According to Gunnery Sergeant Kevin Murray, the detachment’s Academic Coordinator, the resource center brought a 26 percent attrition rate down to nearly 15 percent. The resource center consisted of over seventy computers provided by the Army and

533 CIDD, Command History for CY06, Third Quarter, 25 October 2006.
535 See Scott, Exit Interview, 14 April 2008.
536 Scott, Exit Interview, 4 March 2008, p. 4.
537 Scott, email to McGinn and Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006.
loaded with language learning applications that students could access in the Marine barracks. According to Marine Maj. Jim Manuel, the Army and Marines had cooperated to put back into service surplus Army equipment that was having a meaningful impact on language training. The Marines decided to establish their own learning resource center after watching similar but pre-existing Army, Navy, and Air Force learning resource centers upgrade to more advanced capabilities.\(^{538}\)

The Marines bid farewell to Maj. Karl C. Rohr, commander from 15 August 2003 until 18 May 2006, and welcomed his successor as commander, Maj. Gilbert A. Barrett III, during a ceremony at the Presidio’s Soldier Field on 18 May 2006. Barrett was already serving as the unit’s executive officer from June 2005 when he took the position and accepted it after receiving a promotion to major on 1 May.\(^{539}\)

Barrett commanded the detachment until 18 June 2007 when he in turn relinquished command to Maj. James E. Manel, again at Soldier Field. Manel, a native of Brooklyn, came to Monterey from Division G2 at the 1st Marine Division and had seen deployments in Panama, Cuba, and Iraq. He was now in charge of 490 Marines, which he regarded as both a great accomplishment and a challenge. Barrett’s next assignment was the Division G2, Division Intelligence Officer, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California. According to Barrett, working in Monterey, was “the greatest job I’ve ever had.” He complemented his Marines for their work in the school, on the post, and in the community.\(^{540}\)

Marine students participated in numerous volunteer events during this period, including by supporting the AT&T Pebble Beach Golf Tournament, the Big Sur International Marathon, the Pacific Grove Good Old Day Parade and similar local events.\(^{541}\) On 21 June 2006, Marine Pfc. Justin Wallace, an Arabic student at DLIFLC, succeeded in rescuing a four-year-old boy and his older sister both endangered by treacherous wave action along Monastery Beach near Carmel. While walking on the beach, Wallace heard shouts and immediately responded, jumped into the cold water, and retrieved the child. He and another DLIFLC student then assisted the girl who paramedics later treated.\(^{542}\) The unit also held a memorial for Sgt. Michael M. Kashkoush on 2 February 2007.\(^{543}\)

**Foreign Area Officer Program**

FAOs or Foreign Area Officers were commissioned officers with a broad range of experience with graduate-level training and direct experience and language expertise related to the region of their specialty. The FAO program was distributed across several services and DOD agencies but DLIFLC played an important role in supporting FAO language training because

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\(^{543}\) Memorial flyer for Sgt Michael M. Kashkoush, February 2007, in “Students/Military Units” ff, RG 21.24.
FAO officers attended the Institute for language studies and the program was locally coordinated out of the Weckerling Center on the Presidio of Monterey. Col. Humberto Rodriguez and Richard Higdem administered the FAO program office during this period.544

In 2006, DOD formally reviewed its FAO program to evaluate program management, issued its instructions on FAO program management, and guidelines on submitting annual FAO reports. Also during 2006, DLIFLC requested feedback from the various program elements to update the Foreign Language Objectives (FLOs) that it covered in teaching language courses to FAO officers. A meeting was held in April coordinated by Lt. Col. Jeffrey S. Wiltse, who was the Associate Director, FAO Programs, DLO.545

**Trial Defense Service**

In 2004, the Army established a Trial Defense Service (TDS) field office at the Presidio of Monterey that was independent of the DLIFLC Staff Judge Advocate and did not report to either the DLIFLC commandant or Garrison commander. The purpose of the TDS was to represent Army personnel from the Presidio of Monterey, Fort Hunter Liggett, the Naval Postgraduate School, Camp Roberts, Camp Parks, Travis Air Force Base, and the USAREC 6th Brigade Recruiting Command. Service members previously had to seek independent defense council from TDS officers at Fort Lewis, Washington, so this made in person counseling practical for many less serious situations and the office also took on a preliminary advisory role for non-Army military personnel in the area. On 1 July 2006, the first change of defense council took place as outgoing defense council Capt. Rob Smith transferred to the Presidio’s Office of Staff Judge Advocate. He was succeeded by Capt. Mark Kim. TDS officers reported to a TDS field grade officer at Fort Lewis, which allowed the field office to maintain independence from the local command in representing service members charged with infractions.546

Of particular note in July 2007 was recognition earned by S. Sgt. Francisco P. Ramirez of the DLIFLC and Presidio of Monterey TDS. Ramirez was selected to receive the JAG Corps Award of Excellence after being nominated and evaluated by a panel of senior non-commissioned officers.547

**U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey**

Under the command of Col. Jeffrey S. Cairns and Col. Pamela L. Martis, the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, provided base support and facilities management for the installation that housed DLIFLC. As noted in Chapter II, Martis assumed command from Cairns on 23 June 2006 during a transfer of command ceremony conducted on the Presidio’s parade ground. Civilian Pamela von Ness, Deputy to the Garrison Commander, continued her role as primary advisor to the commander and director of garrison staff.

544 DLIFLC Directory (2006). Note, no quarterly reports for the FAO program were located.
As the period began, the Southwest Region Office of the Installation Management Command (IMCOM), under Hugh M. Exton, Jr., was the Presidio’s garrison superior command. During 2006, however, IMCOM reorganized and merged its Southwest Region Office into its West Region Office, consolidating four separate regions into two with the West Region headquartered at Fort Sam Houston in Texas and the East Region at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Thus, in January 2007, Randy Robinson, West Region director and member of the Senior Executive Service, assumed control over the Presidio. In a visit to Monterey, Robinson said his foremost goals were (1) the well-being of the Army family, (2) sustaining and regenerating the force, and (3) ensuring that soldiers were properly trained. Robinson acknowledged that IMCOM was working to manage resource constraints affecting the Presidio. The West Region Office administered thirty-one installations. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, Lt. Gen. Robert Wilson, who also commanded IMCOM, paid a visit to the Presidio of Monterey in February 2007. Robinson again returned to Monterey on 27

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548 Technically, the Presidio fell under the Authority of the Installation Management Agency until formation of the Installation Management Command in early FY 2007, which combined components of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, the Installation Management Agency, the Army Environmental Center, and the US Army Community and Family Support Center. IMCOM reported directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army, thus providing a single authority over mission support activities. Overall IMCOM command was assigned to the Assistant Army Chief of Staff for Installation Management located in the Pentagon. See “Army Announces Installation Management Command Activation,” Monterey Military News, 25 August-7 September 2006, p. 7.


November 2007 to sign a covenant or agreement pledging Army support for Army families.\textsuperscript{551} Colonel Martis espoused a similar message as when she stated that her own “top priorities as Commander are people, sustainment and stewardship” and that support provided by the Garrison’s civilian workforce was key to enabling her priorities.\textsuperscript{552}

Resource Constraints and Reorganizations

As documented in Chapter II, DLIFLC and Garrison leadership experienced some friction during this period while negotiating the distribution of resources and other issues stemming from the creation of IMCOM and the separation of the Presidio’s mission and garrison functions. The issue of who was in charge of the Public Affairs Office (PAO) office drew particular concern. According to IMCOM, the original “Standard Garrison Organization” directive assigned PAO to Garrison and there was no DAHQ exception, regardless of whether it made sense locally.\textsuperscript{553} DLIFLC staff strongly disagreed, as Colonel Mansager frankly stated on several occasions. During the tug-of-war over PAO, one of its long-time employees, Bob Britton, decided to retire. He left on 30 June 2006 after 46 years of government service. Mansager awarded Britton, who had served in both the Presidio and the Fort Ord PAOs, a special award “for exemplary performance of duty while serving as Writer and Editor, Public Affairs Office, Presidio of Monterey, from 1 October 2003 through 30 June 2006. Britton’s many stories helped to document the history of both Fort Ord and the Presidio.\textsuperscript{554}

While DLIFLC continued to experience an infusion of new resources to meet increased performance and mission requirements, the Garrison operated under fiscal restraints in 2006 due to national budget debates. As a result, its Resource Management Office restrained procurements of supplies, canceled or postponed non-essential travel, released temporary workers funded from baseline funding (OMA) not related to health and safety, froze new contract awards and downsized existing ones where possible, and froze hiring into FY 2007.\textsuperscript{555} It was also underfunded for its operations due to how funding was allocated within IMCOM, which was distributed to subordinate commands on the basis of a standard organizational structure that assumed that one base was exactly like any other. Hence, each post had similar functions and IMCOM allocated funds to their garrisons based upon a “Standard Garrison Organization” model. Posts that had responsibilities that departed significantly from this model or had missions not covered by it, had to request exceptions or “reclamas” from IMCOM decisions.

In August, Lt. Gen. Tom Metz advised all subordinate TRADOC commands to follow the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army’s guidance in restricting the hiring of civilians. To reduce the total Army end strength in 2006, the Army mandated that only current permanent Army civilians who were fully qualified be hired into vacant Army civilian positions, not the best qualified


\textsuperscript{555} Garrison staff meeting briefing slides, 22 August 2006, in “Garrison” ff, RG 21.24.
These measures were deleterious to support for DLIFLC, which continued to expand its operations despite restraints by IMCOM, which even conducted a manpower review to put additional pressure on Army garrisons to reduce their manpower down to strength authorized by the official TDA (Table of Distribution and Allowances). Colonel Martis dutifully informed her superiors that reducing the Presidio Garrison to the strength authorized by the standard TDA “would break us.”

At about the same time as these personnel restraints were imposed, DOD mandated the transition of numerous DOD civilian employees from the long-establish General Service personnel system into a new personnel system called the National Security Personnel System or NSPS. The transition began on 30 April 2006 when the first phase of about 11,000 DOD employees converted to NSPS. Conversions to NSPS for DOD civilian personnel at the Presidio of Monterey began later. Colonel Martis told a Town Hall gathering of Garrison and California Medical Detachment personnel in January 2007 that IMCOM would make the transition that April. According to Martis, “this change is going to happen, and we all know it so we need to learn more about it, so we can implement it more effectively,” and she added, “as painless as possible for all affected.”

Senior DOD leaders hoped that NSPS would provide more flexibility to managers to reward high achievers and penalize poor performers. As implemented nationally, NSPS used complex rules that often confused employees, was generally more cumbersome to operate, was not transparent, and did not significantly offer greater rewards for high achievers or lower rewards for low achievers, all of which increased institution resistance and led eventually to allegations of unfairness and inefficiency and congressional intervention.

The Directorate of Information Management (DOIM) began transitioning the email used by all post employees to a new system as mandated by DAHQ. The transition from the existing email system to the new Microsoft Exchange 2003 required the creation of a centralized Army Knowledge Online Account (AKO) that provided each employee with a new address ending in “us.army.mil.” Historically, federal employees typically experience such transitions every few years and often result in technically improved systems and security at the cost of data loss and inevitable downtime as employees migrate data, overcome technical glitches, and learn to operate new software. DOIM implemented an important change in its own organization as well when Colonel Martis executed an agreement between IMCOM and the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Signal Command signed in April 2007. The agreement required the realignment of document management and publishing by removing these functions from DOIM and transferring them to the Directorate of Human Resources effective 1 October 2007. Some of the specific functions transferred included Army records management, official mail distribution, Army correspondence, Freedom of Information Act requests, and printing and publication control.

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559 “Upgrade to Presidio’s E-mail System Underway,” Monterey Military News 22 June 2007, p. 1.
Real Property Management

Under the management of its Directorate of Public Works, the Presidio of Monterey began or completed several important construction projects during this period. For example, there were several barracks projects underway in 2006 to upgrade existing barracks, mainly Buildings 645, 646, and 648. Barracks Buildings 627, 629, and 630 also received some improvements amounting to about $1 million apiece. The program was temporarily put on hold in 2006 due to programming issues in the IMCOM chain of command, but work later restarted. To facilitate coordination with DLIFLC officials on strategic planning for the post, Garrison officials established the first Installation Planning Board in June 2006. They also met regularly with DLIFLC staff to coordinate space-use issues in Building 614, the installation headquarters. In early 2007, the Garrison published a draft Real Property Master Plan for the Presidio of Monterey as prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The master plan was a requirement for every Army installation (AR 210-20), intended to provide a long-range vision for planning and decision-making, and time-consuming to finalize. The last such document drafted for the Presidio of Monterey was in 1984.

The first draft of the Real Property Master Plan encountered stiff DLIFLC criticism. In his input to the plan, Colonel Mansager argued that the plan should be “Presidio of Monterey-centered,” that is, he did not want to see any disposition toward a build out of DLIFLC operations on land controlled by the Garrison on the former Fort Ord. More significantly, from a historical point of view, Mansager said that the plan “should include at a minimum the tear down and replacement with General Instructional Building (GIBS) of existing 1900-era facilities.” He went on to detail his strong preference for the elimination of most of the historic structures within the historic district of the post. Mansager did detail his views for “contingency” planning for a build out of educational facilities at OMC, which, again, in his mind meant the worst case scenario. In that case, he preferred a primary focus to use space for GIBs, barracks, and administrative offices on property adjacent to Joe Lloyd Way, not in the Marshall Park area that he felt needed to be retained to develop homes for DLIFLC staff and faculty. He also wanted the Garrison to conduct a comparative analysis of the environmental efficiencies to be gained by tearing down the Presidio’s historic buildings. The goal, he said, was for the plan to show the maximum limit of optimization that this strategy could achieve on the Presidio, among lesser concerns, such as documenting the current DLIFLC use of leased space in the Monte Vista and Larkin schools. In recapping his concerns, Mansager stated that the plan needed to clarify the difference between legal constraints and “good neighbor” policies. “While we want to maintain a positive relationship with the local communities,” he asserted, “DLIFLC as a DOD entity is not bound by the same restrictions as non-DOD organizations.” In other words, while it might upset local communities to tear down historic buildings, if it was legal to do so, that was what Mansager wanted. It was “desirable,” he stated, to coordinate with the State Historic Preservation Office, but he did not think it was actually necessary. Mansager aimed to “ultimately develop and modernize the entire infrastructure of the Presidio of Monterey before developing land at OMC.”


