
Command History 2011-2013

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MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Command History, 2011-13

1. This report chronicles the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) from 2011 to 2013, corresponding mainly to when COL Danial D. Pick served as commandant.

2. Pick commanded from 29 April 2010 to 18 April 2014. Unlike several recent commandants who had overseen major expansions of DLIFLC, Pick faced a difficult period of diminishing resources and national government austerity measures that threatened not only faculty and staff job cutbacks but the capacity of the Institute to continue to improve the proficiency of its graduates. During Pick’s tenure, DLIFLC faced a 22 percent reduction in funding. At the same time, DLIFLC continued to support training non-military linguists in the general and special purpose forces using language training detachments, mobile teaching teams, and distance-learning technology.

3. In the face of a Secretary of Defense directive to reduce staffing to fiscal year 2010 levels, DLIFLC reached a high water mark of approximately 2,400 employees and then declined under Pick to less than 2,090. In between these points, Pick led DLIFLC through a tough period of congressionally induced budgetary confusion, cutbacks, furloughs, and a Defense Department-wide hiring freeze. Notably, he succeeded in obtaining a two-year manpower waiver authorizing 767 additional staff to allow DLIFLC to execute both its mission and a rationally programmed decline.

4. Pick next led the Institute through a Defense Department-mandated organizational manpower analysis. DLIFLC triumphed in successfully fending off challenges to its low student-to-faculty ratio, which protected proficiency gains (as well as numerous faculty jobs). However, Pick and other Institute leaders were less successful at justifying several organizational functions within the Directorate of Language Science and Technology, which forced its disestablishment. Working with the DLIFLC Provost, Pick then led a major effort to reorganize DLIFLC while reintegrating former LS&T staff into the Institute’s basic programs. The success of this effort requires future analysis.

5. Pick also completed a major goal begun under the previous commandant, COL Sue Ann Sandusky, which was to implement plans to deploy a new non-military high-capacity educational computing network or “dot-edu.” The goal was to overcome security obstacles that prevented faculty and students from effectively optimizing the
use of language learning technology. Under Pick, DLIFLC established its first Chief Technology Office and proceeded on a three-project that successfully built out the new system and then migrated all DLIFLC faculty and students to it.

6. Despite challenges, DLIFLC continued to meet high academic standards having awarded more than 8,000 Associate of Arts in Foreign Languages degrees by 2013.

Encl

PHILLIP J. DEPPERT
COL, MI
Commandant

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Acknowledgements

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Chapter I – Global Security and Foreign Language Needs

“Language, regional and cultural skills are enduring war fighting competencies that that are critical to mission readiness in today’s dynamic global environment. Our forces must have the ability to effectively communicate with, and understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and local population.”

Leon Panetta, the Secretary of Defense, 10 August 2011

The Scope of Change

The United States remained at war during the period of this report, 2011 through 2013. Thus, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) continued to require robust support by personnel skilled in foreign language use. Foreign language and cultural knowledge certainly played a role in helping the United States achieve an important military aim in May 2011. After years of painstaking on-the-ground effort in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) determined the precise whereabouts of Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the terrorist attacks of 9/11. To avoid civilian casualties and to ensure success, President Barak Obama ruled out air strikes, which meant launching a much more dangerous ground attack within the friendly country of Pakistan where the fugitive terrorist leader was hiding. Early on May 2, a U.S. Navy Special Operations team, experienced in cross border raids and trained in local languages, secretly entered Pakistani territory without permission, attacked the compound harboring bin Laden, and killed him. Pakistanis leaders were furious and took actions that made it more difficult to supply and support Western nations fighting the Taliban insurgency in neighboring Afghanistan, but the fugitive’s body was carefully processed according to Muslim traditions and the world could see that when it was necessary, sophisticated and able use of foreign language and cultural knowledge was well within the grasp of American security forces. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, who at the time of bin Laden’s death was the CIA director, told members of the community gathered to hear him speak at the Presidio of Monterey a few months later that “you have to take risk, if you want to get any damn thing done.”

He then noted how important language and cultural skills were to enduring war fighting competencies, mission readiness, and the ability to communicate effectively. Providing such skills to the military forces was and remains the principle mission of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC).

Despite that measure of success, a solid decade of difficult counterinsurgency campaigns overseas had strained the U.S. military. Senior U.S. leaders struggled with major issues facing the force, especially the Army, including the fatigue of extensive deployments, too many undertrained and underdisciplined soldiers or soldiers promoted before they were ready, the constant rotation of senior officers that diluted their ability to mentor and instill discipline, and tension between military and civilian leaders. This wear on the Department of Defense was evident to Defense

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2 DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012.
3 Lance M. Bacon, “New Army Chief of Staff Eyes Big Changes,” Army Times, 7 May 2011.
Secretary Robert M. Gates near the end of his own long tour leading the department. Pointedly, Gates noted in February 2011 to an audience gathered at West Point that “any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.”

General Martin Dempsey, who became both the new Chief of Staff of the Army in 2011 and soon thereafter succeeded Admiral Michael G. Mullen as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had a vision to overcome mounting problems that he shared with Secretary of the Army John McHugh. Dempsey wanted less focus on budget cuts, more on upholding the ideas of the “Profession of Arms,” improving the military by retaining the best as downsizing occurred, and clarifying a confusing “full-spectrum” doctrine in an age when the Army seemed unlikely to face massive deployment abroad. As Under Secretary of the Army Joseph Westphal explained, the Army did not need every brigade combat team to train for full-spectrum operations. Instead, many such units should specialize in counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory missions. Foreign language training would remain important to these functions.

In 2011, General Dempsey was unduly optimistic that Iraq and Afghanistan were stabilizing, but he clearly foresaw that the consequences of the “Great Recession” would produce a much tougher resource environment. As senior leaders questioned the role of the military and restricted funds, his greatest focus, despite his own advice, was countering the negative impact of budget cuts. Indeed, rapid and chaotic funding reductions stand out as the key issue affecting the armed forces of the United States during this period.

**Budget Cuts and the Military**

In the past, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq drove upward growth in the federal workforce by as much as 282,000 or 15 percent since 2003. During the period of this report, the U.S. Congress dramatically sought to limit and reduce that growth. In August 2011, Congress passed and President Barak Obama signed the Budget Control Act of 2011, which required DOD to cut $487 billion over the next ten-year period in the absence of an agreement between the executive and legislative branches to reduce spending. The Pentagon took the first major step toward shrinking its budget after a decade of war in January 2012 by announcing future limits to military pay raises, increased health insurance fees for military retirees, and plans to shutter military bases within the United States. The Army would be reduced in size, going from its Iraq war strength of 570,000 to 522,000 in 2012. Planners further expected to reduce the Army to 490,000 by October 2015, then to 450,000 by 2017, and possibly even to 420,000 if automatic budget cuts driven by the 2011 budget act took effect. These reductions promised to end the military careers of many young

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6 General Martin E. Dempsey, Memo “Thoughts on Crossing the Line of Departure [on assuming position as 37th Chief of Staff],” [ca. 2011], all Army email, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
captains and majors who had served multiple combat assignments but who could not all expect to be retained in a period of dramatic resource cutbacks.9

On 1 March 2013, the Budget Control Act of 2011 imposed across the board DOD budget reductions of 10 percent, equal to $43 billion, because Congress and the president did not pass a budget. In response to this fiscal situation, new Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed another reevaluation of the basis of the department’s defense strategy. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey was uncertain how much U.S. defense strategy would change, but noted that “we’ll need to adjust our ambitions to match our abilities.”10

In April 2013, Secretary Hagel stated that the automatic spending cuts triggered on 1 March made it likely that DOD would have to reduce its budget by $1 trillion over the next ten years. According to Hagel, “the United States military remains an essential tool of American power but one that must be used judiciously, with a keen appreciation of its limits.” Much of the department’s budget was being consumed by spending on unaffordable weapons systems, healthcare, troop pay, and retirement.11

In June 2013, in response to severe budget cuts, the Army announced that it would reduce the number of its combat brigades from 45 to 33, cutting 80,000 positions, while also relocating thousands of soldiers, and canceling $400 million in construction projects. The decision would impact ten major military bases and their local communities.12 It was now possible that force reductions would go as low as 440,000 while some in Congress called for a force of only 380,000, a smaller Army than the one the United States possessed at the onset of WWII. Hagel also said the military command structure was still too brass heavy and more billets for generals and admirals needed to be cut.13 Pushing back against congressional budget cutters, Army Chief of Staff Ray Odierno warned that the view that land power was no longer necessary was “naive” and “dangerous.”14 Budgetary reductions also resulted in federal employee furloughs of eleven days that began in July 2013 for more than 800,000 DOD civilian employees, although these were later reduced to just six days.15 However, a second and unplanned furlough in October 2013 also occurred after Congress failed to enact a fiscal year 2014 budget or a temporary measure to fund operations after the end of the 2013 fiscal year.”16 Obviously, such furloughs were demoralizing to everyone within the department.

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10 Robert Burns, “Hagel Orders Review of Defense Strategy,” Monterey Herald, 19 March 2013, pg. 3. Already, the strategy had gone from fighting two wars simultaneously to fighting just one (see following section).
14 “Impact Zone: Budget Ax Reaps Chaos across Army,” Army Times, [? Date], in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
16 Sec. John M. McHugh, Email message, 1 October 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
Iraq and Afghanistan

During this period, the United States transitioned its role in Iraq and looked forward to a planned withdrawal from Afghanistan. On 21 October 2011, after nine years of war, President Obama announced that the United States would withdraw its remaining combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. The war had cost upwards of $1 trillion and more than 4,500 Americans. U.S. military forces had succeeded in overthrowing dictator Saddam Hussein, but the American occupation had also produced the reputation-damaging Abu Ghraib prison scandal, conflict with U.S. allies, and failure to secure a stable pro-Western Iraqi government or even a capable non-sectarian Iraqi Army. The president’s decision, therefore, was met with a mixed reaction. It was a promise kept for many Americans, according to House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, but others criticized the decision, such as Sen. Joseph Lieberman, who said the decision was a mistake and risked losing all that America had fought for by invading the country in the first place.17 The fragility of the situation was indicated by the conditions under which U.S. officials staged the formal ceremony marking the official end of the American combat role in Iraq on 15 December 2011. Security was still so unsettled that the 45-minute ceremony was held in a fortified area of the airport that was ringed by concrete blast walls while guest chairs were tagged with the location of the nearest bunker in case of a mortar attack. Most of the designated Iraqi VIP seats were empty. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, who presided over the ceremony, told U.S. personnel in attendance: “You will leave with great pride—lasting pride—secure in knowing that your sacrifice has helped the Iraqi people to begin a new chapter in history.”18

The next month, Secretary Panetta announced a new U.S. defense strategy for the next decade. The goal of that strategy was to allow the United States the flexibility to fight emerging threats on multiple fronts while accounting for budget cuts that dramatically reduced the Army. As directed by President Barak Obama, the new defense strategy had an Asiatic focus. The United States would thus retain all of its eleven aircraft carriers and pivot away from expensive ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to address threats

from China and the continuing threat of Iran. With a smaller Army, the Pentagon no longer planned to sustain two concurrent ground wars at one time, the aim of past national military strategies.\textsuperscript{19} Further force reductions in Europe were also announced. The U.S. V Corps, maintained in Germany since 1951, was inactivated in Wiesbaden, Germany, during the summer of 2013, after returning from a final mission as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{20}

**Regional Alignment**

Concurrent with a new national military strategy, the Army, and the other services as well, began a general reorganization that moved its posture away from the previous era intended to allow the United States to be able to fight two wars simultaneously. Instead, the Army prepared for global engagement or global readiness through an effort called “Regional Alignment.” The idea behind this strategy was that the services would no longer focus on Iraq or the Afghanistan area of operations, but would posture globally with certain forces targeted toward specific regions and countries within a region and to specific regionally focused combatant commands. Regional Alignment required that the services be ready to provide a full range of operations from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to helping partners build capacity, such as training foreign forces, or when necessary to conduct combat operations of varying types and sizes. However, all of these functions were to be tailored to the expectations of Regional Alignment.

Regional Alignment included culture and language training for soldiers at the home base. It was designed to improve unit familiarity with a particular region prior to deployment. Many soldiers could also participate in combined and joint exercises within a partner nation’s borders. For example, soldiers from 2d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, regionally aligned with U.S. Africa Command, participated in Shared Accord 2013, a biennial training exercise that strengthened cooperation between the U.S. and South African militaries.\textsuperscript{21} DLIFLC often provided culture and language training for such deployments. In this case, however, more than 150 soldiers from this unit received tailored regional language and culture training from Dagger University.\textsuperscript{22}

Each service took a different approach to prepare for Regional Alignment. It thus was unclear what foreign language and culture training requirements were needed. At Joint Base Lewis-McCord, Lt. Gen. Robert B. Brown began promoting a potential new standard for the Army that tied units to specific exercises in the Pacific theater. For example, if a brigade was going to participate regularly in an annual military exercise in the Philippines, then that unit would prepare by training some of its soldiers in Tagalog or other dialects used in the Philippines. Units participating in routine military exercises in Korea or Indonesia would adopt similar training

\textsuperscript{19} Thom Shanker and Elisabeth Bumiller, “In New Strategy, Panetta Plans Even Smaller Army,” *New York Times*, 5 January 2012,


\textsuperscript{22} “Dagger University,” *STAND-TO!*, 20 June 2013.
habits, thus tying themselves to a regional mission generating requirements both for regional expertise and foreign language training.\(^{23}\)

Thus, the Army appeared be to moving away from the model for absorbing culture training that it had used for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For Afghanistan, that model had relied upon mission continuity expertise provided through a program called the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands or AFPAK Hands. AFPAK Hands had sustained a small cadre of uniformed foreign language-trained regional experts during repeated assignments to the area as well as point-of-need cultural training for general purposes forces tagged for deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan. Such training was needed to help prepare military units pulled randomly as needed with no special orientation to any particular region of the world. Future foreign language and culture training would depend on a military unit’s designated regional alignment.

Rising Tensions in Asia

During this period, the People’s Republic of China began deployment of its first aircraft carrier, capping two decades of efforts to increase the size and capability of Chinese naval forces, including the deployment of sophisticated offensive weapons such as missiles capable of destroying U.S. stealth aircraft and warships. At the same time, the Chinese government continued to assert its claims to disputed island territories that were claimed by other nations in the region, including U.S. allies, and to waters hundreds of miles from its shore that the United States considered to be international. Ironically, it was the wealth generated from China’s abandonment of Marxist economic policy and its increased willingness to trade with Western nations, especially in consumer goods, that provided the means by which the People’s Liberation Army and Navy were able to expand their now threatening military capabilities. The rise of an assertive China was a clear concern for U.S. defense planners whose response was to develop ever more sophisticated weapons, such as the U.S. Air Force’s Long Range Strike Bomber. In other words, the situation was fostering an arms race between the two major Pacific powers. Although the United States continued to have a larger and more capable military, its forces were deployed on a global basis and focused upon the Middle East while China’s forces, including an expanding amphibious and submarine warfare capability, were concentrated near to its own shores. Surveys suggested that many in Asia believed already that China was surpassing the United States as a superpower. Whether true or not, some now worried that China’s goal was to undermine the ability of the United States to continue to offer credible military support to allies. If access to ports and bases of friendly countries became problematic, those nations would become more likely to bend to China’s ambition to dominate the Western Pacific region.\(^{24}\)

President Obama’s decision to reorient U.S. defense policy and withdraw from two major wars begun under the administration of George W. Bush was intended to counter the rising influence and aggressive behavior of China. The new strategy emphasized security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region along with improved capabilities in cyberwarfare and missile defense.\(^{25}\)

\(^{23}\) Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Steven Payne and Cameron Binkle, 4 April 2014, pp. 6-7, transcript in DLIFLC Command History Office files.

\(^{24}\) Tom V. Brook and Calum MacLead, “China’s Military Flexes its Muscle,” USA Today, 28 July 2011, pp. 1, 2.

U.S. relations with North Korea also remained dicey during this period. The U.S. Eighth Army continued on station with some 28,000 American forces in the Republic of Korea. Eighth Army commanders sought to optimize their military posture on the Korean Peninsula by improved cooperation with their South Korean colleagues and by policy and training enhancements. On 6 June 2012, Lt. Gen. John D. Johnson, signed “a historic agreement” with the commander of the Third Republic of Korea Army Commanding General Gen. Lee Hong-ki. The agreement enhanced the contingency and combined operations capabilities of the two armies, fostered sister-unit relationships, and combined live-fire training and small unit training. Later that summer, Lt. Gen. Johnson announced that Eighth Army was assuming “a more prominent ready posture” apparently due to rising concerns about “the potential for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the emergence of global competitors, threats to the global commons and of course the provocative and dangerous regime in North Korea.”

U.S.-South Korean cooperation continued to agitate North Korea. In April 2013, the United States took measures to address continued North Korean provocations and threats stemming from joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises. After the North Koreans stated that the security of foreign diplomats stationed in the North’s capital could not be guaranteed, the new U.S. commander in South Korea, General James Thurman, delayed planned testimony to Congress as “a prudent measure” while the Pentagon postponed a Minuteman 3 missile exercise on the West Coast while also moving missile defense systems into the region.

Elsewhere, Japan became more unsettled during this period due both to China as well as a disastrous 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami that hit the country’s northeastern Honshu coast on 11 March 2011. The tsunami inflicted massive casualties and instigated a major nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. The United States mobilized more than twenty thousand military personnel to assist the stricken country during “Operation Tomodachi” or “Friend” garnering deep appreciation among Japanese citizens only one year after tensions over American military bases had forced the resignation of a Japanese prime minister. Japanese-speaking U.S. officers and language aides provided by DLIFLC usefully assisted this massive relief effort. Regarding China, Japanese fighter planes mustered on numerous occasions to address perceived incursions of Japanese air space by Chinese aircraft. In 2013, these incursions saw a dramatic uptick from past years. China’s assertion that it owned numerous small islands in the East China Sea, including several claimed by Japan, was the source of this friction. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was also championing a more hawkish line than past Japanese leaders. Although any substantive change in Japanese military or foreign policy required amending Japan’s constitution, which banned the exercise of non-defensive military maneuvers, the political pressure to make such changes was increasing. Japan’s more open political debate about changing its constitution to enable a more assertive defense policy was a trend to watch.

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Other Security Concerns

U.S. concerns about Iranian efforts to enrich uranium undermined hopes that diplomacy could avert further sanctions or war but diplomatic efforts continued. The United States confirmed that the Islamic Republic had begun to enrich uranium, key to building a nuclear weapon, at a bunker near the Shi’ite Muslim holy city of Qom. Iran maintained that its nuclear program was purely non-military but Western governments believed its purpose was to produce nuclear arms. Hence, the confirmation that Iran had begun uranium enrichment further escalated tensions between Iran and the West. Iran was already in violation of several U.N. resolutions over its nuclear program and the target of economic sanctions by both the United States and the European Union. France called for measures of “unprecedented scale and severity.” Worsening the situation was the fact that Iran announced a death sentence for Amir Mirza Hekmati, an Arizona-born former U.S. military interpreter with dual nationality, who was convicted of spying. The pain associated with Western economic sanctions also stoked fears that Iran would threaten international shipping in the Persian Gulf and thereby send global oil markets into chaos. With continued high levels of tension between the United States and Iran, the requirements for military linguists escalated and DLIFLC dedicated an entire school to the single purpose of teaching Persian Farsi.

Back in the Western Hemisphere, Undersecretary of the Army Joseph Westphal caused a small stir when he spoke in early 2011 about Mexico’s problem with drug cartels. Westphal answered questions after giving a talk at the University of Utah’s Hinckley Institute of Politics during which he expressed his personal views about the possibility of sending armed U.S. soldiers to the border, or even over it, to hold back lawlessness and violence. According to Westphal, “there is a form of insurgency in Mexico with the drug cartels that’s right on our border.” Continuing, he noted that “this isn’t just about drugs and about illegal immigrants, this is about, potentially, a takeover of a government by individuals who are corrupt.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had made similar comments a few months before, finding that “we face an increasing threat from a well-organized network, drug-trafficking threat that is, in some cases, morphing into or making common cause with what we would consider an insurgency, in Mexico and in Central America.” She had even compared the situation to Colombia twenty years before. Clinton’s comments upset Mexican authorities and forced President Obama to intervene to clarify U.S. policy. Outside experts noted that the drug cartels were not seeking to overthrow the Mexican government and that non-military options, such as enforcement of drug laws in the United States and better border control were superior options than sending troops to the border. However, as a potential blind spot in U.S. security concerns, certainly the drug war in Mexico was worth pointing out.

Social Change and the Military

A major change that got underway in 2013 was the decision by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directing military leaders to begin tearing down the remaining walls preventing women from holding combat and special operations jobs. Plans reported by the press indicated that women could start training as Army Rangers by mid-2015 and as Navy SEALs a year later. The directive touched upon a sensitive topic, which was the physical and perhaps mental standards required to

quality for certain infantry, armor, special operations and similar positions across the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines and whether allowing women to serve in such positions would cause the standards to be differentiated by gender or else weakened. It was the secretary’s intent that there would be a single common standard regardless of gender for each job. It was possible, therefore, that some standards might be softened, but gender would no long bar candidates who met them. The decision was also made in light of another problem afflicting the Armed Forces during the period, which was a high number of sexual assaults. In early 2013, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey stated that sexual assaults might actually be linked to the “no women in combat” ban, “because the disparity between the roles of men and women creates separate classes of personnel — male ‘warriors’ versus the rest of the force.” He admitted that sexual assault was a complicated problem, but to the extent the ban seemed to aggravate the situation, the easier it was to move ahead with its repeal. The ban, he said, “created a psychology that lends itself to disrespect for women.”

In 2010, Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act,” which abolished the Clinton-era directive regarding homophobia in the military that had served as a stopgap between past ill treatment by the military of gay and lesbian service members and future formal acceptance by the military of a complete ban on discrimination due to a person’s sexual orientation. The law was challenged in court and appealed to a higher court. During this time, the Secretary of Defense ordered that all pending actions against service members accused of violating the rule would have to be signed by the service secretaries, which effectively meant that the military put a stay on all such actions.

