Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center & Presidio of Monterey

Command History, 2001-2003

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Monterey Cypress painting by Alison Stilwell, 1942
U.S. Army image, Command History Office, DLIFLC

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Commandant’s Memorandum
Preface

This command history covers the three years between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2003, which roughly corresponds to the period when Col. Kevin M. Rice served as commandant and installation commander of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey, California. The report is divided into six chapters with each chapter discussing an important aspect of the function, structure, and management of DLIFLC and its associated garrison—the Presidio of Monterey. Appendices, various figures, a glossary, and an index are included to help the reader make more efficient use of the document, which is intended to serve as an encyclopedic reference and official history of DLIFLC and the Presidio during this period. Most references cited may be found in the DLIFLC and Presidio Archives located in the Chamberlin Library at the Ord Military Community in Seaside, California.

The author of this report is Cameron Binkley, who currently serves as the deputy command historian for DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey. Dr. Stephen M. Payne, who currently serves as the DLIFLC command historian, edited this report, wrote the section entitled “Response to Higher Proficiency Needs,” and co-wrote sections relating to the Defense Language Aptitude Test and Curriculum Development. In addition, Dr. Harold Raugh, Jr., collected data incorporate in this report while he served as DLIFLC command historian between 2004 and 2006. Thanks are due DLIFLC archivists Kurt Kuss and Lisa Crunk and the many DLIFLC and Presidio employees who have shared important information about their activities through quarterly reports, newsletters, comments, and other means. We thank the Command History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, for input on the draft. Finally, thanks are due to the former DLIFLC Commandant, Col. Kevin Rice (Ret.), who generously gave much useful information for this report during an interview conducted by Payne and Binkley in October 2008, and to Clare Bugary, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, for her comments on the draft.

Inadvertently, this history may have left our some relevant details or contain undiscovered errors for which the author and editor accept responsibility. Nonetheless, this history should prove useful to those who need to know something about the “big picture” surrounding events during this period.

The cover image on this report depicts a painting commissioned by the U.S. Army in 1942 to hang in the Soldier’s Club at Fort Ord, which once stood prominently upon a bluff overlooking Monterey Bay. Soldiers nick-named the popular venue “Stilwell Hall” to honor World War II General Joseph Stilwell for his efforts to improve the welfare of enlisted men. The oil on canvas painting, measuring 6 feet 10 inches by 15 feet 3 inches, was mounted directly above the fireplace in the Writing Room of the club and the painter was General Stilwell’s own daughter—Alison, who combined her love of China and nature in depicting a stylized Monterey landscape. The Army closed Fort Ord in 1994 while time and weather were not kind to Stilwell Hall. Colonel Rice faced the decision to demolish the venerable building after severe erosion undermined its foundation. Fortunately, the Army removed Alison Stilwell’s painting before demolishing the club in 2003. The Command History Office has placed the restored painting on loan to California State University, Monterey Bay, where it is on long-term display.

Mr. Cameron Binkley
Deputy Command Historian
June 2010
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Chapter I

The Defense Foreign Language Program

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) is the largest foreign language school in the United States with about 2,800 military graduates in 2000. Located on the Central Coast of California at the historic Presidio of Monterey, the institute, commonly known as “DLI,” forms the core the Defense Foreign Language Program (DFLP), which the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) operates to provide language training and assistance to the defense establishment and other branches of the U.S. government. The institute’s primary mission is to train military linguists who serve with the U.S. Armed Forces. The commandant and senior commander of DLIFLC is a U.S. Army officer who also has responsibility for the Defense Language Institute-Washington (DLI-W), an affiliate office in the nation’s capital that supplements institute training through contracts in less commonly taught foreign languages.¹ The commandant also serves as the installation commander for the Presidio of Monterey.

This “command” history covers the period 2001-2003, which roughly corresponds to the period when Col. Kevin M. Rice served as commandant. It was a particularly important time in the history of the institute for many of the school’s programs and staff were affected by the consequences of the events of 11 September 2001. On that date, Islamic jihadists associated with long-time American nemesis Osama bin Laden hijacked four commercial jetliners, three of which they used to attack the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and to destroy the twin World Trade Center towers in New York City while the fourth aircraft crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania. These suicide missions were widely acknowledged as the most significant and successful terrorist attacks ever attempted against the United States. In addition to the loss of some three thousand lives, the economic impact of “9/11” was devastating. The attacks forced major change to the global commercial airline industry and cost billions in damage cleanup and reconstruction as New York City recovered and other cities prepared for anticipated future terrorist attacks. More importantly, 9/11 launched the United States upon a sustained period of conflict formally categorized by the U.S. government as “the Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT). The dramatic shift in U.S. foreign and defense policy imposed many new requirements for language training, as this study illustrates.

Globalization

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, as dramatic and horrifying as they were, were symptomatic of a larger trend in geo-political affairs—globalization. Globalization, defined as growing international interdependence in the areas of economics, security, and environment, was a major cause leading to the collapse of Soviet power and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Stalinist economic policies and institutions were poorly adapted to benefit from the phenomenon, which has continued into the new century. Many observers lauded the achievements of globalization and were encouraged that the process would lead to continued expansion of pluralistic political systems and free-market-oriented economies that

¹ Another element of this system is the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC).
would in time foster a more peaceful co-existence among nations. Nevertheless, the United
States and its Western allies were not immune from the negative consequences of globalization,
including environmental degradation, increased economic disparities between wealthy and poor
 citizens and nations, and the more rapid spread of new and dangerous diseases as well as radical
ideology that could now reach audiences on a global scale. Many foreign policy analysts were
increasingly alarmed about the impact of globalization upon international security affairs.
Samuel P. Huntington and Robert Kaplan, for example, notably argued that the process would
lead to a “clash of civilizations” or even anarchy. In the wake of 9/11, this perspective appeared
especially prescient.

Certainly, globalization was likely to have both positive and negative effects. As far as
the negative effect on security was concerned, military analyst Antulio J. Echevarria II noted that
globalization might both expand the conduct of war and make it more dangerous. Globalization,
after all, meant a freer exchange of people, goods, and ideas. Such exchanges could benefit both
non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, or state actors trying to develop outlawed weapons,
including weapons of mass destruction, or anyone simply seeking to advance their military and
economic aims by obtaining valuable information. Indeed, globalization also facilitated the
development of new forms of warfare, including “cyber-war” or “cyber-theft,” issues of ever-
growing concern, especially in U.S.-China relations.

Not all agreed. The well-known military historian John Keegan, for example, argued that
war was the extension of the culture of a people and when cultures became less warlike, less war
would occur. Still, most likely agreed with Echevarria, who favored the oft-quoted Prussian
military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz in maintaining that war was as an extension of politics
more clearly now than ever. Indeed, according to Echevarria, both U.S. President George Bush
and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden were “actually using war as a political instrument, that is,
they [were] subordinating its conduct to achieve political aims.” Certainly, globalization has
strengthened the role played by politics in exerting greater real-time control over military
operations and has increased the seriousness of hostile relations because political leaders can use
modern communications technology to inflame passions for war more quickly than ever before.
Moreover, globalization provides leaders access to other technologies that can open new areas
for conflict, across greater distances, and with more and new types of weapons. These factors,
according to Echevarria, stressed the importance of classic Clausewitzian principles, such as
chance and uncertainty, inherent in war. Globalization was making the world less safe, not safer,
and nations would continue to need skillful commanders and well-trained militaries.

Clausewitz, of course, concerned himself mainly with nations waging war against other
nations. After 9/11, an additional paradigm became evident as small ideological groups began to
wage war on nations that they felt threatened their cultural and religious prerogatives. Within the
context of globalization, at least three salient factors stood out as influences upon the DFLP and
the role of the Defense Language Institute in meeting national security requirements. These

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2 See Richard Faulk and Andrew Strauss, “Toward Global Parliament,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1
(January/February 2001): 212-220.
3 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996) and Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War World (New
Situation” folder, RG 21.22, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and Presidio of Monterey
(hereafter, DLIFLC&POM) Archives.
factors were the impact of technological change, the rise of China, and the need to grapple with “asymmetric” foes.

**Impact of Technological Change**

Whatever philosophers thought about the nature of war, conflict in the 21st century seemed at least as likely as in the past while being more likely to require a sophisticated understanding of a potential opponent’s culture, which increased the importance of the DFLP and DLIFLC. This was true despite the impact of technological change upon global communications, economics, and conflict alluded to above. Rapid technical progress is one hallmark of globalization, however, and technology was having an impact upon the DFLP, although during this period, technology made little real progress in reaching the frequently proposed goal of replacing human interpreters with machines. In February 2002, in fact, the Secretary of Defense reported to Congress that “there are no imminent breakthroughs in technology for translation and interpretation of foreign language that will eliminate our shortfalls in human language capability.”

A few weeks later, however, the Army G-2, Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan Jr., noted that the Army did hope to acquire automated translators. “The goal,” he stated, “is to have them with soldiers on patrol so they can have a dialogue on the street.” The problem, unfortunately, was that they would not be ready for many years.

The DFLP discussed some of the pitfalls of translation technology during meeting on 11 July 2001. The Army was developing an advanced concept technology demonstration project called LASER, meaning “Language and Speech Exploitation Resources.” LASER included technology vendors attempting to adapt the latest advanced translator devices for potential users in the combatant commands. The Coast Guard representative at the meeting noted that the Guard employed LASER only until it could bring an interpreter on aboard, suggesting the system’s limitation. By October 2003, however, DLIFLC was collaborating with LASER to develop an interpreter call center to provide military forces with live interpretive support for up to 140 languages on a round-the-clock basis. This project required the design of a systems architecture that would allow access to both secure and non-classified interpreter pools with initial trials expected to take place during military exercises in 2003.

Another new device was the One-Way Phrase Translation System, a product of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), known as the “Phraselator.” Although a promising breakthrough, examples of its performance included: a medical mission during which the device could not effectively overcome translation problems stemming from a patient who insisted on giving long-winded answers to questions that exceeded the machine’s capability; and complaints by Marines in Korea that the devise failed to have a sufficient vocabulary in logistics to suit their field needs. Beyond the fact that language translation technology was of limited utility, Glenn Nordin lamented that “one of the toughest jobs we face is getting the planners educated that an MI or Cryptolinguist is not a translator-interpreter.” For these

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reasons, Nordin continued to conduct briefings to senior leadership emphasizing the requirements process and the important “role that Doctrine plays and why we need doctrinal development,” an issue of growing importance as further discussed below.\(^\text{10}\)

Failure to make significant breakthroughs, however, did not prevent technology vendors from promoting their wares to foreign language consumers within DoD and the intelligence community. In July 2001, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) held its 2\(^{nd}\) Foreign Language and Technology Day Conference in Washington, DC. The conference focused upon technological innovations in machine translation and was well attended by vendors.\(^\text{11}\) In general, potential users wanted language translation technology to enhance military information collection, to operate in multinational force environments, and to reduce dependency on linguists. The ultimate goal was that “all branches of DoD require seamless communication capabilities between non-similar languages in both text and voice.”\(^\text{12}\)

In August 2001, institute officials offered comments on the Army Language Master Plan II (ALMP II), an ambitious follow-up to the ALMP I, a document that described major changes in linguist requirements. The institute did not offer suggestions for substantive change, but did recommend some technical changes resulting from implementation of the Prophet Tactical SIGINT System (TSS). This system was expected to reduce linguist requirements in the Korean language and that in turn meant consolidation of three Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) fields: 98R, 98H, and 98G. The goal was to reduce training needs. Thus, while technology was unlikely to replace human interpretation or translation in the near term, DFLP and DLI managers needed to remain aware of how technology brought changes to the Army’s role and mission for such changes would affect linguist training and resources.\(^\text{13}\) It is unclear from openly available sources why a signals intelligence processing system would lead to a reduced requirement for Korean linguists. According to Dr. Stephen M. Payne, who served as vice chancellor during this period, institute staff predicted the concept would fail and have a negative impact on student load, leading eventually to increased requirements for Army students.\(^\text{14}\) Nevertheless, the principle of understanding how technological change might indeed effect student requirements was sound and a phenomenon that DLIFLC needed to track closely.

More broadly, the problem with intelligence gathering was not a lack of technological fluency, according to Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, but that human analysts were “stretched too thin” to mine the data collected and unable to use it to counter unconventional threats, such as terrorism. Indeed, while technology had so far proven a poor substitute for replacing human interpreters, translators, or analysts, the quantity of data that the United States could now collect using satellites and spy planes had surged. The


\(^{13}\) Joseph R. F. Betty, “Army Language Master Plan, Phase II (SLMP II),” info paper in “FLPP” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Note, Prophet was not, nor was intended to be, any type of human language translation system. Instead, its primary mission was to conduct electronic mapping of radio frequency (RF) emitters on the battlefield from 20 MHz (High Frequency/HF) to 2000 MHz (Super High Frequency/SHF). It was intended to detect, identify, locate, and track all RF emitters operating within line of sight and audio range to produce a graphical depiction of these emitters to allow for nodal analysis and correlation with other intelligence feeds and, of course, for targeting data. See www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/prophet.htm (accessed 9 December 2008).

\(^{14}\) Stephen Payne, discussion with Cameron Binkley, 12 December 2008.
institute itself had plugged into the development of video-teleconferencing and Internet-driven technology in the 1990s to conduct remote training programs.  

The Rise of China

A second trend of globalization that was beginning to generate major long-term foreign policy concerns with implications for language training was the seemingly inextricable development within the People’s Republic of China. Communistic and authoritarian, but bent on expansive free-market growth and reform, many have seen China as a potential competitor to global U.S. military, political, and economic dominance.

Indeed, China was striving to become a great power while also becoming more accessible to Western nations, said Colonel Rice, who became commandant in November 2000. “There is more personal freedom in China than ever before,” Rice told a gathering of the General Joseph W. Stilwell Chapter of the Association of the U.S. Army on 30 January 2001, although, he also added, “China abuses human rights.” Rice was an expert on Asia, had studied Korean and Chinese, and was a former U.S. Army attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. He had personally witnessed the impact of great power politics while stationed in China. Rice explained how the Chinese government orchestrated violent though controlled student protests outside the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in the wake of the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1999, during bombing operations to thwart Serbian-backed ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Having travelled extensively in China during his tour, Rice discussed the Chinese-controlled area of Tibet where “Tibetans refuse to speak the Chinese language and only want to speak their own language.” Rice noted that though a sparsely populated region of China, “that area is the most heavily fortified and garrisoned part of China by the People’s Liberation Army.” China has modernized its armed forces, Rice added, mainly by improving training, reducing the time conscripts must serve to two years, and creating a non-commissioned officer corps (presumably incentivizing low-ranking recruits to consider the military a career while freeing more officers for higher levels of responsibility than directly overseeing troops).

Rice was not alone in his worries about Asian security. U.S. Pacific commanders were increasingly concerned about Asian linguist readiness in 2001. Despite added slots at DLIIFLC, “there are recurring and persistent shortages of Asian linguists to meet Operation Plan (OPLAN) and Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) requirements,” stated Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, in written testimony to Congress. He also noted that low-density languages were needed to support likely noncombat-related evacuation operations but the ability to do so remained problematic. Military recruiting and retention deficiencies and the longer training periods required for Asian languages aggravated the problem.

Not noted by the admiral, however, was information from a report by DFI International that was commissioned by the Defense Department to address its preparedness for emerging security problems in Asia. DFI International found that the Army was the only service that trained officers to be regional and language experts through its career-track Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. DFI International reported that both the Air Force and the Navy FAO programs were underdeveloped and ineffective, especially in the Asian region. In its report of 30

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September 2001, “Focusing the Department of Defense on Asia,” the contractor found that most regional policy positions in the U.S. Pacific Command were not staffed by qualified regional experts. “China,” according to DFI International, “poses a particular problem: Officials at the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific noted that, even if they dedicated all of their all-source intelligence analysts to China, they would still not have enough analysts to handle China.”

In the near-term, U.S. national security concerns soon shifted away from matters pertaining to China by the events of 11 September 2001. In the long term, however, China’s rising stature as a great power ensured continued need for DoD to maintain and improve its Chinese cultural knowledge and expertise. Indeed, just days before the invasion of Iraq by U.S.-led forces in March 2003, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, who succeeded Blair as chief of U.S. Pacific Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture that potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula or over the Taiwan Straits remained the top two U.S. strategic long-term concerns in Asia. That and fear that any war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir could quickly involve the region in a nuclear conflagration.

**Countering the Asymmetrical Threat**

The third major security-related trend the United States and its Western allies faced at the beginning of the 21st Century was their long-standing but ever-widening dependence and interdependence on petroleum, the major fuel source for their economies. This phenomenon deepened U.S. involvement in unstable areas of the world, especially the Middle East, the locus of a large percentage of global petroleum reserves. A major result of petroleum dependency, not fully appreciated by Western leaders until 11 September 2001, was how the concomitant political, military, and perhaps cultural linkages generated tremendous hostility and spurred the effective organization of dangerous anti-Western sub-state actors committed to the use of “asymmetrical” methods of warfare to counter Western, especially U.S., influence in Islamic areas of the world. Of course, the ability to grapple with asymmetrical war was facilitated by the ability to understand the culture and language of one’s opponent, whether an insurgent or terrorist. Unfortunately, in this area especially, the United States remained deficient.

For example, one of the many earlier incidents involving al-Qaeda prior to its 9/11 attack, was the assault on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in the port of Aden, Yemen, on 12 October 2000. This attack resulted in the killing of seventeen and wounding of thirty-nine of the ship’s crewmembers, in addition to extensive damage to the vessel. The ship, moored for refueling in

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19 Fargo also listed terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, and instability caused by failing nation-states as additional long-term U.S. security concerns, but he placed Korean, Taiwan, and Kashmir first on his list of major security concerns. See Statement of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, 13 March 2003, in DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.

20 Apparently, the U.S. Army only formally recognized the dramatic impact of the end of the Cold War upon geo-political realities in February 2000, when its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published a white paper entitled “Capturing the Operational Environment.” The white paper discussed how TRADOC had finally abandoned the long-enshrined Soviet doctrine-based opposing force (OPFOR) model used to train military units in practice combat exercises and replaced it with an OPFOR more suited to prepare soldiers to face the “contemporary operational environment” in which asymmetrical methods of warfare predominate. The white paper is discussed in: George A. Van Otten, “Educating MI Professionals to Meet the Challenges of Changing Geopolitical Realities and Modern Asymmetric Warfare,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, 28, no. 3 (July-September 2002): 33-36.
the port of an Arab country, had inadequate force protection measures in place.\textsuperscript{21} One problem, explained Glenn Nordin, Assistant Director for Intelligence Policy (Language) and the primary proponent of military language training in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I), was that there were no Arab linguists on board the ship, or even a taped Arabic language warning to broadcast.\textsuperscript{22}

After this attack, DoD established the USS \textit{Cole} Commission to identify the reasons for the attack’s success and to make recommendations to prevent the recurrence of similar future attacks. One of the Commission’s findings, made in January 2001, was that “DoD does not allocate sufficient resources or all-source intelligence analysis and collection in support of combating terrorism.”\textsuperscript{23} To address this concern, the Commission suggested the “Secretary of Defense reprioritize resources for the development of language skills that support combating terrorism analysis and collection.”\textsuperscript{24} Near-term actions included activating military reserve language specialists and hiring contract linguists. In addition, DoD began Headstart training and testing in Pashto (the national language of Afghanistan), Dari (the Afghan dialect of Persian-Farsi), and Uzbek (a Turkic language spoken mainly in Uzbekistan and other parts of central Asia). Few of these recommendations were enacted by 11 September 2001.\textsuperscript{25}

The impact of globalization on U.S. security and the preparedness of Americans to grapple with its challenges was the topic of a “National Briefing on Language and National Security,” sponsored by the National Press Club on 16 January 2002. The briefing began with a statement by U.S. Ambassador James Collins, who noted that, yes, English had become the new lingua franca, a product of global American cultural and political dominance increasingly funneled by the Internet. Nevertheless, being able to speak the language of other countries was even more important. According to Collins, globalization was a great advantage to Americans per se, but it had brought many problems, including challenges involving criminality, nonproliferation, and terrorism.\textsuperscript{26}

Robert Slater of the National Security Education Program noted that just one year before 9/11, Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi held a hearing to investigate the lack of sufficient foreign language capabilities in the federal government. Federal officials, many from the intelligence community, agreed with his concerns. In fact, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Christopher Mellon testified that, “in the changing world environment, the levels of language expertise that were adequate in years past don’t cut it today.”\textsuperscript{27}

The briefing also included U.S. Navy Cdr. Edward Kane, of the U.S.-European Command (EUCOM), who explained the importance of linguists to EUCOM, which then covered an area involving ninety-one sovereign nations. According to Kane, EUCOM linguists translated for mobile training teams working with militaries throughout the theater to analysts.

\textsuperscript{21} Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, \textit{The Attack on the USS Cole}, 106\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 2\textsuperscript{nd} sess., 2000.


\textsuperscript{26} “National Briefing on Language,” 16 January 2002.
translating and analyzing captured documents. Their ability to decipher such material rapidly was critical to EUCOM engagement, force protection, and counterterrorism operations, but more was needed. Kane complimented “the efforts of the National Security Education Program, in conjunction with other organizations like the Defense Language Institute,” for raising awareness of the problem and helping to provide some of the solutions. However, to create a lasting solution, Kane wanted DoD to build a larger pool of fully trained and prepared linguists with a sustained commitment of funding and educational resources.  

Dr. Ray T. Clifford, Chancellor of DLIFLC, also spoke at the briefing. Clifford gave a short history of language education in the United States. He noted in particular that teaching Americans foreign languages had long been a culturally difficult proposition, but the solutions had also long been known, they just had not been enacted. Clifford lamented that foreign language training was not required throughout secondary education and proficiency testing was not required to enter college. Clifford recommended the establishment of a federally funded National Language Foundation parallel to the National Science Foundation, and suggested giving ROTC scholarships to foreign language majors. He also suggested creating an option for proficiency-based language majors, as opposed to literature-based majors at the service academies, and wanted to exempt “regionally-accredited language schools, such as the Defense Language Institute and the academies from future BRAC initiatives, so they can focus on improvement of their language programs.”

The Defense Foreign Language Program

During the period of this command history, the Defense Department remained broadly committed to the notion, according to Defense Planning Guidance 2002-2007, that “foreign language skills and area expertise are integral to or directly support every foreign intelligence discipline and are essential factors in national security readiness, information superiority, and coalition peacekeeping or warfighting missions.”

Despite numerous such pronouncements, however, DoD was only beginning to grapple with the long-standing problem of having too few trained linguists or even having defined a military linguist “doctrine.” Such doctrine, like teaching the importance of “combined arms” or counterinsurgency tactics, was key to inoculating military officers with an understanding of the importance of foreign language expertise as vital to combat operations across the full spectrum of military needs, whether they were intelligence collection, coalition interaction, peacekeeping, or military diplomacy.

Colonel Rice was keenly aware of such issues. At the 13 June 2001 DFLP Policy Committee meeting, he presented the institute’s annual report and brought up various issues that would remain constant themes throughout this period, including funding, proficiency standards, updating the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT), the development of a DoD linguist doctrine and required levels of translation capabilities.

Another reoccurring issue was whether the services were sending enough students to fill their authorized seats at DLIFLC, a problem particularly for the Navy and the Marines. The Navy, for example, had seen a 6-9 percent decline in filling available training seats. This issue

prompted a debate about the need to meet the institute’s unfunded training requirements when
the Services were not filling all of their authorized seats. Nevertheless, Rice asked the Policy
Committee to support a memorandum recommending that those unfunded requirements be
funded. He wanted $17.6 million to hire 251 authorized but unfilled civilian positions, over $4
million to support curriculum development and to provide non-resident support, and $60 million
for classroom and barracks renovations. Unfortunately, the institute only received 85.8 percent
of what it requested for FY 2002, that is, $73.1 million with no added construction funds. For
FY 2003, in the wake of 9/11, Rice submitted the largest single-year funding request ever made
by a DLIFLC commandant, over $129 million, much of which was needed for curriculum
development, a category generally not well funded, and military construction for new classrooms
and barracks. However, the institute only received $2.1 million more than in FY 2002. Thus,
while Rice obtained marginal annual increases, the institute remained chronically underfunded
through this period.\footnote{Questions Related to the Foreign Language Program, [FY 2003], info paper prepared for Lt Gen Noonan, located in Command History Files, 2002 folder, DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives. Note, out year projections were revised dramatically upward beginning in FY 2004.}

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Figure 1 DLIFLC funding projections (president’s budget), FY 2003

Inadequate funding debilitated the DFLP and insured that DLIFLC curriculum remained
outdated. Teaching staff continued to do double duty as curriculum developers while meeting
immediate operational requirement to teach existing students. Inevitably, test development
faltered and classroom space remained in short supply. By focusing all resources on meeting the
teaching load, however, the institute continued to train the full number of students requested by
the services.\footnote{Questions Related to the Foreign Language Program, [FY 2003].} Beyond resource questions, whether DoD was meeting its actual military
requirements for linguist mission support was a topic of perennial discussion.

**Language Doctrine and Linguist Requirements**

When Admiral Blair testified to Congress about military language needs in early 2001, he
apparently recognized for the first time that those needs were wider than merely the intelligence
Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 2002 Posture
Statement, 27 March 2001.} His statement was a harbinger of new DoD-thinking about foreign language policy.

Since 31 March 1999, Glenn Nordin, OSD’s primary proponent of military language
training for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I), had been arguing for
an overarching strategy to manage the major myths, players, requirements generators, and force
tasks and needs impinging upon military language training. His vision included a “Defense
Foreign Language and Area Specialist Corps,” the transition of the Defense Language Institute
Foreign Language Center to the “Defense Academy of Languages and Area Studies,” and a
“Coherent and Collaborative Information Technology Acquisition Program Across the Defense Language Training and Processing Organizations.” All of these would help achieve a “True Defense Foreign Language Program” with oversight on component language support and training operations.34

On 5 September 2000, U.S. Air Force General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a memorandum supporting the assistant secretary of Defense (ASD) for C3I and the DFLP Policy Committee in their efforts “to establish a comprehensive defense-wide language strategy developed with coordinated service input.” Members of JROC also supported the recommendation that the Combatant Commands and their components ensured sufficient detail in their plans on their linguist needs so that the services could conduct adequate force planning and so that linguist requirements could be determined.35

By 18 July 2001, Nordin’s briefing had evolved into a working paper entitled “A Strategy for the New Century: The Defense Foreign Language Program and DoD Foreign Language Readiness.” The mission of the DFLP was to “formulate and oversee DoD policy and programs to ensure adequate foreign language capability within DoD components.” Nordin’s vision was “a total force foreign language capability enabled with technology providing professional services across the spectrum of DoD missions.” The document fleshed out in more detail the notions embedded in Nordin’s briefing above.36 According to Nordin, DoD was “vetting and revising the strategy over the next few months” of 2001.37

Despite articulate spokesmen like Nordin, the DFLP still had to combat misconceptions about language training. According to Col. Jeffrey Johnson, Assistant Commandant, DLIFLC, there were a number of myths, including:

1. “The pipeline is too long,” although in reality the foreign language education component was too short for the skill levels required;
2. “The Schoolhouse is broken,” even though DLI was regarded as one of the best foreign language training schools in the world;
3. “Native and heritage speaker will meet our needs,” even though native speakers often had a difficult time obtaining the necessary security clearances and the language level of heritage speakers was often too low in the target language as well as in English;
4. “Language skills should be viewed as commodities,” even though the use of unvetted contractors in military situations was an extreme security hazard; and finally,

(5) “Technology will solve our problems,” despite the persistent inability of machines to come anywhere close to the interpretive and translation skills needed by DoD.  

In the period immediately prior to 9/11, DFLP officers, such as Johnson, knew that DoD “[did] not have the quantitative or qualitative foreign language capabilities needed to support Defense objectives domestically or abroad.” Moreover, said Johnson, “we have outdated policy and underfunded programs.” But, he added, service and agency language program offices were attempting to articulate true language support requirements while the institute had a “clear five-year command plan for basic mission and modernization.”

At the 13 June 2001 DFLP Policy Committee meeting, Nordin raised the issue of operational requirements and the process by which these were obtained, a key point being that service foreign language program chiefs only had authority to manage intelligence-related language requirements while some 50 percent of DoD’s foreign language requirements were non-intelligence related. This and the lack of a “language doctrine” meant, he pointed out, that identifying and articulating non-intelligence language requirements in the planning process to support overall operation requirements continued to be problematic. He then offered a proposed secretary of Defense policy statement for the committee to review.

Nordin’s concern was well considered. Indeed, the issue of developing operational requirements for linguists was “a long-standing problem.” Unlearned lessons from Balkan operations indicated that the requirements were poorly defined, that the requirements were driven by existing inventory, and that there was no strategy for determining how to encourage requirements.

The Joint Staff recognized the problem and advised the commanders in chiefs “to provide more detail to Deliberate Plans” and use “Illustrative Planning Scenarios” to help the services conduct force planning. Institute leaders agreed that “language doctrine needed to institutionalize linguist requirements” and advised DoD to establish “a more synchronized and integrated DFLP that effectively addresses both intelligence and non-intelligence linguist requirements and resources.”

Thus, to help define operational requirements, the DFLP Policy Committee began efforts to promote a “linguist doctrine” for U.S. military forces. The purpose for such a doctrine would be to obviate the problem of different military services who “speak different languages,” as it were, in defining their linguist needs and tasks. Existing doctrine was “fragmentary and vague” and limited to intelligence and special operations fields. A comprehensive or joint approach, however, would assist in linguist force development and operational planning by describing conditions and circumstances for employment of linguists, offering allocation guidelines and

40 Minutes of DFLP Policy Committee Meeting, 13 June 2001, in “DFLP Policy Committee” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
41 These issues were also confirmed by an independent report by DFI International addressing DoD readiness to meet emerging threats in Asia. According DFI International, U.S. military services gave little attention to language training outside the intelligence field while DoD lacked a Defense strategy to identify key language needs and to provide top-down guidance to commanders to meet those needs. Instead, each service independently defined its language requirements and policies, often not differentiating between critical languages with shortages and common but less needed languages, such as Spanish. See Peters, “Lost in Translation,” 1 May 2002.
articulating resource strategies, and providing discipline and standards by which to measure linguist requirements.  

The initial DFLP Policy Committee draft policy statement read that “any U.S. military unit, ship or aircraft deployed shall have the ability to communicate with persons speaking the language(s) of the area to which deployed or transiting.” Unfortunately, numerous technical difficulties, including with machine translation needed at the lower levels of proficiency or the lack of capable technical means at higher levels, hampered progress. Likewise, defining what level of language capability was “mission essential” or “high risk” would be problematic when attempting to flesh out the broader statement. For example, asked one reviewer, “what level of language support will the ground forces need, what level will the major units need?” This issue was a new concern of the Policy Committee in 2001 and was labeled “Operational Requirements and Service Process.”

The attendees at meetings of the Policy Committee were sympathetic as well as frustrated with the requirements process. Kipp Burgoynes, of the Army’s language program office, noted that the complex nature of language training meant that the same problems continued to plague the program. The U.S. Marine Corps representative noted that the services were reluctant to identify all language requirements as these would then be tied to readiness, but he did agree they should fund their DLIFLC students rather than let seats go empty. Renée Meyer, NSA Senior Language Authority, recommended that OSD establish a foreign language office to better oversee the DFLP, a recommendation that the events of 9/11 would help to implement.

A month later, during the RRCP meeting of 11 July 2001, participants discussed the “Requirements Generation Roadmap” and the “Balkan Linguist Requirements and linguist Doctrine.” Participants seemed to agree on the need for a comprehensive linguist doctrine at the joint level and that the way forward was to assign a “Lead Agent” for the process.

Nordin then distributed an updated “working draft” policy. The statement envisioned that all U.S. military forces would possess foreign language capability via interpreter/translator, telephonic assess to remote interpreters, or automated means. The working draft was entitled “Defense Foreign Language Program ‘Language Support to Military Operations’.” It listed five levels of capability: survival, routine operational, crises response, negotiation and military diplomacy, and coalition operations, which would define the minimum essential language capability required by all U.S. military units, ships, and aircraft deployed to or transiting non-English-speaking areas. An alternative proposed was to create a “DFLP Center and Foreign Language Corps” that would be based at the Presidio of Monterey with an expanded mission “to include asset tracking and tasking of human and technology language capabilities across the

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45 Minutes of DFLP Policy Committee Meeting, 13 June 2001, in “DFLP Working Notes, Draft” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. In addressing an inquiry by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Christopher Mellon, the U.S. Marine Corps representative also asserted that the Marines took foreign language training seriously and did have an immersion program.
DoD thereby establishing a “Defense Foreign Language & Area Corps matrixed across all services.”

In October 2001 and soon after the 9/11 attacks drew more attention to the requirements issue, Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) John P. Stenbit followed up on the debate over the need for the services to state clearly their true requirements for linguist support. Combatant Commanders had reported linguist shortfalls for at least five consecutive years. “Without validated operational requirements for language support, resources for accession and education of language specialists or purchase of language expertise can not be justified,” he wrote in a memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Stenbit emphasized that it was simply not possible to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan “if DoD does not have validated requirements articulated by language and by task to be performed.” The problem, he thought, was that DoD based its language needs on five-year plans projected in the context of two major theaters of war while language requirements in the Middle East and Southwest Asia were poorly defined aside from military attaches.

On 5 November 2001, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz signed a memorandum in response to Stenbit’s concerns. He directed all major DoD components to “quickly and clearly define their current and projected linguist needs with immediate emphasis in context of the anti-terrorism campaign.” For the Defense Language Institute to do its work, force planners and programmers needed detailed descriptions of mission language needs and assets. To help oversee this process, Wolfowitz further encouraged “each DoD Component to establish a single ‘Foreign Language Office’” and requested their support to help the DFLP Policy Committee to complete “an overarching DoD strategy and policy that will maximize return on investment in language education and translation/interpretation services.” The Wolfowitz memorandum strongly influenced the direction of the DFLP and brought significant change to DLIFLC.

Responding to Higher Proficiency Needs

As discussed in the 1996-2000 Command History, “fixing the language problem” was a major issue within the intelligence community. Basically, the “fix” involved obtaining more linguists with higher proficiencies in key and contingency languages. How to obtain the fix was the problem. During the late 1990s, Dr. Clifford advised a working group at the National Security Agency (NSA) and the DFLP Policy Committee on the issue. By late 2000, having served as DLIFLC provost for nearly two decades, he had developed a mature understanding of the potential for any type of “Proficiency Enhancement Program” or PEP, given the limits on funding and adult language-learning.

Clifford especially drew insight from a previous effort in 1985 to enhance the proficiency of DLIFLC graduates. That effort included an increased financial investment of 33 percent with a return on investment equivalent to a 363 percent increase in proficiency. According to Clifford, five factors were still key to any new PEP plan. These included the difficulty of the language, the design elements in the language program, the design of the curriculum, the ability

of faculty, and the characteristics of students. Beyond these essential factors, Clifford pointed out six specific actions that contributed to increased proficiency results:

1. Increasing the length of the language programs,
2. Increasing the intensity of the teaching and learning process,
3. Reducing the number of students in a classroom,
4. Increasing resources spent on faculty development,
5. Using more authentic materials, and
6. Using technology to free up faculty time which can be spent on higher order teacher-facilitated learning activities.

In December 2000, Clifford outlined three courses of action to increase the proficiency of institute graduates. There was a low cost choice that would provide incremental improvements in graduate proficiency levels, a costly alternative that would lead to a quick improvement in proficiency, and a status quo approach that would simply maintain the gains achieved under the earlier initiative.51

In considering these options, Clifford argued that the improvements seen in the 1985 PEP occurred due to carefully planned initiatives and despite setbacks caused by the refusal of the services to extend Category IV programs to seventy-five weeks. He pointed out that speaking, a productive skill, naturally lagged behind the receptive skills of listening and reading; therefore, proficiency goals should not be equal. Thus, on the federal Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) scale, linguists would be graded not at Level L2/R2/S2 but at L2/R2/S1+ or L2+/R2+/S2.52 Finally, Clifford urged that the DFLP establish goals that recognized “the rule of diminishing returns.” In other words, programmatic proficiency increases would not occur in a straight linear progression. Instead, increases in programmatic proficiency would occur in a geometric progression of 4 percent a year up to the point that 60 percent of graduates achieved the set goal, then continuing at a rate of a 2 percent annual increase until 80 percent of graduates reached the goal, and finally, at 1 percent per year after that. In other fora, Clifford argued that pushing beyond a goal of 80 percent would be too costly and unrealistic. His belief was that it would be better to plan on processes designed to move 80 percent of graduates to Level L2+/R2+/S2 rather than wasting time and money in a fruitless effort of getting 100 percent (or anything close to 100 percent) of graduates to Level L2/R2/S1+.53

An important issue addressed during the 2001 DFLP Policy Meeting was a proposal by the Army Language Proponent (the deputy chief of staff for intelligence) that asked the Policy Committee “to make DLIFLC stretch to higher levels with a standard for graduation of 100% at R2/L2/S2.” Institute management (commandant and provost) had agreed to set the goal at L3/R3/S3, but objected that a “goal” was not a “standard.” Meanwhile, the Requirements and Resources Coordinating Panel (RRCP) did not want unrealistic expectations established, NSA did not want speaking emphasized at the expense of listing and reading, and the services did not want to extend training time. These facts made raising the standard quite complicated.54 Thus,

52 Where “L” stands for “Listening,” “R” stands for “Reading,” and “S” stands for “Speaking.”
53 Clifford used a bell curve to explain this rule.
the Army Language Proponent later requested the Policy Committee to table the request until 2002, but asked DLIFLC to assess the impact of raising graduation goals and to work with service and agency language offices to prepare an analysis for the DFLP RRCP prior to submission to the Policy Committee for decision.55

The consensus of the various language program managers continued to be that “at face value it remains a good idea, but is really not affordable in a cost-benefit analysis with the present linguist attrition rates and our constrained resources.”56 In fact, instead of raising standards, military program managers wanted to waive requirements, at least for intermediate and advanced courses when candidates were close but failed to reach DLPT test score standards. The Navy Foreign Language Program Manager, Ted Hagert, asked Colonel Rice if he was willing to grant entry waivers, thus obviating the need to seek a DFLP Policy Committee decision.57 Rice asked Lt. Col. Richard Chastain for his input. Chastain noted that, “in concept, such a waiver policy/practice could be useful,” although the problem was that with class seats nearly full, to waive a less qualified individual might result in a more qualified individual being denied a seat. Chastain also pointed out that the two or three point waiver policy was within the margin of error of DLPT testing and at any rate “the Services are using the one or two Intermediate/Advanced courses each year for reenlistment/reward, not linguist life-cycle requirements,” which the institute was not going to be able to affect. Ultimately, waivers would increase the number of intermediate and advanced students but would save the institute from having to scramble to admit marginal students, which it was likely to do anyway.58

**The “Hayden 3/3 Memo”**

The question of raising standards was persistent during this period. In April 2002, NSA Director Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden issued an information memorandum announcing NSA’s decision to raise the operational standard for NSA cryptolinguists to perform their assignments to L3/R3, thereby abandoning the previous standard of L2/R2. Hayden stated that various studies, especially the U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 408 entitled “Cryptologic Language Performance Standards,” had shown that 83 percent of all cryptologic language missions were at Level 3 or higher. “Reflecting on the world situation,” the general continued, “it is certainly no surprise that Level 2, which implies comprehension of factual, straightforward language, is no longer sufficient to prosecute our targets, who communicate in free-flow, colloquial speech through a variety of 21st century technologies. Level 3, which implies understanding ‘between the lines,’ represents our 21st century challenge.” The new proficiency requirement “will mean adjustments in training, assignments, and numbers of billets. These adjustments will not be easy, but they are absolutely essential.” Hayden then directed NSA components to work “in a collaborative partnership with the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center.”59

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55 Minutes from the 13 June 2001 DFLP Policy Committee Meeting, in “DFLP Working Notes, Draft” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
Hayden was responding to internal NSA/CSS findings that L3/R3 was the minimum proficiency for satisfactory performance of NSA’s mission. The services maintained, however, that L2/R2 was sufficient for their performance needs for crypto-language analysts assigned to units outside the NSA. Nevertheless, the Hayden Memorandum had wide affect and helped push new funding to DLIFLC both to improve teaching and testing as further discussed below and in Chapter 3.

**CLEM**

By 2002, Clifford decided to design a software program that he could use to predict group outcomes in foreign language programs at DLIFLC. If Clifford could build a reliable model, he could apply various inputs against various restraints and then predict the maximum efficiencies, giving administrators a valuable tool to increase group proficiency results among students.

The programming model, called the Course Length Estimation Model (CLEM), went through several versions leading to the last version, 2.4, in 2003. The model allowed the user to adjust variables in six areas: (1) proficiency profile of entering students, (2) listening proficiency goal, (3) language Category, (4) minimum DLAB allowable, (5) average DLAB of the students in the class/section, and (6) number of students in the class/section.

CLEM’s embedded algorithms gave answers to the following questions: (1) current cost per class/section for the entire program of study, (2) weeks needed to meet the proficiency goal, (3) reduction, if any, for prior proficiency, (4) new program length, and (5) the new cost per class/section based on the new program length. All the results were based on getting 80 percent of graduates to the desired proficiency goal that was set by the user. In addition, Clifford set the teaching cost per week at $3,200 in 2002, although this variable could also be reset by the user.

In developing CLEM, Clifford used historical data-driven averages of student outcomes to build the algorithms that powered the model. In conducting his research, Clifford found that he was somewhat hampered as there was limited data available on DLIFLC students with high scores on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). This lack of data forced him to extrapolate variables using data from DLI-W students who had taken the Modern Language Aptitude Test (MLAT) as well as the DLAB prior to taking language courses at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) of the U.S. Department of State. Clifford then used the DLAB and MLAT results together with the DLAB and MLAT results to develop a conversion formula to develop a table that equated the two aptitude tests to one another. Using the conversion table with the average MLAT scores of FSI students and the average DLAB scores of DLIFLC students he was able to determine that the average aptitude scores of the FSI students were a quartile higher than the average aptitude scores for DLIFLC students.

62 Course Length Estimation Model, CLEM Version 2.4, 24 July 2002. Although labeled Version 2.4, this version appears to be the same as version 2.3. However, one version of 2.3 has additional data that factors the savings in 2002 dollars for smaller classes and prior proficiency.
63 Ray Clifford to Stephen Payne, email: “CLEM Questions,” 16 October 2008, in “PEP Material from S. Payne” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. This was not too surprising as all the Foreign Service Officers were in their late 20s to early 30s and were careerists with at least one master’s degree.
This approach had two problems: (1) FSI class sizes were smaller than the typical DLIFLC ten-student class/section size and (2) when Clifford reviewed the results obtained by military officers at FSI with the results obtained by officers who graduated from DLIFLC, he found that FSI graduates generally had higher proficiency scores than DLIFLC graduates.

DLIFLC students who graduated from language training at FSI took both the FSI Proficiency Test and the DLPT. Clifford was thus able to compare the results of both tests taken by the same students and develop comparison data for the DLPT vs. the FSI test. Clifford then developed a corrective formula to factor what would happen if the students had higher DLAB scores and were situated in smaller class sizes. The predicted results were various DLPT scores depending on the variables placed in the six areas of the CLEM formula. Basically, higher DLAB scores coupled with fewer students in a class/section indicated higher DLPT scores on average.

Clifford felt that CLEM was useful. Unfortunately, he realized that the limited data available on students with high DLAB scores forced him to extrapolate many of variables used in the model beyond the ranges of available data sets. Necessarily, he concluded, there would be some unforeseen interactions among the variables that could not be predicted from historical student outcomes, such as a reduction in academic and/or administrative disenrollment. In other words, the model could not be relied upon by decision-makers to guarantee desired results.

Service Responses

Meanwhile in May 2002, the Air Force asked the institute to raise the graduation standards for Air Force foreign area officers “as close as possible to the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) 3/3/3 level.” Colonel Rice responded by explaining that “achieving a level 3 in speaking is extremely difficult, particularly from a basic course.” He offered that the best way in which to secure this level of proficiency was through an in-country immersion program, which would also provide officers with important and subtle cultural training. “If the Air Force is genuinely interested in building a highly qualified FAO cadre, the long-term, in-country immersion programs are vital,” he stated. Rice emphasized that the institute was ready “to work with the Air Force,” including by developing an immersion program.

As Hayden’s memorandum began to circulate, Maj. Gen. Tommy F. Crawford, Deputy Chief, CSS, at NSA, solicited input from the services on 17 July 2002 regarding their “initial ten-year implementation plans, cost figures, manning requirements, and timelines by 30 Sep 2002” to reach the new L3/R3 skill levels. Crawford told the services that their input was needed to assist Hayden when he testified to Congress on the Consolidated Cryptologic Program funding and manpower requirements needed to reach the new L3/R3 goal. On 6 January 2003, Michael H. Decker, Assistant Director of Intelligence, U.S. Marine Corps, responded that DLIFLC and the Regional SIGINT Operations Centers (RSOCs) would require an additional $2.4 million annually to meet Marine Corps needs.

64 On occasion military students take language training at FSI for various reasons.
69 Astore, “DLIFLC Command History for CY03: Provost.
DLIFLC would require $8.28 million to support Air Force requirements for L3/R3, not including the cost of training materials. Neither of these cost estimates included the cost of new educational programs or new facilities at the Presidio of Monterey.70 During the 2003 Annual Program Review, CWO4 Rollie E. Purvis, of the Army Foreign Language Proponency Office (AFLPO), explained that the Army supported NSA Director Hayden’s memorandum. However, the increased cost of meeting this new NSA standard meant that Army customers who sought to match that goal would have to bear the cost because the Army standard remained at L2/R2.71

**Proficiency Enhancement**

Although the AFLPO did not appear to support the transition to higher proficiency, James B. Gunlicks of the Army Training Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, at Headquarters, U.S. Army, tasked DLIFLC in December 2002 to develop a concept plan on how to transition from L2/R2 to L3/R3. He gave a suspense date of 31 December 2002. The deadline was later extended to 24 January 2003, at which time Colonel Rice replied with a Memorandum for Record, “Attaining Higher Language Proficiency Levels,” including four options with the recommendation to adopt Option 4, whose estimated cost of $134.6 million was spread over five years and sought to meet a proficiency goal of L2+/R2+/S2. On 31 January 2003, Col. Dennis K. Redmond, director of Individual Training, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), approved Rice’s recommendation with the caveat that TRADOC estimates concerning the costs to hire more instructors and build more classrooms in Monterey would be higher than the initial estimate.72 Rice had Richard Chastain, then working as a contractor for SYColeman, Inc., review the initial estimate.

On 9 June 2003, DLIFLC sent a revised PEP plan, dated 4 June 2003, to Susan Schoeppler at TRADOC. On 16 July Robert E. Seger, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, TRADOC, announced that he would support the PEP plan as long as the institute had not missed any deadlines for the FY 2007 military construction program. Finally, on 19 August 2003, Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones, Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff, TRADOC, gave tentative approval for the PEP initiative as “executable if resourced.” He further noted, “this will require a sustained commitment on the part of DA and OSD. DLI and TRADOC cannot fund any of this internally, and ‘piecemeal’ funding will not produce the desired results.” However, Jones cautioned, “HQ TRADOC agrees with DLI that level 3/3 (general professional proficiency in listening/reading) is not a realistic goal for initial entry training (IET) students. DLI proposes a Basic Course graduation goal level 2+/2+ (limited working proficiency ‘plus’ in listening/reading). After at least one tour working in their language, preferably in a unit and with in-country experience, service members can return to DLI for follow-on training in existing Advanced Courses to attain level 3/3.”73

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70 Astore, “DLIFLC Command History for CY03: Provost.


72 Astore, “DLIFLC Command History for CY03: Provost.” There was much debate as to how far proficiency standards could be pushed. Although Ray Clifford, as provost, had established the L2/R2/S1+ standard arbitrarily based upon his experience as to what was realistically attainable, most DLIFLC graduates were barely testing above graduation standards. DLIFLC would steadfastly oppose setting L3/R3 as a graduation standard. Clare Bugary, discussion with Stephen M. Payne, 26 May 2010.

73 Astore, “DLIFLC Command History for CY03: Provost.”
2003 PEP Arabic/Iraqi Dialect Pilot Program

While final planning was underway for “PEP II,” NSA agreed to sponsor a thirteen-week PEP pilot program as an add-on to the DLIFLC Basic program in Modern Standard Arabic. The pilot had two iterations, one starting on 10 April in Middle East School I 10 April 2003 with twelve students (two sections of six) in Arabic with Iraqi dialect\(^7\) and the other beginning on 10 May in Middle East School II with one section of six students. Since the pilot was an additional requirement, NSA agreed to reimburse the institute $510,000. The additional funding allowed the school to bring aboard four contract Arabic faculty from DLI-W program schools, put them through the Instructor Certification Course, and pay for their transportation and lodging. These instructors were not assigned to the pilot; rather they were to fill-in for faculty who were reassigned to the project.\(^7\) Unit service commanders chose eighteen student volunteers\(^6\) to remain in Monterey to take part in the pilot. NSA, of course, preferred that the students be those who were to be assigned to NSA and the RSCs rather than other DoD billets.\(^7\) There was some confusion over the entry level of these students with DLIFLC believing that NSA wanted to restrict the program to students who scored high 2s or 2+ on the Arabic DLPT IV, while NSA reported that they had no such requirement.\(^7\) All but one student was an active duty service member with the exception of one civilian who was an NSA employee.

As the pilot was an NSA-sponsored program, Maj. Gen. Tommy Crawford, U.S. Air Force, set the initial requirements, which were later refined by NSA Senior Language Authority Renée Meyer, in consultation with Chancellor Clifford. The plan was to have twelve weeks of classroom work in Arabic and Iraqi dialect with one week devoted to testing. For the first six weeks faculty taught Arabic 80 percent of the time and Iraqi Dialect for the remaining 20 percent of the time. During the remaining six weeks, the language/dialect mix was reversed and students focused on Arabic 20 percent of the time and Iraqi dialect 80 percent of the time. The curriculum was a combination of the DLIFLC intermediate and advanced Arabic courses and an Iraqi dialect course that institute faculty had developed at Fort Gordon.

The testing week was split into several days over thirteen weeks to allow for an entry diagnostic assessment at the beginning of the program, the taking of the DLPT IV in Arabic halfway through the program, and Iraqi testing at the end of the program. Staff evaluated Iraqi with

\(^7\) Astore, “DLIFLC Command History for CY03: Provost.”
\(^7\) At least one Army student who did not want to volunteer was chosen. Marcy S. Brown, CTIC, to Christine Campbell and Maj Patricia S. Parris, email: “FW: PEP Name,” 9 May 2003, and attached emails, in “PEP Material from S. Payne” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

\(^7\) Although most students entered the pilot with MSA scores of 2 or 2+, one Navy student entered with a 3 in listening and a 3 in reading. Lt Col William J. Astore to Christine Campbell, et al., email: “RE: PEP Demo Memo,” 11 March 2003; Ricky A. Elrod to DLIFLC Service Commanders, email: “RE: PEP,” 18 March 2003; Christine Campbell to Martha Herzog, email: “RE: Diagnostic Assessment of Arabic Students,” 10 April 2003 and attached emails; Lt Col William J. Astore to Christine Campbell, email: “RE: PEP Demo Memo,” 11 March 2003; Christine Campbell to Stephen Payne, email: “RE: PEP Students’ OPI Results,” 16 April 2003; all in “PEP Material from S. Payne” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
the new DLPT 5 listening proficiency test, a reading test using handwritten documents, and a speaking test or “Bio-Data” interview. 79

The purpose of the pilot was to ascertain the potential impact of moving instruction to the PEP II proposal of section sizes limited to six students and increasing the instruction time to seventy-five weeks. This last aspect was not a PEP II proposal but the final portion of the original PEP requirement from 1985. The goal of the pilot was to increase students’ Arabic by at least a half level with an eye on reaching Level 3 in listening and 3 in reading (speaking was not retested). In addition, NSA wanted to see what the institute could achieve in Iraqi dialect in the time allowed. The program was also a chance to evaluate the Technology Enhanced Classroom initiative (TEC-3) as each student received a laptop computer and the classrooms were equipped with a computer and interactive “whiteboards.”

The results of the pilot were encouraging. Of the sixteen students with known DLPT entry scores in Arabic, four increased their listening scores by one level to 3, two increased their listening scores by a + level, three increased their reading scores by one level to 3, and seven increased their reading by a + level. The Iraqi results also gave support to the PEP process. Of the seventeen students who completed the pilot, six reached Level 2 on the Iraqi listening DLPT 5, eight achieved a 1+ in Iraqi listening, while only three scored a 0+ in the Iraqi listening proficiency test. The median score for the Iraqi listening test was 1+. The scores on the Iraqi Handwriting Reading tests ranged from a high of 88 achieved by one student to a low of 37 duplicated by two students while the median was a score of 66. The results of the Bio-Data Iraqi Speaking tests ranged from one student achieving a perfect score of 100 percent and one scoring only 50 percent with 75 percent as the median score. 80

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The institute established the PEP II initiative with an initial ten-year goal, beginning in FY 2005, of raising 80 percent of basic program linguists to L2+/R2+/S2. To meet this ambitious goal, it proposed smaller section sizes of eight students in Category I and II languages and six students in Category III and IV languages while extending Category IV language courses from 63 weeks to 75 weeks. Next, it sought to increase DLAB entry scores by 10 points in each language category while developing an automated web-based DLAB. DLIFLC also hoped that new funding would enable an eight-year cycle of curriculum update and replacement. 81 In addition to these measures designed to enhance proficiency, NSA provided funds to develop a new web-based DLPT to use to test both military and civilian linguists throughout the Intelligence Community. Finally, NSA worked with DLIFLC to develop Language Training Detachments (LTDs) at various NSA sites employing high concentrations of linguists to help


80 The NSA civilian scored L1+/R2 on the MSA DLPT IV. He scored Level 0+ on the Iraqi listening DLPT 5, 37 percent on the handwriting test and only 50 percent on the Iraqi Bio-Data Speaking Test. The reluctant Army student’s scores remained at L2/R2 on the MSA DLPT IV, although she scored Level 2 in the Iraqi listening DLPT 5, 61 percent on the Iraqi handwriting test, and 70 percent on the Iraqi Bio-Data Speaking Test. Maj Patricia S. Parris to Christine Campbell, et al., email: “FW: PEP Results,” 2 June 2003; Christine Campbell to Stefan Konderski, email: “FW: Complete Set of Scores on Arabic PEP Students,” [ca. 11 July 2003]; Marcy S. Brown, CTIC, to Maj Patricia S. Parris and Christine Campbell, email: “2nd PEP Class DLPTs,” 2 July 2003; All in “PEP Material from S. Payne” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

institute graduates maintain and increase their language proficiency. The implementation of PEP II will be further discussed in a future command history.

Changes in the Defense Language Proficiency Test

In 2001, the DFLP Policy Committee tasked the Executive Agent to develop a five-year plan to revitalize and expand testing for the DLPT, beginning in FY 2002. It approved in principle expansion of the system to include DoD civilians, who were by law now allowed to receive FLPP.

A major impetus to develop a new DLPT was the determination, according to Colonel Rice, that “the DLPT system is facing an increasing risk of catastrophic failure and thus potentially crippling the entire resident program.” The system was due for modernization for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was probably a series of routine deferments of DLPT funding to meet basic language needs. Other major reasons included the fact that some twenty languages of national security interest lacked a test; increased Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) was generating increased interest in testing (which may or may not have been tied to a disturbing rise in the number of possible test compromises); changes in the Army FLPP program; potential involvement of the U.S. Coast Guard; and the forthcoming involvement of DoD civilians. About thirty thousand DoD non-intelligence civilians professed having a language capability and there was also no way to test contractors. Intelligence civilians could take the DLPT from military proctors, but only as space was available. After NSA’s senior language authority reviewed and validated institute concerns, NSA provided start-up or first year funding to begin upper range test development, to accelerate periodic updates in specific languages, and to modernize the test-delivery system. The institute prepared a five-year plan to update the DLPT, but did not secure funding in the FY 2003-2008 budget.\(^2\)

Linguists throughout the military were concerned about these major changes in the DLPT and the institute placed information about the new DLPT format, delivery system, and implementation timetable on its website.\(^3\) For more information on the development of this test, see Chapter IV.

Army Audit Agency Report

From May 2000-June 2001, the Army Audit Agency conducted an audit of the Army Foreign Language Program at the request of the U.S. Army Foreign Language Proponency Office (AFLPO) through the deputy chief of staff, G-2. The mission of AFLPO was to administer the DoD contract for outsourced linguist support and to fulfill Army contingency needs using Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP), contracting, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and individual augmentation. AFLPO had no tasking authority and was not the Army Executive Agent for the DFLP, but it was the Executive Agent for contract linguists.\(^4\)

Commissioned and researched prior to 9/11, the audit looked at training support, language proficiency, proficiency pay, and recruiting and retention initiatives, but its final report

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\(^2\) Lt Col Richard Chastain, “DLPT Update and Modernization Plan,” 8 June 2001, info paper; and “Talking Points for DFLP Policy Committee Meeting,” 13 June 2001; both in “DFLP Policy Committee” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

\(^3\) Hertzog, “History of the DLPT,” July 2006.

in June 2002 noted language proficiency as a major concern and found that 23 percent of Army linguists were not proficient. AFLPO agreed with that finding, but hastened to add that the report did not distinguish between reserve and active components or between “language dependent MOS proficiency and the proficiency of linguists assigned to a language required billet.” It was an important distinction because in the language-dependent MOSs, i.e., 98G Crypto-Linguist, 97E Interrogator, and 97L Translator/Interpreter, proficiency was measured at 87 percent while those linguists in a job that required a language was only 63 percent. The latter category included Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs positions in which language-qualified soldiers typically received no language sustainment or else were in Special Operations Command forces. The AFLPO agreed to review and revalidate some five thousand SOC positions and to develop an accession plan that mandated DLIFLC or equivalent training or L2/R2 proficiency for soldiers in those positions that had a validated L2/R2 need.

Another finding of the report was that commanders preferred to spend their Command Language Program training funds on maintaining the proficiency of linguists in the language-dependent MOSs. Other linguists, namely 98C, experienced the atrophy of their skills rather unless they also occupied a language-required billet. The audit agreed that reserve forces experienced the biggest problem in maintaining language proficiency, especially in Special Operations. Moreover, FLPP, which was limited by law to 1/30th of the monthly stipend per drill day, was a meager incentive for linguists to self-maintain their language proficiency. The AFLPO recommended that:

The Army must facilitate the language maintenance of every soldier that the Army considers a linguist because the acquisition of language skills is difficult, costly, and highly perishable if not maintained. In FY02, DLI graduated 86% of all language trainees at 2/2/1+ or better as compared to 62% in FY92. This has allowed commanders in the field to shift training towards maintenance and improvement and away from training to meet the Army standard. This upward trend in graduation rates must be sustained. In the final analysis, linguists given adequate maintenance training sustain their proficiency in the field.

Incidentally, the mission of AFLPO was to administer the DoD contract for outsourced linguist support and to fulfill Army contingency needs using FLPP II, contracting, IRR, and individual augmentation. AFLPO had no tasking authority and was not the Army Executive Agent for the DFLP, but it was the Executive Agent for contract linguists.

**Foreign Language Proficiency Pay**

Effective 1 April 2000, the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act authorized a higher Foreign Language Proficiency Pay ceiling of $300 while dividing FLPP into two separate categories, FLPP I and FLPP II. The latter category sought to accommodate service members with a language capability not required for their actual work, but who might be called upon in an emergency. This policy was successful and the deputy chief of staff for intelligence recommended updating the FLPP I list of languages authorized for FLPP in 2001 (then 169 languages), but wanted to limit FLPP II to authorized languages at the Category III and IV
levels. The goal was to balance the desire to recognize the large inventory of soldiers with language capabilities with the congressional requirement that the military pay for only what it could afford.\(^{88}\)

In July 2001, DLIFLC provided input to help the Army make periodic adjustments to the languages eligible for FLPP. Changes to the FLPP I, based upon the Army Language Master Plan, raised specific issues. For DLIFLC, the key issue was how the Army would manage languages that the institute did not have a capability to test because the new FLPP I list included several languages without an existing DLPT (such as, Provençal). Furthermore, within its FLPP ranks, the Army was over-represented by Spanish- and Samoan-speakers far beyond any documented requirements and had not budgeted for high numbers of soldiers qualified for FLPP II. This situation was further complicated in that the funding cutbacks that drove the Army to revise guidelines resulted in FLPP being awarded only to linguists filling a language-designated position. The Army Language Program had requested $14 million for FLPP for 2001, but instead received only $4.8 million, resulting in a loss of sustainment and enhancement program funding.\(^{89}\)

To help put the importance of FLPP into perspective, DLIFLC issued a policy paper. It found that a huge increase in readiness had resulted when Congress increased FLPP from $100 to $300 in 2000. More importantly, Congress also provided that soldiers with demonstrated proficiency who were not in language-designated positions were eligible for $100-level payments. According to the policy paper, “no one anticipated the huge success in bringing out soldiers with existing language capability.” This success was good, but the institute worried that more extensive use of the DLPT and the need to test in languages without them would strain its resources. Indeed, the new policy brought a surge in testing and more than a sufficient volume of soldiers in both FLPP I and II categories.\(^{90}\) The Army then decided to define the FLPP II list as only those Category III and IV languages for which the Army had documented positions. As a result, the Army eliminated FLPP for both Samoan and Spanish. The only Samoan who could thereafter receive FLPP was the Samoan recruiter, a language designated position, in the Portland Recruiting battalion, the unit responsible for recruiting in American Samoa.\(^{91}\)

DLIFLC recommended that “the Army needs to provide clear and precise regulatory guidance on how to evaluate languages for which it does not have testing capability.” It also recommended that AFLPO rely upon DLIFLC guidance as per its charter to “establish and maintain criteria for standards and procedures affecting tests, measurement and evaluation devices, scoring, and official interpretation of scores, including their validations.” The Army had apparently not sought advice before implementing its changes and the institute wanted to make clear that it “has an important role to play in FLPP matters” particularly because “testing implications will continue to be important.” Moreover, the institute objected to the Army plans to eliminate FLPP II whenever sufficient numbers of soldiers reached L2/R2 proficiency in a particular language. “The purpose of the DLPT,” DLIFLC insisted, “is not to pay FLPP, but to measure language proficiency as Service members perform their wartime missions.” DLIFLC

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recommended testing using the OPI for those FLPP I and II languages lacking a DLPT or eliminating those languages that could not be officially tested because if the languages were truly critical, the institute should be funded to expedite test development. Finally, DLIFLC argued that further studies were needed before the Army eliminated FLPP II for high-density languages like Spanish and Tagalog.92

In 2001, another less contentious FLPP issue was a Memorandum of Understanding between DLIFLC and the U.S. Coast Guard to support a small pilot program of testing and distance learning. The Coast Guard hoped to obtain FLPP for its qualified members and thus asked the ASD C3I to allow it to participate in the DFLP.93

In April 2002, the Army completed another review of FLPP and issued changes modifying the Critical Languages List for payment of FLPP II. This list qualified soldiers not designated as career linguists to receive FLPP. With few exceptions, career linguists were considered those enlisted soldiers in MOS 97E, 351E, 352G and officers in MOS series 18 or having a functional area designation of 39 or 48.94 Many Category I and II languages were deleted from the list, because the Army had reached required strengths in those areas, meaning soldiers with those languages not in career linguist fields lost their FLPP.95

**Impact of “9/11” upon the Defense Foreign Language Program**

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the attacks of 11 September 2001 proved to have immediate and long-lasting implications for the DFLP and DLIFLC. On 7 October 2001, the United States retaliated militarily against Afghanistan and its Islamic fundamentalist government for allowing the 9/11 terrorists a safe-haven and base of operations within its territory. Suddenly, military requirements surged in a number of low-density languages common to Central Asia as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the code name for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, got underway. The unforeseen needs could not be met through normal military channels and an emergency request was made for one thousand Dari and Pashto linguists and for those with South and Central Asian regional expertise. At the same time, DLIFLC and its subordinate office in Washington, DC, acted to address OEF language support needs as the training and education arm of the DFLP.96 Institute leaders also had to ramp up their training for the longer GWOT and that would require large increases in the numbers of Arabic linguists especially. Lt. Col. Terry Sharp, U.S. Army, Maj. Margarita L. Valentin, U.S. Air Force, Ivy S. Gibins, and the rest of the staff at DLI-W programmed an additional 500-700 students through contracted foreign language instruction in less commonly taught languages.

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93 “Talking Points for DFLP Policy Committee Meeting,” 13 June 2001, in “DFLP Policy Committee” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Apparently, issues involving the USCG MOA were resolved and were sent to TRADOC and the USCG for approval by 11 July 2001 RRCP meeting.
94 MOS 97E = Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector; Warrant Officer 351E = Human Intelligence Collection Technician; Warrant Officer 352G = Voice Intercept Technician; Officers in MOS series 18 = Special Forces; Functional area designation of 39 = Psychological Operations (PSYOP); and Civil Affairs or 48 = Foreign Area Officer.
96 DLIFLC produced over 85 percent of all basic level foreign language education for the federal government.
Then, in early 2002, DLIFLC made plans to increase its student load up to 6,250, although that scale was later cut back.97

Another ramification of 9/11 was that on 5 October 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed HR 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Bill. The main purpose of HR 2883 was to approve classified funding for U.S. government intelligence organizations and to create an independent commission, appointed by Congress and the President, to investigate the performance of the intelligence agencies prior to the terrorist attacks. Rep. Sam Farr (D-Carmel) used the occasion to offer an “expanded mission for Defense Language Institute.” According to Farr, “in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, it has become pretty obvious that our intelligence organizations need to do a better job, and that is what this bill addresses.” “One of the things this bill calls for,” continued Farr, “is a dedicated language school that would enhance the unique foreign language skills of people who are trained to work in intelligence agencies. It’s important for the nation to realize that such a school already exists right in Monterey, California. There is no need to reinvent the wheel, all we need to do is enhance the mission of the Defense Language Institute.”98

Indeed, DLIFLC and DLI-W had long been structured to accommodate requirements generated by the services and other agencies, and by 11 September 2001 had already significantly modified programs focused upon teaching Cold War European languages to programs focused upon scenarios involving two Major Theaters of War and Small Scale Contingencies.99 No one, however, had effectively anticipated 9/11 or that the United States would commit itself to conducting extensive and extended counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency campaigns. Therefore, in October 2001, DLI-W began teaching twenty-seven unscheduled languages to address urgent security concerns arising from the September attacks. This plan began with courses to cross-train existing linguists who were already proficient in similar languages or basic courses abbreviated for quick fielding of minimal-level linguists. In Monterey, the services/agencies immediately increased their training seats by forty students each in current DLIFLC Arabic and Persian-Farsi programs and began a Persian to Dari conversion course, which held three classes in FY 2002. The institute also began initial training courses in Pashto and Uzbek.100

The Army Language Master Plan (Phase I), had accepted a certain risk in not planning specifically to fulfill potential needs in the less commonly taught languages. Some saw this as a fault, in that the gamble failed and the low capability in OEF languages hampered both intelligence and operations. On the other hand, as Lane Aldrich of AFLPO commented to institute Historian Dr. Clifford Porter, “the concept of contracting for low density linguists was successful.” Aldrich also trumpeted the institute’s use of language survival kits to fill the gap for non-linguists.101

According to AFLPO CWO4 Rollie E. Purvis, Army commanders met their immediate needs for linguists at Guantanamo, Cuba, and in South Asia by identifying approximately two-hundred soldiers in the Active Component and approximately fifty soldiers in the Reserve Component qualified in the requisite languages. However, the Army also had to outsource about fifty low-density linguist requirements costing an average of $180,000 per man-year. In total, approximately three-hundred personnel in ten languages were immediately committed to support OEF, with the first linguist deployed on or about 15 September 2001.  