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final submittal plan in 2008 and briefings about ongoing planning in late 2009 delineated the emergence of two competing visions for directions for development of the master plan: the first plan was Presidio-centric, as Mansager had wanted. The second alternative balanced future development between the Presidio and OMC and included three new GIBs to be completed at the Presidio along with a build out of self-contained educational living and working spaces at OMC. This alternative was preferred, but the Army’s final decision was unclear at this point. However, the master planning process had clearly developed the challenges for future construction on the Presidio. In order of priority, they were water credits, limited real estate (and steep slopes on the Presidio), force protection needs, environmental constraints, and historic district constraints.\footnote{US Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, “Pre-Final Submittal—Real Property Master Plan Digest,” [2008]; and Presidio of Monterey Real Property Master Plan briefing slides, 22 October 2009, in ff #5, RG 51.01.10-05.}

On 13 October 2006, the Garrison organized a special ceremony to mark what was perhaps the most important new project to get underway at the Presidio—a groundbreaking for a new dental clinic. Costing nearly $6,700,000, the project was awarded to JMR Construction of Folsom, California, in August, and was due to be completed in December 2007. It was to have sixteen chairs and be able to provide comprehensive dental care to service members and their families. Dignitaries who participated in the groundbreaking ceremony included Colonel Martis, Col. Thomas MacKenzie, Western Region Dental Corps Commander, U.S. Representative Sam Farr, 17th District, and Steve Hupaylo of JMR Construction Corp., the private firm contracted to build the clinic.\footnote{Dental Clinic Groundbreaking flyer, 13 October 2006, in “Garrison” ff, RG 21.24; and “POM to Hold Dental Clinic Groundbreaking,” Monterey Military News, 6 October 2006, p. 1; “Presidio Dental Clinic Construction Begins with Groundbreaking,” Monterey Military News, 20 October 2006, pp. 1, 4.} Another construction project handled by the Garrison’s Directorate of Public Works that began in November 2006 was driven by a settlement agreement from a lawsuit against the Army over the failure of some buildings on the Presidio to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act.\footnote{Garrison Staff Meeting Notes, 16 January 2007, in “Garrison” ff, RG 21.24.} Finally, of longer range benefit, Presidio officials signed an agreement in principle to transfer real estate still owned by the Army on the former Fort Ord to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for the purpose of establishing a new health care clinic to benefit veterans, retirees, active duty military, and their families. The land transfer was signed on 25 July 2007 by Colonel Martis and a representative from the VA’s Palo Alto Health Care System. A lack of care facilities in the area meant that while active duty personnel received medical attention by visits to the Presidio clinic, their family members had to visit off-post providers contracted for that purpose.\footnote{Elizabeth D’Angelo, “Presidio, VA Closer to Setting Up Joint Health Clinic,” Monterey Military News, 3 August 2007, pp. 1, 6.} The VA clinic was designed to serve active and retired service members and their families.

As noted above, the Garrison continued to oversee former Fort Ord property still owned by the Army at OMC, including family housing areas and facilities that housed several mission-related or Garrison functions. In 2006, Garrison officials worked with City of Seaside officials to develop an agreement to swap land previously transferred to Seaside by the Army after the closure of Fort Ord and known as the “Stilwell Kidney Parcel” (due to its shape on maps). This
land held an abandoned military housing area that the Army wanted back to use in redeveloping a new military housing area. Meanwhile, Seaside was interested in exchanging the same land for a strip of land owned by the Army along the entrance to OMC and potentially better suited for commercial activities.Officials expected to see approval for the land swap by late summer 2006, but various delays pushed approval into 2007. The Kidney parcel consisted of 102 acres of land sitting in the middle of the Army’s OMC housing area. Originally, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process had required the Army to transfer the land to the Fort Ord Reuse Authority, which in turn transferred it to Seaside in 2000. Seaside, however, had done nothing with the property and duplex-style homes there had deteriorated into an ugly and blighted condition. More than an eyesore, the Kidney parcel had become a safety risk to children living nearby and a fire hazard. In exchange for the Kidney area, the Army did agree to transfer to Seaside a parcel of OMC land located closer to the freeway, which happened to include existing facilities housing the Presidio of Monterey Fire Department and a Burger King restaurant. The fire department would continue to have occupancy rights for fifteen years after the agreement while the Burger King would only have the same rights for three years. To the regret of many at OMC, after the agreement expired, the restaurant closed its doors and the vacant facility has remained unused to the current time.

For its part, the Army had a clear plan for the Kidney parcel. Recent initiatives to improve military housing in the Monterey region had proven highly successful. The Garrison had worked closely with local municipalities and private companies, especially Clark Realty and Pinnacle Property Management, as well as the Navy, to forge a regional public-private initiative aimed to reduce costs associated with military housing construction and routine management. By the end of 2006, the Army’s agreement with the Clark-Pinnacle consortium (known as Monterey Bay Land LLC) had produced 373 new homes built at Fitch and Hayes Parks within OMC. This new housing stock replaced substandard 1960s-era housing with homes meeting modern building code standards. The operation of the fifty-year lease arrangement between DOD and the companies pleased local garrison officials who continued to laud its merits in improving the quality of life of service personnel assigned to the area. After the Army obtained the Kidney parcel in 2007, it drafted plans to demolish the derelict housing area as soon as possible to allow construction of between 250 and 420 new privatized houses for military members.

The Presidio shared two specific awards for the success of partnering arrangements. Mary Ann Leffel, on behalf of the Monterey County Business Council, presented the awards in June 2006. The first award was for the City-Based Installation Management Program that allowed the cities of Monterey and Seaside to perform respectively public works maintenance for

the Presidio of Monterey and OMC facilities. Services shared between the three agencies included water distribution and storm water abatement, facilities maintenance, fire protection, street maintenance, fencing, as well as heating, ventilation, and cooling system services. The arrangement, said Leffel, established the nation’s first civil-military public works contract with the Army and was an important tool in helping to prevent the closure of the Presidio after the closure of Fort Ord. Similarly, the leased transfer of DOD-owned military family housing stock to the Clark-Pinnacle partners had provided $600 million in construction-related funds to invest in modernizing or rebuilding antiquated military housing. The award honored the improvements in the lives of service members and that also provided DOD civilians with affordable housing while using market efficiencies to save taxpayer’s money.571

Other forms of coordination and cooperation with local civilian authorities included planning for potential natural disasters. For example, in September 2006, the Presidio of Monterey police conducted a drill with the cities of Monterey and Pacific Grove to simulate a natural disaster. In such emergencies, one measure that the Army planned was to open its gates to allow easier traffic flow away from affected areas. Road closures due to traffic accidents, however, would not qualify for the Army to reduce its security procedures.572 Indeed, these were actually strengthened in June when the Garrison revised traffic and gate rules to increase security and mitigate traffic issues. It later installed tire spikes to prevent vehicles from entering the post using the outbound lanes and restricted gate hours at the Presidio’s High Street entrance.573 In 2007, Colonel Martis decided to open the 15th Infantry Street Gate, closed for several years, to help alleviate morning traffic. Because the Presidio gates lack stand-off distance from the local community, any traffic congestion caused by gate delays affected the City of Monterey.574 The 15th Infantry Street Gate opened for a thirty-day trial in November 2007.575 Finally, one other efficiency measure implemented during this period proved less popular with service members. DOD implemented a new policy that required the Garrison to transfer responsibility for paying utilities in family housing areas directly to service members.576 Also, sadly, in July 2006, Jerry Abeyta, former head of the Garrison’s Public Works Directorate, passed away. A memorial was held for him at the San Juan Bautista Mission.577

574 “Planners Expect Gate Reopening will Improve Morning Traffic Flow, Monterey Military News, 26 October 2007, pp. 1, 6.
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

To improve the quality of life and working arrangement for students and staff on the Presidio of Monterey, the Garrison’s Director of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) sponsored some important initiatives during this period. Most importantly, in March 2006, perhaps reflecting long-standing trends in American culture, MWR opened two new Presidio facilities—its first coffeehouses, known as the Java Café. The first Java Café opened in the Hobson Student Center on the upper Presidio following a ribbon cutting and then a grand opening ceremony the following day. Trials were held in August 2006 to determine if Saturday open hours were feasible, but sales fell below the breakeven point. More unfortunately, this operation had to be placed upon a program improvement plan in 2007 after it lost money during the first quarter of FY 2007. After Dave Fickle, who worked at the Price Fitness Center, retired, MWR consolidated the management and staff of the Hobson Student Center and the fitness center under one office. The second Java Café ribbon cutting was held on 3 March to mark the opening of a coffee house in Building 632. Facing the central quad, Building 632 was part of the academic complex designed originally for the Cold War-era Russian language program. Both the Hobson and “Russian Village” cafes featured “great coffee, great food and an inviting place to relax!” The establishment of the latter Java Café was not without controversy, however, as it required DLIFLC to displace six classrooms being used to teach Arabic while U.S. Forces were fighting in Iraq. Moreover, completion of the first of three planned general educational facilities on the Presidio was still two or three years in the future. On the other hand, many faculty and students have long complained that the classrooms in the Russian Village were poorly suited for teaching because of soundproofing issues when simultaneous classes were held. At any rate, the final decision was popular with students and staff whose patronage made the cafés successful.

MWR initiated another innovative activity at the Ord Military Community in May 2006 when it opened a paintball facility. To mark the occasion, a grand opening paintball tournament was held in which active duty personnel participated in teams. Army soldiers used the opportunity both to have fun and to practice their urban warfare training. Over one hundred active duty personnel attended the grand opening. MWR also supported the Garrison’s organization day on 5 October 2007 at Hayes Park in OMC. MWR catered an outdoor luncheon for Garrison staff who also participated in various activities, including a tug-of-war contest.

579 Ibid.
581 Dr Stephen M. Payne, Comments on draft, 26 March 2013.
During this period, the Directorate of Logistics (DOL) faced a big issue—the management of a study conducted to determine whether the Army could outsource some of DOL’s work to private contractors. The management study began in July 2006, as announced by Col. Pamela Martis at a Town Hall meeting, but she provided a broader outline of the study and its impact during a special briefing to DOL staff on 28 August 2006.\textsuperscript{584} The results of the study would eventually lead to lay-offs of DOL staff and outsourcing of work of some employees.

This was not the first time the Army had commissioned an outsourcing review of government work at the Presidio of Monterey. In fact, the RAND Corporation used one of these earlier outsourcing reviews at the Presidio as one of several examples for a 2006 study that RAND made to evaluate previous efforts to outsource support functions at DOD education and training facilities. RAND found that the outcome of such studies was problematic even when outsourcing reviews resulted in cost savings.\textsuperscript{585} RAND’s report had no impact on the DOL outsourcing review, however.


Another important event affecting DOL took place in June 2006 when long-time DOL Director John Robotti retired. Afterwards, Garrison officials had trouble in gaining approval from their chain of command to hire a replacement, a situation that likely had a negative impact on DOL as it went through the outsourcing review. The operation of the Belas Dining Facility also fell under DOL’s purview. Apparently, due to Institute growth, the Belas facility was facing a shortage of space for dinners. As a result, Colonel Martis sought to add an extra door to make access easier to an outside eating area. She also sought agreement from the commandant about prohibiting civilians from using the facility. DOL unveiled its solution to ease mealtime congestion on 29 October 2007. The solution was a new outdoor “bistro” at the Belas dining facility that operated for lunch and provided full food service to students and other authorized diners. Instead of a new doorway, the facility operated by adding an outside window through which food was passed to patrons.

**Base Realignment and Closure Activities**

The Garrison’s Environmental Division and the BRAC Office continued to be involved with Fort Ord closure issues with Gail Youngblood serving as the BRAC environmental coordinator. In January 2006, the Army proposed a change to the clean-up plan adopted in 2002 that required it to operate a voluntary relocation program for citizens affected by prescribed burns on the former Fort Ord. Prescribed burns cleared away brush so that teams could access the terrain to remove old ordnance, which was required before base lands could be reused. The Army decided that it was too difficult to provide exact dates for relocation due the need to time burns with appropriate weather circumstances as well as expected minimal health hazards stemming from the burns, which nevertheless were within two miles of large civilian population zones. In 2006, the Army proposed to only burn a small fifty-eight-acre parcel known as Munitions Site 16 (MRS-16). The area had been used for training soldiers to use bazooka rockets.