After the appeal process ended and the law was upheld, the Secretary of Defense ordered a phase in period before lifting all prohibitions against gay and lesbian service members and required DOD-wide training for the entire force to become educated about the new policy and the new cultural norm of toleration. Thereafter, “witch hunts” for homosexuals in the military were to end and deliberate discrimination against service members due to sexual orientation became a prosecutable infraction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. On 20 September 2011, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law was repealed. Afterwards, some former service personnel who had recently been booted from the military under the old rules, requested reinstatement, including to DLIFLC. Jason Daniels, a former seaman twice booted from the Navy for being gay, was reinstated with assistance from the Service-members Legal Defense Network. Daniels was scheduled to return to DLIFLC to attend the Persian Farsi basic course. Army spokesman Danial

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34 Local DLIFLC service commanders were told to push out any students to their next assignment and not to hold anyone facing charges under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” for eventual discharge, as had been the previous policy. As Garrison Commander Col. Darcy Brewer stated, “bottom line they’re taking up billets and eating beans, ship ‘em out to Goodfellow.” Cameron Binkley, Historian’s Notes for DLIFLC Commander’s Update, 3 November 2010, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
35 DLIFLC military and civilian leaders completed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” repeal training (Tier II) on 8 April 2011. Similar training (Tier III) for all solider was to be completed by 15 July 2011. DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files (hereafter the same for all “Sitrep” or situation reports, POM Updates, and office quarterly reports).
Carpenter told local media that Daniels’s arrival at the Institute would not be “a big deal” and “when he comes here, he’ll be treated like any other student.” 36

NSA Domestic Spying Scandal

One of the biggest stories to unfold during this period was the saga of Edward Snowden, a systems analyst and former contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA), a subordinate agency of the Department of Defense for whom many DLIFLC-trained linguists work. Snowden provided classified information to several major newspapers that he obtained illegally. The information Snowden revealed documented a massive ongoing NSA operation to spy on the electronic and phone communications of American citizens without their knowledge. Much would be said or penned about this subject, documentaries and Hollywood films were eventually made, but immediately it put the intelligence service into the news in a defensive posture that one can hardly image it wanted. In justifying its domestic surveillance program to Congress during hearings by the House Intelligence Committee in June 2013, General Keith Alexander, NSA Director, and other intelligence agency representatives, testified that the program was responsible for preventing several major terrorist-related plots against the United States. Few details were presented openly and such exchanges did little to tamp down the outrage that many Americans felt about the violations of their personal privacy. Political pressure eventually forced a reluctant President Obama to curtail the most blatantly invasive authorizations approving NSA’s domestic surveillance program.37 The decision by NSA leaders to conduct domestic surveillance highlighted the risks faced by intelligence officials when making decisions in a cloistered environment pitting security against democratic values.

The State of Language Transformation

In the mid-2000s, the Department of Defense embarked upon a broad effort to institutionalize within the military an attitude that respected and promoted the pursuit of foreign language and cultural expertise as a critical war-fighting skill. In September 2004, the department published its so-called Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, a plan that heralded among other things, a significant expansion of the efforts of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center as major driver and implementer of this transformative process.38 More funding came to DLIFLC both for personnel and for infrastructure. Reduced student-to-teacher ratios and expanded overseas immersion exercises improved the proficiency of DLIFLC graduates while the Institute began an extensive program to support the language training requirements of deploying forces and field linguists through mobile or detached language training teams and online training. DLIFLC statistics consistently showed a high number of students from its basic language courses graduating at or above standard while its language training reach became truly deep. Progress was made.39

37 Kimberly Dozier and Donna Cassata, “NSA Director Surveillance Foiled Plot again Wall Street,” Monterey Herald, 19 June 2013, pg. 3. The Guardian newspaper broke the story about NSA collecting the telephone records of millions of Americans in June 2013 followed by revelations in the Washington Post and Guardian that the agency also actively surveilled online communications of anyone using the servers of several major internet firms.
39 See DLIFLC Fact Sheets in Appendices J and K.
After Leon Panetta became director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he mandated professional fluency in a foreign language for senior managers to be promotable to the highest grades. According to Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Dr. Michael Vickers, an accomplished DLIFLC graduate who had helped hunt down Osama bin Laden, “it certainly had an impact on the number of people working harder at it.” 40 However, it was a difficult task to institutionalize the mastery of foreign languages. That goal continued to elude the military services, especially the Army, which was chiefly responsible for counter-insurgency operations. According to Col. Richard Outzen, writing for the Small Wars Journal, despite backing from its highest leaders, the Army “never made broad organizational or doctrinal changes to develop long-term capability” in the languages and culture of Iraq and Afghanistan, relied excessively on contractors, and commanders frequently neglected the language readiness of their own components, for example failing to capitalize on command language programs. These problems endured even as commanders strove to overcome strong institutional bias that tended to stovepipe language expertise narrowly into the intelligence field despite its clear utility to foot soldiers on patrol.41

Outzen also faulted the Army’s Culture and Foreign Language Strategy for failing to live up to the goals of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. DOD had done little to manage better its linguist force to ensure proper assignments or by making commanders and headquarters responsible for language readiness training (as they were for physical readiness). Moreover, he fundamentally argued against the notion embedded in the strategy that “culture” as a realm of knowledge was and could be taught separately from “language,” an idea abhorrent to anthropology that lent itself to counterproductive organizational stove-piping and rivalry. In an era of diminishing resources, Outzen argued that it was even more important for the Army to institutionalize language and culture knowledge. He offered a solution in the form of a “Foreign Area Officer Corps,” which could be established with few resources, and that would convey culture change across the institutional Army more effectively and enduringly than any other solution to meet the goals of language transformation. With a bit more funding, he further argued,

40 Natela Cutter, “Top defense intelligence official says foreign language critical to national security,” www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/90248. Panetta previously served as a congressman in a districted that included DLIFLC.

an expansion of foreign language proficiency pay would also promote broader language and cultural training across the force.\textsuperscript{42}

Undersecretary Vickers was cognizant of concerns by Army officers like Colonel Outzen. During testimony before a congressional hearing on homeland security and foreign language capacities in May 2012, Vickers told Congress that foreign language proficiency was an area that still needed improvement both for intelligence and special operations. “It’s very hard to maintain high levels of proficiency in languages if you’re not using it all the time,” he explained, and encouraged the senators to provide more incentives to those willing to maintain high language proficiency scores.\textsuperscript{43} The committee also appeared to appreciate the concerns of language transformation critics and asked similar questions about why there still was not enough language capability within DOD. In part, the answer was not only the culture within DOD, but within American society. American schools needed to offer more early language education to produce truly able foreign language speakers. Without such training, the pool of suitable candidates available to the military would simply remain too small.\textsuperscript{44}

Senator Daniel K. Akaka, who chaired the committee, stated that “even in a difficult budget environment, we must fund important international education and foreign language study programs to build the pipeline to a 21\textsuperscript{st} century workforce.” Senator Akaka wanted to “make sure that budget cuts [were] not at the expense of strategic national security interests.” He pointedly noted that the 9/11 Commission had raised concerns about the shortage of personnel with Middle Eastern language skills. Agencies in need of more linguists in hard-to-learn languages included the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Defense. According to Senator Akaka, “federal agencies could do more to coordinate and share best practices in recruiting, retaining, and training personnel.” He called for “a coordinated national effort among all levels of government, industry, and academia” to tackle the problem of improving the nation’s language capacity and effectively confront the challenges to our nation’s security and economic prosperity.”\textsuperscript{45}

With all of this as backdrop, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center continued onward as DOD’s lead vehicle for providing foreign language and culture training and faced its own organizational transformation during this period, as the following pages detail.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[42] Outzen, “Language, Culture, and Army Culture: failing Transformation.”
\item[43] Cutter, “Top defense intelligence official says foreign language critical.”
\item[44] Cutter, “Top defense intelligence official says foreign language critical.”
\end{footnotes}
Chapter II – DLIFLC Management

This section describes the major management issues facing the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center during the period between 2001 and 2013 with some overlap as required to cover issues comprehensively.

Command Staff and Leadership

Throughout this period, the DLIFLC Commandant was Col. Danial D. Pick, a U.S. Army officer serving as a foreign affairs specialist in the Military Intelligence Branch. Pick held master’s degrees in military studies and Near Eastern studies, served with Special Forces during the initial U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and arrived at DLIFLC after holding a year-long U.S. Army War College fellowship at Stanford University’s Hoover Institute. Before that experience, Pick had served at the Presidio of Monterey in charge of the Foreign Area Officer’s training program. He spoke Arabic, Farsi, Dari, and Assyrian, the latter picked up from his own family’s background. He assumed command of DLIFLC on 29 April 2010.46 Pick reported to Combined Arms Center, an element of the Training and Doctrine Command led from 2011 until 2014 by General Robert W. Cone.47 Indirectly, Pick was also accountable to the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) under the Secretary of Defense.

Pick believed that what had qualified him for command of DLIFLC was previous command experience at various levels, which helped him prepare for the leadership challenges associated with being the commandant. He was also a graduate of the DLIFLC Arabic basic course in 1997 and had gone through the DLI Washington Arabic refresher program, which allowed him to understand that aspect of DLIFLC’s mission. Finally, Pick noted that his assignment as the FAO program director at DLIFLC was critical: “Being assigned to an organization, not knowing you’re going to be in charge of it, and having no one around you knowing that you’re going to be in charge of it, gives you a perspective that you wouldn’t otherwise get.”48

As Pick assumed command, there were only two overarching issues for which he received guidance. First, Pick had to continue trying to smooth tensions between DLIFLC and the military services generated by the Institute’s deployment of the Defense Language Proficiency Test 5. That test was a more accurate language proficiency test than previous versions. Unfortunately, little was done to prepare working military linguists, whose jobs depended on passing the test, for the reality that the upgraded exam would be a more rigorous exercise than previous versions. As scores fell among military linguists, it generated consternation. Second, the operational needs of the NSA, DLIFLC’s largest stakeholder, for military linguists proficient in Arabic dialects, had

47 “General Robert W. Cone, Command General United States Army Training and Doctrine Command,” biography, ca. April 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files. General Cone refocused TRADOC on the period beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts and initiated the Army’s Strategic Landpower and Force 2025 review.
put pressure on DLIFLC to develop a curriculum focused upon dialect instruction over Modern Standard Arabic. Pick knew he needed to move DLIFLC quickly toward Arabic dialect basic courses.49

DLIFLC assistant commandants, who also served as commanders for the Air Force’s 517th Training Group, were Col. Terry Bare, who retired in June 2011. Bare was followed by Lt. Col. Laura M. Ryan, a career intelligence officer with a background in human intelligence, strategic debriefing, interrogation collection and instruction, all-source intelligence collection management, force protection; space operations, and information operations.50 Ryan was promoted to full colonel after she arrived at DLIFLC in 2011. She in turn was succeeded by Col. Ginger Wallace, whose change of command ceremony took place at Soldier Field on the Presidio of Monterey on 26 June 2013. The presiding officer for that event was Air Force Col. Kimberlee Joos, Commander of the 17th Training Wing, Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.51

![Image of a ceremony](image1)

Figure 3 DLIFLC Assistant Commandant, U.S. Air Force officer Laura M. Ryan, was promoted to colonel (top) at DLIFLC in 2011. Lt. Col. Michael Frenchick, DLIFLC Chief of Staff, shown at his retirement ceremony (bottom) on 27 April 2012.

The DLIFLC chief of staff for the first half of this period was Lt. Col. Michael Frenchick who retired on 27 April 2012, ending a 24-year military career. During that career, Frenchick saw service from Alaska to Afghanistan. He was followed by Lt. Col. Ross Gagliano, who was in turn followed by DLIFLC’s first ever civilian chief of staff, Steven N. Collins, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel whose role is discussed further in Chapter V.

The DLIFLC Change of Responsibility ceremony took place between Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Tracey Bellotte, and incoming Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Allan Pendergast on 22 June 2012 again on Soldier Field at the Presidio of Monterey. Bellotte began her military career in Monterey as a DLIFLC student and was happy to be able to retire from the

49 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 31 March 2014, p. 5.
same place. During that career, Bellotte served as an Electronic Voice Interceptor and German linguist, deployed three times to support Operation Iraqi Freedom, and retired after 24 years of service.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 22 June 2012; Brian Lamar, “DLIFLC Command Sergeant Major retires after 26 years of service,” \textit{Globe}, Vol. 35, No. 3 (October 2012): 41-42.}

Defense Language and National Security Education

As this period began, the senior DOD body responsible for guiding doctrine and policy governing the entire foreign language community was the Defense Language Office (DLO). DLO coordinated meetings of the Defense Language Steering Committee where foreign language issues common to several agencies were aired. A key figure in DLO was Dr. Michael Nugent, who initially headed the National Security Education Program (NSEP). Nugent visited first DLIFLC in May 2011 with a group of representatives from several U.S. universities participating in NSEP. He and NSEP were able to gain insight into how the educational program at DLIFLC was able to take students to $2/2/1+$ proficiency and beyond in a relatively short time while also following up with sustainment and enhancement training over a linguist’s career.\footnote{DLIFLC_POM Update 27 May 11, DLIFLC Quarterly Report files, Historical Records Collection, Command History Office. Note, all quarterly reports are digital, reference their exact file name and are henceforth only referred to by that name. See also DLIFLC, Operation Order 11-xx: “NSEP Flagship Annual Meeting in Monterey,” ca. May 2011, in \textit{DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013} files.} By January 2012, Nugent had become acting director of DLO and thus became more interested in the Institute’s resident and non-resident missions and its manpower challenges. During an assessment visit, Nugent stated that “as we draw down forces, it is important to maintain a readiness capacity in language. We need to put our investments where our priorities are, and one of those priorities should be language learning.”\footnote{Brian Lamar, “DLO/NSEP chief says invest in language priorities,” \textit{Globe} Vol. 35, No. 2 (May 2012): 46-47; DLIFLC SITREP week ending 20 January 12.}

Dr. Laura Junor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, was the highest official responsible for military training. Dr. Junor thus chaired the steering committee composed of senior language authorities from the services and other stakeholders as she was the DOD Senior Language Authority. In Colonel Pick’s view, Junor was “a strong supporter of DLI,” although one who was also simultaneously a strong advocate for gaining efficiencies and reducing manpower and budgets responsibly over time.\footnote{Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 31 March 2014, pp. 24-25. For one reason, Junor was responsible for mishap reduction. She received her Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University. Biography posted website of the Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, copy in \textit{DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013} files.} In fact, Junor apparently decided to merge DLO and NSEP for efficiency gains, drawing together two somewhat dissimilar programs. The new organization was designated the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) on 6 February 2012.\footnote{DLO changed to DLNSEO when OSD combined it with the National Security Education Office to reduce civilian manpower, removing the SES that was in charge of DLO, Nancy Weaver, and placing the combined offices under Dr. Nugent. Unfortunately, according to Colonel Pick, the responsibilities of the respective offices were not adequately deconflicted. One program was responsible for oversight of the Defense Foreign Language Program while the other...} Dr. Nugent became the first DLNSEO director.
At its 23 February 2012 meeting, the Defense Language Steering Committee considered the impact of the recent DOD-wide hiring freeze on DLIFLC. Colonel Pick briefed the committee on how the hiring freeze would impact DLIFLC’s mission and requested OSD help to work with the Army to obtain a waiver that would allow DLIFLC to continue hiring instructors to meet mission requirements, a topic addressed in greater detail below. On DLIFLC’s behalf, the Department of the Army G-3/5/7 drafted a waiver request for staffing through subordinate commands. Junor clearly expressed that it was the Secretary of Defense’s desire to increase the number of culturally adept personnel in DOD. She then directed a working group to refine DOD’s Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Strategic Plan. The steering committee also tasked DLIFLC to provide a case for its low student-to-instructor ratio. Nugent was particularly interested in the risk of increased attrition resulting from larger class size.

With Junor’s backing, DLIFLC’s manpower waiver was moved to the Secretary’s office. However, on 23 August 2012, the steering committee made clear that the cost for DLIFLC to gain a waiver would entail manpower offsets elsewhere in DOD because Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter would not exceed the department’s overall personnel cap. Junor hoped that the services, agencies, and DLIFLC would find ways to improve student outcomes thus reducing student throughput requirements. To achieve that outcome, DOD also had to reduce well known problems in managing linguists after graduation from DLIFLC. For example, complaints from the field continued to indicate poor force management decisions. Problems included underutilization of Arabic, Pashto and Dari linguists serving in the Mideast, paying expensive contractors in the same languages, and non-sensibly sending Korean linguists to Iraq where their language skills atrophied. More importantly, no billet in DOD was coded by language proficiency level, so even when linguists were correctly matched to mission, it was completely random as to whether a 3/3 Arabic speaker was heading for a billet at a generic combat brigade or a 2/2 speaker was going to a slot working in the most sensitive operation at NSA headquarters. Such problems demoralized highly trained linguists and reduced retention.

During this time, Colonel Pick made frequent presentations before the Defense Language Steering Committee and elsewhere to promote his view that DLIFLC was not the source of DOD’s “language problem.” Using available data, Pick demonstrated that the habit of the services granting a high number of Defense Language Aptitude Battery waivers resulted in DLIFLC graduating sub-proficient linguists. These were then not managed well within the force in terms of billeting and follow-on training. The services often failed to retain their linguists for second

sought to promote foreign language education through universities and managing grants that promoted foreign language study. It was unclear how manpower was leftover to focus on DFLP issues of concern to DLIFLC. See Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 31 March 2014, pp. 23-24.

57 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 10 February 12. Other items briefed included the impact of services waiving minimum Defense Language Aptitude Battery scores on attrition and graduation rates, the success of the Pilot Spanish Basic Course Extension, and the way-ahead for Arabic Dialect Training.

58 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 24 February 1.

59 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 23 March 2012. The waiver was signed by the signed Deputy Secretary of Defense on 16 July 2012.

60 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120824. During this meeting, the Navy discussed creating an Asia-Pacific Hands.

and third terms, which meant sending more students to DLIFLC. This practice was costly. In an environment of budgetary uncertainty, Pick believed this argument resonated with senior DOD leaders. In the past, it was easy to blame the Institute for problems associated with foreign language training, but many of those problems were systemic in nature and beyond the scope of DLIFLC’s responsibility.\(^{62}\) The steering committee did take up these concerns. At its October 2012 meeting, committee members discussed progress within the department to improve linguist recruitment, training, assignment, and retention, as well as potential ways to review requirements.\(^{63}\)

By 2013, the Defense Foreign Language Program was benefitting from more stringent service policies aimed at reducing the number of waivers issued to students with low language acquisition aptitude scores, which meant that more students actually graduated from DLIFLC.\(^{64}\) At the same time, according to the Intelligence and Security Command, the Army was seeing improved DLPT scores among current linguists in the force (higher 2/2, 2+/2+, and 3/3 scores). This was due in part to more efficient training/management of linguists as well as the success of the Army’s 35P Cryptologic Linguist career field, which offered new enlistees pay bonuses (available in few other career fields) and accelerated promotion if these recruits entered the military with DLPT test scores in specific languages with a 2 in listening and a 2 in reading. The more soldiers who entered the force already speaking a target language, the fewer slots were needed at DLIFLC for training in those languages and that meant fewer overall instructors were similarly needed. Military leaders also credited DLIFLC for improved instruction/study halls and more rigorous enforcement of graduation standards. By May 2013, DLIFLC was seeing a decrease in out-year instructor requirements due to these policies and their enforcement.\(^{65}\) In September 2013, Colonel Pick briefed Brig. Gen. Wayne Grigsby, Jr., the U.S. Army Director for Training (G-3/5/7), on management of the Defense Foreign Language Program and issues affecting DLIFLC. He told the general that continued reduction of waivers for those trainees with low language aptitude test scores, enforcement of 2/2/1+ graduation standard, and improved retention of crypto-linguists remained the crucial elements to reduce the cost of producing and sustaining DOD’s foreign language capability.\(^{66}\)

In November 2013, Pick assured his own commander that DLIFLC would continue working with senior military intelligence leaders and the G-3/5/7 to decrease the Institute’s training load through better recruitment, higher production at DLIFLC, and better retention. DLIFLC was scheduled, in fact, to participate in a review of the Army’s intelligence career field (CMF35) in January 2014 and planned to host a February 2014 meeting with military intelligence officials focused upon enterprise-level linguist management. Still, Pick was probably happy to learn that the Army would maintain authorization levels for its “35P” force through 2017 despite the Army drawdown of

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\(^{62}\) Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Steven Payne and Cameron Binkley, 4 April 2014, pp. 9-10, transcript in DLIFLC Command History Office files.

\(^{63}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 19 October 2012.

\(^{64}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 25 January 2013.

\(^{65}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 24 May 2013.

\(^{66}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 5 Sep 2013.
80,000 soldiers. The 35Ps, or crypto-linguists, made up the largest segment of Army students at DLIFLC. Pick remained confident that the Army understood his “language cycle of excellence” model and how to best train and maintain force linguists. The Army’s continued focus on enterprise solutions to limit attrition at DLIFLC and to increase retention of able linguists already serving gave him “great hope” to increase effectiveness and efficiency.

Linguist Cycle of Excellence

Colonel Pick drew upon his experience as commandant, incorporated views expressed by DLO and the Defense Language Steering Committee about improving linguist proficiency and management, and began espousing a model that he termed the “Linguist Cycle of Excellence.” He intended this Cycle of Excellence idea to embrace the various stages in the military services’ efforts to recruit, educate, and retain the best military linguists. The goal was to look at the entire enterprise rather than trying to work on isolate parts of the cycle in isolation.

Both Pick and Dr. Junor wanted to protect and enhance DOD’s foreign language capability with less resources. Pick’s model sought to drive down DLIFLC’s budget and manpower requirements by training fewer students. He wanted the Institute to accept only those students with high language aptitude scores and to hold these to a standard 2/2/1+ graduation minimum, and increasingly 2+/2+/2. Meanwhile, the services needed to improve their linguist retention rate by ensuring that they actually assigned linguists to jobs that required language skills. That would result in fewer students needing training. Pick also wanted the services to differentiate language billets not only by language, which was currently done, but by language skill level. In 2013, every DOD foreign language billet was rated 2/2/1+. There were no billets requiring linguists qualified at a higher standard of 3/3 or 2+/2+. Thus, there was no “demand signal” drawing the best graduates to the hardest jobs.