By March 2003, Purvis reported that 175 military linguists were deployed as individual augmentees, many who were non-career linguists. As a result, he concluded that “FLPP II works.” Unfortunately, even at this early date, the Army was already using “Stop-Loss” measures to retain skilled linguists for current operations and was pushing the secondary MOS 97L for qualified heritage speakers. The reason, noted Purvis, was that “the Army had expended all GWOT-related linguists including IRR.” AFLPO met additional GWOT needs by hiring 245 contract linguists.

An example of this process all worked is illustrated by the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade stationed at Fort Gordon, GA, which unit altered existing plans after 9/11 to meet the president’s directive to focus on fighting terrorism. By the end of September 2001, Brigade staff had identified the skills needed from its reserve component to bring the unit to full strength and forwarded its request to the Pentagon. Mostly what it needed were soldiers in MOS 98G or Cryptologic Linguists focused upon the Arabic and Farsi languages. “There was a great cry for linguists,” said the Brigade’s reserve liaison officer. “There simply weren’t enough to meet the additional requirements Operation Enduring Freedom levied.” As a result, the 513th MI Brigade gained approval to hire contractors fluent in Uzbek, Pashto, and Dari, because there were no soldiers who spoke these languages available. The brigade deployed to the theater on Thanksgiving and entered Afghanistan from Uzbekistan in early December as part of a mobile interrogation team.

In short, the Army met its immediate requirements through a strategy consistent with the Army Language Master Plan: It drew all available proficient linguists from the Active and Reserve Components and then outsourced the difference at a projected cost of over $40 million.

**National Security and the Need for Linguists**

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, numerous investigators began to examine how the U.S. government collected and analyzed intelligence. Perhaps the most important of these reports was the congressional “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” which among other findings reported that:

Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community was not prepared to handle the challenge it faced in translating the volumes of foreign language counterterrorism

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104 John F. Berry, “The 513th military Intelligence Brigade in Support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 28, no. 2 (April-June 2002): 4. Besides a shortage of linguists, the brigade was hampered by previous Army decisions to eliminate “echelons above corps and theater SIGINT units.” The brigade’s SIGINT battalion thus had one warrant officer doing collection management, analysis, and dissemination until reservists could staff the operation up to twenty or so.
intelligence it collected. Agencies within the Intelligence Community experienced backlogs in material awaiting translation, a shortage of language specialists and language-qualified field officers, and a readiness level of only 30% in the most critical terrorism-related languages.\(^\text{106}\)

According to some authorities, as reported by *Government Executive Magazine*, U.S. intelligence agencies had become overly reliant upon satellite and other forms of electronic technology to gather intelligence at the expense of maintaining the language skills and regional expertise found in experienced field officers. That is, the intelligence-gathering elements of the federal government had failed to develop and maintain the low-tech but vital human intelligence-gathering function. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had no Dari- or Pashto-speakers available to debrief refuges fleeing the civil war in Afghanistan in the early 1990s who might have provided valuable information about coalescing radical Islamic forces that would soon have catastrophic impact upon the United States.\(^\text{107}\)

In fact, Susan Westin, testifying to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee for the General Accounting Office (GAO), reported in March 2002 that U.S. intelligence agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the State Department lacked sufficient foreign language trained personnel to carry out their functions. The Army, in particular, did not have enough linguists to support its war planning or intelligence collection needs. Westin’s testimony was based upon a GAO report entitled “Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls” (GAO-02-375) that argued that the Army, State Department, and FBI were all seriously deficient in their ability to translate or interpret. The Army alone had a 44 percent shortfall in five key languages: Arabic, Korean, Mandarin-Chinese, Persian-Farsi, and Russian from some 15,000 positions requiring foreign language proficiency in sixty-two languages. The report noted long-standing trends that agencies have had in hiring and retaining qualified linguists, but in particular found that only the FBI actually had a comprehensive plan to link its foreign language training program to its strategic goals. None of the other agencies, including the Army, had identified the strategy, the performance criteria, the authorities responsible, and the resources needed to correct its language deficit.\(^\text{108}\)

**Summary of GAO Report**

Four members of the House-Senate International Education Study Group requested the Government Accounting Office (GAO) review the use of foreign language skills at the U.S. Army, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service, and the FBI. Specifically, the GAO “(1) examined the nature and impact of reported foreign language shortages, (2) determined the strategies that federal agencies use to address these specific shortages, and (3) assessed the efforts of agencies to implement an overall strategic workforce plan to address current and projected shortages.” In general terms, this GAO review concluded that:

The four federal agencies covered in our review reported shortages of translators and interpreters as well as shortages of staff, such as diplomats and intelligence specialists, with foreign language skills that are critical to successful job performance. Agency

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officials stated that these shortfalls have adversely affected agency operations and hindered U.S. military, law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism, and diplomatic efforts. Many shortages were in hard-to-learn languages from the Middle East and Asia, although shortages varied greatly depending on the agency, occupation, and language.

The Army, according to GAO, experienced acute shortages in “translators and interpreters, cryptologic linguists, and human intelligence collectors.”

The Army, for this survey, provided data on translator positions for six critical languages: Arabic, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, Persian-Farsi, Russian, and Spanish. (Spanish was excluded from this GAO analysis, as it was the only one of the six critical languages for which the Army had a surplus of translators and interpreters.) In FY 2001 (from 1 October 2000 to 30 September 2001), the Army was authorized 329 translator and interpreter positions in these five languages, but filled only 183 of them, resulting in a shortfall of 146 trained linguists, or 44 percent. The Army also had 142 unfilled cryptologic linguist positions in the critical languages of Korean and Mandarin Chinese, representing a 25 percent shortfall. There was also a critical shortage of human intelligence collectors in five of the foreign languages designated as critical, with 108 unfilled positions, or a 13 percent shortfall. The greatest number of unfilled human intelligence positions was in Arabic. The Army noted that “linguist shortfalls affect its readiness to conduct current and anticipated military and other missions. . . . and that it does not have the linguistic capacity to support two concurrent major theaters of war, as planners required.”

The GAO report also reviewed the strategies these agencies used to meet their foreign language requirements. While the Army provided language training and incentive pay for foreign language proficiency, this Army career path was not considered attractive and conducive to retaining linguists. In FY 2001, for example, “more than 45 percent of cryptologic linguists left the service after completing their initial tour of duty, with up to 2 years spent in basic, foreign language, and intelligence training.”

In respond to the GAO report, DoD stated that “sound management of foreign language assets is important to Defense performance, and this topic will be addressed as part of the development of the Human Resource Strategic Plan now being prepared to shape the next issuance of Defense Planning Guidance.” In one of its own reports to Congress, OSD more explicitly acknowledged that “the Defense Foreign Language Program (DFLP) as organized, funded and managed cannot meet the operating forces and combat support agency demands for language support in intelligence, force protection and coalition operations. We are in the process of refining a strategy and program to adequately support the Department’s operations with qualified language services.”

**CIA Input on the Language Problem**

In a May 2003 report, the CIA further chimed in on how to fix the “foreign language problem.” The CIA’s report, “Strategic Direction for Intelligence Community Foreign Language

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Activities,” sought to lay out several basic goals needed to assure that the intelligence community would be adequately resourced in foreign language expertise. According to CIA Director George J. Tenet:

The capability of the Intelligence Community to process and operate in a large number of foreign languages is fundamental to the achievement of our intelligence objectives and missions. The demand for foreign language skills has only increased following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the U.S., the subsequent global war on terrorism, and the liberation of Iraq. These language capabilities cannot be established overnight; they must be carefully managed.

This Strategic Direction provides initial objectives and priority areas for action that will assist the Intelligence Community in the planning and budget process. The list of objectives has been purposely kept short to maintain focus on the key objectives—obtaining the requisite language-capable work force and enabling them with tools they need to enhance productivity. The plan recognizes the diversity of mission requirements among the agencies but seeks to maximize interagency cooperation, where it makes sense, given the scarcity of language resources.

The CIA plan had only two simple goals, first that community members should “invest in people” and second, that agencies should “incorporate new tools and technology,” although the agency readily admitted that “the core of our ability to deal with foreign languages and with foreign nationals ultimately depends on people with superior foreign language skills.”

Virtual Translation and Heritage Speakers

One result of concern about the limits of the U.S. government’s ability to cope with foreign languages was that Everette Jordan of the National Security Agency established a “National Virtual Translation Center” in early 2002, which Congress mandated under authority of the Patriot Act. The purpose of this new national center was to ensure the accurate and timely translation of foreign language materials that may have national security implications. The directors of the CIA and the FBI were charged with creating such an institution and the job was given to Jordan as its director supported by a deputy director from the CIA for technology and one from the FBI for operations. The center was to employ a “virtual cadre” of security-cleared translators from around the United States who would use the latest translation technology. By October 2003, this national translation center was still struggling to get off the ground. Although it offered viable solutions, it lacked the resources needed to recruit, test, and clear the necessary translators, and thus to get more timely and accurate information available to senior government officials. DLIFLC was interested in supporting a “translation call center” in possible partnership with the National Virtual Translation Center, but the relative immaturity of that translation center limited the utility of any arrangement by the end of 2003.

Another result of concern about language deficiencies was renewed interest by DoD in so-called heritage or native speakers. Because it took so much time to train a soldier to become a

linguist, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz felt it would be easier to train native or “heritage” speakers of languages suddenly needed by DoD to be soldiers. Thus, in February 2003, Wolfowitz tasked the Army to establish a pilot program focused upon recruiting native speakers in the languages of Arabic, Dari, and Pashto to meet critical foreign language requirements. Eventually, this directive would serve as the impetus for the creation of a new military occupational specialty—09L Translator Aide. Known as “O9 Lima,” the function became an official MOS in February 2006. The Army program offered heritage speaker recruits major incentives, including signing bonuses and an expedited path to U.S. citizenship. The first class of 09Ls graduated from Advanced Individual Training in March 2004. Heritage speakers had to meet a number of requirements for the Army to accept them into the 09L program. First, they had to be a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident. Second, they had to obtain a minimum score of 10 on the Armed Forces Qualification Test and a score of 2+ or higher on the Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) in the required language. Third, they had to speak a required level of English or else pass English language training prior to Basic Combat Training. Finally, to mitigate possible counter-intelligence concerns, these linguists could not serve in sensitive positions requiring security clearances. There was considerable debate about raising the age limit for heritage speakers with the notion that they should be allowed to enter service up to the age of 40 or perhaps even 45 due to the importance of linguistic skills, an option that would expand the available talent pool. This option was resisted by many who insisted that linguists were not like doctors or lawyers and needed to have soldier skills and thus to pass through a rigorous basic training program to be suited for military service.

**Linguist Doctrine and Requirements**

When Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz issued his memorandum on DFLP requirements in November 2001 he pointedly complained about the “lack of a coherent strategy and an integrated process within the Department for determining foreign language support requirements and managing DoD language assets.” To help support Operation Enduring Freedom, he directed that all DoD components “quickly and clearly define their current and projected linguist needs with immediate emphasis in context of the anti-terrorism campaign.” He noted that military planners needed to know “mission language needs and assets” while DLIFLC needed “training requirements defined by mission needs for specific foreign language support (by language and by task).” He thus encouraged each DoD component “to establish a single ‘Foreign Language Office’ with responsibility and authority to oversee all requirements and resource planning for foreign language services.” Finally, he requested that DoD support be given to the DFLP Policy Committee “in completing overarching strategy and policy that will maximize return on investment in language education and translation/interpretation services” to help achieve better use of military linguists.

During the Annual Program Review from 5-7 March 2002, Glenn Nordin, Assistant Director of Intelligence Policy (Language), echoed Wolfowitz in supplying an analogy that the Defense Foreign Language Program was less a battleship, than a loose confederation of small PT boats made up of agencies, services and programs. He explained that DFLP was not managed by

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any single office focused upon language issues. He noted that having a special DFLP office, clearly defining and adding to the responsibilities of the Executive Agent, and establishing a Joint Service Language Center would be a huge benefit and would prevent such problems, as the Army suddenly dropping 1,200 linguist billets particularly at a time when more linguists were clearly needed.121

![Figure 2 Venn diagram showing total force foreign language needs, March 2002](image)

Meanwhile, DFLP strategy was to address language skills needed in the total force structure—as shown in the diagram. What was missing was “real operational requirements for language capability across the board but especially in force protection, civil affairs and counter intelligence.” The program also needed adequate numbers and qualification criteria for language and area specialists and then a doctrine for their employment. The Wolfowitz memorandum boosted DFLP’s strategic vision, which boiled down to the concept “all deploying military units, ships, and aircraft shall have access to foreign language capability” as defined by access to a qualified interpreter/translator, remote linguist access, or possession of some form of automated translation technology suitable for the level of use.122

Apparently, the push to codify linguist doctrine was making headway—DoD began to consider a draft DFLP directive that detailed OSD staff and component responsibility for foreign language by functional area, established foreign language offices, severed the English and foreign language functions, and revised joint instructions and doctrine. During this “transformation,” a special DFLP office was to be established, and planners raised the topic of whether to retain the Army’s Executive Agency over DLIFLC or instead transform the school into a “DoD field activity.” Over the horizon, DoD was even considering how to construct, track, and manage a “Defense (JS) Language Specialist Corps.”123

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121 Minutes, 5-7 March 2002 DLIIFLC Annual Performance Review, 2, in DLIIFLC&POM Digital Archives.
**Improving DLIFLC**

To address the deficiencies outlined by GAO, the CIA, and DoD itself, OSD reported to Congress the urgent need to increase by $25 to $35 million annually “O&M” funding over the 2004-2009 period “to update, modernize and transform operations of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center.” DLIFLC was the major DFLP budget component, funded in FY 2003 at $75.5 million out of a planned and requested $101 million. More concretely, OSD sought to establish a program office in FY 2003 that would oversee, set policy for, and program funding for both DLIFLC and DFLP service/agency components to help in obtaining more adequate language support.  

As the GAO report found, a major cause of the language problem was that the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks meant that U.S. military forces had to deploy to regions where linguist skills were needed that few planners had previously anticipated. Operations in Somalia in 1992 proved this true even before 9/11. Moreover, by 2001, more than half of all DLIFLC students were already enrolled in the four difficult Category IV languages of Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, Korean, and Persian-Farsi. Still, after 9/11, the institute had to kick start linguist training in Dari, Pashto, Uzbek, and Tajik—the languages of Afghanistan and its bordering states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan—by creating a special task force (see Chapter II). The purpose of the task force was to support OEF. The institute also accelerated its production of field survival kits with their pocket-sized language cards, phrasebooks, and tapes, which were very useful although some viewed these merely as “language Band-aids” compared to the difficult task of educating proficient linguists.

Neil Granoien, a former Russian instructor and Korean School dean, assisted the task force by providing curriculum development support. He noted several problems. First, to teach an exotic language, the institute often had to develop the basic grammar needed to teach courses. According to Granoien, while Spanish and French have had an articulated grammar for centuries, “if you take a language like Uzbek, there’s much work to be done.” Developing a grammar, derived from applied linguistics, is something the institute has experience in doing, said Granoien, but “it’s not something you pull off a shelf.” Second, finding the instructors was a challenge. DLIFLC instructors had to be proficient native speakers of the target languages who also spoke English and could teach. Such instructors, said Dr. Ray Clifford, “are not being produced for us by U.S. colleges and universities.” In fact, the U.S. public school system does not even include language education as a core requirement. Instead, the institute had to find native speakers and train them on its own. A third issue, argued Clifford, was the difficulty of “educating and re-educating decision-makers [in the government] who have come up through the American educational system and have not understood the benefits of other languages.” According to Clifford, “crises such as those we are experiencing right now validate the position we’ve held that languages are the key to understanding, and we’re not going to have long-term peace and stability without them.” David Edwards, Executive Director for the Joint National Committee for Languages, agreed writing that “we cannot address the government’s language

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124 OSD, “Language/Linguist Shortfalls,” February 2002. Secondary sustainment costs via command language programs and outsourced language services contracts were even higher but buried within DoD’s larger budget.
127 Accelerating instruction in specific languages with little advanced warning also generates difficult problems in workforce management, although OPM granted DLI authority in 1997 to hire quickly to help address sudden new security threats. Approval of FPS improved the quality and retention of experienced faculty.
needs without addressing the nation’s language needs.”

In 2002, OSD as well reported to Congress that “the nation as a whole suffers from a lack of foreign language and area knowledge and lack of capacity to educate and employ these skills.”

None of the problems identified by language experts reflected negatively upon DLIFLC. According to Christopher K. Mellon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the institute was “a highly valued organization. I think the problems that we have, the shortcomings and the shortfalls in the area of languages, are not problems that can be laid at their doorstep.” Continuing, Mellon said “it’s clear that in the world we live in today, a lot of these linguistic requirements we need to be thinking about…native speaker skills and levels…you’ve got to have very sophisticated linguistic skills, which are very hard to achieve through training.” For that reason, Mellon concluded, meeting defense-related language needs will continue to be “a real challenge and still very much of a constraint.”

Thus, if DoD wanted linguists, it would have to continue to recruit and educate them itself and there was no easy way to do it. In January 2005, DoD once again recognized that, “Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of Defense needs a significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages and dialects, a greater competence and regional area skills in those languages and dialects, and a surge capability to rapidly expand its language capabilities on short notice.” As always, the issue was not about recognizing the problem but how to resolve it.

**Army “Transformation”**

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who served throughout the first term of the Bush Administration, promoted an ambitious program of reform labeled “Transformation.” The purpose of military transformation was to allow the U.S. Armed Forces to maintain their position as the most capable military establishment in the world. The major vehicle chosen to accomplish this aim was high technology—“long-range reconnaissance and strike capabilities,” purchased with efficiency that increased the military’s ability to deliver lethal firepower precisely and with significantly lower human capital costs.

To achieve this mission, Rumsfeld focused upon “jointness” or significant improvements in the integration of air, sea, land, and “ISR” (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets brought to the lowest level and applied through acquisition policies as well. He wanted to field “lighter, more agile, easily deployable military units” through a “military culture that rewards innovation and risk-taking,” ideas borrowed from his experience in the business world. Even in the wake of 9/11, Rumsfeld declared that “the war on terrorism does not supplant the need to transform DoD; instead, we must accelerate our organizational, operational, business, and process reforms.” In September 2002, Rumsfeld issued a memorandum to senior staff highlighting his top ten priorities for the coming year. Transformation was second only to fighting terrorism on this list.

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DFLP officials noted that Rumsfeld’s plan included the need to “optimize intelligence capabilities” and to “improve force manning” through longer tours, revised career paths, and “improved language capabilities.” An emphasis in Transformation both on jointness in operations and how “future training must be able to adapt continuously to the changing nature of the national security environment” augured well for DLIFLC, which functioned in a joint environment and, historically, has been adept at change. Moreover, Transformation dove-tailed with DFLP and DLIFLC efforts to address the long-standing problem in obtaining requirements from the services that had helped inspire DFLP to promote a DoD-wide foreign language doctrine. In March 2002, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted that “we still have stovepipes that continue to cause gaps and seams between our combatant commands and the forces that are provided by our services. These gaps and seams must be eliminated. Close collaboration across the services, combatant commands, and with other government departments is key to success in achieving our national security objectives.” According to Myers, “to evolve into a decisive superior force, transformation must spread across doctrine, organizations, and training—not just material solutions.”

The Role of Under Secretary of Defense Dr. David S. Chu

In November 2002, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Dr. David S. Chu directed each military department, combatant command, and Defense agencies to review its requirements for language professionals, including enlisted soldier, commissioned officer, and civilian interpreters, translators, cryptologic linguists, interrogators, and area specialists. Unfortunately, this review “resulted in narrowly scoped requirements based on current manning authorizations instead of requirements based upon recent operational experience and projected needs.” Although this review was of limited value, it did indicate Chu’s “transformative” interest in how to manage the Defense Foreign Language Program.

What was Chu’s interest in DLIFLC? According to former Commandant Kevin Rice, OSD was interested in taking more command and control of DFLP, which had traditionally rested in the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and the Army staff. Chu felt that OSD could obtain more resources and place a higher priority on language training than the Army, which he did not believe was vitally interested in language education. Post-9/11, Rice felt that DoD had resourced the institute well and that consolidation of more command and control within the Pentagon by non-language experts would add little value to DFLP and little additional progress in “Transformation” was conducted under his watch.

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Eagle/Enduring Freedom” folder, box 41.A, DLIFLC&POM Archives. The purpose of the memorandum was to castigate senior DoD officials who had failed to move Rumsfeld’s reforms forward on the basis of insufficient statutory authority. “If you need relief from an unnecessary legal restriction, please ask for it,” Rumsfeld informed officials.

135 This paragraph was extracted from Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, 1.
136 Col Kevin M. Rice (Ret.), interview by Cameron Binkley and Stephen Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1031-1032), in DLIFLC&POM Archives. Rice did not believe OSD’s interest in obtaining command and control of DLIFLC would benefit DFLP because the program needed better resourcing, not coordination. This problem was significantly reduced after 9/11 brought renewed attention to language training.
On 19 March 2003, President George W. Bush directed the United States to launch a “preemptive” invasion of Iraq. Shortly after this attack began, the president declared to the American people that coalition forces were in “the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.” A few weeks later, the president declared that major combat operations in Iraq were completed. Soon enough, however, military commanders faced a potent and growing insurgency directed against the American-led military occupation of Iraq. Combined Task Force 7 recognized the need for and later requested 6,500 Arabic and Kurdish language and regional experts. This large demand could not be met with uniformed military personnel, which was the genesis of yet another study on the foreign language capabilities of DoD.

On 11 August 2003, Chu tasked Dr. Jerome F. Smith, Jr., a retired U.S. Navy rear admiral, who had served as the first DoD chancellor for Education and Professional Development from October 1998 through March 2004, to “conduct a review of the operations, plans, funding, governance, and physical plant of the Defense Language Institute (Foreign Language Center).” The purpose of this review, according to Smith’s appointment memorandum, was “to determine whether the DLI is postured to support the Department’s present and future needs for language expertise.”

The Smith Report

Admiral Smith visited the Presidio of Monterey in September 2003 and made extensive visits to other related military and government offices and agencies in the course of his review. Smith’s report, dated 7 November 2003, included his assessment of the DLIFLC operations, plans, funding, governance, and physical plant. He began his assessment by recognizing that the institute “is the world’s largest foreign language school, making direct comparisons with other language institutions somewhat strained.”

In terms of operations, Smith observed, “First, DLIFLC is configured to be responsive to multiple customers,” and that:

An example of responsiveness of this model was the ability of DLIFLC quickly to ramp up the training in languages important to the global war on terror (GWOT) through contract training administered by the Washington office [DLI-W], while adding an unprogrammed 100 seats (40 in Modern Standard Arabic, 40 in Persian-Farsi, and 20 in Persian-Afghan) and standing up the Operation Enduring Freedom for training additional students in up to thirty non-traditional, low-enrollment language[s] at the Presidio of Monterey campus.

Under this category, Smith also addressed curriculum development, the role of the instructor in language training, technology in classrooms, and external pressure to increase language skill proficiency. Smith also made a number of “Conclusions and Recommendations” in his study, most of which pertained to the revision of governing directives, realignment of

responsibilities with DoD, the establishment of a new high-level advisory committee to replace the no-longer-functioning General Officer Steering Committee, and a review of the delegation of the management of the DLIFLC. The Smith study “articulated the needs for qualitative improvement in language skills of graduates and robust support to other Defense Components; i.e., beyond the Intelligence Community.”

After Smith’s report, the institute began its own “Language Transformation” effort to realign the overall program “to the ideal of an effective, nationally recognized authority of language-related capability that grows initially from DLI.” That goal, however, had long existed. In October 2003, the institute’s Academic Advisory Council expressed its view that DoD should review and simplify the multiple jurisdictions that controlled the operations of the school with the intent to strengthen oversight and possibly centralize authority within OSD. This recommendation was expressed as early as 1979 in a report from the President’s Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies entitled Strength through Wisdom: A Critique of U.S. Capability. Eventually, OSD interest to better coordinate DFLP activities drove it to create the Defense Foreign Language Office.

Meanwhile, Chu requested an assessment of DoD capabilities in the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. Key FAO areas of expertise were language proficiency, area knowledge, and cultural awareness, but Chu believed that “we have not focused upon the true needs for language and area specialists across the spectrum of DoD missions.” Chu wanted department planners to realize the need for “solid foreign language and area expertise” to achieve successful DoD missions around the globe. He therefore directed on 19 November 2002 a thorough review of languages needed and proficiency required for interpreters, translators, cryptolinguists, and interrogators as well as area specialists in all ranks based upon operational experience and projected needs as per current Defense Planning Guidance and Transformation (and not on simple manning authorizations). Mindful of budgetary realities, Chu directed that agencies indicate where tradeoffs could be made to support emerging requirements.

Ultimately, DoD’s Strategic Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 2006-2011 directed Chu to develop and provide to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, a comprehensive “roadmap” for achieving the full spectrum of language capabilities necessary to support the 2004 Defense Strategy. This guidance established four goals for “language transformation”:

1. Create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components;
2. Create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities;
3. Establish a cadre of language specialists possessing a level L3/R3/S3 ability;

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143 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, 2. In September 2003, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans (DUSD (Plans)) commissioned a study by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) that would research in detail five language functions: language management within the Combatant Commands; management of FAOs within the services; development of foreign language and regional knowledge in the officer corps; management of language personnel; and requirements determination processes for assessing language needs.
146 See Appendix D for an explanation of foreign language proficiency levels.
(4) Establish a process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers.\textsuperscript{147}

DoD officials undertook numerous meetings and initiatives to meet these language transformation goals and to produce the \textit{Defense Language Transformation Roadmap}, a topic treated in a forthcoming command history.

**Bureau of International Language Coordination**

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created the Bureau of International Language Coordination (BILC) in 1966 to share information on language training and to hold annual conferences to discuss related issues and to help improve language teaching and testing. DLI has long held a prominent role in these conferences. The Foreign Language Training Center Europe (FLTCE) operates the secretariat of BILC, which is located at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

Two years after the breakup of the Soviet Bloc in 1991, seven former communist East European states were invited to become NATO partner countries and at the November 2002 Prague Summit, they were invited to join the Alliance.

Between 2001 and 2003, BILC held training reviews in three former communist states: Slovakia in 2001, Latvia in 2002, and Slovenia in 2003. The reviews were conducted by multinational BILC teams composed of members from the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the BILC secretariat. Between November 2000 and June 2003, BILC conducted six testing seminars that were well attended by professionals from NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.

During this period, BILC also focused attention upon completing work to develop an updated standardized table of language proficiency for joint use across all NATO countries. According to Clifford, this project began in 1999 when the BILC Steering Committee created the multinational Working Group on language testing and assessment to “interpret and elaborate STANAG 6001,” referring to NATO’s 1976 standardization agreement on language proficiency levels. Eleven NATO member states thereafter began working to reinterpret and update the standards of STANAG 6001. In 2000, the Steering Committee approved a trial of the “draft Interpretation Document” during the “Language Testing Seminar” for PfP nations, which was conducted by five BLIC countries. In 2001, BILC devised the process for conducting language needs assessments for NATO members and was also designated by NATO the keeper of NATO’s STANAG 6001 Language Proficiency Levels. In 2002, the Steering Committee approved the Interpretation Document, which thus became an amendment to STANAG 6001 that NATO disseminated, although minor bureaucratic delays prevented formal approval of the Interpretation Document by June 2003. STANAG 6001 designated Level 3 Proficiency in language as the NATO standard for NATO positions requiring language proficiency. This standard was hard for all NATO and PfP states to meet. It was for this reason, therefore, that BILC conference attendees turned their attention in 2003 to the theme of testing and validation. Conference subgroups tackled this subject by trying to answer such questions as “how does one measure the effectiveness of classroom instruction,” what are the “central principles of curriculum design and development,” how to “teach according to STANAG 6001 scale,” and how to achieve “fairness and validation in language assessment.”\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{147} DoD, \textit{Defense Language Transformation Roadmap} (January 2005), 1.

Perhaps the most momentous event to affect BILC occurred on 21 November 2002 when NATO members met in Prague, the Czech Republic, and issued a joint communiqué, known as the Prague Declaration, that called for NATO to transform itself from a static, Cold War-era body into an organization capable of addressing the Global War on Terrorism. Specifically, article 3 of the communiqué stated:

Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO’s Strategic Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come. Today's decisions will provide for balanced and effective capabilities within the Alliance so that NATO can better carry out the full range of its missions and respond collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.  

NATO thus began a reorganization that foresaw major change to obtain “one vision of the future.” In that future, Alliance forces would conduct fully joint operations. NATO commanders would hold combined arms and joint responsibility through out the chain of command on an integrated battle space with equally integrate logistics supplying precise, long-range weapons and using decision cycles timed in minutes to field expeditionary forces on a global basis. They would also use and secure large and distributed information networks. All of this would also require effective instantaneous interaction and communications among NATO’s multilingual members and partners.

BILC held its 2003 Conference in June at Harrogate, United Kingdom. Its theme was on “Evaluation and Validation: Measuring the Effectiveness of Language Learning.” Dr. Ray Clifford chaired the conference and presented its opening remarks, focused upon NATO’s impending transformation, BILC’s role in NATO as its consultative and advisory body for language training matters, and BILC’s future role in NATO. Indeed, concluded Clifford, “no matter how NATO (re)organizes, successful communication will depend on the language skills of individuals.” BILC, Clifford implied, was going to be even more important to NATO’s success in the future than in the past.

One sign of DLIFLC’s commitment to BILC was a memorandum of understanding it signed with FLTCE in 2002 under which the institute agreed to assign a senior faculty member to FLTCE as a liaison and to assist it with academic matters. FLTCE conducted Foreign and English language instruction and provided language-training expertise in support of the Defense Language Program and the security cooperation objectives of the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Central Command, and the Marshall Center. Clifford chose Dean Peter Armbrust to be DLIFLC’s representative at FLTCE. The arrangement essentially called upon the institute to establish a Language Training Detachment (LTD) at FLTCE consisting of a single member of the “DLIFLC Title X Faculty Personnel System.” Clifford assigned Armbrust to FLTCE because he was a specialist in U.S. government foreign language education and could ensure that FLTCE continued to maintain DLIFLC standards and practices and thus meet the continuing

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language education needs of NATO and U.S. military linguists attending annual FLTCE courses. Armbrust was expected to serve as chair of the FLTCE Linguist Enhancement Department with responsibility for all U.S. linguists except for FAOs.\footnote{“Foreign Language Training Center Europe,” 4 January 2007, info paper in Command Histories folder (2002), “FLTCE” files, DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.}
Chapter II
Managing the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center &
Presidio of Monterey

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at the Presidio of Monterey, California, and its subordinate element, Defense Language Institute-Washington, conducted the training and education of the Defense Foreign Language Program for the 2001-2003 period, as they have done for many years. Combined, they provide over 85 percent of foreign language education for the federal government, by training uniformed members of all four military services (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines) and other Department of Defense agencies. In 2001, there were about 3,500 students (50 percent Army, 26 percent Air Force, 16 percent Navy, and 7 percent Marine Corps) programmed for attendance at the DFLP resident foreign language program in Monterey. The length of resident language training programs, based on language difficulty, ranged from twenty-five to sixty-three weeks, with more than 60 percent of the students attending courses exceeding one year. DoD programmed an additional 500-700 students for contract foreign language training in less commonly taught languages through the DLI-W office. Future plans made in early 2002 included increasing the number of students to receive resident language training to 6,250 over an unspecified period of time.

Command Leadership

Col. Kevin M. Rice became the twenty-third commandant of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and installation commander of the Presidio of Monterey on 1 December 2000. Rice had just completed a three-year tour as the U.S. Army attaché to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. He was also a 1978 graduate of the institute’s Chinese (Mandarin) basic course and its advanced course in 1983. Rice reported to the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Rice was interested in the possibility of commanding DLIFLC, although at first thought the chance unlikely. When informed that Col. Daniel Devlin was close to retirement after over four years as DLIFLC commandant, Rice jumped at the chance to apply for the position. The first step was for him to win nomination by the Army through its approval chain, and then the Army sent the application to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for vetting through inter-service processes. Then Lt. Gen. Steel at Fort Leavenworth interviewed Rice, followed quickly by an interview with General John N. Abrams, TRADOC Commander. Abrams was happy with Rice and backed his application as the Army’s candidate for the position. After Abrams gave his support, Rice was surprised to find out that many more months were required to gain DoD approval. His

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nomination then had to pass inspection by the other services because the institute was a joint-service organization. The process took several additional months unlike the process for similar TRADOC assignments to Army-only commands. It helped that Rice was fluent in Chinese and a DLIFLC graduate, had served as an attaché, had commanded an infantry battalion at Fort Benning, and, of course, was available.\footnote{Col Kevin M. Rice (Ret.), interview by Cameron Binkley and Stephen Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1011-1012), in DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

At his change of command ceremony, Rice asked Mrs. Kuei Chen Ma, the instructor who taught him Chinese in 1978, to join him on the grandstand. “She created exciting opportunities in my life,” he stated, “as well as enhanced my service to our nation through her patience and dedication in teaching me her language.” Rice came to command at the school with a strong pre-existing sense of its mission and in his first months as commandant, he continued to promote faculty dedication and excellence as the key to the institute’s success.\footnote{Col Kevin M. Rice, “Faculty Dedication is Key to Institute’s Success,” \textit{Globe} 24, no. 2 (February 2001): 3.}

Rice had a simple but specific command philosophy with regard to his management of the Defense Language Institute. As commandant, Rice followed four key principles: First, he believed maintaining and improving the caliber and motivation of professors was vital. He thus made efforts to motivate instructors and to recognize their achievements. For example, he sent most of his deans to the Center for Creative Leadership in Colorado Springs, a private organization in Colorado, for a special forty-hour leadership workshop designed to improve participant self-understanding and relationship skills. The deans returned “raving” about the program. Second, Rice believed that the institute’s classrooms required the most up-to-date equipment, and he sought their modernization during his tenure. Third, he beefed up efforts in the long-neglected area of curriculum development, his goal being to provide teachers and students with the best instructional materials available. Finally, Rice emphasized the necessity of maintaining “a proper balance between language training and the military.” Both military training—soldiers must know how to behave—and maintaining civilian accreditation as an academic organization were important. Rice, however, had studied Chinese as a young captain. He knew personally how difficult it was to learn a foreign language and that the task required much devotion and hard work. “For that reason” he later stated, “you can’t overdo the military stuff, you can’t have people doing so much military training that it takes them away from their homework and their studies.” As commandant, Rice constantly emphasized to his service unit commanders that some physical and military training were appropriate, but the primary function of students at DLIFLC was to study their target language.\footnote{Rice, interview with Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1040-1041).}

Other key staff included Col. Johnny Jones, who remained assistant commandant with responsibility for the Operations, Plans and Programs and the Evaluation and Standardization Divisions until replaced by Col. Jeffrey Johnson, whose responsibilities changed somewhat (as described below) after a major staff reorganization. In March 2003, Col. Sandra F. Wilson took over responsibility as assistant commandant.\footnote{DLIFLC&POM Staff and Key Personnel Directories for 2001-2003. Colonel Wilson became Assistant Commandant, DLIFLC, and Commander, Air Force Element (AFELM), Presidio of Monterey, California, in March 2003, after attending the DLIFLC Spanish Basic Course. She received her commission through the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill’s Air Force ROTC Program in 1980. She served as commander of an intelligence squadron, a combined intelligence center, and an Air Force training group. In addition, Wilson served in several Air Staff and joint-duty positions, to include action officer for national intelligence programs; assistant executive officer.} The assistant commandants, who were all Air Force officers, were also in charge of the Air Force Element at the Presidio.
Dr. Ray T. Clifford remained DLIFLC provost. However, Colonel Rice reclassified Clifford’s position late in 2001. Clifford thus became DLIFLC chancellor and “Senior Language Authority.” As chancellor, Clifford reported to the assistant commandant, but as senior language authority, he provided direct advice to Rice. Dr. Stephen M. Payne became the vice chancellor for Academic Affairs while Lt. Col. Stephen Butler, an Air Force officer, became vice chancellor for Student Affairs until May 2002 when he was administratively relieved of duty. Lt. Col. William Astore, another Air Force officer, replaced Butler. Rice formed a search committee in July 2002 to hire a new provost and approved the appointment of Dr. Elivira Swender, director of professional services of the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, to assist with the hiring of this high profile civilian position. Swender chaired a Provost Search Committee composed of various DLIFLC representatives, including the Academic Advisory Board, represented by John Petersen, who had experience hiring upper academic management officials. In August 2003, the institute welcomed the new provost, who was Dr. Susan Steele. Steele had served on the Linguistics faculty and as an administrator at the University of Arizona and as an administrator at several colleges before moving to Monterey.

The U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, was commanded by Col. Peter Dausen in 2001, and by Col. William M. Dietrick in 2002. On 9 July 2003, the garrison held an Assumption of Command ceremony for Col. Jeffrey S. Cairns at Soldier Field on the Presidio, who replaced Dietrick as garrison commander on that date. To fill the gap between the departure of Dietrick and the arrival of Cairns, an Army officer from the newly created Installation Management Agency (IMA), Col. W.C. Garrison, briefly assumed command. To assist the garrison commander in managing daily affairs of the Presidio of Monterey, the Army had already established a civilian deputy garrison commander. The position was occupied Mr. Wes Hood in 2001 and 2002. James M. Willison, the director of Environmental Resources, assumed the position from 15 June to 22 September 2003 until Deputy Garrison Commander...
Pamela von Ness arrived in August 2003 to assume the position she still holds. The garrison commanders were responsible for physical and resource support for DLIFLC.


Mission, Goals, and Accomplishments

Throughout this period, DLIFLC’s mission remained to educate, evaluate, sustain and support DoD linguists and foreign language needs worldwide.

In 2001, 2,849 students enrolled in institute language courses. Of these 2,576 were in the basic program, which saw 1,900 graduations that year (74 percent). The higher courses saw 254 of 273 students graduate (93 percent). In 2002, despite significant efforts directed toward the war on terrorism, service requirements fell with only 2,249 basic program enrollments from which 1671 graduated (74 percent). There was an increase in higher-level enrollments, however, with 346 students of whom 313 graduated (90 percent). Finally, in 2003, average daily resident attendance was 3,026 with an overall graduation rate of 73 percent. See Appendix C for more details.

DLIFLC’s five-year plan, 2004-2009, departed from its 2003-2007 plan in that it expected to see an increase of $49 million with 171 new hires needed to support “348 MACOM-validated requirements,” that is new students, although these slots were not yet authorized. Significant changes from the previous five-year plan included the development of a new Institutional Training Resource Model (ITRM, discussed further below), OEF support, and a Structure Manning Decision Review.

DoD tasked the institute to support OEF support after 9/11, especially by providing a base of linguist talent and language material to respond to short-notice contingency operations for “less commonly taught” languages. This support was split between DLIFLC and DLI-W.
Ten staff worked in the area of low-density/enrollment languages, namely Dari, Pashto, and Uzbek. Other languages in the category included Turkmen, Kazak, Georgian, Urdu, Hindi, Sudanese, Indonesian, and Tagalog. DLI-W handled most training by contract.

By March 2002, OEF support included sending thousands of Language Survival Kits (LSKs) in Dari, Pashto, and Uzbek, providing over three hundred hours of unprogrammed training using mobile teams or televised courses, and providing proficiency-based guided testing for Dari and Pashto. DLI-W had added 77 seats in OEF-related languages.

Army G-3 provided strong support for contingency language training development and the institute expected to add Dari to its basic curriculum by April 2002 with Pashto and Uzbek added in June 2002. The institute saw one hundred new seats in Arabic added and expected related hiring actions in these and other less commonly taught languages. Management issues included space, centralized installation management, force protection with insufficient resources, manpower validation for OEF and permanent contingency language operations funding.

Various Command Issues

Resourcing the Institute

At the onset of this period, institute leaders expected to receive $45 million to increase intermediate and advanced training and for modest updates in curricula and testing. However, increased training requirements especially after 9/11, locality pay increases, and higher energy costs negatively affected real spending. The Presidio of Monterey also had some $75 million in unfunded mandates.

In early 2001, two unexpected budgetary problems hit DLIFLC. The first arose from the California Energy Crisis that began in May 2000 and ended in September 2001. Enron and other energy companies took advantage of California’s partially deregulated energy market to engage in illegal market manipulation that caused huge increases in energy prices and a series of rolling blackouts across the state. Consequently, Lt. Col. Kaye Moore, the deputy chief of staff for Resource Management (DCSRM), informed Colonel Rice in January 2001 that the institute would have to lay off some forty faculty to pay its utility bill. To void such drastic action, Rice transferred staff positions to the School for Continuing Education (SCE, later CE) using funds obtained through the help of Rep. Sam Farr. This staff then helped to develop online support for the Monterey Regional Education Initiative (MREI). The institute was then able to pay its energy bill. Later, the Army reimbursed DLIFLC for its energy costs, leaving the school with an unexpected surplus at the end of FY 2001 that it used to help upgrade classrooms.

The second unexpected budgetary problem resulted from the welcome decision by Congress in 2001 to include Monterey County in the San Francisco region for federal General Schedule salary purposes. That year, “Locality Rates of Pay” for the San Francisco region

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included a 16.98 percent adjustment to compensate for high living expenses. The equivalent adjustment for the generic “Rest of United States,” in which Monterey County was previously designated, was just 7.68 percent. Congress authorized the reclassification to help offset the high cost of living for federal employees in the Monterey area. The adjustment meant these employees would receive a pay increase equivalent to 12 or 13 percent of their base pay. The suddenness of this issue was a result of the fact that while Congress had mandated the reclassification in authorization legislation mid-year, it had not factored the increase into its appropriations and did not give the money to the Army. Thus, as soon as he took command, Rice faced a budget shortfall of $5-6 million. Every month he notified TRADOC that he would run out of funds to pay the mandatory pay increase (and the energy bill) long before the fiscal year’s end.\footnote{Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1017-1018).} Fortunately, the Army eventually supplemented these expenses.\footnote{Dr. Stephen Payne, conversation with Cameron Binkley, 1 December 2008.}

Another complicated issue arose in FY 2003 after the Army cut funding through the Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) process for fourteen DLIFLC class sections, which the institute dutifully cancelled. Military recruiters were unaware of this decision, however, and dutifully signed more enlistees for language training than provided for by SMDR. As a result, more recruits began to arrive at DLIFLC with signed enlistment contracts that guaranteed them language training than DLIFLC had programmed and funded seats to train them.\footnote{Clare Bugary, discussion with Stephen M. Payne, 26 May 2010.} The situation created a considerable backlog. As of 10 July 2003, DLIFLC service units reported 459 students in a “hold-under” status. These military trainees had reported for duty on time only to face an average wait time to start their language class of 112 days. Fortunately, DLIFLC secured $4 million in additional funding from TRADOC to address the hold-under problem. The institute added new language sections, especially in Arabic, to alleviate the backlog. By December 2003, the number of students awaiting training began to drop, and was expected to continue to drop with the addition of new sections in 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># Hold-under</th>
<th>Average days</th>
<th>Average weeks</th>
<th>Student Man-years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3 Student “hold-unders,” 2003

Perhaps the most important funding issue to face Rice, however, related to the failure of the “POM FY04-09” to program adequate resource levels to meet DLIFLC’s projected requirements. According to Rice, who began articulating the institute’s need for significant new resources in late 2001, such funding would only meet 61 percent (less than $79 million) of those needs for the five-year period beginning in 2004. The problem was twofold. First, DLIFLC faced considerable new and unplanned requirements stemming from 9/11 and its need to support Operation Enduring Freedom, but second, it had numerous existing unfunded or underfunded requirements to support non-resident sustainment and to develop curriculum and testing materials, an area that DoD had not properly supported for years. In particular, Rice made it a priority “to realign a significant amount of manpower and the supporting funding from structure

\footnote{Clare Bugary, discussion with Stephen M. Payne, 26 May 2010.}
load (General Skills Training) requirements to bolster our lagging curriculum and test development responsibilities (Training Development).”

To help accomplish this task, Rice sought to revamp how DLIFLC applied the Institutional Training Resource Model, an Army management system integrating training and resource management into one model. ITRM generated DLIFLC’s requirements by assigning funds to the activities ITRM described for DLIFLC. Thus, according to the model, if all the requirements for DLIFLC described by ITRM were funded at 100 percent, then Army readiness for language training would also equal 100 percent. The problem for DLIFLC was in supplying the correct inputs to the ITRM model to allow it to describe the institute’s true requirements. Unfortunately, much of DLIFLC’s sustainment and training development efforts were not captured by ITRM. With the help of Clare Bugary, DCSOPS chief of Scheduling, arrangements were made for contract consultants Larry Smith and Don Chung of CACI International, Inc., to visit Monterey and evaluate data produced on DLIFLC by ITRM and an associated model known as the Course Level Training Model (CLTM). The consultants evaluated three main areas: training development, training support, and training. According to Bugary, “it soon became very clear that DLIFLC has not done an adequate job of describing and documenting its true resource requirements.” Efforts were then made to restate DLIFLC’s ITRM process to capture the true costs in these areas.

In 2002, Rice asked “the Executive Agent to authorize all previous MACOM validated requirements and a minimum of 90% (critical resourcing level) of its new civilian manpower requirements for the POM 04-09 Management Decision Package.” Rice based his funding needs upon a 1999 TRADOC Manpower Assessment, the revised ITRM process, and the Army Strategic Campaign Plan requirements. Rice was able to push for higher funding because DLIFLC could now properly show how it faced both an increased training load for OEF and why the true costs of its training development were higher than originally projected. With emergency funding to address OEF and a clearer view of the true costs of language training, Rice set DLIFLC on the path to becoming better resourced as the Army and DoD grew more focused upon the importance of foreign language training to support U.S. efforts to combat terrorism and to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

Space

Although DLIFLC received funding support for its operations, the acquisition and management of classroom space proved to be a growing concern during Rice’s command.

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183 Col Kevin M. Rice, to Commanding General, US Army TRADOC, memorandum: “POM FY04-09 Commandant’s narrative,” 20 February 2002, in RG 42.03.10-01, folder 1 (ITRM), DLIFLC&POM Archives.
184 Clare A. Bugary, memorandum: “DLIFLC Staff Requirements for the Institutional Training Resource Model,” 4 October 2001, in RG 42.03.10-01, folder 1 (ITRM), DLIFLC&POM Archives.
185 In 1999, TRADOC conducted a Manpower Review to determine DLIFLC requirements. Thanks to Lt Col Richard Chastain, Director of Operations, Plans, and Programs, an expert on Army manpower and budgeting issues, TRADOC reported that DLIFLC requirements were unique, a positive outcome. The review also found that the Presidio of Monterey Garrison was unique within TRADOC because of its partnering arrangements, first with the Navy, and later with the city of Monterey. See Col Johnny Jones, Assistant Commandant, “Key Accomplishments and Ongoing Issues,” in “Colonel Johnny Jones” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
187 Rice did credit his predecessor, Col. Daniel Devlin, as well as Rep. Sam Farr for success in obtaining congressional add-ons (ear marks) for military construction at the Presidio of Monterey despite space shortages,
After 9/11, the institute’s student load increased to meet the language needs of OEF and this increased placed much pressure on existing classrooms. One of Rice’s priorities as commandant was to finish an important project of his predecessor—remodeling the old Silas B. Hayes Medical Center located on the former Fort Ord. The Defense Department had elected to locate the Defense Manpower Data Center in the newly remodeled facility, christened the “DoD Center, Monterey Bay,” and there was additional space in the eight-story facility that DLIFLC could use for its own needs. However, as the project dragged on, Rice and his garrison commanders (Col. Pete Dausen and Col. William M. Dietrick respectively) had to spend much leadership time pushing the military bureaucracy and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to complete the large renovation project.\(^\text{188}\)

There were several problems with the renovation, possibly because it had languished behind other Corps projects. However, with Rice and the garrison pushing, the Army awarded a bid and construction went forward. It took two years. One of the major renovations included a multi-million dollar seismic retrofit followed by renovation of the offices and classrooms. The completion of the Hayes remodeling, which took most of Rice’s tour to oversee, made it possible for the institute to plan to move large organizations off-site that did not have to be located on the Presidio itself where classroom instruction space was limited. By early 2002, Rice and Clifford had chosen to relocate SCE in the new DoD Center. Rice next agreed to expand the mission of SCE to include intermediate and advanced courses, which he also relocated to the new DoD Center.\(^\text{189}\)

Unfortunately, by early 2002, Lt. Col. Patrick C. O’Rourke, DCSOPS, reported that “we cannot create space fast enough to meet current or future structure load demands let alone our OEF requirements.” The expansion of the OEF Task Force, the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (ES), and Curriculum and Faculty Development (CFD) meant that despite the transfer of an expanded SCE to the DoD Center, DLIFLC schools were soon expected to exceed their capacity. Several unpleasant options were presented, including simply a “structure load reduction.”\(^\text{190}\)

The decision to reorganize SCE and move it across the bay caused some concern among the schools. Many feared the loss of the best teachers in a scenario similar to how SCE was originally created (see Command History, 1996-2000), or that faculty leave, disciplinary matters, or promotion opportunities might be affected. Vice Chancellor Payne argued, however, that these worries were not valid. SCE was to move only with the teachers it then had. The institute would neither permanently assign those teachers to intermediate and advanced courses nor shuffle off problem instructors to new deans instead of ensuring that any problems were addressed by existing supervisors. The shortage of space was a real concern, said Payne in April 2002, as he distributed a decision brief to key staff on the move to the DoD Center.\(^\text{191}\)

\(^{188}\) Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1014-1015).

\(^{189}\) Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1030-1031).

\(^{190}\) Col Jeffrey S. Johnson to Stephen Payne, email, 8 April 2002, in “CH 7 Garrison” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. DLI was planning a new General Instructional Facility IV, which would help alleviate space problems, but funding was not approved during this period.

\(^{191}\) Col Jeffrey S. Johnson to Stephen Payne, email, 8 April 2002, in “CH 7 Garrison” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
Classroom Technology

After Colonel Rice became commandant, he toured the various facilities and classrooms and found to his surprise that technologically, not much had changed since he had been a DLIFLC in 1978. One of his major goals soon became to upgrade instructional technology. He saw that it could both help students learn and make it easier for teachers to impart their knowledge. At the suggestion of Clifford and Payne, Rice asked Ben De La Selva, dan of the Latin American and European School, to evaluate some new technologies readily available on the civilian market (known informally as Computers in the Classroom) that could be used to facilitate foreign language teaching. De la Selva assembled a small team to conduct some tests, including trying out various examples in actual classroom situations using students. One of De La Selva’s recommendations was to make use of a popular MP3 recorder (the “iPod” by Apple, Inc.). The institute adopted the idea and Rice directed the phase out of the cassette recorders students had been using since the 1970s.192

Rice also decided to update the school’s language labs, which had once been at the forefront of language education technology but which Rice now saw as “ancient.” He wanted the labs to be able to allow students to work at their own pace, which was possible with newer technologies.193 In early 2002, Clifford and Dr. Neil Granoien, then director of Combat Development (later Language Science and Technology), agreed that the technology had become outdated and decided to move forward on improving on the language lab concept after sixty years of use. Instead, compact disc and MP3 technology would be deployed to allow virtually any classroom to become a “language lab.” The language labs had become obsolete wasters of valuable classroom space.194

This was the origins of the “Technology Enhanced Classroom” or TEC program. Funding was the initial obstacle, so from the start the program so planners designed the program to evolve in phases. Starting with TEC 1, which was really De La Selva’s prototype “computer cart” idea in FY 2001. TEC 2 involved placing computers hooked up to whiteboards in Middle East Schools I and II and in European II classrooms in FY 2002. In TEC 3, DLIFLC issued laptop computers to every student, established wireless classrooms, and planned to leverage its role in OEF to facilitate the necessary funding. The program had to minimize expenses in furniture, installation, and technology, and take up as little space as possible in classrooms. It had to be expandable or upgradeable and it had to be as user-friendly as possible considering that many faculty were not especially adept with computers.195

Clifford appointed Granoien, who in 2001 was assistant provost, to head up DLIFLC efforts to reinvigorate its information technology. Granoien set about to investigate various new technologies and visited a number of universities. The idea that probably made the biggest splash was the interactive whiteboard. Whiteboards were wall-mounted screens that could be used as a chalkboard, a digital notepad, or an Internet portal. Professors using such devices could write on the screen and students could download exactly what the teacher had written or they could view, dissect, and copy news items directly from the Internet. Staff evaluated two or three options. Rice himself felt that young students were especially enabled by such technology

192 Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1015-1017).
to learn and retain language better, and the younger faculty were enthusiastic, especially many who had come from Asia and with recent degrees. Older faculty, especially in the Russian and Persian-Farsi departments, were uncomfortable with the new technology and Rice realized the issue was not whether the technology would benefit the students, but how to train the staff in its use, so that over the long term the technology would be used and not left to languish. Eventually, with the support of Clifford, Payne, and others, Rice authorized the purchase of some three hundred whiteboards. These devices became the centerpiece of the TEC 2 and 3 initiatives.

The funding to purchase the units, estimated to cost about $25,000 per classroom, followed a circuitous route. As noted above, during the California Energy Crisis of 2000-2001, the institute’s energy bill shot up to a point where some forty faculty faced lay-offs so that Lt. Col. Marilee Wilson, the resource manager, could pay its energy bill. To avoid such drastic action, Payne suggested moving several faculty into a technology development project funded through the MREI Initiative, which wound up saving the funds needed to pay the institute’s excess energy bill. At the end of the fiscal year, somewhat unexpectedly, the Army then provided additional funding to reimburse the energy bill, which left DLIFLC with a surplus in FY 2001 funds to the tune of a million and a half dollars. The funds came in just after 9/11 and staff knew that additional emergency funding was coming for OEF-related languages. Rice, at Granoien’s recommendation, spent the excess end-of-year funds to purchase equipment for the non-OEF languages, mainly whiteboards, and later added similar technology from OEF funds for the OEF-related languages.

![Figure 4 Final phase of the Technology Enhanced Classroom initiative, ca. 2003](image)

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196 Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1015-1017). After Rice left retired, students also received “tablet PCs,” which allowed them to copy from the whiteboards, write like in a notepad, and share their work. This idea was first broached while Rice was commandant.

197 Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1015-1017); Stephen Payne, discussion with Cameron Binkley, 21 October 2008.
Initially, the use of the whiteboards was slow, and school deans had to encourage their faculty to work with the new technology, but students were enthusiastic from the beginning, and the commitment was made. Rice accepted that any major change would take time to implement in a large organization, and has since been gratified to know that the technology today is both widely used and widely popular.

**SMART and Attrition**

In February of 2000, Col. Daniel D. Devlin, DLIFLC Commandant, and Col. Johnny Jones, DLIFLC Assistant Commandant, introduced a concept to have all students enroll in a pre-basic language course program called “SMART.” The Air Force Element developed SMART to help Air Force students at the institute build basic knowledge of the grammatical structure and rules of language. Figures prepared by Sr. M. Sgt. Rodney L. Irons showed that academic attrition for Air Force students had dropped almost 20 percent from when the program started in 1996 to about 8 percent in 2001, although there was no clear causal connection between the SMART program and those figures.

Irons, the SMART program manager, staffed a proposal to make SMART a basic course prerequisite for all initial entry students (IET). The Army, as the institute’s Executive Agent, and General John N. Abrams, TRADOC Commanding General, approved the SMART course for inclusion into the Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) process for funding. In October 2000, DLIFLC incorporated all joint service requirements for SMART into the SMDR process for FYs 2003 and 2004. Once SMART was scheduled as a separate course, however, limitations within the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), a system used by the Army to record and manage students, created an administrative nightmare for program managers. The cumbersome ATRRS required typists to enter manually the data for all IET students to create a reservation in the SMART program to avoid conflict with the normal ATRRS process. This had the effect of locking students into a given language program such that if they participated in SMART before hand, time was cut off at the end of their language training, which then prevented the students from being able to complete their studies and final graduation requirements, including passing the DLPT. In other words, system inflexibility prevented the successful execution of the SMART program by forcing students out of their courses a week too early.

Service program managers thought SMART was valuable, but administrating it through ATRRS was unmanageable: the system was too slow to react to program changes. The workload for quota managers, program managers, and scheduling staff increased as a result of the SMART program. In FY03 the Army, Air Force, and Navy experienced lower fill rates than expected due to the difficulty in juggling students between SMART seats and basic seats. The DLIFLC scheduling program manager, Clare Bugary, suggested the problem be resolved by including SMART within the basic program. After much discussion, the service program managers agreed to this option, but the SMART program had to be paired down to one week by eliminating the

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198 Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1015-1017).
199 They essentially vetted the concept to the Defense Foreign Language community during DLIFLC’s Annual Program Review (APR).
language specific area studies portion. The services were then better able to manage their enrollments into SMART at the expense of reduced substantive content.\footnote{Jones, “Key Accomplishments and Ongoing Issues”; Clare Bugary, discussion with Stephen M. Payne, 26 May 2010.}

Related to efforts to reduce attrition was continued work by Dr. Sam L. Sparks. Sparks, whose son, Maj. Thomas Sparks, commanded the Marine Corps detachment in Monterey, had begun a project in 1998 for the U.S. Marine Corps (See \textit{Command History, 1996-2000}) in which he studied methods to reduce attrition among marine students. Sparks’s company, Sparrow Hawk Communications, also participated in an extensive multi-year study intended to gauge the potential usefulness of the Learning Assessment Map Profile (LAMP or the “Sparks Profile”), to reduce attrition rates in other services. In late 2001, before the Sparks Profile was completed, Rice asked Sparks to submit a proposal for a further project intended to help the institute reduce attrition specifically in the Arabic and Korean programs. This “Sparrow Hawk Profile,” as Sparks called it, attempted to match faculty teaching styles with student learning styles as a means to attenuate attrition. Unfortunately, to complete a proposal, Sparks required detailed data on institute faculty and students, which new Assistant Commandant Jeffrey Johnson determined could not be supplied. Contracting rules forbade disclosure of information that might set a precedent in supplying data to other contractors in preparing research proposals. As a result, Sparks apparently did not submit the proposal.\footnote{Col Jeffrey Johnson to Sam L. Sparks, email, 20 December 2001, in “Sparks Report” folder (Ch4 Academic Support), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

\textit{Monterey Regional Educational Initiative}

In 2001, the Defense Language Institute began to participate in what was called a “Regional Collaborative Project Team” whose members consisted of five local academic institutions: California State University, Monterey Bay (CSUMB), DLIFLC, the Fleet Numerical Meteorology Operations Center (FNMOC), the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), sometimes called the “Gang of Five.” This collaborative was authorized by Section 8165 of the FY 2001 DoD Appropriations Act entitled “Monterey Regional Educational Initiative” or MREI, which was sponsored by Representative Farr. The purpose of the act was to allow these institutions with various resources in technology and expertise and interests in foreign language to cooperate to help overcome shortfalls in the capacity of U.S. linguists in strategic languages, such as Arabic, Chinese, and those of South and Central Asia. Shortages in these languages had forced the nation to rely upon language services provided by foreign nationals, which many thought a risky security situation. One function of the legislation was that it allowed non-competitive acquisition of foreign language broadcasting through the SCOLA network.

Through collaborative efforts, MREI hoped to share resources and reduce duplication. The group especially focused upon sharing resources, such as Language Line, and various online projects, such as DLIFLC’s Continuing Language Education Program, and promoting the development of web-based education in the region. Along with Proficiency results, the status of MREI was one of the first two items requested by Colonel Rice for weekly updates after he became commandant.\footnote{Various emails in “MREI & Gang of 5” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.} The consortium planned to hold its first conference in the fall of 2001 on the topic of “Assessing the Quality of Online Instruction” at the Naval Postgraduate School,
which, according to Neil Granoien, was the primary driver of the group. (The Navy had tasked NPS to provide more education to the fleet without adding additional staff.) To foster and help market the LangNet/LingNet effort, Granoien suggested that the institute promote the establishment of an external advisory group for MREI. Nordin and others offered several candidates to sit on such a board.205

As it evolved, Rice and a representative from each of the other educational organizations met every two months to develop projects. Besides some conferences held at MIIS and CSUMB, the most useful project to develop from MREI was the Global Language On-line Support System (GLOSS), a function of SCE.206 Curiously, GLOSS arose out of the California Energy Crisis that began in May 2000 and ended in September 2001. Enron and other energy companies took advantage of California’s partially deregulated energy market to engage in illegal market manipulation that caused huge increases in energy prices and a series of rolling blackouts.207 Consequently, DLIFLC experienced an unexpectedly large energy bill. In 2001, according to DCSRM, the institute would have to lay off some forty faculty to pay its bill. To avoid such drastic action, Rice with the help of Farr and MREI transferred the positions to SCE to help develop online support for MREI. Having avoided a layoff, these personnel then developed and later expanded GLOSS, which came to include LingNet and LangNet, as the most tangible product of the MREI arrangement.208

Leaders like Rice and Farr used MREI to better integrate the military and civilian educational institutions in the Monterey area. They hoped to generate synergies between these institutions to help inoculate all of them from future threats to eliminate one of them as that might have a negative impact on the others. In the years after the closure of Fort Ord, Monterey leaders sought to reduce the likelihood of other big cutbacks or the loss of another major regional institution.209

Post-DLPT Training Concerns

In October 2001, the training of a female Navy student became the subject of a minor dispute between staff of the Naval Technical Training Center Detachment and staff of the Russian program, but the problem implied a broader issue. The sailor had failed to pass the DLPT at the end of her training and the NTTCD wanted to recycle her into another pre-existing class for two of her classmates and was willing to foot the bill. The school was opposed to the training because the student had not succeeded after sixteen months of training, roughly the equivalent of four extra months in her Russian program. The issue was bumped to Lt. Col. Stephen Butler, Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs, who consulted DLIFLC Regulation 350-1. According to the regulation “both the school and the service unit must agree that the probability of success for the student is high with additional instruction. If either party disagrees, the student will not be placed into a post-DLPT education program.” Butler argued that he had no provision to mediate the dispute and thus “if the school says no, the answer is no.” Lt. Cdr. F. T. Rochefort, Officer in Charge of the NTTCD, argued that the sailor was “clearly worthy of the additional training.” Later, he indicated that the Navy would train the student one way or the

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208 Stephen Payne, discussion with Cameron Binkley, 21 October 2008.
other, but it would be more beneficial if DLIFLC helped as “it just seems a complete waste to not include her in the already initiated PDLPT/EOT course.” Rochefort pointed out especially that some thirty Post-DLPT/EOT program graduates had successfully joined the fleet in the previous two years, but that “we continue to have to fight different school administrations to participate in this overwhelmingly successful program, nearly every time the issue is raised.” He argued that DLIFLC should adopt the Navy program. Butler disagreed noting that had the student been in any other service, she would have been waived and the problem was that the NTTCD commander needed that authority instead of fighting to recycle every student that failed to pass the DLPT. Butler defended the school’s sense of the capability of the student to meet her potential after forty-seven weeks of training and follow-on training and “that the implication that we are not doing everything in our power to support the mission is nonsense.” Rochefort explained that he did have waiver authority but did not want to use it because the student could be “recycled” into an existing course that only had two students and as such would not place an additional training load on the school. Butler, however, refused to countermand the school’s decision, leaving Rochefort to pursue the issue with his own chain of command. Hearing of the dispute, Glenn Nordin suggested that a small working group be established to clarify and write up the relationship of the services to DLIFLC regarding DLAB testing, admission requirements, completion requirements, etc., in DoD instructions.\(^\text{210}\)

Minor issues aside, Rice recalled that he faced no major problems in working with the service units at DLIFLC who were not under his command (the Air Force, Navy, and Marines) and sought to resolve problems by maintaining a good rapport with the unit commanders.\(^\text{211}\)

**Academic Accreditation and Associate of Arts Degree**

The Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges (ACCJC) of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges granted the Defense Language Institute the authority to offer academic credit for its foreign language courses in 1979. Academic accreditation was a boom to the institute and its students in several important ways. In the beginning, academic accreditation allowed students to double the amount of academic credit they could obtain for successful completion of DLIFLC courses and it allowed the institute to compete better with other institutions in attracting and retaining skilled professional faculty. Eventually, through a cooperative arrangement with Monterey Peninsula College (MPC), institute students could obtain an Associate of Arts (AA) degree by combining DLIFLC coursework credit with MPC general education requirements, but only if their commanders thought they were doing well enough in their language programs to allow the students to take MPC weekend courses. At the same time, by achieving accredited status the institute became compliant with a requirement of the secretary of Defense and DoD’s chancellor for education and professional development who saw academic accreditation as a means of assuring program quality through outside review.

To maintain academic accreditation, however, DLIFLC had to demonstrate to the regional accrediting authorities that it was making progress in developing an actual degree-granting program. ACCJC and other regional accrediting commissions only allowed degree-granting programs to become accredited. ACCJC granted an exception to DLIFLC due to the peculiarity that it was a military institution providing strong academic programs. Moreover, for

\(^{210}\) Various emails in “End of Training SN Michele Murdy” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Nordin also suggested, however, that it was not a hire priority.