Many locals met the proposal with heated criticism due to concerns generated especially by the fact that two previous burns had spread out of control and produced copious amounts of thick black smoke. “Residents who are most at risk from the smoke, such as the sick or elderly, will have to relocate or huddle in their homes,” said LeVonne Stone, executive director of the Fort Ord Environmental Justice Network. According to Gail Youngblood, however, the burning of the brush did not pose any long-term threat except for those particularly sensitive to smoke, and that controls the Army had in place would prevent any fire breakout like the one in 2003. When the Army issued press releases for the planned burn to occur at some time in the summer or fall of 2006, it continued to offer to reimburse any residents who chose to travel away from

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the area the day and night of the burn as long as they were enrolled in the voluntary relocation program. However, the Army would only pay the relocation fees when a burn actually took place, which was now harder for residents who would have no advance warning of a specific burn date.\textsuperscript{592} BRAC community involvement programs continued throughout this period and involved workshops, information dissemination, and occasional public tours of clean up areas.\textsuperscript{593}

On 19 October 2006, the prescribed burn of MRS-16 took place in the Parker Flats area on the former Fort Ord once weather conditions allowed. As planned, the Army burned fifty-eight acres of chaparral and scrub oak to prepared the area for munitions removal work under the auspices of the BRAC office. Under the command of Presidio of Monterey Fire Chief Jack Riso 4 helicopters, 10 fire engines, and 30 firefighters were mobilized for the operation, which was executed without incident and took about three hours.\textsuperscript{594}

In July 2006, the BRAC office also declared 177 acres of land cleared of munitions and transferable to the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA). The area was near Fort Ord’s East Garrison and research determined that it was never used for training with high explosives and thus did not require extensive mitigation before transfer to civilian authorities for redevelopment or use in habitat conservation.\textsuperscript{595} At the same time, some pro-development representatives of FORA expressed as “repugnant” and even illegal a separate determination by the Army that it would need to maintain its existing water rights at Fort Ord. When the former base closed, the Army continued to hold onto 1,577 annual acre-feet of water from a previous total of 6,600 acre-feet. Many developers were planning that the Army would turn over some of this capacity to FORA to allow further commercial or residential construction. Unfortunately, the Army, engaged in a major built up in language training since 9/11, found instead that its own requirements for family housing at OMC, which housed married students and cadre of DLIFLC, meant that its need for water was growing and would expand exponentially by 2014.\textsuperscript{596} In September 2007, FORA and the Army collaborated to decrease the time required to clean up some 3,500 acres of land of particular interest to many local residents and community leaders in that was the closest to population centers. The agreement allowed FORA to take over some of the munitions clean-up work itself. Unfortunately, once FORA’s plans were announced to the public that the faster clean-up process would still take seven years and required the areas to be closed to the public for that time, it set off a wave of public protest by bicyclists, equestrians, and hikers.\textsuperscript{597}

\textsuperscript{592} DLIFLC & POM, Press Releases 06-007 and 06-008, in “Garrison” ff, RG 21.24.
\textsuperscript{595} Kevin Howe, “177 Acres Safe or Use,” \textit{Monterey Herald}, 14 July 2006, B1.
Chapter V

Chief of Staff Organizations

Overview

The single biggest change during the period when Col. Tucker Mansager served as commandant of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center was simply the tremendous growth of the Institute. That growth not only increased the faculty size, but it required an increase in the size of military command and staff offices. Thus, as commandant, Mansager did not feel compelled to re-arrange the organization chart dramatically, although he made some changes. Instead, he focused upon expanding the number of personnel and offices inside the existing organizational structure, particularly those responsible for administrative management of the institute and the installation.

Organizations in this chapter reported to the DLIFLC chief of staff. Lt. Col. Deborah L. Hanagan served in this position effective from 9 January 2006, succeeding Lt. Col. Richard E. Coon, who retired, but became the new DLIFLC deputy chief of staff for personnel and logistics.98 Hanagan was a Military Intelligence Branch officer who had graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, as well as DLIFLC’s French Basic Course and the Monterey Institute of International Studies where she earned a Master of Arts in International Policy Studies, which allowed her to become a Foreign Area Officer. Hanagan, who also served a tour at DLIFLC as a company commander, was the first woman to serve as Chief of Staff for DLIFLC.99 In July 2007, Marine Corps Lt. Col. John F. May became the new chief of staff after serving as Associate Vice Chancellor, Directorate of Continuing Education. He retired on 11 October 2007.600 May was more briefly succeeded by Lt. Col. Steven Sabia, who was in turn followed by Lt. Col. Richard Skow, who remained in the position into 2008.601

To help the chief of staff better manage installation and mission tasks, Mansager created a staff action control officer (SACO) position and sought more effective administrative and staffing procedures. These measures included implementation of an electronic staffing vehicle called SharePoint, development of a training program called Right-Seat-Ride to educate staff and new employees about DLIFLC offices and missions, and completion of a staffing standard

598 Richard E. Coon, e-mail entitled “Chief of Staff” to All-DLI, 9 January 2006, in “Biographies” ff, RG 21.24.
601 Personal recollection—few archival documents detail the rapid turnover in the DLIFLC chief of staff position with precision. Obviously, it was not efficient to rotate key leaders this rapidly, but the demanding position required an officer of the correct rank from a limited pool of officers at retirement age.
operating procedure by early FY 2008. Several senior leaders had recommended such efforts to help improve and speed efficient staff work.  

Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management  

As with DCSOPS, DLIFLC’s resource management office, known as Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM), grew substantially during this period. In 2001, DCSRM managed a budget of $77 million. In FY 2006, it managed a budget of $197 million. In 2007, DLIFLC’s budget grew to $205 million on its way to $240 million. To ensure that the Institute used this infusion of resources to grow effectively, Colonel Mansager decided it was crucial to increase the size of DCSRM. The TRADOC manpower assessment certainly assigned more positions to DCSRM to enable it to cope with DLIFLC’s growing budget. “You have a lot more beans,” said Mansager, “so you have to have more bean counters.” Basically, DCSRM had to continue to account for and ensure that the money coming DLIFLC’s way was appropriately spent, which required more staff. However, DCSRM not only had to grapple with the growth in funds propelling DLIFLC, it had to manage DLIFLC’s growing complexity as well. According to Mansager, DCSRM had not previously had the need to track funds as closely as it now had. For example, was a particular instructor hired as part of PEP’s program to reduce

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602 “Installation Staff Pre-Offsite Session,” 15 June 2007, p. 4, in “Offsite 2007-METL” ff, RG 21.24. The first SACO was Iris Nannie, who was recruited in February 2007 from the Provost Office, also serving as the first SACO for that office from April 2006. Iris Nannie, personal communication, 20 August 2012.

the student-to-teacher ratio or because DLIFLC’s training requirement for that instructor’s language had increased.\textsuperscript{604}

For years, DLIFLC had had a relatively small budget in Pentagon terms, and those funds were generally spent on the same activities year after year. Now, DLIFLC was spending on PEP, including many new hires, procuring much new technology, and conducting extensive immersion operations. It was also providing much more support to DOD’s general-purpose forces through Video Tele-Training (VTT), Mobile Training Team (MTT), and Language Training Detachment (LTD) methods, and working to field ever more sophisticated computer-delivered and computer-adaptive foreign language tests. In other words, the Institute was becoming a much more complicated enterprise than it had been in the past. Mansager wanted DCSRM to create a new Programming Division and to enlarge its other sections in restructuring to be completed by mid-FY 2008. He wanted to ensure DCSRM would pass the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency survey. His goal was to “develop the capability for management to have better visibility of costs and expenditures.”\textsuperscript{605}

Despite DLIFLC’s growth trajectory, DCSRM staff still had to manage bureaucratic issues affecting federal spending. For example, to tighten up the expenditure of funds, the Secretary of the Army directed in February 2006 that the authority for civilian hiring and service contractors be delegated to higher commands to ensure greater scrutiny. DLIFLC, therefore, had to seek approval from TRADOC’s Combined Arms Center for every such action.\textsuperscript{606} The Army issued revised guidance on 26 June 2006 to allow managers to fill open positions that did not increase Army strength, which eased some concerns.\textsuperscript{607} This easement also did not allow DLIFLC to hire new civilian faculty.\textsuperscript{608} Fortunately, DLIFLC was able to obtain an exception to continue its PEP efforts, but continued to face spending restrictions that required that threatened program cuts and/or staff work to negotiate.\textsuperscript{609} One issue related to how Congress funded the war in Iraq. Each year to continue operations, Congress had to pass an Emergency Supplemental, which it failed to do before leaving on its Memorial Day recess in 2006. As a result, the Army did not have sufficient Operations and Maintenance (OMA) funds to cover its expenditures and imposed spending restrictions during the month of June. When Congress passed the supplemental, the Army chose to keep some restrictions owing to the possibility that Congress would appropriate less funding for the Army in FY 2007 than the president requested. For DLIFLC, discretionary spending was restricted, government purchase cards were reduced to zero available funds, non-essential travel was suspended, civilian hiring actions were put on hold, and contracts were reviewed for termination. Plans were also laid as well to release

\textsuperscript{604} Col Tucker B. Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, pp. 3-4.


\textsuperscript{609} Col Tucker B. Mansager, “From the Top,” Globe (Summer 2006): 3.
temporary and service contract employees. These types of actions or inaction by higher echelons multiplied the workload.

Similar budget restrictions continued for FY 2007. In April 2007, the commanding general of TRADOC required DLIFLC budget officials to impose restrictions on spending geared not specifically dedicated to the most important mission functions. The restrictions protected named operations, activities that if not funded would result in degraded readiness for units deployed or preparing to deploy, and activities needed to protect life and property, etc. Thus, contract activities were cut back, summer and student hire programs were stopped, non-critical temporary civilian employees were released and new civilian hires were frozen effective 20 May 2007. Other restrictions included unnecessary travel, purchases for spare parts and supplies, and use of government purchase cards, etc. This action required DCSRM to publish detailed fiscal guidance as “resource flexibility will remain limited for the foreseeable future.” This situation resulted from the failure of Congress to pass emergency supplemental funding for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and requirements for prosecuting global anti-terrorism actions. In response, DOD requested permission from Congress to allow the temporary transfer or reprogramming of $1.6 billion from Navy and Air Force accounts to the Army’s operating account, while Army commanders imposed spending restraints to minimize the impact of the expected squeeze in funding. At DLIFLC, the fiscal crisis was eased after the commandant and assistant commandant made clear to Army leaders what the impact would be on DLIFLC’s mission, especially the all important Proficiency Enhancement Program. The fact that PBD 753 funds were “visible” to Undersecretary of Defense David Chu, as Colonel Scott noted, was probably also helpful in persuading Army leaders to ease their controls on DLIFLC. On 25 May 2007, the president signed into law the FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental and the Army lifted spending restrictions of FY 2007 OMA funds imposed in April 2007.

**Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations**

The organization known as DCSOPS (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations) grew substantially during this period, almost doubling in size. Indeed, due this growth, and the growth of the resource management and other offices as well, DCSOPS had to plan, recommend, and implement a major reallocation of space in Building 614, DLIFLC headquarters, to accommodate the expansion in early 2007. The DCSOPS mission was to coordinate and implement command decisions. One of the most important overarching tasks for DCSOPS during this period was to help implement the FY 2008-2012 Action Plan including by

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612 Col Daniel L. Scott, Exit Interview, 4 March 2008, pp. 5-6. Another issue with the resourcing of DLIFLC was how the Army managed the so-called “GWOT supplemental.” In FY 2007, the Army took $26 to $28 million from DLIFLC’s operations budget, which it later reimbursed with GWOT funds, a wash in terms of mission impact, but something of an issue, as Scott said, to “Comptroller types.”


recommending a restructuring to support the Institute’s expanding commitment to non-resident training as outlined in the Language Transformation Roadmap.  

Lt. Col. Steven N. Collins served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations until May 2006 when he retired from the U.S. Army. Ms. Clare Bugary served as the assistant deputy for DCSOPS. After Collins retired, Bugary stepped into his position. DCSOPS was divided into four major sections, including Strategic Communications, Operations, Mission Support, and Scheduling.

![Figure 35 Clare Bugary, who succeeded Lt. Col. Steven N. Collins as DCSOPS, with Col. Tucker B. Mansager, at a reception for Collins in May 2006.](image)

**Strategic Communications**

The mission of Strategic Communications (Stratcom) Division was to document and tell the DLIFLC story through photography and stories about DLIFLC published in military media, especially the Institute’s *Globe* magazine. Mansager established Stratcom on 1 September 2006 by removing the *Globe* magazine and its staff from the Public Affairs Office. Natela Cutter moved to Stratcom from PAO to serve as the Stratcom chief, a move probably facilitated by her

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616 DLIFLC Staff Directory (2006).
Stratcom’s creation was generated by a U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency assessment that year, which identified serious problems in the structure and manning of the DLIFLC Public Affairs Office, which it found understaffed, overtaxed, and performing DLIFLC, Garrison, and local public affairs activities all at once. The manpower analysis determined that the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, never established an independent PAO. It therefore recommended that DLIFLC redesignate its public affairs cell as the Strategic Communications Office and that the Installation Management Command establish a separate Garrison PAO in accordance with manning standards developed by the U.S. Army Public Affairs Center and the Manpower Analysis Agency.

The U.S. Army Garrison, however, claimed that PAO belonged to it as an IMCOM function. Mansager strongly disagreed, holding that DLIFLC was the only significant active Army activity on the Central Coast of California. Other than prescribed burns on the former Fort Ord, he claimed, almost all publicity about the Army in the area was tied to DLIFLC. Unfortunately, Mansager could not correct the situation or the decision made by a previous commandant to allow PAO to transfer to the Garrison despite the fact that it was listed on DLIFLC’s TDA. Because he was not satisfied with the level of media coverage PAO was willing to offer in support of mission activities, Mansager created his own organization to provide that support using surplus mission funds. Over the longer term, this situation would create ongoing staffing issues for Stratcom and possibly PAO as well, which went from an office of nine civilians and three military staff prior to the reassignment, to just five civilians afterwards.