According to Pick, if DOD drove down the number of linguists needed to be trained, then it could reasonably and fairly reduce DLIFLC staffing levels and civilian pay, which was the biggest portion of DLIFLC’s budget. This scheme would also improve the quality of the department’s foreign language capability. Pick believed his argument resonated with Dr. Junor and Maj. Gen. Stephen G. Fogarty in charge of the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command, which employed most of the crypto-linguist force working in NSA-type missions. Of course, Pick’s solution required long-term commitment by senior leaders who had to ensure that the services paid attention to the coding of billets, the assignment process, and the elimination of language aptitude test waivers. The prospects for the Linguist Cycle of Excellence were debatable. To accomplish the goal of an enterprise-level reform of linguist management required more accountability at numerous levels of the cycle than the services historically provided for linguists. Certainly, there were other military career fields not as well managed as the linguist force, but it was unlikely that flight-qualified officers routinely found themselves doing non-aviation work. Of course, the

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67 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 29 November 2013.
68 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 15 November 2013.
69 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 31 March 2014, pp. 25-26; and 4 April 2014, pp. 9-11.
70 Ibid., 31 March 2014, p. 26. Pick frankly noted that “DLNSEO, in all of this, could be a better help.”
documented cases of linguists deployed to non-linguist assignments were plentiful. DOD even had to assign an “06-level” office in Afghanistan to ensure that the Joint Chiefs’ of Staff-inspired Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program, which fielded highly trained foreign language and cultural advisors to support campaign continuity, were placed in positions that capitalized on their hard-won skills. Meanwhile, bureaucrats were more likely to be enticed by the near-term savings accrued by cutting DLIFLC’s budget or imposing a fee-for-service regime despite whatever long-term harm such thinking caused.

Figure 4 Col. Danial D. Pick’s “Cycle of Excellence” for increasing effectiveness and efficiency of foreign language training for professional linguists.

Nevertheless, despite need for improvement, Pick felt that linguists in the force were being better managed than in years past. In 2014, he noted that the inventory of linguists at the higher proficiency levels was increasing as were service retention rates. Better management by stake-holders was making a difference. The weight of evidence suggested that DOD understood Pick’s argument that DLIFLC was not the major problem in the force-wide management of military linguists. At least, no comments have come to light by senior leaders on record disputing him. Going forward, Pick believed the Institute’s major role in fostering better management of the linguist cycle was simply “keeping the problem framed correctly and not letting it default or degenerate or devolve to DLI.”

Funding and Campaign Plan

During this period, DLIFLC continued to update and maintain a standardized protocol called the Campaign Plan. The Command Plan looked out five years, was typically reviewed each year, and prioritized the Institute’s mission and functions. The plan help focused commanders and senior

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71 For example, Army Reserve Sgt. Myla Lumayag Maravillosa, a fluent Tagalog linguist, DLIFLC class of 2003, was killed on 24 Dec. 2005 while serving with an Army intelligence unit in Iraq where Tagalog, a languages of the Philippines, is not spoken. Pick’s point was less that lower echelon combat support units have linguists in languages they cannot use, but that the services should tag fluent Tagalog speakers to high proficiency billets needing Tagalog.

72 Where the military services paid a fee for each training seat in a DLIFLC basic course or LTD, incentivizing them to plan more carefully but with unpredictable results. DOD was reviewing the possibility at the time of this report.

73 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 4 April 2014, p. 4.

74 Ibid., p. 12.
leaders upon essential tasks and was a key instrument available to guide any required force reductions driven by budgetary uncertainty. The central theme for the 2011-2015 Campaign Plan was integration. Staff members across the Institute were generally enlisted, typically during a one- or two-day retreat where groups tackled the project of prioritizing major mission functions or lines of effort, which occurred in 2011.

Staff from the working groups who participated in the 2013 Command Plan revision generally found the offsite to be helpful, but a great deal of staff time was required for the exercise. In fact, executing the Command Plan revision using input from staff across DLIFLC required 86 manpower days plus coordinating staff preparation time. As a result, the commandant decided that there should only be one offsite annually to inflict the least amount of pain. Based upon staff advice about the budgetary cycle, Colonel Pick chose late June as the best time for a review of the Command Plan. He reminded staff not to let the process become more important than the function. The 2013 working groups, he said, had produced useful input and decisions about change in the mission, vision, and values. The process had resulted in only minor change to the mission statement and it was decided not to change the vision statement at all. Several participants argued that making changes for the sake of change was pointless.

Pick also praised “great support” provided by TRAC Monterey’s Lt. Col. Jon Alt and Maj. Chris Marks who reviewed the Institute’s Campaign Plan 2013-2017 effort. TRAC Monterey was a TRADOC analytical group based at the Naval Postgraduate School. The TRAC team provided a set of recommendations to help DLIFLC simplify planning and to develop relevant metrics to better measure performance and effectiveness. According to Pick, “their expertise in system analysis and functional decomposition of a very complex organization provided terrific insight for our future planning process. An excellent example of cross-organizational assistance.”

Budgetary Uncertainty and Its Impact on DLIFLC

On average it took DLIFLC six months to hire a new teacher. Staffing the Institute was difficult under the normal circumstances of constantly changing student load requirements. Hiring managers were typically behind schedule to fill vacancies for upcoming classes. As this period began, DLIFLC was seeking to staff more than three hundred open positions but had only 140 individuals in the process of being hired to fill those positions, leaving 165 vacancies. In December 2010, TRADOC also decided to have its manpower team conduct an assessment of the Institute and its Concept Plan. By then it was probably beginning to be apparent to the commandant and other DOD officials that DLIFLC had a discrepancy between its authorized manning level and the faculty it required to train the validated joint requirements for fiscal years 2012 through 2014. Numerous special budgetary decisions had been made during the 2000s that had authorized funding to expand DLIFLC activities to meet mission training requirements. However, those

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77 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 10 May 2013.

78 DLIFLC Sitrep 10 Dec 2010. Susan Anthony was the TRADOC Manpower Team head (G-8).
initiatives had never resulted in actual increased staffing authorizations. Such a situation was tolerable in an era of war-driven expansion, but any downturn in the budgetary environment could leave the Institute vulnerable without official validation of its staffing levels to severe cut-backs, which in fact became a major concern during this period.

In late 2010, DOD began to confront the situation imposed by the inability of the U.S. Congress to pass a budget. No budget was passed in 2010 and the government had to run on so-called “continuing resolutions” wherein Congress only provided funding for the same programs at the same level as the previous fiscal year. As the expiration date for the continuing resolution for fiscal year 2011 drew near on 8 April 2011, it was unclear whether the resolution would be extended. As a result, Federal agencies, including DLIFLC, had to begin preparing for unplanned emergency furloughs in case the government had to shut down all but essential operations due to a lack of approved funding. That crisis was narrowly averted after Congress extended its continuing resolution. The commandant issued an email to the entire command thanking everyone for their patience and dedication during a stressful period of uncertainty. The uncertainty, however, was only beginning.

Lacking an overall budget, the Army imposed hiring constraints and TRADOC limited the hiring of subordinate organizations. In response, DLIFLC sought waivers to authorize continued hiring. Following an internal mid-year review by DLIFLC of its budget and spending plan, TRADOC did approve DLIFLC to resume hiring to fill critical shortages of language teachers, pending further guidance, but continued to impose a hiring freeze for General Service Schedule employees. In January 2011, the secretary of defense directed that DOD freeze (or cap) the number of fulltime civilian employees at the fiscal year 2010 level for fiscal years 2011-13, which was later extended to 2018. This directive challenged the ability of DLIFLC to meet its mission requirements.

Hiring freezes turned to cutbacks after Congress passed a major bill, which President Barak Obama signed on 2 August, called the Budget Control Act of 2011. This measure established significant spending cuts to reduce the U.S. budget deficit by $1.2 trillion. The act mandated that the failure of the government to develop an agreed plan for these spending cuts would result in “Sequestration” or mandatory across-the-board spending cuts, including within DOD. After Congress failed to negotiate an agreed upon plan by November 2011, Sequestration took effect beginning in fiscal year 2013, eventually leading to furloughs.

After passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011, military officials became hyper concerned about spending. In a 17 October 2011 memorandum Defense Secretary Leon Panetta placed newly appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter in charge of “eliminating duplicative functions, and driving ongoing and new efficiencies initiatives that can help us achieve the


80 DLIFLC POM Update 6 May 2011; DLIFLC POM Update 17 June 2011(rev).

81 DLIFLC Update 13 May 2011.

82 This was expressed in Resource Management Decision 703a2, 25 January 2011.
aggressive budgetary goals that we have set.” DOD began planning to cut $450 billion from its budget by 2023. DOD had not seen such massive spending cuts since the end of the Cold War.83

Pentagon leaders first directed cuts in plans and programs with an emphasis on weapons systems, but Sequestration meant they also faced cutting formerly sacrosanct budget items, including service member benefits, support to NATO, and the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Sequestration would more than double the size of the cuts facing the Pentagon.84 In 2012, the White House directed another cut of $78 billion from the Pentagon’s budget request and the cuts were worse again in fiscal year 2013. In January 2013, Deputy Secretary Carter directed an immediate civilian hiring freeze.

For the commandant of DLIFLC, there were four options for the budgetary constraints that limited his ability to hire as needed to fulfill mission requirements. The first option was to increase the student-to-teacher ratio. The likely impact of this measure was to lower graduation scores while increasing the Institute’s attrition rate. The second option was to pull staff from another department, e.g. Curriculum Development, and put them in the classroom as teachers. This course of action would negatively affect future curriculum and test development. The third course of action was to delay or cancel courses. This would create a backlog of students waiting for start dates or lead back to the first measure with larger class sizes and/or poorer academic results.85 The final or fourth option was to request an exception to the policy limiting the Institute’s hiring authority. Repeatedly and successfully, DLIFLC chose the fourth option, but success came with its own consequences.

After the Secretary of Defense imposed a fiscal year 2010 budget cap, TRADOC permitted DLIFLC to continue with excepted hiring for key faculty but that ended effective 27 January 2012. This meant that the Institute would see teacher shortages in 2012 for critical languages in Pashto (55 percent filled), Persian Farsi (86 percent filled), Arabic (82 percent filled), Punjabi (29 percent filled) and Turkish (50 percent filled). Along with other language needs and an increasing student population, DLIFLC expected to experience a major language instructor shortage. After assessing the impact of this policy, staff prepared a special waiver request. In February, clearly knowing that he was swimming against the direction of the entire department, Colonel Pick went before the Defense Language Steering Committee seeking backing for a waiver to permit DLIFLC to hire above the fiscal year 2010 level.86

As DLIFLC graduated 132 professional linguists on 9 February 2012, Colonel Pick reported that the proficiency outcomes for graduations that year were down 10 percent from the same period from the previous year before staffing shortages began (that is, graduates scoring 2/2/1+ or above on the DLPT). “While we are evaluating the many factors that impact proficiency outcomes,”

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85 DLIFLC Sitrep 4 MAR 2011.
86 DLIFLC SITREP week ending 27 January 12.
stated the commandant, “we believe we are seeing the effects of last year’s hiring freeze manifesting in these graduations.”

DLIFLC continued to work with the Army Executive Agent, TRADOC and CAC to overcome hiring constraints. In March 2012, General Cone authorized DLIFLC to make 58 offers. At the same time, to mitigate the short-term impact on language training for incoming DLIFLC students, Institute leaders cancelled several mobile language sustainment teams to move those faculty into basic course classrooms. This sustainment training had to be rescheduled, but the combination of new hires and reduced sustainment training prevented cancellation of any basic course classes in the March-April timeframe. Further staff transfers to the schools continued to take place, however. In July the provost lamented the postponement of an online diagnostic assessment effort for the Egyptian dialect, a Chinese FAO project, and the development of a Global Language Online Support System for Chinese due to this problem.

Figure 5 Due to austerity measures, DLIFLC transferred staff from support divisions to sustain its teaching functions. Postponed in July 2012, DLIFLC’s online diagnostic assessment program still lacked an Egyptian Arabic component in 2017.

On 5 April 2012, with backing from the Defense Language Steering Committee and the NSA, Colonel Pick submitted a “hiring authority waiver” through the Secretary of the Army to the Comptroller Office of the Secretary of Defense seeking approval to hire 857 employees in fiscal year 2013 above the level authorized for the Institute according to its fiscal year 2010 budget. After DLIFLC provided an impact statement, the comptroller sent the waiver to Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter for a decision. Meanwhile, the commandant requested authority from TRADOC to hire 48 additional teaching faculty for classes beginning in May and June. Carter sent the DLIFLC hiring authority waiver back to DLIFLC and asked the Institute to scrub another ninety slots from the list. Colonel Pick told his supervisor that “the reduction cannot be entirely mitigated, but will not result in mission failure.” The numbers washed from the waiver included personnel in management,

87 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 10 February 12.
89 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120713.
90 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 27 April 2012.
91 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 6 April 2012; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 8 June 2012.
faculty development, course/curriculum development, and product development, mainly to LTDs. The waiver allowed the Institute to fill 767 slots above its authorized civilian hiring level, which then became 2,491 personnel. Some of these were already on staff but the waiver made it possible for DLIFLC to retain them and to hire others to accomplish its training mission. DLIFLC was the only Army organization to request relief from the civilian cap.

The waiver allowed hiring above current authorizations for two years. The question then became what was DLIFLC’s appropriate staffing thereafter? A major repercussion of the waiver was close scrutiny of DLIFLC operations by DOD. Right away, the Institute began working with its stakeholders to improve the requirements definition process in a bid to lower required staffing, but the Army also directed the Institute to undergo an external review of its academic programs and a DOD-directed manpower analysis by the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency.

**Manpower Analysis**

In May 2012, Brig. Gen. Todd B. McCaffrey, the Army’s Director of Training (G-3/5/7), who was also the Executive Agent for DLIFLC and the Army’s Senior Language Authority, requested a man-power study for the Institute. The U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency, known as USAMAA, was the DOD entity responsible for such work. It arrived in late 2012 to begin its formal review and analysis of the Institute’s Table of Distributions and Allowances (TDA), the document that established the manning and budgetary authority for funding organizations within DOD. To govern the review, DLIFLC signed a memorandum of understanding with USAMAA, but from the start DLIFLC leaders had to reconfigure their schedules when USAMAA began its study two months earlier than planned, causing a conflict with an external academic review of Institute programs directed by Secretary of Defense that had already begun in November. DLIFLC hoped that the external academic review, discussed separately below, would help establish the academic validity underlying its TDA requirements, so this scheduling conflict was a concern. Fortunately, the academic review was efficiently completed in time to inform the USAMAA process.

In advance of the USAMAA study, Colonel Pick attended town hall style meetings with every directorate at DLIFLC to explain how he had briefed the Secretary of Defense’s office upon the mission hiring shortfall, requested a waiver for DLIFLC to continue hiring during the DOD hiring freeze, and was directed to undergo a manpower survey that could lead to an organizational

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92 RE_DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 8 June 2012.
93 Ash Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum “Civilian Waiver Request for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center,” 16 July 2012, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 20 July 2012. The original request had been for a maximum civilian authorization of 2,581 personnel. See Appendices A and B.
realignment. The staff at these meetings were both gratified that the Defense Department so valued DLIFLC to waive it in the face of an otherwise across-the-board hiring freeze, but noticeably nervous about the implications of a full-fledged USAMAA review. The review could and did result in lost jobs, personnel dislocations, and a general realignment of DLIFLC’s non-classroom organizational structure. Earlier that summer, likely anticipating recommendations of the USAMAA review, Colonel Pick directed DLIFLC to review its personnel and funding resources and execute an organizational realignment to be in the strongest position prior to the formal DOD study. In conducting his own reorganization prior to the USAMAA study, the commandant sought to fulfill DLIFLC’s mission while also minimizing personnel disruption. In June 2012, Colonel Pick approved a new institutional structure to meet the challenges facing the Institute in fiscal year 2014. He formed a special team headed by Steve Collins, to facilitate realigning various Institute responsibilities to better reflect DLIFLC’s mission, to reduce redundancy, and to increase manning of those functions whose requirements had increased.

USAMAA intended its first visit to brief and coordinate, to orient its team to the DLIFLC mission, and to provide substantive training to DLIFLC personnel on how to prepare the so-called “Baseline Submission Packages” that each office (or in USAMAA parlance “work centers”) would have to prepare during the Institute-wide study. The team also conducted planning and front end analysis. Most of the Institute’s managers and leaders were consumed in preparing reports for USAMAA for the next month or more. USAMAA sought such data as class size benchmarking/studies, class/instructor data for the past ten years, including SMDR and DLPT information, and work center designations and physical locations.

Meanwhile, DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office (OSD CAPE) had the mission to cut manpower somewhere else in the department to account for DLIFLC’s hiring-freeze waiver. It recommended postponing the decision on civilian manpower off-sets into fiscal year 2015 so that it could be informed by the USAMAA manpower review. A three-star panel apparently agreed in early November 2012. The Army reported the USAMAA results and its manpower offset recommendations to OSD CAPE in September 2013. The Army recommended prorating the cost of additional authorizations for DLIFLC among the services based upon the number of training seats allocated to the Institute in fiscal year 2014. The Army felt this approach fairly balanced growth in total DOD requirements and incentivized the services “to more

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97 Historian Cameron Binkley attended several of these town hall meetings in 2012.
99 See Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), DLIFLC Reg. 10-1 (June 2012).
100 All POM message regarding FY14 Transition Plans, 12 July 2012, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
101 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 14 September 2012; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 16 November 2012.
102 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 2 November 2012.
accurately assess language training demand signals to collectively improve course completion rates.\textsuperscript{103}

The data collection phase of the USAMAA study continued well into 2013. USAMAA looked at and questioned DLIFLC’s existing organizational structure, whether tasks it performed were in accordance with USAMAA’s understanding of the Institute’s mission and whether fewer or greater resources were needed to meet those requirements. Meanwhile, DLIFLC remained below the hiring cap of 2,496 civilians approved by its waiver. Hence, managers continued to hire instructors to train arriving students as required. Hiring civil service employees, on the other hand, took longer than expected, because TRADOC procedures forced DLIFLC to justify any hires outside of TRADOC despite being well under the hiring cap. Thus, after months of staff effort, DLIFLC managed to hire just two new civil service employees.\textsuperscript{104}

Brig. Gen. McCaffrey and Brig. Gen. Robin L. Mealer, Director of USAMAA, updated Dr. Junor on the DLIFLC manpower study and described the ongoing analysis and iterative dialogue between DLIFLC and USAMAA, whose teams were engaged in detailed analysis of the Institute’s organization to validate its manpower requirements.\textsuperscript{105} The USAMAA study involved constant contact and communication between a numerous contacts on both sides of the study. By the end of March, it became apparent that USAMAA would focus some concern upon DLIFLC’s newly developed academic network and would require significant documentation from the Department of the Army to justify an endorsement.\textsuperscript{106} USAMAA and TRADOC Manpower study leads conducted interviews and provided guidance in April 2013 to assist DLIFLC work center directors who had to create “manpower submission packages” for various offices across the organization.\textsuperscript{107}

Meanwhile, both to address USAMAA’s potential findings and budget uncertainty, DLIFLC prepared to administer up to $49 million in reductions. The commandant issued budget guidance and imposed severe spending restrictions that announced the ongoing hiring freeze (except by waiver), the mandatory termination of term appointments (exceptions for some instructors), banning most travel and non-mission essential supply purchases, and recalling all Blackberry devices except for key command and emergency personnel. He later made the unprecedented decision to cancel Language Day, the Institute’s annual community open house.\textsuperscript{108}

On 20 May 2013, USAMAA announced the findings of its manpower analysis and recommendations to adjust the Institute’s organizational structure.\textsuperscript{109} The study validated and

\textsuperscript{103} Maj. Gen. Michael T. Harrison, Sr., Memo “Resource Management Decision 700A 1 Directive for Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC),” September 2013. See Appendix D. Hence, USA-38 percent; USAF-35 percent; USN-15 percent; and USMC-12 percent.

\textsuperscript{104} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 11 January 2013; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 25 January 2013.

\textsuperscript{105} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 15 March 2013.

\textsuperscript{106} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130322.

\textsuperscript{107} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130322.


\textsuperscript{109} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130517.
recommended no change to the instructor-to-student ratio model that had propelled major proficiency gains among Institute graduates but that had also fueled faculty growth. In colloquial parlance, DLIFLC had “dodged the bullet.” Without this finding, DLIFLC would have had to cut its teaching faculty by several hundred, an event that would likely have crippled the mission and organizational moral for years. Still, USAMAA also proposed further data collection efforts to support or refute the Institute’s methodological approach to teaching foreign language, so the story was not yet over. The proposed study would have to be an experimental effort between DLIFLC, USAMAA, and TRADOC, and would have to last at least 64 weeks to collect data from the start to finish of all categories of languages taught by DLIFLC. Meanwhile, the main study continued to refine its conclusions while briefing individual work centers, many of whom had to prepare rebuttals to the proposed USAMAA findings. The final results of the study were still a concern to DLIFLC leaders grappling with the threat that the cumulative effects of manpower reductions recommended by USAMAA would drive down DLIFLC’s proficiency and graduation rates.