\(^{211}\) Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1034-1035). One thing he did was to help them maintain their barracks, which was an Army responsibility.
a military school to grant academic degrees, Congress had to authorize its approval. DLIFLC had shown progress toward establishing an accreditable degree-granting program by developing an “articulation” agreement with MPC in 1994. However, the MPS program was of limited utility to only the most exceptional students who were enrolled in the longest language programs and who thus had time to fulfill MPC’s course requirements in residence while they were stationed in Monterey. The authority to grant degrees, on the other hand, would allow all DLIFLC students to earn a degree because graduates could combine coursework taken at the Presidio with general educations coursework taken at any accredited college before arriving or after they had left Monterey. Thus, students could complete a degree program after they had graduated and moved on to other assignments. The AA degree option was a major incentive to attract high caliber students to enlist as military linguists. The main justification for DLIFLC to grant its own degrees, however, was that it was ultimately an ACCJC requirement to maintain accreditation.  

In 2001, Glenn Nordin and Brad Loo in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Drs. Ray Clifford and Stephen Payne in Monterey worked to get Congress to consider a legislative proposal through the House Armed Services Committee. Legislative staffer John Chapla assisted. The proposal provided legislative authority to allow DLIFLC to confer an Associate of Arts degree in Foreign Languages to all students of its programs who fulfilled all requirements. The proposal was submitted as a part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2002 and was approved without controversy.  

DLIFLC immediately began to award degrees. Between 1 May 2002 and 9 April 2003, it awarded 285 AA degrees. In FY 2002, 85 percent of basic course graduates met or exceeded

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212 Ray Clifford to Brad Loo, email, 12 July 2001, and similar emails in “AA Degree” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

213 Clifford to Loo, email, 12 July 2001.
DoD proficiency standards of L2/R2/S1+ while 31 percent of these graduates met proficiency standards of L2+/R2+/S2. By comparison, only 9 percent of graduates from four-year degree programs met equivalent standards during the same period.214

**Graduation Requirements**

While DLIFLC officials worked to acquire degree-granting authority, they also considered two issues relating to graduation requirements. First, the assistant commandant, Col. Johnny Jones, attempted to make progress on correcting the problem with many students who actually graduated without passing their courses, a feat that normally did not occur within a university. At DLIFLC, proficiency goals set a de facto standard, not a student’s GPA per se, which meant that while some students could move on to their MOS training or field assignments by passing the DLPT with the minimum scores, they might not receive a diploma or credit units applicable to a degree program. Jones identified the problem after the Air Force requested several Serbian/Croatian linguists before they had completed their coursework with the promise that these students would be allowed to complete the courses upon arrival at their duty stations. However, after a few weeks it became apparent that each faculty teaching team was teaching its courses differently and it was not possible to discern what elements of the curriculum had been taught. The institute’s first graduation requirements went into effect in January 2001, but they needed more work, including the need to break down the curriculum into courses that could be judged by credit hours, as in a university.215

The second issue relating to graduation requirements centered upon what to do about those students who met all other requirements to graduate, but failed to pass the DLPT. In this case, despite having successfully completed all coursework, students could also not receive a diploma and could not qualify for an AA degree. In FY 2001, there were 317 students in the basic program who failed to meet the graduation standard of L2/R2/S/1+, although fully one-third of these students had a GPA of 3.0 or better. It was likely that many of these 317 students could later raise their DLPT scores, but even so they would remain ineligible for a DLIFLC diploma or AA degree.

In March 2002, Roelof Wijbrandus in the Directorate of Academic Affairs proposed that the institute permit all basic program students who did not meet the DLPT graduation standard—but who did so at a later date—to become eligible for the both the AA degree and a DLIFLC diploma upon submission of improved DLPT scores. This proposal was intended to help motivate students in the field to improve their language skills and not let them deteriorate and to improve the morale of those students who had otherwise completed the general education requirements for an AA degree by graduation time but who had not passed the DLPT. In response, Lt. Col. Stephen Butler, Dean of Students, advised that the DLPT was much like a final comprehensive university exam, and as such, needed to be passed in residence where a higher level of test control was possible than in the field. DLIFLC had never before awarded graduation diplomas to former students who failed to pass the DLPT in residence but later passed the test in the field and the AA degree requirement was for students receiving that degree to have passed all DLIFLC graduation requirements during residency. Altering this requirement would represent a major shift in policy. Butler thus recommended that institute leaders address the issue with ACCJC before making any decision. Col. Jeffrey Johnson, Assistant Commandant,

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agreed to take the subject to the ACCJC. However, he also thought that because the DLPT was the institute’s own test, no matter when or where administered, a student ought to be able to retake it through LingNet or some other approved means. This process would be similar to a university allowing a student to retake a comprehensive exam after additional study. The main issue was to protect DLIFLC’s accreditation standing, so the input of the ACCJC was key to revolving the issue.\(^{216}\)

With congressional approval pending in late 2001 for DLIFLC to grant AA degrees, institute staff began efforts to develop an articulation agreement with CSUMB, similar to the arrangement previously developed with MPC. In this arrangement, DLIFLC coursework would feed into a baccalaureate program instead of an AA program. A range of issues first had to be resolved, however. High on the list was simply identifying which DLIFLC credits were transferable and to which CSUMB program? It was important that clear procedures and policies be in place to adjudicate typical military problems, especially the frequency of service members relocating prior to meeting their residency requirement and thus never being able to complete an academic program. Lt. Col. Patrick Smith explored three possible programs that CSUMB offered and that seemed compatible with DLIFLC credit, these being the university’s Integrated Studies Special Major, the Global Studies Major, and the Liberal Studies Major. However, he could not discern how many credits could be applied to which program to satisfy the requirements. Basically, if a lieutenant colonel could not figure out how to transfer credit, it was unlikely that DLIFLC students were going to make that happen either. Further talks between DLIFLC and CSUMB officials were necessary. As it stood late in 2002, Smith thought it easier for an institute student to get a degree from a college in New York than one that was just ten minutes away.\(^{217}\)

**Leadership Development**

Another project that DLIFLC leaders formulated during this period was a leadership development program. The purpose of the program was to promote organizational growth by facilitating the development of core competencies in foreign language teaching, curriculum development, teacher development, leadership, and program administration. The program involved a variety of training options, including workshops, courses, projects, and seminars for those staff, whether academic chairs, deans, specialists, team leaders or others in specific leadership positions. Several senior staff attended special forty-hour leadership development workshops during FY 2002 and FY 2003 with the expectation that they could then lead their own.\(^{218}\) The Center for Creative Leadership, a private organization in Colorado Springs, conducted the workshops in Colorado. Colonel Rice started and funded the expensive effort and sent most of his deans through the program as part of his command philosophy to motivate and recognize institute professors, whom he firmly believed to be the backbone of DLIFLC.\(^{219}\)


\(^{217}\) Patrick L. Smith to Judith Swartz, email, 4 September 2002, and Darlene Jones to Patrick L. Smith, email, 4 September 2002; both in “AA Degree” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

\(^{218}\) Various emails and attachment labeled “Leadership Development Program at DLIFLC” in “Leadership Development Project” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

\(^{219}\) Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1040).
**SARS Epidemic**

From November 2002 until July 2003, a regional pandemic erupted in China with the emergence of a highly contagious virus known as SARS for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. The epidemic had a high mortality rate if contracted by elderly individuals and would claim nearly 800 lives in South China. The problem grew in intensity because the Chinese government at first attempted to suppress information on the epidemic. The U.S. government became concerned with the problem after a U.S. businessman returned from China and was diagnosed with the disease in February 2003. Subsequently, medical staff that treated him also became infected and, in March 2003, the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention issued a health alert. The SARS outbreak because an issue at DLIFLC because teaching staff in Asian languages, primarily Chinese, wanted to return to their homelands over the spring holiday break to visit their families. Such travel, however, presented the real possibility that the instructors might pick up the disease, return to teach in Monterey, and rapidly spread the virus within the closed confines of the Presidio. Rice provided staff medical briefings and personally encouraged the Chinese instructors not to travel home at that time. Rice had no authority to prevent them from traveling to China, as they were civilians, but he did warn them that if they went they might have to be quarantined for several weeks upon return, meaning they would not be allowed to return to teaching until after the quarantine period was over. Most of the instructors took the advice.220

**DLIFLC Enforcement of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”**

In November and early December 2002, several national media organizations reported or ran editorials on the discharge of several service members from DLIFLC under DoD’s ten-year-old “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.221 This policy, expressed under 10 USC 654, required a member of the armed forces to be separated upon findings that the member had engaged in homosexual conduct (although the propensity for such conduct was not grounds for separation). On 11 December 2002, Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness and who supported enforcement of the policy, requested the Inspector General of the Department of Defense to conduct an investigation into why DoD had allowed homosexual students to attend the Defense Language Institute in the first place. According to Donnelly, “DLI tolerated a situation that was an unconscionable waste of time and resources,” because training slots held by gay service members could have been given to qualified, non-gay students. The commanding general of TRADOC, Kevin P. Burns, asked DLIFLC to respond to him regarding the specific allegations made by Donnelly that the Defense Language Institute had a “gay-friendly” atmosphere.”222 Colonel Rice collected staff input and refuted Donnelly’s allegations, which were no truer, he told Burns, than previous complaints about the institute conducting “witch hunts for gays.” Instead, Rice explained that DLIFLC enforced DoD and Army regulations on

homosexual conduct. In 2002, the 229th MI Battalion had discharged nine soldiers under Article 15 (Homosexual Conduct), specifically because two were found naked together during a routine inspection while the rest came forward to their commanders to state that they were gay. Meanwhile, a comparable number of students were discharged under Article 15 for other causes, including unsatisfactory performance, being overweight or pregnant, or for misconduct. In other words, these discharges were both unavoidable and typical under the law and regulations military commanders were required to apply. According to Rice, the TRADOC IG had also reviewed the institute’s training, support, IET policies and discipline in 2002 and found no faults. Media focus on the issue soon faded. In early 2004, with U.S. forces fighting both in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Associate Press reported that the number of gays dismissed from the military under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy had declined to the lowest since 1995.

Response to Terrorism after 9/11

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Defense Language Institute set forth to grapple with the military’s need for communications expertise in the obscure languages of key regions that had suddenly become battlegrounds in the newly launched “Global War on Terrorism.”

Determining which languages to focus upon was not difficult, although the Office of the Secretary of Defense originally listed 140 languages of concern to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). However, only a few of these languages were being taught at the institute, namely Arabic and Persian-Farsi, either in Monterey or through DLI-W, the institute’s Washington-based office. DoD had no capability in some one other hundred languages.

The first two tasks faced by Colonel Rice, however, were to secure his post and to reassure staff shaken by the horrific events on the East Coast. Rice had a significant problem in increasing security at the Presidio of Monterey because he lacked an organic military police detachment, as discussed below. Rice knew no more about what was happening on the morning of 11 September 2001 than did anyone else. However, once the outlines of the terrorist attack were clear he, along with Chancellor Clifford and DLIFLC union representative Alfie Khalil, set about meeting with all institute staff and students to assure them that they were safe and could continue their work without repercussions. There were some concerns raised, including the need for faculty to maintain military tags on their vehicles, which some instructors of Arabic descent feared might mark them for reprisals. Rice had personally experienced the storm of angry protests against the United States in Beijing while serving there as U.S. military attaché following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during NATO-led air campaign against Serbia in 1999. He sought to address staff concerns in a calm and objective manner, knowing the situation at DLIFLC was no where near as serious as what he had experienced in Beijing two years before. Eventually, fears abated and routine operations at the institute resumed, although with many new taskings in response to the crisis.

Force Protection

Force protection was on the minds of those in the military prior to 11 September 2001 because the increased terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies, warships, and other overseas assets had already heightened concerns. For example, the Presidio of Monterey conducted a force protection/anti-terrorism mission rehearsal exercise from 21 to 24 March 2001 to validate its existing force protection, anti-terrorism, and mass casualty plans. More to the point, in 2001, General Eric Shinseki, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, increasingly concerned over the possibility of a terrorist attack against the United States, ordered that all U.S. Army installations worldwide implement plans to go to a “closed-based” status. Thus, for security reasons, all vehicles seeking access to U.S. Army bases worldwide now had to be registered on post, or inspected at entry, and all persons entering the facility would have to show photo identification. Colonel Rice had the unpleasant task of informing local community leaders in Monterey that on 1 August 2001 the Presidio of Monterey would implement this policy, which would prevent civilians unaffiliated with the military from routinely transiting the installation, which they had used for decades as a major thoroughfare connecting the cities of Monterey, New Monterey, and Pacific Grove. Gate closure would also prevent passage of municipal buses, requiring these to be rerouted on short notice. The decision did not make Rice popular with Monterey City Mayor Dan Albert, other local leaders, or the public at large who vigorously protested the military policy (and Rice personally) by airing numerous complaints in the local media.

At 0800 on 11 September 2001, in response to coordinated attacks within the United States on both civilian and military targets, Rice, as installation commander, ordered the implementation of the Presidio’s existing force protection plan, the plan rehearsed back in March. That plan restricted entry onto the installation to DoD registered vehicles and personnel with valid government identification, with some exceptions for visitors with official business. Searches began on all vehicles at the Private Bolio and Franklin Street Gates. Rice also closed all pedestrian gates, although he later had the High Street Pedestrian Gate reopened during commuter hours.

Between 14 and 17 September 2001, TRADOC deployed teams to observe how units of its command were effectively meeting readiness goals under heightened force protection conditions. The surprise terrorist attack had caught the United States completely off guard and TRADOC emphasized to all its elements the need to think asymmetrically. An After-Action-Review noted the need to focus beyond mere points of access, that barriers directly in front of buildings did not pass the “Khobar Towers” test, that commanders needed to use operational measures in thinking about security. In other words, expand the perimeter into the surrounding community (for surveillance), and stop relying upon FORSCOM tenet units for security as these might soon not be available, if deployed for combat. The problem at the Presidio of Monterey, however, was worse than that.

Beginning on 1 August, Rice had had no choice but to deploy students for force protection, because the Presidio of Monterey was the only TRADOC installation without an

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228 Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1020-1021).
organic military police or combat unit presence. All Rice had were a few Military Language Instructors to serve as sergeants of the guard and his students. He tried not to pull students directly from class, but used those in casual status where possible. After 11 September 2001, the situation became more serious, and between that date and 11 October 2001, DLIFLC lost 1,912 student-hours of language training due to events related to 9/11. The only good news, Rice recalled, came from the editor of the Monterey Herald, who told him that although the paper still had many angry letters to print about the gate closure policy, many local citizens had called the paper with request that those letters not be printed or be retracted. Suddenly, everyone recognized the seriousness of security.

Inevitably, student enrollments had to be postponed in lieu of gate guard duty. The students came mostly from the Army, with some help from the Marines. This unfortunate situation eventually prompted an angry phone call to Rice from a TRADOC general upset that there were not enough Army students, especially Arabic, in some of DLIFLC classes. According to Rice, he patiently explained the situation—that DLIFLC had no military police or troop units, only students (unlike larger posts). Rice said he could staff the guards with non-Arabic students, but then asked the general which other language was less critical, Pashto, Chinese, Korean, etc., so that those students could be used instead. Finally, the general acknowledged: “you’ve made your point, Colonel Rice, I’ll get you the money for private guards.”

On 10 October 2001, true to his word, “TBG” [TRADOC brigadier general] provided $1.2 million to fund 56 percent of the cost for forty-three guard and five police officer positions. Recruiting began immediately, but the first referrals were not available until late November 2001. The question then became how soon could DLIFLC replace its student guards with an adequate number of civilian guards. To fill that gap, the Army activated the 72nd Military Police Company, a unit of the Nevada National Guard. The unit assumed the duty of force protection at the Presidio of Monterey on 12 October, thereby relieving DLIFLC of the responsibility. By 25 August 2002, garrison staff expected the 72nd MP Company to depart, having successfully filled the gap in force protection resources. Unfortunately, the low pay of $29,000 per year set for the civilian guards made it difficult to hire a sufficient number, given the high cost of living in Monterey.

Another problem arising from the new security situation became apparent by April 2002, when residents in the neighborhood near the Taylor Street exit to the Presidio of Monterey announced their agitation with DLIFLC’s policy choosing to use the street as a main entrance to the base. These residents complained through the press and their elected representatives that the Army had brought numerous problems to the neighborhood, including traffic jams, noise, pollution, and even minor criminal activity. Rice, as installation commander, explained that the Taylor Street exit had to be used because “many Presidio employees who live in Pacific Grove,
Carmel, or Pebble Beach would be required to go out the east side High Street or Franklin Street gates and then drive around through Monterey to get back home if that gate (Taylor gate) were closed.” This reasoning upset the residents near the Taylor gate especially because just before 9/11, the Army closed off the long existing right of passage through the base from Monterey to New Monterey to civilians, which meant that civilian residents in the Taylor Street area, unable themselves to transit the base, had the same problem in reverse. The neighbors claimed that “Taylor Street is not appropriate nor legal access for the operation of your installation” and threatened to file a “class action law suit against the Army for violation of their rights and endangerment of their lives.” 238 Finally, on 20 March 2003, Rice announced that access restrictions for both motorists and pedestrians entering or leaving the Presidio using the Taylor Street Gate, which had become the source of much friction with adjacent property owners. Henceforth, the gates would be closed from 2000 to 0500 except to allow passage of emergency vehicles. 239

Another post-9/11 security issue concerned automobile searches. After 9/11, all vehicles entering the Presidio of Monterey of Monterey were subject to random search. Several faculty objected strongly to this policy and made it an issue for the faculty union, whose representative, Alfie Khalil, brought complaints about the policy Rice on several occasions. The issue went back and forth between the two for some time. The requirement for automobiles to have military stickers was also a concern, because these could be use to identify employees who feared they might be subject to reprisal. In an unplanned and somewhat humorous incident, Rice and Khalil were returning from a lunch meeting one day with Rice driving. When they approached the gate, the gate guards, National Guard MPs, asked Rice to pull aside for a random inspection of his vehicle. After the search, Rice also vouched for Khalil, who had forgotten his identification. Khalil, somewhat chagrinned, then acknowledged to Rice that if even the commandant was subject to random vehicle searches, then the faculty would just have to accept it. Thereafter the issue died away. 240

Planning the Approach

DLIFLC management certainly understood that myriad new language-based contingency requirements would result from 9/11 and the institute could no longer conduct “business as usual.” In time, the institute’s overall response to 9/11 focused upon four general areas where accomplishments could be prepared on a scale of immediate, short-term, and long-range requirements and goals:

(1) Determining how DLIFLC could best support the “war fighter” by basing language training on specific service language requirements;

(2) Organizing and offering contract training for less commonly taught languages through DLI-W;

(3) Establishing a task force in January 2002 at the Presidio of Monterey to meet the long-range needs of OEF in resident language training;

238 “Dear Neighbors: This is My Response to Colonel Dietrick’s Letter,” essay in the form of a letter to Colonel, U.S. Army, Commanding, 30 April 2002, by a property owner adjacent to the Taylor Street Gate, in “Correspondence” folder, box 41.A, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
240 Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1028-1029). Rice swore he did not pre-arrange the random search.
(4) Developing testing support for OEF languages.\(^{241}\)

DLIFLC conducted external coordination for OEF language support with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Computers and Intelligence (OSD/C3I), the Training Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), and the individual service foreign language program managers. Intelligence officials reportedly drew a circle on a world map around the areas where U.S. military forces would need to be deployed to search for al-Qaeda elements and the Taliban, and initially found there were thirteen languages spoken in these areas for which the military had no language training programs, nor were suitable training programs commercially available.\(^{242}\)

Under the leadership of Rice, Assistant Commandant Col. Jeffrey Johnson, Chancellor Dr. Ray Clifford, and Provost Dr. Stephen Payne, DLIFLC conducted major academic, administrative, and logistical coordination to support the OEF effort. In terms of OEF support, the institute’s mission was to “provide the DoD with language education and support for Operation Enduring Freedom,” and its purpose was to “provide the DoD a base of linguist talent and language material to respond to short-notice contingency operations especially for ‘less commonly taught’ languages.”\(^{243}\)

Rice divided the work requirement for OEF between DLIFLC and DLI-W. On 19 November 2001, he authorized Johnson to move forward with plans to hire ten Dari, Pashto, and Uzbek “SMEs” for course development, test development/refinement, and teaching basic courses slated to begin in April 2002, although by this date the Army had not supplied the institute with its language training requirements generated by OEF. Staff also expected to support a range of contingency languages and roughly estimated the cost of meeting those requirements to be $7.5 million per year, factoring routine course costs of $250,000 per language for thirty OEF languages with two “SMEs.” These additional languages included Urdu, Tadjik, Punjabi, Sindhi, Turkmen, Kazakh, and Baluchi. Johnson envisioned the load of meeting OEF requirements as being divided between DLIFLC and DLI-W, with the institute focused upon developing basic courses and course curriculum for some ten OEF languages while DLI-W handled current needs, apparently including developing some needed LSKs.\(^{244}\)

**Initial Response: Conversion Courses & DLI-W**

An almost immediate problem that DLIFLC managers had to face in the wake of 9/11 was how to field linguists for OEF, but shave time off the months of training normally required. One of the first ideas was to conduct conversion training—take linguists already proficient in one language and shift them into a new desired target language. The problem with this strategy, however, was finding students and/or existing linguists in languages that were sufficiently related to be adaptable for this purpose. For example, speakers of Arabic, a Category IV language, would experience little advantage by converting to Persian-Farsi, a Category III


\(^{242}\) Capt Angi Carsten, Associate Dean, Emerging Languages Task Force, to Command Historian, email: “Command History: Emerging Languages Task Force,” 17 December 2004. The Operation Enduring Freedom Task Force was renamed the “Global War on Terrorism Task Force” in October 2003 and was later renamed the Emerging Languages Task Force.


language unrelated to Arabic. Arabic, in fact, turned out to be a poor feeder language for any kind of conversion strategy for OEF. However, Persian-Farsi was related to Dari, spoken in Afghanistan, and to Tajik, spoken in Tajikistan while Hindi, spoken in India, and Urdu, spoken in Pakistan, had close affiliation. Similar linkages existed within the Pashto group of languages shared across the borders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Despite a complexity of issues, it seemed possible to conduct cross-training courses in these languages in eight to sixteen weeks with a goal to achieve L2/R2 level proficiencies.

To train linguists in these languages, the Army proposed to take existing military linguists who had a proven ability to learn a Category III language and put them into conversion courses. The rationale for this move was, first, that no force structure existed for the proposed OEF languages and the Army did not anticipate creating billets in these languages that would not be needed beyond the forthcoming war. Second, existing linguists could be taught in the less regimented DLI-W environment that was not suitable for Initial Entry Training students who were trained in Monterey under close supervision. Third, having learned one language, soldiers with a proven linguistic ability were less susceptible to attrition. Moreover, they would already have security clearances required for their military specialties and would not require MOS training. The Army proposed to send eight Persian-Farsi linguists for cross-training in Dari and over one hundred Russian (or similar level) linguists for training in the Pashto, Dari, Uzbek and other OEF languages. Neither Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) nor Personnel Command (PERSCOM) could identify enough linguists to fill these slots from within the active duty force, but the Army hoped to find and activate enough reserve linguists to meet its needs. If those needs changed by the time the linguists were cross-trained, they could be returned to their home reserve units.

DLI-W canvassed five commercial language schools and the Foreign Service Institute to determine if they could teach these less commonly taught/low-density OEF languages, beginning initially with Dari, Pashto, Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Georgian, Urdu, Hindi, Sudanese, Indonesian, and Tagalog. New Dari and Pashto classes began on 15 October 2001. Other OEF target languages and dialects included Albanian, Amharic, Armenian, Baluchi, Berber, Cebuano, Chechen, Dinka, Ilocano, Javanese, Malay, Punjabi, Somali, Swahili, Tadjuk, Tausug, and Tigrinya. The results of these efforts included the growth of the DLI-W training base by the addition of seventy-seven seats (student allocations) in Dari, Pashto, Urdu, Uzbek, Somali, Tadjuk, Punjabi, and Swahili. Back in Monterey, the institute quickly added 100 additional unprogrammed seats in Arabic, Persian-Farsi, and Pashto in Fiscal Year 2002 (FY 2002, from 1


October 2001 to 30 September 2002) despite significant constraints in funding, qualified faculty, classroom space, and other factors.251

**Operation Enduring Freedom Task Force**

In January 2002, DLIFLC established its Operation Enduring Freedom Task Force (OEF Task Force). Colonel Rice placed this new organization under the immediate supervision of a dean, Dr. Mahmood Taba-Tabai, formerly dean of European School II, and Associate Dean Capt. Frank von Heiland, an Air Force officer who was replaced by Army Maj. David Tatman in 2003. A chief MLI, one administrator, one information technology specialist, and one supply sergeant also supported the office. The task force had program leaders for each major language program and translation team, but there were no department chairs or academic specialists. By 2003, there were program leaders for Dari, Pashto, Uzbek, and Georgian, while selected personnel were attached to ES to develop tests and perform Oral Proficiency Interviews (OPIs) and familiarization training. Organizationally, Rice aligned the OEF Task Force beneath the Office of the Chancellor.252

The first mission of the OEF Task Force was “to get the Dari class off the ground.”253 Its wider mission was to provide a rapid and flexible response to new contingency language requirements while temporarily bridging the gap between the resident language training programs conducted at DLIFLC and the contract programs coordinated by DLI-W.254 The task force would provide resident instruction for those “emerging” languages where the military had a recurring requirement to send more than six students. This effort required hiring and training faculty, developing curricula and proficiency testing, and conducting language training. It took some time. Thus, it was not until April 2002 before the task force instructors began conducting the first conversion course using Persian-Farsi linguists who cross-trained in the closely related language of Persian-Dari.255

DLIFLC began its first Pashto Basic Course in June 2002, followed by Uzbek in September 2002 with three-teacher teams each. They were forty-seven-week courses. In the beginning phase of each course, instruction focused upon the four basic skills of listening, reading, speaking, and writing practiced continuously, with a colloquial focus and using current content. In the final phase, students focused upon military skills needed for force protection, civil affairs, landmine issues, and the handling of refugees and detainees.256

Institute staff assembled this task force by “leaning forward,” i.e., they drew upon existing resources in anticipation of future increases to begin creating coursework and language aids for immediate OEF needs. Task Force managers met with Clare Bugary from OPP, Payne from the Provost Office, DLI-W staff, and others from OSD, on a sometimes weekly basis to discuss and set priorities and to decide whether the OEF Task Force or DLI-W would handle

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which classes. According to von Heiland, “our number one priority at the OEF TF was to ensure we had a capability to provide materials and instruction for languages where we had U.S. troops on the ground and in contact. That is why Dari, Pashto and Uzbek were the first to meet the requirements in OEF and Afghanistan.” Later, with U.S. troops serving in Georgia, a former republic of the Soviet Union, the Task Force began instruction in Georgian, followed by Kurdish-Behdini, a sub-dialect of Kurdish-Kurmanji spoken in northern Iraq and suddenly made important due to the U.S. invasion of that country in March 2003. Approximately nineteen other languages were considered for future training and faculty members were hired to teach Baluchi, Hindi, Urdu, Armenian, Chechen, Ilocano, and Javanese.

Over time, DLIFLC built the capability to handle other OEF requirements, including in the Southern Philippines, where such languages as Tausug, Yakan, and Chavacano were potentially important. An LTD instructor taught classes in these at the Korean Regional SIGINT Operations Center (K-RSOC). According to von Heiland, the Task Force divided OEF languages into regions (for example, Southwest/East Asia, Far East Asia, Africa, etc.). Finally, it paired related language families and attempted to hire staff proficient in more than one language to increase coverage of low-density languages.

The next major problem was the lack of suitable instructors, educational materials, or validated tests in any of the “less commonly taught languages.” The Task Force accomplished its mission by both teaching and doing curriculum development simultaneously. As von Heiland recalled, “in some cases, faculty were building tomorrow’s lesson the day before.” Task force instructors began the process by developing Language Survival Kits for their respective languages. These same instructors would next coordinate with the Testing Division to produce Guided Listening and Reading tests and to receive training in how to conduct OPIs. Meanwhile, they continued to teach and to participate in MTTs. As early as May 2002, Col. Jeffrey S. Johnson, Assistant Commandant, foresaw that the OEF Task Force was essentially “becoming a separate school.” Later, it became the Emerging Languages Task Force.

The OEF Task Force also clearly developed “immersion environment” techniques during this period, which would lead to an ongoing immersion language program. Task force instructors wanted students to learn the target language in a manner similar to how they learned their first language. They used English only as a “stepping stone” to bridge gaps in understanding. Early on, staff focused methodologically upon spoken language proficiency as opposed to reading and writing because most students would work in the field with native speakers and would need to use a high level of verbal fluency. In other words, the approach bypassed the need to learn “sound-symbol relationships” until students had developed a

\[257\] Von Heiland to Carsten, email, 27 August 2004.
\[258\] Mahaldar to Raugh, email, 15 June 2005.
\[259\] Von Heiland to Carsten, email, 27 August 2004.
\[261\] Von Heiland to Carsten, email, 27 August 2004.
\[263\] Col. Jeffrey S. Johnson, End of Tour Interview, 30 May 2002, 4-5, transcript in RG 10, box H, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\[264\] Another influence on DLI efforts to create a resident immersion language program was the “NSA edict” defining L3/R3 proficiency as the minimum professional standard for a crypto-linguist. See Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1040-1041).
foundation in listening and speaking. Nevertheless, staff sought to develop the four primary linguistic skills (listening, reading, speaking, and writing) during every hour of instruction by using authentic job-related materials, interactive learning, and minimum use of English.

Teaching Pashto and Dari

The OEF Task Force began teaching the institute’s first forty-seven-week basic courses in Dari and Pashto in 2002. The Category III languages, obscure to most Americans, were the widely spoken and officially used languages of Afghanistan. Dari was spoken in western portions of the country while Pashto was spoken in the south and southeast mountainous regions and across the border into Pakistan. Task force instructors had to prepare course materials concurrently for Dari and heavily revise those for Pashto, although they got a head start in developing the Pashto curriculum by using a course developed earlier by the Center for Applied Language Learning (CALL), which was supplemented with in-house-prepared material. DLIFLC was still developing DLPTs for both of these languages during this period. Task force staff also began to teach a forty-seven-week course in Uzbek. Another Category III language, Uzbek was spoken in northern Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Staff sped curriculum development for this program by adopting a commercial course that they supplemented with their own material. Similar to Pashto, the Uzbek curriculum faced heavy revision, and lacked a DLPT.

Two final Category III basic course languages that the task force prepared to teach in 2003 were Georgian and Kurdish-Behdini. Ultimately, staff only taught one iteration of the Georgian course, developing its curriculum concurrent with instruction, before it was cancelled for lack of continuing demand. Similar to Uzbek, the basic Kurdish-Behdini course was developed from commercial curriculum supplemented by materials prepared in-house with later heavy revision and DLPT development.

In addition to teaching and basic curriculum development, the OEF Task Force began to conduct extensive familiarization training (cultural and limited language) in 2003 for Army and Marine units deploying to Afghanistan. It also developed and supplied basic survival kits for Armenian, Javanese, Indonesian, Chechen, and Hindi. Finally, the Dari faculty finished the translation of the U.S. Army Ranger Handbook and U.S. Army Field Manual 7-8. The task force began a project to translate the Ranger handbook into Pashto in 2003. The Army sent translated copies of the handbook to Afghanistan to use in training the new Afghan Army. Similarly, task force staff translated leaflets, flyers, and other small projects for Army units to help them communicate with the local villagers in Afghanistan.

Finally, during this period, various DLIFLC departments participated as requested in “JTF 160,” an effort to translate detainee mail from the U.S. military detention center at the U.S. naval base located at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in the most challenging languages as well as translating documents.
Language Survival Kits

As mentioned above, an equal priority for DLIFLC as it set about developing basic, conversion, or contractor-taught courses was to support troops on the ground with Language Survival Kits, which staff rushed to complete at the onset of OEF. LSKs were small kits containing a list of English words and phrases translated into target foreign languages with native scripts. DLIFLC offered LSKs on the topic of Force Protection in a number of OEF languages, a few special aircrew LSKs, and medical LSKs in Dari. Additionally, the Republic of South Korean medical staff provided OEF support by translating the Dari-English Medical LSK into a Dari-Korean Medical LSK. During the process, the Task Force updated the kits, abandoned cassette tapes for CDs, and even provided online access to the material. DLIFLC also produced digital LSK applications to use in the “Voice Response Translator,” a ruggedized handheld device that had been tested by police, Naval, and Marine units, and which could be plugged into a loudspeaker (for use at checkpoints, etc.). Additionally, the Task Force produced Visual LSKs—laminated folding reference guides using pictures and text.271

Eventually, DLIFLC developed LSKs in Pashto, Uzbek, and Dari, and distributed thousands to the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), U.S. Air Force elements, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and service units at Guantanamo Bay.272 Many OEF languages had never been taught in Monterey because DoD had never had the requirement. The ability to do training in some languages was problematic, including Turkmen, Sindhi, Chechen, Tausug, and Javanese, but the institute nevertheless produced at least some survivals kits for fifty-one languages and by March 2002 was able to ship nearly 4,000 OEF-related kits.273 By the end of 2003, the task force had developed LSKs in sixty-two languages, including medical LSKs in Dari, Korean, Kurmanji, Turkish, and aircrew guides in Dari and Georgian. Through 23 January 2004, over 29,000 LSKs were developed, produced, and distributed.274

The LSK effort was not without issue, however. In January 2002, a problem arose after Colonel Rice directed an internal DLIFLC reorganization, which included shifting the Programs Division of OPP to the School for Continuing Education, previously under Joseph R. F. Betty. Robert R. Wekerle inherited the responsibility for producing LSKs and requested an update from DLI-W on any kits they were producing. DLI-W Director Terrance R. Sharp responded that the only kits done were in Urdu, Pashto, Dari, and Uzbek and that DLI-W was having “some problems with continuing to produce survival kits” apparently because it fell outside the scope of DLI-W’s contract, which was for training linguists, not producing curriculum materials. Betty, Assistant DCSOPS, reported to Colonel O’Rourke that the institute was “at a standstill with DLI-W on Survival Packages” and suggested that the LSK task be transferred to Dr. Taba-Tabai and the OEF Task Force, which had just been formerly organized. The matter had risen in priority as the United States prepared to establish a base in Kirghizstan with 3,000 soldiers and there was an immediate need for force protection and aircrew survival packages.275 The task force continued

272 The OEF Task Force continued with this mission until September 2003, when responsibility for the development of LSKs was transferred to the Curriculum Development Division.
to develop LSKs until September 2003 when Rice transferred responsibility to the Curriculum Development Division. 276

By late 2003, DLIFLC had rechristened the task force. Its mission had expanded due to the global span of U.S. anti-terrorist efforts and additional military operations resulting from the United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The OEF Task force thus became the “Global War on Terrorism Task Force.” However, this name did not stick and was soon dropped in favor of the “Emerging Languages Task Force,” a name that reflected the function of the organization, not its immediate geographic or operational focus. Despite frequent name changes, the purpose of the task force remained the same—to develop processes and methodologies to train and supply linguistic expertise to support urgent and unforeseen military needs in obscure foreign tongues. 277 The task force now acquired stand-alone status as an ongoing DLIFLC basic program and made its first appearance on organization charts issued by Colonel Simone.

Reorganization and Miscellaneous Issues

Two reorganizations of the Defense Language Institute occurred between 2001 and the end of 2003. Colonel Rice approved the first re-organization plan in October 2001, immediately following 9/11. According to Rice, however, “while the events since 11 September have changed our lives significantly, this reorganization is not a reaction.” Instead, he stated that he had directed the chief of staff “to look at several issues and make recommendations towards a possible reorganization” earlier that summer. Rice also noted that the institute had “many expanding roles and some misaligned or unassigned responsibilities” in existing organizations that simply required reorganization, and specifically stressed that it was “not because any organization or individuals are not performing.” “On the contrary, he emphasized, “I have been impressed with what all of you are doing every day. I believe now is the time to implement some significant functional shifts in order to better execute our vital mission requirements.” 278

Regardless of whether the reorganization was 9/11 driven, Rice stated in his reorganization memorandum that “foremost, I saw a need for a dedicated Installation Coordinating Staff.” Prior to the emergency, the institute had had never had a true twenty-four-hour Emergency Operations Center. Thus, Rice expanded the coordinating responsibilities of his chief of staff, Lt. Col. Gordon T. Hamilton, who became responsible for overseeing four new positions, the first being the deputy chief of staff, operations and plans (DCSOPS). Rice told Lt. Col. Patrick C. O’Rourke, who had a Special Forces background and previous experience working in a real Emergency Operations Center, to get one together, and that Rice would give him the needed resources. This meant an organization with security, intelligence, and personnel functions. O’Rourke worked with Richard Savko, who had run DLIFLC’s previous EOC, but O’Rourke was now in charge. The first task of O’Rourke and Savko was to get base security tightened up in the wake of 9/11. They put roving patrols into action and sent several junior officers to special Army training courses. 279

The second new position Hamilton began to oversee was the deputy chief of staff for Resource Management (DCSRM). The financial management, force structure, and manpower

functions of this position, previously known as the director of Resource Management, stayed the same. However, Rice realigned the Resource Management Office under the chief of staff. Lt. Col. Kay Moore was the DCSRM.\footnote{Rice, memorandum: “Installation Reorganization,” 11 October 2001. See also Chapter V.}

Another change regarded the assistant commandant, whose position became more oriented toward DoD. Rice wanted his deputy to be “DLIFLC’s lead advocate to DoD and responsible for all foreign language education functions” to match the institute’s growing role within the foreign language community. The assistant commandant continued to supervise the Chancellor/Provost Office, DLI-W, the FAO Program Office, and the new Combat Developments Directorate, and gained new responsibility for coordinating with the NSA Liaison Office and DLIFLC’s military service units. Rice also created a new position of deputy assistant commandant, occupied first by Lt. Col. Cori Mazik and later by Maj. Shawn J. Cardella, to coordinate and monitor day-to-day operations, plans and scheduling functions.\footnote{Rice, memorandum: “Installation Reorganization,” 11 October 2001. The deputy assistant commandant position disappeared after Colonel Simone’s reorganization.}

Col. Michael Simone, who became commandant in June 2003, conducted another re-organization in October 2003. This reorganization updated and ratified major structural changes brought about under Rice’s administration. That month, the Academic Advisory Council commented that Simone’s plan was “a positive step towards arranging the necessary offices and activities into a functional structure to enable DLI to accomplish its mission and respond with timely results.” Adding a cautionary air, however, the AAC also stated that “DLI should expand to meet the needs of its mission, while at the same time guarding against a disproportionate expansion of the administration.”\footnote{“Summary of the Defense Language Institute Academic Advisory Board Meeting,” 23-24 October 2003,” in “DLIFLC Academic Advisory Board, 2002-05” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

The institute had planned its 60th Anniversary Celebration to take place in November 2001. In light of the 11 September terrorist attacks upon the United States, Colonel Rice had to decide whether to go forward with those plans, or to modify or even cancel them. Rice considered various factors, including that no attacks had occurred upon the West Coast, although the terrorist threat to military installations certainly would continue and the near-term likelihood of U.S. military actions would raise threat conditions levels of alert. Cancellation costs were minor, but the anniversary remained an important opportunity to boost the moral of faculty and staff and many original members of the Military Intelligence Service were now 80-90 years old. Many might never have another opportunity to be honored for their WWII service. Rice thus elected to proceed with a modified schedule of events for the 60th Anniversary, which took place on 3 November 2001 with a gala celebration held at the Hyatt Regency in Monterey.\footnote{“DLI 60th Anniversary Decision Brief,” in “60th Anniversary” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives; Stephen Payne to Cameron Binkley, email, 11 December 2008.}

Finally, Rep. Sam Farr included a provision in an appropriations bill to establish a national foreign language skills registry at DLIFLC in response to the war on terrorism that would allow U.S. citizens proficient in foreign languages and willing to volunteer in times of crisis to sign up online.\footnote{“Farr Reports Funds for Local Projects,” Monterey County Herald, 21 December 2001, in “Newspaper Articles” folder, box 41.A, DLIFLC&POM Archives; and “Will Funds Translate into Volunteers?,” Army Times, 4 February 2002, 6.} Congress agreed and passed the provision in early 2002.
The biggest reorganization affecting the Army during this period resulted when Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White approved plans to consolidate all U.S. Army garrison operations under the management of a single agency from 1 October 2002. In effect, White divorced senior mission commanders from administrative responsibility for the Army installations on which their
commands were housed. This reorganization, which had a major impact on DLIFLC, is detailed extensively in Chapter IV: Presidio of Monterey Garrison.

Annual Program Reviews, 2000-2003

DLIFLC conducts an Annual Program Review (APR) at the beginning of each calendar year covering the year immediately passed. The purpose of the APR is to show the institute’s shareholders and customers, the U.S. government agencies and military services that employ its linguists, how and what the school has been doing during the last year and similarly to allow those customers to provide feedback on the school’s efforts.

The 2000 APR was held in Monterey, 7-8 February 2001, and was the first APR that Colonel Rice presided over as commandant. Given Rice’s announced views on the importance of faculty to the institute’s mission, it was no surprise that the focus of that year’s APR was upon keeping and attracting “as many quality teachers and students as possible.” OPP and the Provost Office co-sponsored the event for about one hundred attendees, most of whom came from the defense intelligence community outside the institute itself.285

Rice saw a higher quality of instruction than when he attended the institute in 1978, but noted that there were still problems in hiring and retaining good instructors. To ameliorate this condition, the Army was offering better locality pay and would pay the tuition for those instructors willing to pursue masters degrees in teaching English as a second language at the nearby Monterey Institute of International Studies.286

Dr. Robert Slater, director of the National Security Education Act Program spoke, stating that “languages in national security is important” and that the goal of the National Defense University was to make “Americans be globally proficient.” He discussed details of the civilian-oriented program, but noted its goal, similar to the institute’s, of “turning out students with 3/3/3 proficiency levels in listening, reading, and speaking.”287

Provost Dr. Ray Clifford stated that the institute wanted “to be recognized as the premier foreign language school in the United States. We want premier teachers with accountability.” He emphasized that improvements came not from following class schedules, but from teacher initiatives. Still, one proposal at the meeting was to extend training in Category IV languages, the most difficult, up to seventy-five weeks, including making the entire third semester an immersion section. This option would require more funding and teachers. Another option was to increase the military’s language school entrance test requirements.288 Clifford suggested ways to increase the number of high scoring recruits, including widely advertizing the possibility of students obtaining an associate of arts degree while attending the institute through its cooperative relationship with Monterey Peninsula College. He also discussed staff and faculty desires to develop Final Learning Objective exams for each semester, not just the last, and to create post-

288 Britton, “Getting Straight,” Globe (February 2001): 4-7. Most DLIFLC students passed the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) with a score of 100 of 165, but 85 was the passing score for Category I languages. One consideration was to raise the DLAB score from 100 to 110 for the Category IV languages (Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean).
program continuation courses for students who failed to pass their initial courses but who retained a strong potential to do so with additional study. Finally, while most DLIFLC language courses were less than ten years old, about three hundred sub-courses needed to revision, which would take funding and probably several years of effort.289

At the APR for 2001, held 5-7 March 2002, Rice again welcomed the participants, but now also offered a few comments regarding the “War on Terrorism.” Conference attendees gave much attention to Operation Enduring Freedom and the institute’s response to it, as previously discussed. In particular, Rice noted that all four services were involved in combat operations; coalition operations, and joint and combined warfighting operations worldwide. The linguists trained at DLIFLC and other agencies provided both strategic and tactical intelligence, including in real time for tactical operations underway. According to Rice, linguists on the ground, in the air, and aboard ships provided intelligence that made operations successful or unsuccessful. He briefly touched on the school’s student load with 600 basic students in Arabic. He went on to state that trained linguists were needed for interaction capabilities during planning with NATO allies as well as to provide support for the Combatant Commanders. Language requirements were not just signals intercept or tactical document exploitation, but had evolved into operating on the ground with coalition and multi-national operations. According to Rice, intermediate and advance courses underlay the success of these ongoing operations and language training mattered because linguists were key force multipliers.290

Clifford spoke again at the next Annual Program Review. His theme was “Reinventing DLI” and he focused upon plans to reorganize the institute “for improved span of control.” Clifford hoped to improve responsiveness, innovation, collaboration, and accountability. Under responsiveness, DLIFLC began new language programs to support OEF and began “Mission Language Needs Analyses” to help the services define their needs. Under innovation, DLIFLC was using distance learning, the so-called “Technology Enhanced Classroom” or TEC project, and was within ninety days of approval to grant AA degrees. Under collaboration, DLIFLC was working with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, and the National Foreign Language Center to accomplish what it alone could not. Under accountability, DLIFLC continued to monitor proficiency (“our most important product”), had established production rates for course development projects, was adding evaluation of machine translation and similar technical language services, and using both qualitative and quantitative measures of accountability. According to Clifford, the collected data demonstrated the correlation between teacher staffing and student results, the higher the ratio leading to higher percentages of graduates at the L2/R2/S1+ level. Clifford was quick to point out, however, that higher student-teacher ratios did not produce better results, but instead made better results possible. One might have a high ratio but if teaching assignments were not stable or if teachers were not given adequate preparation time, results could still suffer. By 2001, 83 percent of graduates were achieving the L2/R2/S1+ graduation standard or higher, an enormous increase in proficiency from 1991, when the graduation rate was only 61 percent meeting the same standard.291

The APR review for 2002, held in Monterey from 5-6 March 2003, continued to discuss DLIFLC support for OEF but also returned to the more usual format of past years rather than the

290 Minutes from the 5-7 March 2002 DLIFLC Annual Performance Review, 1-2, in DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.
special focus of the 2002 APR that sought in large part to address the institute’s response to OEF. Methods to enhance proficiency were an important part of this year’s program. Acting Provost Stephen Payne focused attention upon the “Language Enhancement Accelerated Proficiency Program” or LEAP. LEAP hoped to establish and provide a learning environment that was highly conducive to second language acquisition to improve students’ proficiency through systematically maximizing target language use in the schoolhouse. Each school was to set up a program to meet this objective by a variety of approaches, including the use of special badges, through special contracts, and via both on-site and off-site immersion experiences. One new topic in 2002 was the Combat Developments Directorate, created to focus on supporting combat technology relating to foreign languages, such as LSKs, a call center for real-time language support, or the Phraselator device and other machine translation type technologies. Proficiency FLO results were 85 percent in 2002, increased slightly from 83 percent in 2001.292

During the APR for 2003, from 2-3 March 2004, the institute easily claimed that it was the largest language school in the United States, possibly the world, with more than one thousand full-time faculty, accredited as a Junior College to grant Associate of Arts in Foreign Language degrees, and teaching both lower and upper division courses in several foreign languages. The institute prided itself on its commitment to good teaching and student focus within an organizational culture that promoted accountability, defined learning outcomes, data collection, and date-driven innovations.293

Rice, along with his faculty and managers, was also committed to the belief that “technology will not replace teachers or language analysts, but teachers and language analysts who use technology will replace those who don’t.” Under Rice, DLIFLC committed to major infusions of learning technology and by his final Annual Program Review, staff could report success in implementing the Technology Enhanced Classroom (TEC) program. Under Rice, new computer technology was integrated into instruction, including whiteboards, wireless classrooms and language labs, laptop computers with audio file manipulation software, and MP3 players while computerized notepads (PC tablets) were considered (and later introduced under Col. Tucker B. Mansager).294

In 2003, proficiency FLO results remained stable at 83 percent, declining only slightly from the year previous.295 However, institute leaders were in the throws of implementing a second Proficiency Enhancement Program (PEP), driven by the NSA director’s decision in 2002 to raise NSA standards for cryptolinguists to L3/R3. DLIFLC’s plan was to launch 100 PEP “classes” in fiscal year 2005 focused upon Arabic, Chinese, Korean, and all other languages. The intermediate goal was to achieve proficiencies of L2+/R2+/S2. Some of the components of this push, discussed more extensively in Chapter III, were to raise faculty hiring standards, adding post-basic enhancement courses, immersion programs, reducing class sizes to six students per instructor in Category IV languages (with eight elsewhere), and raising DLAB enrollment requirements.296

As reported at the Annual Program Review for 2003, late that year new commandant Michael Simone, reorganized the structure of the institute to help achieve better efficiencies.

This reorganization created a new branch called Language Science and Technology (LST). LST absorbed elements of Faculty and Staff Development, Curriculum Development, as well as the DLIFLC Libraries, and created the Combat Developments and Technology Integration divisions.297

Privatization of Military Language Training?

In early 2003, DLIFLC leaders suddenly had to sidestep higher echelon interest in the potential merits of outsourcing military language instruction, an almost perennial threat to the mission of the school and DoD’s ability to field a cadre of qualified military linguists. The situation derived from a push to privatize federal positions in compliance with President Bush’s management agenda, which included outsourcing as many federal positions as possible consistent with limits relating to the efficiency or inherently governmental nature of those positions. In DoD, outsourcing officials initially targeted as “non-core” to the Army some 213,637 positions, including 154,910 civilian jobs and 58,727 uniformed jobs. Procedures existed for managers of positions targeted for an outsourcing study, called an “A-76” review, to challenge the need for such a study, and numerous DoD organizations filed requests for exemptions from these studies.298

By March of 2003, fully eighteen major reviews had previously documented the benefits and efficiencies of in-house military language instruction and the corresponding problems in large-scale contracting, although the institute had always favored outsourcing through DLI-W infrequently taught languages or those for which the military had few requirements. These reports stretched back several decades. Nevertheless, to head off renewed interest by the Bush Administration in privatization of government functions, DLIFLC filed a so-called “Third Wave Exemption Request” to avoid renewed efforts to outsource in-house foreign language training provided by the institute. The exemption request included a summary of the finding of each of the previous eighteen studies. In signing the exemption request, Rice offered a detailed explanation of how and why the institute, which began to grant Associate of Arts in Foreign Language degrees in May 2002, would lose its accreditation status. The Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges (ACCJC), Western Association of Schools and Colleges, granted accreditation to DLIFLC in 1979. Since that time, institute leaders had viewed the chance to earn college credit for language coursework completed at DLIFLC, and later the chance to earn an AA degree, as powerful recruiting incentives to attract top talent into the military. By charter, post-secondary institutions accredited by ACCJC may not lend the prestige or authority of their accreditation by contract to organizations not so accredited. Thus, any major change in the institute’s programs would require re-evaluation by ACCJC, which almost certainly would withdraw accreditation if major portions of that curriculum were outsourced.299

In his memorandum of 27 February 2003, Rice informed the commander, Combined Arms Center, that:

Contracting out of military foreign language instruction to universities and commercial contractors, as a replacement for conducting foreign language instruction at DLIFLC, is not a new approach to reducing training costs or to increasing foreign language instructional capacity over what DLIFLC can handle. Eighteen studies conducted from 1958 through 1994 determined there were no savings in cost by contracting out foreign language instruction.  

In requesting an exemption from additional outsourcing, Rice pointed out additional military specific issues, such as the loss of control of course content leading to “a watering down of military-specific concepts and terminology,” loss of efficiencies in the teaching of high volume languages, loss of control over Initial Entry Training soldiers, problems stemming from high-turnover rates with contract instructors, conflicts over teaching philosophies or labor problems/strikes conducted during a war, and the inability of traditional universities to match military training tempos. Rice strongly urged HQDA to exempt the institute from further consideration from large-scale contracting of its primary mission of language instruction. “However attractive contracting seems to appear during a given budgetary or operational crisis,” he wrote, “eighteen separate investigations of the costs and outcomes of foreign language instruction provided by universities and/or commercial contractors convincingly determined there were no cost savings to be realized. Furthermore,” he concluded, “proficiency outcomes did not meet those attained at DLIFLC.”

On 2 March 2003, Jean M. Bennett, DCS, G-2, responded to Rice about his exemption request. Bennett acknowledged “that contracting out has been looked at many times. There are certainly some compelling reasons why DLI should not [be] included in the 3rd wave. The age of some of the studies may be a negative factor but the reasons for not contracting are still valid.” Bennett expressed support for Rice and the thought that “we can work our way out of this.” Subsequently, both Bennett and Rice assigned follow-up work to lower staff to provide additional information to Army headquarters staff. The issue did not come up again and the crisis was averted.

In a few short weeks, the war in Iraq began and it became even clearer why privatization of important military language training functions was not a good idea, or at least, why it was essential to maintain core capabilities. “Responding to mission needs in real-time,” noted 1st Lt. Amit K. Khosla, an Air Force officer assigned to the OEF Task Force, “truly requires remaining flexible and maintaining a war-ready language capability through core teams.” According to Khosla, “not only do we have the capability to teach the language but also accomplish LSK development, curriculum building, test development and special translation work such as translating the Ranger Handbook into Dari (now also needed in Pashtu and Kurdish).” Based upon field input, Khosla pointed out that when the military suddenly expressed a need for capability in a given language, it was never expressed as “will you be able to in the future” provide this service, but “can you teach/translate/build it now.” The only way, he felt, to provide a rapid response to military language needs was to remain “proactive” and that required a core capability because it simply took too long to hire and train contractors in an emergency.

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Change of Command

Colonel Rice transferred command of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center to Col. Michael R. Simone on 4 June 2003 and retired after thirty years of military service. Lt. Gen. James Riley, Commanding, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, officiated the ceremony. “Colonel Rice leaves big shoes to fill,” stated Simone as he assumed command of DLIFLC. “I follow in the footsteps of General Joseph W. Stilwell with learning a foreign language, culture and customs of another country.” Simone served as a military attaché in Moscow and became the new commandant after serving as the chief of the European Threat Reduction Agency’s Onsite Inspection Directorate.304

Chapter III
Language Training Programs

Between 2001 and 2003, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center remained one of the premier foreign language-training schools in the world. Its responsibility was to provide resident, contract, and continuing education training programs to U.S. Army, Department of Defense, and federal agency personnel. DLIFLC provided 85 percent of all U.S. government foreign language training, and provided evaluation, sustainment, and contingency support for DoD foreign language requirements worldwide.

Overview

An average of 2,826 students attended DLIFLC from the Active and Reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces during this period. They came to study in one of over twenty resident language programs. A fraction of these students were commissioned officers in ranks from captain to lieutenant colonel, but the vast majority were junior enlisted personnel preparing for their first military assignments. A smaller contingent of officers and non-commissioned officers attended the Defense Language Institute-Washington to study in a wider range of less commonly taught foreign languages, a service usually provided via contract arrangement. The rank and discipline of these personnel favored successful study in a less structured environment. The courses varied in length from two weeks to eighteen months depending on the difficulty of the language and the learning objectives.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the number of DLIFLC students increased, but the increase was not as dramatic as anticipated. For example, the number of graduating Arabic Basic Program students actually declined from FY 2001 to FY 2003, as indicated by Figure 8, which shows the eight largest languages taught at DLIFLC, in terms of the number of graduates.

DLIFLC’s major response to the events of 11 September 2001 was to supplement its normal resident language course offerings through its OEF Task Force, a program that could supply training field support for some twenty different languages of concern to Operation Enduring Freedom. In FY 2003, the institute offered classes in four of new languages: Dari, Pashto, Kurdish, and Uzbek Basic. The OEF Task Force also developed or had the capability to teach Armenian, Chechen, Hindi, Urdu, and Georgian. In FY 2002, the institute graduated forty-two students from OEF language-training courses, and twenty-seven graduates in FY 2003.

In 2002, besides teaching foreign language, DLIFLC began granting Associate of Arts degrees for the first time. Students who transferred existing general education coursework completed through another accredited institution were able to combine these credits with those earned at DLIFLC for foreign language coursework. The institute awarded its first 249 AA degrees in 2002 with 297 AA degrees awarded in 2003, bringing the total of AA degrees.

Fiscal Year 2003 figures include: 1,373 Army; 881 Air Force; 468 Navy; 203 Marines; and a few others, to include spouses. See DLIFLC, DLIFLC Program Summary FY03 (DLIFLC, 2003), p. 7, and previous volumes. Total enrollment in FY 2001 was 2,500; in FY 2002 it was 3,036; in FY 2003 it was 2,943.
awarded to 546. The ability to grant degrees was a significant recruitment tool for the military services and helped to motivate students.

By 2003, the institute employed about 1,094 civilian faculty members from over forty different countries organized into schools that were broadly geographical. Of this number, about 580 faculty members held advanced degrees, of whom 430 held advanced degrees in a language-related field. Forty-six faculty members were enrolled in the Master of Arts in Teaching Foreign Languages program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Since the establishment of the Faculty Personnel System in 1997, DLIFLC had hired over 400 qualified faculty members, most with expertise in less commonly taught languages. It also had eighty-seven Military Language Instructors (MLIs) who greatly assisted students, especially on job-specific military subjects, and who served as role models. DLIFLC employed more faculty teaching DoD’s five highest enrollment languages than the total number of U.S. students graduating in those languages nationwide.\textsuperscript{306}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year/Language</th>
<th>2001 Graduates/(Enrollees)</th>
<th>2002 Grad/(Enrollees)</th>
<th>2003 Grad/(Enrollees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>398 (585)</td>
<td>365 (517)</td>
<td>354 (481)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese-Mandarin</td>
<td>205 (260)</td>
<td>182 (238)</td>
<td>224 (308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>69 (78)</td>
<td>63 (67)</td>
<td>88 (95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>314 (461)</td>
<td>266 (379)</td>
<td>247 (370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian-Farsi</td>
<td>95 (121)</td>
<td>97 (122)</td>
<td>130 (184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>297 (425)</td>
<td>271 (400)</td>
<td>304 (457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian-Croatian</td>
<td>58 (76)</td>
<td>59 (75)</td>
<td>84 (115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>313 (378)</td>
<td>228 (271)</td>
<td>226 (284)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More specific data for Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, Korean, Russian, Serbian-Croatian, and Spanish Language Programs is provided under each of those sections below. In FY03, 83 percent of basic course graduates met or exceeded minimum DoD proficiency standards of L2/R2/S1+ while 33 percent met proficiency standards of L2+/R2+/S2. Only 9 percent of graduates from four-year degree programs met such standards.

Figure 8 DLIFLC student completions, 2001-2003\textsuperscript{307}

As reflected by Col. Kevin M. Rice’s comments to the \textit{New York Times}, this period in the history of DLIFLC marked its true transition from the Cold War-era in which the school taught Russian to up to a thousand students per year. In 2002, the commandant noted, DLIFLC had only 400 Russian students enrolled while that year it dropped the once important languages of Czech and Polish all together. Even before 9/11, Arabic had become the most popular language and had some 600 students enrolled in the sixty-three-week course in 2002. A few months after 9/11, the institute was teaching fifty students in Dari and Pashto, the languages of Afghanistan, while a hundred students were still taking Serbian/Croatian due to ongoing peace-keeping operations in the Balkans. Vestiges of the Cold War remained as witnessed by the continuing need for Korean and the growing need for Chinese speakers. Nevertheless, the world was changing and so, too, did the languages the United States needed to maintain its security. Another indicator of this fact was that at any one time a quarter of the institute’s eighty-five senior enlisted Military Language Instructors (MLIs) were deployed for weeks to months at a


One important reality about the transition to post-Cold War teaching was that the institute focused much less upon Category III languages, which included most Eastern European languages. Czech, Polish, and Russian were ranked as Category III in difficulty, which meant that students studying these languages required forty-seven weeks of training to reach the required operational proficiency levels. At the same time, students studying Arabic, Korean, Chinese, and Persian-Farsi, all Category IV languages, required sixty-three week programs. In 1990, just prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the school’s average daily attendance was 2,996 students, ranging from a high of 3,171, to a low of 2,847 students during the year. After 1990, graduations in Cold War-related Category III languages declined from over 2,000 students to below 1,000 students by 2001. Meanwhile, the number of students in Category IV languages increased, going from 1,200 in 1990 to about 1,800 in 2001. However, given no relative increase in overall student requirements, these changing student demographics meant that the institute trained fewer overall linguists. Thus, in 2001, the average daily attendance was only 2,422, ranging from a high of 2,553 to a low of 2,299.\footnote{309}{Stephen Payne to Jeffrey S. Johnson, email, 19 October 2001, in “Student Populations” folder, (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

DLIFLC had an annual operating budget of $72 million in 2002. It cost the United States more than $31,500 to train a student in the Arabic Basic Course with the goal being that 80 percent of graduates would achieve proficiency levels of Interagency Language Roundtable Levels (ILR) of 2 in listening, 2 in reading, and 1+ in speaking (L2/L2/L1+). Despite the aforementioned changes in program areas, Rice further noted, that the institute had still managed to raise the proficiency scores of its graduates from 29 percent meeting the proficiency standard in 1985 to 80 percent in 2002. Rice attributed this dramatic accomplishment to DLIFLC’s emphasis on practical speaking, but it could not have been achieved without dedicated teachers, administrators, and, of course, the hard work of students.\footnote{310}{Schmitt, “Language Boot Camp Fills a Void,” A15.}

\textbf{Provost/Chancellor Office Activities and Challenges}

The Provost/Chancellor Office faced many challenges during this period but leadership remained steady, as it had been for many years, under the able administration of Dr. Ray Clifford.\footnote{311}{Lt Col William J. Astore, Associate Provost and Dean of Students, supplied much of the material and writing for information about Provost Office activities in 2003.} By October 2001, Rice had agreed to reclassify Clifford’s position, in concert with an overall administrative reorganization. Instead of “Provost,” Clifford became “Chancellor and Senior Language Authority.”\footnote{312}{Col Kevin M. Rice, memorandum: “Installation Reorganization,” 11 October 2001, in DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.} According to Clifford, the title “chancellor” was originally used by DoD in directives issued to implement congressional approval of the Faculty Pay System. At first, he had resisted adopting the title, saying it was “just sounded too high falutin,” but as the growth of the institute imposed the need for additional levels of administration, for example, with separate divisions for resident programs, continuing education, evaluation and standardization, and other staff offices, Clifford began to think that the standard academic title seemed more appropriate.\footnote{313}{Dr. Ray Clifford, interview by Dr. Harold Raugh, 21 December 2004, pp. 3-4, in DLIFLC&POM Archives.} He may also have thought the more prestigious-sounding title...
would provide some leverage to work DLIFLC issues in the Pentagon. The title “senior language authority” was one that all the services had begun adopting for their key language advisors in the late 1990s and Clifford was the obvious choice for DLIFLC. As chancellor, Clifford reported to the assistant commandant, but as senior language authority, he provided direct advice to the commandant. Clifford was responsible for the resident programs, Evaluation and Standardization, Curriculum Development, Faculty and Staff Development, Continuing Education, and provided oversight of the academic programs at DLI-W.

For Rice the reason to create an institute chancellorship was indeed that the Provost’s Office had gradually increased its span of control and external responsibilities to such an extent that it risked jeopardizing mission success. Ironically, Rice may have thought, as he later suggested, that the institute was run too loosely like a liberal arts college—in other words, not enough like a military organization. At any rate, “to minimize future risks” and to “recognize the increased responsibility,” Rice realigned the Provost Office by elevating Clifford from provost to chancellor, creating two new vice chancellorships, and making the provost position strictly responsible “for the delivery of all resident foreign language instruction” and supervision of the resident schools.

Lt. Col. Stephen Butler, an Air Force officer, served as associate provost and dean of students, until May 2002 when he was administratively relieved of duty. Lt. Col. William Astore, another Air Force officer, then replaced Butler. Butler and Astore occupied the first of Rice’s two new vice chancellorships. In succession, each became vice chancellor of Student Affairs (dean of students) while Dr. Stephen Payne became vice chancellor of Academic Affairs.

Other Hires and Significant Personnel Changes

After elevating Clifford to chancellor, it became necessary to re-staff his old position, which retained the title “provost.” Clifford’s position had become more focused on events in Washington, DC, external to the institute, rather like the function expected of a university president. Normally, at a university, the provost oversees academic matters. As an interim measure, Clifford assigned Dr. Stephen Payne to be Acting Provost, but professionally, Payne was an historian and the post required someone with professional expertise in foreign language education. Thus, senior staff organized a Provost Selection Committee, consisting of Vice Chancellor Astore; Dr. John Peterson, Academic Advisory Board member; and Dr. Christine Campbell, Dean, Middle East I School, who reviewed applications and interviewed candidates in June 2003. The Provost Selection Committee completed its report and forwarded its recommendations to Clifford, who then sought input from the Academic Advisory Council and the Dean’s Council. In August 2003, the Provost’s Office welcomed a new provost, Dr. Susan Steele, who also served as vice chancellor of undergraduate education. Steele brought a wealth of experience from civilian academia to the institute.

314 Stephen Payne to Cameron Binkley, email: “Answers,” 25 November 2008, in “ACH 2003 Provost” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Clifford was also possibly trying to position himself or his successor to assume complete management of DLIFLC as a civilian-run school.
317 See footnote 163 for an explanation.
After Steele arrived, Clifford, with the commandant’s approval, assigned Acting Provost Payne to the new position of senior vice chancellor in charge of day-to-day affairs. More importantly, the School of Continuing Education, the institute’s graduate program previously part of the Office of the Provost, now became its own vice chancellorship separate from the provost and the basic programs. Dr. Thomas Parry then became vice chancellor of Continuing Education. DLIFLC’s basic programs remained under Provost and Vice Chancellor Steele, who, however, also acquired oversight of the dean of students, which position was designated the associate vice chancellor. During the 2003 re-organization, Dr. Martha Herzog, chief of Evaluation and Standardization, became vice chancellor of Evaluation and Standardization and Dr. Neil Granoien became vice chancellor of Language, Science, and Technology, a newly created directorate.320

In May 2003, Clifford welcomed a new executive assistant, Mystery Chastain, who quickly became indispensable by organizing the visits of Dr. Jerry Smith (Dr. Chu’s special representative), Renée Meyer (an SES-4 and NSA’s senior language authority), and the Academic Advisory Board. For her dedication and contributions, Chastain was awarded the Installation Commander’s Coin of Excellence in October 2003.

On 29 June 2001, Sgt. Maj. Norman Zlotorzynski, a Russian linguist and chief Military Language Instructor, retired after 26 years of military service.321 Afterwards, his position was apparently vacant into 2003 until Sgt. Maj. Kathrine L. Kelly took over as head of the MLI Management Office.322 MLIs supported classroom instruction and provided ideal role models for young enlisted personnel, but continuing shortfalls in the numbers of MLIs assigned to the institute led Colonel Rice to consider the merits of adopting a contract MLI program. On 19 March 2003, he approved hiring retired military linguists to serve as MLIs. They were to perform all the teaching and mentoring tasks of active duty MLIs, to include wearing the uniform. The institute hired its first contract MLI in Korean in July 2003. By December 2003, it hired two additional contract MLIs, also in Korean.323 Another change of note was the First Command Sponsorship of the MLI of the Quarter Award. First Command, a national investment and insurance company specialized in advising military members, generously agreed in 2003 to sponsor the MLI quarterly award. Thereafter, the MLI of the Quarter received an engraved desk set and check for $200 from First Command, which also provided food for the awards ceremony. The First Command point of contact was Ms. Victoria Hoy, working closely with Sergeant Kelly.324

**Academic Accreditation and Degree-Granting Status**

As discussed in Chapter II, in 2001 Congress authorized DLIFLC the right to award Associate of Arts (AA) in Foreign Languages degree. Thereafter, graduates could both receive up to forty-five college credit hours toward an AA degree and they could acquire that degree from the institute, a fully accredited degree-granting body, by transferring additional coursework.