To enhance the delivery of the Institute’s message and brand, Stratcom implemented a plan beginning in October 2006 that tied all externally oriented DLIFLC products to a specified design focused upon the Institute’s heraldic colors of purple, gray, and gold. The first document to bare this memorable stamp was the Annual Command Plan. The same marketing plan also included new DLIFLC folders, letterhead, and business card designs. In early 2007, Stratcom received its first public affairs trained employee—S. Sgt. Brian Lamar.

In 2007, Stratcom continued to promote DLIFLC and to cover its activities through photography, publication of the Globe, and sundry other activities, among which included working with contractor Erik Gandolfi to guide development of a promotional video about the Institute.

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620 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, pp. 9-11.
623 DCSOPS, 1 Apr-30 Jun 2007 Quarterly Report, in “DCSOPS” ff, RG 52.01-01.
Operations Division

New Operations Chief Lyndon Tarver arrived in January 2007. The division coordinated various functions for the commandant, such as commander’s cup runs, blood drives, parade participation, the annual student winter block leave known as “exodus,” ceremonies, and special Joint Language Training Exercises, including the first JLTX at Fort Stewart, Georgia, in February 2007. In May and April 2007, the Operations Division supported additional JLTXs for DLIFLC Arabic students on providing culture and negotiations training to hundreds of soldiers and commanders.

Mission Support Division

Mission support coordination focused especially upon the delivery of DLIFLC command briefs, preparing the Annual Program Review, managing contract actions, publishing various command operations orders, and many other functions, including organizing DLIFLC’s annual Language Day and coordinating instructor training for MLIs assigned to the Institute. Under Mansager, DCSOPS began to generate and track a DLIFLC Task List for Institute directors to

624 DCSOPS, 1 Jan-31Mar 2007 Quarterly Report.
625 DCSOPS, 1 Apr-30 Jun 2007 Quarterly Report.
626 Ibid.
Another important responsibility came to Mission Support in December 2006 when it assumed the mission of filling unit requests for LSKs, which until then had been the responsibility of Continuing Education. To accomplish this new task, Mission Support developed spreadsheets to track orders and their stockage levels in the DLIFLC book warehouse, and investigated the means by which units could self-order these training aids over the Internet. Finally, it helped prepare DLIFLC for a major manpower assessment in 2007.

**Scheduling Division**

The Scheduling Division chaired quarterly Training Requirements and Arbitration Panel (TRAP) meetings to refine Armed Forces training requirements at DLIFLC, it developed and published the annual resident class schedule and maintained related databases. The division also scheduled MTT, LTD, and VTT assignments. Moreover, the division scheduled familiarization training requests and a pilot Broadband Language Training System effort. In 2007, Mr. Terry Thornton became chief of the Scheduling Division. As discussed in Chapter 2, DLIFLC faced a growing scheduling problem during this period of student growth and limited classroom space, which was resulting in increasingly large casual population, most of whom were students awaiting class. As a result, DCSOPS evaluated the possibility that DLIFLC would need to implement shift work due to the rapid expansion of the Basic Language Program, with an implementation date of 5 July 2006. Actions by the U.S. Army Garrison appeared to have forestalled this need, however. In addition, for Fiscal Year 2007, the services pushed for additional Pashto seats in DLIFLC classes, but it was extremely difficult to hire Pashto instructors on short notice to meet an unexpected requirement. Scheduling proposed increasing Pashto class sizes to ten students to meet this situation, but the Air Force objected to increased class sizes for its students. DLIFLC had also absorbed four Pashto teachers from its DLI-Washington contract program and had scheduled a special request to train Danish soldiers in the DLIFLC Pashto course, although that requirement was a lower priority. At the same time in FY 2007, however, the services only maintained a 79 percent overall fill rate for their allocated seats. According to DCSOPS, the reason for this problem was the services failing to disseminate information on training opportunities broadly enough. Scheduling also faced the prospect of coordinating a significant expansion in DLIFLC’s Persian Farsi Basic Course programmed for the 2009 fiscal year when 288 requirements would increase to 352. Meanwhile, the Korean program was programmed to lose eight sections and the Serbian-Croatian section was to lose three. To help adjust, the Korean program converted to PEP-teaching sooner than it would have to help maintain experienced teachers. By late 2007, the Institute had made enough progress in

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628 DCSOPS, 1 Jan-31 Mar 2007 Quarterly Report.
629 Ibid.
630 DCSOPS, 1 Apr-30 Jun 2007 Quarterly Report.
631 Shift work is discussed in Chapter Two under relations with the U.S. Army Garrison.
transitioning its classes to the PEP model that only some Arabic and Chinese classes remained unconverted during the 2008 fiscal year.632

![Student Fill Rate by Service](image)

**Figure 37 Enrollments in percentage figures comparing requirements against the number of students by service who began instruction at DLIFLC between FY 2002 and FY2007.**

**Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Logistics**

When Colonel Mansager first arrived, DLIFLC had no position to manage personnel and logistics. Lt. Col. Deborah Hanagan, who shortly became DLFILC chief of staff, managed the function up until DLIFLC received higher approval to create a position for a deputy chief of staff for personnel and logistics. Mansager then hired the first DCSPL, a retiring Army officer, Lt. Col. Richard Coon. Coon in turn hired a personnel person and a logistics person and sought additional staff.633 The DCSPL served as the chief advisor to Mansager on all DLIFLC personnel management, logistical and facility management matters.


One reason Colonel Mansager created the DCSPL was to help him revise the management of DLIFLC’s faculty personnel system or FPS. The Provost Office oversaw FPS until Mansager placed it under DCSPL, effective 5 February 2007.634 As authorized by Congress, FPS provided merit-based incentives for DLIFLC teaching staff. Mansager, however, felt that FPS paybands were outdated and that its merit pay procedures needed an overhaul to provide a mechanism to incentivize identified groups of faculty. He wanted Coon to work with senior officials in the Secretary of Defense office to update FPS and asked him to publish a policy on faculty retention incentives by early FY 2008.635

Mansager wanted DLIFLC to have an even more flexible pay system than it had to help it hire and retain high quality faculty. The task was difficult, however, because DOD had already told Mansager and the former Chancellor Ray Clifford that it would not adjust the FPS paybands. Mansager also felt Washington officials were not sympathetic to changing FPS without real evidence (“not anecdotes”) that DLIFLC was having problems attracting team leaders, for example. He acknowledged as well that DLIFLC had succeeded in hiring senior leaders, especially the new provost in 2005 as well as several deans and an associate provost, so there was not good evidence that the current system was inflexible. Indeed, the system allowed DLIFLC complete control of entry pay, authorized moving allowances, and provided recruitment pay already.636

Another FPS issue was that DLIFLC had managed the system on its own and separately from the Army’s Civilian Personnel Operations Center (CPOC) system. By 2007, however, Mansager realized that this arrangement might fail to pass the inspection of a manpower survey. CPOC had advised DLIFLC in 2004 or 2005 that FPS should migrate to CPOC for administration. At the time, according to Mansager, CPOC’s local office, the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC), was undergoing a reorganization and was not capable of managing the substantial number of FPS employees. Thus, FPS continued to remain under the authority of the DLIFLC Chancellor/Provost Office.637 The Army, however, clearly had a system for managing civilian personnel and Mansager concluded that DLIFLC was possibly guilty of the potential criticism of duplicating effort and expenses.

That summer Mansager signed a memorandum of agreement between DLIFLC and the Army’s regional CPOC located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to transfer FPS management to CPOC, and its local on-post subordinate organization—CPAC. Thereafter, CPAC became responsible for routine FPS hiring and personnel management activities, although DLIFLC continued to retain broad policy-making authority. Another determinant for Mansager in electing this course was that CPOC was better resourced to manage the growth of DLIFLC’s


635 Mansager grew increasingly frustrated with FPS, even expressing ambivalence about the perennial concern of moving DLIFLC to Fort Huachuca. If that ever actually took place, he asserted, it would at least serve to clear the personnel system of low-achieving faculty. During a move, he expected most new faculty, over whom he had greater control, and those who were the most committed to teaching to relocate with the school. See Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, pp. 4-5.


637 Ibid, p. 3.
faculty. Although Mansager’s budget was much larger than his predecessor’s budget and while DLIFLC had hired many new faculty, “you’ve got to have the personnel to run a system,” he asserted. “You’ve got to be able to run a budget that’s that big, to run the demands that are that big and run the personnel and logistics that are that big.” Clearly, Mansager believed that CPOC, with better resources and CPAC, post-reorganization, was better suited to manage FPS as DLIFLC grew. DLIFLC did not need to bear the burden as long as essential policy decisions remained in the commandant and his representative, DCSPL Coon.638

Another issue facing Coon was to prepare for the adoption of a complex new civilian employment system Congress was planning to authorize specifically to manage DOD personnel, which contained the largest number of civilian workers in the federal government. Known as the National Security Personnel System or NSPS, DOD expected the new system to provide better incentives than the existing General Service (GS) personnel system for productive employees and more tools for managers to use in managing less productive employees. DLIFLC faculty were to remain under FPS, but many staff under the GS personnel system were scheduled to transfer to the new system shortly after Mansager’s tour as commandant.639 To implement NSPS, DCSPL had to impose a moratorium on hiring for GS positions in late 2007 until the new system was in place.

DCSPL was also responsible for union negotiations as well as the oversight of logistics and facilities, which required coordination with Garrison officials.

Office of the Inspector General

The DLIFLC Inspector General (IG) served as a personal and staff officer and confidential representative for the Installation Commander. The IG assessed and reported on matters affecting mission performance, efficiency, discipline, morale, and esprit de corps, assisted organizations by identifying and correcting systemic problems, and conducted formal and informal investigations into matters affecting mission performance and readiness. In 2006, the IG was Lt. Col. Stephen J. Coonen, who arrived in August 2005. Coonen was detailed to the position and attended IG school in September 2005. Skip Johnson, the Deputy IG, who had arrived in April 2002, continued to serve in his position. The office was also supported by three enlisted assistant IGs, although a U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency (USAMAA) review eliminated two of these positions from the TDA in FY 2007. IG staff traveled to Human Resources Command to discuss the restoration.640 In early 2007, all five positions were listed as authorized, but two were unfilled. Lt. Col. Coonen, detailed as IG in 2005, also departed on transition leave in October 2006, and retired on 28 February 2007. With two other senior enlisted staff scheduled to retired in 2007, Johnson began working with DCSPL and the Combined Arms Center (CAC) to obtain funding for one civilian assistant IG over hire to help

638 Mansager, Exit Interview, 24 September 2007, p. 1. The decision also offset potential criticism of DLIFLC for slowness in hiring faculty.
639 Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, p. 4.
640 IG, Quarterly Command History Report, 1 January–31 March 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives. Note, only one quarterly report was received in 2006.
fill the expected manpower void. 641 Assistant Inspector General M. Sgt. Collette E. Hornsby retired on 8 June 2007 during a ceremony at Munakata Hall’s rooftop terrace. 642

During this period, the IG conducted general command climate assessments, including one at DLIFC-Washington. Specific investigations included such topics as Faculty Performance Counseling, the routing of traffic stops with persons subject to UCMJ provisions by Presidio of Monterey Police Department, DLIFLJC disenrollment processes and procedures, and the adequacy of supervisory understanding of performance review processes and staff understanding of time and attendance policies. 643 In Early 2007, the IG hosted the CAC Inspector General to re-inspect the Institute’s property accountability and compliance with Government Purchase Card program. 644

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) was a consolidated legal office supporting both DLIFLC and the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey. It was organized to provide legal, administrative, and civil legal advice to commanders and staff, to assist commanders in the delivery of military justice to subordinate military personnel, to represent the United States in litigation, and to support service personnel in various other capacities. Lt. Col. Jody M. Hehr served as the Staff Judge Advocate in 2006 while Wesley Truscott served as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate. 645 Lt. Col. Jonathan A. Kent arrived and assumed the duties of Staff Judge Advocate on 29 Jun 2007. 646

The office participated in a wide variety of routine activities and training events during this period, but one item of note was that on 18 October 2006, Colonel Mansager signed a memorandum establishing a Command Tax Program in 2007 to support service personnel with the tax filings. 647

In February 2007, the SJA’s Legal Assistance Division and a portion of the Litigation and Claims Division were renovated. The purpose of the renovations was to construct additional private offices for current and future SJA personnel and to create a new Command Tax Center/Conference Room in support of Mansager’s earlier initiative. The SJA also supported the visit of the Judge Advocate General of the Army (TJAG), Maj. Gen. Scott C. Black, and his Executive Officer, Col. Kathryn Stone, in March. They visited and inspected the SJA office in accordance with Article 6, UCMJ. Major General Black found no significant issues. Later, he helped to judge the annual SJA office chili cook-off and

641 IG, Quarterly Command History Report, 1 January–31 March 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives. Note, only one quarterly report was received in 2007.
643 IG, Quarterly Command History Report, 1 January–31 March 2006.
645 Office of Staff Judge Advocate Quarterly History Report, 1st Quarter, CY 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
646 Office of Staff Judge Advocate/Installation Legal Office Quarterly History Report, 2nd Quarter, CY 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
647 Office of Staff Judge Advocate Quarterly History Report, 4th Quarter, CY 2006, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
presented JAG coins of excellence for SJA’s efforts to process claims for FY 2005.  

Another item of note in September 2007 was that SJA attorney Lannette Moutos accompanied two Assistant United States Attorneys on a site investigation to Fort Hunter Liggett. The site investigation included interviews of 11 potential witnesses in a $20 million federal lawsuit.