In August 2013, Colonel Pick broadcast a special message over the academic network to inform all staff about the final results of the USAMAA study and general budget cutbacks. Pick explained that DLIFLC had suffered manpower and budget reductions due to Sequestration. In fiscal year 2013, DOD directed DLIFLC to take and administer an 18 percent budget cut, which was a permanent reduction in future budgets as well. DOD then claimed another 10 percent budget cut in fiscal year 2014, which were also enduring. Budgets beyond 2014 were likely to decline further. Pick also explained the USAMAA study findings. USAMAA had assessed DLIFLC’s enduring workload, functions, and structure, and determined that it could complete its mission with less manpower, mainly by cutting the Institute’s robust academic support staff. The main critique that DLIFLC did not effectively refute was that decisions past leaders had made to segregate support functions, as housed under the Language Science and Technology Directorate, were less efficient than integrating those functions in either undergraduate or continuing education programs. Still, as noted, USAMAA did not demand a reduction in class size ratios or key functions of the Proficiency Enhancement Program protecting the large body of teaching staff from further cuts. Moreover, DLIFLC requirements had been reduced by DOD and the military services implementing process improvements, such as reduced student entry waivers, which helped address concerns about broader DOD staffing. As a result, USAMAA determined that DLIFLC needed fewer staff and cut its overall manpower requirements by 367. As such, in September 2013, the Army revised the DLIFLC manpower waiver request from 767 to 400 additional authorizations.

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110 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 24 May 2013; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 14 June 2013. Staff submitted rebuttals to USAMAA in July. See DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 12 July 2013.

111 DLIFLC Situation Report for Period Ending 13 Sep 13.

112 DLIFLC Re-Alignment VTC Brief_13 DEC 13 (Final) and DLIFLC Re-Organization VTC Brief_13 DEC (Collins Comments - 11 Dec), digital slides prepared to brief Headquarters, TRADOC, on USAMAA’s findings, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

113 Col. Danial Pick, video broadcast to DLIFLC, 28 August 2013, transcribed by Cameron Binkley, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files. Pick’s information was from an Army Secretary and Chief of Staff memo.

The officially approved cap for civilian personnel at DLIFLC for fiscal year 2014 was then set at 2,153 and was further constrained to 2,090 in fiscal year 2015.\textsuperscript{115}

In late September, USAMAA briefed the Army G-3/5/7, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding the results of its DLIFLC manpower study. Further briefings were held to advise NSA and other stakeholders about the study and its impact on language training.\textsuperscript{116}

DLIFLC was the only organization within DOD whose primary mission was foreign language teaching with responsibility for producing qualified military linguists.\textsuperscript{117} The Institute did not fit any other DOD organizational model and the USAMAA analysts had difficulty understanding structures created to manage completely unique functions. DLIFLC successfully defended its low student-to-teacher ratio, but was less able to defend the rational for its support organizations, many of which had evolved over the years as various government agencies had funded DLIFLC to produce foreign language materials or create new programs. Such evolution, however, had not corresponded to additional authorizations for positions on DLIFLC’s TDA. As a result, despite preparing for the manpower review by reorganizing and publishing a new TDA, USAMAA took exception to many of DLIFLC’s support activities, including faculty and curriculum development, the services provided by the Student Learning Center, and those of the Chamberlin Library administered by the Institute after the close of Fort Ord to support the military community. All of these organizations were eliminated by the USAMAA study.

Under scrutiny by the TRADOC G-1/4, Civilian Human Resources, to manage its workforce downward, DLIFLC began its academic realignment following the USAMAA study and to address budgetary uncertainty and meet its fiscal year 2014 manpower targets. It even expected to meet its fiscal year 2015 targets six months ahead of schedule. According to the commandant, this would be done “while taking care of our people and making mission.”\textsuperscript{118} Further details are discussed in Chapter III.

Sequestration and Furloughs

In January 2013, DLIFLC began planning to address possible additional budget cuts and a potential government shut-down caused by fiscal uncertainty and the Budget Control Act of 2011, which included mandatory sequestration in the absence of an agreed upon deal between the White House and Congress to reduce the budget deficit. In preparation, the Army directed the Institute to implement near term spending reductions pending the decision by higher headquarters on manpower. These plans had to note that other organizations, especially the Mission Installation Contracting Command, were also preparing civilian workforce cuts that would likely have an


\textsuperscript{116}DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 30 August 2013; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 27 Sep 2013; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 3 October 2013.

\textsuperscript{117}Special Forces Command conducted low level foreign language training, the military academies maintained language departments, and the DOD dependent schools also provided foreign language training.

\textsuperscript{118}DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 22 November 2013; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 13 December 2013.
impact on the Presidio of Monterey’s Garrison and communications infrastructure. In March, DLIFLC alerted Institute leaders, including the DLIFLC faculty union, and developed agreed guidelines to implement potential furloughs. Fortunately, DLIFLC projected a reduced student load in fiscal year 2014, which meant that it would need 258 fewer civilian employees than it had in fiscal year 2013, which helped somewhat. This marked the beginning of a downward trend in some programs, which then required careful management to avoid the problem of cutting talented faculty simply because their terms expired first.119 During this period DLIFLC began to realize the impact of legalities affecting its large population of H-1B Visa holders, more than 250 foreign faculty recruited under guidelines allowing employers to recruit overseas to combat domestic labor shortages. In May 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel excepted DLIFLC’s H-1B visa holders from furlough due to Department of Labor regulations, which also helped but created its own problems as discussed further below.120

On 14 May 2013, Secretary Hagel announced the imposition of department-wide furloughs for DOD civilians. Press reports indicated that as many as 4,500 DOD employees in the Monterey Bay region faced an eleven day furlough. Furlough notices were sent to all local DOD employees.121 DLIFLC’s plans were in place to begin these furloughs on Monday, 8 July 2013, pending guidance of higher headquarters.122 On 6 August, Hagel reduced the furloughs to six days for most DOD civilians due to a combination of Congressional approvals and DOD budget management efforts.123

Another impact of the budget crisis was to reduce the availability of merit pay to award exceptional employees for superior performance. With the sharp cut backs, Colonel Pick approved a one percent award calculation for General Schedule and Wage Grade employees for the performance year 2011, but in March 2012 he changed the procedure going forward to limit the availability of future award funds. The release of award funds for the 2012 performance year required his personal approval. Of course, the command promoted other non-monetary means to recognize superior performance.124 Perceived unfairness regarding the equity of the merit pay procedures used in early 2011 led to a number of complaints in May 2011 enumerated to the command by Associate Provost Deniz Bilgin, who proposed that DLIFLC actually redo the merit pay process for the Faculty Personnel System (FPS).125 In June 2013, Colonel Pick released merit-pay funds and merit-based advancements for FPS employees to be completed by August, a boost for FPS


120 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 17 May 2013.


122 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 28 June 2013; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 5 July 2013.


staff facing furlough during the same period. He said the long delay in issuing the 2012 merit pay was to make sure DLIFLC didn't violate Department of the Army policies on releasing funds. However, no pay raises, merit pay bonuses, or time-off awards were issued to GS employees.\footnote{Col. Danial Pick, all-DLIFLC email “Commandant's Merit Pay 2012 Message,” 28 June 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.}

In September, DLIFLC rushed to extend eight selected GS term employees. Their loss would immediately halt production of DLIFLC Headstart\textsuperscript{2} and Rapport products. With the government hiring freeze, term appointments could not be renewed without approval, in this case by the TRADOC commanding general. Fortunately, the positions themselves were validated during the USAMAA manpower study, but TRADOC only authorized extensions for thirty days at a time, creating stress for those employees and their managers.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 16 August 2013; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 5 Sep 2013; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 20 Sep 2013.}

“With deep sadness,” on 1 October 2013, Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh directed the Army to impose a second round of furloughs “made necessary after Congress failed to enact either a fiscal year 2014 budget or a temporary funding measure that would have allowed normal operations to continue after the 2013 fiscal year ended on September 30.”\footnote{Sec. John M. McHugh, Email message, 1 October 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.} Accordingly, DLIFLC shut down non-essential operations and furloughed employees accordingly.\footnote{SITREP_DLIFLC_20131004;} The Institute continued to operate only excepted activities, that is, mission essential activities during the government shutdown. Therefore, it could not deploy mobile training teams or send staff on temporary duty without higher headquarters approval. Language instruction and testing continued.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 11 October 2013.}

One of the odd repercussions of sequestration related to the 2012 Army ban on conference attendance. The new Army conference policy imposed restrictions on spending funds associated with temporary duty status used for personnel during short-duration travel, and known as TDY. Travel by personnel to attend academic conferences became nearly impossible, of course, but the Army’s new conference policy unexpectedly made it difficult for DLIFLC to send Initial Entry Training or IET students graduating from DLIFLC on to their next assignment. Normally, career

\begin{figure}[h]
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\caption{Army Secretary John McHugh had the unfortunate task to direct furloughs and budget cuts while serving as secretary but he expressed great support for foreign language training while visiting DLIFLC on 21 May 2012.}
\end{figure}
soldiers traveled TDY while IET travel was financed separately. Colonel Pick worked with Army authorities but had no choice but to continue sending soldiers who completed training onward to their next scheduled training courses at Goodfellow air base in a TDY status. Not doing so, Pick explained to his commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth, would exacerbate the shortage of barracks space and cause students to miss AIT class start dates in their training pipeline. A year later the problem continued to affect students who needed to use TDY to reach follow-on training assignments. In fact, during the midst of the federal government shut down, DLIFLC had to prepare a list of eleven soldiers so that the Secretary of the Army could personally approve their travel, a bizarre and seemingly unnecessary bureaucratic snafu. Fortunately, TRADOC quickly helped secure the necessary permission.

On 7 October 2013, DLIFLC’s furloughed civilian employees were directed to return to work. By 17 October, the Institute had returned to normal operations with the reversal of government shutdown. In late October 2013, Colonel Pick and Dr. Fischer visited TRADOC and CAC to conduct a workforce management briefing during which they gained permission to package critical GS hiring requests for expeditious processing by CAC and TRADOC.

Academic Review of DLIFLC

As discussed above, after DOD imposed hiring restrictions limiting subordinate agencies to fiscal year 2010 hiring authorizations, Deputy Secretary Carter granted DLIFLC a waiver that allowed it to continue to employ or to hire an additional 767 instructors above the fiscal year 2010 cap to meet projected student requirements. DLIFLC’s successful and almost unprecedented waiver generated “push back” within DOD and led to the aforementioned USAMAA review of DLIFLC. Probably the single most important question raised by those scrutinizing how DLIFLC operated was about its vaunted low student-to-instructor ratio, which DLIFLC adopted to help improve student proficiency outcomes. Increased linguist proficiency was a goal sought by the Institute’ major stakeholders, especially NSA. Obviously, if one instructor could teach more students, fewer instructors would be needed and that in turn would reduce the funding necessary to sustain DLIFLC. The problem, of course, was that a higher student-to-instructor ratio could also devastate proficiency gains.

The fear that USAMAA would conclude that DLIFLC was overstaffed led Institute leaders to plead their case to Erin C. Conaton, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and Dr. Michael Vickers, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. To bat against the powerful USAMAA, they would need to marshal an independent assessment about whether DLIFLC could provide proficiency-based advanced language capability more efficiently. Undersecretary Conaton subsequently chose to make the Institute the focus of an independent review and commissioned a team of experts with extensive experience in teaching and research related to foreign language proficiency. The review team was led by Dr. Michael Nugent, in charge of DLNSEO, and Dr. Dan Davidson, President of American Councils for Education, who descended

131 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 26 October 2012.
132 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 3 October 2013.
133 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 11 October 2013.
134 SITREP_DLIFLC_20131010; SITREP_DLIFLC_20131018 (Higher headquarters guidance).
upon the Institute in late November 2012. The team reviewed DLIFLC’s academic programs and methodologies, including selected DLIFLC basic courses, to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the Institute’s foreign language teaching and learning practices. Five language programs, namely Arabic, Levantine, Russian, French, Persian Farsi, and Chinese, supported the academic review by briefing their operations, preparing class observations, and coordinating sensing sessions with students and teachers. The academic review team’s report, issued in January 2013, validated DLIFLC’s practices and methodology, but did suggest changes to further improve the Institute’s proficiency outcomes. Most importantly, the team validated the importance of keeping DLIFLC’s small class sizes to help achieve proficiency goals aimed to reach 2+/2+/2 and 3/3/3 outcomes. In turn, the DLIFLC academic review helped deter faculty reductions determined by USAMAA, which did indeed give these class ratios close inspection.136

Colonel Pick gave much credit to DLNSEO for helping DLIFLC obtain its waiver to hire an additional 767 employees following the DOD-wide hiring freeze and thereafter to defend its student-to-instructor ratio, which was the main pillar of PEP, through the external academic review. Beyond that, unfortunately, DLNSEO was largely unable to influence other budget reductions ultimately directed by USAMAA.137

H-1B Visa and the Prevailing Wage

The complexity of administering DLIFLC became evident in May 2011 when Institute leaders faced a bureaucratic challenge that undermined both the moral of existing teaching faculty and the ability of DLIFLC to hire or retain foreign national instructors.

The Department of Labor set what was called the “Prevailing Wage for Labor Certificates,” a mechanism to establish guidelines for hiring H-1B visa holders, that is, non-U.S. citizens with specialized skills hired to work in the United States. These guidelines were intended to prevent the exploitation of foreign nationals and to encourage employers to hire U.S. citizens. The “prevailing wage” established a minimum rate that corporations had to pay for employees of similar qualifications, the idea being that if those employees were truly in short supply domestically, companies would be more than willing to pay that rate to hire foreign nationals with the required credentials. This process was intended to prevent companies who were simply trying to undercut wages and not overcome a real shortage of qualified U.S. citizens.138

The problem for DLIFLC was that the prevailing wage had risen to $69,490. Unfortunately, wage rates applied by DLIFLC’s Faculty Personnel System (FPS) never grew in proportion to those set by the prevailing wage survey and were more than $10,000 less than the H-1B visa wage rate. The situation created a dichotomy between U.S. citizens and permanent residents who comprised most of DLIFLC faculty. Under Labor Department rules, H-1B visa holders had to be paid the minimum prevailing wage. As a result, a tenured DLIFLC faculty member might have to work alongside a


137 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 4 April 2014, pp. 1-2.

138 Steve Collins, interview by Binkley, 22 November 2015.
junior H-1B visa holder who was being paid much more. Moreover, H-1B visa holders were exempt from sequestration and furlough rules, but not FPS employees, which became an issue in 2013. It was impossible to prevent faculty members from sharing salary information amongst themselves, so the situation created a morale problem.\footnote{Steve Collins, interview by Binkley, 22 November 2015.} DLIFLC could also not make offers to non-U.S. citizen FPS applicants without paying the prevailing wage set by the Labor Department and there were implications for already hired FPS employees who might not be able to renew their H-1B visas. As a stop gap, the Army’s Staff Judge Advocate requested Labor Department permission temporarily to set the prevailing wage for DLIFLC employees back to $57,600.\footnote{DLIFLC POM Update 27 May 2011.}

The Army then approached the Labor Department with proposed legislation to substitute a DOD prevailing wage survey for the Labor Department’s own determinations, but the Labor Department had several concerns. In March 2012, the DLIFLC’s personnel officer worked with the Army’s Staff Judge Advocate and other Army offices to address Labor Department concerns. In the meanwhile, the existing wage survey approval for DLIFLC H-1B and Permanent Resident applications expired on 14 April and DLIFLC became worried whether or not the Labor Department would extend its approval for the existing prevailing wage rate or replace it with a higher wage determination.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 28 September 2012.}

In September 2012, Colonel Pick received news that the Department of Labor had agreed that the prevailing wage for both permanent (green card holders) and H-1B applicants, effective through 30 June 2013, should be $58,274. This determination meant that the Institute would not have to pay H-1B visa holders a higher rate than U.S. citizens or permanent residents, but every time the prevailing wage survey was updated, DLIFLC had to repeat the exercise and so continued to coordinate with TRADOC and HQDA to pass legislation to remedy the situation permanently.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 4 October 2012; LIFLC Situation report for period ending 19 October 2012. At one point, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs asked DLIFLC to explore “regulatory changes” instead of a legislative remedy.}

The goal of military officials was to craft a legislative proposal to shift labor certification responsibility from the Secretary of Labor to the Secretary of Defense for DLIFLC foreign language instructors, but a resolution was not achieved during this period.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 28 October 2012.}

**Army Language Regional Expertise and Culture Strategy**

During this period, the Army continued to develop its language, regional expertise, and culture strategy, known as LREC. The Army was the service responsible for DLIFLC, falling under the Department of the Army’s G-3/5/7 (Operations/Plans), but the Senior Language Authority was lodged in the Army’s G-2. Meanwhile, the Training and Doctrine Command divided cultural training between its Culture Center at Fort Huachuca in Arizona and its language school at the Presidio of Monterey. Against this background, DOD was reorganizing into a regionally aligned forces model with each service responsible to determine its own pathway. With diffused oversight,
a broad realignment, and an evolving mission, it was difficult for DOD to determine the optimal structure and requirement for language and culture training.

Within the Army, G-3/5/7 took the lead to coordinate and deconflict various capabilities and to try and develop a coherent LREC strategy, but tension persisted. For many years, TRADOC had believed this function organic to G-2, that is, military intelligence, and the TRADOC G-2 oversaw the Culture Center. DLIFLC, however, continued to report through Fort Leavenworth up to the Army’s G-3/5/7.

Attempting to deconflict LREC led to several language and cultural summits. The first of these, in January 2011, brought together decision makers from the military services, the Combatant Commands, and other government agencies to discuss the “strategic imperative” to improve policies and procedures governing language and culture education across DOD.]

The DOD Defense Language Office organized the summit on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. Clifford Stanley. Stanley was concerned with the threat to DLIFLC’s language and culture training from early in his tenure and had made understanding the institutional aspects of its programming apart of his portfolio. During the summit some three hundred participants addressed the challenges of building capabilities and capacity, improving personnel management, and building partnerships. Dr. Stanley urged decision makers in industry, political, government, and academic institutions involved with language and culture policy and studies to discuss and promote innovative ideas for enhancing language, regional, and cultural capabilities within the DOD and throughout the nation. “We need to look at the entire educational system regarding language. This is more about America than the Department of Defense,” stated Stanley in his opening remarks.

Major themes of the summit included:

1. DOD needed a holistic, joint, and interagency approach to resolve language, regional, and cultural challenges;
2. DOD needed to value foreign language and cultural skills and endorse them as a professional requirement;
3. DOD needed to reform its personnel management system to reflect the organizational value brought by language, regional, and cultural skills.

Key-note speaker General (ret.) Anthony Zinni stressed that “culture and language have become as important in decision-making as the threat we face.” According to Zinni, possessing an understanding of the culture and geography of a nation was paramount in all military, diplomatic, and/or academic interactions. Many speakers recognized the importance of foreign language

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144 DLIFLC Sitrep 28 Jan 2011. Colonel Pick moderated a panel on language support to the warfighter.

145 Dr. Stanley was only in his position a short period before resigning after an inspector general investigation found faults with his performance as Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. See “Pentagon Personnel Chief Resigns” Federal Times, 31 October 2011, p. 3.

146 Clifford L. Stanley, Undersecretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, 18 February 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
training and its necessity for national security, but the need for industry to focus attention on the area for commercial benefits was also discussed. Perhaps the most salient theme of many conference speakers was an emphasis on the need for more language and culture studies at the pre-K through 12 level. Achieving that aim, however, required changing the way Americans valued foreign language and culture.147

In early March 2011, more than three hundred participants, including many foreign nationals and non-DOD experts on cultural education and training, as well as a team from DLIFLC, attended culture conference at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Fort Huachuca where the Culture Center was embedded.148 TRADOC sponsored the event, its fifth rendition. Organizers focused on practical methods to build cross-cultural competence in the U.S. military as well as other topics concerning military operations in multicultural environments. Lt. Gen. Kenneth P. Keen, Deputy Commander of U.S. Southern Command, was the keynote speaker. Senior DLIFLC leaders promoted the Institute’s culturally based foreign language training and education programs and products supporting culture training.149

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno, visited DLIFLC on 4 November 2011 to review how the Institute was handling the task of conducting DOD’s language and culture training mission. According to Odierno, “the size and ability for DLI to reach out not only to initially teach our young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines how to operate in a language, but also the way service members can reach back and continue to learn once they leave is impressive.” Odierno summed up his visit by proclaiming that “DLI is going to continue to grow and I think it is going to be something that we find will be one of the most important things we need in order to continue to advance in understanding cultures and language capabilities.”150

Figure 7 Conferences did not overcome the “stovepiping” of foreign language and culture training within the Army, but senior leaders engaged the issue, including Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno shown here wearing a suit with Col. Danial Pick and Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Tracey Bellotte in 2011.

148 DLIFLC_POM Update 25 Feb 11.
In mid-2012, DLIFLC itself hosted a language and culture conference in affiliation with the Language Education and Resource Network—LEARN. The Director of National Intelligence sponsored the workshop, which was for Romance languages. Celia Durall who managed the director’s cultural, regional expertise, and foreign language programs, attended the workshop as did Joan Majoros, NSA Associate Director for Education and Training.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 3 August 2012; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 3 August 2012.}

Other Army conferences held during the summer of 2012 continued to try and focus the Army’s culture and foreign language strategy. During an event sponsored by the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), action items were tasked to various organizations, including DLIFLC, to improve the professional capabilities of Army linguists. INSCOM leaders expressed commitment to assisting DLIFLC in increasing the quantity and quality of graduates especially by more effective use of language screening tools.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 3 August 2012.} Conferees also sought to improve the means by which to determine the type of foreign language and cultural knowledge needed by Army general purpose forces. According to Brig. Gen. Gordon B. (Skip) Davis, Jr., the Deputy Commanding General of CAC, the Army’s G-3/5/7 offices were “still moving lots of big rocks,” but he expected progress and asked Colonel Pick to continue to participate in future language and culture meetings.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 10 August 2012 and 30 August 2012.} In September, Brig. Gen. Todd McCaffrey, the Army’s Director of Training, convened yet another Army Language and Culture Enterprise conference. DLIFLC and other Army organizations continued to discuss the ambiguity of General Purpose Force language requirements, the need to refine them, and the status of the Army’s LREC Strategy and LREC requirements identification process. Brig. Gen. McCaffrey intended to hold more frequent meetings to shape Army language and culture positions for the Defense Language Steering Committee.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 21 September 2012 and SITREP_DLIFLC_20120921. Other participants included DA G2, ASA M&RA, TRADOC, LD&E, Cadet Command and USASOC.} He did convene a second LREC working group meeting at DLI-Washington in November 2012. The working group began to draft an LREC strategy to which DLIFLC submitted input.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 9 November 2012; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 16 November 2012.} McCaffrey’s successor, Brig. Gen. Wayne Grigsby, continued holding similar meetings in 2013.\footnote{SITREP_DLIFLC_20131025.}

Military service organizations also held culture and language strategy summits. In July 2013, DLIFLC Air Force leaders participated in an Air Force LREC Executive Steering Committee. In August 2013, the Provost office participated in a Navy LREC Strategy working group to discuss Navy LREC objectives and potential strategies.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 19 July 2013; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130823.} Finally, in November 2013, DLIFLC participated in a video teleconference to support Royal Air Force LREC capabilities, mainly by helping to provide inexpensive access to DLIFLC online resources.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 1 November 2013.
Unfortunately, there were problems in the Army’s Culture and Foreign Language Strategy. As noted in Chapter I, Col. Robert Outzen had written in the Small Wars Journal how the strategy was failing to live up to the goals of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. According to Outzen, DOD had done little to manage its linguist force to ensure proper assignments or to make commands more responsible for language readiness training. He was strongly critical of the Army’s approach to providing separate culture and language training.