On 8 January 2003, DLIFLC announced that it had granted its first 185 AA degrees in foreign language. Asked to comment on this milestone, Rice stated that “the goal at the Defense Language Institute is for all students to receive a comprehensive education that enables each

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323 Astore, “DLIFLC Command History for CY03: Provost” [5 May 2004].
324 Astore, “DLIFLC Command History for CY03: Provost” [5 May 2004].
student to carry out linguist duties and responsibilities.” Furthermore, he added, “knowledge equals power—power that our country’s linguists must employ fully and wisely in the Global War on Terrorism.”

DLIFLC completed its Midterm Accreditation Report in December 2002. In January 2003, the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges, Western Association of Schools and Colleges, accepted that report. The ACCJC scheduled its next accreditation visit for 21-23 March 2006. Dr. Stephen Payne was then serving as the institute’s accreditation liaison officer.

Attrition Study

The U.S. Army Research Institute conducted an attrition study to provide input to DLIFLC leadership on the causes and remedies for the problem. The study based its findings upon responses from 213 current students to a questionnaire in January 2001 and interviews with a subset of 53 students who completed the questionnaire. The study broke its preliminary findings into which factors motivated students and which did the reverse. By the time the Army Research Institute briefed DLIFLC, some 12 students from the pool of 53 interviewees had been lost from the program. Apparently, the impact of this attrition on the remaining students was not severe in affecting their motivation unless an attrited student was a personal study partner or seen as having been treated unfairly. In general, the study found that DLIFLC language training was working well. However, the report did identify increasing tension between what it called the “teacher centric,” the “curriculum centric,” and the “student centric” models of instruction, which in turn brought about conflict between teachers, administrators, and students. The stress and pace of language training was also an issue for the students. Most students wanted fewer military obligations, a more efficient learning experience, more organized and effective training, and the opportunity to tailor language training to their specific strengths and weaknesses or style of learning.

New Policy on Department Chairpersons

In April 2001, DLIFLC implemented a new Department Chairperson Policy following establishment of the Faculty Personnel System. The new policy made it impossible for one person to hold indefinitely the department chairperson position, instead requiring that it rotate among teaching staff. Provost Ray Clifford intended that the new policy might allow more teachers to have an opportunity to become involved with management and conversely to allow chairs to teach. “There is no assignment more important than teaching,” he said. Dr. Jielu “Jim” Zhao, dean of Asian II, the Korean School, was the first dean to reassign a chairperson when he asked longtime Chairperson Alice Lee to return to teaching as the institution’s first Dean Emeritus. Lee agreed: “I have always wanted to be a teacher…so I am more than happy to go back to the classroom and teach full time…it gives some of the other faculty a chance at leadership.” Clifford emphasized that the new policy would not penalize the former chairs. Lee said she was glad to see the institute moving in a new direction. The policy, first proposed during the re-accreditation review of 1993, could not be implemented until the Academic

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Advisory Council, the union, and the Academic Advisory Board had a chance to review it. Clifford hoped the new policy would create a pool of faculty who could serve in informal leadership positions when needed while fostering better innovation in teaching. Few school deans followed Zhao’s lead, apparently, and the expected opportunity for faculty to move into leadership positions was slow to realize.

Perceptions of Faculty Professionalism

In 1986, DLIFLC developed a basic vision that included the goal that it would become “recognized as the premier academic institution specializing in foreign language instruction.” To accomplish that task, the organization set broad sub-goals that included staffing by a cadre of professional faculty, who welcomed responsibility, accountability, and visible leadership of language schools and departments that took the lead in academic innovation. In essence, the institute sought to develop “academic programs where teaching students is more important than teaching the schedule” and would be rewarded through merit pay and rank advancement opportunities.

In July 2002, faculty held a series of meetings designed to improve faculty understanding of the institute’s core institutional competency in “Second Language Acquisition.” Institute leaders had determined that a number of areas required re-emphasis, including in curriculum design and production and in program management. With more funding expected for curriculum development and with DLIFLC needing to maintain about 250 faculty with recent experience in team leader, chair, dean and equivalent staff positions, the institute promised more recognition for those willing to serve in these areas through both merit pay contribution points and consideration in tenure and rank competitions.

The meetings also emphasized that it only took a few bad examples of unprofessionalism among faculty members to taint the school’s reputation as a center of excellence. Public comments about staff behavior and lapses of professionalism served as examples. Staff quoted one student who observed: “I have been a student since August of 2001 and have been taught by many teachers. … I have seen a lot of good teachers who truly care about their students and want to help them learn, others who care but are unable to teach, and still others who don’t even care.” To counteract such complaints, DLIFLC emphasized that professional faculty should:

(1) Care about the institute and its missions;
(2) Be actively engaged in improving their own skills;
(3) Show through their actions that they care;
(4) Refrain from involving students in “school politics”; and
(5) View their job as a profession, not an income.

Despite management’s feeling that faculty needed to rededicate their sense of professionalism, staff also pointed out the recent positive trends. These included the publication of articles about DLIFLC or by its staff in such professional and general publications as Foreign Language Annals and Government Executive, students’ opinions of instruction had actually

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328 DLIFLC, “Faculty Meetings, July 2002,” briefing at “Command Histories\2002\Faculty Meetings 02 July.ppt,” DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.
329 DLIFLC, “Faculty Meetings, July 2002.”
improved despite the quote noted above, faculty were being recognized for their contributions, and DLIFLC had received approval to grant its own college degree.\textsuperscript{330}

Faculty did serve on Faculty Advisory Councils (FACs) within the schools and elected representatives to the Academic Advisory Council (AAC), whose chair became Ayca F. Dutertre in May 2001 when Dr. Zeilu “Jim” Zhao, the first AAC chairperson, became dean of Asian School II.\textsuperscript{331} The FACs and AAC were established in 1997 to provide non-supervisory faculty with a voice in academic affairs.

**Proficiency Enhancement Efforts**

Important efforts to improve the proficiency results of DLIFLC students began during this period, most importantly through progress made to develop a new Proficiency Enhancement Program (PEP), as discussed separately in Chapter I.

An important subset of PEP was the Language Enhancement Accelerated Proficiency (LEAP) program. The purpose of LEAP was to “Establish and provide a learning environment that is highly conducive to second language acquisition to improve students’ proficiency through systematically maximizing target language use in the schoolhouse.”\textsuperscript{332} The Provost directed each school to set up a LEAP program but was allowed to use a variety of approaches. LEAP included both on-site and off-site immersion exercises and the use of “language badges” to identify students by target language, useful to both instructors and students to facilitate greater use of the target language outside the classroom. Middle East School I began the first “off-site” immersion exercise from 24 to 26 March 2003 at the Weckerling Center. It was a resounding success. Subsequent to this, immersion exercises were held in Serbian/Croatian and Russian.

An immersion task force led by Dr. Christine Campbell worked to define and refine immersion requirements across the institute. The goal in CY 2004 was to identify a dedicated immersion facility and to institute immersion programs across all basic programs.

On 14 May 2003, Colonel Rice approved the wearing of language badges by students. Thereafter, each basic language program began to issue badges to its students to encourage them to converse in the target language. Dean Ben De La Selva at ELA took the lead in developing and producing the badges. Staff thought the program successful in encouraging students to use their respective target language as much as possible.

**Soldierization vs. Proficiency**

In October 2002, Associate Provost/Dean of Students Lt. Col. William J. Astore began to address school concerns “that soldierization is front-loaded.” The schools were complaining that military training was reducing the overall academic quality and success rate of students. The problem was that the Army sent soldiers to Monterey who were still in Initial Entry Training status. The Army expected DLIFLC to complete the basic training regime of these new soldiers during the first three months that they were in residence. This training was very intensive when the soldiers first arrived in Monterey, with soldiers more focused upon pleasing their drill instructors than working to keep up with their studies, leading some to fall behind. Moreover, these soldiers were tending to arrive with lower DLAB scores, meaning the importance of getting these weaker students into the right learning groove was even more important than

\textsuperscript{330} DLIFLC, “Faculty Meetings, July 2002.”

\textsuperscript{331} Ray Clifford to Ayca F. Dutertre and Stephen Payne, email, 9 May 2001, in “AAC” folder (Ch4 Academic Support), drawer 4, ACH 2001-2003 folder, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

\textsuperscript{332} Dr. Stephen Payne, “Academic Review,” briefing, [2002], in DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.
before. Astore thought the schools understood the importance of soldierization, but school concerns caused him to begin considering the possibility of spreading the military training out to lighten the load during the first few weeks so students could focus more upon strengthening their language and study skills.\footnote{Lt Col William J. Astore to George B. Scott, email, 18 October 2002, in “Student Population” folder, Ch3: Basic Programs file, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

**Schools of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center**

As in previous years, DLIFLC taught basic, intermediate, and advanced resident foreign language instruction in classes organized into schools administered by deans. These schools were sub-divided into departments focused upon a specific language and administered by department chairs. This section discusses significant events and changes within the teaching mission at the institute during the period 2001-2002.

**School Reorganizations**

In 2001, DLIFLC consisted of eight main schools to provide resident instruction in selected basic course foreign languages plus the School of Continuing Education, whose scope expanded in 2003. By the end of 2003, however, changes in DoD requirements for language instruction resulted in the reorganization of a number of the schools. In February 2003, Colonel Rice directed the transfer and relocation of selected language programs to accommodate increasing student enrollment. Effective 10 March 2003, therefore, the Greek and Turkish language programs were transferred from Middle East I (ME I) to the European and Latin American School (ELA). At the same time, he also transferred the Intermediate and Advanced Arabic language programs from ME I and Middle East II (ME II) to SCE, which was preparing to relocate to the new DoD Center, Monterey Bay. Temporarily, these courses were taught using facilities provided by the Monterey College of Law on Franklin Street.\footnote{Col Kevin M. Rice, memorandum: “Transfer and Relocation of Selected Language Programs,” 28 February 2003, in “CH 7 Garrison” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.} Thereafter, SCE managed advanced resident instruction in its Resident School of Continuing Education and through its distance learning programs.

As Department of Defense requirements for Russian language instruction continued to decrease, it became apparent that consolidating the Russian faculty into a single school would lead to greater efficiency and a more streamlined organization. In December 2003, the commandant, Col. Michael Simone, directed that the Russian language program at European II (with the exception of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which moved to SCE) merge with the Russian language program at European I. European I was renamed the Russian Language School. European II (located in Building 848) became the Multi-Language School (MLS), which included Persian-Farsi, Serbian-Croatian, Hebrew (moved from ME I), and Turkish (moved from ME I to ELA and then to MLS).\footnote{Astore, “DLIFLC Command History for CY03: Provost” [5 May 2004].}

A school reorganization in December 2003\footnote{Col Michael R. Simone, memorandum: “Transfer and Relocation of Language Programs,” 29 December 2003, in “CH 7 Garrison” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives; ATZP-DRM to Command Historian, DLIFLC, memorandum: “Annual Historical Summary for CY04,” 26 May 2005, and attachment: “Historical...”} resulted in the following changes to the various school designations:
In 2001, Asian School I Dean Peter Armbrust had to struggle to accommodate changing administrative demands and requirements for teaching Chinese course sections without laying off faculty unnecessarily. In FY 2002, he had to teach 42 sections, requiring 84 instructors, but the section load was to drop as low as 32 in late FY 2003, meaning he would have to cut faculty by up to twenty positions. Of course, if the section requirement went up later, it would create a significant problem because of how difficult it was to hire or rehire and train new faculty later. This decline was greater than the 10 percent fluctuations school deans were expected to negotiate. Moreover, he had ten Chinese faculty on loan to other school divisions and worried that their return might cause him to have to release even more faculty. Clifford responded that “we are working hard to create the stability you need.” He explained that he was trying to get funding for course development for a ten-year curriculum replacement cycle and that would mean employing five Chinese faculty for development work at all times. He was also trying to work with the SMDR process to provide training support to the field, similar to how faculty positions were allotted to resident courses. This would allow the schools to plan better for staffing of Video Teletraining (VTT) and Mobil Training Team (MTT) positions. In the meantime, Clifford wanted to place a cap on the number of maximum Chinese faculty who could be employed for VTT or MTT, the only problem being that there was still not enough Chinese faculty in the VTT and MTT programs, which is why they were being borrowed from Armbrust. Clifford thus suggested that the cap be reduced for FY 2003 or place enough teachers in SCE to handle all the requests beneath the cap. Finally, he told Armbrust that the Chinese faculty on loan to ES would not be returned for at least another year. For FY 2002, therefore, Clifford suggested Armbrust continue hiring Chinese faculty and if any staffing overage did occur, it could be corrected by normal attrition through faculty retirements, resignations, and promotions.337

From 28 January to 1 February 2002, DLIFLC held a Joint Language Training Exercise (JLTX) in which forty-eight Chinese students interrogated “Chinese merchant seamen” and “illegal immigrants,” interpreted for “diplomats,” and interacted with personnel from the Coast Guard Station Monterey and the Naval Postgraduate School. The JLTX provided students an

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opportunity to practice their linguistic skills in a realistic environment, not only via the scenarios but by interacting with other service personnel. The focus in the training was also on the students’ Final Learning Outcomes (FLOs) to accomplish their mission objectives. Coordinators included Maj. David Tatman, Associate Dean of Asian School I, and Coast Guard Lt. Thomas Stuhldreher, commander of the Coast Guard Station Monterey. From the Coast Guard perspective, it was useful to be able to interact with interpreters while practicing boat-boarding, said Stuhldreher, while adding that “It was a good opportunity for Major Tatman’s students to put their language skills to work in a simulated field environment.” Later, students and professors from the Naval Postgraduate School also participated in simulated diplomatic negotiations involving the People’s Republic of China, the Philippines, and the U.S. Navy.  

More generally, in 2001, Asian I worked to update Semester III Curriculum for the Chinese-Mandarin Program, provided counseling training to faculty in how to analyze a student’s learning problems to develop a learning strategy for that student. The school also introduced a realistic end-of-course scenario called “Storm over the Spratleys” with help from the Naval Postgraduate School and Coast Guard. This program faced the same hurdles as other Asian I efforts in dealing with continued growth, limited space, and faculty shortages. Increasing enrollments led Asian I to create a new teaching team, bringing the total number of teams to thirteen. However, this decision also created a “severe space-shortage problem” and hiring the faculty was difficult for lack of a suitable candidate pool compounded by a continuing need to share faculty for evaluating and sustaining the institute’s mission. For students a highlight of 2001 was the annual 2001 Speech Contest in San Francisco where 31 DLIFLC students competed among 480 contestants, winning 14 awards, including one 1st Place, three 2nd Place, and five 3rd Place awards.

In 2002, Asian I consolidated its intermediate and advanced programs into a single department while continuing to support Curriculum Development and VTT/MTT requirements at multiple locations. During 2002, Asian I improved upon its proficiency FLO results over 2001, increasing its L2/R2/S1+ graduation rate from 90 to 96 percent with the number of L2+/R2+/S2 graduates moving from 23 to 36 percent.

Throughout 2003, the organizational structure of Asian I School remained the same with the Office of the School Dean overseeing three Chinese Departments (A-C), including seventy-four civilian faculty who taught thirty-four sections, and one Multi-Language Department (Japanese, Tagalog, Thai, Vietnamese). An important change in leadership took place, however, when Dean Peter Ambrose left the school at the end of 2002 to become the DLI liaison at Garmisch. Dean Luba Grant, who had served as the dean of Middle East II since 1993, assumed his duties as the dean at Asian I in January 2003. Capt. Ian Tudlong became the associate dean in January 2003, replacing Major Tatman who was transferred to the Emerging Languages Task Force. Tudlong departed in July and Maj. Jaime Adames then became the associate dean.

As of 15 April 2003, the number of civilian instructors in Asian I School, including team leaders, was: twenty-three in both Chinese Departments A and C; twenty-six in Chinese

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Department B; and twenty in the Multi-Language Department for a total ninety-two teachers plus four department chairs. Perhaps the most significant change during 2003 was that six instructors and eight intermediate/advanced courses were transferred to SCE in November.  

The three Chinese departments continued their revision of the Chinese Basic Course during the year. Perhaps a good informal indicator of Asian I’s increasing performance results came during the 28th Mandarin Speech Contest of California held the first week of April 2003. Asian I sent forty-seven students who competed for thirty-seven prizes. Institute students won seventeen, including three 1st Place, three 2nd Place, five 3rd Place, and six Honorable Mention awards. Asian I’s language students outperformed their counterparts from several prestigious universities and colleges, including the University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford University. Also worthy of mention was that Sfc. Scott Brokaw, Chief MLI, won the DLIFLC MLI of the Year Award for 2003.  

Asian Schools II and III

The mission of Asian II School was to teach the Korean language and culture according to the guidelines of the Defense Foreign Language Program to support DoD and other federal agencies. Under Dean Dr. Jim Zhao throughout this period, the Office of the Dean provided supervisory and administrative oversight and program management. The office itself included an executive officer, a chief MLI, two academic specialists, and an information technology officer. In 2001, Asian II was organized into six departments (A-F), but that would soon change.  

In April 2001, Colonel Rice indicated to key staff the likelihood in the next year that he would “make the decision to go with an additional Korean School” to accommodate growth in the Korean program. Provost Ray Clifford then asked John Dege to take the lead in defining the school’s organization. By May, Rice had indeed decided to split the two schools and the selection of a new permanent dean for “Asian III” began. At the same time, Rice decided to move Asian II to Munakata Hall. Staff planned the move to take place between June and November 2001. This meant that the existing occupant of Munakata, ELA, would also have to relocate, a decision made because ELA was being downsized. Staff prepared to relocate in December 2001, during the Winter Holiday break, and hoped to maintain the integrity of their team assignments.  

To create a new Korean school, Clifford and Dege divided the existing faculty between Asian II and the new Asian III. They asked Zhao, because of his personnel knowledge, to divide the faculty, although Zhao did not know which school he himself would administer. Clifford chose Dr. Hiam Kanbar, a department chairperson in Middle East I, as the dean of Asian III. The school then moved into Building 611, which was later named “Collins Hall” (see Chapter V).  

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347 Kevin Rice to Kathy Moore and Ray Clifford, email, 16 April 2001, and Ray Clifford to John Dege, email, 23 April 2001; both in “Korean Program” folder (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.  
348 Ray Clifford to Col Kevin Rice, email, 15 May 2001, in “Korean Program” folder (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
With the creation of Asian III, Asian II was divided into three departments (Korean A-C), each of which was further sub-divided into five teaching teams. Asian II retained its intermediate and advanced programs until these were transferred to SCE in late 2003 as part of an over-arching reorganization of the institute. The mission of the new Asian III School was the same as Asian II—to train military personnel in the sixty-three-week Korean Language Basic Course. It, too, consisted of three departments (Korean A-C), all under Dean Kanbar, who continued to run the school through 2003. Kanbar’s staff included a total of seventy-five civilian teachers and seven civilian administrative and support staff personnel, teaching basic Korean.

To create a new school, Rice had first obtained TRADOC authorization to increase civilian staffing necessary to operate it. In making his case, Rice emphasized that DLIFLC’s success was not judged upon quantity of its output, but the quality of its graduates and that, therefore, effectiveness was more important in organizational terms than the efficiency of having one large school. “When it comes to language instruction, smaller is better,” he argued. Moreover, supervision was “flat” at DLIFLC, meaning there was only two levels of supervisors (the dean and department chairs) in each school. According to Clifford, the optimum size of a school should be forty-eight instructors per dean with the maximum size no more than twice that. Whenever the institute had reduced the size of a school, he declared, the proficiency of the graduates from that school increased. For example, Clifford explained that the Chinese program obtained its greatest proficiency improvement when that program had the smallest school. With an increased student load, just to maintain an average school size of eighty-five instructors per school, said Clifford, DLIFLC had to form an eighth school. Thus, he supported the creation of Asian III to help stimulate the proficiency of Korean language students using a proven administrative model governing the ratio of instructors to supervisors.

The Korean Basic program continued to grow after the expansion. Asian II added two new teaching teams in August and December 2003, one each in Departments A and B. The number of Korean Basic program sections also increased from thirty-five to forty-one, and the average number of students increased from approximately 290 to approximately 380 (a 24 percent increase in student population). However, in December, all intermediate/advanced program classes moved from Asian II to SCE, located at the DoD Center, Monterey Bay. The move involved the coordinated transfer of eleven students and seven faculty members. During the same year, Asian III had to hire more than twenty teachers to backfill the retirements and/or resignations and increase the number of classes and sections. One notable change in personnel was the retirement of Associate Dean Maj. Brent Helmick, who retired from the U.S. Air Force on 12 May 2003. He was succeeded by Capt. Robert Swenson, also of the Air Force. Dr. Sahie Kang, Department C Chairperson, was appointed the dean of Middle East II School in January 2003, and was succeeded by Mr. Yong S. Kim.

Other activities in the two Korean schools during this period included installation of Technology Enhanced Classroom II (TEC II) suites, which included whiteboards and other computer equipment. Asian II installed forty-three such suites by January 2003 and put another ten suites in that August. This meant that all Asian II classrooms, split rooms, and the Analog

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351 Ray Clifford to Col Kevin Rice, email, 24 May 2001, in “Korean Program” folder (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
352 Zhao, Memorandum for Command Historian, 12 April 2004.
Lab were equipped with the TEC II equipment. Asian III installed the high-tech whiteboards and relevant support equipment into its classrooms and breakout rooms early in 2003.

On 20 June 2003, Asian II held a student Speech Contest in the Tin Barn. Representatives from all classes participated, presented speeches, and competed against students in the same semester of language training. Asian II also held a student essay contest on 6 October 2003. Students wrote essays demonstrating appropriate-level mastery of structural control or grammar, lexical control or vocabulary, organization, penmanship, and handwriting. Faculty from both Asian II and III also participated in the creation of an archive of Listening Exercises in which over eight hundred authentic-material exercises. Select faculty and the academic specialists completed the curriculum revision of KP 140, Humanities and Area Studies I.

**Korean Program Challenges**

In October 2002, ES implemented use of its newly developed Korean DLPT (Forms C/D/E). Basic program graduation rates then plummeted below 50 percent—and in some classes below 30 percent (see Appendix B). Complaints from the field erupted—the new test was too hard. Nevertheless, DLIFLC moved to invalidate older DLPT versions and argued “that the new Korean DLPT is a truer reflection of the 2/2 standard.” In fact, the upgraded DLPT was the result of efforts to improve the proficiency of graduating Korean program students. For many years, field commanders had complained that these students were weaker than the existing L2/R2/S1+ standard indicated. DLIFLC agreed and moved to improve both its instruction and evaluation. NSA then provided funds to validate the new Korean DLPTs (Forms C/D/E). No one questioned the accuracy of these new tests, at least initially. They were considered the most rigorously calibrated DLPTs ever developed.

Concerned by the falling scores, both Korean language schools and the Office of the Provost conducted a detailed review and determined that the main challenge was to improve listening students’ comprehension. Many factors complicated the challenge, including the variability of teaching team quality in the Korean program, grade inflation, curriculum and testing issues, and the inherent difficulty of the Korean language.

As an interim measure, Rice directed that all Korean students take both the A/B and the C/D/E versions of the listening portion of the DLPT until February 2004, reporting only the A/B results as the students’ official results (for listening only) and using the C/D/E version for comparative purposes.

Meanwhile, the deans of Asian II and III, Dr. Zhao and Dr. Kanbar, developed an aggressive response the produced results. Their response included: the reconstitution of teaching teams that performed inconsistently; the development of mid-course and end-of-course tests to

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354 Zhao, Memorandum for Command Historian, 12 April 2004.
356 Zhao, Memorandum for Command Historian, 12 April 2004.
357 Zhao, Memorandum for Command Historian, 12 April 2004.
358 Lt Col Patrick Smith to Martha Hertzog, Glen Nordin, et al, email, 2 January 2003, in “Korean Program” folder (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
360 “Background Paper for COL Rice,” 12 February 2003, in “Korean Program” folder (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. There were later doubts about the validity of the calibration of the listening portion of the C/D/E Korean DLPTs. See William J. Astore to Daniel L. Scott, email, 14 February 2005, in “Korean Program” folder (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
measure student proficiency accurately (prior to taking the DLPT); the development of improved curriculum that stressed directed, non-participatory listening; greater use of authentic materials in the classroom; increased emphasis on faculty development, including English language and computer skills; and more effective use of immersion experiences, field trips, and language badges. By the end of the year, listening success rates in Korean (using the new forms of the DLPT) approached 60 percent.362

Asian III implemented additional measures to help improve student performance during this period. First, it stopped evening or “Nite Owl Enhancement” study in lieu of “7th Hour” or daytime training during part of the lunch hour. Dean Kanbar ordered this change to take advantage of the duty day when teachers were more readily available, and to decrease the level of fatigue faculty and students faced prior to DLPT testing. Evening Study Hall, however, continued as a separate program. In January 2003, Asian III also changed its approach to post-DLPT training by establishing a post-DLPT teaching team devoted to improving those areas students did not pass. This method replaced the less desirable option of placing a poor-performing student into an ongoing lower-level class. According to Asian III, this technique seemed to be successful. Finally, on 7 April 2003, Asian III implemented a new grading scale for all unit tests to provide a more accurate assessment of student progress. Each specific unit divided the new grading scale because each unit had different levels of emphasis regarding listening, reading, and speaking. The new grading scale “did lower some grade point averages,” but student complaints gradually declined as upper students graduated. At the same time, Kanbar developed a test-grading cadre to provide an objective and unbiased scoring of all internal unit tests. The cadre included teachers from other teaching teams and the department MLIs to cross check the validity of the answers as students might use different words but could have the same answers.363

To improve faculty performance, Asian III promoted professional development by coordinating English as a Second Language (ESL) training for the Korean faculty. This training focused both on speaking and teaching based upon the use of modern technology, especially important since installation of the whiteboards and support equipment. The California State University, Monterey Bay, conducted the ESL training for twelve weeks. Initial planning began in September 2003, but actual classes began 1 October 2003. Ten teachers attended the training, which Asian III believed improved their presentation and technology skills. Asian III planned another iteration and hoped to include instructors from other schools in subsequent years.364

In addition to teaching and student issues, both Asian II and III observed Korean Independence Day on 15 August 2003 II, an annual event made especially symbolic as in 2003 it celebrated the 50th anniversary of the armistice of the Korean Conflict. Both faculty and students spent the day participating in outdoor activities at the Price Fitness Center. On 9 October 2003, Asian III also celebrated Korean Language Day in the Tin Barn. Vocal performances and dances entertained faculty and students alike. In addition, students received awards for video and essay submissions. Asian III also provided support for the annual DLIFLC Language Day and Worldwide Language Olympics.365

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Between 2001 and 2003, the European and Latin American School (ELA), under the leadership of Dean Ben De La Selva, taught basic language courses in Czech, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Turkish. In 2002, the Office of the Dean included Associate Dean Major Cardella, who was replaced by Maj. Warren E. Hoy,366 an executive officer, a chief MLI, two administrative assistants, and the chairpersons for two Spanish Departments (A and B) and the Multilanguage Department.367

The program saw major change during this period. First, DLIFLC discontinued its Czech Basic Course in FY 2002, although Dagmar Pavlik stayed on to work on archiving the program’s materials until she retired in 2003. Second, it transferred the Greek Basic Course from Middle East School I on 12 March 2003 and finally closed it after the last Greek class graduated in August 2003. Fortunately, Clifford was able to reassign all three Greek instructors to the Evaluation and Standardization Directorate (ES). Effective 12 March 2003, he also transferred the Turkish program to ELA while reassigning three Turkish instructors to ES, but two remained to teach in ELA until December when they were again moved to the newly designated Multilanguage School. According to Lt. Col. James Worm, DLIFLC Resource Manager, the institute made these transfers to accommodate increasing student enrollment in the Arabic program.368 In fact, Dean De La Selva had to relinquish half of Building 632 to the Middle East Schools to accommodate that growth. As a result, ELA’s Italian instructors and students moved into Building 624 in December 2003.369

Despite many retirements and staff changes due to the decline in requirements, new teachers were hired into the French, Italian, and Portuguese program, although several instructors were not native speakers of the target languages but instead displaced teachers from other DLIFLC programs cutting staff. Of note also was that one of the school’s MLIs, Sfc. Frank Everson, completed his graduate program at MIIS and received an MA in Foreign Language Teaching.370

The European and Latin American School continued to adapt technology for learning during this period. For example, current news was videotaped in Microsoft’s Audio Video Interleave format and made available to all classrooms every morning for students’ and/or teachers’ use. The school made continued heavy use of existing multi-media labs. With the ability to send individual files to students for self-paced work, school instructors were able to give students considerable practice with Performance FLOs. The school also continued to upgrade its Spanish audio and video programs, including forty-eight dialogues of the Old Spanish Course. An even bigger change, however, took place when the school discontinued use of audiocassettes and began using the first generation of MP3 players, which were considered “top notch.” However, the company discontinued them and later substitute players were of

367 DLIFLC&POM Staff Directory, April 2002.
lesser quality. De la Selva insisted that his teachers be computer-literate, apply the Internet and SCOLA to coursework, and be able to grapple with technological change by learning how to digitize audio and video files. By February 2003, every ELA classroom was equipped with a whiteboard, which teachers could then use to deliver all course text, audio, and video materials live in the classroom.\footnote{De La Selva, “Historical Report, CY03, European and Latin American School,” 9 April 2004; “Minutes from the 05-07 Mar 2002 Annual Performance Review,” 9, in “Annual Program Review 5-7 March 2002” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

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<tr>
<th>FY 02 LANGUAGE</th>
<th>GRADS</th>
<th>DISENROLLMENTS</th>
<th>L2/R2/S1+</th>
<th>L2+/R2+/S2</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>ADMIN</td>
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<td>2 3.0%</td>
<td>3 3.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
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(*) Czech and Greek were discontinued; Turkish moved to MLS.\footnote{De La Selva, “Historical Report, CY03, European and Latin American School,” 9 April 2004; “Minutes from the 05-07 Mar 2002 Annual Performance Review,” 9.}

*Figure 10 ELA statistics, FY 2002 and FY 2003*

Beyond the efforts listed above, De La Selva devised a program of in-school language immersion for European and Latin American School students to participate in halfway through their respective basic courses. The students signed a pledge promising to use the target language and then received a special immersion badge to remind them (and others) to use the target language. Later, the European and Latin American School took the lead in designing, producing, and coordinating the use of immersion badges for all the twenty-plus languages taught at the Presidio. The school established immersion rules and badge award ceremonies for its Spanish and other students. School officials believed that this program noticeably increased the use of target languages in the schoolhouse.\footnote{De La Selva, “Historical Report, CY03, European and Latin American School,” 9 April 2004; “Minutes from the 05-07 Mar 2002 Annual Performance Review,” 9.}

Of course, the school also conducted many other activities during this period, including hosting educators and students from various school districts and universities, providing informative orientations on the school’s mission to military and government-affiliated VIPs, and by participating in Language Day and World Wide Language Competition activities.
Figure 10 depicts ELA statistics for FY 2003 as compared to FY 2002. Underlined numbers signify the statistic went up, and italicized numbers signify the number went down. As the graph shows, academic attrition for the school as a whole went down, while proficiency in both L2/R2/S1+ and L2+/R2+/S2 went up.

**European School I/Russian Language School**

European School I, under the leadership of Dean Deanna Tovar from 2001 through 2003, was located in ten separate (and many historical) buildings on the south side of Soldier Field on the Presidio of Monterey. European I housed both the Russian and Serbian/Croatian training courses. Organizationally, European I was composed of the Office of the School Dean, two Russian Basic Language Departments (A and B), one Serbian/Croatian Basic Language Department, a Russian Intermediate/Advanced Language Department, and a Serbian/Croatian Course Department (curriculum).374

During 2003, European I saw major changes and staff reductions driven by declining requirements. Before this change, the number of instructors, including department chairs, team leaders, and course developers, was 101, which included 53 Russian, 31 Serbian-Croatian, 1 academic specialist, 5 administrative support staff, and 11 MLIs.

In 2001, Ms. Claudia Bey, a recent hire, became the Serbian/Croatian Department chair and oversaw efforts, assisted by the Navy, to develop improved Serbian/Croatian 140 (area studies) curriculum materials and tests. The department also worked on “Semester II Final Learning Objectives” for the audio labs and a task-based intermediate program.375 Outdated curriculum had proven to be a significant challenge during the year, especially because 50 percent of the faculty had worked at DLIFLC for two years or less. The department hired four new faculty in FY 2001, but was still so short of teaching staff that it had to delay faculty professional development. The problem was not funding but finding qualified candidates. The Serbian/Croatian Department also began its first intermediate course in 2001. The course was reliant upon the Internet.376

In July 2001, the Presidio of Monterey Police Department conducted a physical security inspection of European I to check on the correction of deficiencies identified in an April 2000 inspection. European I was located in a series of historic buildings adjacent to Soldier Field on the Lower Presidio of Monterey. European II, although located in Nicholson Hall, a relatively new building on the Upper Presidio, also failed the inspection. Chief of Police Alexander Kerekes had to report to Col. William Dietrick, U.S. Army Garrison Commander, that both schools had again failed the inspection. European I “had no control over keys and the building security process” while European II actually told the inspector “not to re-inspect until they are ready,” which insured that Dietrick reported the problem to Colonel Rice to gain his support in “dropping the hammer.” Rice moderated in saying that there were a number of new associate deans and “give them a chance to fix the problem,” but he also added: “This isn’t difficult and I’m tired of hearing excuses on why we can’t figure out how to lock our buildings before we go home.” Clifford protested that European I was trying to fix the problem and that there was more to the story. The school had recalled its keys, but many illegal copies were apparently still in

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use. Funding to rekey the school was not available so faculty were asked to log in with the staff duty officer whenever they worked late, but these officers frequently told faculty that it checking in was not necessary. Clifford reminded everyone that faculty who were working late on their own time were usually preparing lesson plans or grading student work and this was unpaid overtime and a great asset to the institute. A solution proposed was to seek funding for European I (and Asian I located in the 1903 “Buffalo Soldier” barracks above Soldier Field) to purchase and install new keyless entry technology, that is, electronic door locks. Rice supported this approach. The Director of Public Works then began to develop a $150,000 proposal to rekey all DLIFLC academic buildings with such technology, because there would be major benefits in an economy of scale approach. The plan was to use end-of-year funds. Unfortunately, no building had fewer than ten external doors and the cost to install card-reading locks on all of them was prohibitive. Rice decided that the solution was to require better enforcement of locked doors after the end of the duty day.

During 2003, European I worked to reduce its 16 percent attrition rate and did successfully lower it to 10 percent prior to the major reorganization at the end of the year. In her annual report for this period, Dean Tovar credited this success to the hard work and devotion of the faculty and staff. Despite such hard work, however, many faculty and staff members retired in April 2003, and with them, as Tovar sadly expressed, went many years of experience and knowledge, although nothing could replace the years of training they gave the many students that passed through the school. In June 2003, a staff and faculty photo was taken on Soldier Field. It represented the last time that the Russian and Serbian/Croatian language staffs served together under the name of European School I.

In 2003, there were more changes. First, in August, DLIFLC decided that the Intermediate and Advanced Russian Courses, to include six faculty and staff members and their students, should become part of SCE, in conjunction with the same decision affecting all other schools. These courses were moved from Building 204 on the Presidio to the DoD Center, Monterey Bay at the former Fort Ord where SCE was located. The actual move took place in December 2003. At the same time, the Serbian/Croatian Department moved from European I (Buildings 204-207) to European II (Building 848). This reorganization marked the end of an era when the Russian Department had been the largest program at the institute and had occupied two large schools. With the consolidation of Russian Basic Courses within European I that December, DLIFLC officially re-designated European I as the Russian Language School.

In addition to its reorganization, European I conducted a Joint Language Training Exercise (JLTX) at the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) training site at the former Fort Ord in July 2003. Shortly after this event, which included participation by all schools, the training area suffered fire damage and had to be closed to future exercises. As a result, the schools gradually reconfigured the JLTX, which evolved into a new format—the institute’s now well-known school immersion program. With MOUT no longer available, European I followed the lead of Middle East I, which had begun conducting three-day immersion trainings at the

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380 Russian Language School, Memorandum for the Commander, 5 April 2004.
Weckerling Center on the Presidio of Monterey in March 2003. European I marked its transition from the JLTX program to the Immersion Program when the Serbian/Croatian Department began its first immersion at Weckerling in October 2003. Russian immersions training events at Weckerling soon followed.

From January to December 2003, European I produced 346 graduates of the 2,363 students who attended DLIFLC, which gave the school 14.6 percent of the total number of graduates. These graduates included students from the Russian and Serbian/Croatian Basic, Intermediate, and Advanced Courses. The total number of students graduating from European I with a L2/R2/S1+ was 283, which was 81.7 percent of the school’s total graduates. Several Commandants’ and Provost’s Awards were presented to these graduates. In 2003, the institute also awarded its first AA degrees to those students completing the required criteria and nineteen of them were European I students.

In 2003, European I was the first school selected to receive the TRADOC-funded modern Classroom XXI computer lab. With the help of an assigned contractor, the school quickly began training faculty and staff to utilize the new technology in the new language-training lab.

In 2003, European School I presented six Commandant Awards, the highest award presented to a student at graduation; eight Provost’s Awards; one Maxwell D. Taylor Award; one Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) Award; one Martin J. Kellogg Award; one Kiwanis Award; and one Certificate of Academic Achievement.

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381 Samuel Lipsky to Col Kevin Rice, et al, email, 27 March 2003, in “Arabic at DLIFLC” folder (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. See Middle East I section for more details.
382 Russian Language School, Memorandum for the Commander, 5 April 2004.
383 Russian Language School, Memorandum for the Commander, 5 April 2004.
384 Russian Language School, Memorandum for the Commander, 5 April 2004.
385 Maj Geraldine G. Gainey to Command Historian, DLIFLC, email attachment: “Yearly Historical Report for 2003,” 19 April 2004. According to the DLIFLC General Catalog, January 2003: “Several graduation awards are presented in recognition of exceptional academic achievement in foreign language study. In addition to academic excellence, these awards are based on the student’s efforts to broaden his or her knowledge of the geographical, political, and cultural milieu in which the target language is spoken, as well as on personal accomplishments that reflect credit upon the U.S. Armed Forces. A number of other awards are made to outstanding students at the end of the program. With the exception of the Certificate of Academic Achievement, these awards are given in each language category (I, II, III, and IV) during the graduation ceremony:

The Commandant’s Award is based on academic achievement (GPA of 3.7 or higher or DPLT scores of L2/R2/S2 or higher), high interest in foreign language study, and contributions made to local, academic, and military communities.

The Provost’s Award is based on academic achievement (candidate is in the top five percent of his/her class and attains a DLPT score of L2/R2/S2 or higher).

Other awards include:
The Maxwell D. Taylor Award is presented for academic achievement (GPA of 3.7 or higher or DLPT score of L2/R2/S2 or higher and military performance).
The Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) Award and the Martin J. Kellogg Award are each presented for exceptional achievement in the understanding of a foreign culture as well as academic achievement (GPA of 3.7 or higher or DLPT score of L2/R2/S2 or higher).
The Kiwanis Award is presented for academic achievement (GPA of 3.7 or higher or DLPT scores of L2/R2/S2 or higher) and achievement in understanding a foreign culture to recipients demonstrating the potential to be creditable representatives of the U.S. during an overseas assignment.”

Originally, European School II consisted of two programs: Persian-Farsi and Russian. As with European I, European II underwent major changes during this period. In conjunction with the school-wide reorganization, the commandant transferred European II’s Russian Basic Program to European I in December 2003 except for the DTRA Russian program. Simultaneously, the chancellor transferred European I’s Serbian/Croatian Department to European II, which also acquired Hebrew and Turkish. As a result European II was renamed the Multi-Language School.386

Dr. Mahmood Taba-Tabai served as dean of European II in 2001 until becoming head of the OEF Task Force after which (from 2002) John Dege served as the dean. Maj. Peter Huller served as associate dean until his retirement from the Army in April 2003. Capt. Harry Nitschke, another Army officer, served as interim associate dean until Maj. Charles Mazzarella, an Air Force officer, arrived in August 2003. The dean was assisted by an executive officer and a chair for each department. Until the end of 2003, European II had five departments, two for Persian-Farsi (A and B) and three for Russian (A, B, and C). It also employed one academic specialist and from April 2003 a part-time assistant from the Faculty Development Division. In 2003, the Persian Department’s staff grew to forty-eight teachers.387

In 2001, all European II classrooms were equipped with the new whiteboard technology and instructors received training on using the technology to teach.388 By 2003, all teachers had acquired computers and were using the Internet and a shared computer drive to advance student learning. The latter practice enhanced the learning process by allowing faculty members to review teaching materials in one location. Moreover, European II digitized, reviewed, and revised Persian-Farsi “Threshold Books.”389

Persian-Farsi

By the end of 2001, the institute employed some thirty-two instructors of Persian-Farsi. However, after 9/11 U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf increased and the Navy requested more Persian-Farsi linguists. In early 2002, staff had to scramble to meet projections that would increase the enrollment in the Persian-Farsi Program by one-third. Some thirty-seven instructors would be needed by March 2002 with forty-five needed by September 2002 culminating in a total need for fifty-one instructors for most of 2003.390 Ultimately, this translated into the need to hire twenty instructors, a demanding task, given how hard it was to find native heritage speakers who both spoke English and who had some teaching experience. The need to have these instructors onboard two months early to process and train them created additional pressure.391

A final problem was that the age of course curriculum. By March 2002, the Persian-Farsi Program was beginning to implement a “standardized end-of-course test,” including the introduction of “authentic materials” into the curriculum to cope with the fact that the course was

390 “Persian-Farsi Instructors Needed,” chart in “OEF Issues” folder, RG 46.01.06-01, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
391 Mahmood Taba-Tabai to Stephen Payne, email, 23 November 2001, in “OEF Issues” folder, RG 46.01.06-01, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Presumably, the program hired sufficient staff, but existing data for the period is limited.
forty-years old. In 2003, European II introduced Joint Language Training Exercises for all Persian classes. Next, as discussed under Curriculum Development, it contracted through MIIS to develop a new Persian-Farsi Basic Course. By the end of 2003, MIIS, had submitted the first four units of materials to the departments for review and projected completion of the first semester by September 2004, although the project eventually proved unsuccessful. The Persian Department also participated in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Babylon Translation Project and translated more than 2,000 pages of text.

Although beset with problems, the Persian-Farsi program produced a high rate of proficiency in its graduates. In 2003, 88.5 percent of graduates reached ILR proficiency levels of L2/R2/S1+.

**Russian**

In 2001, the Russian Program introduced a major initiative using diagnostic speaking interviews. Staff had gained an increased awareness of the importance of student speaking abilities rather than memorized oral responses and sought to better gauge the development of this student language skill. The program was also focused upon making its course materials more “current and relevant,” bringing the teachers together to determine a standardized testing program, and ensuring students had more opportunities for immersion within the learning environment.

In 2002, the proficiency FLO results for the Russian Basic Program reached 89 percent for L2/R2/S1+ with 29 percent reaching scores of L2+/R2+/S2. As was the case in ELA, Russian students began wearing language badges to support immersion training.

In 2003, the Russian Department continued normal classroom instruction while simultaneously coordinating its move that December. During April 2003, several faculty members participated in a terrorism conference. In May 2003, one team received the Assistant Commandant’s Team Excellence Award for its graduating class. In December 2003, five Russian teachers received the Commandant’s Coin of Excellence for the outstanding results they achieved with their class, ranking tenth among 209 classes that had graduated since record-keeping began.

Throughout this period, European II also remained responsible for providing intermediate and advanced Russian language training to student officers serving with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The thirty-six-week training course supported the agency’s mission to help verify Russian compliance with U.S.-Russian (Soviet) arms control treaties. DLIFLC graduates of the Russian course helped DTRA as monitors and interpreters for arms control

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393 Dege to Raugh, email, 20 April 2004.
397 Dege to Raugh, email, 20 April 2004.
treaty-related inspections in the former Soviet Union and as escorts for Russian inspectors in the United States.  

As previously noted, the institute’s DTRA program remained in European II under Russian Department A after the school was reorganized. The program continued to operate and receive funding according to an existing Memorandum of Approval between DLIFLC and DTRA. In 2002, at the request of DTRA leaders, the institute increased the length of the Russian DTRA courses to forty-seven weeks and also added one additional teacher to perform diagnostic assessments, which required DTRA to increase its funding of the program.  

**Middle East Schools I and II**

The two Middle East Schools both saw significant changes during this period that effectively streamlined and focused them upon the Arabic Basic Program. Middle East School I (ME I) operated under the leadership of Dean Dr. Christine Campbell from 2001 through 2003. From 2001 to 2002, Major Seely was the associate dean, who was followed by Maj. Patricia Parris, who departed in 2003 to study French and to take a position at the U.S. Embassy in France. Maj. Mark Johnson took her place. Capt. Robert U. Hoffman arrived in August to fill the executive officer position and became the associate dean in December 2003 upon the departure of Johnson.  

In 2001, ME I consisted of the Office of the School Dean, four Arabic departments (A-D), and a Multi-Language Department consisting of Greek, Hebrew, and Turkish branches. In 2003, however, several changes in the organizational structure of the school followed changes in DoD requirements for language support. Colonel Rice intended these changes to help free up classroom space. As noted above, effective 10 March 2003, Rice transferred the Greek and Turkish language programs from ME I to the European and Latin American School (ELA). About the same time, he also transferred the Intermediate and Advanced Arabic Programs from ME I and Middle East II (ME II) to SCE, which was preparing to relocate to the new DoD Center, Monterey Bay. The result was a further staff reduction in ME I of sixteen instructors. The final transfers and relocations occurred late in the year. Effective 23 December 2003, thirteen Hebrew instructors—the entire Hebrew Department, in fact—moved to the newly created Multi-Language School. Thereafter, ME I consisted of the Office of the School Dean and four Arabic departments with eighty-eight Arabic teachers.  

Luba Grant served as ME II dean until 5 January 2003, when Dr. Sahie Kang took over. Maj. Joseph P. Sidor and Maj. Johnson served as associate deans in 2001 and 2002 respectively until replaced by Lt. Col. Joseph W. Patterson. Like ME I, Middle East School II trained military personnel in the sixty-three-week Arabic Basic Course and, until April 2003, intermediate level courses. The school was composed of one dean, one associate dean, one chief

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398 Clare Bugary to Richard Gibby, email, 30 October 2002; and Richard Gibby to Clare Bugary, email, 21 November 2002; both in “DTRA/OSIA” folder (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.  
399 Bugary to Gibby, email, 30 October 2002; and Gibby to Bugary, email, 21 November 2002.  
400 DLIFLC&POM Staff Directories, 2001-2003.  
402 Col Kevin M. Rice, memorandum: “Transfer and Relocation of Selected Language Programs,” 28 February 2003, in “CH 7 Garrison” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Until the DoD Center opened, faculty taught these upper division courses using facilities provided by the Monterey College of Law on Franklin Street.  
403 Capt Robert Hoffman, Memorandum for Commander, 16 April 2004, in “ACH2003 ME1” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.  
military language instructor, four civilian administrative aides, and two academic specialists. The dean oversaw four departments, each with a chairperson, with twenty teaching teams and a total of ninety-four civilian teachers and ten military instructors. After April 2003, all ME II teaching teams taught only the Arabic Basic Course, because Rice transferred all intermediate-level classes to SCE along with their teaching teams and eight instructors.\(^{405}\)

In January 2001, DLIFLC completed the renovation and replacement of equipment for ME II’s audio/listening facility in building 620.\(^{406}\) Teachers from each department began to gain experience in the use of the newly installed “Multi-Media Language Lab.” In April 2003, ME II also welcomed the installation of classroom and breakout room whiteboards and support equipment as part of the institute’s ongoing effort to upgrade language-training technology.\(^{407}\)

On 23 February 2001, ME I and ME II co-sponsored a Joint Language Training Exercise with eighty-eight Arabic linguists. The training incorporated lessons learned from field experience in Bosnia and Kosovo because it included MLIs or platoon sergeants who had served there. The exercise put students through five “lanes” or training experiences similar to what soldiers had experienced in previous peace-keeping missions, including, for example, interpreting between U.S. commanders and a local police chief about allegations of U.S. troop misconduct or the challenging guard post duty on the line between warring local factions. During this drill, students had to gather information on both sides while keeping the gate open and preventing weapons or guerillas from passing. Students also had to move between recorded voice and live voice sessions. “All of these lanes [drill stations] are designed to give substance to what we are teaching every day in the classroom,” said Capt. Brian Soldon, C Company, 229th MI Battalion, “and to expose students to what they could face…in the field.” The program, which began in the late 1990s, had no official proof of its effectiveness, Soldon admitted, but “there is nothing else we could have done that would have been such a confidence booster,” he concluded.\(^{408}\)

On 19 and 23 Mar 2001, ME II hosted Lt. Col. Rick Francona (Ret.) for a series of presentations about his experiences as an Arabic linguist and U.S. Air Force intelligence officer in the Middle East.\(^{409}\) That same month, ME II hosted educators from Salt Lake City for a school orientation.\(^{410}\)

On 24 September 2001, two weeks after 9/11 and explicitly to support a projected long war against international terrorism, ME II proposed an “Arabic Enhancement” program. The program would have extended supplemental training to Arabic Basic Course students with demonstrated potential who were to attend an additional optional course of thirty-five weeks. Staff expected this additional training to help Basic Course graduates obtain L3/R3/S2+ proficiency. Other course suggestions included new offerings in Arabic dialects.\(^{411}\) Although this program was not approved, the schools expected their enrollments to climb.

\(^{405}\) Sahie Kang, Memorandum: “Middle East School II Annual Historical Report,” [January 2005], in “ACH2003 ME2” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

\(^{406}\) Maj Joseph P. Sidor, “Middle East School II 2nd Quarter FY01 (Jan - Mar 01) Historical Report,” 24 April 2001, in DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.


\(^{408}\) “It’s Not Just a Training Exercise,” *Globe* 24, no. 3 (April 2001): 8-17.

\(^{409}\) Francona was inducted into the DLIFLC Hall of Fame on 8 November 2006.

\(^{410}\) Sidor, “Middle East School II 2nd Quarter FY01 (Jan - Mar 01) Historical Report,” 24 April 2001.

\(^{411}\) “Arabic Enhancement Program,” info paper in “Schools Middle East II” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
Throughout the fall of 2001, Dr. Pat Boyland conducted extensive research into the feasibility of teaching the Turkmen language at DLIFLC, a language of OEF-interest. This work involved indentifying and reviewing in detail the only known course in existence for that language (written for English-speakers). She made contact with native speakers and possible teachers, helped to develop and disseminate a DLIFLC Turkmen job description, identified sources for teaching materials, especially via the Internet, and transferred this material to the OEF Task Force.412

By March 2002, ME I and ME II had developed a “grammar survey” to help determine the need for grammar training as both focused more upon the notion “to take the student to the country” by using less English in the classroom and by working to further develop a pilot off-site three-day immersion program. The need to conduct the program off-site was important in that school deans could not implement immersion practices outside their own schools. Once teachers released students from class, barring special events like the proposed off-site immersion, they immediately fell under the authority of their military service units, who tended to focus on military training needs. Some thought that drill instructors should begin shouting out PT commands in target languages—an appealing thought to some—but it was not practical for a variety of reasons.413

In March 2003, the school started assigning three instructors per night to provide more contact possibilities for the students during Study Hall. During 2003, ME II also supported the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization regarding End of Course Tests, LangNet Texts, and DLPT V. Two faculty members were transferred to support the Sorani DLPT project and NSA higher-level material development, respectively. ME II also supported Curriculum Development Division by sending two teachers to support the Arabic Basic Course Curriculum Development Project and by helping develop dialect material and recordings of Syrian, Egyptian, and Iraqi Dialect.414

Building upon its training experiences, between 24 and 26 March 2003, ME I pioneered the institute’s first “Off-Site Immersion Experience.” Thirty students and sixteen instructors participated in the two-day long event held at the Weckerling Center. Students remained immersed in the target language for the full two days and conducted numerous practical scenarios and activities. The school soon expanded the exercise to three days and conducted the exercise for each class during its third semester.415 Visitors to the immersion exercise included NSA liaisons Samuel Lipsky and MCPO Rick Elrod. According to Lipsky, “the many hours of coordination, pre-planning and development of pedagogically sound activities were clearly evident.” He further noted that NSA had conducted a hundred similar exercises over many years and knew their value. “What we saw at Weckerling, he continued, “was absolutely one of the best-planned and executed immersions of its type. Students and teachers were engaged in meaningful, realistic communicative activities—many directly related to the Performance FLOs and thus the missions that the students will be performing.” As representatives of NSA, both Lipsky and Elrod urged DLIFLC to incorporate immersion work in all semester basic courses

415 Kang, memorandum: “Middle East School II Annual Historical Report” [January 2005].
and to extend the training to five days, if possible at a dedicated off-site location. He expressed NSA’s willingness “to assist with the planning and organizing of future immersions.”

ME II saw other significant staff changes during 2003. For example, two civilian instructors and two MLIs retired while Dr. Ali Cicke-dag joined the school as an academic specialist on 30 June 2003. Grace Fakhouri, chair of Department B, also left the school on 31 December 2003 to work at Ft. Gordon. She was succeeded by Neween Alwahab. More importantly, however, in April, November, and December 2003, over twenty teachers left the school to support SCE’s new mission for the Arabic Intermediate, Iraqi Familiarization, and 09L courses. These departures included Bahgat W. Malek, chair of Department C, who was recognized and awarded “Chair Emeritus” status on 18 December 2003 after twelve years of service as a chairperson. Malek was succeeded by Mohsen Fahmy. Offsetting these losses, during the same year, the school’s basic student population grew significantly, which required it to hire twenty teachers to backfill the retirements and the increased student load.

In coordination with ME I, ME II hosted the second iteration of the Proficiency Enhancement Program Demonstration Class (PEP Demo). The results showed a significant increase of proficiency scores of all PEP students. During 2003, ME II also administered and scored End of Class tests, established new guidelines and grading procedures for the new Area Studies Book, and reviewed and edited Basic Course tests. On 22 August 2003, ME II held its Biannual Staff Offsite Conference during which five teaching teams received the Teaching Excellence Award for their students’ outstanding exit exams, i.e., over 80 percent of their students passed the listening and reading portions of the test while over 60 percent passed the speaking section. ME II also supported five iterations of Iraqi Familiarization MTT—the school sent three teachers and MLIs to give Iraqi Familiarization courses to troops being deployed to Iraq.

Finally, throughout this period, both Middle East Schools provided support to annual DLIFLC activities, including Language Day and the Worldwide Language Competition.

School for Continuing Education

In February 2000, DLIFLC established the School of Continuing Education, initially known as SCE, to serve as its major outreach program and to relieve training pressure on the resident language schools by incorporating distance learning instruction and other language services into one school. Dean Thomas Parry oversaw SCE and two major restructurings that occurred during this period.

In 2001, as discussed in Chapter II, SCE obtained a large number of staff transferred from teaching positions to work on MREI and who developed the successful GLOSS project. This transfer enabled several successful projects to be completed. For example, in 2002, SCE developed a design template for curriculum developers to use for converting content into the

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416 Samuel Lipsky to Col Kevin Rice, et al, email, 27 March 2003, in “Arabic at DLIFLC” folder (Ch3 Basic Programs), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
417 With an additional academic specialist, it was possible for Middle East II to start various in-house faculty professional development courses, including Reflective Teaching, Text Typography, New Teacher Preparation, Use and Utilization of Smartboards, Use and Utilization of Multi-Media Language Lab, and Advanced Training for Users of Computers, Smartboards, and MMLL.
418 Kang, memorandum: “Middle East School II Annual Historical Report” [January 2005].
419 Kang, memorandum: “Middle East School II Annual Historical Report” [January 2005].
LangNet format without having to wait for programmers, which was a big boost to the management of time resources.\footnote{2002 ACH Notes,“ file in “Command Histories” folder (2002), DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.}

To help determine what linguists in the field were doing to maintain their language abilities, SCE worked with Gunther Mueller, the head of the language department of the U.S. Air Force Academy, to try to raise funds to conduct a cross-service study in 2002. The proposal, which sought a modest sum of $50,000 and was strongly supported by Glenn Nordin in OSD/C3I, was to be conducted by Mueller’s staff for the benefit of all service language sustainment programs. Col. Jeffrey Johnson, Assistant Commandant, thought the proposal should get a kick-off at the May 2002 annual Command Language Program Seminar in Monterey.\footnote{Col Jeffrey S. Johnson to Thomas Parry, et al, email, 28 January 2002, and Johnson to Ray, et al, email, 19 April 2002; both in “Support to Linguists in the Field” folder (Ch4 Academic Support), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

In its 2002 configuration, SCE supported field units and Command Language Programs, provided training for CLP managers, provided better communication between DLIFLC with its customers, and improved the institute’s VTT and MTT programs. SCE was striving to integrate diagnostic assessment services into all its continuing education programs. In 2002, SCE’s major areas of responsibility included:

1. Distance Learning (VTT and MTT),
2. Diagnostic Assessment Services (On hold),
3. CLP Coordination/Support/Special Programs,
4. O9L Translation/Interpretation; and
5. Language Teaching Detachments (LTDs).\footnote{Dr. Thomas S. Parry, “School for Continuing Education: Status Brief FY 2002,” [2002], briefing in DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.}

This organization was temporary, however, for plans were made in 2002 to reorganize SCE in conjunction with its relocation to the DoD Center, Monterey Bay. At that time, SCE acquired all resident non-basic language programs, including SMART, intermediate, advanced, refresher, and DTRA courses.\footnote{Thomas Parry to Barbara Jarvis and Stephen Payne, email, 2 August 2002, in “CH 7 Garrison” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.} In November 2003, the institute formally restructured SCE into the Directorate of Continuing Education (CE), consisting of one school (School for Resident Continuing Education) and three program areas (Distance Learning Programs, Extension Programs, and Field Support and Special Programs) that were each administered by an academic dean. SCE thus became CE and its mission was to “provide post-basic foreign language instruction via resident and non-resident programs to approximately 25,000 DoD and other U.S. government personnel each year to assure full linguist mission readiness.”\footnote{Directorate for Academic Administration, DLIFLC Program Summary, FY03 (DLIFLC, 2003), 89.}

A major reason to reorganize SCE “was the need to streamline administration of course/program development as well as instructional delivery functions by consolidating each within a separate organization.” Thus, all instruction was placed within the school while LangNet program development and all curriculum development/online course development projects were transferred to the new Curriculum Development Division. The new CE also absorbed elements of OPP, which itself was re-organized into DCSOPS. Finally, CE acquired

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  \item[4] Directorate for Academic Administration, DLIFLC Program Summary, FY03 (DLIFLC, 2003), 89.
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all Command Language Program coordination functions, VTT technical support, and the LingNet administrator who supported CE’s role to deliver instruction.\(^{425}\)

Perhaps the major impetus for the changes that took place in SCE/CE during this period was simply the need to make more space available on the Presidio of Monterey for basic course students. Moving CE to the new DoD Center, Monterey Bay, was expensive, however, and in August 2002 Parry moved proactively to ensure adequate funding was provided. He needed funds transferred to administer the newly acquired programs as well as funds to purchase new furniture sufficient to accommodate four instructors per office, funding which had not yet been obtained. Parry was successful in getting funds to outfit his new classrooms with whiteboards and to purchase laptops for all of his instructors, especially those in the VTT/MTT and field support efforts, who frequently traveled.\(^{426}\)

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**Figure 11 Organization of the School for Continuing Education, 2002**

**School for Resident Continuing Education**

The School for Resident Continuing Education (RCE) was organized in November 2003 as a component of the Directorate of Continuing Education with the consolidation of all intermediate, advanced, refresher, and sustainment courses in one location at the DoD Center, Monterey Bay. This school functioned as a resident program and housed all post-basic language instruction taught at DLIFLC. The goals of RCE were to:

1. Provide superior intermediate and advanced-level language instruction for experienced linguists utilizing comprehensive core and tailored curricula, highly-trained faculty, and the use of the latest educational technology;


\(^{426}\) Thomas Parry to Barbara Jarvis and Stephen Payne, email, 2 August 2002, in “CH 7 Garrison” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
(2) Enhance linguists’ global language proficiency with additional emphasis on colloquial as well as more formal usage of the language with the completion proficiency goal of R2+/L2+/S2 for intermediate students and R3/L3/S2+ for advanced students; and

(3) Expand linguists’ knowledge base of the target language region, its cultures, perceptions of the United States, politics, demographics, ethnic diversity, religion(s), and major social and cultural phenomena.

Eight languages—Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, Hebrew, Korean, Persian-Farsi, Russian, Serbian/Croatian, and Spanish—were to be taught in programs ranging from a few weeks for refresher courses to up to a full year for intermediate and advanced courses. Beginning in FY 2004, the DTRA Russian Arms Control Speaking Proficiency Course (RACSPC) was taught in RCE. In total, there were nearly seventy faculty and staff affiliated with the Resident School for Continuing Education with sixty-five permanent and five “when actually employed” (WAE) members.  

**Distance Learning Programs**

SCE provided customized language maintenance and enhancement instruction via distance learning to about 25,000 Defense Department in FY 2002 and other U.S. government personnel. SCE taught over 16,570 instructional hours in DLIFLC’s highest-enrollment languages (as compared with 16,331 hours in FY 2001), and coordinated over 2,120 additional hours of instruction in lower-enrollment languages, with a total of over 1,700 students being taught in 300 separate classes.  

By February 2002, DLIFLC was able to show off its new Video Teletraining Facility (Building 420) to participants in the Annual Program Review. Its new online language support service—LangNet—was also up and running.

By 2003, Distance Learning Programs (DLP) had nearly thirty faculty and staff that performed the following functions:

(1) Refresher, sustainment, and enhancement language instruction via Video Teletraining, Mobile Training Team, and Online Learning;

(2) Development and implementation of innovative methods of technology-mediated delivery, including Broadband Language Training System (BLTS), Other hybrid delivery (i.e., VTT and Online), Integrating GLOSS learning objectives; and

(3) Technology integration at DoD Center, Monterey Bay.

In FY 2003, DLP conducted 16,254 total instructional hours in DLIFLC’s highest enrollment languages. This total included 6,054 hours of VTT instruction to thirty sites (including eighty-one hours of online BLTS instruction), and 10,200 hours of MTT instruction to fifty sites—the latter a 25 percent increase over FY 2002.  

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430 “Distance Learning (DL), Distance Learning via Video Teletraining (VTT), Mobile Training Teams (MTT), and On-Line Learning (OLL),” info paper in DLIFLC *Annual Program Review, 2-3 March 2004* (DLIFLC, 2004), IP-12.
additional hours of VTT and MTT instruction in DLIFLC’s lower-enrollment languages, and taught 1,715 students in 300 separate classes. These numbers dropped precipitously in FY 2004 when DLP taught less than 10,000 total hours due to heavy service member deployments to Iraq.

Extension Programs

Extension Programs (EP) administered SCE’s Language Teaching Detachments (LTDs). LTDs functioned as DLIFLC branch campuses in the field to provide on-site tailored instruction in the target languages through a mixture of formal course and “just-in-time” training for units on a year-round basis. Assigned faculty served rotational assignments to field locations for a period of three to five years to conduct a variety of courses, including proficiency refresher, maintenance, and enhancement, as well as intermediate and advanced language instruction. Some LTD assignments included language for special purposes and emphasized dialects, instruction in translation and interpretation. All faculty members participated in curriculum and course development activities regardless of their assignment.

DLIFLC established the first LTD to train National Guard linguists assigned to the Fort Meade Joint Training Center (JTC) in Maryland in 2002 or early 2003. Initially, the institute had difficulty with limited funding and could only operate such detachments by pulling instructors from its resident programs. It had temporary funds, such as the Emergency Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), but these were not suitable for maintaining a long-term program that would force cutbacks when the funding dried up. Discussions began with NSA representatives to assess LTD alternatives. Fortunately, according to Clare Bugary, then assistant deputy chief of staff for operations (DCSOPS), DLIFLC could fund a minimum of two Arabic and one Korean LTD instructors in FY 2004 by switching unused funds from VTT courses and by converting all Fort Meade language requirements into Arabic and Korean. The program could thus start immediately via DERF funding as the LTD was in the SMDR system for FY 2004.431

By the end of FY 2004, LTDs were established and operating at:

1. Joint Language Center (JLC), Ft. Gordon, Augusta, Georgia (11 teachers);
2. JLC, Ft. Meade, Baltimore, Maryland (11 teachers);
3. National Cryptologic School-Language Learning Center, Baltimore, MD (7 teachers);
4. Hawaii Language Center (Kunia), Hawaii (13 teachers);
5. Southwest Center of Language (Medina), San Antonio, Texas (11 teachers);
6. Foreign Language Training Center Europe (FLTCE), Marshall Center, Germany (1 program manager);
7. Naval Special Warfare Group-1 (NSWG-1), San Diego, California (1 teacher);
8. Naval Special Warfare Group-2 (NSWG-2), Norfolk, Virginia (1 teacher);
9. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas (1 teacher); and

Field Support and Special Programs

Field Support and Special Programs had nearly thirty-five faculty and staff members who performed varied functions. Field Support coordinated the Worldwide Command Language Program (CLP); provided training for CLP managers; developed CLP incentive programs, including a CLP Manager of the Year competition, a DoD Linguist of the Year competition, and a Worldwide Language Competition; and organized special conference and seminars, such as the Annual CLP Managers Seminar. Field Support also provided Combat Interpreter (09L Translator/Interpreter) training for Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers, familiarization language training for non-linguists, and linguist conversion training. 433

Defense Language Institute-Washington

One office subordinate to the DLIFLC commandant was not located at the Presidio of Monterey, but in Washington, DC. 434 The Defense Language Institute-Washington (DLI-W) carried out three important functions: It developed and executed the Contract Foreign language Training Program (CFLTP); managed the training and certification of Russian translators for the Moscow-Washington Direct Communications Link (MOLINK; the famous “hot-line”); and represented DLIFLC in the nation’s capital. Lt. Col. Terrance Sharp, a U.S. Army officer, directed DLI-W and a staff of twelve from 2001 until June 2003, when he was reassigned to the Presidio of Monterey as associate vice chancellor for the SCE. DLI-W Deputy Director Maj. Margarita Valentin served as acting director until she retired from the U.S. Air Force and was replaced by Lt. Col. Zsolt Szentkiralyi, another Army officer, who arrived in September 2003. 435 Valentin was then hired back in a civilian capacity as the deputy director.