Chief Information Office

After certifying the “robust mission requirement” for information technology at DLIFLC, the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency accepted that the DLIFLC commandant had no planning cell or coordination element necessary to map and execute current or future information technology needs. The existing TDA did not authorize positions for this function. Thus, the agency recommended DLIFLC use the model for a Chief Information Officer (CIO) at other TRADOC schools to create two new authorized positions on its TDA. The agency also recommended the transfer of the existing DLIFLC webmaster located in PAO to CIO.

Colonel Mansager implemented the manpower survey recommendations. Soon, DLIFLC had its first Chief Information Officer, Lt. Col. Jorge Serafin, who asserted that the Institute’s “investment in new technology will payoff by providing the newest and most innovative learning and teaching tools for students and instructors.” The main task of the CIO was to implement the newly developed DLIFLC strategic information technology plan, which addressed PEP requirements, especially the need to build more IT infrastructure to support more classrooms at DLIFLC in Monterey and more virtual classrooms taught by DLIFLC instructors to students at sites around the world. According to Serafin, “the existing network will be upgraded, wireless network services will be established and DLIFLC’s connection to the Internet will continue to be expanded as usage increases.” Moreover, the development of an integrated wireless network and the distribution of tablet PCs to all students by the CIO was creating a “paradigm shift” for instructors, said Dr. Jack Franke, a professor in the European and Latin American School. The once staid curricula of DLIFLC was becoming dynamic and able to incorporate authentic materials on the fly. Perhaps as important, the use of robust iPod devices, allowed students to store all of their classroom materials and courseware in one convenient and portable location that they would be able to keep after graduation to continue their learning and to remain better connected to DLIFLC afterwards. The CIO was also concerned to extend the reach of technology into testing with new applications for DLPT exams.

As a marker for achievement, DLIFLC students did not have access to the Internet or even a DLIFLC email account in September 2005. A year later, they did, despite what Colonel Scott described as long delays caused by Army contracting and information technology policies.

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648 Office of Staff Judge Advocate Quarterly History Report, 1st Quarter, CY 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
649 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate/Installation Legal Office Quarterly History Report, 3rd Quarter, CY 2007, in DLIFLC Digital Archives.
653 Lee, “Cutting Edge Technology at DLIFLC Improves Student Proficiency.”
and had begun the process of building a wireless IT campus where every classroom and barracks was a WiFi hotspot.\textsuperscript{654} In July 2006, the CIO stood up its initial “knowledge management team” in line with the strategic plan. The team began working to implement an automated faculty hiring process, developing a system for DLI-Washington to manage student enrollment, testing, and attendance information, and devising a replacement for the Institute’s existing Student Attendance and Tracking System that would be online and available to both military unit and school staff. To help develop new information management systems, the CIO requested DLIFLC division appoint academic and mission experts to help it define the requirements and improve the current processes.\textsuperscript{655}

Figure 38 Students work on new Apple tablet computers introduced at DLIFLC in 2006.

By November 2006, CIO had issued over 500 tablet PCs. IT had also procured 5,400 iPods to supply students and teaching teams into the summer of 2007. This technology also required faculty training on how to operate the new devices. To support this technology, Serafin was procuring a 5 Terabyte Storage Area Network that could be evolved into a 10 Terabyte capability. Concurrently, he increased the installation’s bandwidth from 7 MB in 2005 to 48 MB in 2006 with a 60 MB capability planned for 2007.\textsuperscript{656} He scheduled wireless installation to

\textsuperscript{654} Col Daniel L. Scott, email to Gail McGinn and Nancy E. Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006, in ff 1, RG 52.01-02.
\textsuperscript{656} Scott, email to McGinn and Weaver, entitled “DLPT 5,” 17 September 2006.
begin in December 2006, although that date later slipped into 2007. Serafin’s knowledge management team had to establish the “portals” for these devices and to manage the uploading of information through podcasting. He expected the force multiplier impact of this new technology to increase both the quantity and the quality of Institute graduates as it deployed this new technology over the next three years.657

In early 2007, CIO hosted a TRADOC group who presented information about TRADOC’s Lifelong Learning Center, which came to Monterey to demonstrate how its web-based model might be adapted by DLIFLC to meet its requirement to collaborate and share language and mission essential materials. The Lifelong Learning Center delivered curriculum, follow-on training, faculty development, and provided managers with important mission-related data. CIO adopted the model and initiated a $330,000 equipment procurement and $1.1 million procurement for storage space.658

In April 2007, the DLIFLC Chief Information Office helped to secure an exemption from Army Regulation 25-2, Information Assurance, 14 November 2003, requiring that all non-citizen foreign nationals display their national affiliation in email addresses. The requirement was upsetting to many DLIFLC staff who did not necessarily want their countries of origin to be specified. The exemption allowed DLIFLC to identify foreign faculty using the term FN for foreign national without a specific country code identifier.659

On 17 May and 18 May 2007, Colonel Mansager, and the Garrison Commander, Col. Pamela L. Martis, signed a joint concept of operations plan.660 The purpose of this “Single DOIM Transition Plan” was to outline how DLIFLC would transfer resources to the Garrison’s Directorate of Information Management (DOIM), which was in the process of separating itself from mission operations as required by the Army to implement establishment of the Installation Management Command. To implement this agreement, CIO coordinated with DOIM to negotiate what assets in infrastructure and funding to turn over to DOIM. The issue was tricky, however, because it was TRADOC’s position that DLIFLC not permanently transfer resources and personnel authorizations to DOIM for any functions that then might require DOIM to provide mission services to DLIFLC.661 The transition plan itself was designed as a “living document” susceptible to change. This was in part due to unforeseeable hang-ups but also because the issue was contentious. As a result, the transition plan flatly stated that “the final decision regarding transfer of resources and funding from DLIFLC (TRADOC) to the Garrison (IMCOM) will be resolved at the appropriate level.” After discussions between TRADOC and IMCOM in June 2007, CIO felt little progress was being made. Frustrations grew with DOIM as delays mounted, especially for delays to necessary increases in installation bandwidth and perhaps for the technical aid CIO had to supply DOIM to move matters forward. Bandwidth

658 Quarterly History Report, 29 November 2006 [2007], in “CIO” ff, RG 52.01-01.
661 Information Paper, 16 August 2007, submitted as 2nd quarter 2007 historical report, in “CIO” ff, RG 52.01-01.
limitations imposed serious and increasing constraints as DLIFLC brought online many new computers and expected increased network use by DLPT5 examinees both at the Presidio and worldwide after January 2008 when the temporary moratorium on the DLPT5 expired. After that date, some 1,500 new test-takers would begin taking the online version of the test to avoid losing their foreign language proficiency pay. Progress, however, was made.

In June 2007, CIO workers began a three-month phased implementation of the wireless network at DLIFLC. CIO expected to apply any “lessons learned” during the initial pilot phase to install the network in buildings in later phases. The first buildings to go wireless were the linked 619, 621, and 623 on the upper Presidio, known as Nakamura, Hachiya, and Mizutari Halls, which incidentally were also the first school buildings to have been named after Institute graduates fallen in combat. The teams had to coordinate with classes to avoid conflicts with class schedules for work inside the classrooms. CIO also worked with DOIM to upgrade significant capacity upgrades to the installations NIPRNET circuit.

Safety Office

DLIFLC did not have a Safety Office until the function was recreated by Colonel Mansager. When IMCOM split the Presidio of Monterey into two organizations, the U.S. Army Garrison inherited the installation safety function from DLIFLC, which the Garrison placed under Ollie Parducho. As the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency assessment in 2006 pointed out, DLIFLC’s TDA did not include an authorization for this function. By implication, therefore, the Garrison should have been responsible for all Safety Office tasks related to both mission and support activities at the Presidio. Unfortunately, according to Mansager, Garrison officials told him explicitly: “We don’t provide safety coverage for you. We do it for ourselves.”

The above situation in mind, Mansager sought to create his own Safety Office. He justified his decision after DLIFLC was required to conduct convoy training for all Army students who resided in Monterey longer than one year, which accounted for the vast majority of Army students. To execute such training, DLIFLC had to send its students to Camp Roberts via convoy and back for range training. The training required a risk assessment, which was not deemed a Garrison function. Mansager used this need to achieve permission to create the Safety Office. The Manpower Analysis Agency agreed and recommended that TRADOC add the Safety Office function to DLIFLC’s TDA with the caveat, however, that it later eliminate authority for the office if TRADOC subsequently eliminated the convoy-training requirement. The requirement did not decline, but through the auspices of Rep. Sam Farr, a defense authorization bill passed in 2006 included a $2.3 million request for DLIFLC for a virtual convoy operations training system to allow soldiers and other service personnel at the Presidio of Monterey to prepare for facing security challenges once deployed. Mansager favored the virtual trainer because it would save time and the system closely replicated actual battlefield conditions,

662 Ibid.
663 Ibid.
664 Mansager, Exit Interview, 26 September 2007, p. 9.
he believed. Based on this bill, the Garrison developed plans to install a “Vehicle Convoy Operation Training” system in 2008, which presumably would eliminate DLFILC’s requirement for a Safety Office.

After establishing the Safety Office, Mansager hired his own command safety director, initially Lorese Dudley, followed by John Rice in February 2008. Rice was a retired U.S. Army helicopter pilot. The new DLIFLC TDA only authorized one Safety Office position, but a safety specialist was added as an “over-hire.” At the same time, Mansager had the office relocated from the former Fort Ord area to the Presidio of Monterey. The office engaged in basic safety awareness training and risk management assessment, conducted risk management training for staff, and coordinated traffic safety training, including motorcycle safety training, which was required for personnel operating motorcycles on the Presidio of Monterey. It also participated in the periodic Installation Safety and Occupational Health Advisory Council.

Chaplain’s Office

The Chaplain’s Office at DLIFLC was organized into a “Unit Ministry Team” whose mission was to practice a “proactive ministry with a common purpose of impacting the [Presidio of Monterey] community with an energetic, relevant Religious Support Program that will enhance the spiritual life of service members and their families.” The Chaplain’s Office supported the religious needs of all military personnel at the Presidio, including DLIFLC, the U.S. Army Garrison, civilians, and their families, catering to a variety of specific religions. The team was composed of chaplains and support staff who reported both to TRADOC and to IMCOM. The senior ranking chaplain of the office was Lt. Col. Daniel J. Minjares, Installation Chaplain, who arrived at the Presidio in January 2006.

Beyond routine religious ceremonies, the Unit Ministry Team taught various courses and seminars geared to help prevent suicide or build stronger families, provided personal counseling, arranged religious retreats, organized concerts and non-alcoholic events, and even sponsored “Korean Immersion Bible Study.” Staff also participated in training sessions for chaplains and chaplain’s assistants while staff of the World Religions Department conducted courses or spoke at local high schools on topics like “torture.”

The Chaplain’s Office scored a home run in March 2006 with a “good news story” on the topic of training for soldiers to help them develop better premarital interpersonal skills. The office participated in a pilot program to provide training by Dr. John Van Epp of Medina, Ohio, whose program, known as “How To Avoid Marrying A Jerk,” presented a practical and easy-to-understand overview of the key areas that determine the long-term success of a dating relationship.
relationship. With its success, the Chaplain’s Office continued in 2007 with its “Premarital Interpersonal Choices & Knowledge for Soldiers” program.

In July, the Chaplain’s Office conducted a vacation bible school for several days for children aged five to twelve at the Ord Military Community Chapel in Seaside. The same month in 2007 an Officers’ Christian Fellowship began meeting at the Chapel and continued to meet on a weekly basis thereafter as the program was well attended. However, complaints about the Chapel building and outside area apparently generated an evaluation of the Chapel building as being non-compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 2007. In September 2007, therefore, contractors began demolition and removal of the old pavement along the east chapel entrance, followed by construction of new pavement inclined to the entrance of the building. Contractors also installed new sidewalks and handicapped signs in accordance with ADA guidelines and began to make modifications within the chapel in October.

During the holidays, the Chaplain’s Office organized special seasonal programs, such as the Thanksgiving food voucher program designed to help junior enlisted service members, a

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workshop to teach families how to make their own gifts during the holiday season, and the very successful “Angel Tree Program,” which used donations from parishioners, service members, DOD civilians, and local veterans groups to provide hundreds of toys to needy children.  

**Protocol Office**  
Mystery Chastain headed the Protocol Office whose mission continued to be coordinating and developing itineraries for the visits of official parties to DLIFLC. During this period, Protocol continued to educate staff about the need to process official visitors through the office. In October 2007, she reported that the visitor tracking system was broken. Many organizations continued to host visitors without ensuring Command Group awareness or approval, which meant, for one thing, that distinguished visitors might not receive the proper military courtesies and the commandant did not always know who of importance was visiting DLIFLC. Nevertheless, Protocol still managed to plan and coordinate scores of official visits to DLIFLC during this period without significant issues, including the coordinating the first DLIFLC Board of Visitors meeting at the Presidio of Monterey in December 2007.

**Command History Office**  
Command Historian Dr. Harold E. Raugh, departed from his position in 2006. During his tenure, Raugh independently published two pictorial histories that covered the Presidio of

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Monterey and Fort Ord using images from the Historical Research Collection of the Command History Office.677 Raugh also took up the task to complete the 1996-2000 DLIFLC Command History, started by Dr. Clifford Porter in the fall of 2000,678 as well as the DLIFLC Command History for 2003, but was unable to finish either. Colonel Mansager subsequently appointed Dr. Stephen M. Payne to fill Raugh’s position. Prior to becoming Command Historian, Payne had served at DLIFLC as senior vice chancellor and also as the deputy command historian. Payne’s first task was to hire a deputy command historian and an archivist to manage the DLIFLC and Presidio of Monterey historical research collection.