At some point in 2012, the Army’s G-3/5/7 tried to resolve tension within the LREC strategy by resubordinating foreign language training from TRADOC G-2 and placing it under TRADOC G-3. The Army also resubordinated TRADOC’s Culture Center to Leader Development and Education at Fort Leavenworth, although the program itself remained firmly lodged at Fort Huachuca. According to Colonel Pick, this was an effort to bring the LREC strategy into better alignment, but it was not a full step. The strategy faced the considerable challenge of the TRADOC Culture Center being woven into the fabric of Fort Huachuca and the Army Intelligence School where it provided training for intelligence professionals. The intelligence school wanted to keep that capability. As a result, despite numerous conferences, professional criticism, and some organizational changes, the LREC strategy continued to be less than fully coherent.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs Center and School

For some time, Army staff had been considering the proper proponent for Civil Affairs activities, a question first put to the Army by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who had challenged the Army to justify why this specialty fell under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Proponency for Civil Affairs within the Army Reserve force was at that time transferred to the U.S. Army Reserve Support Command, historically responsible for directly supporting Army general and not special purpose units. However, Special Operations remained responsible for the function in the Regular Army and in 2010 requested permission and funding to expand the Civil Affairs component of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. This may have inspired others to relook the Civil Affairs situation in light of expanding requirements for linguistic, cultural, and social science training and given a generation of military officers now experienced in military government-type work. In 2011, DOD and Army officials began discussing the notion of combining the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Center and School with DLIFLC at the Presidio of Monterey. The idea was to create a center of gravity around which to forge a “U.S. Army Culture and Foreign Language Center of Excellence.” A number of confluences in Monterey made this proposal viable. They included, of course, that Civil Affairs activities required foreign language training and both the Special Forces and the Reserve Civil Affairs offices already sent their soldiers to DLIFLC for such training. As important, the nearby Naval Postgraduate School already taught the relevant social science components, DLIFLC already administered the language component of the Foreign Area Officer program, and various

159 Outzen, “Language, Culture, and Army Culture: failing Transformation.”
160 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 4 April 2014, pp. 7-9.
other related units in Central California could all be drawn in to support such a center that would concentrate cultural training and reduce redundancies.

In essence, the idea was that TRADOC, to which DLIFLC reported, should assume responsibility for Civil Affairs in the Army because the function was not well supported being split between two separate components, the Army Reserve Command and Special Operations Command. To work well when needed, the Army required a proponent, such as TRADOC, that could managed a unified training program supporting the entire Army. This element of the proposal met with support within DOD. It met support from DLIFLC, too, where the command would have favored the proposal on many grounds, one being simply that it would have brought a general officer billet to the Presidio, which had been a long sought goal. Although several senior DOD officials were interested in moving responsibility for Civil Affairs to TRADOC, or to the Department of the Army, to relieve the split proponency issue, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School continued to be responsible for the activity within the active Army. Meanwhile, some of the functions traditionally part of Civil Affairs administration were outsourced, including by those backing such novel concepts as the “Human Terrain System,” while the U.S. Navy dramatically eliminated its entire Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Force Assistance Teams. As a result the idea of establishing a Civil Affairs school at the Presidio of Monterey faded. Critics continued to argue that this situation had a negative impact on Army Civil Affairs by reducing funding and support for Army Reserve Civil Affairs units and lessoning interaction between active and reserve components.163

NSA-DLI Relations

Throughout this period, DLIFLC maintained a close working relationship with the National Security Agency. The agency continued to maintain a DLIFLC liaison office in Monterey and staff from its National Cryptologic School, Center for Language and Area Studies, visited the Institute frequently to understand better how it managed language training and the integration of key technical training requirements.164 On 24 September 2011, General Keith B. Alexander, NSA Director, visited Monterey to observe Levantine language training and receive a technology demonstration from students.

The NSA had a keen interest in the Iraqi and Levantine dialect courses, both of which were developed in close cooperation with personnel from NSA’s Fort Gordon Center for Language in Georgia. The curriculum involved learning a dialect from the beginning of the sixty-four-week course, a major departure from the way DLIFLC had normally taught Arabic in the past. Instead of focusing upon Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) from the start, these courses gradually introduced MSA vocabulary and its written script, as used in news reports while focusing more on understanding the spoken dialect. “The progress made in teaching Arabic dialects to native English speakers may profoundly affect the way Arabic is being taught everywhere,” said the DLIFLC commandant, Colonel Pick. The successful graduation rate of students according to NSA standards for the Iraqi dialect generated further requests for DLIFLC to teach Arabic dialects and


164 DLIFLC_POM Update 6 May 11.
thus the Institute had pilot courses running in all the three Middle East Schools for the Levantine
dialect, while plans were underway for the development of curriculum for other dialects spoken in
the Middle East.\textsuperscript{165}

Pick had served as a professional Arabic linguist and had used his Arabic in a variety of settings,
including in an embassy, during a combat deployment, and translating as a policy officer in the
Pentagon. He had seen the strengths and weaknesses of his own education firsthand and had found
himself wanting better command of the Iraqi dialect while deployed to Iraq where MSA was only
marginally useful. As a result, when Pick arrived at DLIFLC, already struggling to implement full
Basic Courses in the Levantine and Iraqi dialects, he became a major proponent of their
implementation. One of the first things he did after assuming command was to travel to
Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas to assess the quality of the program. Pick interviewed several
DLIFLC graduates of the Iraqi basic course and found they were thrilled with their experience and
their ability to adapt more quickly to the live mission.\textsuperscript{166}

In December 2011, DLIFLC hosted the second Final Learning Objective (FLO) enhancement
summit, which brought together DLIFLC faculty and staff and NSA experts, including Dr. Laura
Murray from the Center for Language and Area Studies. Hugh McFarlane, NSA Deputy Senior
Language Authority, gave the keynote address.

The goal of DLIFLC’s “enhanced FLO” (EFA) activities program was to minimize the gap
between DLIFLC graduates and cryptologist analysts in the field. The idea was to prepare future
linguists by employing sound language learning strategies, high-level audio selections with
purposefully imperfect quality, multiple speakers, and colloquial speech along with other activities
practiced in the field, such as grammar review, geography/map usage, target language research,
and English report writing. Using practical mission-style tasks, enhanced FLOs let students
resolve problems by predicting, inferring, and hypothesizing. According to Taek Chung, DLIFLC
had developed more than nine hundred enhanced FLOs for twenty-three languages and dialects.\textsuperscript{167}

During the conference, NSA expressed approval for how DLIFLC had improved and integrated
various activities into its curriculum.\textsuperscript{168} Summit topics included an overview of the
accomplishments and aspirations of PEP, and discussions related to the development and
implementation of the enhanced FLO Activities. Dr. Murray, Felipe Aguilar-Figueroa, Deputy
Director, Georgia Center for Language, and Susan Callahan, Senior Methodologist and eLearning
Strategist, addressed the issue of bridging the gap between DLIFLC graduates and cryptologic
analysts. In the afternoon, developers in various languages gave demonstrations of their EFAs,
with actual student participation in a couple of the languages. Summit themes included continued
training and implementation of EFAs at DLIFLC and its LTDs; FLO tests, DLPTs and FLOs,

\begin{footnotes}
called for a Level 2 or more in listening in the Iraqi dialect, but only a 1+ in reading MSA. Nevertheless, DLIFLC
retained the Level 2 reading requirement for MSA.
\item[166] Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 31 March 2014, pp. 2-6.
\item[167] DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012, in \textit{DLIFLC Command History
2011-2013} files.
\item[168] DLIFLC SITREP week ending 16 December 11.
\end{footnotes}
continued cooperation between DLIFLC and NSA, how to get more information to teachers about how well DLIFLC graduates perform on their jobs, and how to avoid making EFAs too technical. A major result of the summit was further NSA support for DLIFLC to continue to develop and teach EFAs.\textsuperscript{169}

In early May 2012, NSA’s Susan Callahan spent a week in Monterey working with various DLIFLC faculty involved with ScribeZone, a classified electronic learning program developed exclusively for NSA that employed EFAs. She worked with them to help transfer the first generation EFAs from ScribeZone to another program used at DLIFLC.\textsuperscript{170} The project seemed to go well for the next year. In June 2013, the European Language School similarly adapted nineteen Spanish EFA lessons for use at DLIFLC.\textsuperscript{171}

The NSA was also concerned with the impact of budgetary uncertainty upon DLIFLC. During a meeting with stakeholders to discuss the limits imposed on the Institute’s fiscal year 2014 structure load, the agency highlighted the importance of foreign language training upon its mission. The NSA was particularly keen to support DLIFLC’s post-basic extension program involving deployed language training detachments. The agency strongly asserted that any cuts at DLIFLC would have a long-term ripple effect across the NSA community.\textsuperscript{172}

Another NSA project at DLIFLC involved extending the Spanish basic course. The course had been extended ten weeks to give teachers more time to push students to higher language proficiency levels and also to acquire greater understanding of the Caribbean and Central and South America. The U.S. Southern Command had also supported the extended course, because its area of responsibility included nineteen of the worlds’ twenty-one Spanish-speaking countries.\textsuperscript{173} When the first of three planned pilot extended classes concluded in late January 2012, Institute leaders proclaimed it a complete success while NSA representatives attended and spoke at the first graduation on 2 February.\textsuperscript{174} After the graduation of all three classes, agencies interested in more capable Spanish linguists would have to decide whether to lengthen the course permanently. DLIFLC added additional curriculum to the course so that students had more time to address specific topics and more complex grammatical concepts. A major benefit of the ten-week extension was that it allowed enough time for students to conduct a four-week immersion trip to Puerto Rico, a teaching methodology known to improve student proficiency.\textsuperscript{175}

In late July 2012, NSA representatives came to Monterey to conduct meetings with DLIFLC staff in the areas of continuing education, security, scheduling, and resource management.\textsuperscript{176} In August

\textsuperscript{169} SITREP_DLIFLC_2011-12-16.
\textsuperscript{170} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120504; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130503.
\textsuperscript{171} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130614.
\textsuperscript{172} DLIFLC SITREP week ending 9 December 11.
\textsuperscript{174} DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 3 February 12.
\textsuperscript{176} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 27 July 2012.
Ron Carrier, NSA Associate Senior Language Authority, visited to help develop and implement the Sudanese, Egyptian, and other dialect programs. He returned in March 2013 to review ongoing Arabic dialect classes in Iraqi and Levantine and to receive updates on curriculum development for Egyptian, Sudanese, and Persian Farsi. The NSA team praised the progress DLIFLC had made in its Persian Farsi program and continued to be pleased with the effectiveness of the Arabic dialect graduates in the field. DLIFLC’s provost and other staff also made their own visits to NSA headquarters during the period to attend meetings of the Cryptologic Language Advisory Council.

Beyond dialect courses and enhanced FLOs, the NSA also continued to engage DLIFLC on such issues as the use of “super authentic materials” in the class room and improving DLIFLC’s test development program, that is, the rigor of DLTP5s. Staff from various NSA field sites visited Monterey to review curriculum specific to their operations. These typically spent time in the classroom talking to curriculum developers, teachers, and graduates. During such visits, NSA staff provided feedback on what they found, which helped provide faculty members with information needed to ensure DLIFLC remained in touch and thus relevant. In short, NSA’s role as DLIFLC’s largest client remained critical for the Institute to ensure that the school was producing the caliber of graduates needed in the field.

Congressional Interest in DLIFLC

In May 2012, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing at which Glenn Nordin, Principal Foreign Language and Area Advisor in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, spoke about the importance of foreign language training for the intelligence community. In summary, “No —silver bullet will solve the IC’s language problem,” he testified. “Not even an unlimited budget for contractor support or the build-up of machine translation tools,” he offered could replace human interpreters. And those, he continued, needed “time to learn a language well; no real shortcuts exist, despite claims to the contrary.” Of course, an unlimited budget for foreign language expertise did not exist. Moreover, there was an insufficient supply of clearable, linguistically skilled contractors while technical solutions, such as a “universal translator” that could replace humans, remained a distant possibility. Thus, said Nordin, the intelligence community “will always need to train a portion of its workforce in languages critical to its mission.”

177 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 30 August 2012.
178 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 1 March 2013. According to DLIFLC’s Provost, Dr. Donald Fischer.
179 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 7 December 2012.
180 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 4 April 2014, pp. 4-5. This type of interaction would remain important going forward. With NSA help, DLIFLC had adapted its curriculum to the challenge of teaching slang and dialect, but further change was expected to cope with yet unknown graphic “cyber space” requirements that were evolving quickly. What, for example, would cyber FLOs look like?
181 Statement for the Record on Behalf of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 21 May 2012, Glenn Nordin Principal Foreign Language and Area Advisor Office to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files. Witnesses, including Laura Junor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and Eduardo Ochoa, Assistant Secretary, Department of Education Postsecondary Education, addressed recruiting
To address the issue at its heart—insufficient trained personnel—the intelligence community was sponsoring a “National Foreign Language Initiative” to support undergraduate and graduate language studies at select universities, which included the DOD-managed National Security Education Program.

Figure 8 Glenn Nordin testified before a Senate committee on the “Shortage of Foreign Language Speakers in Government” about the need for military foreign language speakers.

A few others in Congress were also interested in foreign language education. Will Goodman, Military Legislative Assistant (MLA) for Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Adam Goodwin, MLA for Senator Murray (D-WA) and Michelle Lenihan, MLA for Senator Durbin (D-IL), and Lt. Col. Kelly Laurel, Army Budget Congressional Liaison, visited DLIFLC on 28 August 2012. The group received a command briefing, conducted Persian-Farsi classroom observations, received distance learning and online product demonstrations, and met students. The visit request came from the staffers through TRADOC. Questions from the staffers included how DLIFLC products could be made available to K-12 programs, what collaboration exists between DLIFLC and other executive branch agency language schools such as the Foreign Service Institute, and how the services were building language and culture competency in the force over time. The group was impressed with the students’ ability during the classroom observation. They were very pleased with DLIFLC’s online offerings and discussed the possibility of proposing an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for a pilot program with their states to support K-12 language learning programs using available DLIFLC products. DLIFLC staff discussed the Army’s ongoing efforts to support AFPAK Hands and General Purpose Force training, work underway to develop the requirements for regionally aligned forces, and work being done to properly scope language and culture requirements for the Army Learning Model. They highlighted support from TRADOC and the Department of the Army’s G-3/5/7 (DLIFLC’s Executive Agent) for adequate manpower and funding resources needed to accomplish the Institute’s assigned missions providing DOD and the intelligence community with important capabilities.182

Monterey area congressman, U.S. Rep. Sam Farr, continued to maintain his interest in local military affairs during this period. The commandant participated in Team Monterey, which was Farr’s effort to bring local military commanders together to inform the community about their personnel, providing incentives for foreign language study, improving educational programs, and the potential impact of budget cuts on the recruitment and retention of foreign language speakers.

182 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 30 August 2012.
mission. Three or four times each year, Colonel Pick met with local mayors, county officials, business community leaders, and congressional staff to discuss DLIFLC and other local military installations and their concerns. Pick also took part in the Monterey County Business Council’s Higher Education Cluster where he met with the heads of institutions of higher learning in the Monterey Peninsula area to discuss collaboration initiatives, including one intended to reinvigorate a campaign to promote Monterey as the “language capital of the world.”

Engaging Congress and local leaders was important to communicate DLIFLC’s national security and economic importance. Better understanding by Congress and local populations meant better support and some protection from the possibility of future efforts to shutter military posts, especially important because Monterey was isolated from the nation’s capital by distance and insulated from the surrounding community by being a closed post.

**Government Accounting Office Study**

The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2011 required the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent nonpartisan agency that works for Congress, to investigate certain issues to improve planning and coordination of Army and Marine Corps foreign language and culture training for general purpose military forces. GAO officials interviewed key personnel within DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps, and at DLIFLC to assess the degree to which DOD planning efforts aligned with Army and Marine Corps strategies, including goals, training approaches, and investments. GAO also looked at how well DOD identified necessary training requirements for Army and Marine Corps forces deploying to the U.S. Central Command. The study, which DOD largely concurred, determined that while both the Army and Marine Corps developed broad goals within specific strategies that tied training programs and activities to these broad goals, the services did not always prioritize or apply the investments needed to achieve those broad goals. DOD did develop a strategic planning process to better align military service training requirements, but the department failed to establish a procedure by which to achieve agreed upon priorities and funding obligations with the services. DOD also did identify the language and culture training requirements for military forces committed to U.S. Central Command, but that command lacked its own overarching process to synchronize those requirements. The command had no clear or consistent guidelines for foreign language training requirements, which languages were most needed, how long instruction was needed, or which type of instruction. For example, in 2009, the Army required all units deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan to undertake four to six hours of online language training while the Marine Corps in 2010 required a two-day culture course for Marines deploying only to Afghanistan. GAO also found that these requirement often changed, which generated confusion. Hence, GAO strongly urged U.S. Central Command to adopt a procedure to align its training efforts with DOD guidance.

**Board of Visitors**

DLIFLC’s Board of Visitors (BoV) continued to play an important governance role during this period by supporting the Institute as an external academic advisory council. The BoV was also

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183 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, p. 12.

required for DLIFLC to maintain accreditation as an academic degree-granting body. Normally, the BoV held biannual meetings but none were held in 2011 due to substantial delays caused by re-appointments and re-nominations, which had to be channeled through the White House Liaison Office.\textsuperscript{185} Only seven members were finally able to attend the March 2012 meeting in Monterey and that meeting only lasted one day. The board spent that day mainly receiving updates on the latest issues and challenges facing the Institute. The board did have an opportunity, however, to meet members of the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges (ACCJC), the organization responsible for conferring academic accreditation upon educational institutions.\textsuperscript{186}

The Provost Office hosted the bi-annual BoV meeting at DLIFLC from 31 October until 1 November 2012. The BoV continued to play an important governance role for DLIFLC as an external academic advisory council whose existence was required to allow the Institute to maintain accreditation as academic degree-granting body. DLIFLC leadership and senior staff briefed the BoV on DLIFLC’s performance and progress during fiscal year 2012 and the fiscal year 2013-2017 Campaign Plan. The board focused upon DLIFLC’s Directorate of Language Science and Technology (LS&T). Board members closely reviewed and observed all the LS&T divisions and made recommendations.\textsuperscript{187} Their concern for LS&T was driven, no doubt, by fear that a manpower analysis of DLIFLC might cut deeply into the many LS&T programs not cemented onto the Institute’s TDA.

In its recommendations, the BoV asked DLIFLC to reexamine its Student Learning Center “learning to learn” program, “possibly reorganizing the schedule for greater efficacy.” But the BoV strongly backed preservation of DLIFLC’s current teacher-student ratios as “a salient feature of the high quality of DLIFLC language education,” called the Institute “a national treasure and the best research laboratory for language learning, faculty development and integration of technology."\textsuperscript{188} Unfortunately, the next BoV meeting had to grapple with the fact that most of the programs deemed of high value by the BoV were recommended to be cut by the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency study.

The BoV held its next meeting between 31 July and 1 August 2013. BoV members visited DLIFLC’s Basic program schools and the school of Continuing Education, met with the schools’ deans, and observed classes. The Board focused its attention upon class size, program effectiveness, and best practices, and was especially interested in the potential impact on DLIFLC of the USAMAA manpower analysis review that threatened drastic personnel cuts and programmatic retooling.\textsuperscript{189}

The final BoV meeting during this period convened at the Institute on 11-12 December 2013. This occasion marked the eleventh BoV gathering since first the organization was constituted in

\textsuperscript{185} Some of the problems appointing the 2011 BoV may have resulted from conflicts of interest with proposed candidates who serve as Special Government Employees. DLIFLC issued “An Ethical Guide for the Members of the Board of Visitors at DLIFLC and POM,” during this period, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

\textsuperscript{186} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120323.

\textsuperscript{187} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 2 November 2012; and SITREP_DLIFLC_20121102.

\textsuperscript{188} DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012.

\textsuperscript{189} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 2 August 2013; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130802.
December 2007. DLIFLC staff briefed board members on issues recently raised by the ACCJC as well as the impact of organizational restructuring resulting from DOD budget cuts. The board’s main purpose in coming to Monterey, however, was to examine DLIFLC initiatives on life-long learning and how the Institute planned to maintain a continuity of instruction with its graduates throughout their careers through continuing education, in-person and online instruction, and an alumni outreach program.  

Figure 9 DLIFLC senior leaders and Board of Visitors at the Presidio of Monterey, including (top l to r) Dr. James Keagle, Dr. Robert Savukinas, Dr. Galal Walker, Dr. Robert Gard, Dr. Ervin Rokke, Scott Allan; and (bottom l to r) Col. Danial Pick, Craig Wilson, Col. Ginger Wallace, Dr. Betty Lou Leaver, and Dr. Richard Brecht, the BOV chair, in December 2013.

Academic Network Project

During the command of DLIFLC Commandant Col. Sue Ann Sandusky, the Army began imposing security restrictions on its global military network that inadvertently constrained the ability of DLIFLC instructors and students to access authentic foreign language material. The problem was simply that capitalizing upon language learning technology required effective connectivity while security safeguards were increasingly diminishing it.