Through CFLTP, DLI-W taught foreign languages not provided at the Presidio of Monterey. DLI-W also provided training in languages taught in Monterey, primarily to meet the needs of the U.S. Defense Attaché System and to support military contingency operations for students who could not attend language training in Monterey due to scheduling conflicts.

DLI-W also used contracting to support contingency operational and intelligence needs, including in language training and training support services for deploying units and for short-notice initial acquisition training. In collaboration with the dean of Curriculum Development, DLI-W also assisted in providing content for language familiarization modules the institute was developed to support deploying forces. Finally, DLI-W supported units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan by providing contract instructors to teach with Mobile Training Teams.

The training and certification of Russian translators was DLI-W’s second task, accomplished by two instructors on the DLI-W staff. Despite the end of the Cold War and the advent of other communication systems, MOLINK remained a vital communication tool for the leaders of the two nations.

The final mission of DLI-W was to represent DLIFLC in the Washington area. DLI-W staff participated in various organizations, committees, and programs, including the federal Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR), established to coordinate language issues throughout the federal government, and the Director of Central Intelligence Foreign Language Committee.

434 Technically, DLI-W was located in Arlington (Crystal City), Virginia.
(CIFLC), chartered to provide similar coordination for the various elements of the intelligence community. In addition, DLI-W represented DLIFLC on matters concerning the Defense Foreign Language Program.

In FY 2001, DLI-W taught 490 students in 49 languages. In FY 2003, DLI-W trained a total of 686 students in sixty-three languages. In 2001, 18 percent of this training took place using the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute while about 77 percent of training took place at facilities provided by commercial contractors. DLI-W training was a useful supplement to DLIFLC’s overall mission, although DLI-W’s focus remained to fill gaps in languages for which the military had limited needs. Moreover, while 90 percent of DLIFLC students were enrolled in basic courses in 2001 with 96 percent in enlisted ranks E-6 or below, 44 percent of DLI-W students were field grade officers, reflecting an emphasis on the training of senior staff for more diplomatic, less rote intelligence functions.436

One issue often asked about DLI-W was whether the strategy of hiring contractors to teach less commonly taught languages was sufficiently reliable for military purposes. Colonel Rice maintained that it was. Contractor quality could vary. For example, did the contractor hire native speakers who had advanced degrees and were prepared to work as instructors or did it merely hire anyone who could speak the language? A lot depended upon DLI-W in vetting the contractors, some of whom were quite good, according to Rice. Ideally, Rice would always have a fully qualified language teacher in Monterey do the job, but the student load would never be large enough to teach Chechen, for example, which forced reliance upon DLI-W.437

![DLI-WASHINGTON OFFICE](image)

Figure 12 DLI-W organizational chart, 2001-2002

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437 Col Kevin M. Rice (Ret.), interview by Cameron Binkley and Stephen Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1029-1030), in DLIFLC&POM Archives.
Chapter IV
Academic Support

The following chapter discusses all non-teaching, or academic support functions of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, including those related to academic affairs; language technology and curriculum development; faculty and staff development; educational resource center management; testing research, evaluation and standards; student activities; and Foreign Area Officer program training.

Academic Affairs Directorate

The mission of the Directorate of Academic Affairs (DAA) remained to manage the DLIFLC academic database and provide academic information, reports, and analysis to the chancellor, provost, and school deans on all aspects of academic programs and processes. DAA was responsible for creating and maintaining the systems needed to collect, input, track, monitor, analyze and produce accurate multi-faceted reports on students, faculty, teams, departments, and schools. It also served as the delegated manager of mission work years and utilization of intermittent employees. In addition, DAA was responsible for all DLIFLC registrar functions to include implementation of all academic student policies. It also managed the records of all student actions from initial enrollment through graduation and beyond and all graduation documentation, to include Associate of Arts (AA) degrees, transcripts, diplomas and awards. DAA also ensured that matriculation processes, graduation, and AA degree policies and procedures were observed. It also supplied official student records as appropriate according to relevant laws in a manner similar to typical university registrar offices. DAA also oversaw the institute’s two libraries.

Dr. Alex Vorobiov remained dean of Academic Administration and Ms. Pamela Taylor remained associate dean throughout this period. Roelof Wijbrandus was the chief of Academic Records and registrar from 2001-2002. A number of other key employees assisted DAA, including a data systems manager, a Student Training Administrative Tracking System (STATS) manager, and a registrar assistant.

On 1 February 2001, Vorobiov realigned the division. The Academic Records Division became the Registrar Division while the Program Management Division became the Academic Records Division. By January 2003, the title of Academic Administration changed to Academic Affairs and the office was again realigned to include an Academic Data Office (the former Program Management Division), the Office of the Registrar, an Associate of Arts Degree Office, and the Student Records Office (which kept student transcripts).
In December 2001, Congress authorized DLIFLC to award AA degrees in Foreign Languages.\textsuperscript{442} Having authority, however, was only one step in the degree-granting process. To grant degrees, DLIFLC had to seek approval from the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges (ACCJC), Western Association of Schools and Colleges. The ACCJC awarded degree-granting status on 1 May 2002. Once fully accredited, DLIFLC graduates could receive up to forty-five college credit hours toward an AA degree and they could acquire that degree from the institute by transferring additional coursework. With authority to grant degrees, the institute through DDA became responsible for maintaining this student data, certifying student compliance with the requisite standards, and awarding degrees to those students who had fulfilled the requirements. DLIFLC awarded its first two AA degrees in foreign language to two Army enlisted students who graduated from the Korean Basic Course on 6 June 2002.\textsuperscript{443} By 8 January 2003, it had granted 185 AA degrees.\textsuperscript{444}

![Figure 13 Organization of the Academic Affairs Office, 2001-2002](image)

As an example of its 2003 workload, DAA processed student data for 105 graduating classes, prepared 2,100 diplomas and transcripts, and processed 175 awards for graduating students. It also prepared 1,073 certificates of attendance and transcripts for students who attended the VTT program, who attended the MTT program, or who did not graduate from DLIFLC. Other actions taken by the registrar in 2003 included:

1. Received and processed 4,042 requests for academic transcripts.
2. Prepared and mailed 9,668 academic transcripts in response to requests.
3. Processed 1,605 student enrollment changes (DLIFLC Form 716).
4. Received and processed 1,645 requests for DLPT score reports.
5. Prepared and mailed 3,656 DLPT score reports.
6. Sent out 2,542 letters to students regarding transcripts, DLPT scores, and deferments.

\textsuperscript{442} As discussed in Chapters II and III and in the \textit{1996-2000 DLIFLC Command History}.

\textsuperscript{443} “Installation Commander’s Quarterly Staff Meeting,” 5 June 2002, briefing slide entitled “Academic Administration,” in “Installation Commander’s Quarterly Staff Meeting” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

(7) Produced 327 transcripts for investigative agencies.
(8) Received 1,019 AA degree petitions.
(9) Certified 331 AA degree recipients.
(10) Continued to manage STATS, which was utilized by both the schools and the military units in tracking their students’ progress. In FY 2003, the number STATS users started increasing in the schools since some of the Military Language Instructors (MLIs) began inputting their own students’ data, rather than the chief MLIs doing all of the input. DAA supported their PCs through installation and maintenance of the STATS program, and maintained the integrity of the database. DAA maintained STATS in approximately 100 PCs.445

Throughout this period, Academic Affairs gathered data, prepared slides, and produced the DLIFLC FY 2001-2003 annual and mid-year program review books, which incidentally have proven to be useful sources of data for DLIFLC command histories. Academic Records also continued to support ad hoc requests for reports and data by the Chancellor’s Office and Command Group, and it continued to support the Student Database System (SDB) by installing, maintaining and validating SDB programs operating on approximately sixty school PCs.446

Libraries

Aiso Library, under the direction of Chief Librarian Peggy Groner, continued to serve the academic information needs of the DLIFLC students, faculty, and staff during this period. Groner also oversaw the Chamberlin Library, which provided library services to DoD employees and Ord Military Community (OMC) members on the former Fort Ord. There were no major staff changes during this period, but in November 2003 the library organization was transferred from Academic Affairs to Language Science and Technology (LST).

In 2003, the library made many changes in administrative functions with the implementation of a new library management system. The project was accomplished from January through May 2003. The library staff prepared data for the first three months of the year to convert to the new system. In April, The Library Corporation (LLC) in West Virginia prepared the new library data server, shipped it to Monterey, and had a company technician set it up in the Aiso Library. Later that month, the company delivered a web-server and soon the new library website was up and running.447 Library staff received a week of in-house training on the system in mid-April. The librarians continued to check in materials under the old system, while checking out materials on the new system. For the first time in nine years, the library began issuing library cards.

Early in July 2003, library staff learned that the library mezzanine project would be funded. This project involved construction of an upper terrace around the inside perimeter of the two-story Aiso building. Essentially an inside balcony, the mezzanine met seismic safety requirements while creating additional usable space within the library. Staff soon began to prepare for the project, which would dislocate services, library holdings, and furniture, although personnel offices were not affected. Aiso staff set up an alternate location to provide library service from a conference room in Munzer Hall (Building 618), next door to the library. Staff moved the book collection and shelving to Chamberlin Library where there was room for shelves

447 The Asio Library address was: http://www.youseemore.com/DLIFLC/default.asp
in the library center. The books were shelved solid with no space left for additional acquisitions during the construction at Aiso. The audio-visual collection, newspapers and magazines, computers, and circulation and reference desk functions were moved to Munzer Hall as the service point.

While in Munzer Hall, library staff continued to serve the military community, both from Munzer Hall and from Chamberlin Library, whose evening hours were extended for two nights a week. The institute scheduled the renovation project for completion by mid-December 2003, but construction delays pushed this date into late January 2004.448

Curriculum and Faculty Development

Originally under the direction of Dean Grazyna Dudney, Curriculum and Faculty Development under went significant changes during this period. In January 2002, the Provost, Dr. Ray Clifford, split Curriculum and Faculty Development into separate divisions for Curriculum Development, under Steve Koppany, and Faculty Development, which remained under Dudney. In late 2003, both were then placed under a new organization called Language Science and Technology under the direction of Dr. Neil Granoien, who by early 2001 was already serving as assistant provost for technology policy and cooperative ventures.449

The groundwork for the creation of LST began early 2001. In May, Granoien became responsible for coordinating DLIFLC involvement with a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) voice recognition project and the commandant, Colonel Kevin Rice, asked him to begin keeping track of developments in language translation technology. The issue arose because a company called DiA, Inc. wanted DLIFLC to help provide the company access to linguist materials to support the development of a “wearable language translator system.” Rice originally thought involvement in these types of issues might be a distractor from DLIFLC’s core mission to train and sustain linguists. However, he discussed the proposal with Clifford, Assistant Commandant Col. Johnny Jones, and the Defense Foreign Language Program Action Officer, Glenn Nordin, who worked for the assistant secretary of Defense for command, control communications and intelligence (ASD/C3I). Both Jones and Clifford argued that DLIFLC should engaged the topic, because the military had attempted to use machine translation technology and would continue to do so. According to Jones, DLIFLC staff should “be knowledgeable enough about the capabilities of machine translation to advise on the feasibility of substituting a machine for a trained linguist.” Nordin pointed out that there were at least five vendors offering “automated low level translator” devices. With this input, Rice decided that it was important for DLIFLC to remain aware and knowledgeable about technical developments in machine translation. Jones and Clifford recommended that Granoien become the contact on a case-by-case basis to provide such advice, to which Rice agreed.450

The issue arose again that summer when four “Falcon” auto translators went on trial in Hawaii, but some coordination problems resulted in the effort receiving “very little real input from knowledgeable language experts,” in the words of Glenn Nordin. Several million dollars were allocated for the current Advance Concept Technology Demonstration, including such

translation projects, but with another program in the offing to the tune of $15 to $30 million, Nordin wanted to emphasize to DLI staff the importance of remaining engaged with technology developers. Supporting such projects, he reiterated, was valuable in that “the auto translators do help educate the users and their commanders as to why they need qualified human interpreters. We have learned that by helping place auto translation on INTERLINK and other networks, those who firmly advocate replacing humans with technology suddenly discover a level of frustration that tells them to switch advocacy.” As a result, Rice assigned CWO4 Joseph R. McDaniel to work with Granoien on field machine translation issues. McDaniel had operational experience with this issue.451 This was the genesis of the Combat Developments Directorate, which was established in May 2001 with Granoien as chief and McDaniel as deputy.452 In late 2003, Col. Michael Simone realigned Combat Developments under the newly created Language Science and Technology directorate with Granoien as its director.

**Directorate of Combat Developments**

The mission of the Directorate of Combat Developments was to “Lead the DFLP community in determining and implementing the best technology-based solutions for foreign language education and operational requirements.” That is, it collaborated with other agencies to define and develop language products for numerous applications. Initially, the office fell directly beneath the Assistant Commandant. It began by reviewing off-the-shelf technologies, hired the author of some Pashto and Uzbek off-the-shelf materials, worked with vendors, and put Personal Digital Assistants in the classroom. Combat Developments provided OEF support, evaluated machine translation technology (e.g., Babylon), and collaborated with the Army Research Lab, MIT, the Navy and others. It also explored the Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER) Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration, which was intended to push language technology forward and reduce the foreign language barrier (including through a call center for real-time language support), and numerous other initiatives intended to improve the tools available for language training and translation. Combat Developments was involved in developing a website for linguist and analyst language tools (Foreign Language Resource Center), a wireless learning support system to help deliver language familiarization training to deployed forces and Remote Expert Language Support to deliver translation, interpretation, cultural information, and language mentoring, again to deployed forces.453

Also in May 2001, Granoien acquired technology-related tracking responsibility for the institute’s contract with SCOLA, the provider of satellite foreign language television programming. Curriculum Development was using SCOLA to develop course content in Russian and Serbian/Croatian, for developing DLPTs in all languages, and in developing Arabic dialect testing. Through the contract between DLIFLC and SCOLA, the Command Language Programs were also able to access the SCOLA programs. A key issue was that SCOLA, unlike other providers, agreed to copyright release, which made it possible to use SCOLA programming in curriculum and testing work. Carl Darby of the Foreign Language Executive Committee

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452 DLIFLC&POM Staff Directory, April 2002.
rejected funding for the FY 2002 SCOLA contract, but Nordin and DLIFLC staff were successful in restoring $250,000.\textsuperscript{454}

In 2002, Combat Developments especially promoted its efforts to develop “24-7-365” language support for military operations, government, law enforcement, and humanitarian assistance, and began to develop the system architecture. It acquired funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for constructing Language Survival Kits (LSKs) in machine-readable or Phraselator format in partnership with a contractor named Marine Acoustics, International. Combat Developments also sought to conduct machine translation assessments in partnership with the Lincoln Laboratory at MIT. It worked on assessing speech-to-speech capabilities in human-machine interfaces as well as the ability of machine to conduct text-to-text translations. It planned an initial trial using English to Spanish for April 2003 with Via-PC.\textsuperscript{455}

**Directorate of Curriculum Development**

As suggested by its name, the focus of the Directorate of Curriculum Development (CD) was to develop curriculum although with a heavy emphasis on technology support. A key reason the institute split CD from Faculty Development was the breakthrough effort, led by Dudney, to develop a multi-year cyclical course development plan for the seven major Basic Course languages designed to bring them all up-to-date. Dudney’s plan was to have the language programs in continual course development. The plan focused first upon the basic level, then intermediate, advanced, and other requirements, such as contingencies, sustainment courses, etc. In addition, CD would oversee course development for the smaller languages as the schools developed them. Dudney’s plan included a ten-year timeline for the development process that laid out, by month and year, each of the major phases of course development. The idea was based upon the notion that course content or the curriculum for each language, at each level of training, needed to be updated periodically to remain current with trends in the evolution of language use as well as teaching and technology. Participants of the February 2001 Annual Program Review noted the issue’s importance. Charts amply demonstrated that the age of the institute’s Basic Course curricula, as measured by the oldest key component, was ten years in 2001, ranging from five years for Spanish and Tagalog, to thirty-eight and forty-one for German and Tai respectively. The curricula for Arabic and Persian were twenty-seven and thirty-six years old respectively. Some students were learning off materials whose cultures had undergone dramatic change in the last decades and updating the curriculum was becoming critical.\textsuperscript{456}

\textsuperscript{454} Ray Clifford to Neil Granoien, email, 30 May 2001, in “CD 2001” folder (Ch4 Academic Support), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.


The length of time to develop a full curriculum was a constant source of debate. The administration felt that a basic skeleton with some enhancements, where absolutely warranted, should be the goal of curriculum development and to be accomplished in two years. Faculty, they felt, could add supplemental materials to infill the structure, which would tend to keep the material fresh and provide them a voice, or “buy in.” While all agreed that this approach would work in schools composed of faculty who had degrees in teaching foreign languages, such as English as a Second Language, most of the language department chairs preferred a complete course. Most faculty did not come to Monterey with teaching degrees or have the desire to obtain advanced language teaching credentials after duty hours. When asked in early 2002 to explain why it took ten years to develop course curricula when DLIFLC taught a semester of college-level foreign language every two weeks, Dr. Martha Herzog explained that “to develop an hour of finished product, quality instruction requires twenty-five hours of staff experts’ involvement and five hours of graphic support.” According to Koppany, other factors affecting course development, and determining which languages for CD to focus upon, included the size of the language program; the importance, in terms of national security, of the program; the availability of faculty who knew how to develop curricula; the availability of funding; and finally, the availability of authentic sources to develop course materials.

Funding to develop curriculum had remained a problem for the institute for most of its existence but Rice backed this effort on the advice of Clifford, and other experts. Rice thus

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457 Information supplied by Stephen Payne, January 2009. Note, each semester, some fifty DLIFLC faculty members attend the MATFL program at the nearby Monterey Institute of International Studies and bring back valuable lessons that are often used the following day in their own classrooms. Three notable graduates (of several) of the MIIS MATFL program were Deanna Tovar, Grazyna Dudney, and Steve Koppany.


decided to put some of the monies that came to DLIFLC as a result of 9/11 into updating those curricula that were outdated or even antiquated.460

With command support, Grazyna thus set about to develop a resource requirements model to present a proposal for a program that would include a staff of sixty-six. Clifford wanted to ensure that the organization remained as “flat” as possible, that is, included the least degree of administration. He wondered if Grazyna or an assistant dean for curriculum development should supervise this new organization. Indeed, “with this many people and projects to supervise,” he asked, “should we create a separate organization devoted solely to curriculum development”\(^461\)

At any rate, Rice approved CD to function as a separate self-contained entity. Under Koppany, CD continued to update the aging curricula and began to develop current and methodologically sound course content in languages that included Arabic, Persian, and others. Basically, CD supported resident and nonresident missions by developing and maintaining modern curricula built on state-of-the-art learning and teaching principles and produced using an optimum combination of existing and emerging technologies.462

Koppany, like Dudney, felt that curriculum development projects, in the larger languages, needed approximately ten to twelve people to develop a quality product. Each language needed four to eight subject matter experts in the target language, plus an additional group of four to do the technical work of production and computer utilization. Koppany, however, felt the time to complete a full curriculum could be shortened to three years from the time the project was assigned until the final product was handed over for instructional use. Koppany’s method was to develop and test the curriculum in the classroom to ensure the workability of the course design.463

During 2001, CD teams completed a revision of the Arabic Area Studies components of the Basic Program (AD 140 and 240: Foreign Language Culture I and II; and AD 340: Foreign Language Area Studies III). They also completed the Serbian/Croatian Headstart program, the Kosovar Albanian Familiarization course, and the Vietnamese Listening Comprehension Enhancement course. In November 2001, CD began work on the Arabic dialects of Egyptian, Levantine, and Iraqi, completing these courses in 2003.464

The Chinese Basic Course development project, which began in 1999, was put on hold between March 2001 and February 2002, when the Chinese developers were assigned to the LangNet project. The third semester was developed in the schoolhouse over two-and-a-half years, without CD input; however semesters one and two were developed in CD with a team of nine Chinese subject matter experts.465

460 Col Kevin M. Rice (Ret.), interview by Cameron Binkley and Stephen Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1041), in DLIFLC&POM Archives.
463 Information provided by Dr. Stephen Payne, January 2009.
For several years, DLIFLC made efforts to revise the Serbian/Croatian Basic Course, but this project encountered numerous problems. As early as 1993, faculty, out of necessity, attempted to revise the Serbian/Croatian curricula by modifying the Canadian audio-lingual course. Dean De La Selva proposed a full curriculum project in 1994 and development began in August of that year, but this effort was almost immediately put aside so the developers could work on a Cross-Training Course from Russian to Serbian/Croatian (after the beginning of the Bosnian War). In late 1999, the project once again resumed with two developers, trained by Neil Granoien, developing supplementary materials for the Canadian course. Granoien and team worked for about a year, but the two instructors then returned to teach full-time. However, they continued to work on the curriculum part-time with oversight from faculty in CD.

In May 2002, CD began planning upon the basis of dedicated funding instead of “occasional reimbursables” or “out of hide” funding at the expense of teaching. Koppany solicited the priorities from each school dean to begin short- and long-term planning. Institute hope for dedicated funding was furthered by an exceptional curriculum development proposal put forward by CWO3 James J. Morris. This proposal argued for funding and manpower “to properly update the curricula of 21 language programs taught at DLIFLC.”

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466 Serbian/Croatian was a victim of the “peace dividend” and was discontinued in 1989. When it was resumed, most of the faculty had found other jobs or had retired. More importantly, the old curriculum was not to be found. See Stephen M. Payne, DLIFLC Command History 1993 (DLIFLC, 1996), p. 96.


Beginning in 2002, CD undertook to develop “a resident server-supported database of diagnostic assessment-based Learning Objects (LangNet),” that is, an Internet-based capability to test and assess learners in a variety of languages. Rice transferred this project to CD as part of a general reorganization. Koppany stressed to observers that LangNet was to add value in the classroom and not replace it. With enough funding, the project would provide online “Subject Matter Experts” who could interact live with LangNet users providing immediate feedback that would enhance learning, but it was primarily intended to be used for diagnostic assessment. The Monterey Regional Education Initiative initially funded the project. 470

Another technology-related issue was CD’s ability to provide online language learning and testing packages for Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs), Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs), and military intelligence (MI) units. In December 2001, Glenn Nordin encouraged the institute to acquire the capacity to provide language-learning products suitable for use in a Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF). Most military linguists actually worked in SCIFs, venues approved to hold or access highly classified information. DLIFLC provided several vehicles for distance learning, including VTT, LingNet, and LangNet, but DoD prohibited their use in SCIFs for security reasons. Thus, military linguists could not conduct language maintenance while at their typical duty station. Nordin believed that the institute should establish a SCIF at the Presidio of Monterey where those with the proper security clearances could access such classified systems as the Joint World Wide Intelligence System (JWWICS) or the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Such a set-up would better serve DLIFLC’s main customers, namely, the National Security Agency (NSA) and other military cryptologic elements. Marine Lt. Col. Patrick O’Rourke, Director of OPP, laid out a strong case for why it was inappropriate for DLIFLC to move in that direction. O’Rourke argued that producing SCIF-compliant products was an add-on mission,

470 “Minutes from the 05-07 Mar 2002 Annual Performance Review,” in “Annual Program Review 5-7 March 2002” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. More funds were expected from NSA, CIA, and OEF.
while DLIFLC’s focus was on curriculum development, test development, and working contingency operations, especially for the war in Afghanistan. A JWWICS terminal, he said, would be manpower intensive and its mission was not clearly defined—would SCIF translation be classified? He felt that as long as DLFICL had clearly defined deficiencies to work off in mission areas, then it should tackle those first. Moreover, if DoD had not directed the new mission, then DoD would not fund it consistently. Eventually, the institute acquired a limited capability for senior staff to access classified information, but it dropped the SCIF concept.

In 2003, CD began experimenting with an eight-year course replacement cycle (originally proposed by Grazyna Dudney), sought to redesign and streamline the online LingNet (Linguistic Network), and to develop and support ongoing course development efforts in languages beyond the major DLIFLC programs. Meanwhile, it continued to publish Dialogue on Language Instruction and to distribute over 250,000 textbooks in support of resident and non-resident programs. In May 2002, CD managed to distribute 16,000 Iraqi dialect LSKs to III Corps units facing imminent deployment to the Mid-east.

A major CD project in 2003 was the redevelopment of the Persian-Farsi Basic Course. Portions of the course were nearly forty years old and did not reflect radical changes in the politics and culture of the region (Iran). However, war-related training requirements had made it difficult to update course material because there were not enough Persian-Farsi teaching staff who could be spared for such work. In 2002, Dr. Stephen Payne, Interim Provost, attempted to get Persian course development underway by having the whole project contracted. DLIFLC did contract with SYColeman, Inc., of Washington, DC, to build the core materials for a new curriculum. SYColeman, however, sub-contracted the work to the Monterey Institute of International Studies, although DLIFLC planned to build the technology/laboratory portion of the course. The project, which would take three years to complete, was to cost nearly $4 million and was funded through supplemental OEF-related congressional funds. Dr. Ruth Larimer, dean of the Graduate School of Language and Educational Linguistics at MIIS, headed the project. Larimer was a Persian-Farsi linguist herself, which gave confidence to DLIFLC leadership that MIIS could manage the project. Larimer, however, hired several native Persian-Farsi speakers unfamiliar with military standards. The MIIS team began with a “Scope and Sequence” and developed the core component of the first semester. Unfortunately, after developing a few rough drafts of some of the units and chapters contracted, internal divisions erupted and the effort fell apart. By August 2004, Clifford had to bring the project back to CD for internal development.

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472 Dr. Stephen Payne, discussion with Cameron Binkley, 16 October 2008.
474 Lt Col Patrick Smith, email to Col Kevin Rice, 23 October 2002, in “CD 2002” folder (Ch4 Academic Support), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
475 “Persian-Farsi Course Development,” info paper, [March 2003], in “CD 2003” folder (Ch4 Academic Support), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. There was also some discussion of supplementing the existing or planned Persian-Farsi curriculum with “LanguagePro,” a set of Persian-Farsi curricular materials produced by a CIA-contractor named Transparent Language, Inc. Steven Koppany to Lt Col Patrick Smith, email, 11 February 2003, in same folder.
By the end of 2003, CD had established an “Instructional Design Department” to handle design, layout, animation, etc., and had started developing “FLASH” programming capabilities while advancing other technical innovations. It had completed Basic Course projects in Russian, Chinese, Arabic, and Persian, the last representing the first fully integrated technology component within a basic course under development, and had completed development of three twelve-week conversions courses in Iraqi, Syrian, and Egyptian. CD also continued to build GLOSS, an integrated online language learning support system designed to provide users with personalized assistance in maintaining and enhancing their foreign language proficiency. These online lessons were developed in collaboration with the Foreign Language Center at Fort Lewis in the languages and numbers shown in the figure below.477

In addition to these efforts, CD directly supported operational units, for example, by supplying Iraqi phrase manuals to Marine Corps units, developing Iraqi cultural background/familiarization materials, providing an online capability for downloading Visual LSKs, and by establishing the position of LSK Quality Control Coordinator to support DoD operational needs.478

Finally, by late 2003 Chancellor Clifford decided to place both CD and Faculty Development under Granoien who became the new vice chancellor for Language Science and Technology. Granoien’s experience working on other technology projects, including voice recognition with DARPA and MIT while director of the Combat Developments Directorate made him the ideal candidate.479

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Learning Objects</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARABIC (MSA)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51 DLIFLC, 18 Ft. Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINESE</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58 DLIFLC, 17 Ft. Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSIAN</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>final draft, DLIFLC developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIAN</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23 DLIFLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERBIAN/CROATIAN</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15 Ft. Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPANISH</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84 DLIFLC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 17 GLOSS online lessons developed in 2003

When DLIFLC began to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), there were no faculty and no curricula covering the languages of Afghanistan. Within a few weeks after 9/11, DLI-W began teaching sections of Persian-Dari, one of the languages of Afghanistan. However, the services began asking for more classes in Dari as well as several other languages throughout the region. At that point, Colonel Rice asked Col. Jeffrey Johnson to establish a working group, to see what the institute could do to respond to the needs of the services. Assistant Commandant Johnson decided to establish the OEF Task Force and began recruiting faculty to teach the new requirements. Assistant Provost Payne recommended that Dr. Mahmood Taba-Tabai head the new organization. As a native of Iran and an experienced manager, Taba-Tabai understood Dari (closely related to Persian-Farsi), was able to select new faculty, and began developing and running the new program.480

478 Kopany to Raugh, 3 December 2004.
480 Dr. Stephen Payne, discussion with Cameron Binkley, January 2009.
Meanwhile, Granoien and Dudney began searching for curriculum materials. They found little that met the needs of a DLIFLC program and decided that CD would have to develop a course. With students slated to begin arriving in six months, Taba-Tabai recommended that his new teachers be given some course development specialists and that the new course be developed within the task force, rather than sending new faculty to CD. Taba-Tabai’s plan was accepted and Granoien sent him two trainers with curriculum experience (Suzanne Piccari and Masako Boureston). When the first student arrived, faculty taught from the curriculum developed by the OEF Task Force.\(^{481}\)

**Directorate of Faculty Development**

In 2002, DLIFLC split the Directorate of Curriculum Instruction so that CD could focus upon expanding its mission. As a result, the Faculty and Staff Development Division (FSD) also became an independent directorate under Dean Grazyna Dudney. In 2003, FSD provided 5,000 hours of training to 2,500 participants in four programs: Pre-Service, In-Service, Academic Development, and Leadership Development. Four new faculty developers were hired in 2003 due to expanded programs and some turnover in the division.\(^{482}\)

Over two-hundred new instructors attended the “Pre-Service Instructor Certification Course” used to prepare new teachers. The large increase in the number of faculty members taking this course resulted from the hiring upsurge following military operations initiated after 11 September 2003. The “In-Service” program saw many changes, too, especially in providing instruction related to the use of whiteboards in foreign language teaching. This technology operated like a digital chalkboard upon which written text or images could be stored and conveyed to everyone in the class or else used like a wall-mounted computer. Nearly two-hundred instructors participated in courses planned to help them in devising sound pedagogical tasks for use with the technology. Staff also began development of an advanced course, subsequently taught in early 2004. Finally, FSD contracted with Monterey Peninsula College (MPC) to provide thirty hours of Basic Computer Applications for twenty-five teachers deficient in beginning computer skills. School assistance continued with class observations and feedback to individual teachers.\(^{483}\)

The Academic Development Program focused on two areas: Foreign Language Education (FLED) and English as a Second Language (ESL). Teachers had the opportunity to enroll in four semester-long FLED courses and four ESL courses during the year. These were the equivalent of undergraduate-level teacher education courses. Monthly Foreign Language Activity “SWAPs” brought teachers from all schools together to exchange successful classroom techniques and supplemental activities. Most growth occurred, however, in the Leadership Development Program. FSD developed major workshops to provide instruction in effective leadership and cultural awareness in the workplace. The initial target group was the team leaders, who had previously been offered very little leadership training. In 2003, over fifty team leaders completed the training, which continued in 2004, with plans for a version directed at deans, chairpersons, and academic specialists.\(^{484}\)

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\(^{481}\) Payne, discussion with Binkley, January 2009.


Staff could also develop professionally by participating in the Academic Advisory Council (AAC). The AAC sponsored “Faculty Professional Development Day” every May to allow faculty and staff an opportunity to share “insights into our profession and mission.” The 2001-2004 AAC was voted into office in September 2001. The AAC published a quarterly newsletter to discuss such topics as the pursuit of postgraduate degrees in language education.\(^{485}\)

FSD provided support to the field throughout the year. FSD collaborated with DLI-W to provide orientations on teaching approaches and techniques to over ninety instructors in contract language schools in the Washington, DC, area. Topics covered included teaching for proficiency, designing learning tasks for listening, reading and speaking, and classroom observation and feedback. The series of orientations began in 2003 and continued in 2004. FSD also organized a Visiting Scholar Program, in which nine different professionals from the academic community were invited to present workshops on such diverse topics as team building, experiential learning, role of the supervisor, interactive language teaching, and correcting employee conduct. Over 250 faculty members and program leaders attended. Finally, FSD also organized and sponsored the annual Holiday Program during student exodus, a six-day event in which institute faculty made fifty presentations to 1,467 attendees on topics of interest to foreign language professionals.\(^{486}\)

**Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization**

The Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (ES) remained under the leadership of Vice Chancellor Dr. Martha Herzog throughout this period. In general, ES was responsible for the standardized language testing, program evaluation, and educational research for DLIFLC resident and non-resident language training programs.\(^{487}\)

To facilitate the accomplishment of its mission, ES held conferences and workshops. For example, the fourth annual DLIFLC and U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca Language Conference was held in November 2002. The purpose of the conference was to “provide a forum to discuss the instructional design of advanced language acquisition and assessment programs used by military linguists striving to improve their proficiency.”\(^{488}\)

ES management and staff supported mission-related work conducted through the three ES divisions of Proficiency Standards, Test Development and Standardization, and Research and Evaluation. The first division, Proficiency Standards, was responsible for tester training and education, test administration and management, proficiency standards implementation, and guided proficiency tests for key languages in war on terrorism. It was newly created to help improve proficiency standards. The second division, Test Development and Standardization, oversaw the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) Development System as well as performance and semester test development. Research and Evaluation, the third ES division, was responsible for research, analysis, and evaluation.\(^{489}\)

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\(^{485}\) Various flyers and newsletters in “Faculty: Academic Advisory Council” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.


\(^{487}\) Annual Program Review, March 2-3, 2004, slide 211.


There are many pedagogical reasons for the continuous need to develop new language tests, but one of them, inevitably, is to replace compromised tests. This topic came to the fore in April 2001 when the Naval Security Group Activity at Fort Meade, Maryland, reported that the Serbian/Croatian DLPT IV, Reading Comprehension Form A, was compromised when a videotape with information about the test was made and subsequently disseminated. Apparently, the former spouse of a service member alerted the Naval Security Group.490 The issue was taken up during the Annual Program Review in March 2002. Herzog asked the services to help develop a strategy to prevent such events because, in actuality, the institute had no budget to redo tests and any compromise pulled money from other projects. The Navy’s response to the compromise was to require all tests to be scored at a central location—field units were no longer trusted. However, the Navy still had to deliver the test to linguists stationed in field. One suggestion was to create three sets of questions for every test, so backups were available in case of a test compromise, which when done concurrently would not add much to the overall costs of producing tests. ES assured others concerned about moving the DLPT to the Internet that it understood the risks of taking the test online and would not do so until security could be assured, which is why the first step was to place the DLAB online.491 Pressure of this type helped generate a consensus on the need to develop a new DLPT altogether, as discussed further below.

Proficiency Standards

By early 2002, ES had created the Proficiency Standards Division (PSD) under Dean Sabine Atwell, who remained in charge in 2003. PSD was composed of two previous divisions: the Tester Training and Education Division, which Atwell had previously headed, and the Language Testing and Management Division.492 In the area of tester education and training, PSD continued with its robust Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) tester certification program by selecting, training, and maintaining the skills of 400 OPI testers in twenty-five languages. PSD granted certification to OPI testers after ninety-six hours of rigorous workshop training. Thereafter, PSD kept OPI testers’ skills fresh via a mandatory annual two-day refresher training and ongoing individualized consultation and training. For non-testers, several iterations of two-day training sessions were open to all faculty. By-request OPI orientations were conducted for military, school staff, and others. PSD maintained an excellent quality control program for OPIs given, using random review of 10-20 percent of all tests, automatic review of split and outlier scores, automatic review of tests below graduation or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) standard, analysis of all student complaints, and careful tracking of tester performance. OPI also maintained a program for master testers (particularly experienced and skillful testers), eliciting additional service for them in the form of demonstration OPIs (live and recorded) and, as needed, pairing with newly trained testers during OPIs.493

In FY 2003, there was a heavy schedule of OPIs at DLIFLC for graduating students (mostly face-to-face) and other military linguists and civilian new-hire candidates (largely telephonic, with some VTT and tape-mediated OPIs). PSD also worked to meet requests for telephonic testing of all Individual Ready Reserve candidates recruited for 09L (Translator Aide) program. PSD also continued with a joint project with the American Council on the Teaching of

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490 Commanding Officer, Naval Security Group Activity, Memorandum to Defense Language Institute, 4 April 2001, in “Schools: European I Serbo-Croatian” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
492 DLIFLC&POM Staff Directories, 2001-2002.
Foreign Languages (ACTFL) to obtain ACTFL’s services in conducting overflow OPIs. Finally, PSD pursued development of special proficiency tests for languages identified as critical for fighting terrorists and for which experienced teachers and test developers were scarce. Development of these tests included initial production of a “guided proficiency test,” designed to be conducted face-to-face with a test candidate by a native speaker of the language with the assistance of an expert tester not conversant in the language being tested. Information gained from conducting guided proficiency tests formed the basis of plans for the subsequent production of paper and pencil language tests using the “constructed-response” or written answer format. 494

During this period, PSD’s test management staff scheduled and administered a high volume of proficiency and performance tests for military linguists and Faculty Personnel System (FPS) staff and job applicants. The numerical breakdown for FY 2003 is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Volume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DLPTs for listening and reading comprehension</td>
<td>6,000 administrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance tests for Final Learning Objectives</td>
<td>13,300 administrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face-to-face OPIs</td>
<td>2,600 administrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone, VTT, and tape-mediated OPIs</td>
<td>1,100 administrations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 18 Number of tests administered by Proficiency Standards Division, 2003

PSD also intensified its monitoring and implementation of proficiency standards across all language-related projects at DLIFLC (e.g., testing, curriculum) to ensure adherence to U.S. government proficiency standards. It conducted ongoing work to train reviewers, coordinate the numerous reviews, and maintain a tracking system for review results. 495

One issue was that in March 2001 Dean Herzog approved a request by M. Sgt. Scott Armstrong, DTRA Liaison to DLIFLC, who sought an exemption to DLIFLC policy on the release of OPI test results to students. Upon careful consideration, Herzog agreed that test results should be made available as soon as possible to DTRA students because the OPI test score carried significant weight in the determination of whether students would meet DTRA’s standards. Early release of test results, therefore, facilitated student assignment and planning processes. 496

**Test Development and Standardization**

Dr. Dariush Hooshmand ran the Division of Test Development and Standardization in 2000, while Dr. Gary Buck took over the division from 2001 until 2002, and Dr. Anne B. Wright from NSA assumed responsibility from 2003 until 2005. Test Development’s primary mission was to develop and manage the DLPT system used worldwide by DoD to measure foreign language proficiency. Its secondary mission was to develop and manage performance and semester tests for the resident program.

According to ES Director Dr. Martha Herzog, Test Development sought to meet functional and quality mission requirements, by maintaining:

1. Productive interagency partnerships;

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(2) A tailored, “systematic” approach to testing that was integrated with flexible test formats;

(3) Multi-disciplinary, well-trained, highly experienced test development teams;

(4) A standardized test development process with documented test specifications, thorough internal and external reviews, and piloting; and

(5) A rigorous validation process using military personnel, government civilians, and university students that achieved official score calibration of newly developed paper and pencil tests by comparing their validation scores with the results of special two-skill (reading and listening) comprehension proficiency tests of the same examinees in interview format; and a move toward eventual computer-based proficiency testing.\(^{497}\)

Problems with the Defense Language Proficiency Test

DLPT design and standards continued to be driven by mission requirements, the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) theoretical framework for ensuring standardization across the DLPT system, and perhaps recommendations of the American Council on Education for college credit.\(^{498}\) However, by the late 1990s, the DFLP community was growing increasingly concerned about the state of the DLPT IV and older tests. Some felt that security compromises and lax handling of scoring sheets and test booklets by military test control officers, previously noted, were beginning to undermine the testing regime.\(^{499}\) In addition, some tests were overexposed, meaning examinees may have seen the same test, in use for decades, ten to twenty times. NSA officials thus believed that the DLPT scores of military personnel were not reflective of their true level of proficiency.\(^{500}\) Meanwhile, others wanted to modernize the testing system, to make it more readily available using technology, and to add new tests, especially for dialects.

At the DLIFLC Annual Program Review in February 2000 there was much discussion both about testing in various dialects and developing a new DLPT series. Both Clifford and Herzog wanted to develop a new DLPT, which they referred to as the “DLPT 5.”\(^{501}\) ES began to review the requirements needed to develop dialect listening tests, as DFLP representatives wanted, and began to hash out what level dialect tests should test and whether Arabic dialect testing was intended to test for proficiency or performance.\(^{502}\) In June 2000, Hugh G. McFarlane, NSA’s Cryptologic Training System representative in Monterey, reemphasized NSA’s desire that “DLI… upgrade all DLPTs, redesign the delivery mode, renorm or otherwise improve current tests, and develop new tests, such as Arabic dialect, Albanian, Burmese, Cambodian, [and] Hindi.”\(^{503}\)


\(^{500}\) McFarlane, paper for Requirements and Resources Panel on Arabic dialect testing, 12 June 2000.

\(^{501}\) Apparently, they decided to switch from Roman numerals to Arabic numbers in designating DLPT test series to abate confusion in the field over whether Roman numerals referred to a number system or a letter of the alphabet.

\(^{502}\) Hugh G. McFarlane, paper for Requirements and Resources Panel on Arabic dialect testing, 12 June 2000.

Limited funding stymied progress on new test development. Late in 2000, NSA promised funds “to begin Iraqi and other dialect tests for experimental purposes” in a face-to-face constructed-response format, meaning the test-taker would have to compose answers instead of selecting the correct answer from a range of options.\(^{504}\) DLIFLC needed much more funding, however, to develop a new DLPT.

**Funding New Test Development**

During a meeting of the DFLP Policy Committee on 17 May 2000, Glenn Nordin expressed concern that the Army, which was DLIFLC’s Executive Agent, was not providing the funds needed to update the DLPT. Arthur Money, Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I), had tasked Nordin and the DFLP Policy Committee to develop a strategy, together with supporting policy and instructions for the DFLP, that would reflect the “operational requirements, force management and resource oversight processes and procedures that are needed to build and maintain a ready, qualified, and cost-effective language support capability.”\(^{505}\) Nordin provided the Policy Committee with four courses of action:

1. Task the Army, the Army Personnel Command (provider of testing services), and DLIFLC (DLPT developer), to develop a five-year plan together with the resources needed to update and expand the DLPT and modernize the test delivery system to accommodate all potential users, including non-DoD civilians, starting in FY 2001;

2. Task, as above, but restrict use of the DLPT to military personnel of the four services;

3. Task the Army to provide resources to allow DoD civilians, as well as the Coast Guard and Public Health Service uniformed and civilian employees, to use existing DLPT tests; or

4. Continue with the status quo.

Nordin identified the funding levels DLIFLC needed to modernize the DLPT and requested OSD fund a contract “to help us make it happen.”\(^{506}\) After discussing the options, the committee tasked the Army as Executive Agent and the institute to develop a five-year plan, including resource requirements, to update the DLPT and modernize the test system beginning in FY 2002. In principle, the committee also approved allowing DoD civilians to take the DLPT.\(^{507}\)

On 16 June 2000, the Joint Monthly Readiness Report (JMRR) Language Training and Education Working Group issued a report detailing needed improvements in training and education for military and civilian linguists. It suggested five specific training areas to improve:

1. Establish centralized direction;

2. Shift the primary focus to “distributed” learning;

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\(^{504}\) Martha Herzog to Deniz Bilgin, email, 24 June 2006.  
(3) Develop general professional and specific position/job qualification standards;
(4) Implement a comprehensive evaluation program; and
(5) Realistically assess the role of military linguists.  

The JMRR also recommended more post-DLIFLC language support delivered using the Internet (i.e., LangNet, GLOSS); job qualification standards for all DoD language positions; and more funding for DLIFLC in such areas as curriculum development, proficiency enhancement, diagnostic assessment, and DLPT 5 development.  

Another issue the JMRR report raised was the need for a test to assess linguist performance above Level 3 on the ILR scale, which no DLPT measured. Dr. David S. Chu, who became Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on 1 June 2001, took an interest in the JMRR’s findings, especially the overall need for more central management of DoD foreign language issues. The JMRR report therefore had an important role in boosting development of a new DLPT.

In addition to these factors, Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, director of NSA, tasked Renée Meyer, NSA Senior Language Authority, to replace the agency’s existing Professional Qualification Examination (PQE), used to test newly hired civilian linguists. NSA could not give this test easily, apparently because parts of it were classified. Hayden wanted a general test to use to help ensure that NSA linguists maintained required proficiency levels for which the DLPT was well suited, but DLIFLC had to strengthen the test to address NSA concerns that DLPT exam results failed to match true military linguist proficiencies.

Fortunately, even as JMRR issued its report, Clifford and Herzog were talking to Meyer and several other NSA language experts about developing upper range DLPTs for use by NSA and lower range DLPTs for general use, in other words, a comprehensive evaluation program. Meyer said that NSA would fund the DLPT project, including alternate forms beginning with the languages most taught at the institute. According to Herzog, DLIFLC and NSA discussed computer-delivery and eventual computer-adaptive testing in June 2000, the notion being for the institute to provide CDs that NSA could use to administer tests in its own test labs.

The DLPT Modernization Plan

Herzog and Deniz Bilgin, director of Test Evaluation, drafted a list outlining what to accomplish. DLIFLC could design, plan, and develop DLPTs in alternate forms. It could

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508 JMRR Language Training and Education Working Group, report: “Issues and Solutions,” 16 June 2000, pp. 1-4, delivered to DLIFLC Commandant, Col Daniel Devlin, and Provost, Dr. Ray Clifford, on 19 June 2000 by Samuel Lipsky, NSA Cryptologic School Representative. JMRR was a high-level Pentagon group formed to identify, analyze, and resolve critical deficiencies that might reduce a commander’s performance of assigned missions. In the JMRR, the services described their current global force commitments, the current and projected readiness of their units, and functional assessments in such areas as intelligence, including linguist readiness.


512 PQEs were a NSA-developed classified and unclassified Level 3 test battery consisting of four listening and reading tests, two of which dealt with classified material and two with unclassified material. Renée Meyer and Pardee Lowe, Jr., “Materials for Discussion of JMRR #6, PQE PT.1,” 21 June 2000, in “DLPT” folder, drawer 4, 2001-2003 ACH files, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

513 NSA also considered continued in-house development of classified tests or outsourcing test development, but chose to fund DLI to develop a new DLPT.

validate multiple-choice tests with two-skill interviews with the cooperation of NSA and other organizations using a scoring system tied to the ILR scale. It could also develop a scoring system for constructed-response tests, coordinate with the Army Human Resources Command for the delivery of lower range paper and pencil tests, and develop software to deliver the DLPT 5 via computers. Finally, it could develop software algorithms to generate alternative forms of the DLPT IV and advise NSA on creating a prototype computer-adaptive test.

The last point grew in importance, as the computerization of any new DLPT quickly became the expectation of NSA administrators who wanted to have all examinees take the test on a computer with computer-adaptive test forms. In other words, the computer would have software that would pick questions from a database containing hundreds of potential questions that were tailored to the level of the individual examinee. The computerization of the test was a departure from the methods used to deliver the DLPT in the past. Written portions of earlier DLPTs were printed in a test booklet while the listening portion was delivered on a cassette tape (later versions did use a computer for this purpose). The questions for both reading and listening were in the test booklet. Using pencils, examinees filled in bubbles on an answer sheet that test control officers scored manually or with object recognition scanners.

On 26 July 2000, Herzog proposed that DLIFLC design an upper-range DLPT to measure ILR proficiency levels between 2+ and 4+. Upper-range test format designs for multiple-choice and constructed-response tests would be ready by 1 October 2000 and a prototype in listening and reading would be ready in one year. Herzog also agreed to provide computer-delivered DLPTs, probably on CDs, during FY 2001, although ES needed to conduct a comparability study before the computer versions could replace the paper-pencil tests. Finally, Herzog stated that the institute would eventually develop computer-adaptive DLPTs, although this was not an immediate goal.

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515 While DLIFLC developed the earlier versions of the DLPT, HRC delivered the tests to test control officers who administered the tests. This process would later change as the DLPT 5 was delivered via the Web and the Defense Manpower and Data Center (DMDC) became responsible for test delivery.


517 NSA’s expectations were outlined in a memorandum by Renée Meyer and Pardee Lowe, “Materials for Discussion of JMRR #6, PQE Pt. 1,” 21 June 2000, in possession of Stephen Payne. The memo laid out the stages, options, and set-up of the new DLPT, and emphasized NSA’s concern about the “nature of link & reliability” of delivering tests over fiber optic, satellite, or phone equipment, and not on stand-alone computers using CDs. The memo illustrated NSA’s desire to move beyond paper and pencil tests and to deliver such tests using a secure, centrally administered system of networked computers.


On 30 November 2000, Herzog and Bilgin completed a DLPT Modernization Plan that formed the basis of the DLPT 5. It required DLIFLC to replace DLPTs for the six most taught languages every six years and focused specifically on the lower DLPT testing range. These languages were Modern Standard Arabic, Chinese Mandarin, Korean, Persian-Farsi, Russian, and Spanish. It would replace other language tests every eight years. The plan proposed to replace the languages taught solely at DLI-W every ten years. The plan also sought to “expand the use of communicative item types” by “requiring examinees to process authentic language,” resulting in longer tests with multiple questions for each text, a departure from DLPT IV norms. Next, DLIFLC was to train its test developers thoroughly to speed up the process and to assure quality control. Also, to minimize test over-exposure, new tests were to be issued in at least three alternative forms, although some test items would be recycled from existing tests. Finally, the plan sought to improve the technical validation process by using a statistically sufficient number of live linguists instead of simply calibrating the new test against existing forms of the test. Although DLIFLC staff and administrators could identify what to do, the key obstacle remained long-term funding.

The new validation process was challenging. It required both face-to-face and constructed-response assessments and at least 200 examinees for each language with skill levels ranging from ILR Level 0+ to Level 4 in reading and listening. Moreover, each examinee had to spend from 16 to 25.5 hours over a period of 3 to 5 days on face-to-face assessment, on the machine-scorable listening and reading test, and on constructed-response listening and reading tests. Unfortunately, DLIFLC could find few potential examinees in Monterey where ILR proficiency levels above 2 in reading or listening were uncommon. Herzog pointed out that examinees at these levels would have to come from external sources and would often have to be paid for their time.

The costs associated with developing the new DLPT directly related to the eighteen months required to find appropriate items at each ILR level of proficiency for each language. Test Development and Standards needed to hire eighteen additional test-writers and project officers. The Modernization Plan included a five-year cycle that called for six language projects to start annually with two test writers and one project officer per language. With staggered development, three projects could be finished in the first year and six projects could conclude each year thereafter. To keep a rigorous timetable while producing these tests, the division required an annual budgetary increase of $1,666,875 in FY 2002 and $1,856,250 annually from

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520 See “DLPT Modernization Plan,” 30 November 2000. This document includes extensive historical background and discussion about the DLPT and DLIFLC’s plan to modernize the test.
521 Deniz Bilgin to Fredrick A. Mohr, email: “Info Paper for CMDT,” 21 November 2000, in “DLPT” folder, drawer 4, 2001-2003 ACH files, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Mohr, an Air Force lieutenant colonel who was assistant dean of ES, recommended that the information paper be held and that “the simpler APR version” be used until the new commandant could be briefed.
522 “DLPT Modernization Plan,” 30 November 2000, pp. 4, 8. The Modernization Plan focused on developing lower range tests. It recognized the need for upper range tests in languages where higher proficiency was of interest to DoD and projected associated costs to develop and validate such tests.
2003 through 2006 for development and validation costs. Using these figures, the commandant, Colonel Kevin Rice, requested budget increases beginning in FY 2002.

Herzog, with Clifford’s support, also sought to advance the computer technology portion of the new test. She assigned Bilgin as the DLPT “migration” manager. Part of his duties would be to determine which sites were ready to administer the tests via the Internet or on CD. She had Jon Varosh continue with efforts to program the Russian DLPT IV on CD, which DLIFLC was to pilot both in Monterey and at DLI-W. Clifford also agreed to have the DLPT 5 in Serbian/Croatian, Russian Upper Range, and Albanian programmed for web-delivery with a demo prepared using items in the English Familiarization Guide. Herzog felt that “this allows us to plan web-delivery for DLPT 5 right from the start” and that the “new tests should be available on web, [CD], and in booklet and tape.”

In late 2000, to improve management of DLTP development, Assistant Commandant Col. Johnny Jones replaced the director of Test Development and Standardization, whom he returned to teaching. Jones felt that the director had kept test development too secretive. In his place, Jones appointed Dr. Buck, who was an internationally known second language-testing expert.

Buck soon brought in a group of experts to review test development. He included English language reviewers, not just native speakers. These test developers began considering how to move the DLPT from paper to an electronic version, which would have the advantage of bypassing sluggish bureaucratic personnel processes that lacked quality control in the field. Electronic tests were also easier to re-issue in differing versions and developers hoped that future tests could use gaming principles to allow test-takers to respond to scenarios designed to assess their capabilities in all modalities, moving the tests away from restrictive multiple-choice DLPTs and the labor-intensive oral proficiency interviews.

On 13 December 2000, Clifford, Herzog, and Buck, met with Renée Meyer and other NSA language staffers in Washington, DC. The Modernization Plan helped create the framework for their discussion. During the meeting, Meyer announced that eventually the tests would need to be computer-adaptive and asked what could be done in that fiscal year. Herzog

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526 For insight as to the issues involved with converting the Russian DLPT IV to a CD format see Deniz Bilgin to Gary Buck, email: “DLPT IV CBT In-House Development,” 7 November 2000, in “DLPT” folder, drawer 4, 2001-2003 ACH files, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
528 The FPS system made this possible (unlike the GS pay system). This incident resolved a dispute over the methods used to validate DLPT IV cut-off scores, the basis of ILR proficiency ratings. Jones, Clifford, and Herzog felt to validate DLPT cut-off scores, face-to-face interviews were required, whereas Hooshmand, originally authorized by the previous director of Evaluation and Standardization, Dr. John L.D. Clark, had chosen to simplify and speed-up the validation process by using constructed-response tests, scored by untrained members of the testing division. When challenged, Hooshmand was unable to explain effectively his methodology and insisted that the process needed to be kept secret for test integrity, which led to his removal. Col Johnny Jones, Assistant Commandant, “Key Accomplishments and Ongoing Issues,” [ca. 2001], assessment in “Colonel Johnny Jones” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives; and Martha Herzog to Stephen Payne, email: “NOTES FOR STEPHEN PAYNE,” 18 August 2008, in possession of Dr. Stephen Payne.
529 Buck, held a doctorate from the Department of Linguistics and Modern English Language, University of Lancaster, England, in 1990, had formerly served as a research scientist at Educational Testing Service (1992-1999), and authored Assessing Listening Comprehension (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
agreed to host an academic conference in Monterey to discuss the topic. Later, DLIFLC and NSA would hold differing interpretations over what they had agreed at this meeting. DLIFLC acknowledged that it had agreed to hold the conference, but disputed other aspects of delivering the new tests via computer. Herzog remembered that “at some point in 2004 Renée [Meyer] and Pardee [Lowe, Jr.] became more insistent on computer adaptive delivery than they were in 2000.” Thus, according to Herzog, computerized delivery and adaptation of the DLPT became a sore spot “that interfered with progress of the project.” When Dr. Wright transferred from NSA to DLIFLC in 2003 the emphasis upon computerization increased because, according to Herzog, it was in that area that Wright was able to find reliable contract support. Herzog thus felt that she and Clifford were “blind-sided” with the result being that “the Services were then placed in the periphery until at some point they were told by Ms. [Gail] McGinn and Col. [Daniel] Scott that they no longer had the option to use paper/pencil test.” As late as 2004 or early 2005, “buy-in” from the services for computerized DLPTs seemed absent due to the failure to coordinate.

At any rate, on 22 January 2001, Herzog, for DLIFLC, signed a Memorandum for Record with McFarlane, for NSA, concerning the development of the DLPT 5. They based the memorandum on the December DLIFLC-NSA meeting that had called for the institute to develop a number of lower range DLPTs in Chinese, Russian, and Spanish. And, for the first time, required upper range tests (Levels 2-4) in Chinese, Korean, Russian, and Spanish. It also included projects to determine the competence of linguists in Arabic dialects per NSA’s request. The final version of DLPT 5 items were to be bilingual at Levels 0+ through 3 with both bilingual and monolingual DLPT 5 items at levels 3+ and 4. The agreement stated that “the ultimate goal of this set of projects is computer-adaptive tests.” To accomplish this, the agreement required DLIFLC to develop DLPT 5 prototypes for CD- and web-delivery in Russian, to develop alternative forms of the Korean DLPT IV for computer-delivery, and to host a conference on designing computer-adaptive language proficiency tests.

Test Development and Validation

As early as August 1998, upon becoming the dean of Evaluation and Standardization, Herzog began reviewing past practices used to validate the DLPT while researching current practices in test validation. For future projects, she proposed using two independent methods of calibration to validate the tests: a face-to-face assessment and constructive response tests, the latter requiring students to “construct” or develop their own answers without the benefit of any suggestions or choices. Herzog knew that ES had recently used the face-to-face method to validate new forms of the Korean DLPT, the Portuguese-European DLPT, and the Iraqi dialect listening comprehension pilot test and seemed to derive better information concerning the proficiency of examinees than had previous methods. It was critical, to develop effective testing instruments, that the tests themselves be effectively evaluated to ensure that the

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532 Recollection of Stephen Payne from when he served as Senior Vice Chancellor and Interim Chancellor.
535 “Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) Modernization Plan,” 30 November 2000, pp. 2-4, in “DLPT” folder, drawer 4, 2001-2003 ACH files, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Iraqi dialect pilot was not a DLPT but used the same principles of test development.
proficiency scores they delivered to test-takers were accurate and valid. Hertzog believed that using two methods that provided the same results would improve confidence that the tests and resulting proficiency scores were valid. The initiation of a more rigorous test validation methodology was a sensitive issue because while developers hoped to make the next generation DLPT more accurate, they might also create a more challenging test for test-takers.

As development for new tests began, ES elected to continue the multiple-choice format for the high-enrollment languages that contained large linguist populations who could participate in traditional test validation processes. However, in low-enrollment languages with restricted validation populations, the format was to be “constructed-response,” that is, linguists would have to produce correct answers, rather than simply recognize them.\(^\text{536}\)

After 9/11, it became necessary to test in some additional languages, such as Dari and Pashto, very rapidly. To meet this need, ES produced a version of the DLPT called the Guided Proficiency Test. These reading and/or listening tests were administered face-to-face or by telephone and FAX by a team of native speaker and testing specialists. The guided test was a transitional measure that was to be converted eventually to a “constructed-response” DLPT.\(^\text{537}\)

Test Development began designing the lower range and upper range DLPT tests and validation projects in FY 2001, beginning with Russian and adding new languages as faculty became available.\(^\text{538}\) In 2001, it completed the Arabic projects in Egyptian, Iraqi, and Levantine dialects as well as the upper range reading comprehension items in Chinese, Korean, and Spanish. As agreed, DLIFLC held a “Computer Adaptive Language Proficiency Test Design Conference.” In fact, it held two conferences (2001 and 2002), which were put on with the help of several consultants and which apparently included “spirited discussions” over computer-adaptive testing.\(^\text{540}\) Test Development did create web- and CD-based prototypes in 2001, although concerns over test security required it to use English Familiarization items rather than Russian (Form C DLPT) as originally planned. Staff also tested the computer-delivered alternative forms of the Korean DLPT IV in March 2001 and completed them in April 2003.\(^\text{541}\)

\(^{536}\) Martha Herzog, “History of the DLPT,” July 2006, in “DFLP History” folder, DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.

\(^{537}\) Hertzog, “History of the DLPT,” July 2006. A constructed-response is a written, as opposed to a multiple-choice, test answer.

\(^{538}\) Releasing faculty from other projects became a contentious issue at DLI after 9/11 as faculty were pulled to worked on multiple projects relating to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.


\(^{540}\) Earl Schleske served as a consultant for the 2001 conference, held between 7-9 August at the Maritime Academy in Baltimore, Maryland. Schleske was on loan to DLIFLC via an Intergovernmental Personnel Agreement (IPA) with the University of Minnesota. DLIFLC hired contractor Geoff Marshall, a computer programmer, to work with Carol Greene to test and modify software applications for the DLPT 5. Marshal also installed software and configured hardware in NSA testing labs. In addition, Dr. Richard Luecht, a professor in the Department of Educational Research Methodology at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro and an expert on language testing, served as a consultant to NSA in 2003 on the design for a computer-adaptive test system. See “Proposed Actions to Facilitate CD and Web Delivery of DLPT,” [ca. November 2000], memorandum; and Martha Herzog to Dr. Stephen Payne, memorandum: “Status of Deliverables Listed on MFR with NSA,” 28 September 2004; both in “DLPT” folder, drawer 4, 2001-2003 ACH files, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

The fact that Test Development created alternative forms of the same test became confused with the concept of computer-adaptive testing. The Korean DLPT IV scrambled test items and associated multiple-choice answers within a given test so examinees taking the same test would not see the same test item or answer at the same time. Test-takers would still take the same test form, but this practice reduced cheating. Computer-adaptive testing, on the other hand, “meta-tagged” all test items and associated answers by level and placed these into content management system software, which could then randomly select items by level to generate tests unique to each examinee. Outside Monterey, many mistook the terminology to believe that computer-adaptive testing was a reality in 2001, which was not true and which contributed to misunderstandings between DLIFLC and NSA representatives.\footnote{542 Herzog, Martha, Memorandum for Dr Payne, “Status of Deliverables Listed on MFR with NSA,” 28 September 2004. A minimum database of some 750 test items was needed for computer-adaptive testing to work. Meanwhile, DLIFLC struggled to develop two alternate test forms for each DLPT 5 language test while using some test items on both test forms.}

At the Annual Program Review in March 2002, Herzog announced that the design for the DLPT 5 was complete. Although it was only a “minor” improvement over the DLPT IV, this test would be computer-based with two versions, one for the lower ILR scale and one for the higher ILR scale. She stated that Arabic was perhaps the most challenging test with four versions of listening to manage the dialects of Iraqi, Egyptian, Levantine, and Modern Standard Arabic.\footnote{543 “Minutes from the 05-07 Mar 2002 Annual Performance [sic] Review,” 16, in “Annual Program Review, 5-7 March 2002” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

The need for a new test took on urgency after General Hayden issued his memorandum of 3 April 2002 stating NSA’s need for linguists with Level 3 and above language skills.\footnote{544 Lt Gen Michael V. Hayden, Director, NSA, Memorandum for Commanding General, U.S. Army INSCOM, et al, 3 April 2002, in DLIFLC, Annual Program Review 2003 (Monterey: DLIFLC, 2003), pp. 28-29.} Hayden highlighted two key issues that would have to be resolved for NSA to meet higher proficiency goals: training and testing. His memorandum helped create the funding basis for the Proficiency Enhancement Program II (PEP II), but also reinforced the efforts of NSA representatives in urging DLIFLC to develop the new DLPT.\footnote{545 For a discussion of PEP II see, Stephen M. Payne, “A History of the Proficiency Enhancement Plan II: 1995-2003” in the DLIFLC Command History Office.}

In 2002, Test Development developed test specifications for the full range (Levels 0-5) of the DLPT 5 in MSA, three Arabic dialects, and Persian Farsi. It then developed the full range of Arabic and Persian DLPT 5 reading comprehension items with some representative listening comprehension items delivered on CD. It also outlined a plan for constructed-response testing in low volume languages using Dari as the test language. In 2003, it fully developed the Dari constructed-response test, but delayed or deferred other aspects of the DLIFLC-NSA agreement into 2004.\footnote{546 Martha Herzog to Dr. Stephen Payne, memorandum: “Status of Deliverables Listed on MFR with NSA,” 28 September 2004, in “DLPT” folder, drawer 4, 2001-2003 ACH files, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

By the end of 2003, Test Development was pursuing development or validation of new-generation DLPT 5s in twelve languages or dialects. That year it added a new DLPT feature to the Albanian DLPT. The feature was intended as a model to be used with similar languages with only small numbers of operational linguists. Instead of the more familiar multiple-choice answer format, this DLPT deployed the constructed-response format. Meanwhile, Test Development made plans to validate several DLPT 5 exams in 2004, including Chinese (upper and lower
range), Korean, Iraqi, Persian-Farsi, Russian (upper range), Serbian-Croatian, Spanish (upper range), and Modern Standard Arabic. It also scheduled several DLPT development projects for completion in 2004, including Albanian, MSA (upper range), Persian (upper range), and Spanish (upper range). DLPTs slated to start up in 2004 included Greek (lower range) and Hebrew (upper and lower range). Finally, in 2003, Test Development’s efforts toward computer delivery of DLPTs included programming of a Russian prototype, launch of a computerized test usability study (to be followed by a comparability study of the paper-based and computer-delivered Russian DLPTs), and the first exploratory steps toward a computer-adaptive DLPT. Test Development planned to implement the Russian computer-delivered test in FY 2005. ES also developed a few web-versions of some DLPT IV and older tests for use until a DLPT 5 could be developed and validated in Turkish, Chinese Cantonese, and other low volume languages.

**Test Development Process**

ES employed an elaborate process to develop the DLPT 5. For each language, it chose two or three “Target Language Experts” to work as a development team, usually from the teaching faculty based on their project management experience and their background within the school. Sabina Atwell and the ES Test Standards Division staff provided extensive training to those chosen on the ILR scale while Pardee Lowe conducted text typology workshops. They taught teachers how to select language passages that reflected appropriate IRL levels for listening and reading comprehension. The teachers also learned how to write multiple-choice test items and how to make proper use of distracters in the multiple-choice process.

Once trained, team members took authentic reading passages and verified the ILR level and appropriateness of the passage for testing with other team members or project managers. Upon approval, the team translated the passages into English. The team then wrote and rewrote items for the reading portion of the test along with distracters until satisfied. Project managers from other language test-development teams then reviewed the material to ensure item workability, content, and ILR level. The ES Proficiency Standards Division independently reviewed the same material before ES piloted it with DLIFLC students and/or faculty. Project managers then collected data from the pilot tests to analyze and reconfigure any passage and/or items as needed. Afterwards, Proficiency Standards conducted a second review while Test Standards gave a final check for correct English usage and assembled proof test booklets.