In 2006, the Army’s Manpower Analysis Agency reviewed the staffing and faculty manning for the Command History Office during its overall review of DLIFLC and concluded that the office’s three authorized positions were in excess of need. This finding was made even though a previous manpower review in 1999 had established the need for two permanent historians, an archivist, and two temporary positions to process the backlog of command histories and archival materials.679 The agency based its determination upon a comparison of the office’s TDA to those established by the TRADOC Center of Excellence model. The manpower analysis team decided that most other TRADOC centers and schools were staffed with only one historian and recommended the elimination of one permanent position in DLIFLC’s new TDA.680

The Command History Office with the support of the commandant and the TRADOC Command History Office resisted this narrowing of capabilities by asserting that Army Regulation 870-5, Chapter 4-3 (b) specifically detailed that Army field history offices contain two professional historians and additional support staff, namely an archivist or curator, as well as by documenting the workload requirements. Archivist Kurt Kuss, whom Payne hired in March 2007, assisted in this process. In September 2007, historian Cameron Binkley came onboard to fill the deputy slot after TRADOC validated the new three-member Command History Office TDA. Binkley’s first task, with extensive report-writing experience gained from the National Park Service, was to oversee completion of the much delayed DLIFLC Command History 1996-2000, which was published in August 2009.681

Former DLIFLC Command Historian Dr. James C. McNaughton returned to the Presidio of Monterey on 14 June 2007 to give a special lecture on the topic of his recent book, Nisei Linguists: Japanese American in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II. The lecture was well received by the hundred or so faculty, staff, and students who attended.682 McNaughton began the book while still serving at DLIFLC, where he worked from 1987 until 2001. The U.S. Army Center for Military History published the book in 2006. The work has

678 See details in ATZP-MH 96-00, in Quarterly Reports, DLIFLC Digital Archives.
679 ATZP-MH 96-00, in Quarterly Reports, DLIFLC Digital Archives.
come to serve as a definitive account of the record of the thousands of military linguists who served throughout the Pacific Theater during this period. As one reviewer noted, it offers “valuable lessons to U.S. Army officers both present and future” seeking to understand present foes in the Global War on Terrorism.\(^{683}\) While at DLIFLC, McNaughton also worked on a project to advise Congress on the possibility of upgrading Nisei military awards stemming from their WWII service, the theory being that discriminatory attitudes prevalent at the time may have prevented many Asian Americans from receiving full credit for their military accomplishments. McNaughton’s work led Congress to authorize the upgrading of twenty-two awards to Medal of Honor status. Several honorary events were held across the nation in regard to the Nisei linguists of WWII during this period many specifically tied to McNaughton’s book. For example, the Army co-hosted a Capitol Hill tribute for the Nisei linguists with Senator Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii) on 20 March 2007.\(^{684}\)

The Command History Office also tracked, supported, or participated in various other events related to DLIFLC graduates during this period including the DLIFLC Hall of Fame ceremony, the 65\(^{th}\) Anniversary celebration, and the Vance Barracks dedication mentioned elsewhere in this report. Other events of note included the renewal of a three-party memorandum of understanding between the City of Monterey, the California Department of Parks and Recreation, and the Monterey History and Art Association forming a partnership called “Historic Monterey” that was intended to help preserve and promote the history of Monterey. The Command History Office continued to act as a liaison between the Army and this group. The City of Monterey, in accordance with an existing lease agreement with the Army, also acted in 2006 to approve a master plan to develop the lower Presidio into a Lower Presidio Historical Park.\(^{685}\)

![Image of Nisei Linguists](image)

Figure 41 Dr. James C. McNaughton’s history of the Nisei linguists in WWII, the most authoritative and comprehensive treatment of the topic, was published by the U.S. Army in 2006.

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\(^{685}\) See various documents in “History-Memorialization” ff, RG 21.24.
Appendices

Appendix A: Biography of Col. Tucker B. Mansager

COLONEL TUCKER B. MANSAGER

Colonel Tucker B. Mansager was commissioned in the Infantry upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1985. After initial schooling, he was assigned to the 4th Battalion, 502nd Infantry in the Berlin Brigade from 1986 to 1989, where he served as a rifle platoon leader, mortar platoon leader, company executive officer, assistant battalion operations officer and battalion personnel officer. COL Mansager returned to the United States for further schooling and was then assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 1989 to 1992, where he served as battalion personnel officer and commanded B Company. During his time in the 82nd Airborne Division, he deployed to Saudi Arabia and Iraq for nine months in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

COL Mansager studied Polish and Russian at the Defense Language Institute at Monterey, California in 1993, and was assigned as the first U.S. Army officer to attend the Polish Command and Staff College in Rzepin, Poland in 1994, under the auspices of the Army’s Foreign Area Officer In-Country Training Program. Returning to the U.S. in 1995, he received his master’s degree in Russian and East European Studies at Stanford University in 1996, and graduated from the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College in 1997. Next assigned to the U.S. Army’s Southern European Task Force in Vicenza, Italy, COL Mansager first served as an Operations Division (G-3) Plans Officer and then as the operations officer (S-3) for the 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment Airborne Combat Team.

In 1999 he attended the Joint Military Attaché School, and was assigned as the first Assistant Army Attaché in the Defense Attaché Office, Warsaw Poland, where he served for more than three years. Selected to attend the U.S. Army War College in 2002, COL Mansager deferred attendance to serve first as the Political-Military Officer for the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan and then as the Political-Military Division Chief for the new Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan from July of 2003 to July of 2004. He has just completed a year as the Army’s National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

COL Mansager’s significant awards and decorations include two awards each of the Bronze Star Medal, the Army Meritorious Service Medal, the Army Commendation Medal and the Army Achievement Medal, as well as a single award of the Defense Meritorious Service Medal. He has earned the Combat and Expert Infantryman Badges, as well as the Ranger Tab, is a senior parachutist and a qualified Polish parachutist.

COL Mansager is married to Stacy Grigg Mansager. They have three daughters: Audra, Olivia, and Sophia.
Appendix B: Projected Resource Growth/Load Trends, 2006

Future DLIFLC Resourcing
FY06 and Beyond

($'s in Millions)

Trend of Service Load

UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix C: Installation Master Development Plan, 2006

(U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey)
Appendix D


Stephen M. Payne, PhD
Command Historian
Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center

Test Development and Standardization Division

During the years 2005 to 2007, the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (ES) had several changes in key leadership positions. In the spring of 2005, Dr. Martha Herzog, who had served as the director of ES since August 1998, retired and Deniz Bilgin became interim Vice Chancellor. After looking into different options for a permanent replacement for Herzog, Dr. Stephen M. Payne, who was then serving as the Interim Chancellor, recommended to Col. Michael Simone, the Commandant, and Col. Daniel Scott, the Assistant Commandant, that Dr. Thomas Parry, the Vice Chancellor of the Continuing Education Division, be assigned to head Evaluation and Standardization. Parry had originally been hired at DLIFLC as the Korean school dean after he applied for the position of Dean of Evaluation and Standardization 1998.\footnote{Parry had originally been hired at DLIFLC as the dean of the Korean school after he applied for the position of Dean of Evaluation and Standardization when Dr. Clarke retired. Recollection of author.} Likewise, the position of Director of Test Development also had several changes in leadership during this period as Dr. Anne B. Wright, an NSA employee, replaced Dr. Gary Buck in 2003 serving until March 2005, when she left to work in the Defense Language Office in Washington, DC. After posting an internal recruiting action (Call for Candidates) a selection panel of Dr. John Lett, Sabine Atwell, and Wright interviewed Hoffman, the only internal candidate, and Dr. Herzog, after consulting with Colonel Scott, appointed Hoffman to the position.\footnote{Col Daniel L. Scott, End of Tour Interview, 29 February 2008, Part I of IV, pp. 4-5. In DLIFLC Historic Records Collection, RG 10-11, FF# 6.}

In addition to key leadership changes at DLIFLC, on 30 August 2005, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David Chu, directed Gail McGinn, the Senior Language Authority for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to coordinate with the Foreign Language Steering Committee in the development of DoD policy and program direction for the DLPT Program including web-delivery and implementation of the DLPT5. He further directed the establishment of the Defense Language Testing Requirements Board (DELTRB) to develop and coordinate DLPT language testing requirements and set DLPT test development priorities for DLIFLC. The new organization was chaired by the Director of the Defense Language Office, Nancy Weaver, and consisted of representatives from organizations that sat on the Foreign Language Steering Committee and the Defense Language Action Panel. The Army, as the Executive Agent for DLIFLC, would “continue to exercise program authority for test content, validation, and test administration conditions,” as well as continue to program for test

\footnotetext[686]{Parry had originally been hired at DLIFLC as the dean of the Korean school after he applied for the position of Dean of Evaluation and Standardization when Dr. Clarke retired. Recollection of author.}

\footnotetext[687]{Col Daniel L. Scott, End of Tour Interview, 29 February 2008, Part I of IV, pp. 4-5. In DLIFLC Historic Records Collection, RG 10-11, FF# 6.}
development funding. Chu placed Dr. Wright, who by then was working in the Defense Language Office, in charge of implementing his new initiative.688

**DLPT5 Text and Item Development Process**

Throughout the various leadership changes, the Test Development Division of ES continued working on the fifth version of the DLPT, the DLPT5. The test development process was time consuming and quite thorough. In 2005, Dr. Mika Hoffman, the dean of the Test Development Division, estimated that it took approximately two and one half years to develop a lower-range multiple-choice test and another year to year and a half to develop an upper-range test. She also estimated that it took two years to develop a lower-range constructed response test.689

As was the case with the DLPT IV, the test development teams assigned to the Test Development Division of Evaluation and Standards for the DLPT5 project were made-up of two or three target language experts who usually came from the teaching faculty with target-language expertise, English skills, text analysis skills, and often test development knowledge. The test development teams were led by a test-development expert who was generally not a speaker of the target language.690

The test developers were assigned to a language testing team in the Test Development Division from a language school. They were managed by a test-development expert in the division who were generally not speakers of the target language, as had been the case with the teams that developed the DLPT IV.691

Sabine Atwell and the Test Standards Division692 staff of ES gave extensive training on the ILR scale, while Dr. Pardee Lowe, of the Cryptologic Language School, conducted text typology workshops for those chosen to work on a test development team. Using that knowledge, the team members were taught how to select language passages that reflected the various levels on the ILR for listening and reading comprehension. They were also trained in all aspects of multiple-choice item writing.693

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692 The division was later renamed the Proficiency Standards Division.

Once sufficiently trained in all aspects of multiple-choice item writing, the team members found authentic reading passages in print and web sources and verified the ILR level and appropriateness of the passage for testing purposes. Upon approval, the team produced a careful rendered version of the passages into English. The team then wrote items for the reading portion of the test and project managers from other language test development teams reviewed the rendered passages and items. The Proficiency Standards Division of ES then reviewed the passage and items for ILR level before the passage and item were piloted with DLIFLC students and/or faculty for those languages taught at DLIFLC. Data collected from the pilot tests were then analyzed by the project manager who would make changes to the passage and/or items deemed necessary. After this, the items were assembled into validation test booklets.694

For listening comprehension passages and test items, the team used several processes. Although the DLPT5 used authentic passages whenever possible, at times team members would find authentic listening passages with poor sound quality from broadcast media for use as a model, transcribed the passage, then revoiced the passage. Teams also wrote semi-scripted passages of everyday situations or debates on an issue. Once the team was satisfied with what they had developed, project managers reviewed the passage and items for item workability, content, and ILR level. The Proficiency Standards Division reviewed the passage and items for ILR level before the piloting the passages and items with DLIFLC students for those languages taught at DLIFLC. Data collected from the pilot tests were then analyzed by the project manager who would make changes to the passage and/or items deemed necessary. After this, the items were burned onto CDs and assembled in validation test booklets.695

Validation

The ILR levels set for each test was based on whole test scoring; that is, the total number of items answered correctly from anywhere on the test as was the case with the DLPT IV.696 Dr. Gary Buck, who served as the Test Development dean from 2001 to 2002, realized that the most difficult problem with a whole-test scoring system would be in setting the cut-scores. In order to correctly determine the cut score on the multiple-choice tests for each ILR level, Buck required a large group of examinees697 with known proficiency levels, as determined by the two-skills criterion test, to be exposed to all the items that were to be considered for inclusion on the final forms of the multiple-choice test.698 The results for each group of examinees who, based on the criterion test, were determined to be at the same ILR level would be analyzed in order to set the cut scores on the DLPT for that particular level of proficiency.699

694 Ibid.
695 Ibid.
696 However, unlike the DLPT IV, the DLPT 5 scoring system did not convert the raw scores.
697 Probably 200 examinees, as that was the requirement Dr Herzog wrote in the Modernization Plan.
698 The lack of validation examinees for some languages led Dr Herzog to want to develop constructed response tests for more languages than initially anticipated; Buck, 27 April 2001.
A new approach to validation: Item Response Theory

Five months after development began on the lower-range Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) DLPT5, in November 2004, Col. Daniel Scott, already becoming impatient with the pace of DLPT5 development, asked for “a mathematical explanation of the validation process—that is, what level of confidence are we attempting to achieve by our validation model—and how much ‘less’ validation can we use before the risk we assume becomes too great.” 700

Over the next several months, Dr. Ward Keesling, the psychometrician working in Evaluation and Standardization (ES), began looking into whether or not DLIFLC could move away from an external criterion, the two-skill interview process, to validate the pool of items at each level of the test, to a process where an internal criterion, the multiple-choice pool of DLPT5 items, could be used as the criterion. To switch to the internal criterion for validation, Keesling proposed using a statistical methodology called Guttman Scaling.