In the spring of 2010, Colonel Sandusky committed DLIFLC to develop an educational or academic network, known informally as the “dot-edu.” The Academic Network was intended to ensure the Institute’s ability to meet evolving mission requirements. By taking most faculty, students, and staff off the existing and security-constrained military network, planners hoped to enable greater flexibility in the types of software and computer systems the Institute’s numerous language departments could access and use. This positioned DLIFLC to adopt new technical tools and teaching techniques quickly while allowing access to foreign language materials from native sources prohibited on the military network. Similar in fashion to the academic networks used by major California universities, planners expected the new set-up to be four times faster than the existing network.  

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191 Jonathan Russell, “Changes on the way for DLIFLC’s computing network, Globe (Winter 2011): 16. The decision to create a DLIFLC dot-edu arose from the DLIFLC Technology Roundtable, organized in May 2009 by then commandant Col. Sue Ann Sandusky. Soon after that meeting, DLIFLC secured approval to partner with NPS, which
A key factor that made the proposal cost effective was the foresight of the city of Monterey that had chosen years before to lay fiber optic cable throughout the city, including on the Presidio. All DLIFLC had to do to access it was to open its router ports. On the other hand, securing permission for this new network took a full year of command engagement. It was not enough to argue that the military network was slow or difficult to use or too restrictive. Colonel Pick discovered, however, that senior Army leaders readily grasped that their military network could only be further secured by removing DLIFLC’s hundreds of foreign-born faculty from it. Meanwhile, there was nothing classified about language training.

To oversee this project, DLIFLC created a new support organization under a Chief Technology Officer or CTO. DLIFLC hired the first members of the new staff organization, including Jonathan Russell as CTO, in late 2010. These then set forth to prove that the concept would work on a trial basis. Planners then mapped out the larger network and hoped to begin migrating large numbers of users to the new system during the fall and early winter of 2011.

In January 2011, DLIFLC senior staff conferred with the commandant of the 106th Signal Brigade, Col. Chris Haigh, and others to discuss creating a Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the DLIFLC and the 106th to guide the design of an Academic Network Proof of Concept (POC). The resulting agreement cleared the way to migrate the first 150 students, faculty, and staff selected from DLIFLC’s resident Dari language program, one of smaller programs within the Multi Language School.

In February 2011, DLIFLC staff visited Fort Leavenworth to update the Combined Arms Center G-6 (Chief Information Office) about the new network and the need to obtain a waiver from the Department of the Army G-6, which was mandatory to move beyond the Dari POC. Numerous conferences were required to process the waiver and the formulation of a concurrent Service Level Support Agreement (SLA) between DLIFLC, the 106th Signal Brigade (and its local affiliate called POM NEC). Discussions regarding the latter focused upon technical details concerning the migration from the military network to the educational network, 106th security concerns regarding the military network, and the required 106th manpower. In early March 2011, DLIFLC applied to TRADOC for the first $2 million of the $6.7 million funding needed to purchase equipment to begin building the academic network.

Meanwhile, DLIFLC continued to collect survey data about from its POC. A brief survey was issued to all 180 POC participants before and six weeks after the start of the POC. Average

193 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
195 DLIFLC Sitrep 21 Jan 2011.
196 DLIFLC Sitrep 4 MAR 2011.
198 DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011; DLIFLC_POM Update 15 April 11.
satisfaction level with the trial academic network improved from an average of 3.5 to an average of over 7.5 on a 10-point scale. Also, the network decreased the average time users spent waiting on computer resources by 8.3 minutes.\textsuperscript{200}

In April 2011, the Army G-6, through the “Global Information Grid Waiver Panel,” unanimously approved DLIFLC’s request to establish a non-military academic network at DLIFLC.\textsuperscript{201} In June, CTO reached agreement on all points of the SLA with 106th Signal Brigade that established transition rules such as mutual access, service baselines for POM NEC, and what a mature academic network would look like compared to the existing POM NEC network. DLIFLC’s off-post offices at Ryan Ranch were some of the first staff to transition to the new network. In July, the Army notified DLIFLC that $7 million would be available in fiscal year 2011 for its academic network project.\textsuperscript{202}

Because the academic network was to use Apple technology, DLIFLC procured an Apple licensing agreement that allowed DLIFLC products to be published on the company’s iTunes App Store. This innovation would allow users to directly download language learning material at any time and from anywhere without technical or security restrictions.\textsuperscript{203}

Another reason DLIFLC was successful in developing its academic network was the fact that the nearby Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) had itself already taken this step, setting both a precedent and allowing DLIFLC to capitalize on the Navy school’s pre-existing experience and infrastructure. Moreover, the NPS academic network approval authority, the person who basically decided whether a network was approved to operate, was able to serve both as the NPS and the DLIFLC approval authority.\textsuperscript{204}

On January 25, 2012, DLIFLC and NPS held a celebration to kick-off their academic network partnership. DLIFLC would “piggy-back” upon the existing NPS academic network.\textsuperscript{205} During the event, Colonel Pick stated his belief that “this project will serve as a model for others to follow. As we move into a more restrictive budget climate, it is important to find innovative ideas to do more with less.” NPS participation in the initiative was key to a successful outcome but many obstacles remained, as NPS’s Vice President, Information Resources and Chief Information Officer, Dr. Christine Haska, clearly noted. “This is a very new concept and is new to the Army and was new to the Navy as well,” remarked Haska, who found it difficult to convince senior DOD officials that “we could establish a stable, robust and secure environment in which we could serve the mission.” According to DLIFLC’s Provost, Dr. Donald C. Fischer, “when you learn language,

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\textsuperscript{200} DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011.
\textsuperscript{201} DLIFLC Update 13 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{202} Weekly SITREP from DLIFLC 29 APR 11; DLIFLC_POM Update 3 June 11, DLIFLC POM Update 10 June 2011, DLIFLC Update 24 June 2011; DLI Sitrep 22 JUL 11.
\textsuperscript{203} DLIFLC SITREP week ending 9 December 11.
\textsuperscript{204} Col. Daniel D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 31 March 2014, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{205} DLIFLC SITREP week ending 27 January 12. Guests included NPS President Vice Adm. (ret.) Daniel Oliver, Alec Arago, District Manager for Congressman Farr, Tim Clayton, OUSD (I) Director Human Capital Management Office, and Glenn Nordin, Foreign Language and Area Advisor OUSD (I); See also “DLIFLC/NPS officially begin new phase of network partnership,” news item on DLIFLC website posted 27 January 2012.
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what you have to do is to give students lots of authentic materials and a lot of opportunities to practice the language.” According to Fischer, “with this network, and the ability to go anywhere in the world – to anybody – and get materials from anybody, is going to really increase our ability to bring language to the student and therefore increase the proficiency of all those who graduate.” It would still take 18 months to establish the new network institute-wide. Nevertheless, due to budget cuts, the timing of an infrastructure change could not have come at a better time, according to Tim Clayton, Senior Language Authority for the Office of Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, who traveled to the ribbon cutting from Washington D.C. “This took a lot of risk and courage, and quite honestly, I think this is the type of initiative that our leaders have to start endorsing – working together to provide this type of capability. When the money dries up, these are the only ideas that make sense,” said Clayton.206

The academic network involved several concurrent projects, including “Network Core Implementation,” which was 81 percent completed by early March, datacenter implementation, a Student Identity Management System, and then the migration of faculty and students to the new network. Labor issues had to be managed because the build out required so much additional support and relied upon contractors and DLIFLC had to complete SLA negotiations with NPS to meet procurement deadlines. On March 20, Russell assumed responsibility for core network functions. However, some technical glitches delayed launch of the DLIFLC Intranet Portal.207 On 23 March 2012, the Corporation for Educational Networking Initiatives in California jointly awarded DLIFLC and NPS the 2012 “Innovations in Networking Award” in the category of Educational Applications for their partnership to establish a regional academic network. The award was presented at Stanford University.208

In April 2012, Russell began working with the NPS Director of Human Resources, the Director of Civilian Personnel, and DLIFLC’s resource managers to hire NPS employees to support the academic network. This activity was a stop gap while Russell sought approval for the same employees on DLIFLC’s official manning documents or TDA. The employees were migrated to DLIFLC billets once the TDA positions were authorized. Russell also sought to migrate the academic network labor contract from NPS to the Army’s contracting command to expedite administration.209 In mid-April, Russell connected the first 195 users to the new academic network. These users consisted of the entire Dari, Punjabi, Turkish, and Uzbek language programs. CTO also moved 750 users in several small departments to the dliflc.edu exchange email system, which began operating in April. The same month, the TRADOC G-6 approved DLIFLC to purchase Apple Macbooks and iPads for student use.210

In June 2012, Russell’s office awarded a contract to supply new student and faculty laptops and iPads while developing a centralized model for technology distribution and accountability. CTO also continued working with NPS to ensure award of the Phase II labor contract for the academic

207 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120210, SITREP_DLIFLC_20120217, SITREP_DLIFLC_20120224, SITREP_DLIFLC_ 20120302, and SITREP_DLIFLC_20120329.
208 DLIFLC SITREP week ending 27 January 12.
209 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120406.
210 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120420 and SITREP_DLIFLC_20120427.
network, which required teams to meet twice a week to ensure the award was made prior to end of the fiscal year. Finally, Russell reached an agreement with POM NEC to consolidate its “NIPRNET Datacenter” resources in building 344 and to retire the DLIFLC mission datacenter in accordance with the Army datacenter consolidation plan. As a result, mission specific servers and data storage resources were relocated at the Presidio and some were sent to NPS. DLIFLC’s own mission datacenter shut down on 31 August and consolidated with the existing POM NEC datacenter per Army datacenter consolidation plan. Finally, Russell’s office managed to launch a mobile security platform that allowed DLIFLC users to download apps to government owned mobile devices anywhere in the world without the assistance of a commercial vendor.  

In August 2012, CTO deployed the wireless component of the academic network to Building 614, DLIFLC’s headquarters, and to off-post facilities at Ryan Ranch. Russell’s office also identified Technology Distribution Center location for new Apple products, which were already arriving, and worked with the DLIFLC personnel office to finalize a space plan.

In September 2012, migration to the Academic Network stalled at 17 percent completed after a new labor contract was protested by a company that had lost a contract bid. The dispute took several months to resolve. Russell’s office and naval authorities worked to revise and review the labor contract proposals. In October, the existing contract was extended for six months, which helped get the academic network’s “Help Desk” back up to 100 percent capacity in October. Meanwhile, Russell’s office completed installation of a wireless network for the Persian-Farsi School in Building 848 and Russell finalized the TDA for his own office. He sought to create 14 new positions and to make himself a DLIFLC employee.

Labor contract issue persisted into early 2013, delaying migrations to the academic network for several weeks after achieving about 25 percent of the transition (1,600 students, faculty and staff). As a result, CTO was unable to convert all remaining DLIFLC basic program computers to the new academic network before the 28 May deadline imposed by the 106th Signal Brigade to convert all military network computers to the new Windows 7 operating system. This meant that the European Latin American, Arabic III, and Arabic II Schools all had to undergo a required migration to the Windows 7 operating system before converting to the new Apple-based academic system, a step that was otherwise completely unnecessary. The delay therefore added an additional hundred machines to convert. The problem not only required more time and labor by CTO but resulted in a short-term productivity loss for the affected schools. In February Navy support staff prepared to award the new labor contract, but expected the losers to protest, given their

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211 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120608, SITREP_DLIFLC_20120615, SITREP_DLIFLC_20120622, SITREP_DLIFLC_20120629, and SITREP_DLIFLC_20120831; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120907. Later, the Network Communications Command relocated its military network servers out of state in a transition that caused a general slowdown in speed for local computers using the military network.

212 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120713, SITREP_DLIFLC_20120817, and SITREP_DLIFLC_20120824.

213 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120907; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120921; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121004; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121012; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121019; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121102.

214 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121221; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130111.
history. Fortunately, at least DOD furloughs, caused by congressional sequestration, were not negatively impacting roll out of the academic network.\textsuperscript{215}

In April 2013, the CTO awarded a new labor contract (for a one year term with an option to renew) and began working with a new contract vendor who had to be educated and socialized to DLIFLC and the academic network project. At the same time, the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency informed Russell that it would not include CTO in its overarching DLIFLC manpower study, which meant that he did not have to re-justify his request to hire more staff. Instead, USAMAA planned to do a comparative study of three other military schools, these being NPS, the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point to help demonstrate the underlying basis for the Institute’s information technology staffing requirements.\textsuperscript{216}

In May 2013, Fed Tech Magazine conducted a video interview regarding how DLIFLC was using its mobile devices and the new academic network to enable student-centered learning and to improve the proficiency of its graduates. The video included vignettes with the commandant, Russell, as well as instructors and students.\textsuperscript{217}

On 7 August 2013, CTO began to migrate the Middle East III School to the academic network, marking the seventh of eight schools that had transitioned away from the military network with its onerous security restrictions.\textsuperscript{218} DLIFLC also began discussions with the Army War College, which had contacted CTO regarding its mobile device management requirements, over the possibility of partnering with DLIFLC to share resources.\textsuperscript{219} Meanwhile, in line with TRADOC guidance, Russell began reducing support for Blackberry devices and rewrote DLIFLC’s mobile phone policy in the process.\textsuperscript{220}

On 29 August, DLIFLC experienced a significant unscheduled outage that affected several military network web applications, including online language sustainment material, the Oral Proficiency Interview scheduling system, and parts of DLIFLC’s website. The outage lasted for six days.\textsuperscript{221} On 9 October 2013, DLIFLC experienced another shutoff of its academic network, reportedly due to contractor error. The outage temporarily disrupted classes and prevented access to DLIFLC’s website.\textsuperscript{222} CTO also continued to suffer a labor shortage due to an inability to obtain hiring approval from TRADOC. Despite such problems, migration of faculty and students to the

\textsuperscript{215} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130118; SITREP_DLIFLC_2013020; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130315.
\textsuperscript{216} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130426 and SITREP_DLIFLC_20130503. In establishing CTO, Russell had to choose between hiring contractors or trying to validate hiring additional civil service employees.
\textsuperscript{217} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 17 May 2013.
\textsuperscript{218} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130809
\textsuperscript{219} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130809
\textsuperscript{220} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130419.
\textsuperscript{221} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 5 Sep 2013. Called the Legacy Mission IT NIPRNET SQL Database.
\textsuperscript{222} SITREP_DLIFLC_20131010.
academic network proceeded into its final phase in late 2013, increasing bandwidth and capability where the network was deployed.\(^{223}\)

In December 2013, CTO complete two final steps in transitioning to the academic network. First, it took responsibility for running DLIFLC’s “public facing” website from the Network Communications Command (NETCOM), which still hosted the website on the military network. In theory, removing the website from the military network created a more stable environment with forty-times more bandwidth. Second, CTO backed up all student databases and restored them on the academic network. These changes essentially removed most faculty, staff, and students from the military network and afterwards NETCOM restricted DLIFLC access to all dot-mil databases as “read-only.”\(^{224}\)

This concluded a three-year effort to modernize DLIFLC’s information technology infrastructure whose goal was to provide a high-capacity computing network optimized to support audio- and video-based foreign language curricula. The academic network was also designed with a robust wireless capability to support mobile computers, tablets, and handheld devices. Students could use mobile devices to access their curriculum, an array of language learning applications, and authentic materials via the Internet. Having access to both Internet and DLIFLC resources on a mobile device reinforced classroom lessons with outside learning opportunities. Using the same devices, faculty members were also able to tailor lessons to the interactive capabilities of mobile computing. According to CTO Russel, another benefit of the academic network was that it allowed cyber-security personnel to manage the security posture of more than ten thousand mobile devices, use location services to find lost devices, and remotely erase all content on a device in the event of theft. This deployment was so successful that the Army War College partnered with DLIFLC to help secure that organization’s mobile devices. In sum, students spent less time waiting for technology and more time practicing their language. Faculty members were also able to deliver a more immersive experience inside the classroom while providing more engaging activities outside the classroom. Finally, development teams were creating more interactive curricula and language learning tools.\(^{225}\)

**Key Distinguished Visitors**

**Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta**

By far the most distinguished visitor to arrive at DLIFLC was the visit by the Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta on 23 August 2011. The Secretary’s visits was a positive experience for Institute faculty, staff, and students. He visited a Dari class, spoke with students, faculty and staff on Soldier Field, and met senior academic leadership and Service unit commanders during a command briefing. Impressed by their proficiency, Secretary Panetta told the students “you have come a helluva long way since the school started.” Col. Danial Pick presented the command brief, but Secretary Panetta already had a good understanding of DLIFLC history and the BRAC process, having testified in Congress on behalf of the school while he served the Monterey region as its congressional representative. Panetta was most interest to know how many languages DLIFLC

\(^{223}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 20 December 2013.

\(^{224}\) SITREP_DLIIFLC_20131220.

taught today, where students were assigned after graduation, and if they were placed in positions where they would be using their language. During his public address on Soldier Field, Panetta noted how important foreign language training was for successful nation-building, how cultural training “is every bit as important as a guy firing a weapon,” and “can help you save lives,” and how the military leader was “on the other edge of this, I think leadership understands the value of language.” He also understood that a key issue for DOD was how to retain the skills brought to the department by the Institute and the country’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan — “we don’t want to lose that experience,” he concluded.226

Figure 10 Rep. Sam Farr, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, and Col. Danial D. Pick reviewed the troops and spoke to approximately 2,500 civilian and military personnel at the Presidio of Monterey on 23 August 2011.

In March 2013, the Army participated in a Monterey-wide welcome home reception for Panetta, a life-long resident of the area, after he retired as Secretary of Defense. California State University-Monterey Bay hosted the event. DLIFLC provided a color guard, service unit leaders, and its senior faculty and staff.227

Secretary of the Army John McHugh

From 20-21 May 2012, John McHugh, Secretary of the Army, visited DLIFLC to learn about the Institute’s mission, to discuss manpower and educational technology issues and to observe distance learning and classroom activities. The visit went well and made the front page of the local paper the following day. The commandant discussed DLIFLC manpower issues and thanked the Secretary for his support of a waiver to OSD’s personnel cap. As requested, DLIFLC provided Secretary McHugh additional information in case he needed it to discuss with the Deputy Secretary of Defense or others.228 While in Monterey, McHugh said that language and culture skills were critical for the successful accomplishment of missions overseas both today and in the future. McHugh acknowledged that budget cuts had reduced the Army’s troop strength, but emphasized that that smaller future force would have to be “carefully shaped” and the “best of the best retained.” As a result, McHugh noted about DLIFLC that “the relevancy of this program, this

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227 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 22 March 2013.
228 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 25 May 2012.
initiative, has never been greater.” He expected that “those who remain on the ground to be more culturally aware and adept.”

Other DOD Visitors

On 19 April 2011, Lt. Gen. Robert Caslen, Jr., Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, made his third trip to DLIFLC to meet the military commanders responsible for the training and well-being of service members studying foreign languages. Caslen emphasized that DLIFLC received high caliber students, but such talent needed mentoring as well as access to the best infrastructure and technology to enable them to accomplish their mission of learning foreign language and culture. According to Caslen, there was a growing need for military linguists in the operational environment, which only DLIFLC could fulfill. “The question is going to be whether or not the Installation can support the increased demand of those [students] who will be coming here,” he said. “I don’t think what we are dealing with is going to diminish any time soon, either at the tactical, operational, or strategic level, which implies that DLI’s mission is going to become increasingly important and that there are going to be continuous demands for DLI support,” Caslen explained.

The director of Strategy, Plans and Policy for the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7, Maj. Gen. Peter Bayer, visited DLIFLC on 11 January 2012. Bayer said that new guidance from the Secretary of Defense announcing a shift of emphasis to the Pacific while still maintaining a presence in the Middle East, meant continued language training at various proficiency levels and that DLIFLC would experience “a lot of continued business” as the Army shifted its priorities around the world. Bayer expected the need would grow for linguists specialized in languages of the Pacific area. Bayer also affirmed the continued need for pre-deployment language and cultural training, although he noted that “we are never going to have everyone in the Army that speaks another language.” To get a limited capability, however, Bayer supported DLIFLC’s LTD model, which was “what is probably a workable mode,” he stated. LTDs allowed soldiers to attend training on location and DLIFLC had thirty of them around the world. The issue, said Bayer, was that “we now need to play that forward and figure out what that translates into and build a future, not only a training plan, but a resource allocation plan to match that.”

Foreign Delegations

DLIFLC hosted a delegation of Foreign Language Instructors from Kazakhstan during the first of March 2012. The visitors included six instructors who taught Chinese, German, Russian, or Turkish. They attended a Faculty Development program titled “Reflective Approaches to Technology-Enhanced Task-Based Instruction.” The Kazakh instructors observed classes and participated in workshops focused on technology in the classroom and lesson planning.

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event was actually part of an annual exchange between DLIFLC and the Kazakhstan Military Institute of Foreign Language that began in 2008. The partnership involved annual faculty visits and the enrollment of Kazakh cadets in DLIFLC’s English Language Center at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Significant differences in teaching methods meant that the visitors were likely to gain a lot to take back to their home institution, even the Kazakh Institute lacked SMART Boards, tablet PCs, iPods, or good access to other media. The Khazak instructors, for example, were impressed by how the students and teachers interacted, how students could change their opinions and express their thoughts, how DLIFLC’s flexible learner-centered pedagogy provided instructors with freedom to be creative and to regularly employ their own authentic materials.233

On 21 November 2013, a team led by Maj. Gen. Elena Knyazeva, Deputy Chief of Science and Training of the Military University, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, visited DLIFLC to learn more about how DLIFLC taught foreign languages. The group consisted of Russian military educators, the counterparts in Russia of Institute faculty. Lt. Col. Jason Weece, FAO Program Director, briefed the Russians about DLIFLC’s mission and answered many questions about the length of courses, linguist attrition rates, and the use of educational technology. According to Pick, Maj. Gen. Knyazeva was the only female general in the Russian military and a leader in English language training for the Russian military.234

Foreign Service Institute

Catherine Lamoureux, Educational Systems Coordinator for the Foreign Service Institute, and other representatives, visited DLIFLC in December 2013 to study how the Institute was integrating technology into foreign language education and to learn more about how it had migrated from a military network to an educational network.235

Bureau for International Language Coordination

In May 2011, the DLIFLC provost and senior academic leaders represented DLIFLC at the Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC) meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania. BILC was a consultative and advisory body for language training matters within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). BILC consisted of all NATO country Defense Language Schools. The theme for the conference was “Developing Operational Proficiency.”236 The next BILC meeting was held in Prague, Czech Republic, 14-18 May 2012. Again, the DLIFLC provost and various other DLIFLC academic staff members attended the meeting.237

235 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 20 December 2013; SITREP_DLIFLC_20131220.
236 DLIFLC Update 13 May 2011 and DLIFLC_POM Update 13 May 11.
237 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 18 May 2012.
Chapter III – DLIFLC Basic Programs

Between 2011 and 2013, DLIFLC had more than 3,500 military service students in residence, graduated more than two thousand professional linguists annually in one of twenty-six foreign languages taught in Monterey, and supported more than thirty thousand linguists worldwide through sustainment, enhancement, or pre-deployment language and cultural training. DLIFLC’s online pre-deployment programs, called Rapport and HeadStart2, had also become the Army’s choice for online language and culture training.238 The period saw the onset of major restructuring resulting from government sequestration measures and budget cuts that spanned the entire Department of Defense.