For listening comprehension, Test Standards followed a similar process using authentic material matched to the appropriate ILR levels, although staff had to record the final approved product in a studio setting with edits made to stay within listening time specifications. After a review by Proficiency Standards, Test Standards piloted the recordings with DLIFLC students and/or faculty, collected data to analyze and revise, re-submitted the final recordings to

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Proficiency Standards, and conducted a final check for correct English usage. Project managers then burned audio material onto proof CDs and assembled proof test booklets.

Test Development developed the face-to-face interview tests in the same fashion as the reading and listening comprehension tests. Rather than having multiple-choice items, however, the teams translated the passages into English and wrote test items and scoring protocols that identified the type of answer expected. ES senior reviewers then reviewed the final test for consistency.

Once Test Development finalized the multiple-choice reading and listening comprehension pilot tests, it administered them to validation subjects, who were also administered the face-to-face interview tests to determine their proficiency level. With scores from two tests, the ES psychometrician statistically analyzed the resulting data before the project manager assembled the operational forms of the tests.

![Figure 19 Target Language Expert team test development process, ca. 2001-2003](image)

**Summary of DLPT 5 Development**

During this period, Test Development sought to meet functional and quality mission requirements by maintaining a standardized test development process with documented test specifications, thorough internal and external reviews, and the piloting of new tests prior to general release. Under Dean Martha Herzog, ES sought to implement a rigorous validation process for the DLPT 5 that employed the same military personnel, government civilians, and university students to calibrate the tests. These validation subjects took both the newly developed paper and pencil tests and special reading and listening comprehension proficiency.

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549 The validation process was radically changed in 2006 as will be discussed in the 2006-2007 Command History.

tests in an interview format. The results from each test could then to be compared to help validate the test. Herzog felt that the use of strict standards and processes paved the way for eventual computer-based proficiency testing.  

**Miscellaneous Projects**

In 2003, besides DLPT-related matters, Test Development worked to develop end-of-course tests in three languages; conducted comparability studies between customary paper-and-pencil and new-design computer-delivered tests; and conducted a cognitive usability study of computer-delivered tests in four languages to evaluate computer screen designs and various computer delivery functions. Finally, in collaboration with NSA/CSS, Test Development sought to develop a self-diagnostic test combined with learning activities intended for CD-based or Web-based delivery in the languages of Arabic, Persian-Farsi, Russian, and Spanish.  

**Research and Evaluation**

The program of the Research and Analysis Division was under the management of Dean Dr. John Lett throughout this period. Lett maintained oversight of applied research in foreign language learning, language needs assessments for the user community, and DLIFLC activities under the Technology Transfer Act. This division was formed in 2001 by merging the existing Evaluation Division with the Research and Analysis Division.

The ESR Evaluation program included ongoing collection, analysis, and reporting on student opinion of resident and nonresident programs and management of the Feedforward/Feedback system for follow-on training. The Evaluation program was also responsible for the TRADOC Quality Assurance Office. One highlight was the ongoing multifaceted ESR evaluation of resident language programs and classroom instruction. Using data generated by automated questionnaires administered mid-course (Interim Student Questionnaire or ISQ) and end-course (End-of-Course student Questionnaire or ESQ), the program continued regular and frequent reporting on students’ opinions about effectiveness of the language program in which they studied, about the effectiveness of the classroom instruction itself, and about quality of life at the Presidio beyond the classroom. Reports continued to take the form of either routine ISQ and ESQ reports for each class and class section (vis-à-vis learning success for each class and section), annual qualitative and quantitative summaries of students’ opinions and learning success, special efforts to notify chain-of-command when data gathered pointed to potentially volatile issues, or evaluations on special request. Evaluation improvements for FY 2003 included the speed-up of the nonresident questionnaire system, start-up of a new Quality of Life trend report (derived from resident ISQ and ESQ input), and updates to the Feedforward/Feedback system exchange of questionnaire, student demographic, and performance data with Goodfellow Air Force Base.

In the area of ESR Research and Analysis, project highlights for FY 2003 included a report entitled “Linguist Training and Performance Study” with the Army Research Institute, coordination and collaboration with the Special Operations Forces Language Office, and assessment of a potential off-site language immersion program for DLIFLC Basic Course students. Also important was the creation of new language codes and code lists, in both digraph

553 DLIFLC&POM Staff Directories, 2001-2002.
(two-letter) and trigraph form. The project developed a list of trigraphs approved by the Joint Requirements and Integration Office as well as trigraphs that met requirements of the International Standards Organization.\footnote{Herzog to Raugh, “FY03-ES-History.doc,” 18 April 2005.}

In 2003, in collaboration with Middle East I, ESR also conducted a detailed examination of curriculum, instruction, student outcomes, student feedback, and lessons learned from a three-day on-site immersion in Arabic for students nearing the end of their Basic Course. This study was published as: Gordon L. Jackson, \textit{Evaluation Report for 24-26 March 2003 Middle East School I (MEI) Immersion Program} (DLIFLC, 2003).

In collaboration with staff from the ES Directorate, ESR also pursued several development initiatives for improving the Defense Language Aptitude Test Battery (DLAB). The first initiative, begun in 2002, was to develop a computer-delivered DLAB. The military was then administering the pencil and paper test at some sixty Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), but DLIFLC staff believed, in response to field requests, that the test would be easier to deliver over the Internet and once automated would likely significantly increase the number of tests taken.\footnote{“In Progress Review: Automated DLAB Project,” fact sheet, 17 September 2002, in “DLAB” folder (Ch4 Academic Support), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.} This in turn would increase the pool of candidates for language training who had a potential to attain high proficiency. By October 2002, NSA had provided a small amount of seed money for the project and had already begun to work with the Navy by providing sample DLAB-like items on its website intended to attract interest in language learning.\footnote{“Automation of Defense Language Aptitude Battery,” fact sheet, 16 October 2002, in “DLAB” folder (Ch4 Academic Support), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.} The Navy, however, wanted to test all of its recruits to improve the manning of its linguist billets. To accomplish this goal, DLAB testing would have to occur not at the MEPSs, but at the actual recruiter stations. Martha Herzog and John Lett immediately challenged this proposal, because it would open the DLAB to possible compromise. In their view, such a procedure was like asking language instructors to administer the DLPT—faculty, like recruiters, had an interest in seeing student test scores raised. Unless the Navy could devise a process where by the test could be given only by Test Control Officers who had no stake in the outcome of the test, then they felt the DLAB should not be given at the recruiter level. Rodney A. Feidt, an Air Force senior master sergeant, thought the services did need to give the test at the recruiter level if the goal was to increase the number of test-takers, but acknowledged the likelihood of test compromise, which he also agreed was unacceptable. Feidt pointed out, however, that the Air Force administered the DLAB to 88 percent of those recruits otherwise qualified once they were in basic training and could live with the existing situation if necessary.\footnote{Martha Herzog to Deniz Bilgin, email, 9 October 2002, in “DLAB” folder (Ch4 Academic Support), RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

By the end of October 2002, ES staff realized that “the need to allow individual recruiters control of DLAB appears to be incompatible with the need to maintain test security.” As a solution to this problem, ES decided to offer a two-tier automated aptitude test that would allow recruiters to conduct on-line aptitude “screening” tests that would be followed up at MEPS where the secure DLAB could be administered to the subset of recruits who passed the screening test. ES planned to have an operating prototype available by January 2003. At the same time, ES proposed to obtain a “site license” to allow limited use of the Modern Language Association...
Aptitude Test (MLAT) in cooperation with the University of Minnesota. By May 2003, this test could be made available to a limited number of field recruiters.\(^{559}\)

The Military Entrance Processing Command for usage issues, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) for technical assessment, plus contract assistance in gauging implementation feasibility provided additional assistance for this project. During FY 2003, the DLAB was programmed for automation, a prototype was delivered to the DMDC, and planning began on the next steps to be taken.\(^{560}\)

The second DLAB initiative was called “DLAB II.” DLAB II explored the possibility of using new approaches and test items in a reengineered DLAB. It absorbed the opinions of leading applied linguist and cognitive psychologists.\(^{561}\) The DLAB required updating because the test was nearly thirty years old and did not measure such important attributes as cognitive ability, motivation, or personality. In addition, it was time to automate the DLAB. By early 2006, Congress provided $1 million to allow the institute to pursue development of both an automated DLAB and a new test.\(^ {562}\)

**Foreign Area Officer Office**

The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Office continued in efforts to prepare U.S. Army officers for future service in the Army’s Foreign Area Officer Branch. In 2001 and 2002, the director of the FAO Office was Col. Manny Fuentes. In 2003, the director of the FAO Office was Lt. Col. James Cobb. The FAO Office was located in the Weckerling Center on the Presidio of Monterey.\(^ {563}\)

The FAO Office complemented the FAO student’s language training by providing an Officer Professional Development (OPD) program, Foreign Area Officer Conferences, and opportunities to attend embassy-style receptions. In 2003, the FAO Office sponsored thirteen OPDs, two FAO conferences, and two embassy-style receptions, as well as eleven “brown bag lunches” at which individuals knowledgeable in specific regions of the world talked to the FAOs assigned to those regions about relevant issues in those regions. The FAO office also assisted FAOs in all matters related to their transition into the FAO branch, and included get-togethers for FAO spouses with the FAO Office director and his wife. The FAO Office was located in the Weckerling Center on the Presidio of Monterey.\(^ {564}\)

At any given time, some 75-100 FAOs were present at the Presidio while some 200 attended the school annually. FAO students studied in all languages taught by DLIFLC. The largest number of FOAs came from the “48G” career field and there were about 25-30 of these.

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\(^{564}\) “Foreign Area Officer Office Command History Report 2003,” [15 April 2004].
officers present at any given time. Most FAOs came from combat arms or intelligence branches, but learned their foreign language in Monterey.\textsuperscript{565}

The OPD program consisted of various subjects presented in formal presentations and “Brown Bag Lunches.” The Brown Bag Lunches were smaller group discussions usually more specific to one particular region of the world. Knowledgeable scholars and military leaders with experience in foreign relations led these discussions and presentations. In one of these OPDs, former Ambassador Rodney Minott, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, presented a five-part series about embassy life and historical U.S. relations with other countries. Other interesting OPD presentations included in March 2003, when Major General Charles F. Scanlon, U.S. Army (ret.), spoke about his experience with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Defense Attaché System, or in August 2003, when R. James Woolsey, former Director of the CIA, spoke about “The Long War of the 21st Century: How We Must Fight It.” Some FAO OPDs were entirely functional as when in October 2003, Men’s Wearhouse and Macy’s, two local department stores, teamed up and presented an OPD entitled “Dress for Success.” They introduced FAOs and their spouses to the appropriate attire worn at embassy and foreign receptions.\textsuperscript{566}

In 2003, the FAO Office sponsored FAO conferences in June and in December. Both conferences were weeklong courses of instruction intended to provide FAO trainees critical information from the strategic level to the individual level, which in turn was expected to benefit their careers as FAOs. The FAO Conference included four days of instruction on U.S. foreign policy, Regional Overviews, FAO Career information briefs, including for spouses on living overseas, and an informal social event. The fifth day was a “university fair,” which involved invited representatives from numerous U.S. universities who spoke about their respective international relations programs. The university fair gave the FAO trainee a preview of the different universities available for advanced civil schooling attendance.\textsuperscript{567}

On 20 June 2003, the FAO Office also held a “University Fair” at the Weckerling Center on the Presidio. The fair was an opportunity for graduate school representatives to discuss their programs with those interested in international relations and area studies.\textsuperscript{568}

Students

For command, control, and administrative purposes, DoD assigned military foreign language training students attending DLIFLC to a troop unit of their respective service. U.S. Army language training soldiers were assigned to the 229\textsuperscript{th} Military Intelligence Battalion (229\textsuperscript{th} MI Battalion); U.S. Air Force personnel were assigned to the 311\textsuperscript{th} Training Squadron (311\textsuperscript{th} TRS); U.S. Navy personnel were assigned to the Center for Cryptology Detachment (CCD), Monterey (which changed its name from Naval Technical Training Center Detachment or NTTCD); and U.S. Marine Corps soldiers were assigned to the Marine Corps Detachment (MCD).

\textsuperscript{566}“Foreign Area Officer Office Command History Report 2003,” [15 April 2004].
\textsuperscript{567}“Foreign Area Officer Office Command History Report 2003,” [15 April 2004].
229th Military Intelligence Battalion

Between 2001 and 2003, the mission of the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion remained to “produce and maintain soldier-linguists to meet Army foreign language requirements worldwide.” The 229th MI Battalion was organized into a staff section containing an executive officer, a command sergeant major, an S1, S2, S3, S4, and six companies (A to F) under the command of Lt. Col. Viaene from 2001 to 2002 and then Lt. Col. George B. Scott in 2003.569

The 229th MI Battalion’s “vision” was to “produce motivated, disciplined, physically fit, battle focused soldiers” who were “proficient in their assigned language and prepared for follow-on assignments in the operational force.” The battalion sought to care for its soldiers, civilians, and families “to ensure total readiness and sustain commitment to the Army.”570

The U.S. response to 9/11 and the beginning of the war in Iraq had a significant impact on the 229th MI Battalion during this period, as reflected by the growth in the average student population. While the battalion’s average strength was 1,332 soldiers in October 2001, by October 2002 the battalion’s strength averaged 1,814 soldiers, then it shot up again during the first five months of 2003 to an average strength of 1,943 soldiers, although the average strength fell back to just over 1,800 soldiers by the end of 2003.571 In addition to the increasing student population, battalion staff underwent significant turnover due in part to officer taskings to support operations worldwide.

[Diagram: The battalion leadership]

Normally, enlisted soldiers assigned to the 229th MI Battalion arrived straight from Initial Entry Training (IET). Actually, they were still completing IET. Therefore, the Army assigned them to B Company until they passed their Army Physical Fitness Test. During this phase, the soldiers had to remain on post and live in the barracks (even if married), dress in military clothing only, and were restricted from smoking or using cell phones. Once they passed the physical fitness test, the soldiers gained more liberties and the battalion allowed them to move

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570 The two quotations in this paragraph are from an unnumbered slide, “229th MI Battalion Griffins,” in Briefing, “229th MI Battalion Quarterly Training Brief,” 229th MI Battalion, June 2003.
571 Statistics derived from briefing: “Battalion Strength: OCT 01-MAY 03.”
into other companies of the unit. Married soldiers could then live with their families. The battalion assigned soldiers to various companies based upon their language.\(^{572}\) A Company, for example, was responsible for Korean students ranking from private (E-1) to specialist (E-4). It divided these equally into platoons with the goal of maintaining class integrity. Typically, the platoon that had the fewest soldiers absorbed the next starting Korean class. This procedure provided the platoon sergeant more time with each individual soldier during their language training. In 2003, A Company graduated 169 soldiers from the Korean Basic Course while sustaining approximately 375 soldiers and their families. The battalion organized its remaining companies similarly with variations due to students’ languages or rank.\(^{573}\)

Company D was perhaps the most diverse unit supporting students in the ranks of private (E-2) to lieutenant colonel (O-5) who were studying in basic, intermediate, advanced, refresher, and sustainment courses for a variety of Middle Eastern and European languages. In 3rd Platoon, personnel were preparing for Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) assignments or attending the School for Continuing Education.\(^{574}\)

Another important mission performed by the 229th MI Battalion was security, handled by the battalion’s S2. During this period, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) began a transition of its personnel security investigations program. This process led to significant delays in processing security clearances while OPM resolved details with DSS associated with a transfer of responsibility and personnel planned to occur before the end of Fiscal Year 2003. In the interim, OPM began to process DoD investigations that were submitted since 1 October 2003. Cases received prior to that date continued to be worked and completed by DSS.\(^{575}\)

Traditionally, the 229th MI Battalion participates in various extracurricular activities, including support for various charities. For example, on 27 April 2002, the 229th MI Battalion cooperated with the Fort Ord Area Retiree Army Emergency Relief Fund to sponsor a gold tournament held at Monterey Pines Golf Course, which raised $6,000 for the Army Emergency Relief Fund.\(^{576}\) During the Spring of each year, the 229th MI Battalion also conducts its annual “run through the streets of downtown Monterey.” On 28 May 2003, the run began at Soldier Field on the Presidio of Monterey, traveled through the downtown area and returned. The public was invited to watch and police escorts managed the run route.\(^{577}\)

Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Ronnie Chaney retired on Soldier Field on 28 March 2002. Known as “the gentle giant,” Chaney was both easy-going and rigorous in encouraging soldiers to do their

\(^{572}\) Maj Thomas Patrinicola to Harold Raugh, email, 3 June 2005, in “ACH2003 229 MI BN” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives. According to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), initial entry soldier training was to proceed in phases. Phases I through III took place during Basic Combat Training, i.e. “boot camp.” Trainees were then sent directly to their advanced training assignments, where they completed Phases IV and V. At DLIFLC, during the last two phases, soldiers had to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) and participate in financial readiness training. In Phase IV, soldiers were not allowed to smoke or wear civilian clothes and had to live in the barracks. In Phase V, soldiers could wear civilian clothes off-duty, and if married, could live with their family. After passing the APFT with a minimum score, trainees were reassigned to A, C, D, or F companies (depending upon their target language) and were authorized Phase V+ privileges, which included smoking, using cell phones, traveling off-post, etc.


best in all spheres both physically and language-wise. He served twenty-five years in uniform and finished his career at DLIFLC where he began it as a Russian linguist. After retiring, Chaney went into the defense industry. Colonel Viaene, commander of the 229th MI Battalion, stated that Chaney was “a true professional who knew the pulse of the battalion with its enlisted soldiers and NCOs.” In his own words, Chaney said that “the Army is the best place in the world to learn and grow. The Army lets you make mistakes and learn from them.” Sgt. Maj. Jackie Moore, who arrived from the 344th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade at Goodfellow AFB, replaced Chaney. Moore had also studied Russian at DLIFLC.  

![Figure 21 CSM Ron Chaney, 229th MI Battalion, retires at Soldier Field in March 2002](image)

**311th Training Squadron**

The 311th Training Squadron (TRS) fulfilled the same function for the Air Force as the 229th MI Battalion did for the Army—it managed and supported U.S. Air Force service members attending DLIFLC to become Air Force military linguists. The 311th TRS was subordinate to the 17th Training Wing located at Goodfellow AFB in Texas. It included both an Academic Training Flight and a Military Training Flight. The Academic Training Flight was aligned by school. From 2001 until 2002, Lt. Col. Smith served as Squadron Commander of the 311th TRS until replaced by Lt. Col. Stuart Lay. Lt. Col. Matthew Baker assumed command of the 311th TRS on 7 October 2003.  

Students in the 311th TRS ranged in rank from airman basic (E-1) to colonel (0-6), and were studying eighteen languages in basic, intermediate, advanced, refresher, sustainment, and DTRA courses. To manage these students, the 311th TRS was authorized 50 total positions, including 5 officers, 43 enlisted, and 2 civilians. However, in 2003, the 311th TRS was actually assigned 42 total staff, including 6 officers, 36 enlisted, and 0 civilians.

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The Military Training Flight took care of all enlisted non-prior service students. These students were broken down into sub-flights within the Military Training Flight (A-J). The phase of the student determined their flight assignments, not the language they were assigned to study.

During 2003, there were a number of important visits by senior Air Force personnel, beginning with a visit by Mrs. Peter Teets, the spouse of the Undersecretary of the Air Force, on 29 January 2003. Mrs. Teets’ primary concern was quality of life. The 311th TRS gave her a tour of the unit’s dorms and provided her the opportunity to speak with several staff members. She expressed approval of 311th TRS facilities, standards, and especially unit students. On 6 May, Lt. Gen. Richard E. “Tex” Brown III, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, spoke to the officers and senior noncommissioned officers of the 311th TRS and the Air Force Element staff. He addressed officer and enlisted force development, changes to officer assignment and promotion processes, and returning the Air Force to a steady state “AEF rhythm.” On 11-12 August 2003, Maj. Gen. and Mrs. John F. Regni visited DLIFLC. General Regni, 2nd Air Force Commander, spent time learning more about students awaiting training and what they were doing before class. Mrs. Regni got a first-hand look at the important quality of life aspects that make the Presidio a unique environment for Air Force members. Finally, Maj. Gen. William M. Fraser III visited DLIFLC on 19 November 2003 to speak with staff and students. Fraser received a mission brief and a presentation, which included Band, Choir, Drill Team, Honor Guard Team, and language skills presentations. Fraser looked into several issues, including reclassification, security holds, and quality of life needs.⁵⁸¹

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Flight Assignment</th>
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<tr>
<td>A Flight: Phase 1-2 (Female)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Flight: Phase 1-2 (Male)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C Flight: Phase 3-4 (Male)</td>
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<td>D Flight: Phase 3-4 (Male)</td>
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<tr>
<td>E Flight: Phase 3-4 (Female)</td>
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<tr>
<td>F Flight: Phase 3 and above (Married, living off-post)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G Flight: Phase 3 and above (Bldg 648, Coed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>H Flight: Phase 3 and above (Bldg 649, Coed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I Flight: Phase 3 and above (Bldg 650, Coed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>J Flight: Phase 3 and above (Bldg 651, Coed)</td>
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<th>Phase Assignments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1: Arrival through the 28th calendar day</td>
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<td>Phase 2: 28th through the 44th calendar day</td>
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<td>Phase 3: 45th through the 180th calendar day</td>
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<td>Phase 4: 181st through the 365th calendar day</td>
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<td>Phase 5: 366th day through graduation</td>
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**Figure 22 311th TRS student flight assignments, 2003**

During the summer of 2003, the 17th TRG/Inspector General (IG) team conducted a follow-up inspection to a Standardization and Evaluations Office inspection it previously conducted in October 2002. The follow included a deeper review of 311th TRS programs to set the unit on course for the forthcoming Unit Compliance Inspection scheduled for 12-14 January 2004. Unit staff also briefed more than 281 female airmen on sexual assault and harassment in

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2003. The briefing gave the airmen a better understanding of the system and how it works. Applied suicide intervention training classes were also conducted for all airmen.\footnote{Baker, Memorandum for Command Historian, 14 April 2004.}

To support its training mission, 311\textsuperscript{th} TRS replaced outdated computers in its Language Resource Center with new Pentium-4 based computers. The computers were supplied by the 17\textsuperscript{th} Training Group (17 TRG) with end-of-year fallout money. The upgrade was useful for students in casual status who were able to use them for language maintenance while waiting to continue their specialty training. Another innovation began on 20 October 2002 when thirty-eight students began a month-long SAT course called “Introduction to Comparative Politics taught by Naval Postgraduate School Professor James Wirtz, Chairman of National Security Affairs. Wirtz worked with institute staff to see how his course could satisfy the social studies requirement for an Associates or Bachelors of Arts degree. This cooperation was the first known joint effort between NPS and DLIFLC.\footnote{Baker, Memorandum for Command Historian, 14 April 2004.}

\textbf{Naval Technical Training Center Detachment/Center for Cryptology Detachment}

The mission of the Naval Technical Training Center Detachment (NTTCD) was “the training of students in a foreign language and culture at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center.” In 2003, the unit was under the command of Lt. Cdr. Karla J. Nemec.\footnote{Most information in this section from: Officer in Charge, Center for Cryptology Detachment, Memorandum entitled “Annual Command History, 2003” to Commandant, Defense Language Institute, 16 April 2004, in “ACH2003 CCD” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.} On 18 August 2003, the NTTCD was officially re-designated as the Center for Cryptology Detachment, Monterey (CCD Monterey).\footnote{Linda F. Millay to All DLI, email: “FW: All DLI Announcement,” 18 August 2003, in “ACH2003 CCD” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.} CCD was subordinate to the Center for Cryptology, Corry Station Pensacola, Florida. Its commanding officer, Captain Deets, visited the Detachment on 15-16 April 2003.

The NTTCD was comprised of approximately 600 Navy personnel, most of whom were attending language training. Approximately 85 percent of the unit’s students were reporting for training from Recruit Training Command or from the Fleet under the Selective Conversion and Reenlistment Program or lateral conversion programs. The remaining personnel were enlisted and officer personnel en route to numerous commands that required language skills, including SEAL teams, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Personnel Exchange Program assignments, Commanding Officers, Executive Officers, Public Affairs Officers, Cryptologic Officers, Intelligence Specialists, Military Assistance Group Officers, foreign Naval War College selectees, etc. The permanent party staff numbered about sixty.

One of the Detachment’s key achievements during this period was to maintain the lowest rate of student disenrollment or attrition among the service units. In FY 2002, NTTCD’s attrition rate was 6.7 percent for academic causes and 16.3 percent for administrative causes. In total its attrition was only 23.1 percent as compared to 28.7 percent total attrition for the Army and 31.7 percent total attrition for the Air Force.\footnote{“Installation Commander’s Quarterly Staff Meeting,” 26 February 2002, briefing slide entitled “Basic Program Disenrollments for Classes Graduating in FY 02,” in DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives.}

In 2003, DLIFLC administered the DLPT to 395 NTTCD/CCD students: 369 were basic, 4 were post-DLPT, 2 were refresher, 15 were intermediate, and 8 were advanced students. The
chart below provides test results and accompanying notes to clarify information. Between January and December 2003, 248 Basic Course naval students passed this test.

During 2003, the detachment conducted a good deal of routine maintenance on its buildings, including 629, 648, and 652, through DPW contractors or self-help projects, which generally involved interior and exterior painting. In 2003, the unit turned over all duty vehicle responsibility to Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) transportation as directed by Ms. Liz Owens, NPS Transportation Officer.

On 22 May 2003, NTTCD hosted the 22 May 2003 DLIFLC joint Memorial Day ceremony, worth noting because a good performance here ensured that many of the key personnel and NTTCD procedures were employed on 4 June 2003 to conduct the change of command ceremony between Col. Kevin Rice and Col. Michael Simone as DLIFLC commandant. The detachment also provided over 1,200 volunteers (13,720 man-hours) for thirty-six community events and charities. Naval volunteers, for example, supported the 2003 Kidney Foundation/Cadillac Golf Invitational; the East vs. West Shriner's Game at Pac Bell Park; AT&T ProAm Golf Tournament; Headquarters set-up and the Eagle's Wing Sanctuary Fundraiser; and Monterey and Seaside Fourth of July parades, to name only a few.

A number of VIPs visited the NTTCD in 2003, including R. Adm. Joseph D. Burns (Commander Naval Security Group Command), R. Adm. Leendert R. “Len” Hering, Sr. (Commander, Navy Region Northwest/CTF33), and others, who visited with NTTCD sailors on 8 April 2003 to communicate language importance to the Navy mission. The detachment also hosted a visit from Acting Secretary of the Navy H. T. Johnson on 16 May 2003. For sailors, the most interesting visit was probably by retired Navy Cdr. Lloyd Bucher, former commander of the USS Pueblo. Bucher was the guest speaker at the 228th Navy Birthday Ball held on 18 October 2003. The event and offered a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for NTTCD sailors, young and old, to interact with an icon of naval history.

The NTTCD reported the fourth suicide attempt of the fiscal year on 27 July 2003, two days after an “all hands” suicide prevention training. Common factors among the suicidal sailors were undisclosed mental health, family abuse, drug/alcohol, and suicidal history. In response, the detachment initiated a chaplain billet request to improve both NTTCD and the Marine Corps Detachment personnel support. Captain Phillips, Commander, Naval Personnel Development Command Chaplain, also visited with key NTTCD and DLIFLC personnel on 15 August 2003, gathering insight into personnel concerns including suicidal tendencies and the detachment’s “at risk” sailor tracking. On a more positive note, the Detachment conducted a Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey in July 2003, returning feedback from roughly 21 percent of the population (161 of 757), that showed NTTCD scored higher than other services and the Navy in all equal opportunity areas except for perceived work group effectiveness.

### Marine Corps Detachment

The U.S. Marine Corps Detachment (MCD) was responsible for the administration, military training, and foreign language instruction of Marine student linguists (whenever these were not in class). It also provided administrative support to all Marines assigned to locations throughout the Monterey Peninsula. Due to frequent Marine reassignments, administrative activity remained high during this period. MCD fell under the Marine Corps Training and Education Command, located in Quantico, Virginia.\(^{587}\)

Maj. Thomas A. Sparks commanded MCD from January 2001 until July 2002 when he was replaced by Maj. David A. Reynolds. Reynolds was replaced on 12 March 2003 by Capt. Raymond A. Servano III, who served only until August 2003. Thereafter, Maj. Roht headed the detachment.  

MCD was responsible for soldier training but also provided academic support by conducting pre-academic counseling based on each Marine’s learning styles and academic aptitude. The Detachment’s military training was aimed at maintaining and, in some instances enhancing, the basic Marine training received by initial entry marines. MCD thought such training especially important due to the joint service environment at the Presidio of Monterey and the length of the courses. In addition to the linguistic and military training, MCD leadership hoped to act as ambassadors for the Marine Corps. The MCD does this partly by participating and assisting in numerous community activities, from sending color-guards to participate in the ceremonies of various ceremonies to individual volunteers who help organized marathons or who help run the annual “Christmas in the Adobes” in Monterey.

In 2001, the monthly strength of the MCD ranged from a low of 518 (228 officers and 290 enlisted men) in November 2001 to a high of 589 (278 officers and 311 enlisted men) in July 2001. This number included nine officer and fifteen enlisted permanent party personnel. The unit passed an IG inspection in February with a grade of “mission capable.” However, one major and unfortunate incident involved two MCD marines.

On 15 March 2001, L. Cpl. Jesse Carson and Pfc. Jason Blad were arrested for involvement in an 11 November 2000 attack on a Pacific Grove woman. The Marine Corps discharged both of them on 3 April 2001. On 27 February 2002, a jury convicted Carson of premeditation in attempting to murder the 20 year-old woman whom he brutally stabbed and left for dead on the Pacific Grove Recreation Trail. He received life in prison with the possibility of parole in nine years. On 16 April 2002, Blad pled guilty to the same charge and also received life imprisonment with possibility of parole in seven years. On 8 November 2002, the victim, who survived the attack with serious physical and emotional scares, filed a $100 million damage claim against the U.S. government, which was denied by the U.S. Navy (the party responsible for the Marines) in September 2003. According to court testimony and other evidence, the marines had collected material on serial killers and had planned the attack to experience what it was like to kill someone. In March 2004, the victim filed suit against the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center alleging that the military was “actively training” the pair to kill. The lawsuit asserted that military supervisors failed to prevent the assault by overlooking or ignoring items, such as an encyclopedia on serial killers, on weekly room inspections, that should have warned of their mal-intent. According to Lt. Col. Jonathan Kent, Staff Judge Advocate, DLIFLC, the U.S. attorney representing the Navy filed a motion for “Summary Judgment” on the basis that the two marines were not acting with in the scope of their duties. The court granted this motion in October 2006 and gave the victim sixty days to appeal. In November 2006, the

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victim’s attorney offered not to appeal in exchange for a waiver of costs, to which all parties agreed. The case was then closed on 8 December 2006.\textsuperscript{592}

In 2002, the monthly strength of the MCD ranged from a low of 429 (185 officers and 244 enlisted men) in October 2002 to a high of 509 (297 officers and 212 enlisted men) in February 2002. This number included 13 officer and 14 enlisted permanent party personnel.\textsuperscript{593}

In 2003, the monthly strength of the MCD ranged from a low of 442 (204 officers and 238 enlisted men) in December 2003 to a high of 487 (200 officers and 287 enlisted men) in February 2003. This number included 13 officer and 14 enlisted permanent party personnel.\textsuperscript{594}

\textbf{Major Student Activities}

On 21 April 2001, DLIFLC sent fourteen Chinese-language students to compete in the annual Mandarin Speech Contest held at Abraham Lincoln High School in San Francisco. All came back with awards, an accomplishment not matched by any of the other competing institutions, including Stanford University, UC Berkeley, UC Santa Barbara, or San Jose State and San Francisco State Universities. The top honors actually went to Spec. Aron Bray, who said “the staff here at DLI was my key to success.”\textsuperscript{595}

Later that same month, some four hundred DLIFLC students and staff volunteered to help run the 16\textsuperscript{th} Annual Big Sur International Marathon, held on 28 April 2001, which brought in $120,000 to support local charities while another 60 helped support a “fishing derby” for local disabled veterans.\textsuperscript{596} At the 17\textsuperscript{th} Annual Big Sur International Marathon held on 28 April 2002, more than ten thousand runners and walkers participated along the challenging course that runs from Big Sur to Carmel along Highway 1. According to Wally Kastner, race director, “the Big Sur International Marathon is a massive undertaking and simply would not operate without the tireless efforts of the members of DLI. Year in and year out, they have been a core of support, and we are grateful for their continued partnership with us over the years.” The institute provided 307 volunteers who assembled and tore down tents, unloaded trucks, directed traffic, set up barriers, issued refreshments, and performed various other tasks. More than 160 volunteers came from Company B, 229\textsuperscript{th} MI Battalion alone. The marathon was rated as the top marathon in North America because of its financial, product, and service support from sponsors and volunteers and among the ten most difficult. The race was won by Jonathan Ndambuki of Kenya who came in at 2:18:5.\textsuperscript{597}

Another run in which DLIFLC students participated was the Army Birthday Run sponsored by the General Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell Chapter of the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA). The run celebrated the Army’s birthday on 21 June. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Annual AUSA Army Birthday Run was held on 21 June 2003 with more than 230 participants. Both 5- and 10-kilometer races were held on the Presidio of Monterey with Kiran Moorty and Jessica Davenport winning top honors in the 1-kilometer events for males and females respectively. A “Forest

\textsuperscript{592} Lt Col Jonathan A. Kent to Col Sue Sandusky, email, 26 January 2009, in “Pacific Grove Attempted Murder Case” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.


“Gump” impersonator also ran in the race (with his briefcase). For this event, held on the Presidio of Monterey, the gates were closed for two hours, except for emergencies. The race was open to the public.\(^598\)

Of particular note during the last quarter of 2003 was an event involving “Three Good Samaritans.” At approximately 1745 hours on 8 November 2003, A1C Leong and Amn. Weingarten (311\(^{th}\) TRS) along with Pfc. Cardwell (229\(^{th}\) MI Battalion) happened upon an automobile accident on California Highway 1 that had taken place during terrible weather conditions. The troops were first on the scene. Putting their military training to exemplary use, they provided medical response, creatively used another vehicle’s “On Star” service to contact emergency services, provided care to a two-year-old child (orphaned due to death of parents in the accident), directed traffic, and provided aid to law enforcement officials when they arrived.\(^599\)

DLIFLC students have a long history of community volunteerism while stationed at the Presidio of Monterey. For example, on 22 July 2001, Cdr. James W. Jackson, American Legion Post 41, Monterey, California, awarded a certificate of appreciation to “the Presidio of Monterey for their committed and continued support of the American Legion Post 41 through unfailing volunteerism of the Defense Language Institute students.”\(^600\)

**Language Day**

DLIFLC sponsored its yearly “Language Day” celebration in early May of each year during this period. The 2001 Language Day celebration took place on 4 May. Some three thousand military students were excused from classes while the event drew some 1,400 secondary school children who came to the Presidio of Monterey to learn about military language training and the foreign cultures of some of those languages. Visitation was down in 2001 due to a conflict with state tests on the same day, but Lt. Jamison Braun, the event co-chairperson, thought that “it looked like all the students who came were having a good time and learning something about DLI and that is what we hoped for.”\(^601\)

The institute held its next Language Day on 3 May 2002. On this occasion, more than three thousand students arrived to attend the various cultural displays and festivities and to see what language classes in the military were like.\(^602\)

The institute held the final Language Day for this period on 2 May 2003.\(^603\) Action officers were Capt. Amie Kippley, Lt. Kendall McCune, and Lt. Rasul Alsalah. Despite some rain, the event was a resounding success, once again attracting thousands of high school students from across California to Monterey.

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\(^{599}\) All information in this section from: Lt Col Matthew C. Baker, Memorandum for Command Historian, 14 April 2004, in “ACH2003 311 TRS” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.


\(^{603}\) See *Globe Language Day* (May 2003).
Worldwide Language Olympics

In 2001, 173 two-person teams competed during the DLIFLC Worldwide Language Olympics between 14-18 May, held on the Presidio of Monterey. Linguists represented the languages of Chinese, Persian-Farsi, Korean, Arabic, Spanish, and Russian, which fielded forty-two teams. Most teams were from U.S. bases, but participants also traveled from Korea, Japan, Hawaii, and Germany. The competition honed linguist skills because participants must first prepare and succeed at local language Olympics. According to Sgt. Maj. Norman Zlotorzynski, the WLO was also a good opportunity for younger soldiers to travel with older and more experienced noncommissioned officers who mentor them. Zlotorzynski, who had coordinated the event for three years, also noted that change could be expected in future competitions. Part of that was due to the desire to keep the competitions fresh with new games, but other adjustments were budgetary. He explained that “this stuff comes out of DLI’s hide where we have no real personnel, monterary or equipment resources. It’s always: beg, borrow or steal to get WLO successful.” He thought at some point California university teams ought to participate in the WLO competitions, which “would take it to a whole new level.” As usual, Defense Threat Reduction Agency personnel, from Travis AFB, won the Russian competition as the best single unit and the best Russian unit. Other Russian competition participants, noted Zlotorzynski, came to the WLO to compete but also to meet DTRA recruiters, who are considered the best Russian linguists in the U.S. government. DTRA teams participated in U.S. missions to the former Soviet Union to monitor arms control treaty compliance.

DLIFLC held the 2002 WLO from 6 to 10 May, again at the Presidio of Monterey. Tech. Sgt. Forist Babcock II, academic training advisor for Asian languages in the 311th Training Squadron, was the primary coordinator. For 2002, a new rule implemented was a ban on the previous year’s gold medalists from competing in the following year’s game. “This was done to level the playing field and give more people a chance to win,” said Air Force Tech. Sgt. John Morash, who was the NCO in charge of DTRA at the Presidio. Marine Gy. Sgt. John Durish, a Russian MLI, was the chief coordinator of the five WLO events held over the VTT network. All the events were based upon the final learning outcome (FLO) skills in listening, reading, and speaking, said Babcock. M. Sgt. Lucinda Tims, the Presidio’s Command Sergeant Major, was the chief MLI program manager during the event. The 704th MI Brigade, Fort Meade, Maryland, won top place as the best overall multi-team unit while DTRA participants Sr. M. Sgt. William Leaf and S. Sgt. Andrew Patrick earned top place as the over single-unit team (competing in only one language (Russian).

Unfortunately, DLIFLC had to change the name of the WLO for its 2003 annual competition due to a complaint by the International Olympics Committee, which objected to the military’s use of the term “Olympics.” More unfortunately, institute officials had to consider postponing or even cancelling the newly renamed “Worldwide Language Competition” due to concerns about the possible initiation of combat operations in Iraq. DLIFLC sought input from service program managers and Joint Language Center directors on whether or not to proceed with the 2003 event. All of them reported the need to hold a “wait and see” approach in the lead.

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up to hostilities. Subsequently, with the invasion of Iraq in full swing, all stakeholders recommended that the institute postpone or cancel the event, which is what happened.  

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Chapter V

Installation Command Group & Staff

The coordinating, personal, and special staff sections continued to support the commandant, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, and installation commander, Presidio of Monterey during this period. Major changes in staff structure also occurred, however, as Col. Kevin M. Rice, sought to address two over-arching requirements—the need to reposition the institute for a post-9/11 world and to prepare for the implementation of Centralized Installation Management as directed by the Department of the Army and as discussed in Chapter VI. After Col. Michael R. Simone became commandant on 4 June 2003, he made further adjustments to staff structure and duties. Simone hoped to increase staff and support responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency, and to help implement the “standardized common garrison management structure.” The sections below are divided into the categories of “personal staff,” who worked primarily for the commandant, including various executive officers and the institute’s senior language authority, and “coordinating” and “special staff,” who generally reported to the chief of staff.


Coordinating Staff

**Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans**

The role of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans or DCSOPS was to provide installation-wide coordination and to enable DLIFLC support for operational contingencies, which were many and varied during the period between 2001 and 2003. As previously discussed, in late 2001, DCSOPS began to provide contingency support for Operation Enduring Freedom.

Originally, DCSOPS was known as OPP for Operations, Plans, and Programs and was under the direction of Lt. Col. Richard Chastain, U.S. Army, in 2001. The directorate then contained four major divisions, including the Programs and Proponent Division under an Army warrant officer, CWO4 Joseph “Mac” McDaniel, the Operations Division or Emergency Operations Center under Rich Savko, the Plans Division under Major Packard, and the Scheduling Division under Clare Bugary.\(^6\)

Colonel Rice directed the creation of an “Installation DCSOPS” during a general reorganization of DLIFLC in October 2001. According to Rice, “foremost, I saw a need for a dedicated Installation Coordinating Staff.” The core mission of this new office was to be the same as the former Operations, Plans, and Programs Directorate, although Rice redistributed various responsibilities. For example, he transferred the Programs Branch (Command Language Program support), VTT facilitators, and LingNet administrator to the School for Continuing Education. He then created a new deputy assistant commandant position, staffed by Lt. Col.

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Cori Mazik, who became responsible for the Scheduling Division and some Plans & Operations officers. 609

From 2001 to 2002, Lt. Col. Patrick C. O’Rourke, U.S. Army, was DCSOPS chief. In 2003, Lt. Col. James Rollins took the lead of DCSOPS. Rollins was a U.S. Air Force officer but he still reported to the chief of staff. DCSOPS was divided into two main sections, Operations and Plans, but there was a second major change in the organization’s structure in August 2003 due to the Army’s decision to centralize installation management under the Installation Management Agency. Rice had somewhat anticipated the creation of the IMA by creating a DCSOPS, but now the functions of DCSOPS had to be split off or duplicated so that both the institute and the garrison would have planning and coordinating support.

In preparing for this change, DCSOPS faced some important challenges because it was responsible for synchronization of installation planning and programming; force protection, planning and oversight; the emergency operations center; installation activities; centralized tasking; command plan synchronization; and management of the installation Monthly Status Reports program. Without careful planning and coordination, vital mission support activities could be impaired. 610

Staff engaged in debate about how to divide operational and planning functions. Major worries about the forthcoming division included whether sufficient military and civilian personnel would be available to serve in DCSOPS and whether both garrison and DLIFLC staffs would have appropriate positions to support DCSOPS requirements for operations, programming, and planning. 611

DCSOPS Director O’Rourke steadfastly maintained that “both Garrison and Institute require a programmer/ing staff, an operations staff, and a plans staff.” As for an EOC, he argued that the Force Protection mission was an installation function and included the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/Installation Operations Center (IOC) function. “The justification that the EOC/IOC be under the Garrison,” he stated, “is that the mission of the Institute is to educate, evaluate, sustain and support language in the DoD. There is no directive that states Commandant DLI has the responsibility” for an EOC/IOC. Others felt he was more or less right, but DLIFLC still had to deal with educational emergencies, such as “mobilization POIs” or programs of instruction. 612

Having insufficient resources to fund separate planning staffs for the interrelated activities of DLIFLC and the garrison, Rice filed a “reclama” with the TRADOC commanding general on 6 February 2002. 613 DLIFLC had long supported Presidio needs by using the school’s on-hand military personnel. According to Rice, the Army had never appropriately staffed either the school or the garrison and thus “a Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM) is needed to meet the Installation’s operations and planning...
responsibilities.” Similarly, he wanted an S-2/3 staff to meet DLIFLC’s own operations and planning needs.614

![Organizational Chart]

Figure 23 Proposed organization of DCSOPS under CIM, 28 October 2001

By January 2003, DCSOPS was under the leadership of Lt. Col. James Rollins, an Air Force officer, and still consisted of two main sections, Operations and Plans, supporting both DLIFLC and the garrison.615 In August 2003, Col. Sandra J. Wilson, an Air Force officer who had recently become assistant commandant, established a DLIFLC Operations and Plans Section, which was independent of the garrison. Its first mission, however, was to help implement the decision to separate DLIFLC and garrison functions as the Presidio’s base operations was spun off. Rollins continued to lead this new staff section. Maj. Spero S. Pekatos, an Army officer, assumed oversight of the Operations Section, Installation Operations Center, and an anti-terrorism officer. DSCOPS saw relatively large turnovers in staff as officers and enlisted personnel transited to new assignments near and far.616 After the August 2003 reorganization, DCSOPS moved from Building 636A to Rasmussen Hall (Building 614).

Even though the DCSOPS functions were split between DLIFLC and the garrison, the commandant remained installation commander, a position distinct from the garrison commander

position. The garrison commander did not report to the commandant, but the commandant retained authority for installation-wide coordinating functions and served as the senior DoD official on the post.

To cope with the new regime, DCSOPS established processes for long-range planning, updating, revising, and implementing the installation command plan; programming synchronized long-range requirements matched to institute and garrison action plans; and managing force protection. New personnel were also assigned and trained to perform the new responsibilities. DCSOPS, in essence, continued to do what it had before but now coordinated between the mission and garrison functions to insure that their activities were efficiently executed.617

Overall, DCSOPS established responsibilities, set requirements, provided planning, coordination and execution for numerous events, ceremonies, and taskings. It was responsible for managing soldiers on casual status, central tasking, contingency planning, EOC/IOC, installation-level staffing, master calendar, semi-annual installation update, bi-weekly command staff meetings, installation events, the cadre training course, the monthly status report [MSR] to higher headquarters, monthly blood drives, command training guidance, daily activities executive summary (EXSUM) and situation reports (SITREP) to higher headquarters, operations security (OPSEC), Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) site coordination, facility management, and annual holiday Exodus.618 As discussed in Chapter II, the scheduling section helped resolve a major problem in applying the Institutional Training Resource Model in late 2001, which helped bring significant new funds to DLIFLC by laying out the true costs of training development.619

DCSOPS external support included: responding to numerous tasking requirements from HQ, TRADOC, coordinating the completion of translation requests for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (Iraq) or for Joint Task Force (JTF) 160 detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and translating the Ranger Handbook and Field Manual 7-8 (Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad) from English into Dari. Between 2002 and 2003, DCSOPS also provided over 90,000 language survival kits to over 566 units.620 Non-OEF-related DCSOPS support during this period varied greatly. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard requested DLIFLC to supply a military or civilian interpreter with a L2/R2 proficiency to provide communications support for bridge-to-bridge radio transmissions and for Coast Guard boarding teams during cutter operations along the maritime boundary between the United States and Russia in the Bering Sea late in 2002. The Coast Guard, unable to obtain this immediate requirement through normal channels, would cover all costs for the six-week assignment.621

Less seriously, DCSOPS staff also coordinated events with the local community. For example, on 1 June 2001 Rich Savko, then chief of the EOC, coordinated “Launch Day” at Soldier Field.

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619 Col Kevin M. Rice, to Commanding General, US Army TRADOC, memorandum: “POM FY04-09 Commandant’s narrative,” 20 February 2002, in RG 42.03.10-01, folder 1 (ITRM), DLIFLC&POM Archives.


Launch Day marked the 17th annual model rocketry event sponsored by Bay View Elementary School, which utilized the process of building and launching model rockets to teach kids about science. The Army allowed the school to use Soldier Field for the event due to its open space and lack of nearby housing or trees, Savko said.\textsuperscript{622}

Of special note between 2002 and 2003, DCSOPS responded to fifty-five requests from eighteen agencies to support worldwide efforts by Combatant Commanders engaged in global anti-terrorist activities. In doing so, DCSOPS received two flag officer commendations from U.S. naval commanders of the Fifth and Sixth Fleets for effectively providing “time critical requirements to develop foreign language materials that would advise maritime interests of ongoing military operations in the Mediterranean Sea” and for the institute’s “commitment to excellence [which] significantly enhanced United States combat readiness.”\textsuperscript{623}

\textit{Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management}

The Directorate of Resource Management (DRM) was responsible for managing mission resources. The office fell beneath the garrison until 11 October 2001, when Col. Kevin Rice, as installation commander, issued a memorandum reorganizing DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey in response to the creation of the Installation Management Agency. At that time, Rice renamed DRM as the office of the deputy chief of staff for Resource Management (DCSRM). The new designation meant that the head of DCSRM reported to the chief of staff, instead of the garrison commander, but otherwise the function of DCSRM remained the same.\textsuperscript{624} Its main role was to ensure that DLIFLC and the Presidio operated as efficiently as possible, making the best use of limited resources by assessing manpower, budget, and organizational issues. In 2003, Lt. Col. James A. Worm succeeded Lt. Col. Kay Moore as DCSRM. DCSRM was divided into two major divisions, Management and Budget.\textsuperscript{625}

At the onset of this period, the institute was due to receive $45 million to increase intermediate and advanced training and for modest updates in curricula and testing. However, increased training requirements, locality pay increases, and higher energy costs negatively affected real spending. The Presidio also had some $75 million in unfunded mandates.\textsuperscript{626}

Indeed, funding was so short that TRADOC Brig. Gen. John B. Sylvester issued orders requiring subordinate commands to prepare for drastic cutbacks in the FY 2001 budget. He estimated a shortfall of $360 million overall due to such issues as Army Transformation, training requirements, the BASOPS realignment decision, and utilities. The cutbacks would include an immediate civilian hiring freeze and the termination of temporary employees where feasible, termination of contracts not yet awarded unless they were critical to support training loads, and


\textsuperscript{623} Barbara Sobczak-Graham, “DCSOPS 2003,” paper in “DCSOPS Mission Review 2003” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives. According to the Commander, Sixth Fleet, DLIFLC “responded to an emergent Sixth Fleet time-critical requirement to develop foreign language materials that would advise maritime interests of ongoing military operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Answered this requirement with urgency, enthusiasm, and impressive professionalism.” According to Commander, Fifth Fleet, DLIFLC’s “commitment to excellence significantly enhanced United States combat readiness by providing the tools to execute complex evolutions that were essential to improving war-fighting capabilities.” See Memorandum, ATZP-DCS-O, “DCSOPS 2003–Annual Command History,” 30 April 2004.


\textsuperscript{625} DLIFLC&POM Staff Directories, 2001-2003.

\textsuperscript{626} “Talking Points for DFLP Policy Committee Meeting,” 13 June 2001, in “DFLP Policy Committee” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
many other cutbacks. Sylvester insisted, however, that commanders “execute our primary training mission and avoid adversity to our civilian workforce. …You are not to stop training at this juncture, that requires the specific approval of the CG and even the CSA, but if this evolving situation has the potential to impact training, we must know ASAP.”

In follow-up guidance, DLIFLC mission funding was specifically exempted from the cutbacks, but budgetary restrictions ensured that new reporting requirements were imposed and a great deal of work was thrust upon TRADOC resource managers.

In response to TRADOC budget shortfalls, Rice directed cutbacks in travel, supplies and equipment purchases, overtime pay, and the awarding of contracts unless critical to support training. He also directed conservation efforts to save on utilities and allowed only essential, legal, health, and/or safety-related new expenditures. Rice issued a statement on the “Mini-POM 03-07” that claimed DLIFLC’s “FY03 program funding does not support a 3,572 structure load.” By moderately decreasing costs, he expected the institute would be able to support a training load of only 3,000. A major problem was that the Department of the Army had cut “MDEP funding by $5 million” for FY 2001. TRADOC was significantly underfunding DLIFLC validated mission requirements. As a result, Rice was also unable to fund the full requirements to provide VTT and MTT field support, to conduct necessary DoD-wide proficiency testing, to reduce the backlog in curriculum development, or to modernize DLIFLC language labs. “The serious underfunding of BASOPS and taxes on contracts,” he concluded, “is continuing to have a negative impact on the rudimentary levels of quality of life.”

DLIFLC’s budget problems were partially resolved, however, due to the effects of 9/11. As Rice noted in 2008, “prior to 9/11, we were a back-water, but after 9/11, DoD and the Department of the Army were then resourcing DLI.” The first result was that the Army raised the “validated” DLIFLC requirement of $87.4 million by $32.5 million to $119.9 million (with the “critical” funding level raised to $100.7 million). This $32.5 million, added to the original unfinanced requirement, resulted in a total unfinanced requirement for FY 2003 of $44.7 million. Having recognized and increased DLIFLC’s requirements, the Army G3 provided significant support for the “POM 06-11.” The president authorized additional funding increases through PBDs 707, P99, and 738 for FY 2005. Thus, beginning in 2004, $57.6 million in additional funding was allocated for PEP II, training developments, language familiarization/MTT, the Army IRR/09L program, and for other critical needs.

Although DoD’s reaction to 9/11 eased funding problems, DLIFLC’s mission continued to grow in complexity, which posed future year resource challenges. Among these, noted DCSRMs, was the need for longer lead times to affect program changes, the need for DoD to

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630 Col Kevin M. Rice, memorandum: “FY03 UFR List,” 1 April 2002, in “UFR (Unfunded Requirements) FY 03” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
631 Col Kevin M. Rice (Ret.), interview by Cameron Binkley and Stephen Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1031), in DLIFLC&POM Archives.
make multi-year commitments to funding, and the need reduce the drain on military manpower caused by the commitment of U.S. military forces to two simultaneous wars. Moreover, DLIFLC continued to operate with inadequate classroom space and remained uncertain about the resource impact of Centralized Installation Management, as discussed in Chapter VI. 634

Management Division

Rice’s decision to realign the budget office in October 2001 made it slightly easier to address Centralized Installation Management as it took effect on 1 October 2003. Under Rice, DRM was divided into separate mission-oriented and garrison-oriented resource management offices. Worm remained on the mission side along with Management Supervisor Margaret A. Wielandt, Systems Accountant Donald Dwight, three management analysts, three budget analysts, and a management assistant. 635

Rice issued another important directive on 2 July 2001 when he signed a command policy memorandum reaffirming that managers must comply with Army Regulation (AR) 11-2, Presidio of Monterey Pamphlet 11-2, and the Installation Management Control Process (MCP) Program. This program, a local regulation, required “Assessable Unit Managers” to notify the installation commander of program weaknesses and to monitor their progress in eliminating significant weaknesses identified in their departments. Assessable Unit Managers were required to sign a statement of responsibility for management controls, which was included with their performance agreement. A “Management Control Administrator” (MCA) conducted in-house MCP training for all primary and alternate MCP points of contact at DLIFLC in 2003. The emphasis was on the importance and execution of the MCP program. Twenty-three persons attended. MCA also conducted one-on-one training with every primary MCP point-of-contact. The focus was on the technical aspects of MCP execution and the preparation of the respective organization’s Annual Assurance Statement and supporting documentation. Thirty-one persons received this training. 636

MCA worked closely with the thirty-one point-of-contacts at the Directorate, Dean, and Office Staff level in implementation of the MCP. These activities included distributing guidance and requirements; maintaining records on management reviews and reports; tracking the status of reported material weaknesses; and assisting in preparation and coordination of various reports. 637

After the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, DCSRMR managed the new funding that poured into the institute. Rice recalled that at the beginning of his tenure, the DLIFLC budget was approximately $110 million, but after 9/11, funding rose, both in add-on emergency funds, which soon started arriving in clumps of three to five millions, but also in annual budgets. By the time he left, DLIFLC funding was approximately $160 million. Funding for FY 2008 was approximately $230 million. Thus, for Rice the challenge was not in resting additional money from DoD, but in making sure that available funding was well spent. Rice emphasized the need to recruit “well-qualified, educated, motivated teachers—native speakers of the language” and then to put in place a system to vet their credentials (both academic and security-related), create conditions to motivate them, and obtain the all important classroom space, to allow them to work. The latter being a great constraint due to the space limitations of the

636 Worm, “Annual Historical Summary for CY03,” 17 April [2004].
637 Worm, “Annual Historical Summary for CY03,” 17 April [2004].
Presidio, which is why he moved courses into nearby primary schools (Larkin and Monte Vista), whose classrooms were rented.\textsuperscript{638}

In 2003, DCSRM was tangentially involved in two “Commercial Activities competitions” conducted on the Adjutant General’s Office and the Directorate of Information Management. Both were competed with private industry and had to make adjustments to their in-house functions.\textsuperscript{639}

DCSRM also oversaw the Government Travel Charge Card program, which saw changes in January 2003 when DoD announced that the use of the cards for PCS moves was prohibited. Another change in the program was the initiation of “split payments” in September 2003 where certain expenses were centrally billed while others reimbursed the cardholder who in turn paid the bill. Cardholders were required to pay their balances promptly. The average delinquency rate on the Presidio for the number of accounts active was 2.92 percent, which was below the TRADOC goal of 3 percent.\textsuperscript{640}

**Budget Division**

The Budget Division was responsible for policies and procedures related to the distribution of funds and resources. It ensured that personnel followed all regulations in the use of funds. The Budget Division also prepared the Command Operating Budget for the next fiscal year. The end of FY 2003 was especially significant as this was the last year that TRADOC was the major command for both mission and garrison activities on the Presidio. In FY 2004, the Army split these functions with garrison activities thereafter falling under the IMA and mission activities remaining under TRADOC.\textsuperscript{641}

The Budget Division (mission-side only) closed FY 2003 spending $94,475,200. Of that amount, congressional add-ons totaled $17,772,000, funding for the “Global War on Terrorism” was $15,500,000, LangNet was $1,000,000, and SCOLA was $1,272,000.\textsuperscript{642}

**Personal Staff**

**Chaplain**

Throughout the period, Presidio of Monterey chaplains provided chapel services, religious education for adults and children/youth, special holiday programs, counseling, and conducted weddings and funerals both on the Presidio and at the Ord Military Community. Chaplains also provided “Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training” (ASIST) to units, staff and faculty members and joint service in-processing briefings to new arrivals. The Chaplain’s Office provided split religious support to both the installation and garrison after October 2003 when the garrison became part of the IMA.

Lt. Col. Douglas K. Kinder served as the installation chaplain until replaced by Maj. Steven R. Young on 28 June 2003. In the chaplain’s office, Ms. Inge Ruddell served as the administrative assistant and S. Sgt. Marcos Negrete as the NCOIC. Maj. Pat Bailey served as

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\textsuperscript{638} Col Kevin M. Rice (Ret.), interview by Cameron Binkley and Stephen Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1030-1031), in DLIFLC&POM Archives.

\textsuperscript{639} Worm, “Annual Historical Summary for CY03,” 17 April [2004].

\textsuperscript{640} Worm, “Annual Historical Summary for CY03,” 17 April [2004].

\textsuperscript{641} Worm, “Annual Historical Summary for CY03,” 17 April [2004].

\textsuperscript{642} Worm, “Annual Historical Summary for CY03,” 17 April [2004].
World Religions instructor and Maj. P.K. Roberts was in charge of Plans, Operations, and Training. Capt. Albert Ghergich was the resource manager and OMC chaplain; his funds clerk was Spec. Steve Brown, S. Sgt. Howard Thompson managed funds, and Spec. Amber Oberg was the OMC Chapel NCOIC. The 229th MI Battalion supervisory chaplain was Maj. Robert Neske, the battalion chaplain was Capt. Jeff Clemens, the Presidio of Monterey Chapel NCOIC was Sgt. Kevin Stevenson and the chaplain assistant was Spec. James Robor. Capt. Clyde Dyson served as 311th Training Squadron chaplain.

The Religious Support Office (RSO) provided frequent training sessions for chaplains and chaplain assistants, and offered frequent ASIST training for units, faculty, and staff with twenty to twenty-five participants per session. RSO also provided DLIFLC and garrison teambuilding workshops, which sought to promote teamwork and communication across the installation. During an Installation Command Planning Session, participants identified several problematic areas within organizations needing improvement. A working group, consisting of academic deans and senior staff officers, was tasked to provide an action plan for improving teamwork and communication. The working group determined that education and workshops were the best way to address this problem. Coordination began with the Army Management Staff College (AMSC) from Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, which facilitated a one-week training program in April 2003. The AMSC faculty also provided a one-day executive-level group session for all department heads and directors and multiple train-the-trainer sessions for selected representatives from each school and directorate. Upon completion of the two-day seminar, each representative was expected to train other staff and faculty members.

Programs of the RSO included the National Prayer Breakfast, the Community Easter Sunrise Service, Worship on the Water (a worship service on the beach), Vacation Bible School, Christian concerts, Marriage Enrichment Retreat, ALPHA Discipleship Course, Food Basket Program, and Toys for Tots, among others.

**Inspector General**

The mission of the Inspector General (IG) was to assess and report on managerial procedures and on issues affecting personnel, materiel resources, and funding. The role of the IG was to identify problems affecting mission performance, efficiency, discipline, morale, and esprit de corps. The IG sought to isolate causes, determine and recommend corrective actions, and evaluate post-investigation changes for their effectiveness. The DLIFLC IG provided support to over seven thousand joint service active duty members, National Guard and Reserve members, Department of the Army and Navy civilian personnel, military retirees, family members, and civilians. The IG Office provided assistance, training, and inspection support to individuals and units while assisting these to identify and correct systemic problems. The IG also served as a personal staff officer and confidential representative for the installation commander.

Lt. Col. Axel Martinez served as the IG through April 2002. In April 2002, Billy “Skip” Johnson joined the office as the deputy IG. He managed affairs until August 2003 when the IG office again became fully staffed and led by Lt. Col. Erich V. Boerner, who arrived to replace Martinez as IG. The Army scheduled Boerner to remain until August 2005. The IG Office also included three assistant IGs filling one Air Force E-7 slot (AFSC 3A071) and two Army E-7 slots (MOS 42LB). Air Force M. Sgt. Teresa Kistler was assigned as an assistant IG in April 2002 and assumed Section NCOIC duties in 2003. Kistler was recognized as the Air Force

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Element’s Outstanding Senior NCO of the Quarter for the 3rd Quarter, 2003. Sfc. Keith Forney was assigned in August 2003 and Sfc. Lamona Anderson was assigned in November 2003. Two Assistant IGs departed during 2003: Sfc. Ivonne Gonzalez (who had also served as NCOIC) retired in August 2003 and Sfc. Joseph Taylor was reassigned to Korea in August 2003.

During this period, the IG conducted several formal and informal inquiries and investigations while also receiving referral cases from the DoD Hotline Reporting System, the Department of the Army IG, and the TRADOC IG. The IG typically received from fifteen to twenty Inspector General Action Requests per quarter. According to the available IG quarterly reports, all of these requests were for assistance in resolving problems of service members, retirees, dependents, etc. In 2001, no investigation was driven by allegations of misconduct. The problems varied but typical issues were “non-support of family” or military personnel management.

In February 2002, the TRADOC IG Team visited the Presidio and OMC “to assess perceptions about the DLI and the POM command climate through interviews and sensing sessions with soldiers.” In 2003, the DLIFLC IG Office conducted its own climate assessments at DLI-W and at Goodfellow AFB, Texas (a follow-on assignment for many DLIFLC graduates).

The IG Office continued to conduct weekly IG information briefings to new personnel and provided quarterly instructions for new commanders and cadre. In 2003, it conducted assessments/inspections for the Presidio’s Army Health Clinic, the installation in-processing program, and contractor billing procedures at DLI-W. It also conducted climate assessment sensing sessions for the garrison staff and the 1-149th Armor Battalion Force Protection Soldiers.

In 2003, the IG responded to 1,200 requests for assistance, which typically included routine requests for information, advice on regulatory interpretation and implementation, research, and review of command policies and training support. It conducted 128 formal and informal inquiries, of which 65 percent were initiated by military personnel, 22 percent were initiated by family members, 20 percent were initiated by civilian personnel, and 3 percent were anonymous. The top categories of concern were 22 cases involving Personal Conduct, 12 cases involving family nonsupport, 31 cases involving Military Personnel Management, 34 cases involving Personnel Separations, and 17 cases involving Command Policy Management.

**Staff Judge Advocate**

The mission of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) was to support as required by regulation or law, DLIFLC and installation management by offering expertise and guidance in the disciplines of administrative, civil, international, operational, contract, military justice, and environment law. The SJA accomplished this through consultation, advocacy, legal assistance, claims service, tax advice, and notary services. The SJA’s vision was to provide timely and

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646 “TRADOC Inspector General Team to Visit Feb. 25-28,” Community News, vol. 9, no. 38 (22 February 2002), 1, in DLIFLC&POM Archives. Results data unavailable, which tends to indicate no significant issues were uncovered.

accurate legal guidance and support on the full range of issues affecting DLIFLC, the Presidio of Monterey, and the well-being of its people. From 2001 to 2003, the SJA was Col. Karen Judkins, who was re-assigned to Camp Zama, Japan, on 11 July 2003. On 14 July 2003, Lt. Col. (P) John L. Clifton arrived and assumed duties as the Installation SJA. The SJA office had four main functions: administrative law, claims, criminal law, and legal assistance.

**Administrative Law**

Capt. Christopher Burgess assumed duties as chief, Administrative Law, on 21 January 2003. He was responsible for providing the command accurate and timely advice on the legal ramifications of any proposed action by interpreting law and regulation. For example, on the basis of SJA review, Rice determined not to support a request in 2003 to endorse a grant proposal seeking funding to rehabilitate the historic hangar at Crissy Field in San Francisco where the first Military Intelligence Service Language School was started. In this case, the SJA found such an endorsement ruled out by guidelines restricting officials from using their office to endorse such projects. Burgess also assisted the command by recommending courses of action that were both legal and practical and by advocating the command’s position in labor hearings and other forums. Burgess was also responsible for traveling to local universities to interview second- and third-year law students interested in applying for summer internships and full-time Active Duty positions in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Laura Wolting, who also worked in administrative law, successfully managed the Confidential Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form 450) program and submitted relevant reports to TRADOC during this period.

**Claims**

The mission of the Litigation and Claims Office is to investigate, adjudicate, and resolve claims filed both on behalf of the United States and against the United States. These include personnel claims, Article 139 claims, tort claims, and affirmative claims.

**Criminal Law**

In 2002, Captain Weiss was in charge of this section to support commanders and military law enforcement in maintaining good order and discipline by providing expert and responsive advice on all military justice and adverse administrative actions, representing the United States effectively and efficiently in courts-martial and administrative separation hearings, and conducting effective military justice training.

**Legal Assistance**

The Legal Assistance Office (LAO) assisted active duty personnel of all services and their family members with their personal legal affairs, including aid in nonmilitary matters such as writing wills, preparing powers of attorney, understanding rental contracts, dealing with creditors, preparing and filing of income tax returns, counseling on divorce, and advising on civil suits. Annually, LAO performed thousands of notarizations. In 2002, the U.S. Army chief of staff awarded the Excellence Award in Legal Assistance to the DLIFLC SJA office, mainly because of the quality of legal assistance it provided to eligible clients and for its innovative use of information technology in providing better assistance at the installation, for deployment.