Early in January 2006, Drs Keesling and Hoffman gave a briefing to Col. Scott on “Setting cut scores for DLPT5: 2-skills interview vs. Guttman scaling.” Their briefing dealt with the time to develop the two-skill interview, as well as the time to administer both the two-skill interview and the multiple-choice test to each validation examinee. Then, they contrasted this validation methodology with the relative ease of the Guttman Scaling method, whereby examinees took the all of the items on the multiple-choice test, after which Keesling analyzed the results and culled poorly performing items from the test before he set the “cut ability level” raw score on each form of the test. 701

Although Keesling had successfully developed cut scores using criteria of at least 80 percent of items answered correctly within the larger pool of items, after consulting with ILR Skill Level experts, he developed the final cut scores using criteria of 70 percent correct at each ILR level. 702

While the 70 percent criterion was expressed as the threshold of proficiency at an ILR level, the cut scores that were used to award proficiency levels on the DLPT5 could be different as Hoffman explained:

The method of setting cut scores takes difficulty into account, so that the proportion of items examinees must answer correctly on the operational tests in order to receive a particular proficiency level score does not necessarily reflect an expectation that they will answer 70% of the questions on the operational test form at that level. For example, if the test developers select questions for an operational test form that are easier, on average, than the average difficulty of questions in the larger pool, examinees will be expected to get more than 70% of those questions correct.” 703

701 Keesling, “Setting cut scores for DLPT5: 2-skills interview vs. Guttman scaling,” no date. The copy the author has was provided as one of four attachments in an email from Mika Hoffman “Misc. documents,” 21 April 2010.
702 Keesling, p. 103; Hoffman, p. 73.
Although the two-skill interview validation process for the MSA test was already underway, Col. Scott, after listening to the Keesling and Hoffman presentation, made the “decision to stop using Two-Skill Interviews to set cut scores for DLPT 5 tests” and move in this new direction to speed up the validation process. That Scott would agree to use this faster method to validate the tests and set cut scores was not too surprising. He was concerned with the amount of money that had already been spent on developing the DLPT5s. By January 2005, the cost to produce the DLPT5 in MSA alone had reached over $1.125M in development costs and travel expenses.\(^{704}\) Finally, and perhaps the most important reason to switch to a quicker validation process, was the time it was taking to field the DLPT5 in Modern Standard Arabic and the importance of that language due to the war in Iraq.\(^{705}\)

On 26 January 2006, in an e-mail to Nancy Weaver, Renee Meyer, and Beth Mackey Scott explained that the Two-Skill Interview validation process was “very labor-intensive and a time-intensive process, thus resulting in high costs for each test as well as delays as scheduling conflicts [for validation subjects] always arise.” Although the Two-Skill Interview validation process was “certainly a good way to arrive at validated questions and cut scores to determine ILR proficiencies…it’s expensive and time consuming.” Scott concluded, “If the DELTAB [Defense Language Test Advisory Board] does not have confidence in the method, then we can always go back to the Two-Skill approach—but with the caveat that it will take longer to develop the tests.”\(^{706}\)

During the 49th meeting of the DLPT5 Working Group, held on 27 July 2006, Hoffman briefed the group on how the DLPT5 would be scored: The multiple choice test scores would be the total number of options correctly identified or the raw score, as the DLPT5 scoring protocol did not use converted scores as had been the case with previous DLPTs.\(^{707}\) Hoffman also explained that the constructed response tests (CRT) scoring would be done differently than the multiple-choice tests as the CRTs would have a level assigned according to the number of items an examinee got right at a particular level. This prompted some questions as to what a complete answer for a CRT question was. Hoffman told the group that CRT scoring followed a protocol. The protocol considered what would normally be answered in the context of a conversation. At the lower ILR proficiency levels an examinee basically translated the passage, while at the higher levels an examinee would summarize and synthesize not merely translate. Hoffman also told the group that the level of English used in the questions would be as simple as possible; however, at higher levels the English vocabulary used would also be at higher levels than that


\(^{705}\) Much of the remaining portions of this paper will focus on MSA, as it was considered the most important language under development due to the operations in Iraq. However, many issues that surrounded MSA would also surface in other languages such as Spanish and French.

\(^{706}\) Scott to Nancy Weaver, et. al., email: “DLPT 5 Two-Skill Interviews,” 29 January 2006.

\(^{707}\) DLIFLC developed On-Line Diagnostic Assessments for reading and listening in Arabic, Korean, Chinese, and Russian which were available by the end of FY08. Campbell to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 49, 29 July 2006; Hoffman to Payne, email “Some comments on the DLPT History document,” 2 April 2012.
used at levels 1 and 2. She explained that the speaker’s tone or the writer’s attitude, as well as abstract topics and opinions, would have to be understood by the examinee.

Upon gaining permission from Col. Scott to utilize this faster statistical approach to calibrate the test, develop equivalent test forms, and derive cut-scores for each form, Keesling began working on the Modern Standard Arabic Lower-Range Multiple-Choice DLPT. By 5 May 2006, the calibration process was complete and Keesling began analyzing the results. On 8 August, he announced that the statistical analysis showed nothing abnormal and the Arabic test development team began the final quality-control process before the test was released. The Defense Language Testing Advisory Board (DELTAB) then reviewed the test development procedures and validation statistics and reported, “that there are no appreciable departures from professionally-accepted measurement practices …” With that positive assessment, the Modern Standard Arabic test was sent to the Defense Manpower Data Center, to be placed on the web, and into service on 30 September 2006.

**CD-ROM and Web Delivery**

As discussed in the previous Command History (2004-2005), delivering the DLPT5 on the web was a sea change in the way the testing experts at DLIFLC had envisioned delivery of the new test and how previous generations of the DLPT were administered. Nonetheless, as mandated by Undersecretary of Defense Chu, the DLPT5 was a web-delivered test although not without problems. During the 15 December 2005 Army Implementation Meeting, Zeina Zannelli of the Army Human Resources Command reported on various technical issues that the Army Training Support Center (ATSC) was having with the DLPT 5. ATSC had set up a testing lab as a “crash test” site for the DLPT 5. Technicians received the listening test over the Web to see if the full passage was received in the correct order and that an examinee’s answers could be sent back to the DMDC in Monterey. Zannelli reported that the software would freeze up, that the audio test would not start before the test administration timer ran out, that it was difficult to restart the test after an examinee took a break, that the test was submitted back to DLDC prematurely, and that test items were not delivered in order or were skipped altogether. Due to numerous problems with connectivity and software, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Watson, the Army representative, announced that the Army would not accept the DLPT 5 as the test of record until Army Test Control Officers could administer the tests without assistance and that the Army was waiting until mid-February or later to rollout the new test. Until then, Army linguists would probably be given a waiver on the annual requirement to pass the DLPT in order to receive Foreign Language proficiency Pay, as testing with the older DLPT IV was no longer an option.

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708 Campbell to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 49, 29 July 2006.

709 DELTAB is an independent board of testing experts that provide recommendations to DoD concerning the development and administration of language testing. [http://www.casl.umd.edu/node/62](http://www.casl.umd.edu/node/62).


Watson reported that test administrators might have to travel to test sites with laptop computers to administer the new DLPT 5.\footnote{Bilgin to Scott, email: “Army DLPT5 Implementation Meeting,” 16 December 2005.}

Although there were problems with web-delivery, work continued and on 9 January 2006, DMDC delivered the first version of the DMDC client side software and by 13 January 2008, DMDC issued the seventh upgrade (Version 1.7) and more software upgrades were to follow as bugs were discovered and gradually eliminated. During the 22 February 2007, DLPT5 Working Group meeting, several attendees asked if DMDC could activate their systems early in order to work out problems before real tests were administered. Fortunately, DMDC was able to assist with early activation on 26 February.\footnote{Campbell to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 74,” 26 February 2005; Campbell to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 90,” 31 October 2007.}

With the delivery of the new Web-delivered DLPTs, DLIFLC collaborated with DMDC to write a Test Control Officer Manual, a DLPT5 Administration Manual, as well as a DLPT5 User’s Guide. In addition, DLIFLC developed Web-delivered practice tests, a DLPT5 Test Taking Strategies Course, and DLPT5 language specific Familiarization Guides. Explanations of what an examinee could expect when taking the new DLPT were given at the annual Command Language Program Manager (CLPM) Seminars.\footnote{Bilgin to Scott, email: “DLPT 5 Working Group Meeting 2,” 19 May 2005; Bilgin to Scott, “DLPT 5 Working Group Meeting 5, 10 June 2005; Bilgin to Scott, email: “DLPT 5 Working Group Meeting 6,” 27 June 2005; Bilgin to Scott, email: “DLPT 5 Working Group Meeting 8,” 15 July 2005.} With Web test sites scattered around the globe, DMDC organized a 24-hour Help Desk to assist the Test Control Officers who experienced software problems in field test sites. Basically, officials at DMDC reported that in the event of a major disaster, the recovery time would be from 2 to 4 weeks to get the web-testing system up and running again.\footnote{Campbell, to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 79,” 17 May 2007.}

These and other technical glitches plagued the issuing of a firm rollout date for over a year. Dr. Chu signed a memo stating that on 1 January 2007 the DLPT5 was to become the only proficiency test of record for servicemembers. During the years 2005 to 2007, as DLIFLC began delivering the DLPT 5, the services were allowed to continue to substitute the older paper and pencil versions of the DLPT as they, especially the Army, had difficulty finding test sites capable of administering the new Web-based DLPT 5.\footnote{The implementation date slipped several times. At one point it was to be 1 July 2006, then 1 October 2006 was to be the implementation date for the DLPT5, however on 14 September 2006, the Working Group was informed that the date was pushed to the new calendar year; Campbell, to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 79,” 17 May 2007; As of 1 January 2007, the DLPT5 was the official test for Foreign Language Proficiency Pay in the following languages: Albanian, Chinese Mandarin, Dari, Greek, Hindi, Iraqi, Korean, Modern Standard Arabic, Norwegian, Pashto, Persian Farsi (upper range only), Russian, Spanish and Urdu. Directive-Type Memorandum, David S. C. Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, for Secretaries of the Military Departments; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Directors of the Defense Agencies, 27 Nov 06, sub: Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) Certification, in Command History Files.}

Gail McGinn then sent out a memo out notifying commanders that they would be able to recertify linguists who took the DLPT5 for up to one year using their old DLPT results.
Additionally, DLIFLC would continue to give older DLPTs to graduating students, “until teaching methodologies and classroom materials are updated to reflect the standards as measured in the DLPT5.” She further stated, “All DLIFLC instructional language programs, for which there is or will be a DLPT5, will be evaluated and certified no later than September 30, 2007.  

With the movement to computerized testing laboratories several service units, reserve and active, as well as the Coast Guard, made inquiries as to the use of testing sites at other organizations. The volume of tests that were administered at DLI-W precluded additional tests from being administered by that office; however, some service sites were able to administer tests to members of the Coast Guard and the military services. Eighty-five percent of the test sites were operational in November 2007, a major issue for operational readiness as well as Foreign Language Proficiency Pay for service members.

By the end of fiscal year 2007, the cost to develop the DLPT 5 was more than $24 M, and that figure did not include the cost associated with placing the test on the DMDC website or the cost of the content management system that would be needed to move the test to the next level of a computer adaptive test. Due to the amount of money spent on the development of the new testing system, test security was considered a top priority. Test security was an early identified problem that was to be resolved with the use and registration of the newly introduced Common Access Cards; however, not all of the Services or DoD agencies were migrating to these cards at the same time and the issue remained unresolved for over a year. This issue was also problematic for foreign nationals who tested at the DLI-W office but was resolved in October 2006 as foreign nationals could be issued Real Time Automated Personnel Identification System cards to identify who was taking the test. In 2007, the Defense Language Office (DLO) contracted with Caveon Company to conduct a Test Security Audit of DLIFLC and DMDC. After visiting the Monterey testing labs, Caveon researchers identified DLIFLC as the “Gold Standard” for future audits of testing sites. Test security was a special concern with the Ogden program, as the Navy had a wireless network at Ogden. In addition, on 21 September 2006, the group learned that West Point wanted to test

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717 Memo, Gail H. McGinn, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Plans and DoD Senior Language Authority, for Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA), Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (M&RA), and Directors of the Defense Agencies, 1 December 2006, sub: Transition to the Defense Language proficiency Test (DLPT5)

718 Campbell to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 91,” 14 November 2007. When the military services began awarding FLPP in 1987, they agreed that linguists should pass an annual proficiency test that was independent of DLIFLC curriculum so that all language-qualified personnel would be evaluated with a common standard. Herzog to Payne, “Dr Shannon’s SWOT Paper,” 20 January 2005.