Provost Donald C. Fischer Retires

Just before the Christmas holiday break in 2012, DLIFLC bid farewell to its Provost, Dr. Donald C. Fischer. Fischer had previously retired from military service as commandant of DLIFLC, then returned to school to complete a doctorate in educational technology before being hired to replace long-serving former Provost Dr. Ray Clifford in 2006. Notable for either accomplishment, Fischer’s retirement commemorated in total 37 years of government service and was well attended by family members, DLIFLC faculty and staff, community leaders, and professionals from the field of foreign language education.239

Dr. Richard Brecht, Executive Director of the Center for the Advanced Study of Language at the University of Maryland, attended Fischer’s retirement ceremony and offered a summary of his accomplishments. Brecht, a noted authority on foreign language training, had worked with Fischer since he became provost in 2005. According to Brecht, Fischer “was the right man for the right time and he is leaving [DLIFLC] with every student having a MacPro (notebook) and iPad.” Certainly, Fischer placed a heavy emphasis on improving DLIFLC’s use of classroom technology. As commandant from 1980 to 1993, Fischer accelerated the use of Macintosh computers, used by faculty in the early 1990s to develop the Institute’s first computerized language learning materials. He also promoted the Army’s then new video-teletraining system to support language training for combat operations in Panama, Iraq, Somalia and the Balkans. Later, as Provost, Fischer oversaw the installation at DLIFLC of more than seven hundred interactive whiteboards in its classrooms while students moved from tablet PCs and iPods to MacPro notebooks and iPads. Fischer received praise from General Keith Alexander, NSA Director, who thanked Fischer “for strengthening the


239 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 21 December 2012; Kevin Howe, DLI Chief Retires—Again,” Monterey Herald, 15 December 2012, pp. A2-3. Prior to Fischer’s retirement, DLIFLC command staff had proposed a reorganization of the Provost Office driven by concerns that it had grown too large, duplicated existing DLIFLC HQ staff functions, and was susceptible to cuts during any formal manpower review. The chief of staff was also encountering difficulty in obtaining feedback from those staff who first had to report to the Provost Office. See Cameron Binkley, “Historian’s Notes,” 13 October 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files. Following Fischer’s retirement, DLIFLC realignment focused on the forthcoming manpower review.
relationship between DLI and NSA over the past seven years, it has been incredibly fruitful.” In particular, Fischer helped DLIFLC respond to NSA requests to heighten student proficiency by implementing the Proficiency Enhancement Plan (PEP) aimed to raise graduation rates to Level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable scale. PEP reduced class sizes by hiring additional faculty, improved faculty training, used more educational technology, and resisted military service tendencies to waive aptitude test course prerequisites for incoming students. According to Air Force Brig. Gen. Gunther Mueller, “Dr. Fischer drove DLI through the most dramatic and profound transformation in its history toward becoming the premier foreign language education and training institution in the world!”

Figure 11 Retiring Provost, Dr. Donald C. Fischer, an accomplished guitarist since his college days, surprised many when he performed live on stage before guests attending his retirement ceremony on 20 December 2012.

Provost Transition

As an interim measure while a selection committee organized to recruit a successor, Dr. Betty Lou Leaver, was appointed as Interim Provost. Right away, she immersed herself in academic management, began visiting school houses to meet with deans and department chairs, and observed classes. She also initiated a pilot project “Helping Students Become Aware Learner workshop for USAF and USA Commanders.”

A number of highly qualified candidates applied to succeed Fischer. These candidates made a series of presentations, including to the Academic Senate, before the selection panel convened in late April 2013. From 1 to 3 May, DLIFLC Command Group members, the Academic Senate President, and the President of Monterey Institute of International Studies conducted a Provost Panel Interview and soon made a final selection.

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241 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130315; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130328.

242 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130426; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 26 April 2013.

243 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130503.
On 16 May, Colonel Pick informed senior TRADOC and DOD leaders that the Provost Selection Committee had chosen Dr. Betty Lou Leaver as the new DLIFLC Provost: “Dr. Leaver comes to us with an amazing educational background, extensive teaching experience and in-depth knowledge of the complexities of the DLI mission. Her enormous depth as a foreign language educator, coupled with her energy and positive leadership style, will help lead the Institute to new highs despite our resource constrained environment. Congratulations, Dr. Leaver!”

Leaver’s mission was fundamentally different and more difficult than the one that had faced Dr. Fischer as Provost. Under Fischer, the Institute had grown rapidly in response to numerous new missions during a time of war. As Colonel Pick pointed out, DLIFLC never failed to meet a new requirement, but it had not necessarily grown as efficiently as it might have done under the type of scrutiny it now faced. Leaver had to manage a program going the opposite direction.

Indeed, just as Leaver stepped up as Provost, government sequestration measures forced DOD to implement severe budget cuts that spanned the entire department. Then, as DLIFLC leadership was assessing how to address a mandatory across the board budget cut, the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency announced that it would also be conducting a manpower study to validate the Institute’s workload and assess the number of requirements and authorizations allotted for faculty and staff on DLIFLC’s formal Table of Distribution and Allowances. For Leaver, the biggest problem was that various government agencies had come to DLIFLC over many years and paid it to produce foreign language materials or create new programs. Though this may not sound like a problem, it was because the money did not come with authorizations for positions to be added to the Institute’s TDA.

“We are not an ordinary military organization with standard duty descriptions that fit into a neat little box. The USAMAA team had difficulties understanding our structure, how our teaching hierarchy functions, and how support organizations were set up,” Leaver explained. DLIFLC did things no other military organization did. While they could defend DLIFLC’s core mission, Pick and Leaver had to look hard at, for example, developing on-line products, including cultural modules, language refresher or sustainment training, and different diagnostic products. Even DLIFLC’s mobile training teams and contractor operations were under scrutiny. If it was not directly related to the basic course or testing missions, it was susceptible to cutting.

Indeed, as a result of USAMAA report, many of DLIFLC’s organizations that were conducting support activities, including faculty and curriculum development, were severely cut. USAMAA did not support the Language Science and Technology Directorate and it was abolished along with several sub departments, namely Faculty Development, Curriculum Development, and the Student

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245 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 1-3.


248 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 1-3.
Learning Center. The Technology Integration Division had to merge with the Continuing Education Directorate.

Faced with USAMAA’s findings, Leaver “had to sit down and rethink how to preserve the functions that these departments performed in order to not affect proficiency levels of students in the classroom.” Ultimately, she determined that the best way to keep the most key functions was to integrate them into the schools. She explained this by saying that the knowledge of faculty and curriculum developers would become force multipliers who would create “a train-the-trainer system.” Colonel Pick worked closely with Leaver during the reorganization to ensure that former faculty and curriculum developers were not simply diffused into the schools as instructors, essentially losing their capability as developers. Pick did want, however, to remove some of the “shadow staff that had grown in the provost organization,” which he felt would reduce friction with the DLIFLC headquarters staff.

So, faculty and staff from the terminated departments began moving back to the language schools where they assumed similar functions as they previously performed, such as the production of new curricula or faculty training to enhance teaching methodologies in the classroom. However, now they were expected to provide on-the-spot and just-in time assistance to faculty and school managers. In the case of Student Learning Center specialists, they would help teaching teams provide ongoing, everyday learner assistance, not just a single introductory course during the student’s first week or a few individualized days later on. “The writing teams are also going into the schools,” Leaver explained. “They will be able to try out materials as they go and not develop materials in a vacuum but rather as a part of the teaching teams, which will provide them with immediate, valuable feedback,” in reference to curriculum development.

The leadership from the terminated departments were classified as a “core” of experts. Leaver assigned them to the Associate Provost for Academic Support. Their role was to move cutting-edge practices forward, conduct quality assurance, and certify faculty in specialty areas. Joining them was the Research Department, formerly part of the Directorate of Testing, which assisted with analyses and research to position DLIFLC to lead the foreign language field into the future. Personnel who had formed Curriculum Development’s core became responsible for activities generic to all course development efforts, such as overseeing scope and sequence, copyright, and production support.

New Provost Initiatives

In 2013, Dr. Leaver introduced several initiatives designed not only to improve teaching skills but also to change how faculty and supervisors related to each other. “Among these are annual reverse evaluations, in which employees are able to pinpoint the decisions and behaviors of their management that impede mission success (and a good working climate), discuss the critiques in an open forum, and develop “due-outs” for solutions to the problems presented. The reverse evaluation was intended to provide transparency and to change the mentality of “us vs. them” to just “us.” She explained her idea by saying that it reflected “servant leadership.”

250 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 1-3.
better if you don’t look at yourself,” she asserted. “You must know the tools, when and where to use them.” Other initiatives Dr. Leaver launched included:

- Helping Students Become Aware Learners, which was a joint effort between DLIFLC schools and the military units to understand better those elements that help students learn more effectively, such as recognizing the “invisible classroom” (knowing the unspoken roles of students in the classroom, such as the real leader, the nurturer, etc.).

- Mental Management Training, which involved coaching students on pre-exam stress management. The first phase of this program took off in March 2013 with a series of workshops on “helping learners become aware learners” that was offered to military service representatives and military language instructors to help UGE students.

- Diagnostic approaches to teaching, which used diagnostic techniques to find student linguistic strengths and weaknesses and working on specific problems in accordance with their cognitive styles; and

- Recall Protocol, which pinpointed gaps in how students processed language.

Stemming from such initiatives, in May 2013, the Technology Integration Division held initial meeting of the so-called “Appreciative Inquiry” working group to discuss how best to implement brain memory initiatives with the DLIFLC Headstart2 program.

**Academic Affairs and Accreditation**

Academic Affairs managed DLIFLC’s academic information and records and served as Institute Registrar whose functions included implementing all academic student policies and certifying all student degrees, transcripts, diplomas and awards. It ensured that matriculation processes and graduation and Associate of Arts degree policies and procedures were observed. Pamela Taylor served as the Dean of Academic Affairs while Dr. Robert Savukinas was the Accreditation Officer. In May 2012, the Academic Affairs Office reported that DLIFLC had granted 820 Associate of Arts in Foreign Languages degrees and had granted 7,349 since 2002. In November 2012, DLIFLC conferred its 8,000th Associate of Arts degree.

In 2012, the DLIFLC commandant moved DAA from the Provost Office and assigned it to Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Logistics (DCSPL). While working in DCSPL, DAA assisted in USAMAA-driven institutional realignment by analyzing numerous positions on the new and old organizational TDAs and matching individuals losing positions on the old TDA to positions needed staffing on the new TDA, what was termed the “Faces to Places” analysis. In early 2013,

253 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130328.
255 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130510.
256 2011 AA 1st qtr.
257 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120525.
258 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121130.
concurrent with the retirement of Provost Dr. Donald Fischer, the commandant returned DAA to the Provost Office.  

In 2012, the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges (ACCJC), the organization that accredits DLIFLC for academic purposes, directed a periodic accreditation review of DLIFLC to determine if it continued to remain compliant with the standards required to grant the Associate of Arts in Foreign Language degree. DLIFLC’s last accreditation review, conducted every six years, took place in 2006.

For the evaluation, the Institute prepared what the ACCJC called a “self-study document,” a report comprised of more than five hundred pages and seven hundred pieces of evidence to represent areas such as institutional mission, student learning programs and services, human, financial, and technological resources, and governance, including military leadership and board activities.

The process began on 20 January 2012 when a lead representative conducted an initial orientation visit. The full ACCJC team, consisting of senior college faculty and administrators, arrived at the Presidio of Monterey for three days beginning on 19 March. Members observed classes and how students and teachers interacted, held open forums, conducted drop-in interviews, and ate in the military dining facility. Their main intent was to evaluate how DLIFLC defined effectiveness in foreign language teaching while ensuring continuous monitoring of its effectiveness indicators. Dr. Gary Williams, an instructional assessment specialist from Crafton Hills College, explained that the ACCJC expected to see “that the institution has a good sense of its mission, of how that mission gets accomplished, of who’s involved in critical activities, and ensuring that the institution is effective at whatever it defines its mission to be.”

After the visit, the ACCJC team provided DLIFLC with its unofficial findings (which still required review and approval by the ACCJC’s governing body). According to DLIFLC officials, however, the visit went well. The team provided high praise for the professionalism of DLIFLC faculty and

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259 2013 Academic Affairs 1st Qtr.
261 DLIFLC SITREP week ending 20 January 12.
staff and described the Institute’s program as having “an ethos of accountability.” The ACCJC’s recommendations and findings regarding DLIFLC’s re-accreditation status were made available later in 2012.\textsuperscript{263}

While the ACCJC team offered much praise to DLIFLC officials, instructors, and students, it did offer important recommendations. First, the commission had concern about institutional decision-making, the role played by faculty and staff, and effective governance by the Board of Visitors whose appointments were tardy. Indeed, at one point in late 2011, the BoV was briefly composed of a single member. DLIFLC had encountered a problem formally vetting board members, a process required for all federal boards and many potential candidates could not pass the bar, mainly because of conflicts with other responsibilities.\textsuperscript{264} Meanwhile, the commission noted that the DLIFLC Academic Senate was well established and met routinely with senior DLIFLC leaders, as it did on 16 February 2012, to discuss a variety of issues from compliance with accreditation standards and good business practices to rank advancement policies and standards of instruction, signifying the functioning of internal governance.\textsuperscript{265}

Another concern of the ACCJC was that DLIFLC’s mission statement, while otherwise laudatory, failed to account for the fact that since 2002, the Institute was a degree-granting authority. More substantive remarks included ACCJC concern about the ability of DLIFLC to sustain continuous quality improvement. It recommended that DLIFLC evaluate its “institutional planning processes and systems evaluation mechanisms to ensure they are effective in improving instructional programs and services.” The ACCJC was also worried that DLIFLC was not adequately evaluating the instructional and support services it provided to students in DLIFLC programs at locations outside the Monterey. Finally, to fully meet the ACCJC standards, the review team recommended that DLIFLC establish a schedule to review and revise the Defense Language Aptitude Battery to ensure accurate placement scores and to minimize potential biases whether gender, racial, ethnic, or cultural.\textsuperscript{266} These concerns then became the basis for the next ACCJC review of DLIFLC scheduled to begin in 2016.

In a follow-up to the ACCJC visit, on 10 August 2012, Colonel Pick and Provost Dr. Fischer conducted a teleconference with the ACCJC accreditation chair to discuss DLIFLC’s accreditation status with regard to the transition to the fiscal year 2014 TDA. After this discussion, both were confident that the fiscal year 2014 TDA transition would not have a negative impact on DLIFLC’s accreditation.\textsuperscript{267}

In mid-August 2012, the Monterey Herald reported that the ACCJC had reaffirmed DLIFLC’s academic accreditation for the next six years. DLIFLC officials had known the news since mid-

\textsuperscript{263} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 23 March 2012; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120323.
\textsuperscript{264} Cameron Binkley, Historian’s notes, 13 October 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
\textsuperscript{265} DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 17 February 12.
\textsuperscript{266} ACCJC DLIFLC Comp Team Report, 8 May 2012, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
\textsuperscript{267} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120817; “ACCJC DLIFLC Comp Team Report,” 8 May 2012, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
July.°268 Besides meeting all requirements set forth by the accreditation team, DLIFLC received nine commendations, mainly focused on student learning outcomes, which was the focus of the ACCJC’s review. The ACCJC evaluated nine schools during its accreditation review, but only three, including DLIFLC, were reaffirmed without issue. According to Dr. Savukinas, accreditation told students “that the content and rigor of their instruction was college level.”°269

Despite achieving renewal of its accreditation, DLIFLC still had to interact with ACCJC as well as the American Council on Education. For example, the commandant asked Dr. Savukinas in September 2013 to consult with the American Council on Education about whether it could evaluate DLIFLC’s Headstart program to make it possible for service members taking that language training to receive some college credit for their effort. DLIFLC also had to file documents reporting major organizational changes brought about by the USAMAA, which raised concerns about whether bureaucracy-driven changes to the Institute’s structure would impact its ability to comply with ACCJC norms. Dr. Savukinas, however, did not expect the restructuring to threaten the Institute’s accreditation. As 2013 came to a close, he was more concerned about finding new highly qualified candidates to serve as members of the Board of Visitors.°270

**DLIFLC Wins Award**

On 26 January 2011, DLIFLC received an important award for “Outstanding Institutional Practice in Student Learning Outcomes” from the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA). DLIFLC was one of four postsecondary institutions to receive this honor. CHEA was a nongovernmental voice for voluntary accreditation and quality assurance with an advisory role to Congress and the U.S. Department of Education. CHEA’s mission was to preserve the longstanding leadership role of the academy in setting standards for academic quality without interfering with government accountability.°271

According to CHEA President, Judith Eaton, the CHEA review committee was “very impressed” with DLIFLC and even “grateful for the quality” of the Institute’s foreign language education. The purpose of the award was to recognize educational institutions that made exceptional contributions to enhancing student capacity toward achieving higher education. The award measured DLIFLC’s efforts to develop and apply evidence of student learning outcomes to improve higher education quality and accountability by four criteria: (1) articulation and evidence of outcomes; (2) success with regard to outcomes; (3) information to the public about outcomes; and (4) use of outcomes for educational improvement. Drs. Fischer and Savukinas, who provided the input upon which CHEA evaluated DLIFLC’s candidacy, accepted the award at the sixth

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271 Information about the award and process may be found in Col. William Bare, email “DLIFLC 2011 CHEA Award Winner,” 5 January 2011; and “CHEA Awards for Outstanding Practice in Student Learning Outcomes 2011,” ACCJC News (Spring 2011): 6-7; both in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
National Accreditation Forum. The award process included a committee selected from higher education institutions, accrediting organizations, and the public.272

Attrition and Production Rates

The attrition rate at DLIFLC was a topic of concern during this period. It fluctuated. As of 17 May 2012, the number of graduates achieving the graduation standard of 2/2/1+ on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) stood at 73.8 percent while those reaching the higher 2+/2+/2 standard stood at 26.7 percent. At the same time, the academic attrition rate was 9.9 percent and the total attrition rate was 19.9 percent.273 To focus more attention on the issue, DLIFLC began research studies to learn more about how to lower its attrition rate.

In May 2011, the DLIFLC Attrition Reduction Initiative completed an analysis of historical Institute attrition trends from 1990 to 2009. They reported some interesting results, including a major finding that the E1 pay grade was at the greatest risk of leaving DLIFLC. Pay grades E-1 to E3 represented between 70-73 percent of the student population. Another important finding was that the attrition data itself was flawed in that many recycled students were first reported to have left DLIFLC after failing their first language course, but then successfully completed a second course. When these students were counted as not leaving DLIFLC, it reduced attrition by 1.6 percent. Overall, the study found that one of every five students who started a language course at DLIFLC failed to complete the course, a 20 percent attrition rate. Without intervention, two of every five students completed the course to standard. One of five students, or 50 percent, completed the course allowing waivers for those who were close to the graduation standard. This left one or two of every five students who had some issue that DLIFLC might mitigate by intervention and more support.274 In the fall of 2012, DLIFLC began another research study focused on factors internal and external to the classroom to help identify areas affecting student attrition.275

Under Pick, DLIFLC began monitoring its “production rate.” While the attrition rate assessed the number of students that dropped out, it was not connected to the proficiency rate, which measured the achievement of those students who reached the end of their course and who scored 2/2/1+. Pick believed that this metric failed to indicate the program’s true effectiveness because it masked the number of students who actually began the program but later dropped out. Attrition was an important number, as was proficiency, but it was also important to understand how many students who started made it to the end and graduated at the minimum standard of 2/2/1+ or better, which he called the production rate. When Pick took command, DLIFLC’s production rate was in the low 60s. The Army’s production rate was only about 57 percent in 2012. With more focus on intervention, DLIFLC was able to raise its production rate considerably. The key to this

273 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120601. The DPLT measures three modalities (listening|writing|speaking) on a five-point scale with half “plus” steps.
275 DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012.
achievement, according to Pick, was understanding the holistic environment created both by the school house and the service units. If the service units saw themselves only as babysitters for junior enlisted personnel whose job was to ensure those young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines were wearing the right uniform, had the right haircut, attended formations on time, etc., then the production rate would not rise because it was a share responsibility. Fortunately, the service units seemed to understand their responsibility.

In January 2013, the commandant cheerfully reported to his commanding officer that the “terrific work” by DLIFLC service units and academic staff had helped to mitigate the combined academic and administrative attrition rate at DLIFLC. The total attrition rate stood at 24.6 percent, higher than reported in May 2012, but DLIFLC had raised the percentage of students scoring 2/2/1+ on the DLPT to 84.3 percent, which was more than a 10 percent increase. The commandant interpreted this statistic to mean that DLIFLC had increased its production rate of professional linguists to 63.6 percent. The commandant believed that recently adopted policies by the military services to decrease the number of students admitted to DLIFLC with waived aptitude requirements would further help improve production.