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preparation, and for deployed forces. In August 2003, the commandant received a letter of appreciation from the California Franchise Tax Board for LAO’s outstanding VITA Tax Program. Finally, LAO implemented a new procedure in November 2003 whereby soldiers pending Article 15s could view an informative video after school hours. The procedure eliminated the need for units to provide an escort for those soldiers attending the video showing.

A number of staff changes occurred during 2003. For example, Sgt. Brenda Jamison arrived from Germany on 28 February 2003 and assumed duties as the 229th MI Battalion’s legal NCO while S. Sgt. Teresa Stringer arrived from Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, and assumed duties as the SJA NCOIC on 14 July 2003. Several reserve officers also performed their annual training with the SJA office in June, July, or August. In 2002, the SJA was Lt. Col. Ehrsam-Holland and the Deputy SJA was Mr. Truscott.

Special Staff

Air Force Element

The mission of the Air Force Element (AFELM) was to provide administrative support to U.S. Air Force personnel assigned as permanent party cadre to DLIFLC, including officers filling various positions in the schools, MILs, and other enlisted personnel. The DLIFLC assistant commandant, an Air Force colonel, commanded AFELM with the support of a chief master sergeant who served as the unit’s “superintendent.” Col. Johnny Jones commanded AFELM from November 1998 until he retired on 22 June 2001 after twenty-seven years of service. Col. Jeffrey S. Johnson succeeded Jones, although the Air Force scheduled his arrival in Monterey for early August 2001.\(^{649}\) In March 2003, Col. Sandra F. Wilson succeeded Johnson.

Equal Employment Opportunity Office/Equal Opportunity Advisor

The mission of the Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEO) was to administer the DLIFLC and Presidio of Monterey EEO Program. The EEO program was directed at civilians and functioned to comply with U.S. law in ensuring that all persons qualified by training and experience were provided a fair and equal opportunity in employment without regard to their race, religion, color, gender, national origin, age, or disability. Elvira M. Robinson managed the EEO Office throughout this period.\(^{650}\) To accomplish its mission, Robinson scheduled regular trainings for staff, such as the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Program, known as POSH. Under the reorganization to split mission and garrison functions, EEO was realigned under garrison command in late 2003.

In August 2001, Colonel Rice reaffirmed the DLIFLC and Presidio of Monterey Command Policy supporting a progressive equal opportunity program and intolerance of discrimination against anyone not based on merit. EEO then held its first annual Commander’s EEO/EO Committee Meeting under the new commandant on 30 October 2001. During the 2001 meeting, Arbitrator/Mediator/former Judge Sam Vitaro was the guest speaker. The 2002 Commander’s EEO/EO Committee Meeting was held on 29 October 2002.\(^{651}\)


reasons Presidio employees filed EEO complaints of discrimination were religion, reprisal, and national origin. The top three issues that led to those complaints were merit points, rank advancements, and performance ratings.652

EEO’s responsibilities included training collateral duty EEO counselors/mediators. Several were assigned from the schools and the Directorate of Evaluation and Standards. It also maintained a “Special Emphasis Program Committee” with a chair, vice-chair, and secretary. Finally, EEO held special events annually to mark Black History Month, Women’s History Month, Asian Heritage Month, Hispanic Heritage Month, and Native American/Alaskan Native Heritage Month.653

The mission of the Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA) at DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey was to assist all commanders at every level and regardless of service in creating and sustaining a healthy command climate to ensure equal opportunity and fair treatment for all service personnel, regardless of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. Furthermore, the EOA educated military leaders to recognize and prevent sexual harassment in the work place.

Sfc. Cynthia Fraser reported for duty as EOA in August 2001. She planned all DoD-mandated events in accordance with Table 6-1, AR 600-20, during her tenure. Sfc. Samir Abdulaziz replaced her as EOA in August 2003. He planned and coordinated ethnic observances and activities from August to December 2003.654

On 19 November 2001, the EOA submitted results from a military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey conducted at the Presidio of Monterey from 2 July to 3 August 2001. The survey focused upon two sociological issue of workplace concern—race and gender—and produced an Equal Opportunity “Disparity Map and Index” measuring differences to give an overall picture of where DLIFLC stood on these two diversity issues. Sfc. Fraser found no serious issues although with room for improvement she recommended team-building workshops, unit-wide activities, and focus group activity.655

Like EEO, the EOA also promoted heritage events. For example, during Hispanic Heritage month, 15 September-15 October 2003, the EOA organized a panel discussion involving representatives from various Hispanic countries. The panel was held on 4 October 2003 and its members were 2d Lt. Selva, Ms. Cruz, Dr. Cucalon, Mrs. Noble, Captain Beers, and Private First Class Franco. During Native American Heritage month, November 2003, the EOA organized a panel discussion of people from various Native American tribes. The panel discussion, held on 13 November 2003, included M. Sgt. Stone, Mr. Rudy Rosales, Mrs. Kemp, Dr. Baldwin, and Dr. Laberty.656

Headquarters & Headquarters Company

The mission of Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC) was to provide administrative support to U.S. Army personnel assigned as permanent party cadre to DLIFLC, including the commandant and other Army officers filling school positions, MLIs, and various enlisted personnel. HHC was commanded by Captain Barnes in 2001 and by Captain Carroll in 2002. Capt. Aaron J. Van Alstine commanded HHC in 2003. HHC ran a small-arms range at Laguna Seca Rifle Range in May 2003 and that fall performed a special cleanup of the Presidio of Monterey Cemetery.

Every year HHC personnel placed U.S. flags on the gravestones of those buried in the Presidio’s cemetery. In November 2003, Captain Van Alstine wrote the consul general of Japan in San Francisco to inform him about the Japanese prisoner of war, Shiro Nagajima, who was interned in the cemetery in December 1945. Nagajima had died on 19 October 1945 in a prison camp elsewhere in California, but his ashes were sent to the Presidio for reasons unknown. Consul General Shigeru Nakamura thanked Van Alstine for having thoughtfully placed a Japanese flag to honor Nagajima as a veteran of Japan on Veteran’s Day and expressed the desire to visit the gravesite if he should have an opportunity to be in Monterey someday.

Figure 24 and 25 Boy Scouts helped HHC on Veteran’s Day, 11 November 2003

Protocol

The mission of the Protocol Office continued being to coordinate, schedule, and support the visits of distinguished visitors to the Presidio of Monterey, and also to plan and oversee a number of special events.

The Protocol Office was in flux for most of the time that Colonel Rice was in command of DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey. Pierrete Harder remained as chief of protocol until she retired in early 2002. Ingrid Speed, the deputy protocol officer, and the DLIFLC executive officer, managed protocol affairs until Elizabeth A. Mazik was hired on 18 November 2002 to be

the chief of protocol after she retired from the U.S. Air Force as a captain. Mazik held the position in 2003. 660

In 2003, the Protocol Office had 137 individual high profile visitors, 22 events, and 4 group visits totaling 1,697 visitors, not counting the approximately 1,500 visitors who came to the Presidio for Language Day. During 2003, there were two especially important events: the Change of Command ceremony and reception for the DLFILC commandant, and an Assumption of Command ceremony and reception for the incoming garrison commander. DLFILC also held a “Barracks Addition” dedication and a ceremony to dedicate Building 343 as Fergusson Hall, the new DOIM facility. Rep. Sam Farr attended both ceremonies. 661

Public Affairs and Alumni Relations

The DLFILC and Presidio of Monterey Public Affairs Office (PAO) was under the direction of Michael Murphy who reported to the installation chief of staff until 1 October 2003, when the PAO was transferred to the control of the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, as required to implement the Army’s centralized installation reorganization. PAO consisted of a staff of eight: six Department of the Army civilians, one Army E-6 public affairs NCOIC, and one Navy photographer. Mr. Robert Britton served as the deputy/command information officer. The mission of the office was to provide public affairs support to both the institute and garrison through its media and community relations programs. 662

The Community Relations section coordinated support with volunteers and the joint service color guard for 109 community events including the Big Sur Marathon, Special Olympics, Monterey/Seaside Fourth of July parades, Laguna Seca Races, Salinas Air Show, and San Francisco Giants and 49er games. The section also conducted tours for educators, students, and recruiters from various California locations. The Community Relations chief also played a key role in managing the institute’s Language Day, including running an information booth during the event.

The Command Information section published the Globe magazine, the Community News, and daily force protection news on the Internet. PAO published seven issues of the Globe in 2001. The Globe began the year well with its January issue redesigned and presenting a new appearance. That fall, PAO published a special edition of the Globe to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Defense Language Institute. Then in December, the final 2001 edition of the Globe reacted to the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The issue focused upon the importance of linguists to national security, the skills linguists needed beyond their language training, how National Guardsmen were activated for duty on the Presidio of Monterey, and how to assess a possible Anthrax attack. 663 In 2002, however, the Command Information section published only two issues of the Globe. In 2003, it published just a single issue driven by an imperative to cover the DLFILC change of command ceremony in June. Apparently, staff health problems and resource limitations caused by splitting PAO functions between the institute and the garrison led to inefficiency. Former PAO Chief Natela A. Cutter (October 2005-

660 As remembered by Dr. Stephen M. Payne, 25 March 2010.
663 See Lt Col Gordon Hamilton, Editor-in-Chief, Globe 24, no. 7 (December 2001). Anthrax, a lethal biological agent, briefly became a national concern in the wake of 9/11 after someone sent anthrax-contaminated mail through the postal system.
September 2006) credited Sgt. Mitch Fraizer for his dedication in sustaining the publication during this period.\textsuperscript{664}

The Media Relations section produced press releases in support of mission objectives and sought to raise institute visibility through coverage in local, regional, national, and military media outlets, especially after 9/11. In part, it accomplished this mission by arranging interviews with the media for senior staff. For example, in March 2003 the assistant commandant gave several interviews for print, TV, and radio journalists. In these interviews, Col. Jeffrey Johnson explained how U.S. ground forces, especially those without linguist support, used Language Survival Kits and how DLIFLC adapted such kits for special tasks, such as Korean/Dari kits developed for use by Korean doctors who were working with allied forces in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{665}

The section also supported BRAC/environmental clean-up operations, including the two controlled burns at the former Fort Ord in July and October, and assisted with the RCI military housing program.\textsuperscript{666}

In 2002, Colonel Rice established a new office, the Alumni Relations Office (ARO), to improve relations with DLIFLC graduates who were not necessarily in military service any longer, but whose interest in the school, a degree-granting body, would likely continue. The purpose of the new office was “to promote the interaction of the Alumni of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center” by creating a professional and social forum to allow opportunities for communication, career networking, and mentoring.\textsuperscript{667}

Natela Cutter, an instructor of Serbian/Croatian, was chosen to stand up the office, to build a website, to seek out and welcome back alumni, and to organize tours and reunions for them at the Presidio of Monterey. At the same time, Rice asked Ben De La Selva, then dean of the European and Latin American School, to organize a DLIFLC Alumni Association (DLIFLC AA) that could support the ARO as a non-profit organization that could collect funds and in turn benefit the school. Rice apparently got this idea from the Naval Postgraduate School, where as a student he came into contact with the NPS Foundation, a non-profit organization that functioned closely with the naval school. Unfortunately, NPS regulations were more liberal than allowed by the SJA at the Presidio, so ARO was unable to support the DLIFLC AA in terms of office space or even an email address for De La Selva after he retired from the institute. Nevertheless, Cutter and De La Selva managed to organize reunions and escort returning alumni around the Presidio while the DLIFLC AA has continued to provide funding and other support for DLIFLC and garrison activities up to the present time. The ARO was abolished in 2005 after Cutter was promoted to chief of Public Relations.\textsuperscript{668}

\textsuperscript{664} Natela Cutter to Cameron Binkley, email, 9 June 2008, in “ACH 01-03 Public Affairs Office” folder, drawer 5, 2001-2003 ACH files, DLIFLC&POM Archives.  
\textsuperscript{665} “Accessions SITREP,” March 2003, briefing in “ACH 01-03 Public Affairs Office” folder, drawer 5, DLIFLC&POM Archives.  
\textsuperscript{668} Natela Cutter to Cameron Binkley, email, 30 July 2008, in “ACH 01-03 Public Affairs Office” folder, drawer 5, 2001-2003 ACH files, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
In 2001, PAO issued a special edition of the *Globe* to commemorate the 60th Anniversary of the founding of the Defense Foreign Language Institute Foreign Language Center. The special edition featured articles by Shigeya Kihara, who recounted the school’s history from 1941 until he retired in 1974. Colonel Thomas Sakamoto (Ret.) and Gene Uratsu, both WWII veterans and graduates of the original Japanese-American course, also wrote about their wartime experiences. Dean of the European and Latin American School Ben De La Selva wrote about his linguist tour in the Vietnam War while Arabic linguist Lt. Col. Frank Francona discussed being General Norman Schwartzkopf’s interpreter during Operation Desert Storm, and Provost Dr. Ray Clifford wrote about changes in instruction over that time.669

Command History Office & Memorialization Committee

The Command History Office continued to provide historical information and support to the DLIFLC Command Group between 2001 and 2003. Dr. James C. McNaughton served as the command historian until 2 July 2001 when he reported for a new position with the Army in Hawaii. Thereafter, Dr. Clifford F. Porter, the deputy command historian, became responsible for the office. Porter was a military reservist, however, and in January 2003, left the office after being activated for duty. Porter returned several months later, but left permanently in April 2004. By then, Dr. Harold E. Raugh, Jr., had arrived to serve as the command historian.670 During this period, the Command History Office participated in the DLIFLC Memorialization Committee, which continued to be chaired by Ronald E. Graddy, Chief of Child and Youth Services.

Raugh completed two picture books on the history of the Presidio of Monterey and Fort Ord. These books, published by Arcadia Press, included prodigious use of historic photographs

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670 Note, Porter was hired to run the Command History Office in the absence of Command Historian Dr. James McNaughton, who was serving on a temporary assignment in Europe, but was expected to return. Later, Colonel Simone hired Raugh to replace McNaughton as command historian. Raugh’s position became permanent after McNaughton waived his return rights to accept another position.
culled from the collections of DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey Archives. In 2003, Raugh also completed a study on Quarters 327, the 1903 bungalow-style officer’s quarters on the Presidio that traditionally had served as the home of post commanders. Colonel Rice, Quarters 327 occupant, wrote a brief forward for Raugh’s booklet commemorating the centennial of the building’s construction.

In 2003, the Command History Office, among several other staff offices, faced transfer to the garrison when the Army implemented Centralized Installation Management. Although the position fell under TRADOC, it stood to be absorbed into the Installation Command Management Plan and its mission transferred the new U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey. Such an event could have significantly reduced historical office support to DLIFLC. In late December 2001, Lt. Col. Gordon Hamilton, DLIFLC chief of staff, asked Porter to review and rewrite his position description to ensure that it focused upon language-training related activities and that responsibility for installation history was a secondary function of the position. Colonel Rice especially requested that the historians remain with the institute as most of their work focused on its history.

Between 2001 and 2003, there were several meetings of the DLIFLC Memorialization Committee. A major agenda item was the “Berlin Wall” project. The Berlin Wall was a masonry barrier erected by the German Democratic Republic to prevent East Germans from fleeing Communism by simply walking into the democratic enclave of West Berlin governed by France, Britain, and the United States. The wall stood from 1961 until 1989 as a poignant symbol of the Cold War divide between East and West. With the loosening of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the beginning of dramatic political reform, East Germany suddenly announced in 1989 that it would begin to allow East Germans to visit the West. The announcement sparked spontaneous celebrations as Berliners from both sides of the wall gathered, climbed over, and began to tear down the Berlin Wall. In 1990, Germany reunified and undertook full-scale operations to deconstruct the wall, entire sections of which were sought by collectors as souvenirs and for monuments. DLIFLC had a special connection to the wall because many of its graduates were stationed at Field Station Berlin throughout the Cold War.

Walter Scurei, a native-born German who enlisted in the U.S. Air Force and served in the Korean War, sought to donate a three-piece section of the Berlin Wall, so that it could be placed on display at the Presidio of Monterey. Scurei had purchased the wall from a storage warehouse, known as the Midstate Truck and Rigging Yard, after the owner’s failed to pay their storage fees. Scurei paid the $9,000 in back fees and the yard deeded the wall sections to him. The original businessmen had purchased the sections for $110,000 as a speculative investment, probably as part of an auctioning of 250 similar sections that were sold off and sent around the world to major museums and universities in 1990. Later, the concrete slabs turned out to have little speculative value.

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671 See Harold E. Raugh, Jr., Presidio of Monterey and Fort Ord; both books are part of Arcadia Publishing’s Images of America series (San Francisco: Arcadia Publishing, 2004).
672 Harold E. Raugh, Jr., “Quarters 327, Presidio of Monterey: A Centennial Perspective” (DLIFLC, 2003). Attempts were made to compile DLIFLC command histories during this time, but the program fell behind schedule.
674 Keith McMahan, “Humble Haven Home to Pieces of Berlin Wall,” The Fountain Hill Times, 26 April 2000; and Walter Scurei, conversation with Cameron Binkley, 31 October 2008; both in RG 5, box D, “Berlin Wall” folder, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
Scurei was looking to donate the sections to a suitable institution when he met Billy “Skip” Johnson, the institute’s deputy IG, whose sister happened to live near the Scureis’ home in Phoenix, Arizona. Johnson suggested Scurei donate the wall sections to DLIFLC, which he agreed to. Johnson handed the project over to Porter, but after the functions of the school and garrison were split in 2002, the project officer became Arthur D. Douglas, ABC/M PIR Program Director, Presidio of Monterey.675

There was some concern by late 2003 that the project might fail due to costs. The Army mitigated expenses in September 2002, however, when a National Guard transportation unit moved the multi-ton section of concrete to the Presidio as a training exercise.676 The wall arrived near the end of 2004 with a cost estimate of $20,000 to install. Although garrison leaders had not settled on a final location, they identified three appropriate sites by December 2004.677 Finally, on 2 November 2005, a dedication ceremony for the Berlin Wall Memorial was held.

On 29 August 2002, DLIFLC held a special ceremony to dedicate a newly renovated and expanded general instructional facility (GIF-III). The building was named Collins Hall after Brig. Gen. James Lawton Collins, Jr., who passed away on 6 May 2002. Collins was the last commandant of the Army Language School, and became the first commandant of the Defense Language Institute after DoD directed him to transform the Army school into an all-services organization.678 Another dedication was for Fergusson Hall in August 2003, as described in the section on DOIM of Chapter VI.

One project of historical merit the commandant considered during this period was a request by the National Park Service to support a $1,000,000 grant application to the Save America’s Treasures Program to rehabilitate and renovate Building 640 at the Presidio of San Francisco, now part of Golden Gate National Recreational Area. Building 640 was the location of the Fourth Army Military Intelligence School established in 1941. The importance of the building was clear for it was in that abandoned aircraft hangar where the first Japanese language classes were held on the eve of World War II, the event to which the Defense Language Institute traces its own roots. Unfortunately, the Staff Judge Advocate advised Colonel Rice in April 2003 that “the Joint Ethics Regulation prohibited any DoD employee from endorsing, or appearing to endorse, any non-Federal entity, event, product, service or enterprise in the employee’s official capacity.” The main sponsor of the grant application was the National Japanese American Historical Society, a non-federal entity. Therefore, Rice advised the command historian that he would not support the application.679

675 Ronald E. Graddy, Memorialization Committee Meeting Minutes, 26 January 2004; and Billy Johnson to Arthur D. Douglas and Gay Rearick, email: “Memorialization Meeting” [January 2004]; and Arthur D. Douglas, email to Gay Rearick; 23 January 2004; all in “Memorialization Committee” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Later, after Dr. Harold E. Raugh, Jr., became command historian, Douglas wanted to hand the project over to him, pending DLIFLC chief of staff approval in January 2004, for he, too, was moving on. However, DCSOPS appointed Johnson as the project officer. Gay M. Rearick, Family Housing/Public Relations, Residential Communities Initiative, also promoted the wall project on the Memorialization Committee.

676 Ronald E. Graddy, Memorialization Committee Meeting Minutes, 17 September 2002, in “Memorialization Committee” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

677 Graddy, Memorialization Committee Meeting Minutes, 17 September 2002.


679 Col Karen L. Judkins, Staff Judge Advocate, memorandum: “Review of Proposed Support of the Presidio Trust’s Save America’s Treasures Grant Request” for Installation Chief of Staff, 2 April 2003, in “NPS Crissy Field 2003” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
The Command History Office was also involved with preserving important artifacts remaining from Stilwell Hall. To that end, on 17 April 2002, the Army provided on long-term loan a painting by artist Alison Stilwell to California State University, Monterey Bay after contributions by the artist’s family made restoration possible. Alison Stilwell was the daughter of General Joseph Stilwell, the commander of Fort Ord at the start of World War II. Commissioned in 1942 when the artist was twenty-one years old, the landscape mural depicted Monterey Bay using bright colors and designs associated with the Chinese tradition, which Stilwell had become familiar with growing up in Asia. The mural formerly adorned the Cypress Room of Stilwell Hall, the soldier’s club that the artist’s father had constructed at Fort Ord. When the Army closed Fort Ord in 1994, it also closed Stilwell Hall. In 1996, thieves broke into the vacant building and attempted to steal the mural painting by prying it from the wall, which caused severe damage. Fortunately, the thieves were interrupted while committing the crime and fled the scene without the painting. The Army then removed the painting from the structure and stored it with the Monterey Peninsula Museum of Art until donated funds were obtained to restore the painting. The Army had hoped to re-install the mural at the Naval Postgraduate School, but installation costs were too prohibitive. Later, a donation to CSUMB made it possible to install the mural in the lobby of the University Center, where it remains on display.680

Figure 27 Painting by Alison Stilwell as depicted on the *Globe*, June 2002

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680 Jeanne Truesdale Myers, “The History of the Artworks in the Fort Ord Soldier’s Club, California” (masters thesis, San Jose State University, 1996), 15-17; and “Picture Perfect,” *Globe* 25, no. 1 (June 2002): back cover (note caption contains erroneous information—the Army only loaned the painting to CSUMB).
Chapter VI

Presidio of Monterey Garrison

The U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, was responsible for providing base operations (BASOPS) support to all activities and personnel on the Presidio and at the nearby Ord Military Community (OMC). The garrison consisted of 1,135 acres and some 500 personnel supporting some 32,000 active-duty joint service members and their families, reserve component units, and retirees. The garrison commander, a U.S. Army colonel, was responsible for coordinating the major programs of base facilities and infrastructure support, force protection and security, morale and welfare activities, information and communication management, personnel management, religious support, equal employment opportunity, internal review, operations, plans, safety, logistics, privatized housing, and environmental compliance. The garrison commander also developed and maintained partnering initiatives with six local municipalities and close working relationships with federal, state, and local officials. As a major additional responsibility, the garrison commander supervised the Base Realignment and Closure Office, which was responsible for disposing of excess Fort Ord properties that the Army was returning to the local civilian community.

Centralized Installation Management

On 30 October 2001, the Secretary of the Army, Thomas E. White, approved a plan to consolidate U.S. Army installation management directly beneath Headquarters, Department of the Army, effective 1 October 2002. On that date, the secretary directed that major commands or MACOMs no longer manage the installations upon which they were located. Instead, he and General Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, had determined that efficiency was best served by centralized management of Army installations, information management, and acquisitions under an assistant chief of staff for installation management, initially under the directorship of Maj. Gen. Anders B. Aadland. With this reorganization, the Army hoped to streamline headquarters, generate more agile and responsive staffs, and reduce layers of review and approval. White, a retired U.S. Army brigadier general, had decided soon after becoming secretary of the Army, that the Army was not properly resourcing its base infrastructure, for example, its underground sewage and water systems. His solution, instead of simply obtaining more resources for base commanders, was to create a separate organization to oversee base management. The rational for this decision was to avoid the problem of base commanders diverting base operations (BASOPS) funding to meet mission shortfalls, which most commanders could justify in the near-term, but which inevitably led to the long-term decline of facilities.

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682 The plan was called “Transformation of Installation Management” or TIM.
683 Col Kevin M. Rice (Ret.), interview by Cameron Binkley and Stephen Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1036-1039), in DLIFLC&POM Archives.
White thus appointed Aadland to stand up a new organization—the U.S. Army Installation Management Agency or IMA, which was to relieve mission commanders of base management responsibilities and the opportunities it presented to divert funds. Aadland further subdivided his organization under regional directors who became responsible for Operations and Maintenance (OMA) and Army Family Housing (AFH) resources associated with each Army garrison within their regions. The purpose of IMA was to “mold installation support functions into a corporate structure, enabling equitable, efficient and effective management of Army installations worldwide.” IMA took responsibility for overseeing all Army installations, including their environmental programs, construction, morale and welfare, family care, force protection, landscaping, logistics, public works, as well as planning, programming and budgeting to support these functions.\(^{685}\) MACOMs maintained administrative oversight with TRADOC becoming responsible for the Presidio of Monterey.

Locally, this decision meant that much DLIFLC manpower, salary and support costs would transfer to a new organization. The commandant would no longer be in charge of base infrastructure and the institute would become a tenant organization on the Presidio of Monterey, a status the school had occupied when Fort Ord administered the post as a sub-installation. The garrison would manage all property on the base under a garrison commander who reported to the IMA chain-of-command, although the institute commander ultimately retained final authority over the Presidio by retaining the “Installation Commander” designation.\(^{686}\) As installation commander, Colonel Kevin M. Rice believed IMA violated a principle of military management—unity of command. At a minimum, the reorganization would entail numerous conflicts. Rice initiated the directives he was given to prepare the change-over, but when the Army asked him to extend his tour “beyond thirty” to implement the new divided management scheme, he chose to retire.\(^{687}\)

Centralized Installation Management (CIM) required a number of complex changes. These involved the reorganization of installation functions, new rating schemes for senior personnel, the splitting of BASOPS accounts between the garrison and the institute, and decisions about which military staff functions (special staff, G-1, G-2, resource management, etc.) might need to be expanded to support the commandant after the split or which would be shifted to garrison.\(^{688}\)

**A Phased Approach**

The Army realized that implementing CIM would take time and face some problematical issues in dividing organizational functions.\(^{689}\) Thus, the Army adopted a phased approach spanning the course of fiscal years 2003 and 2004. In the first phase, the Army performed a functional review, identified contentious organization and operations plans, and constructed a common garrison structure or model. In the next phase, it attempted to resolve conflicts in


\(^{687}\) Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1036-1039).


\(^{689}\) Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1036-1039).
organization and operations plans, briefed respective Army staff sections and agencies on these changes, and provided CIM doctrinal foundations in Army regulations and field manuals. The final phase dealt with funding and included the provision of a framework for requirements determination, documenting requirements and authorizations, publishing Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDAs), developing a redistribution plan to extend the IMA structure across remaining functions, and conducting future structure assessments.\textsuperscript{690}

TRADOC leaders allowed that commandants might need to create their own support elements. The goal, however, was to transfer those services to the garrison that would not negatively affect mission accomplishment. To avoid unnecessary duplication, some BASOPS services might continue to be assigned to schools, in which case TRADOC wanted them to continue providing relevant support to the garrisons.\textsuperscript{691}

TRADOC asked its schools to highlight areas of BASOPS funding primarily devoted to training support, as opposed to “generic” BASOPS used for such things as municipal services, so that these resources would not be transferred to the IMA when the BASOPS budget was diverted to fund the new garrison organization. Colonel Rice had to insure that he would be able to accomplish his mission, meet the full training load, and execute command responsibilities by carefully accounting for which portions of the BASOPS budget needed to remain under school control because they fulfilled a training function. For example, DLIFLC had already outsourced most local TRADOC school maintenance support to contractors through the Directorate of Logistics (DOL). Understanding the intricacies of splitting functions between the school and the garrison was key to filing a successful challenge to “resource withdrawals.”\textsuperscript{692}

\textit{Implementing the Model Plan}

In January 2002, Rice asked senior staff to review the draft CIM plan and advise him on how to respond to TRADOC on its implementation. School officials hastened to point out the unique elements that set the institute apart from the standard TRADOC school, but largely agreed with the TRADOC model.\textsuperscript{693} However, “with a split of functions,” Rice stated, “DLIFLC will need clear enforceable guidelines and additional authorizations to create its own staff.” He argued that the school and the Presidio had such small staffs already that they could not be further subdivided. He was particularly reticent with regard to splitting up his already understaffed resource management office. Other reasons for Rice’s objection included that the school had suffered when the Presidio of Monterey assumed installation status upon the closure of Fort Ord. According to Rice, when Fort Ord shut down, realignment confusion led to major withdrawals of authorizations that along with a 1999 TRADOC Review of Manpower and increased mission requirements “have contributed to our severe shortfalls of authorizations for both mission and BASOPS functions.” Rice noted that FY 2003 authorizations were short 3

\textsuperscript{690} TF Garrison, briefing: “Common Garrison Structure for the IMA Executive Board: New slides based on changes from 10 July 2003 Board Meeting,” 13 August 2003, slides 19 and 20 of 32.
\textsuperscript{691} Memorandum: “Data Call for Installation CIM Reclama,” no date, in “Centralized Information Management” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
officers/52 enlisted/295 civilians for the mission side and 6 enlisted/352 civilians for the BASOPS side. 694

Figure 28 This model regrouped over 180 Army posts into regional directorates, 2003

While Rice agreed with the need to split resources for planning and operations, the insufficiency of resources drove him to file a “reclama” regarding the CIM model with General John N. Abrams, Commander, TRADOC, on 6 February 2002. Rice concentrated first on the easier to resolve issues. He wanted several key positions to remain with the school, foremost being Headquarters Headquarters Company, because the majority of its soldiers were in the school. He also wanted chaplain positions organic to the training units to remain, all Staff Judge Advocate and Inspector General positions, all public affairs positions, and all historian positions. He also requested a garrison sergeant major, which had not been authorized, but was required for a separate command. 695 He was successful on all counts, excepting for public affairs, which in time complicated relations between DLIFLC and the garrison. 696

The main issue with plans and operations was that the institute had long supported BASOPs by using the school’s on-hand military personnel. According to Rice, the Army had never appropriately staffed either the school or the garrison. Thus, he argued, “a Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM) is needed to meet the Installation’s operations and

planning responsibilities.” Similarly, he wanted an S-2/3 staff to meet the institute’s own operations and planning needs.

Rice noted how the short-staffed school still was able to meet security needs in the wake of 9/11 through flexibility provided by his dual role as installation commander/commandant with control over all personnel and funding within the installation and the institute. For example, as commandant, Rice controlled the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion, which he directed to augment the understaffed Emergency Operations Center and to meet force protection needs for guards and access control. “Now under CIM,” he noted, “this symbiotic and overlapping relationship is changing to two more separate organizations. In the critical operations and plans function, additional manpower and resources are essential.”

Another issue of concern in splitting the installation commander and commandant functions was that the CIM model intended the senior mission commander on the post to set training and mission priorities, installation construction priorities, and basic installation-level policies for soldiers. Garrison commanders were to be rated by their IMA regional directors but their senior rater was to be the mission commander, who at DLIFLC was only a colonel, as was the rank of the garrison commander. This meant that either the commandant had to be graded as a general officer or the garrison commander had to be ranked as a lieutenant colonel, neither of which was a likely option.

On 11 August 2003, DLIFLC implemented Operations Plan (OPLAN) 03-100, Operation Transformation. The stated mission was that “directorates of POM Garrison will conduct a functional review of installation management processes to determine organizational changes necessary to support the proposed structure for Garrison Commands” within the Southwest Regional Office (SWRO) of IMA. The main goal was “increased efficiency and effectiveness in Garrison functions that support DLI, our service members and families, and other organizations.” Lesser goals included communications of where and how to find and easily use garrison functions, to maintain maximum support for DLIFLC’s worldwide language training mission, and to continue full support of local military families. The order to implement the standardized common garrison management structure was to be complete by 5 October 2003.

OPLAN 03-100 required institute and garrison staff to conduct extensive reviews and coordination. A number of directorates were internally reorganized to comply with the standardized common garrison management structure and/or were transferred from DLIFLC to garrison staff. A few DLIFLC directorates continued supporting both the mission and the garrison.

Prior to the effective date of the transformation on 1 October 2003, the garrison consisted of the following offices and directorates: Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC);

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697 Rice to Commanding General, “Reclama to MDEP Roll of Resources,” 6 February 2002.
698 Rice to Commanding General, “Reclama to MDEP Roll of Resources,” 6 February 2002.
699 For a discussion on why the garrison commander position at the POM was graded as an O-6 rather than as an O-5 see: Payne, Stephen M., DLIFLC Annual Command History, 1993, pp. 112-113.
700 “Army Transformation of Installation Management,” undated [August 2002], briefing and notes in “Centralized Information Management” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives. At one point, garrison staff proposed that the garrison commander rate the commandant because garrison commanders were “boarded” while the commandant was chosen by DoD.
701 Paragraphs 2 and 3.a. (3), Mission, to Garrison, DLIFLC, Presidio of Monterey, CA, OPLAN (03-100) (Operation TRANSFORMATION) (U) BASIC ORDER (U), 111630 August 2003.
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR); Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR); Public Safety (DPS); Logistics (DOL); Public Works (DPW); Information Management (DOIM), Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), and Directorate of Contracting (DOC). The transformation resulted in the Adjutant General’s Office (AG) shifting to garrison control and becoming the Installation Adjutant General’s Office (IAGO), which, with the CPAC, was to form the Directorate of Human Resources (DHR). Other offices that were realigned to garrison control included Safety (ISO); Internal Review (IRO); Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO). Initiatives were taken to establish a Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security (DPTMS). The Staff Judge Advocate’s (JAG) Office, Chaplain’s Office, and Inspector General’s Office were designated to continue supporting the installation while providing support to the garrison. The Directorate of Contracting was realigned to the Army Contracting Agency and was designated the Installation Contracting Office (ICO). It became a tenant unit on the Presidio. One staff office, the Directorate of Resource Management (DRM), had to restructure into two separate “split” organizations, with one section continuing to support the installation, and the new section forming a component of the garrison Resource Management Office (RMO), which was also planned to include an administrative office and a Plans, Analysis, Integration, and Operations section (PAIO), all in the garrison headquarters.\footnote{Other garrison tenant units included the Defense Military Pay Office (DMPO) and the California Medical Detachment (CALMED).}

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 29 Proposed realignment of DLIFLC/Presidio of Monterey under “CIM,” 2001**

**Problems in Implementation**

Splitting the DRM into separate installation and garrison resource management offices was contentious within the Army. On 29 April 2003, Maj. Gen. Anders B. Aadland sent out a message stating, “fundamental to the separation of mission and garrison operations under the Army’s Transformation of Installation Management initiative is the establishment of a separate garrison Resource Management Office as directed by the Department of the Army.” The
separation of the budget offices was “not discretionary and must be executed, effective 1 October 2003.” The intended function of garrison RMOs was to provide “dedicated financial, manpower, and management support to garrison operations.”

In a subsequent message dated 13 June 2003, Aadland responded to MACOM concerns and queries by providing additional guidance and clarity on the full intent of the DRM split and the establishment of the garrison RMO. Key points included:

1. **Organization.** The garrison RMO will be a separate organization from the installation DRM. The GC’s RMO will be a separate team with a separate chain of command and rating chain under the garrison commander. The installation RM, under the SMC [senior mission commander], will not be in the rating chain of the garrison RM.

2. **Physical location.** This split does NOT mandate a physical separation (e.g., separate building) or other administrative support requirements; sharing of facilities or administrative support activities is left to the discretion of the garrison and installation commanders, who should work out optimal solutions that meet the needs and preserve resources. Of prime importance to the GC is preparation for and readiness to execute IMA resource management as of 1 Oct 03.

3. **Time sensitivity.** 1 October is fast approaching. Need leaders and staff identified and engaged ASAP. Get on with it.

With this additional guidance, the garrison commander continued to plan for the transition to the standardized common garrison management structure. Then, as directed, the DRM was, in fact, split with one section becoming the RMO for the garrison.

Even before full implementation of the standardized common garrison management structure, garrison leaders realized that their funding was inadequate for the many tasks that they were required to complete. On 27 August 2003, Col. Jeffrey S. Cairns, newly arrived as the first garrison commander under IMA, informed his boss, Hugh M. Sexton, Jr., Director, SWRO, IMA, that “the FY04 operating budget provided to the Presidio of Monterey is grossly inadequate. Base operations funding levels provided by IMA represent over a 20% reduction from the already significantly constrained level we were provided in FY03.” Moreover, Cairns continued, “I desperately need a commitment of additional resources or I will need to inform the Installation and Senior Mission Commander that the POM Garrison is not adequately resourced to operate the installation at an adequate level of support. There can be absolutely no doubt that without additional resources language training at DLI will suffer from lack of installation support.”

In his memorandum, Cairns highlighted specific programs and items that were unfunded in the FY 2004 budget, to highlight the magnitude of the budget situation:

1. **Pay, workforce support, and development.** Funded on-hand civilian strength only (cannot fund to manning level previously resourced by TRADOC); no funding for

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704 The three quotations in this paragraph are from Maj Gen Anders B. Aadland, Director, IMA, to Garrison Commanders, email: “IMA Director’s NETCALL #7–Garrison RMOs,” 29 April 2003.


civilian awards; no travel funding for training, conferences or coordination; cannot fund employee assistance contract for employee and family self-referral and assistance; no funding for EEO complaint processing; no funding for overtime work (major issue for our police force).

(2) **Basic Installation Operations/Support to Mission.** Installation custodial support completely unfunded; no funding for hardware or software maintenance; no funding for grounds maintenance or project development; TMP shuttle bus service and GSA leased vehicle fleets cut severely; no funding for small construction projects; supply funding to billeting so constrained some lodging rooms may be closed; no funding for overnight or express mailing.

(3) **Safety, Police, Fire & FP/AT.** No funding for DA mandated motorcycle safety; cannot fund all police and fire department equipment and training requirements; no funding for WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] and Haz Mat [Hazardous Material] response elements.

(4) **Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance.** Absolutely nothing is funded in our FY04 budget beyond minor provisions for facility maintenance that exist in the contract with the city of Monterey.

(5) **Quality of Life.** Chapel programs completely unfunded (eliminates all catholic [*sic*] services, youth programs, music ministry, and all chaplain training); reduced operating hours in post fitness facility; support to unit intramural programs eliminated; athletic field maintenance eliminated; transportation support to language school off-post cultural events eliminated; appropriated funding support to child development and youth services so decremented that continued operation is in jeopardy.  

Furthermore, Cairns emphasized, “I need to specifically state that this resourcing level will place the Presidio of Monterey in noncompliance with a number of Federal statutes and Department of the Army regulations. Our Environmental program is so eviscerated under the current IMA funding level that fines and noncompliance are an absolute uncertainty.”

Institute and garrison staffs made great strides in analyzing, reorganizing, and implementing the standardized garrison management structure during this period. However, budget and funding issues continued to impact BASOPs and support for the remainder of 2003.

**Garrison Leadership**

As the Presidio of Monterey transitioned to the “standardized common garrison management structure,” the garrison experienced some turbulence and lack of continuity due to senior military and civilian leadership changes. Col. William M. Dietrick, who assumed command of the garrison in 2001, unexpectedly went on terminal leave pending retirement in April 2003. IMA then assigned Col. W.C. Garrison temporarily from its SWRO Headquarters. Garrison provided interim leadership for the Presidio in May and June 2003. Finally, Colonel

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Cairns, a Special Forces officer, assumed command of the garrison on 9 July 2003 after completing a course at the Air War College.

The garrison commander was responsible for BASOPS and installation support, but also served as the deputy installation commander and assumed command of the installation, as distinct from the institute, in the absence of the commandant, who was the installation commander. Under Rice, garrison commanders were formally responsible for coordination, support, and liaison with Presidio’s tenant organizations, both supporting and non-supporting DLIFLC’s mission. During his general reorganization of DLIFLC and the Presidio, Rice elevated Wes Hood, the former BASOPS manager, to deputy garrison commander. As such, he continued the daily supervision and direction of the garrison directorates and the garrison Plans and Operations staff.  

Hood served as deputy garrison commander until he accepted a position in the Army’s BRAC Office in Washington, DC, in May 2003. Hood was replaced by James M. Willison, Director of the Directorate of Environment and Natural Resource Management, on a temporary basis until a new deputy was hired. Pamela von Ness replaced Willison in August 2003.  

M. Sgt. Lucinda K. Barber served as garrison command sergeant major until replaced by Jackie Moore in October 2003. Three main components of garrison command and control were:

**Resource Management Office**

As required, effective, 1 October 2003, Rice split the Directorate of Resource Management (DRM) between DLIFLC and the garrison to implement the standardized common garrison management structure. Dixie Puckett headed the new garrison Resource Management Office (RMO), which included a staff of six budget analysts and one management analyst.

As a component of DRM, Art Gebbia set up an embryonic Plans, Analysis, Integration, and Operations Office (PAIO) while Susan Kastner, a former Army officer, became the staff action control officer (SACO).

**Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources**

The mission of the Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR), under James M. Willison, was to direct and manage environmental and natural resources programs. It was responsible for compliance with federal, state, and local regulatory requirements; habitat restoration activities; cultural and historic preservation; environmental restoration; pollution prevention; hazardous waste disposal; and environmental documentation and reporting. Mark G. Reese served as acting director temporarily while Willison served as deputy garrison commander from May until August 2003. Gail Youngblood coordinated BRAC issues.

Throughout this period, DENR executed a number of complex events, activities, and operations, including the following:

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709 Col Kevin M. Rice, memorandum: “Installation Reorganization,” 11 October 2001, in DLIFLC&POM Digital Archives. Rice apparently formalized an unofficial function by his October 2001 memo, because Hood was listed as deputy garrison commander in both the March 2000 and February 2001 DLIFLC&POM Staff Directories.

710 DLIFLC&POM Staff Directories, 2001-2004.

711 Unless otherwise noted, all information in this section if from: James M. Willison, information supplied to Harold E. Raugh, Jr., in “ACH2003 DENR” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

Community Relations

Throughout this period, DENR conducted a number of public meetings, “Community Involvement Workshops,” media tours, and other outreach efforts to inform the public and interested groups, such as the California Association of Environmental Professionals, about ongoing land transfer and cleanup activities at the former Fort Ord. The purpose of such activities was “to promote mutual trust and communication.”

DENR held Community Involvement Workshops on a monthly basis. For example, at its February 2001 workshop, it planned to discuss the Ordnance and Site Security Program, the DENR Annual Report, an update on UXO (unexploded ordnance) cleanup activities at sites near Seaside, and the status of UXO remedial Investigation/feasibility Study. Periodically, DENR also published a “Document Update” in which it alerted community members to the release of recent public documents relating to the cleanup of the former Fort Ord. In the January 2002 issue, DENR listed summaries of several such documents, including on the urgency of surface UXO cleanup at Parker Flats, data on the operation of Unit 2 Groundwater Treatment Plant by Harding ESE, a study on the merits of various technical devices for specific use at the former Fort Ord in finding UXO by Parsons, a draft Seaside community safety plan by Parsons, and an after action report on the cleanup of UXO at sites OE-15 and OE-44 by USA Environmental.713 In October 2002, DENR added webpages on the Fort Ord Cleanup website to provide public information on the prescribed burn and voluntary relocation programs.714

Historic Preservation

One issue of concern to many in the local community was the disposition of Stilwell Hall, the former Fort Ord enlisted service members’ social club located on a bluff overlooking the ocean. The club was named after General Joseph Stilwell, who commanded Fort Ord just prior to World War II and inspired its construction in 1943. Since the 1940s, severe erosion had caused the bluff separating the structure from the ocean to deteriorate to such an extent that it was at risk of collapsing into the ocean, which was actually the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary.715 The Army constructed the massive 52,000-square-foot structure prior to WWII well before anyone knew about the dangers of lead paint and asbestos that suffused the building. The prospect of Stilwell Hall falling into the sanctuary was an unpleasant thought for Colonel Rice, who could literally see the precariously perched building from his office across the bay. He feared, as he later stated, that “it could ruin the name of the Army, and the language school, and the military community, if I was stupid enough to allow that thing to slide off into the ocean depending upon the storm, when the big storm hit.”716

There was a group of local citizens, including some former retired general officers, who voiced the desire to preserve the building, then located on land transferred by the Army to California State Parks. The Army investigated the possibility of moving the gigantic structure, as had been done at Cape Hatteras National Seashore when shoreline erosion similarly threatened its famous 4,800-ton lighthouse. The cost, however, was prohibitive. Neither the state nor the federal government had the millions needed to move the structure unless there was significant public backing. Despite the desires of many in Monterey to save Stilwell Hall, many others thought the best option was simply to tear it down.\textsuperscript{717} Nature itself hastened the decision-making process when a serious storm brought much rain early in 2001. Unfortunately, rain gutter downspouts on the massive roof were not connected to extensions to allow the rain to be diverted away from the building such that storm water undermined a corner of the structure and left it dangling in the air over the bluff. In response, Rice ordered an emergency removal of a rear section of the building to prevent its imminent collapse into the ocean. The Army hired Alaska-based AHTNA Construction to perform the mission, which it completed in March.\textsuperscript{718}

Rice then ordered a full engineering inspection of the facility, which the Los Angeles and Sacramento U.S. Army Corps of Engineers conducted on 1 August 2001. Their purpose was to estimate the extent of erosion to the bluff, the outlook for structural failure due to weather, and to recommend actions to protect or to demolish the building. The engineers estimated that the building had only one to three years before further damage would result. In a teleconference on 23 August, they further recommended that the south-wing foundation be removed.\textsuperscript{719} Even before the conference, however, DENR officials sought compliance concurrence from other federal officials with the Army’s intent to demolish the structure in its entirety. In a 1 August 2001 letter to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Field Supervisor Diane Noda, DENR Director Willison stated that the Army hoped to demolish Stilwell Hall by 15 March 2002 in a phased project that would also remove the old revetment on the beach. According to Willison, the Army planned to demolish the building after the nesting season of the federally threatened Western Snowy Plover to avoid any impact on the bird. He argued it was mandatory to remove Stilwell Hall as a safety and environmental measure due to the imminent threat that it would collapse and because funds were not available to prevent erosion from undermining the structure or to allow rehabilitation. Moreover, by eliminating the structure base reuse plans could move forward.\textsuperscript{720}

Rice retired in June 2003 before major demolition of Stilwell Hall took place, but his decision-making was key. In September 2003, Rice’s successor, Col. Michael Simone, sanctioned continued efforts to demolish the old club.\textsuperscript{721} Army contractors began preparing it for demolition in September by removing all tile from its roof and asbestos-laden mastic from the ceilings, which had to be specially treated for disposal. The building’s interior floors were cleared of pigeon droppings and cleaned with bleach while plywood covering the buildings windows were removed to provide light and air for upcoming interior activities. All asbestos abatement was completed by early October and the Army scheduled demolition to begin on 6 October 2003 after state air quality inspectors expressed satisfaction with the Army’s abatement

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{717} Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1018-1019).
\item \textsuperscript{718} Spec Mitch Frazier, “Emergency,” \textit{Globe} 24, no. 3 (April 2001): 23.
\item \textsuperscript{719} James M. Willison, Director, DENR, “Quarterly Historical Report: July-September 2001,” 1 November 2001, in “Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources Quarterly Reports” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\item \textsuperscript{720} James M. Willison, Director, DENR, to Diane Noda, Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish and Wildlife, letter, 1 August 2001, in “Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources Quarterly Reports” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
\end{itemize}
procedures. Contractors found more lead-based paint in the building than expected but also recycled much material. It was actually less expensive to recycle the hazardous material than send it to a landfill. The Army recycled approximately 90 percent of the wood in the building through a local company that planed the wood, removed lead-based paint, and resold the material for future construction, an activity permitted by the state air quality board. The Army Hazardous Waste team located at the former Fort Ord coordinated the final disposal of the asbestos materials and the entire vertical structure of Stilwell Hall was down by the end of November, although demolition of the basements took somewhat longer. The contractor broke up most of the concrete for future use as road base by Granite Rock, a local construction supply company, but hauled residual debris to the Marina landfill.\textsuperscript{722}

Another aspect of this project was the mandate to remove rock and rip rap that the Army had used to shore up the bluff on which Stilwell Hall was constructed. On 18 November 2003, Corps of Engineers contractor Marc Edwards met with Ken Grey, California State Parks, and Bill Collins, DENR, to review the planned approach road to the beach that had to be constructed to access the shoreline. Because the area chosen for the road would likely erode into the sea after removal of the rock, there were no mitigation concerns.\textsuperscript{723}

The Army held a retirement ceremony for Stilwell Hall on 12 December 2003. Minor contractor operations continued for a while after this date, which marked the formal end of the famous soldiers club.

\textbf{Site Security}

In FY 2001, the Presidio of Monterey established a Site Security Program Committee “to ensure adequate command emphasis and proper coordination with outside agencies to effectively reduce explosive risks to the community.” Chaired by the garrison commander, the committee was set to meet on a semi-annual basis or as directed. Members of the committee included several garrison organizations concerned with BRAC issues, local law enforcement agencies, state and federal environmental agencies, FORA, the Bureau of Land Management, and community representatives. Committee members were tasked to review the status of site security, recommend actions to address maintenance and repair of fences, trespassing concerns, or whatever would reduce public exposure to unexploded ordnance. The first Site Security Meeting met on 28 February 2002, at which time several suggestions were made, including how to improve emergency access procedures. One action DENR carried out during the year was to designate by name all of the roads within the “Multi-Range Area” used as fire breaks. DENR also developed coordination procedures to improve physical control over the area and worked with the committee to develop the “Ordnance and Explosives Community Safety Plan,” which sought to manage incidents within the multi-range area bordering off-post residences in the city of Seaside. For example, in the event of an UXO investigation or detonation, procedures were developed to ensure public safety, minimize property loss, and mitigate disruption of the Seaside community. Finally, DENR, developed a program for managing site security on a 31.4-acre parcel of land leased to York School in March 2001 for use as an athletic field. In 2002 and

\textsuperscript{722} POM Garrison Significant Action Reports 20030908-12, 20030922-26, 20030929-1003, 20031022-24, 20031110-14, in “POM Garrison Sig Act Reports 2003” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

\textsuperscript{723} POM Garrison Significant Action Reports 20031117-21, in “POM Garrison Sig Act Reports 2003” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
2003, DENR published site-security program summaries for former Fort Ord lands containing UXO that highlighted actions taken during the previous year.  

UXO

In addition, in Spring 2001, the Army determined that an interim action was required to protect the public from potential danger from three former range areas known as Ranges 43-48, Range 30A, and Range OE-16 because of their high risk and proximity to schools, residential areas, and recreational sites even while base-wide remedial solutions were still being developed. In September 2002, the Army and the California Department of Toxic Substances and Control (DTSC) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) signed an interim action record of decision describing the Army’s planned approach to clearing these sites, as reviewed by the regulatory agencies. Ranges 43-48 were the highest priority, as these required prescribed burning. DENR scheduled the burn for fall 2002, but weather conditions delayed action until 2003, as described below. Prior to the burn, crews worked the area around the ranges to enhance their fire containment characteristics.

Meanwhile, DENR focused effort upon cleaning up two areas that it could safely clear without prescribed burns. The proximity of these sites to populated areas and the desire to make safe reuse of the area possible drove progress. The first area was approximately four hundred acres of former Fort Ord land immediately adjacent to the city of Seaside (OE-15SEA.1-4). By fall 2002, DENR reported that it had cleared about 55 percent of the area with work continuing into early 2003. Similarly, it reported having cleared some 75 percent of land in parcels adjacent to the city of Del Rey Oaks, with these operations also continuing into early 2003 (OE-15DRO.1-2). Several hundred UXO items were removed from the two areas.

Between 17-21 March 2003, a U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU) from Red Bluff, Arkansas, responded to six recently discovered “4-inch Stokes mortar projectiles” and a “Livens projector” in the UXO program area near General Jim Moore Boulevard on the former Fort Ord. DENR could not remove the material on its own because Army guidance required a TEU response concerning the discovery of projectiles that might contain chemical munitions. The public was notified on 17 March about the TEU response and the planned closure of General Jim Moore, which was closed from 0900 to 1300 hours on 18 March during which time the TEU extracted the projectiles using special equipment. All the suspect projectiles were assessed using x-ray and Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy and all were determined to be smoke-filled and not chemical munitions. The Army used such munitions to produce smoke for covering tactical military movements. The Corps of Engineers subsequently detonated the projectiles in the Multi-Range Area of the former base on 24 March. Army policy required all livens projectiles to be accessed prior to detonation because the filler of such devices could not be positively identified and might also contain other chemical agents, incendiary explosives, or high explosives. Jim Willison of DENR noted that of six million anomalies investigated at the former

Fort Ord training areas since 1994, less than one percent turned out to be unexploded ordnance.\textsuperscript{277}

On 14 May 2003, DENR discussed the complex issues relating to UXO that influence the establishment of land use controls of former Army property with John Paul Moroney, Assistant Laboratory Analyst, Concurrent Technologies Corporation. Moroney’s company was preparing a report describing the findings of this and other interviews at several closed bases.\textsuperscript{278}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
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\textbf{Fort Ord Munitions Response Program Figures (1994 through November 2003)}\textsuperscript{279} \\
\hline
(1) 6.3 million anomalies investigated \\
(2) 78,053 munitions and explosives of concern removed \\
(3) 6,291 high-explosive (HE) munitions and explosives of concern removed \\
(4) 273,127 lbs. of munitions debris or ordnance scrap removed \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textbf{Figure 30 UXO cleanup statistics, 1994-November 2003}

\textbf{Prescribed Burns}

Since the late-1990s, the Army had planned to conduct a prescribed burn, that is, the deliberate or controlled setting of fire, to clear vegetation on six weapons ranges at the former Fort Ord. These ranges were located within walking distance of the city of Seaside and offered a tempting, but dangerous opportunity for trespassing. In fact, one recent incident involved local school children who trespassed onto the ranges, located near their school, seeking 40 mm grenades they wanted to throw at their school. No one was injured during this incident, but similar incidents in the past and the fear of a serious or fatal injury motivated DENR to clear the ranges of UXO, many of which had to be burned to remove heavy vegetation, because workers could not safely locate and remove UXO in the presence of heavy brush. The Army determined after years of study and consultations that alternative methods, such as mechanical vegetation removal, were less safe than burning, which nonetheless has remained a controversial issue for local interest groups and citizens in general.

Indeed, the Army had halted its prescribed burn program in 1998 following a lawsuit by the Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District (MBUAPCD), which claimed that the MBUAPCD held jurisdiction over such burning and other concerns voiced by the EPA and DTSC. The Army then focused upon areas that could be cleared mechanically until March 2001, when the Ninth Circuit Court ruled that the Army was exempt from MBUAPCD jurisdiction. Instead, the court required that the Army prepare a more detailed account of its plans before it and the regulatory agencies reached a decision, but also required that the decision be substantially in compliance with MBUAPCD requirements. The Army did not further challenge the ruling, and the interim action record of decision (mentioned in the UXO section above) resulted in the prescribed burn at Ranges 43-48. The ruling meant that the Army would have to prepare an Interim Action Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study to address the risks posed by


UXO at the three specific highest priority sites proposed for prescribed burning. This study was intended to be equivalent to an Environmental Impact Statement required under Superfund rules. The Army was also conducting a long-term Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study begun in 1999 for the entire base, but this study would not be completed until 2005.\(^{730}\)

The federal court ruling meant that the Army would have to delay its planned prescribed burn for at least another year. DENR, with much assistance from the Corps of Engineers, plunged into completing the documents needed to reach the interim action record of decision by mid-2002 and planned to conduct a burn in late 2002. The court decision impacted another issue as well. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), responsible for the installation-wide multispecies Habitat Management Plan (HMP), had objected in a 31 January 2001 memorandum to Army plans to use mechanical and manual cutting to remove maritime chaparral in UXO sites. Specifically, FWS opposed mechanical and manual cutting of maritime chaparral as going against the HMP as well as an agreement called the Biological and Conference Opinion for the Closure of Fort Ord signed on 20 March 1999. In light of the court ruling, the Army could not burn for another year, but wanted FWS to withdraw its objection to the Army using mechanical means to clear those high risk areas that were subject to future development (or not in the designated HMP reserves). In making this request, DENR pledged its long-term commitment to the HMP and Biological and Conference Opinion agreement.\(^{731}\)

To help mitigate the impact of pollutants upon local residents, the Presidio developed a voluntary relocation program, which would reimburse eligible community members for meals and lodging for the duration of the burn.\(^{732}\) Unfortunately, unsuitable weather conditions that had stymied previous DENR efforts to conduct controlled burns, again occurred during the fall of 2002 and on 19 November, the garrison commander, Col. Mike Dietrick, ordered an imminent burn cancelled after the California Air Resources Board revised a previous weather forecast. More than two hundred community members had relocated in accord with the voluntary relocation program and the Army paid for their expenses despite the cancelled burn. Dietrick personally apologized for the inconvenience to the community, but emphasized “the danger of the unexploded ordnance on these ranges on the former Fort Ord is significant, and it is paramount we clean the ranges up as safely and quickly as possible.”\(^{733}\)

On 16 January 2003, DENR began new preparations for a controlled burn on the former Fort Ord to clear vegetation to permit clearance of unexploded ordnance at Ranges 43-48. DENR vetted its plans with representatives of the EPA and the DTSC. DENR staff also met with the OMC Fire Department, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Parson’s (a private

\(^{730}\) James M. Willison, Director, DENR, to Nicolas Papadakis, Executive Director, Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments, letter, 18 July 2001, in “Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources Quarterly Reports” folder, RG 21.22, DLIFLC&POM Archives. The essential difference between the Army’s interpretation and that of the MBUAPCD was wording. The Army stated that its efforts to ameliorate UXO on former Fort Ord land was a “removal” activity whereas the Court decided it was, in fact, a “remedial” activity subject to Superfund (CERCLA) rules.


contractor) to discuss the 2003 Prescribed Burn Contract and to reinforce the Fire Department’s role in the planning and contracting process.\footnote{DLIFLC Press Release 03-D-3, “Army Set to Burn Vegetation at Fort Ord in Three Days,” 10 October 2003, in “ACH 2003 PAO Press Releases” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Apparently, the decision to conduct the fall 2003 burn was made in September 2002 when the three parties signed a Record of Decision.}

On 11 April 2003, Dr. Mario P. Fiori, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment, visited DENR to gain a better understanding of the challenges of clearing vegetation from areas that require the cleanup of unexploded ordnance. Gail Youngblood gave a presentation explaining to Fiori that DENR planned the burn for the fall of 2003 when weather conditions, relative humidity (60 to 80 percent), and fuel moisture levels would be optimal.\footnote{James M. Willison, DENR, to Harold Raugh, Command Historian, notes, January 2005, in “ACH2003 DENR” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

In July 2003, the Army publicly announced plans to attempt another prescribed burn that fall. To prepare for the burn, DENR published six community bulletins, each mailed to 50,000 households, and held a series of public meetings. Again, the Army tried to minimize community concerns from smoke release by approving temporary relocating expenses for nearby civilian residents who might be affected during the three days that smoke could be in the air. The Army held workshops to acquaint the public with the program, which included prepaid motel rooms and food vouchers for those registered at least forty-eight hours prior to the announced burn. Dr. Lind Velasquez, acting Monterey County Public Health Officer, compared the health risk to the burn as minimal with any discomfort temporary and “like the effects of sitting around a campfire,” although those with existing breathing conditions might want to consider remaining indoors or temporary relocation.\footnote{DLIFLC Press Release 03-020, “Army Announces Relocation Available during Prescribed Burn,” 21 July 2003, in “ACH 2003 PAO Press Releases” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.}

Weather conditions prevented a burn through early October. On 10 October 2003, the Army announced that it would conduct burn operations at Fort Ord in three days, barring any change in weather, and that its voluntary relocation plan was in effect. According to DENR Director Willison, “we want to burn when weather conditions let smoke rise quickly and blow away at high altitudes.” Addressing community concerns about the possible effects of the burn igniting unexploded ordnance, the Army noted that EPA and the DTSC had previously concluded that a fire on Fort Ord land was basically no different than a fire on land with similar vegetation.\footnote{DLIFLC Press Release 03-D-3, “Army Set to Burn Vegetation at Fort Ord in Three Days,” 10 October 2003, in “ACH 2003 PAO Press Releases” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives. The Presidio of Monterey Fire Department conducted the prescribed burn at Ranges 43-48 with help from naval meteorologists and a contract “burn boss” fire behavioral specialist.}

Weather conditions again postponed action for another week. Then, on 23 October 2003, DENR conducted the prescribed burn at Ranges 43-48. DENR had made careful plans to employ aircraft to fight any fire that escaped the containment area. However, these plans were not sufficient and the fire did escape. Instead of clearing 500 acres, the fire burned over a thousand additional acres, and produced much more smoke than expected. The Army had already scheduled the acreage for later cleanup, but the unexpectedly large fire generated considerable scrutiny and became a major local news story.\footnote{Larry Parsons, “Army Makes Case for Burn: Out-of-Control Blaze Cleared Former Fort Ord Firing Range,” \textit{Salinas Californian}, 31 October 2003, 1A, 2A.} Col. Michael Simone, DLIFLC Commandant, and Col. Jeffrey Cairns, Presidio of Monterey Garrison Commander, gave a media interview that day on the burn. DENR also escorted the media to the burn site to observe and
film the ordnance that was uncovered. The burn contractor identified the probable cause of the escape and provided the media with the results of the preliminary investigation.  

Despite the escape, the Coast Weekly and Monterey County Post both provided positive coverage of the prescribed burn. Moreover, after the Army temporarily relocated nearly one thousand local residents who elected to move from the area during the burn, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, a federal health agency, determined that the resultant smoke did not exceed federal healthy air standards. Nevertheless, given the public’s high interest in the matter, Rep. Sam Farr announced his intent to hold a Congressional Field Hearing in Monterey on the issue. On 13 November, DENR held a public meeting regarding the burn to provide community members the opportunity to air comments and concerns about the burn to senior level Army and regulatory agency leadership. DENR incorporated these comments into the Army’s after action report for the prescribed burn. In mid-December, a Strategic Management, Analysis, Requirements, and Technology (SMART) Team Meeting was also held to discuss the burn, and a number of other priority UXO cleanup projects at the former Fort Ord since a February 2003 meeting.

The Army’s initial investigation concluded that a spot fire may have developed when embers ignited leaves underneath brush that had been pre-treated with retardant before the prescribed burn to help contain the fire, but which was insufficient for the brush density. The Army planned to make available an after-action report on the prescribed burn in spring 2004.

Meanwhile, local fire chiefs, who agreed that it was necessary to conduct controlled burns, concluded that attempting to control fires from the air, as was done during the 2003 fire, was insufficient. The reason the Army did not position ground crews in proximity to the fire was to avoid the dangers of fire-ignited munitions. The solution required the construction of rings around the area to be burned and pre-cleared of munitions. This step would allow firefighters to fight escaped fires closer to the breach. The rings were to be constructed using lands already burned or cleared during previous cleanup actions. Thus, with lessons learned, the Army declared the prescribed burn a success despite the escaped fire and by 2005 DENR had cleared the burned area of 9,730 munitions and explosives of concern.

In addition to the planned fire, an accidental fire was also set within the “Eucalyptus Fire Area” in July 2003. The fire burned approximately 637 acres, including about 367 acres within the former impact area. While the fire was unfortunate, the Army took the opportunity of the

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740 Larry Parsons, “Army Makes Case for Burn: Out-of-Control Blaze Cleared Former Fort Ord Firing Range,” Salinas Californian, 31 October 2003, 1A, 2A.
741 Sukhjit Purewal, “Farr: Army ‘Blew It’ on Burn: Calls for Congressional Hearing,” Monterey County Herald, 29 October 2003, B1, B4. It is not known if the hearing was held.
unexpectedly cleared land to remove ninety-one munitions of explosives of concern and some 29,300 pounds of munitions debris.  

**Water Quality and Waste Management**

On 21 December 2001, Congressman Farr reported that he expected President Bush to sign a House-passed appropriations bill that would bring $2 million in funding for Fort Ord conversion projects. The funds were not directly related to the Army, but were going to be divided between CSUMB and FORA for ongoing conversion and reuse projects, including environmental remediation, affordable housing, and the Monterey Bay Education, Science, and Technology Center involving a joint project on resolving water quality issues.

On 30 April 2003, DENR staff met with state and local agencies to discuss Trichloroethene (TCE) contamination in Well FO-29A. The level of contamination was about .05 PPB, below the state standard of 5 PPB for drinking water. The Marina Coast Water District planned to include this information in its annual Consumer Confidence Report in June 2003. A follow-up meeting were held with local agencies regarding public outreach about the low-level detection of TCE in Ord Military Community water supply well FO-29A, which included the Marina Coast Water District, Regional Water Quality Control Board, DTSC, EPA, Monterey County Health Department, and California Department of Health Services. Meanwhile at the Presidio, DENR collected water samples from some twenty-four residences and offices in late September 2003. The safety of tap water on the Presidio had been a concern in past years due to the antiquated plumbing system of the installation, which was over one hundred years old. DENR analyzed the samples for lead and copper content to ensure that they met regulatory safe drinking water standards. This sampling also evaluated the effect of recent plumbing repairs to the water system. On 4 November, the test results were provided to the garrison commander and analysis indicated that the water met regulatory safe drinking water standards with the exception of Building 235, which had a slightly elevated lead level. Although the analysis did not indicate the lead content posed a health threat, DENR advised Building 235 occupants that lead level could be reduced by letting water run for a couple of minutes at the beginning of the workday.

In other actions, the Army hired a contractor, Innovative Technical Solutions, Inc., to conduct a pilot study for the cleanup of small arms ranges. Phase 2 of the study was completed by February 2003. The company conducted a trial on Range 18 and concluded that the “dry separation” method, as opposed to “wet” or soil washing method, was the best procedure to use for cleaning up the remaining lead-contaminated rifle ranges. The Army Corps of Engineers approved the company’s plan to move forward with a pilot-scale clean up of these ranges using the recommended dry separation method.

Also of note in 2003, Gail Youngblood accepted State Water Quality Control Board Award for Army’s water remediation program at former Fort Ord.