719 DLPT5 Development Costs and Number of Items Developed Per Language as of October 2007. In HRC.

1,000 student cadets at a time on their wireless network at the end of their second and fourth semesters.\textsuperscript{721}

In December 2007, Larry Patterson announced the release of Army Regulation 11-6, The Army Foreign Language Program, as part of the preparation for the new DLPT. The revised regulation superseded AR 611-6 and AR 350-16 and specified how linguists were to be tested as well as how test control officers were to order and administer the new DLPT5.\textsuperscript{722} Another issue for service members was recognition of college credits for the new DLPT by the American Council on Education (ACE). Fortunately, ACE visited DLIFLC in the summer of 2007 and approved the new tests for college credit.\textsuperscript{723}

With the release of the initial tests, DLIFLC began hearing from linguists concerning things they liked as well as issues they had with the new web-tests. The biggest frustration test takers had was listening to passages twice, when the linguist felt they understood the passage the first time. Dr. Hoffman explained to the DLPT5 Working Group on 15 March 2007, “that the cognitive usability study indicated that it’s better to have some people get bored than to have a ‘stop audio’ button that less able linguists might accidentally click.” The members agreed to leave the double play issue alone.\textsuperscript{724}

In the year before the implementation of the new DLPT, Hoffman explained to various groups that the new tests were not simply a newer version of the DLPT IV but that the DLPT5 was significantly different in several aspects. In December 2005, when members of the DLPT5 Implementation Team requested a paper that would show the differences in format, length, and validation procedures between the two tests, Hoffman developed a two-column comparison table (see table below). The table clearly identified the differences between the two tests. In the format section of the table, Hoffman showed that in addition to having two different types of tests (multiple-choice and constructed response), two ranges (0+-3 and 3-4), and being computer-delivered, the DLPT5 format differed in other ways as well and some of these differences made the test, especially the listening portion much more difficult for examinees. While the DLPT IV listening test had only one question per passage, the DLPT5 had up to four questions per passage. Additionally, whereas the audio portion of the DLPT IV listening test featured passages read from scripts, the DLPT5 had passages taken directly from authentic sources or that were semi-scripted. However, other aspects of the DLPT5 format should have made the test easier for examinees. The orientations for the listening passages were displayed on the computer screen allowing examinees to listen to and read the orientations for the listening passages. This was not the case on the DLPT IV as orientations were given aurally without benefit of a written version.


\textsuperscript{722} Markiewitz to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 94,” 20 December 2007.


\textsuperscript{724} Hoffman to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 76, 15 March 2007.
Furthermore, examinees had ten seconds of time to read the listening questions before listening to the passage on the DLPT5, while the DLPT IV plunged directly into the listing passage with no read-ahead time. Finally, all audio passages were played twice on the constructed response tests and twice at level 2 and higher on the multiple-choice versions of the DLPT but only once on the DLPT IV.  

![Figure 42 Comparison Chart DLPT IV and DLPT5](chart.png)

In addition to differences in test format, other factors on the DLPT5 made the test took longer to complete than did the DLPT IV. Where examinees had two and one-half hours to complete the reading test and 65 minutes to complete the listening version of the DLPT IV, the DLPT5 required three hours to complete the reading portion and two and one-half hours for the listening portion of the multiple choice tests and the listening portion of the constructed response tests.

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725 Bilgin email to Scott, “DLIFLC Action Item from DLPT5 Implementation Team Meeting 8 Dec 05,” 14 December 2005, in Command History Files.
DLPT5 required three hours to complete. The additional time to complete the DLPT5 was due to the fact that the passages on both the reading and listening tests being much longer. Where the DLPT IV reading test featured passages up to 120 words, the DLPT5 reading tests had passages up to 400 words. Similarly, the DLPT IV listening test had passages up to 75 words, whereas the DLPT5 had listening passages up to two and one-half minutes in length.726

Hoffman’s chart also showed the differences in validation procedures between the DLPT IV and the DLPT5 that were in place when the newer version was first conceived but was not completed in time to describe the move in validation from the two-skills interview as the criterion to the abandonment of that time consuming process and adoption of the 70 percent criterion to validate the DLPT5 as explained earlier.

**New Test = Low Scores**

In the immediate years before the introduction of the DLPT5, most language programs graduated students who met the graduation goal of ILR levels 2/2/1+. In July 2006, as the new tests were being readied for release, Hoffman told the DLPT5 Working Group to expect to see a drop in the scores of linguists. This, she explained, should be expected as every new generation of the DLPT had low results when the new generation was first released. She concluded that in addition to the changes on the DLPT5 that would make the new test more difficult for examinees, the fact that the DLPT IVs had been in service for a number of years meant that the test content and / or format were very familiar to linguists in the field.727

In an effort to spotlight the fact that the new DLPT would be more difficult for examinees than was the case with the older versions of the DLPT, the Institute put practice DLPTs on its website and informed the linguist community at various fora, such as the Annual Command Language Program Managers Conference in Monterey, that the new test would likely be challenging as it was much closer to the ILR than previous versions. Hoffman also recommended that linguists should work on aligning their proficiency skills with the ILR and recommended that military linguists study for the new test at their commands and at home using the newly introduced GLOSS that the Institute developed and placed on the Web.728

The test development teams also realized that scores of graduating DLIFLC students were likely to drop with the introduction of the DLPT5. In the September 2006 edition of Bridges, three DLPT5 project managers, Theresa L. Richter, Chung-yao Kao, and William H. Eilfort, published “DLPT 5 and Classroom Teaching: What are the Implications?” designed to help faculty understand how they could help prepare students for the new test. They explained that the test used authentic materials related to the Final Learning Objectives (FLOs) and that the best way to prepare students was for the faculty to understand the proficiency levels described in the ILR scale and use authentic materials to develop exercises for classroom instruction.729

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726 Bilgin email to Scott, “DLIFLC Action Item from DLPT5 Implementation Team Meeting 8 Dec 05,” 14 December 2005, in Command History Files.

727 Campbell to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 49, 29 July 2006.

728 GLOSS had been initially funded by the MREI congressional add-on and later by NSA.

Additionally, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness was briefed to expect score drops. Gail H. McGinn, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Plans, who had served as the Senior Language Authority for the office of the Secretary of Defense since May 2004, reported that she went onto the Pentagon Channel and told linguists:

this is a hard test, your scores will go down, you’d better study for it, you’d better work at it in order to keep your scores up. And we charged all the military departments to go out and do the same thing …. It will hit with a wallop, particularly in Arabic.730

As Dr. Hoffman told the DLPT5 Working Group, the introduction of a new DLPTs or new forms of an existing DLPT had historically brought about lower scores by examinees in the field and by DLIFLC students. These results were thought to be due to overexposure of the older tests as field linguists had, depending upon the language, taken the same form of the DLPT or the same two forms for a decade or more and were quite familiar with the test items. In addition, test developers stressed different things, e.g. general proficiency vs. grammar translation on different tests. 731 With the introduction of the DLPT5, however, other factors came into play that contributed to the decline in results.

Chinese Mandarin

When the DLPT5 for Chinese Mandarin was introduced in June 2006, the proficiency scores dropped to a 42 percent success rate. This was a shock to a program that was used to over 90 percent of its graduates hitting the 2/2/1+ proficiency goals. As was the case in Arabic, 42 percent of the faculty had been teaching at DLIFLC for less than three years due to an increase in students and the move to PEP; 732 however, the majority of new Chinese faculty had degrees in English as a Second Language or a related language field, thus were educationally equipped to teach a foreign language, which allowed them to regain lost ground after the Chinese test was pulled in 2007 and reintroduced in 2008.

Spanish

Spanish results remained fairly stable during the ten years prior to the introduction of the new DLPT5, although the Listening score dropped in 1994 with the introduction of forms A and B of the DLPT IV. Spanish scores dropped dramatically in 2006 as only 32 percent of graduates passed the DLPT5. In stark contrast, 92 percent of students who took the DLPT IV in 2006 were successful. The following year, 2007, saw a modest increase in the success rates on the DLPT5 with 54 percent of students passing the new test. As was the case with the Arabic faculty, almost half, 43 percent, of the Spanish Basic Program faculty were new to teaching and this undoubtedly contributed to the low scores.

730 McGinn interview 21 April 2010, DLIFLC HRC RG 10E.
731 Campbell to Scott, email: “DLPT5 Working Group Meeting No. 49,” 29 January 2006.
The MSA Test Review and Suspension

When the Modern Standard Arabic DLPT5 was initially put into service on 30 September 2006, scores of field linguists plummeted with only 1 in 6 examinees passing the test. In an interview with the Army Times, Dr. Hoffman reported that scores “went down more than people had anticipated.” She concluded that the test “does have some specific problems” and pointed out that the test may have contained some false positive options, stating “It would typically be the way some things were phrased. It would be, for example, an answer that was supposed to be a wrong answer could actually be interpreted so that it was a correct answer.” Another factor in the dramatic drop in scores related to introduction of a new DLPT was the fact that fully 45 percent of the Arabic faculty teaching in the Basic Program had been teaching for less than three years. This was due to two factors: 1) the number of Arabic students graduating grew from 354 in 2003 to 636 in 2008, necessitating the hiring of new faculty; and 2) the new Proficiency Enhancement Program II (PEP II) in March 2007, that reduced the number of students in a classroom from ten to only six, thus requiring the hiring of 40 percent more Arabic faculty. Although the new faculty were college graduates, few of the newly hired faculty arrived with a teaching background in any subject. Compounding these issues was the fact that many Arabic faculty were hired with the minimal requirement of Level 3 in MSA. This allowed them to teach beginning students, but hampered their ability to teach Arabic at the higher levels.

On 12 March 2007, NSA complained about the listening portion of the MSA DLPT5 and Mansager decided to award a contract for an external review of the test. On 26 June 2007, Second Language Testing Inc. (SLTI) of Rockville, Maryland was awarded the contract to review the reading as well as listening portions of the MSA DLPT5.

SLTI provided an initial review of the MSA test to DLIFLC on 26 June 2007 that uncovered some problems, especially with double keys. The reviewers, native speakers of Arabic working independently from one another, found eighty-two multiple-choice options that were ambiguous enough that one or more expert reviewers felt another option could also be correct. This was especially evident with test items at higher proficiency levels. They also reported that passages, tasks, and test items were generally correctly aligned to the proficiency level they were meant to assess but that identified problem areas occurred at the plus-level for some passages, tasks, and / or test items as those overlapped the whole levels they were adjacent.


737 May, Information Paper, 20 September 2007. The president of SLTI, Dr Charles Stansfield had a distinguished background in foreign language testing, having won the International Language Testing Association’s prestigious Lifetime Achievement Award in 2007, and was well known to the DLIFLC academic community. SLTI would later provide reviewers and coordinate the review of items for twenty-four languages, including Spanish, Russian, Japanese, Kurdish, and Farsi.
to. For instance, an item that was identified as a level 2+ item had properties associated with level 2 and level 3, which might cause problems for test takers. While the SLTI reviewers felt the use of authentic texts was commendable, they also noted inherent problems with some texts such as: 1) Unintended colloquialism and regionalism in lower-level items, 2) a preponderance of news media at the higher levels, 3) heavy use of Jordanian Arabic over Gulf and North African varieties, and 4) an apparent anti-Arab slant in the passages.  

On 11 September 2007, based on the findings of the SLTI report, Mansager ordered the suspension of the MSA DLPT5 until 31 December to allow time for the Test Division to make corrections to the test and deliver it to DMDC. In the meantime, he had the division produce two forms of a web-based DLPT IV in MSA to be delivered to DMDC by 5 October 2007, as the Service testing centers had returned or destroyed all previous paper-and-pencil versions of the old DLPT IV. Students graduating from DLIFLC would be administered the paper-and-pencil test until the web version of the MSA DLPT IV was ready for use. Mansager further directed the division to fix the DLPT 5 for MSA and have it ready by 1 January 2008. Fixing and fielding the revised DLPT5 for MSA in three months was only possible because the division’s developers did not anticipate that the revised test would require re-validation, a process that would have added another three to six months to the overall process of getting the test to DMDC.

In addition to these actions, McGinn asked the Defense Language Testing Advisory Board, (DELTAB), to review the test and appointed Dr. Anne Wright, at that time the Senior Technical Advisor to the Defense Language Office, as team leader and asked Gerald “Jerry” E. Lampe, the Deputy Director of the National Foreign Language Center at the University of Maryland and former President of the American Association of Teachers of Arabic, and Robert J. Mislevy, of Educational Testing Service, to review the Arabic exam. In December 2007, two months after Col. Mansager’s change of command, Lampe and Mislevy completed their report and submitted it to the new commandant, Col. Sue Ann Sandusky. The findings in the report will be discussed in the next command history.

In the meantime, on 30 June 2007, after reading and hearing the various attacks and suggestions coming from all quarters, Col. Scott wrote an email to Nancy Weaver, the director of the Defense Language Office. Scott reminded her that not all was as bleak as it may have

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739 Memo, Mansager, for Ms Aloha Wilson, Army Personnel Testing Program Education Division, Alexandria, Va., 11 September 2007, sub: Temporary unavailability of DLPT5 in Modern Standard Arabic. In DLIFLC Historic Records Collection, RG 51.01.10-30, FF#6.


741 That McGinn selected Wright as team leader is notable in that Wright had served as the Director of Testing at DLIFLC between 2003 and 2006, thus in charge of the DLPT5 project while it was under development. The report they produced, however, was authored by Mislevy and Lampe.

742 McGinn interview 21 April 2010, DLIFLC HRC RG 10E; Col Sue Ann Sandusky (former Commandant, DLIFLC) interviewed by Cameron Binkley and Stephen M. Payne, Session IV of IV, 17 May 2010. In DLIFLC HRC RG 10.E.
appeared. The Chinese program had just graduated a class with an 86 percent pass rate at 2/2/1+ and almost one-third had reached the PEP goal of 2+/2+/2+. Additionally, the first Persian-Farsi class to take the DLPT5 was to graduate that week with a 63 percent pass rate, which, for a new test, was an extremely good result. Finally, the Korean program had just graduated a large class that obtained proficiency results of 96 percent on forms C and D of the DLPT IV, with only a 5 percent attrition rate of those initially enrolled. This in a program that, two years previously, had to double test students with almost 20 percent of students failing both tests. Scott predicted that the institute would continue to produce linguists capable of passing the DLPT5 as the school had turned its attention to the classroom, got teachers trained, and convinced the students to study. In conclusion he wrote, “There is nothing like a kick in [the] rear end to bring about reform.”

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743 Scott, DLIFLC to Nancy E. Weaver, email: “Latest test results,” 30 June 2008. In DLIFLC RG 51.01.10-03, FF# 5.
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