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Assessments

Throughout this period, external agencies have maintained a close watch over Army cleanup activities at the former Fort Ord. For example, in early April 2003, the Monterey County Environmental Health Department conducted a regulatory inspection of hazardous waste satellite and central accumulation areas on the Ord Military Community. It found all facilities were compliant with federal, state, and local laws and regulations. In mid-November 2003, the California Regional Water Quality Control Board conducted a similar compliance inspection at the closed Presidio of Monterey and former Fort Ord landfills. The board found no violations and that DENR was maintaining the landfills in full compliance with regulatory requirements.\(^\text{751}\)

Funding was a concern for DENR managers striving to maintain compliance. For example, during the 14-15 January 2003 Quarterly BRAC In-Progress Review, held to discuss reuse priorities and progress made on environmental restoration and property transfer, Thomas Lederle of the Army Installation Management BRAC Division, reported that FY 2003-FY 2005 funding would be very limited and allocated to projects that might result in expeditious property transfer. Any cutbacks, however, could affect compliance funding, which the Army needed, besides for safety, health, and environmental concerns, to gain the approval of external agencies to meet the key goal of successfully transferring former Fort Ord property for civilian reuse. Importantly, after conducting an investigation, the EPA concluded in early 2003 that the Army’s system for treating groundwater contamination around the former Fort Ord’s automotive repair facilities was “operating properly and successfully.” The system, known as Site 2/12 Groundwater Treatment System, was placed into operation in 1999. This system was likely to remain in operation for decades due to the excessive time required to extract and treat fully groundwater contamination. Nevertheless, EPA determined that the Army had demonstrated sufficient progress using the system to restore the groundwater to safety levels compliant with human health and environmental standards to justify the near-term transfer of the associate property for civilian use. This determination was an important accomplishment even though future land users could not sink wells until the water was clean enough for safe human use.\(^\text{752}\)

One way that DENR kept on top of compliance issues was through self-inspection. In October 2003, DENR conducted inspections of hazardous waste-generator sites at the Presidio to ensure full compliance with federal, state, and local laws and regulations. These DENR in-house inspections sought to identify and ensure the correction of potential violations, thereby minimizing the possibility of fines and violations being issued during regulatory agency inspections. DENR found that all inspected activities were fully compliant with relevant laws and regulations.\(^\text{753}\)

Directorate of Human Resources

The Presidio of Monterey garrison organized the Directorate of Human Resources (DHR) at the end of 2003 from pre-existing offices, which were Civilian Personnel Services, Military Personnel Services, Education and Services, and the Alcohol and Drug Control Office. The


personnel and administrative functions of the Directorate of Human Resources were executed by the Installation Adjutant General’s Office (IAGO), which consisted of the Adjutant General (AG) Office and the Military Personnel Division (MPD), and the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC).

**Installation Adjutant General’s Office**

Capt. Robert W. Smith, Jr., was the Adjutant General for the DLIFLC in 2003. His mission was to provide administrative support for the entire installation, consisting of 4,720 students, staff, and faculty from the four military services. In addition, the AG office was responsible for all aspects of personnel support to assigned and attached Army personnel and tenant units located throughout central and northern California. In 2003, for example, the AG Office processed 19 Congressional Inquiries while the Casualty and Memorial Affairs Section supported 113 funerals with full military honors and another 169 funerals with modified honors.

One of the most significant activities by the AG and MPD Offices took place between October 1999 and February 2001, when the Army conducted an A-76 outsourcing study (AG Commercial Activity Study) on the MPD Office as part of an ongoing initiative of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. A-76 studies seek to determine whether commercial firms can do the work of government employees more efficiently. The result can be that federal employees lose their jobs when a commercial contractor assumes their duties, which was what happened. In April 2003, the AG and MPD Offices reduced their staff by nine full-time civilian employees. In January 2004, the last military personnel departed MPD stemming from the conversion of its military to civilian personnel to comply with the outsourcing study. The Army expected to save approximately $1 million over the course of five years. As installation commander, Colonel Rice personally opposed the study, which had a detrimental effect on employee morale, but it was a Department of the Army directive.\footnote{Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1035-1036).}

In August 2003, the AG Office implemented the Electronic Military Personnel Office (EMILPO), an Army web-based Human Resources Personnel Database used worldwide to track military personnel data. EMILPO simplified technical support and created access for all authorized users through their standard Internet browser. During the same month, the AG office moved from Building 614 (Rasmussen Hall) to its new location in Room 113, Building 616 (Taylor Hall). MPD completed its reorganization in Building 616. The reorganization of office space and construction within the first floor of Building 616 provided for the future site of the Finance Office, and was planned to serve as a one-stop center for soldiers in-processing, out-processing, or conducting routine business.

**Civilian Personnel Advisory Center**

The Civilian Personnel Advisory Center, responsible for civilian personnel actions, also saw many changes stemming from reorganization. In May 2003, for example, CPAC reorganized using a human resources “generalist” concept; positions would no longer be staffed using specialists for such functions as staffing/classification or management and employee/labor relations. Under the generalist assignment, CPAC assigned a human resources specialist to specific organizations and they performed all the functions for that organization with the exception of labor relations, which the Civilian Personnel Officer retained. More importantly, the personnel community established its own command on 1 October 2003. This resulted in

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\footnote{Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1035-1036).}
CPAC no longer reporting to the installation commander. Instead, all CPACs as well as Civilian Personnel Operation Centers (CPOC) reported to the Civilian Human Resources Agency (CHRA), formerly the Civilian Personnel Operations Center Management Agency. The chief of CPAC was Ms. Nell V. Taylan, who reported to the garrison commander and was senior rated by the regional director of CHRA, West Region.\textsuperscript{755}

CPAC was heavily involved in helping to plan and abet issues resulting from the migration of all BASOPS staff to the IMA. For example, some organizations were not just moved, but split into separate functions, such as the Directorate of Resource Management, which was split into IMA DRM and TRADOC mission DRM. CPAC also supported the Directorate of Contracting, which moved from TRADOC to the USA Contracting Agency Southern Region in October 2003.\textsuperscript{756}

In addition to normal support and help in planning the IMA migration, CPAC staff handled Workers Compensation Program claims (as required by the Federal Employee Compensation Act) and closed 85 percent of them within 120 days in 2003. In April 2003, CPOC approved a request made by CPAC in 2002 to increase significantly the special pay rate for police officers. Finally, CPAC staff provided numerous training sessions and classes throughout the period, many having to do with A-76 outsourcing processes.\textsuperscript{757}

**Installation Support Offices**

**Contracting**

The Contracting Office (ICO) consisted of twelve employees divided into two elements under Penny Sinclair, who continued to serve as director. Her staff included a secretary, the International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card Program director, a system’s manager (Mr. Gordon Ross), the “Standard Procurement System Power User” and PRWeb facilitator; and Chief Operations Officer Sharon Pandile. Pandile, who joined ICO in spring of 2003, supervised the contract specialists in the award and administration of simplified purchases as well as commercial contracts.\textsuperscript{758}

The ICO’s goal was to maintain good stewardship of contract dollars to provide ICO “customers,” both mission and garrison, with a substantial return on investment by obtaining goods and services on time and at the lowest total overall cost while also remaining compliant with statutes and regulatory requirements.

ICO awarded and administered several major contracts, including the BASOPS contract, which it awarded in 2001 to the Peninsula Municipal Service Agency, and which proved to be “a highly successful venture for the Army and City Governments of Seaside and Monterey.” ICO awarded the contract specifically to provide BASOPS support in such matters as building maintenance, roadwork, roofing, etc., to DLIFLC and the Presidio. The contract was especially useful in helping the installation to implement conservation initiatives. The contract was the first in the Army awarded under demonstration legislation, authored by Rep. Sam Farr, whereby the Army outsourced its BASOPS functions to local municipalities, in this case, the nearby cities of Seaside and Monterey. The contract was especially useful in helping the installation to implement conservation initiatives. The contract was the first in the Army awarded under demonstration legislation, authored by Rep. Sam Farr, whereby the Army outsourced its BASOPS functions to local municipalities, in this case, the nearby cities of Seaside and Monterey. The contract was especially useful in helping the installation to implement conservation initiatives. The contract was the first in the Army awarded under demonstration legislation, authored by Rep. Sam Farr, whereby the Army outsourced its BASOPS functions to local municipalities, in this case, the nearby cities of Seaside and Monterey. The contract was especially useful in helping the installation to implement conservation initiatives. The contract was the first in the Army awarded under demonstration legislation, authored by Rep. Sam Farr, whereby the Army outsourced its BASOPS functions to local municipalities, in this case, the nearby cities of Seaside and Monterey.
Monterey and Seaside. ICO placed another contract award upon the open market after the demonstration legislation expired. However, ICO successfully obtained approval from the Small Business Administration to allow it to open competition up to large businesses, which also allowed local municipalities to compete. ICO also handled the food service contract covering two dining facilities, a challenge given the need to meet the expectations of four diverse services. Nevertheless, this contract was very successful at meeting the military’s expectations. Finally, ICO played a major role in the technological expansion of the schools by purchasing information and telecommunications technology and audio-visual equipment and services.

**Safety**

Starting in October 2002, the safety and occupational health functions were carried out by the Command Safety Office located at the Ord Military Community, under the direction of Ollie Parducho. The Command Safety Office reported through the chief of staff to the installation commander until October 2003 when, under IMA requirements, the safety office and its staff of two were reassigned to the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey TDA. Under this TDA, the Command Safety Office became the Installation Safety Office (ISO). This office acted as the primary advisor to the garrison commander and installation commander on matters pertaining to safety and occupational health and provided technical guidance to garrison staff, DLIFLC, and other tenant organizations. The office provided safety and occupational health services such as safety briefings and training, accident investigation, safety awareness, and promotional materials. It investigated personal injuries and illnesses, complaints about safety issues, and potentially unsafe conditions. It provided standard Army safety and occupational health inspections to garrison’s and tenant units’ activities, operations, and its personnel to assist commanders and staff in providing and maintaining a safe and healthful environment to work, live, and train.

**Internal Review**

The mission of the Army’s Internal Review Audit Program was to support the installation commander with in-house, state-of-the-art, reliable, timely, professional auditing and consulting services that promoted improved risk management and fostered best business practices. The Internal Review Office (IRO) was assigned to the garrison as an Installation Support Office during the reorganization that created the IMA. Dwight F. Johnson, who served at Fort Ord from 1980 until its closure in 1994 and was then transferred to the DLIFLC, was the chief of IRO throughout this period. IRO responsibilities included:

During 2003, the IRO conducted two Formal Audits, four Quick Response Reviews, two Follow-up Reviews and one Consulting Service that provided audit analysis with recommended solutions. One audit report pertained to the Army Family Housing Inter-service Support Agreement (the second resulted in an AR 15-6 Investigation). The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) had been providing Army Family Housing support to the Presidio under an Inter-Service Agreement (ISA) for several years. Since the establishment of this ISA, the Army had never received a detailed accounting of all expenditures associated with it. Since the Navy ISA was scheduled to be terminated in August 2003 when the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) or Army Family Housing privatization program went into effect, the garrison commander requested an audit. IRO reviewed an audit of Army funds received by the Navy’s acceptance of FY

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760 All information in this section is from: Ollie M. Parducho to Ramon L. Velasquez, email, 16 April 2004, in “ACH2003” Safety” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
2001/2002 Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests. IRO identified $100,000 in property book items that the Navy purchased with Army funds that were not put on a hand receipt.\textsuperscript{761}

**Directorate of Logistics**

Between 2001 and 2003, the Directorate of Logistics (DOL) consisted of a headquarters element with four divisions, namely Maintenance, Food Services, Supply, and Transportation. John J. Robotti continued to serve as Director of Logistics. He oversaw an operation of 32 GS employees, 20 WG employees, and 76 contractor personnel (including 58 employees in Dining Food Service operations and 18 in the Transportation GSA Vehicle fleet.) The mission of the DOL continued to be service member and family support and to maintain all other support functions for the garrison and institute at the highest level.\textsuperscript{762}

**Maintenance Division**

Under Paul St. John, the Maintenance Division continued to provide vehicle/general equipment support to the customers at the Presidio and OMC, the largest users being DPS, the Fire Department, and the GSA Fleet. The Maintenance Division repaired 833 pieces of lawn equipment with 1,284 man hours expended and $11,209 spent through September 2003. On 30 September 2003, DOL’s Self Help element was outsourced to Clark-Pinnacle, the contractor administering OMC housing area. The Maintenance Division’s workload consisted of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Order Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle/General Equipment work orders</td>
<td>3,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts and Labor</td>
<td>$268,274.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawn Care Transactions</td>
<td>16,385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 31 Maintenance Division statistics, 2003**

**Food Services Division**

Bent Ramskov ran the Food Services Division consisting of two dining facilities and one kiosk during 2003. The Food Services Division’s workload was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Order Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Meals Served</td>
<td>1,104,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Vendor Costs</td>
<td>$2,397,898.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Purchase</td>
<td>$547,880.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 32 Food Services Division statistics, 2003**

**Supply Division**

Under Samuel Davis, the Supply Division continued to support the 135 holders of installation property (hand-receipt holders). Of note, the Supply Division vacated two large warehouses in 2003, which it returned to BRAC.

A goal of the Supply Division was to reutilize inventory, but after exhausting local reuse options, it transported remaining property to the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office (DRMO) at Sharp Army Depot, approximately 160 miles away unless DRMO authorized local


\textsuperscript{762}All data in this section from: John Robotti to Harold Raugh, email, 10 January 2005, in “ACH2003 DOL” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives. Limited DOL data was available pre-2003.
disposition through the city of Marina disposal facility. In 2003, the Supply Division’s workload consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textbook Orders</td>
<td>93,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textbook Cost</td>
<td>$1,424,358.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Survival Kits Issued</td>
<td>119,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Survival Kits Cost</td>
<td>$169,595.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Property Accountability System (DPAS) Transactions</td>
<td>46,352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 33 Supply Division statistics, 2003

**Transportation Division**

Under Belinda Sablan, the Transportation Division continued to support the installation with shuttle services, GSA Fleet support, shipment of household goods, and travel services for service members and DoD employees. Colleen Loman, Chief of Personal Property Section, retired after forty years of federal service. The Transportation Division’s workload was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Inbound shipments</td>
<td>9,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Outbound shipments</td>
<td>14,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Temporary Storage Shipments</td>
<td>1,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage In Transit Shipments</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customers</td>
<td>11,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelers Air Mobility Command</td>
<td>1,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelers Commercial Flights</td>
<td>3,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Vehicles</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mileage</td>
<td>955,381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 34 Transportation Division statistics, 2003

Finally, under Debra Saragian, DOL also continued to process “Report of Survey” reviews to account for lost and damaged government property. In 2003, twenty-six such surveys were completed, with a total dollar amount of $45,770. Equipment recovered totaled $14,770. In terms of pecuniary liability, individuals were determined to be liable for $5,381 worth of equipment, with a $7,140 loss to the U.S. government. In addition, DOL continued to conduct Command Supply Discipline Program annual inspections.

**Directorate of Community Activities/Morale, Welfare, and Recreation**

The Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (DMWR), headed by Bob Emanuel throughout the period, provided a wide variety of diverse community services through three primary programs. These programs were the Army Substance Abuse Program headed by Dr. Tom Tennent, Army Continuing Education Services headed by Ms. Darlene Doran-Jones, and Morale, Welfare and Recreation headed by Mr. Keith Colbert. The DMWR, according to its mission statement, provided enhanced Quality-of-Life programs directly supporting readiness through customer-driven social, recreational, educational, and family support services for the entire Presidio of Monterey community. These major programs included the Army Substance Abuse Program, Army Continuing Education Services, and Morale, Welfare and Recreation. Prior to 2003, DMWR was known as the Directorate of Community Activities.

763 Information in this section was derived from an unpublished command history by Dr. Harold Raugh, who obtained the information from DMWR in 2004. Raugh’s compilation is on file in the DLIIFLC&POM Archives.

Army Substance Abuse Program

The Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) was a DMWR program administered jointly with CALMED, which handled treatment while DMWR oversaw prevention and education. The ASAP office also included the Installation Biochemical Test Coordinator who administered all service member and civilian government employee drug testing. Unfortunately, the CALMED treatment counselor position was vacant for all of 2003, leaving the DMWR as the lone provider of ASAP service for the entire year. This resulted in a limited response to issues including driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), positive drug tests, and requests for help with substance dependency. On the positive side, urinalysis testing of soldiers and certain designated civilian employees indicated confirmed illegal drug use far below the Army average. Of 5,423 specimens tested in 2003, only sixteen were returned positive and none of fifty-three civilian specimens tested positive during 2003.

Army Continuing Education Services

Army Continuing Education Service (ACES) was another important component of DMWR. At the end of 2002, the Presidio’s Education Center staff included the educational services officer, a guidance counselor, and an education technician, who resigned in February 2003 with the position remaining vacant for the remainder of 2003. In June 2003, the Education Center staff hired another guidance counselor to meet the added workload brought on by the DLIFLC Foreign Language Associate Degree Program. The Education Center also received $30,000 through the installation’s PBAC exercise to wire, renovate, and install ten workstations in its “Learning Center” to accommodate computer-based proficiency testing. In October 2003, the Education Center was selected as one of four Army Education Centers to participate in a Military Installation Voluntary Education Program Review (MIVER), beginning in June 2004. IMA chose the Presidio to host MIVER training for the three other selected installations and conducted the training at the Education Center from 12 to 14 November 2003. In 2003 alone, the Education Center conducted 6,245 counseling sessions, 126 briefings, and administered 1,263 tests.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) was a program consisting of five primary service areas. These were Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Resources, Child and Youth Services (CYS), Recreation, Business, and Army Community Service (ACS):

Nonappropriated Fund Resources

Non-appropriated Fund Resources oversaw the MWR Fund, which ended Fiscal Year 2003 with a net loss of $555,359 stemming from expenses due to the closure of the Fort Mason Officer’s Club in San Francisco. Severance pay totaling $115,300 was paid to the club’s employees and $276,200 in NAF property was transferred free of charge to the National Park Service. The MWR program received $613,212 in reimbursable resources from appropriated funds. Income generators included Sports for $5,500, Child Development Services for $4,521, Ticketing for $31,147, Autocrafts for $45,028, and Outdoor Recreation made $200,522. The MWR Fund also received $285,978 as a dividend from the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), $142,091 in interest from an escrow account, and $10,732 from cable TV commission.
Child and Youth Services

Child and Youth Services conducted many worthwhile programs, including Supplemental Programs and Services, Monterey Road Child Development Center, School-Age Services, Middle School and Teen Programs, and Youth Sports (MS&T). In December 2002, Child and Youth Services implemented the Child and Youth Management System, a computer program connecting all CYS programs that proved beneficial to the program throughout 2003. In 2003, the Monterey Road Child Development Center received certification by the National Association for the Education of Young Children. After a management change in July 2003, the School-Age Services Program finished a successful summer program and began working on program re-accreditation by the National School-Age Care Alliance. MS&T continued to offer out-of-school activities for middle school and teen youth, including Boys and Girls Club activities and 4-H programming. The Youth Sports Program continued to be the most popular program despite limited resources.

Recreation Programs

Recreation Programs included Sports and Fitness, Hobson Student Activity Center, Outdoor Recreation, Leisure Travel, and the Autocrafts Shop. Sports and Fitness sponsored the intramural sports program that consisted of five company-level team sports, including leagues in basketball, flag-football, soccer, softball, and volleyball. Hobson Student Activity Center provided a program designed to meet the interests of all service members interested in self-directed activities. The center’s new Director, Steve Hosman, arrived from Germany on 6 January 2003, filling a position that had been vacant since the former chief, Ms. Townsend, left in August 2002. Outdoor Recreation (ODR) provided a number of activities, including ski trips, Scuba classes, “high adventure” programs (hang gliding, parachuting, rock climbing, etc.), and various other outdoor activities in 2001 and 2002, and set a record in 2003 for best financial performance with a net income of $239,000. It added programs in guided high adventure climbing and white water rafting and expanded its transportation program with the addition of a fifty-seven-passenger Vanhool bus. ODR also hosted the popular Adventure Day in 2003 in conjunction with the Commander’s Cup and included a tandem ski dive entrance by the command sergeant major. Leisure Travel Office began selling Ocean Cruise tickets in 2003 and continued to offer tickets to theme parks, such as Disneyland, Universal Studios, Sea World, and Knott’s Berry Farm. Autocrafts continued to provide facilities to allow patrons to do automotive repairs in a safe environment with the proper equipment and trained assistance. In 2003, staff replaced eight Hydraulic Lifts, a tire-changing machine, and a wheel balancer for $56,000.

Business Programs

Programs included Lodging and Food, Beverage, and Entertainment (FB&E). The FB&E program operated in both the Stilwell Community Center at OMC and The Edge, a bar operated on the Presidio. The Presidio’s Lodging program consisted of seventy-four rooms in various configurations. Improvements in 2003 included painting the interior of six two-bedroom duplex units, and painting all the doorjambs and replacing all the double beds with queen beds throughout the suites in Building 366. In April 2003, the FB&E program implemented a new lunch buffet program in the Stilwell Community Center on the Ord Military Community. This

program was a financial success during the first several months, then patronage declined and the program lost profitability, although it did break even through the remainder of the year.

**Army Community Services**

Army Community Services was active in a number of important issues focused upon military families. Throughout the period, ACS held classes focused upon family issues. One well publicized event was a two-day Army Family Team Building course held at the Weckerling Center 13-14 February 2002. The course taught fifteen National Guard spouses and two National Guard spouses stationed at the Presidio on how to handle the various difficulties that follow from the activation of citizen soldiers and more importantly prepared them to teach others. Once the spouses became familiar with the issues and resources, they were expected to return home with the ability to pass on information on how to cope with a deployment, a special problem for National Guard families, who often have no previous experience in an enforced separation. Contractor Melanie Knapp-Cook coordinated the course with Capt. Joanne Farris from the Nevada National Guard. 766 The Army had activated the guardsmen and sent them to the Presidio to relieve students from gate guard duties after 9/11.

The following month, 13-14 March 2002, ACS held an Armed Forces Family Action Plan Symposium at the Presidio with ninety-seven delegates and seven facilitators who examined medical, entitlement, family support and MWR, housing, public works, and relocation issues facing local military families. The group formulated recommendations both for the local installation commander and sent recommendations on more global issues to TRADOC. The local issues were delegated to the local Installation Family Action Plan Steering Committee whose job was to work with proponent agencies until the issues were resolved. The five main issues related to inadequate medical care, inadequate parking, housing not properly inspected prior to service member move-in, the need for centralized maintenance communication to improve trouble free response to housing maintenance requests, and the adjustment of facility hours to help soldiers balance military and family obligations.

The garrison responded to many of these recommendations. First, to provide better medical care for members and their families, the garrison increased the staffing of the Presidio’s Army Health Clinic, although it did not extend staff hours, arguing that trials showed inadequate use beyond a forty-hour work week. It did authorize, however, the provision of pediatric care in the AHC to be provided by civilians, and perhaps most importantly it received approval to plan a twelve-thousand square-foot clinic expansion of the AHC. Second, some recommendations to increase available parking were rejected for safety reasons, but the garrison commander did approve construction of 239 new parking spaces in the lower Presidio, near the Tin Barn, and in the Building 800 area. Third, the garrison ordered the housing office to notify all incoming personnel of pending maintenance and availability issues before viewing a house and that all work be inspected upon completion by a housing inspector. Fourth, DPW was considering “a one-line communication system” to help better track and resolved maintenance requests, but essentially stated that the existing system would continue. And, finally, the director of Community Activities conducted surveys to determine the feasibility of expanding facility hours, but as regarded the Aiso Library, garrison staff offered that “current resources are not available to change facility hours.”767

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767 “Group Works to Improve Quality of Life for Military,” *Globe* 25, no. 2 (September 2002): 6, 19.
In 2003, ACS held Army Family Action Plan Focus Groups each quarter, with 168 total participants. As a result, ACS made several requests for Department of the Army intervention on transition compensation and a few local issues. Local issues that concerned ACS included security vulnerabilities at OMC, military member’s phone service, unhealthy cooper and lead-based plumbing at the Presidio of Monterey, inadequate instructor skills, and the need to improve child education programs. ACS also continued to conduct its annual Army Emergency Relief (AER) fund-raising drives, and raised over $34,000 from 1 April 2003 until 1 May 2003. Due to the closure of the Navy/Marine Corps Aid Society office at the Naval Postgraduate School, the AER Office processed emergency financial services for all four branches of the military. ACS also conducted tours of the Presidio for IET soldiers, completing eight tours for over five hundred soldiers in 2003. In cooperation with the MPD, it also provided out-processing briefings for departing enlisted soldiers, conducted classes in personal financial management, supported family members seeking local employment, and provided domestic violence/child abuse prevention information along with as an exercise and education program for pregnant service members and family members.

Directorate of Office and Information Management

The Directorate of Office and Information Management (DOIM) oversaw a varied program organized in 2001 and 2002 under such headings as Automation and Telecommunications, Systems Administration, Desktop Support, Knowledge Support, Telecommunications Infrastructure, Telecommunications Routing and Switching, Information Management Services and Support, etc. Winnie Chambliss was the DOIM director throughout this period. She planned and supported customer service in computers, network management, telecommunications, visual information, records management, 768 print liaison, and educational television for the entire Presidio of Monterey community. In 2001, Colonel Rice especially praised DOIM for “Great Work!” in securing funding to allow continuation of DLIFLC’s SCOLA contract for FY 2002 as well as adding new additional channels in Chinese, Russian, Tagalog, and German with additional capabilities as they became available.

In 2002, DOIM faced a major reorganization due to the completion of an A-76 Commercial Activities Study that compared the organization’s functions and cost efficiencies to those available in the private sector. The study determined that the private sector was more competitive. As a result, the Army reorganized DOIM into a “Most Efficient Organization” or MEO, consisting of two main elements: the Client Services Division (CSD) and Information Systems Operations Division (ISOD). The CSD contained the IT Help Desk, Records Management, Video Teleconferencing (VTC), Mail Room Operations, and IT programmers. ISOD contained the IT Networks and the Telecommunications Branch. Eleven personnel retired from DOIM in January 2003. On 6 March 2003, DOIM issued section personnel reassignment notices from CPAC as part of the A-76 study. Two positions retained the same series and grade, i.e., Telecommunications Manager (GS-0391-12), and Network Specialist (GS-2210-11), while remaining section positions received grade reductions. Four positions were reduced in grade and

768 Records management included issues relating to Freedom of Information Act [FOIA], Privacy Act, publications, forms, copyright, Army Records Information Management System, official mail, and distribution.
personnel were given safe pay. Reductions included one GS-0391-11 to a GS-0391-09; one GS-0391-11 to a GS-1001-07; one GS-0391-09 to a GS-0392-07; and one GS-0391-09 to a GS-0392-07.  

After DOIM reorganized, TRADOC Brig. Gen. Gregory J. Premo notified DLIFLC that TRADOC was preparing a plan on what “MACOM information technology (IT) missions, functions, assets and resources will move to the DOIM or NETCOM.” Basically, TRADOC had to justify what mission specific IT functions it wanted to retain in-house, as opposed to turning them over to DOIM, NETCOM, G6, etc. Perhaps somewhat like the separation of mission and garrison functions through the new IMA, the Army was ultimately planning, said Premo, “on getting MACOMs out of the business of providing IT services.” Indeed, under this proposal all IT related programs and IT personnel would transfer to DOIM or NETCOM. Art Gebbia, speaking for the Presidio DOIM stated that he could carry out the mission if ordered and, importantly, if funded. That was the gist of the matter, because the A-76 study, which had involved the preparation of a detailed “Performance Work Statement” or PWS for the reconfiguration of DOIM into a MEO, had not factored in the Army’s plans to transfer all IT resources to DOIM. In essence, without careful exception for specialized DLIFLC programs, there would be a big negative impact on the management of such program areas as Provost, ES, scheduling, DAA with its language labs, CRXXI Lab, ADLP Labs, Testing Labs, the Automated Student Questionaire, Scheduling software, student databases, etc., all of which were inseparable from the program staff who kept those systems running. Said Gebbia, “you can’t afford to lose the IT people from the Institute (ES, DAA, Scheduling) because they operate and maintain the programs, software and equipment that keeps the mission running.” The institute would have to argue its case that there be no change to its mission unique IT programs, projects, and software.

Despite the A-76 study and its complications, DOIM executed many routine, if often complex, operations during this period. DOIM purchased and installed upgrades to the network capabilities in twenty-five building as part of the TEC-2 Technology Enhanced Classrooms initiative (TEC-2 provided a computer, LCD projector, printer, desk, VCR, and whiteboard to each classroom). It supported the relocation of the School of Continuing Education to the DoD Center at OMC (which involved installing network equipment and telephone service to the first floor of the DoD Center in three communications closets to support the SCE staff while upgrading and moving SCE’s existing copiers). In February 2003, it implemented a DOIM Help Desk for telecommunication trouble calls while in April 2003, it prepared a draft information system design and cost estimate to support a new General Instructional Facility V (GIF V).

Another task DOIM completed was to install network and phone equipment to support DOIM staff who relocated into DOIM’s own newly building—Fergusson Hall. The 2003 move required DOIM to transfer the installation’s entire server farm from Building 614 into the new Building 342 (conducted with only eleven hours of downtime). At the same time, DOIM worked with many vendors on the procurement of items for the new building, including workstations, cubicles, tables, appliances, and movers.  

DOIM dedicated its new facility on 28 August 2003 as “Fergusson Hall” to honor both Maj. Gen. Robert G. Fergusson, who died in 2001, and his son 1st Lt. Robert L. Fergusson, who was killed in action in Vietnam in 1967. General Fergusson began his military career as an officer in F Troop, 11th Cavalry, while stationed at the Presidio of Monterey. DCSOPS managed the event with support from the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion, Protocol, Public Affairs, and with oversight by the installation command sergeant major and the help of many others. The new commandant, Col. Michael Simone, Rep. Sam Farr, and Mrs. Robert G. (Charlotte) Fergusson spoke at the dedication and ribbon-cutting ceremony for the new building and unveiled a new plaque with an inscription supplied by the command historian, Dr. Harold Raugh. The decision to memorialize both Fergussons came after the passing of General Fergusson and the closure of the Fergusson Officers’ Club on the former Fort Ord, which had been named for Lieutenant Fergusson. DOIM reinstalled the plaque from the old club on the building’s interior while the new plaque commemorating both father and son was affixed to the building’s exterior.774

**Directorate of Public Safety**

The Directorate of Public Safety (DPS) consisted of three departments/sections: Presidio Police Department, Presidio Fire Department, and the Security and Intelligence Section. The directorate came into being when Colonel Rice reorganized institute and garrison staff in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001. In October 2001, Rice directed the creation of the DPS to include the then separate Presidio of Monterey Police and Fire Departments and the existing personnel security function. While DPS became responsible for general public safety for the Presidio and its various facilities in the Monterey area, responsibility for overall installation-level Force Protection planning and readiness exercises shifted to DCSOPS.775 After DPS was organized, the duties of its director became separate from the chief of police, Alex Kerekes, who nevertheless had become the director of Public Safety by April 2002. Christopher Ferris replaced Kerekes on 1 June 2003 by.776

The mission of the DPS was to provide competent, high quality, and effective public safety and security services to all persons, with the highest regard for human dignity, through efficient and professional force protection, anti-terrorism, law enforcement, criminal investigations, fire services, crime prevention, and installation intelligence, as well as personnel, information, and physical security missions.

**Presidio Police Department**

Alex Kerekes served as the chief of the Presidio Police Department until December 2002. Art Gebbia assumed the position from December 2002 until February 2003 when James Laughlin took over. Laughlin remained chief after Ferris was appointed the director of DPS.777 In 2003, the Presidio Police Department received a total of 2,428 calls for service, which resulted

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774 All information from “MOI DOIM Building Dedication Ceremony Jun [Aug] 03” folder in RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
776 Except where noted, all information in this section is from: “Directorate of Public Safety,” 5 January 2005, fax in “ACH2003 DPS” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
in 2,004 police reports being generated. DPS issued a total of 7,597 citations for vehicle code, parking, and other traffic-related violations in 2003.

Two unusual events that occurred in 2002 included the discovery of a suspicious package on 15 May 2002 sent from Hong Kong containing powder that was spilled at Taylor Hall. Officials had the substance analyzed but apparently it was innocuous as no further mention is made in the record. 778 The second event involved a law enforcement request that came in for translating an unknown language. Someone had discovered a one-page document of graffiti but the language was unrecognizable, at least by those not up on modern fantasy literature. The strange graffiti was passed to the Emergency Operations Center where a soldier on casual status recognized it as “Elvish.” Writer J.R.R. Tolkein invented Elvish as background for his series of books on the mythical world of “Middle Earth.” 779

More seriously, in March 2003, the Presidio Police Department reactivated its Special Reaction Team (SRT). SRT was intended to respond to any situation beyond the scope of normal law enforcement to include acts of terrorism, hostage situations, and events requiring special enforcement. In June 2003, DPS created the position of community liaison. The duties of this position included interaction with the local community mayors’ programs, local agencies, and the district attorney’s office. During the daylong Concorsio De Italia event held at the city of Seaside’s (and former Fort Ord’s) Bayonet/Blackhorse Gold Courses in July 2003, the Presidio Police Department provided traffic enforcement for approximately 40,000 vehicles. A Prisoner Escort Team, the purpose of which was to transport and/or pickup military prisoners to a designated location, was also established in 2003. Ten new police officers were hired and six officers resigned. Security guard personnel averaged thirty during the year.

**Presidio Fire Department**

The mission of the Presidio Fire Department was to protect lives, homes, and property from the ravages of fire and other disasters. It accomplished this mission by providing and maintaining a program of training, fire prevention, and public education and professionalism. Chief Jack Riso continued to lead the Presidio Fire Department through this period. He oversaw two division chiefs, one fire prevention specialist, four lead firefighters, and fourteen firefighters.

During this period, the Presidio Fire Department made major changes to operations and equipment upgrades as part of a three-year modernization process. For example, the Fire Department obtained one new type 1 engine and one 1,800-gallon water tender; it initiated an agreement among five fire agencies with FORA to purchase wild land firefighting engines that saved the U.S. Army $178,500; it purchased one new Jaws of Life that replaced a set made in 1975, and purchased new rescue systems equipment; and it obtained new communications equipment in the way of portable radios and on board communications systems.

The Fire Department also continued to provide professional fire and emergency services to adjoining organizations or for special functions via service contracts, receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars to offset personnel costs. It conducted and participated in joint training activities. For example, on 10 April 2002, the department sponsored a quarterly mutual aid firefighting and rescue drill using an abandoned barracks building at Fort Ord. OMC firefighters served as the command staff for responders from eleven other local and state agencies.

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779 “2002 ACH Notes,” file in “Command Histories” folder (2002). Elvish has been popularly used by enthusiasts and youthful criminals alike, but a translation of this particular text was not reported, suggesting that it was not of further security interest.
According to Riso, training was key to successfully combating fire through joint efforts. In 2003, the department trained 190 people in fire safety and proper fire extinguisher use and certified two personnel as DoD and California State Hazardous Materials Specialists after which it established a Hazardous Materials/CBRNE Response Team.\textsuperscript{780}

The fire department responded to hundreds of emergency service events during this period. Of particular note were two major wild land fires in 2003, the Eucalyptus Fire and the prescribed burn escape known as the “Evolution Fire” (discussed in the DENR section). Both fires were significant in nature and warranted the assistance of outside fire organizations to assist in fire suppression.

During this period, the Presidio Fire Department underwent a Fire and Emergency Services Operational Readiness Inspection (F&ESORI) and received only a 73 percent overall rating. By the end of 2003, however, it was able to increase this rating to 87 percent.

\textbf{Security and Intelligence Section}

The mission of Security and Intelligence was to manage and conduct installation intelligence and Security Education and Awareness Training missions, including personnel National Agency Check (NAC) and security clearance investigations. In August 2003, Security Specialist Angelica Seivwright was promoted to security officer for the section. The section consisted of the security officer and one U.S. Army intelligence analyst (MOS 96B). In October 2003, IMA provided funds for a security assistant for the section.

During 2003, Security and Intelligence screened and initiated a total of 209 personnel security investigations. Military personnel underwent background investigations depending upon their military occupational specialties, but were a condition of employment for all civilian personnel. Additional investigations addressed a Department of the Army and TRADOC policy stating that all personnel traveling outside the continental United States (OCONU.S.) must have a country clearance in place prior to travel. The security officer also served as the DLIFLC and garrison OCONUS Program Manager and processed a total of fifty-one actions in 2003. Another Security and Intelligence mission was to plan and conduct Security Assistance Visits and inspections of all installation organizations and tenants.

Between 2001 and 2003, the number of contractors working on post increased. Like civilian employees, contractors requiring computer network access were required to have a valid NAC report on file. As a result, twenty-seven NACs were initiated on contractor personnel. In addition, a Security Representative (SR) program was re-established. The role of the SR was to be the conduit of security-related news, information, and events at the organizational level. All SRs were provided with an all-inclusive CD-ROM, which contained educational posters, regulations, policies, instructions, and checklists.

\textbf{Directorate of Public Works}

The mission of the Directorate of Public Works (DPW) was to manage and maintain base infrastructure. Jerry J. Abeyta served as the director of the Presidio of Monterey Public Works until he retired in January 2003. John Elliott was detailed into the position and later selected as director, effective 1 June 2003. One of the biggest challenges for DPW was the management of its transition from being part of TRADOC to being part of a U.S. Army garrison under IMA.

\textsuperscript{780} “Answering the Call,” \textit{Globe} 25, no. 1 (June 200): 24-25, 27.
The transition generated numerous data calls, changes in reporting systems, and increased emphasis on master planning.  

Throughout this period, DPW continued to manage much of the Presidio of Monterey infrastructure through a contract with the Presidio Municipal Services Agency. The Presidio Municipal Service Agency was a joint powers agency formed by the cities of Monterey and Seaside, who provided the “day to day” support needed to sustain both Presidio and OMC facilities. Their ability to meet the response times for emergency, urgent, and routine service orders was an impressive achievement. Of the eleven installations in the IMA’s Southwest Region, only the Presidio was rated green in this category in the 2003 Installation Status Report.

DPW also continued its efforts to privatize installation water, gas, and electric systems, and made much progress setting up individual water meters for each facility. During negotiations, the Army had agreed that Pacific Gas & Electric would become the owner of the gas and electric systems, which meant that easements also had to be developed and approved.

DPW was responsible for the oversight of several separate Army Military Construction projects between 2001 and 2003, most importantly, completion of the DoD Center, Monterey Bay, which had suffered a number of delays (discussed in Chapter II). The project was finally competed during the summer of 2003. Another important project, which DPW managed with few glitches, began on 7 May 2001 with a groundbreaking ceremony for “General Instructional Facility III,” which DLIFLC expected to cost about seven million dollars. Congressman Sam Farr and Col. Pete Dausen, commander of the Presidio of Monterey garrison, conducted the groundbreaking ceremony. DPW planned the two-story, 20,000 square-foot building to contain forty-six classrooms, two language labs, and office space, and scheduled it for occupancy by May 2002. DPW completed the project in June 2002 and Asian II soon relocated into the new facility, later named “Collins Hall” (see Chapter V).

Other successfully completed projects included the Barracks Addition project. In the Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction Army budget, Farr secured $2.85 million specifically to allow the Presidio to renovate Barracks Building 836 by adding new wings on either side of an existing structure. Farr sat on the Military Construction Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The contractor, J. I. Construction Inc., completed work on the project in April 2003. Colonel Rice held a special ceremony on 15 April 2003 with Farr, who officially opened the expanded barracks. The renovation allowed DLIFLC to house on post up to eighty-eight single soldiers, airmen, and sailors who might otherwise require off-post housing. Rice noted that the institute had some 2,600 single students.

Farr also secured Army Military Construction funds for an entirely new barracks that would become Building 830 (later dedicated as the Staff Sergeant Gene Vance, Jr., Barracks). The design portion of the New Barracks project was completed in June 2003 with construction continued through the end of the year. As with Building 836, the New Barracks project added

781 John Elliot, Director, DPW, to Garrison Commander, memorandum, 14 July 2004, in “ACH2003 DPW” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.
782 Elliot to Garrison Commander, memorandum, 14 July 2004.
783 Rice, interview by Binkley and Payne, 23 October 2008, digital recording (track 1030-1031).
much needed capacity to house students. DPW also completed work on the new DOIM facility in August 2003 and Farr dedicated it as Fergusson Hall on 28 August 2003 (discussed under the section on DOIM).

In FY 2003, the Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) continued a trend of providing sufficient resources to cover only “must fund” requirements and later redistributing year-end funds. One of DPW’s lesser PBAC construction projects included completion of the Rasmussen Conference Room in June 2003, a project awarded during the final months of FY 2002, but not funded by Army Military Construction appropriations. This project included the enclosure of a second floor patio of Rasmussen Hall (Building 614) the headquarters building for both the institute and garrison. It was the last of twenty projects completed from 1 October 2002 that had a combined cost of $5.9 million. In addition, the directorate was able to award forty-four projects, with a combined value of $4.8 million, during the last two months of FY 2003.787

The IMA transition process generated numerous data calls from IMA to establish a baseline of capabilities, level of services provided, and organization structure. IMA’s emphasis on Master Planning, development of a template for Installation Design Guides (IDG) and the draft rewrite of AR 210-20 (Real Property Master Planning for Army Installations) made significant impacts on the directorate’s time and focus. IMA contracted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer, Sacramento District, to adapt the IDG template to the Presidio and work continued on that effort through the year. Master Planning for the installation was revitalized with a preliminary briefing to the installation and garrison command in August 2003 and the first formal Real Property Planning Board meeting was held in December 2003.788

Figure 35 DPW organization chart, 31 December 2003

Residential Communities Initiative

The Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) program was responsible for managing the joint military housing privatization program including existing housing units, protected historical

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787 Elliot to Garrison Commander, memorandum, 14 July 2004.
788 Elliot to Garrison Commander, memorandum, 14 July 2004.

RCI originated in February 1996 when President Bill Clinton signed into law the Defense Authorization Bill (Public Law 104-106). Codified in 10 USC 2871 were provisions collectively known as the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, later called the Residential Communities Initiative, which provided the Services with alternative authorities for construction and improvement of military housing (family and unaccompanied personnel). Under these authorities, the Services could leverage appropriated housing construction funds and government-owned assets to attract private capital in an effort to improve the quality of life for military personnel and their families. The legislation was intended to help maximize use of limited appropriated funds, land, and existing facilities to encourage private sector investment.

The Army thus established long-term business relationships with private sector developers for the purpose to eliminate inadequate military housing in the United States. The Army provided the developer/partner a long-term interest in both land and family housing assets by generating a revenue stream generated by requiring military personnel to provide their entire basic allowance for housing (BAH) to be paid as rent. With guaranteed future income, developers became master community developers for the Army installation. The Army hoped that private sector expertise, creativity, innovation, and capital could leverage otherwise scarce funds to improve the quality of military residential communities.

On 9 July 2002, the Army awarded Clark Pinnacle the contract to create a Community Development and Management Plan (CDMP) for the first joint Army and Navy Residential Communities Initiative Project, which would support family housing at the Presidio of Monterey and Naval Postgraduate School. It took nine months to formalize the CDMP. The RCI Staff and Jones Lange LaSalle (JLL), the Army’s financial consultant, had to work through several key issues, including property taxation, fee and capital structure negotiations, and legal and CDMP document review.

On August 29, RCI scheduled a special housing ceremony to kick off a five-month process to create a development plan intended to serve as “the blueprint for exceptional military housing over the next 50 years.” After noting specific comments by enlisted family members about the quality of the existing military housing, Colonel Rice, as installation commander, challenged the partners:

As we move forward with this Residential Communities Initiative, we will also look to the expertise of Mr. Glenn Ferguson, President of Clark Realty and Mr. Stan Harrelson, President and CEO of Pinnacle Realty Management Company. Both of you have extensive background in community development and have shown you can create world-class communities. Welcome to the Monterey peninsula military community. You are charged with taking this plan from development to execution. Through Clark Pinnacle we will improve the quality of life for our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines.

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790 Information in this section, except where noted, was supplied by the RCI office and is located in “ACH2003 RCI” folder, RG 21.21, DLIFLC&POM Archives.

The plan was submitted for review on 28 March 2003. From 21-23 April 2003, RCI and JLL made a formal presentation of the final CDMP to RCI; Mario Fiori, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations and Environment; and Philip W. Grone, Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and Environment. Congress granted its approval on 16 May 2003 and the Army authorized Clark Pinnacle to proceed on 1 July 2003, which began a transition period lasting until 1 October 2003.

The RCI program, as undertaken in Monterey, included the provision of new housing units and the renovation of existing historic housing units with the ongoing maintenance and management of both. This process required the demolition of 2,227 existing units. Clark Pinnacle planned to enhance and restructure the existing housing areas into functional, livable communities through systematic renovation and replacement of existing structures and construction of additional amenities, including community centers and playgrounds.

Clark Pinnacle integrated the objectives and goals of the RCI program into its own development plan. The goal for Presidio and NPS officials was to transform the housing into quality, 21st century residential communities. The family housing at the OMC, La Mesa Village (NPS housing), the Presidio of Monterey, and the Naval Postgraduate School was to be “refounded” incorporating the best aspects of their history and tradition, but revitalized around five benchmark principles: community; sense of place; education; health/wellness; and technology. Clark Pinnacle sought to enhance and strengthen the high quality physical, social, and aesthetic environment of the Monterey Bay military community with quality military housing.792

Monterey Bay Military Communities LLC, a company comprised of Clark Pinnacle Family Communities and the U.S. government, formed to develop and manage military housing in the Monterey area with a development plan goal to meet military housing requirements within eight years. The comprehensive effort involved a number of steps, including:

1. By 2011, demolish all 1,588 existing non-historic houses at OMC and replace them with 1,579 newly constructed luxury homes exceeding current local market standards. At La Mesa Village, all 589 homes were scheduled to be demolished and rebuilt.

2. Transform OMC from a sprawling collection of outdated houses into a vibrant community with a sense of place, cohesion, and extensive recreational and community amenities.

792 The Presidio of Monterey overlooks the city of Monterey to the south and Pacific Grove to the north. The Presidio lies along a narrow strip from the crest of Huckleberry Hill to its base on Lighthouse Avenue, which skirts Monterey Bay. The Ord Military Community (OMC) is located five miles from the Presidio on the former Fort Ord, and is the site of the majority of Monterey Bay military family housing. OMC is bordered by Seaside to the south and the city of Sand City to the southwest. California State University, Monterey Bay (CSUMB), which is on land deeded to the CSU system after the Army closed Fort Ord in 1994, is to the north of OMC, with the city of Marina beyond. OMC was defined as five family housing neighborhoods: Stillwell Park, Upper Stillwell Park, Hayes Park, Marshall Park, and Fitch Park. These five neighborhoods connected via the intersection of General Jim Moore Boulevard and Normandy Road. OMC also contained other infrastructure, including a military chapel, library, and youth center. The Bayonet and Black Horse Golf Courses, while not part of OMC or the RCI program, were also located within the OMC boundaries while adjacent to OMC was a PX, commissary, fire department, and other military offices, including the newly renovated DoD Center in the former Hayes Military Hospital. The earliest construction at OMC occurred in 1959, with additional development in 1961, and 1978. The area consisted of two-, three-, and four-bedroom homes in duplex and single-family configurations. The housing at the Presidio of Monterey was historic with each of the quarters possessing a vista of Monterey Bay. These thirty-seven quarters were built between 1902 and 1904. Although modified over time, building exteriors have retained the basic style of military architecture of that period.
(3) Enhance the more modern La Mesa Village with new streetscapes and a new Village Center.

(4) Renovate the Presidio’s thirty-seven historic homes and the four historic NPS homes and demolish fifty apartment units at the Presidio by 2006.

(5) Construct two state-the-art Community/Recreation Centers, four new Neighborhood Centers and one Town Hall.

(6) Leverage existing assets (i.e., land, views, grand trees, infrastructure, and ancillary facilities) to improve the quality of life for military families.

(7) Build a technology platform to reduce the cost and increase the availability of Internet access, wireless communications and other technology services to military families.

(8) Renovate all new homes twice during the first twenty years after the completion of the IDP and build all new homes beginning in approximately year 36 of the partnership so that at the end of the 50-year partnership the Army will have new, modern homes and systems.

The Property Management and Operations Plan was adopted from Pinnacle Realty Management’s existing plan employed to manage on a daily basis approximately 110,000 units, although adapted to meet the unique requirements of military family housing. The plan was intended to free the Army of daily property management activities, protect the value of the housing, but still allow the Army to have input into important decisions affecting the welfare and morale of military families.

On 1 October 2003, DoD conveyed the existing 2,268 family housing units at OMC, the Presidio, La Mesa Village, and NPS to Clark Pinnacle and leased to it the underlying land through a limited liability partnership called Monterey Bay Land, LLC (MBL) whereby the Army became a minority partner but retaining significant “major issues” approval authority. MBL in turn, subleased these units and land to Clark Pinnacle (through its wholly owned subsidiary, Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC). The Board of Directors for MBL was co-chaired by the Presidio garrison commander and the Clark Pinnacle project manager. Clark Pinnacle assumed management responsibility from this date.

On 3 December 2003, demolition of existing units began at Hayes Park in OMC and Wherry Grove in La Mesa Village. Clark Pinnacle planned new home construction to begin in early 2004. Property management (by Pinnacle) began 1 October 2003 and was expected to continue for the life of the project (fifty years, plus an optional twenty-five year renewal). When completed, the project was to reflect a total military family housing inventory of 2,209 units plus several major new community amenities, such as large community and recreation centers, neighborhood centers, athletic fields, a town hall at OMC, tot lots, housing welcome centers (at La Mesa and OMC), and enhanced streetscapes. Included in this 2,209-unit total were the forty-one historic homes at the Presidio (thirty-seven) and NPS (four), which were to be restored according to State Historic Preservation Office standards as mandated by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.

793 The Monterey Bay Military Housing Board of Directors planned to convene once each quarter to provide project oversight and direction and first met in November 2003. The NPS Superintendent was also to attend each meeting.

RCI staff and Clark Pinnacle, supported by many of the Army garrison and naval staffs, made a nearly seamless transfer of operations from the military to Clark Pinnacle staff. The rental agreement signing events were tracked closely and, as a result, only six remained unsigned as of 9 October 2003. The tracking of the BAH collection and processing through the Military Assistance Center for electronic transfer to the partners resulted in a minimal amount of outstanding balances for over 1,700 accounts. On the first day of operation, 200 work orders were called into the Pinnacle offices and 50 percent of these were completed within the first three days. The remaining work orders were handled through appointments chosen by the residents.

Figure 36 RCI organization, ca. 2005
### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>Common name for terror attack upon United States on 11 September 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-76</td>
<td>Government bulletin specifying rules to conduct an outsourcing review</td>
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<td>AA</td>
<td>Associate of Arts</td>
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<td>AAC</td>
<td>Academic Advisory Council</td>
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<td>ACCJC</td>
<td>Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges</td>
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<td>ACS</td>
<td>Army Community Service</td>
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<td>ACTFL</td>
<td>American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages</td>
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<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFELM</td>
<td>Air Force Element</td>
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<td>AAFES</td>
<td>Army and Air Force Exchange Service</td>
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<td>AG</td>
<td>Adjutant General’s Office</td>
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<td>Army Language Master Plan</td>
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<td>Alumni Relations Office</td>
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<td>Army Substance Abuse Program</td>
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<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training</td>
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<td>Association of the U.S. Army</td>
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<td>BASOPS</td>
<td>Base Operations</td>
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<td>BILC</td>
<td>Bureau of International Language Coordination</td>
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<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Base Realignment and Closure</td>
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<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence</td>
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<td>Center for Cryptology Detachment</td>
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<td>Community Development and Management Plan</td>
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<td>Civilian Human Resources Agency</td>
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<td>CinC</td>
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<td>Centralized Installation Management</td>
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<td>Course Length Estimation Model</td>
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<td>Command Language Program</td>
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<td>Contingency Plan</td>
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<td>Command Sergeant Major</td>
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<td>CSUMB</td>
<td>California State University, Monterey Bay</td>
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<td>CYS</td>
<td>Child and Youth Services</td>
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DAA  Directorate of Academic Affairs
DARPA  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCSOPS  Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans
DCSRM  Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management
DENR  Environmental and Natural Resources
DFLP  Defense Foreign Language Program
DHR  Directorate of Human Resources
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DLAB  Defense Language Aptitude Battery
DLI  Defense Language Institute (short form)
DLI AA  DLI Alumni Association
DLIFLC  Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
DLI-W  Defense Language Institute-Washington
DLPT  Defense Language Proficiency Test
DMDC  Defense Manpower Data Center
DMWR  Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
DOC  Directorate of Contracting
DoD  Department of Defense
DOIM  Directorate of Office and Information Management
DOL  Directorate of Logistics
DPS  Directorate of Public Safety
DPTMS  Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security
DPW  Directorate of Public Works
DRM  Directorate of Resource Management (DLI)
DTRA  Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DTSC  California Department of Toxic Substances and Control
ELA  European and Latin American School
EEO  Equal Employment Opportunity
EOA  Equal Opportunity Advisor
EOC  Emergency Operations Center
EOT  End of Training
EPA  Environmental Protection Agency
ES  Evaluation and Standardization
ESL  English as a Second Language
ESQ  End-of-course
EXSUM  Executive Summary
FAO  Foreign Area Officer
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation
FD  Faculty Development
FLED  Foreign Language Education
FLO  Final Learning Objective
FLPP  Foreign Language Proficiency Pay
FLTCE  Foreign Language Training Center Europe
FNMOC  Fleet Numerical Meteorology Operations Center
FPS  Faculty Personnel System
FORA  Fort Ord Reuse Authority
FORSCOM  Forces Command
FSD  Faculty and Staff Development Division
FSI  Foreign Service Institute
FWS  Fish and Wildlife Service
GAO  Government Accounting Office
GLOSS  Global Language On-line Support System
GPA  Grade Point Average
GS  General Service
GSA  General Service Administration
GWOT  Global War on Terrorism
HHC  Headquarters & Headquarters Company
HMP  Habitat Management Plan
HQDA  Headquarters, Department of the Army
IA  Interim Action
IAGO  Installation Adjutant General’s Office
ICO  Installation Contracting Office
IG  Inspector General
ILR  Interagency Language Roundtable
IMA  Installation Management Agency
INSCOM  Intelligence and Security Command
IOC  Installation Operations Center
IRO  Internal Review
IRR  Individual Ready Reserve
ISA  Inter-Service Agreement
ISO  Installation Safety Office
ISQ  Interim Student Questionnaire
IT  Information Technology
ITRM  Institutional Training Resource Model
JROC  Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JLTX  Joint Language Training Exercise
JMRR  Joint Monthly Readiness Report
JTF  Joint Task Force
JWICS  Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LAMP  Learning Assessment Map Profile
LangNet  Language Net
LASER  Language and Speech Exploitation Resources
LEAP  Language Enhancement Accelerated Proficiency Program
LingNet  Linguist Network
LAO  Legal Assistance Office
LSK  Language Survival Kit
LST  Language Science and Technology
LTD  Language Training Detachment
MACOM  Major Command
MATFL  Master of Arts in Teaching Foreign Languages
MBUAPCD  Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District
MCA  Management Control Administrator
MCD  Marine Corps Detachment
MCP  Management Control Process
ME I/ME II  Middle East School I/II
MEO  Most Efficient Organization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEPS</td>
<td>Military Entrance Processing Stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIIS</td>
<td>Monterey Institute of International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLAT</td>
<td>Modern Language Aptitude Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLI</td>
<td>Military Language Instructor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLS</td>
<td>Multi-Language School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOUT</td>
<td>Military Operations in Urban Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Monterey Peninsula College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>Military Personnel Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MREI</td>
<td>Monterey Regional Educational Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR</td>
<td>Morale, Welfare, and Recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAF</td>
<td>Nonappropriated Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer in Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTTCD</td>
<td>Naval Technical Training Center Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODR</td>
<td>Outdoor Recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Ord Military Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>Officer Professional Development program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPI</td>
<td>Oral Proficiency Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPP</td>
<td>Operations, Plans, and Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operations Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIO</td>
<td>Plans, Analysis, Integration, and Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBD</td>
<td>Presidential Budget Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Permanent Change of Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSCOM</td>
<td>Personnel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Presidio of Monterey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>Proficiency Enhancement Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Proficiency Standards Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCI</td>
<td>Residential Communities Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMO</td>
<td>Garrison Resource Management Office (Garrison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRCP</td>
<td>Requirements and Resources Coordinating Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officers Training Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSO</td>
<td>Religious Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCE</td>
<td>School for Continuing Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIF</td>
<td>Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCOLA</td>
<td>Satellite Communications for Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDB</td>
<td>Student Database System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Sergeant First Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>Secret Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMDR</td>
<td>Structure Manning Decision Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>Standardized Agreement (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATS</td>
<td>Student Training Administrative Tracking System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWRO</td>
<td>Southwest Regional Office (IMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCE</td>
<td>Trichloroethene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDA</td>
<td>Table of Distributions and Allowances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Technology Enhanced Classroom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Technical Escort Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Training Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UC</td>
<td>University of California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>U.S.-European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTT</td>
<td>Video Teletraining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASC</td>
<td>Western Association of Schools and Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>Wage Grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLO</td>
<td>Worldwide Language Olympics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

A. Linguist Creed

I am a United States Linguist, dedicated to the

**Defense** of my Nation. By providing intelligence through translation to my countries leaders, my global knowledge ensures peace and defends freedom. My

**Language** capability is based on constant training and the thirst for more knowledge about the many countries where my language is spoken. Striving to be the best, I meticulously uphold the highest standards and deliver translations that are more than expected of me. Because soldiers, Marines, sailors, airmen and civilians like me, not machines, are the war fighters’ most valuable assets. I will always remember my

**Institute** recognized as the best in the world for educating, evaluating, sustaining, and supporting Department of Defense foreign language requirements worldwide. This proud Institute maintains the progressive study that builds confident linguists who pass through the Institute’s portals anticipating challenges and always mission focused. It is through her precision and high standards that ensure exact truth through

**Foreign** language collection, interpretation and translation. My profession is tough, exacting, and very unforgiving.

**Language** is my weapon. Greatest of all human tools. I am the voice of the silent warrior for America. I am chosen to take on the most sensitive missions. Recognizing the great danger that awaits me and those I defend, I must not make an error while translating for that could cost my country precious lives. Members of my corps are located at the

**Center** of every U.S. military activity in the world. Mustering my moral courage, I will strive to deliver the highest levels of competence and commitment while constantly maintaining my professional abilities as a linguist. I am a trained and ready “Yankee Samurai”.
B. Proficiency Information on Top Languages, 2003

Arabic Language Program Performance
- 354 students graduated from the Arabic program in FY03. The percentage of graduates attaining L2/R2/S1+ dropped from 84 percent to 82 percent. (This 2 percent drop was, in part, offset by the 13 percent drop – from 22 percent to 9 percent -- in academic attrition in one of the schools.) The percentage attaining L2+/R2+/S2 stayed the same as in FY02 – 25 percent. 38 percent achieved level 2+ or higher in LC (Listening), 62 percent in RC (Reading), and 50 percent achieved level 2 or higher in Speaking (S). The academic attrition rate in the Arabic Program dropped by 5 percent, from 15 percent in FY02 to 10 percent in FY03. The L2/R2/S1+ Academic Program Success Index (APSI) rose by 1 point, from 69 to 70, and the L2+/R2+/S2 APSI rose by 1 point, from 20 to 21.

Chinese-Mandarin Language Program Performance
- 224 students graduated from the Chinese-Mandarin program in FY03. Proficiency Final Learning Objective (FLO) results stayed steady in FY03. Specifically, the percentage of graduates attaining L2/R2/S1+ was 95 percent. Forty-six percent of Chinese-Mandarin students reached L2+, 90 percent attained R2+, and 69 percent reached S2. Academic disenrollment was 7 percent.

Korean Language Program Performance
- 247 students graduated from the Korean program in FY03. The percentage of students achieving L2/R2/S1+ on the new DLPT IV was 32 percent. The academic disenrollment rate was 16 percent.

Russian Language Program Performance
- 304 students graduated from the Russian program in FY03. The percentage of students achieving L2/R2/S1+ was 83 percent in FY03. Ninety-three percent achieved level 2 or higher in Listening, 97 percent achieved level 2 or higher in Reading, and 89 percent achieved a 1+ or higher in Speaking. Fifty-five percent of the Russian graduates achieved 2+ or better in Listening and 68 percent achieved 2+ or higher in Reading. Twenty-five of the Russian graduates scored L2+/R2+/S2 in FY03. The academic disenrollment rate decreased from 13 percent in FY02 to 11 percent in FY03.

Serbian-Croatian Language Program Performance
- 84 students (73 percent completion rate) graduated from the Serbian-Croatian program in FY03. The percentage of graduates achieving L2/R2/S1+ was 81 percent in FY03. Ninety percent achieved level 2 or higher in Listening, 86 percent in Reading, and 96 percent achieved a 1+ or higher in Speaking. Thirty-three percent of the Serbian-Croatian graduates scored L2+/R2+/S2 in FY03. The academic disenrollment rate was 10 percent.

Spanish Language Program Performance
- 226 students (80 percent completion rate) graduated from the Spanish program in FY03. The percentage of graduates achieving L2/R2/S1+ remained at 81 percent, while 61 percent of the Spanish graduates scored L2+/R2+/S2 in FY03. The academic disenrollment rate was 10 percent in FY03.
C. Defense Language Institute Status Report, 2003

Core Missions:
   b. Average daily resident attendance (3,026):
      Army ................1,549  Air Force ....735
      Marine Corps ......208  Others ...........19
      Navy ................. 484

2. Educate
   a. DLI—22 languages taught at the Presidio of Monterey.
   b. DLI-W—85 languages under contract, 50–55 currently taught to 231 students.
   c. Top 8 languages at DLI, based on graduates in fiscal year 2002 (FY03, thru 2d Qtr)
      Arabic .................365(168)  Persian-Farsi 97 (83)
      Chinese ...............182 (75)  Russian ......271(139)
      French ................... 63 (37)  Spanish ......228(107)
      Korean..................265(113)  Serb./Croatian.59 (55)

3. Sustain (FY02)
   a. Distance Learning. Taught 1,700 students in 300 separate classes:
      Support over 267 Command Language Programs worldwide:
   b. 16,570 instructional hours in the seven highest-enrollment courses:
      ▪ 8,162 hours Video Teletraining to 30 sites.
      ▪ 8,408 hours Mobile Teaching Team instruction conducted at 50 sites.
      - 2,120 additional hours coordinated in lower-enrollment languages.
   c. 10 instructors deployed with Language Teaching Detachments.
   d. Web-delivered instruction (learning with computer and human interaction).
   e. LangNet (learning with computer interaction).
   f. National Security Follow–on Assignments: 70% Signals Intelligence (SIGINT); 21% Human Intelligence (HUMINT); 9% Other (FBI, DTRA, DEA, NASA).

In terms of testing and evaluation, DLI administered some 77,760 DLPTs in Fiscal year 2002 and 24,073 through 9 April 2003, but estimated the total for 2003 Fiscal Year would be 45,421. There also were several test development projects ongoing in 2003.

Between 2002- and 2003, DLI supported several combat-related development initiatives, including Machine Translation, Speech Translation Technology (Babylon), Foreign Language Interpretation Call Centers, and Foreign Language Distance Learning. DLI’s School for Continuing Education shipped over 62,440 Language Survival Kits to field units. The institute also supported LangNet (www.lingnet.org), an integrated online language learning support system designed to provide users with personalized assistance in maintaining and enhancing their foreign language proficiency.

D. Interagency Language Roundtable Scale

Foreign language proficiency levels used to assess an individual’s ability to speak, read, listen, and write in another language are based on a scale from 0 to 5, with 5 being the most proficient. Established by the federal Interagency Language Roundtable, these proficiency levels are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proficiency level</th>
<th>Language capability requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – None</td>
<td>No practical capability in the language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – Elementary</td>
<td>Sufficient capability to satisfy basic survival needs and minimum courtesy and travel requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – Limited working</td>
<td>Sufficient capability to meet routine social demands and limited job requirements. Can deal with concrete topics in past, present, and future tense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – General professional</td>
<td>Able to use the language with sufficient ability to participate in most formal and informal discussions on practical, social, and professional topics. Can conceptualize and hypothesize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – Advanced professional</td>
<td>Able to use the language fluently and accurately on all levels normally pertinent to professional needs. Has range of language skills necessary for persuasion, negotiation, and counseling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – Functionally native</td>
<td>Able to use the language at a functional level equivalent to a highly articulate, well-educated native speaker.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A plus sign (+) designation may be added to the linguist’s assessment when proficiency exceeds one base skill level but does not fully meet the criteria for the next base level. DoD expects that more than one year of training is required to bring a new speaker of a Category IV language (such as Arabic) to the “2” level. In addition, research has shown that a level-3 speaker is up to four times more proficient and productive as a speaker at level 2. GAO-02-375, 5-6.
E. Biography of Col. Kevin M. Rice

COLONEL KEVIN M. RICE

On Dec. 1, 2000, Colonel Rice became the Commandant of the Defense Language Institute (DLI), and Commander of the Presidio of Monterey, and Ord Military Community. COL Rice served as the U.S. Army Attaché to the People's Republic of China from November 1997 to November 2000. He is a graduate of the Chinese language program at DLI and the British Ministry of Defense Chinese Language School in Hong Kong. Colonel Rice was born in Henderson, Nev. He graduated from West Point with a Bachelor of Science Degree in 1973.

He began his career as a mechanized rifle platoon leader in the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division. He served in the 15th, 21st, 31st, and 50th Infantry Regiments, and commanded the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry. His assignments include mechanized infantry, light infantry, and airborne special operations units. He has been stationed in Germany, Korea, Hong Kong, and China. Colonel Rice served in the 4th Psychological Operations Group and at Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). At TRADOC, he was the program manager for bilateral training talks between the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the U.S. Army and staff talks between the U.S. Army and the Japan Ground Self Defense Force. Further, he served as Deputy G3, 25th Infantry Division (Light); Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry; Executive Officer, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light); and Deputy Brigade Commander, Infantry Training Brigade, Fort Benning.

Colonel Rice's military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General Staff College, and the National War College. He is a graduate of Airborne, Ranger, Air Assault, and Foreign Area Officer Schools. He holds a Master of Arts Degree in East Asian Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Master of Science Degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College.

His military decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (four awards), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (two awards), Army Achievement Medal, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, National Defense Service Medal (three awards) and the Overseas Service Ribbon (4 awards).

He retires after 30 years of faithful service to the United States. Colonel Rice and Mrs. Rice will be residing in San Luis Obispo, California. They have twin sons, Ian and Kevin who are graduates of Cal Poly.

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F. National Security Education Program Cooperation

Sec. 332 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 amended the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 USC 1902) to authorize the establishment of a “cooperative relationship between the National Security Education Program and the Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language Institute.” The act allowed recipient of awards provided under the Boren National Security Education Act to attend DLIFLC in pursuit of language studies on a space-available basis (or at any other DoD foreign language school). The awards were to defray any costs for administering the program. 796

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