During an off-site retreat with senior leaders in March 2013, the deans of the basic course program expressed a number of concerns about how they were being held accountable for attrition rates. One issue was that there was no common standard per school. DLIFLC leaders set a base standard for attrition to be something on the order of 7.5 percent academic plus 7.5 percent administrative, but the goals were individualized by school. The deans thought it fine to have lofty goals, but that accountable standards needed to be more realistic. Understandably, the deans were opposed to being held accountable for purely administrative dis-enrollments that were largely beyond their control, such as the withdrawal of a student for family, health-related, or disciplinary issues. They were critical of the previous provost, Dr. Fischer, who they said had taken years to conclude that deans cannot be accountable for the administrative factors in attrition and, it seems, were worried that the new focus on production rates would hold them to unrealistic expectations. A key take away from the off-site meeting was that the attrition issue was a sore point and needed careful management.

Despite faculty misgivings, in April 2013, DLIFLC staff reported that student proficiency rates (2/2/1+) and production rates (2/2/1+) continued trending upward. Indeed, both higher than those of the previous year: 86.2 percent vs. 77.1 percent (proficiency rate) and 65 percent vs. 61.2 percent (production rate), respectively. By July 2013, DLIFLC was announcing the achievement of a new record for high course completions, proficiency and overall production. Its course completion rate stood at 81 percent, with 87 percent of those students passing their end of course DLPT for an all-time high production rate of 70.3 percent. The Army led this charge by

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276 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 16-17.
277 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 11 January 2013.
279 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130426.
improving from a 56 percent production rate in 2012 to a high of 71 percent.\textsuperscript{280} DLIFLC’s total attrition did dip slightly to 23.8 percent by September but the percentage of its students scoring 2/2/1+ on the DLPT remained at 86.2 percent.\textsuperscript{281} Thus, despite stresses caused by sequestration, furlough, and budget cuts, DLIFLC actually increased its production during this period while its graduates maintained the standard set for a trained linguist.

Annual Program Review

Brig. Gen. Sean MacFarland and G-3/5/7 Staff conducted the first DLIFLC Annual Program Review or APR for this period from 21 June to 24 June 2011.\textsuperscript{282} DLIFLC held its second APR for this period in April 2012 in conjunction with the Defense Language Steering Committee meeting that met in Monterey. The meeting was well attended by high-ranking visitors.\textsuperscript{283} Some discussion at the meeting focused upon the DLIFLC manpower waiver issue that was then before the Deputy Secretary of Defense, but much of the discussion was oriented toward how to protect the integrity of foreign language training and the work of DLIFLC in a more austere budgetary environment as well as gaining a better understanding of how the requirements process worked and how the services managed their linguist force.\textsuperscript{284}

The final APR, originally scheduled for 11 April 2013, met with difficulties and was cancelled. Colonel Pick personally briefed Dr. Laura Junor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness on DLIFLC’s program achievements and fiscal year 2013 initiatives.\textsuperscript{285} Later that year, DLIFLC staff presented the APR to the Defense Language Steering Committee during a 24 October meeting chaired by Dr. Junor in Washington, DC. During that presentation, Dr Junor praised DLIFLC’s progress over the past year producing the highest ratio of highly qualified graduates in the Institute’s history. She expressed confidence in the Army as DOD’s foreign language Executive Agent and encouraged the services to continue to enforce language proficiency entry standards as a prerequisite for DLIFLC courses. Finally, she strongly supported service efforts to review the career path for linguists and their utilization to improve retention and reduce the requirement of training new linguists at DLIFLC. Of note, the Army’s training director was considering developing “Additional Skill Identifiers” to track soldier skills associated with the

\textsuperscript{280} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 26 July 2013.

\textsuperscript{281} Statistics reported by Associate Provost Dr. Zhao, in Cameron Binkley, “Historian’s Notes on Command Plan Update,” 6 September 2013, in \textit{DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013} files.

\textsuperscript{282} DLIFLC Update 24 June 11. Attendees included Dr. Laura Junor, DASD for Readiness; Dr. Michael Nugent, Director of the Defense Language and National Security Education Office; Maj. Gen. Jim Kefler, NSA Deputy Chief; Tim Clayton, SES Director of Human Capital Management for OUSD(I); Glenn Nordin, Foreign Language and Area Advisor for OUSD(I); Cheryl Houser, NSA Senior Language Authority; Brig. Gen. Mueller, USAFA; Barbara Barger, SES for Department of the Air Force; Theresa L. Sanchez, DISL, DAFC Technical Advisor, Air Force; Scott Miller and Maj. Gregg Mitchell, DCS G-3/5/7.

\textsuperscript{283} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120622. Dr. Laura Junor, Dr. Michael Nugent, R. Adm. Jeffrey Lemmons, Maj. Gen. Jim Kefler, Barbara Barger, Cheryl Houser, attended this meeting, among others.

\textsuperscript{284} DLIFLC transcription of paraphrased notes taken at Annual Program Review, 28 June 2012, in \textit{DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013} files.

\textsuperscript{285} RE_DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 11 April 2013.
Regionally Aligned Forces idea while the Army’s G-2 was reviewing linguist management issues through a TRADOC study scheduled for completion by May 2014.\textsuperscript{286}

Language Schools and Reorganization

In 2011, DLIFLC had more than 1,700 international faculty members, of which 98 percent were native speakers of the languages they taught. More than 40 percent of these instructors held an M.A. degree while 16 percent held a Ph.D. DLIFLC faculty came to teaching from a wide variety of experiences. While some were former government or military officials in their native lands, many others were musicians, authors, artists, as well as educators.\textsuperscript{287} There were eight undergraduate schools loosely based upon geographic or cultural affinities and each headed by a dean, who rotated with some frequency. Although the period began and ended with eight schools consideration was given to creating up to eleven schools and there were organizational adjustments as noted below. All of the deans continued to report throughout the period to Dr. Jielu Zhao, Associate Provost for Undergraduate Education. Zhao served as the chief instructional officer for the eight language schools. From 2010 until 2013, the Dean of Students was Lt. Col. Gregory P. Christiansen, who was an U.S. Air Force intelligence officer. Effective 14 June 2013, Lt. Col. Robert Lisch replaced Christiansen.\textsuperscript{288}

The main issue during this period was budgetary uncertainty, which forced DLIFLC’s schools to grapple with the threat of reduced resources. Some online projects and Mobile Training team training support had to be delayed due to a lack of programmers and the transfer of faculty from these programs to maintain sufficient staffing in the Institute’s Basic Courses during a hiring freeze. The undergraduate schools had to look at other options to reduce spending, such as reducing study hall hours (which required overtime compensation).\textsuperscript{289} More dramatically, the schools were affected by the USAMAA findings that eliminated various departments and required DLIFLC to implement a major restructuring.

On the other hand, even before the USAMAA review, Colonel Pick himself was apparently worried that DLIFLC had wandered too far from its two core missions of professional foreign language training and proficiency foreign language test development. He concluded that “if you were an instructor and you could get out of the basic course to go somewhere else, you would. Because the basic course was hard. It was set hours, high standards. Students either passed or they didn’t and you were assessed accordingly. Long hours of preparation outside of class, all of that.” Pick believed that the faculty were motivated to get into Faculty Development or Curriculum Development, or sought positions teaching short courses at an LTD or in an intermediate or advanced course where instructors dealt with seasoned and motivated students. Basically, many faculty wanted out of Undergraduate Education, which created deficiencies in the core mission. According to Pick, basic courses in Arabic, Persian Farsi, Dari, Pashtu, and several other languages

\textsuperscript{286} SITREP_DLIFLC_20131025; DLIFLC Situation Report for period ending 25 October 2013.

\textsuperscript{287} Faculty & Staff Life, 2011, www.dliflc.edu, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

\textsuperscript{288} Dean of Students, www.dliflc.edu, February 2013, biographical profile; and All-POM email, “Introducing Lt Col Lisch as New Dean of Students,” 14 June 2013, both in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

\textsuperscript{289} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120504; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130201.
were “significantly undermanned” and the Institute could not hire fast enough to keep instructors in those classes.\footnote{Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 31 March 2014, pp. 6-7.}

When external hiring restraints began to make staffing primary mission functions difficult, Pick decided to take DLIFLC in a new personnel management direction. He empowered his personnel chief to move faculty to where they were most needed for an optimal “internal human resource allocation,” as he termed it. Pick was confronted with a shortage of instructors, especially in Arabic and Persian Farsi Basic Courses. He looked at the Arabic faculty and found that while teaching staff were undermanned DLIFLC still had other Arabic faculty who were not teaching but working in support positions such as Curriculum Development. Why not return those faculty to teaching to prevent proficiency losses or cancelled classes? But moving faculty to maximize efficiency went against the Institute’s institutional culture. Some senior academic leaders opposed his initiative. And Pick found he had to overcome the formidable bureaucracy of the Provost Office under Dr. Fischer. As he put it, “in terms of staff functions what I found in the headquarters is the DLI staff wasn’t really the DLI staff. The DLI staff was the Building 614 staff.” By which he meant his headquarters was not empowered to shape the institution because the Provost Office had taken it over. As Pick set out to achieve the goal of a more fluid internal personnel management, he found himself battling the “essentially shadow staff functions within the provost organization that in many cases duplicated what the institute staff was.” The tension this situation created, he stated plainly, eventually led to Dr. Fischer’s retirement.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 8-11.}

Colonel Pick saw other personnel management processes that needed reform, including, for example, faculty rank advancement. However, at least DLIFLC had a faulty rank advancement program and provided merit pay.\footnote{Ibid., p. 11.} He left this reform for his successors as his own time was absorbed by managing the overarching problem that DLIFLC had hired more than five hundred faculty than it was authorized to have. That was not a mistake, the mission required that staffing. Unfortunately, DLIFLC had hired quickly to staff its mission requirements over the preceding decade of rapid growth, but it was only after DOD began to constrain such growth, that is, by reducing civilian manpower levels to those that existed in 2010, that Institute leaders suddenly realized their vulnerability to having an outdated manpower documentation. With hundreds of civilians more than its authorizations, Pick set out to get approval to be able to hire the additional personnel necessary to train the load and also to stabilize his work force. That resulted in a memorandum signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on 16 July 2012 that approved DLIFLC to hire 767 staff above its 2010 limit. The USAMAA manpower study then ensued directly from the Institute having “skylined ourselves bigger than Stuttgart” drawing not a lot of attention within DOD where virtually every other organization was downsizing. But ultimately the department supported the requirements for DLIFLC. The manpower study later determined that DLIFLC needed somewhere in the neighborhood of 2,153 civilians to function. Although its
high water mark was around 2,350, the hire waiver allowed managers to hire the right staff for the current mission while managing the work force downward.293

USAMAA Impact on DLIFLC Schools

Analyists of the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency were not equipped to understand DLIFLC, according to Provost Dr. Betty Lou Leaver, because there was no other organization like it within DOD. As she noted, “the USAMAA team had difficulties understanding our structure, how our teaching hierarchy functioned, and how support organizations were set up.”294 This assessment was likely true, but Colonel Pick, as commandant, also had independent concerns about faculty motivation that played a significant role in how DLIFLC responded to USAMAA’s findings. He believed that DLIFLC “had people doing missions of less important priority while there was the core mission wanting” for personnel.295 Hence, while the USAMAA study drove the DLIFLC reorganization, the commandant’s view on this key issue, influenced how key changes were implemented.

USAMAA determined that many DLIFLC organizations within the Language Science and Technology Directorate, namely Faculty Development, Curriculum Development, and the Student Learning Center, were not mission essential and their required functions were not efficiently structured. Colonel Pick thought these programs were vital to maintaining student proficiency. However, he also felt their separate existence outside the Undergraduate Education Directorate created an incentive for faculty to abandon teaching in the basic program. Thus, while he and other DLIFLC leaders may have disagreed with USAMAA’s findings, they used those findings to implement USAMAA-compliant structural changes re-emphasizing DLIFLC’s core function by eliminating support structures that tended to attract faculty away from teaching. Implementation itself was quite complex as the Provost Office and the Command Group became involved in developing transition plans and coordinating personnel moves across the directorates.296 What they did was to integrate into the schools those key functions lost with the demise of various departments. Faculty developers, therefore, had to become teachers again, a notion touted by the Dr. Leaver as bringing their mentoring skills into the schools to serve “as a force multiplier” and to implement “a train-the-trainer system.” In moving course developers to the schools, where they had once resided many years before, she extolled how they would be able to solicit immediate feedback from instructors as members of teaching teams rather than having to develop them off-site in a vacuum.297

From late 2012 to 2013 various ideas floated to create address issues caused by the merger of Language Science and Technology with Undergraduate Education Directorate, especially the need to curtail the number of employees any one manager would have to supervise as a result of faculty transfers. Department chairs already supervised more employees than the recommended fourteen.

One proposal divided the Basic Course program into two directorates each under an equivalent associate provost. Another proposal, which actually got as far as the commandant’s approval, was to create an additional school, but USAMAA did not validate the management overhead for an additional school and the commandant rescinded this plan after it became clear that the student load was decreasing with the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, DLIFLC proposed to empower team leaders as supervisors by combining two teaching teams under a single branch chief who remained a teacher with a reduced teaching load but oversight for eleven teachers. Three branch chiefs would then have reported to each department chair. The command thought this arrangement might make supervision of the schools more manageable while incentivizing new branch chiefs through lighter teaching responsibilities and freeing department chairs to focus on the quality of instruction. The commandant, however, wanted to see how the proposed scheme would work and directed a six-month proof of concept using Arabic teaching teams. He asked the provost and the schools to carefully “think thru [sic]” the branch chief selection process and ultimately decided against the proposal.

Figure 13 Briefing slides showing tenets underlying DLIFLC’s fiscal year 2014 realignment along with an unadopted branch chief team leader proposal driven by the integration of LS&T and UGE, October 2013.

During the realignment, DLIFLC disestablished Faculty Development, Curriculum Development, and the Student Learning Center, undercutting the basis for the entire Language Science and Technology Directorate, which was also disestablished. With command assistance, Dr. Leaver integrated their staff into the eight undergraduate schools as their departments were eliminated. LS&T’s Technology Integration division was merged with the existing Continuing Education Directorate. With these moves, the schools gained direct access to the functions brought to them and potentially greater teacher buy-in for curricular materials developed within the schools. The reorganization, of course, had drawbacks, too. These included a slower pace for

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299 Ibid.; Steve Collins, Chief of Staff, draft DLIFLC Command History 2011-13 comments, 5 May 2017. Provost Betty Lou Leaver originally recommended Chinese teams for the pilot program, but the commandant was an Arabic speaker.
300 “Provost Restructure Brief,” 31 October 2013, see slide 35. The expected student load had also declined.
curricular development, more decentralized lessons learned, dispersed expertise that was formally concentrated, less standardization, and increased space requirements for each school. To some extent, the oversight burden for associate provost for the already large undergraduate education organization was also increased. DLIFLC had to choose a path forward, however, and this option was that choice.

After Colonel Pick approved the changes, Leaver stated optimistically how the reorganization would bring “cross fertilization, people working together, sharing knowledge.” The process, of course, was clearly painful, the changes disruptive, and the outcome uncertain. The commandant worried, for example, that moving SLC experts into the schools risked the possibility that the one week introductory language course would be absorbed into the rest of the basic course losing its distinctive educational value. For that reason, he directed that course always be taught in a separate physical location from straight language instruction courses.

Remaining functions of LS&T were grouped under a newly formed directorate called the “Associate Provost for Academic Support.” This office was to manage curriculum development quality control, surge requirements, and contracting for the curriculum needs of small language departments that would not receive former LS&T staff. To help oversee quality assurance, and also to help certify faculty in specialty areas, Dr. Leaver assigned Academic Support a small core of LS&T subject matter experts. Academic Support sought to oversee curriculum development activities generic to all course development efforts throughout the schools, such as overseeing scope and sequence, copyright, and production support. The Research Department of the Directorate of Testing was also moved to Academic Support with the mission to conduct research and analysis leading to better future foreign language instruction.

UGE Offsite and Dean’s Concerns

The strain of budgetary uncertainty and the Institute-wide reorganization was having an impact on morale. The undergraduate schools held an offsite meeting at Hermann Hall at the Naval Postgraduate School on 15 March 2013 to facilitate strategic planning and better communication between the school deans and the provost and assistant commandant. Dr. Zhao led the offsite meeting. The deans were concerned about many things, especially the many negative factors affecting learning outcomes beyond their control. For example, the reorganization had led to personnel transfers over which the deans had no control. Some were upset that they were still required to be accountable for learning outcomes even though they may have inherited problem employees that they did not themselves hire. Zhao counseled them to make changes from the bottom where they had control, remain positive, and provide positive reinforcement for subordinates, and assured them that DLIFLC would back them with legal support if taken to civil court on the basis of having fulfilled official duties. The deans were also concerned about being held accountable for administrative attrition rates over which they had no control, but academic attrition was also a problem for them. They noted, for example, that service members who did not want to study their language or were brought to DLIFLC through a waiver of a low aptitude test.


302 “Provost Restructure Brief,” 31 October 2013, see slide 25.

score or who did not even want to be in the military were hard to teach. Finally, the deans wanted flexibility in using overtime beyond the authorized use for one-on-one study hall support, for example, to continue preparing materials for an Urdu pilot extension course. Assistant Commandant Colonel Ryan, however, held a firm line on this point and insisted that prior to asking for overtime the deans should examine other options such as borrowing underutilized staff from other schools. She also suggested the deans look at what their people were actually doing with their time to be sure they were being efficient and doing their job. In an austere resource environment, the command was only willing to pay overtime for tutoring that directly impacted the Institute’s primary mission.

Labor Union Concerns

For many years, DLIFLC had followed a policy of rotating language department chairs after they had held that position for five years. This practice increased opportunities for faulty leadership and provided management a means to judge good managers and presumably also to remove less good ones. In 2010, DLIFLC’s employee union, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Local 1263, requested that the commandant restate the current policy. Union representatives met with the vice-provost for undergraduate studies and learned that the policy would continue and that management viewed its implementation as important. In 2011, however, after several members again asked about the policy, the Union contacted the Civilian Personnel Accounting Center to specify the current policy and was surprised to learn that the Institute had suspended the policy of chair rotation in several schools for unknown reasons.

The biggest concern for AFGE Local 1263 during this period was the USAMAA-driven reorganization of DLIFLC, which was governed both by regulations and an existing agreement with the union signed on 18 January 1991. On 14 February 2013, the commandant issued a policy memorandum specifying how DLIFLC would comply with these arrangements in managing a largescale reorganization that would result in the loss of certain positions and the creation of new ones. The policy specified the goal of retaining qualified faculty and staff and matching those dislocated to the most appropriate new positions using a review of the affected personnel’s educational backgrounds, performance reviews, and supervisor recommendations. Nevertheless, the process of managing the transition brought numerous issues before the Union. Many persons serving in temporary appointments were subject to job loss without a new position necessarily being available while others would have to compete by application for positions advertised, especially for those seeking Civil Service appointments.

Asian Schools

There were two Asian schools, Asian I and II, consolidated from three in 2009. Dr. Luba Grant was the dean of Asian I. Dr. A. Clive Roberts remained the dean of Asian II, the position to which

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he was appointed when DLIFLC announced the merger of Asian II and III, both having been Korean schools.\footnote{This merger is discussed in the \textit{DLIFLC 2008-2010 Command History}, see pages 66-68.} Asian I taught Chinese, Japanese, Tagalog, and Thai (until phased out). Asian II taught only Korean.

\textit{Asian I School}

In February 2011, Dean Grant announced that DLIFLC had hired Dr. Weijiang Zhang to be Department Chair of Asian I’s newest Chinese Department H. Dr. Zhang received his BA in English and Literature in China, his post-graduate certificate in language teaching in Singapore, and his Masters and Doctorate in education from Claremont Graduate University. He had taught many years and won many awards both in China and in the United States.\footnote{2011 Asian I, 1st Quarter Report.} The Chinese program continued to grow and by the end of 2011, Asian I had added yet another Chinese Department. The department’s growth rate, driven by increasing requirements, exceeded the ability of DLIFLC to hire new instructors. Due to this shortage, nine instructors were temporarily assigned to the school from other organizations (mainly Curriculum Development, Continuing Education) to fill vacancies. These temporary transfers lasted from August until December 2011 by which time all personnel had returned to their original organizations.\footnote{2011 Asian I, 4th quarter.}

In March 2011, several Asian I departments relocated to make room for more students and teachers. Chinese Department C was consolidated to Building 450, Chinese Department H set up in Building 451, Chinese Department D moved to Building 209, and the Tagalog Department moved to Building 452.\footnote{2011 Asian I, 1st Quarter Report.}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Tagalog Department 30th Anniversary.jpg}
\caption{The Tagalog Department celebrated its 30th Anniversary as a DLIFLC department on 25 March 2011.}
\end{figure}

That same month, on 25 March 2011, the Tagalog Department celebrated the 30th anniversary of its founding at DLIFLC. Dr. Gyseon Bae, Tagalog Department Chair, welcomed faculty and staff to a brief celebration in Building 452.\footnote{2011 Asian I, 1st Quarter Report.} The program had evolved from a requirement in 1981 for a single instructor into an entire department. Linda Seldow, the first Tagalog instructor, was hired when Col. David A. McNerny was DLIFLC Commandant from 1981 to 1985. According to Seldow, “it was a most
challenging period, because there were no other instructors except for one, me. There was no typewriter or phone to prepare the lessons or communicate with my direct supervisor in those days.” Thus, Seldow was a department of one. She paid special attention to attending McNerny’s Wednesday faculty meeting at the Officer’s Club where he held gatherings with the faculty to get acquainted with them and to find out how he could help them. “These many trips to the Officer’s Club was worth its weight in gold,” said Seldow, who campaigned to retain Tagalog as a permanent resident course and to extend its duration to 47 weeks. The Tagalog Department also annually held a special celebration of the Philippine’s 113th Independence Day on 10 June 2011. Students and teachers prepared a special celebration program that included students presenting various related topics in Tagalog.

In June 2011, Asian I passed an Inspector General inspection evaluating the effectiveness of the school’s Civilian Performance Counseling Program. No deficiencies were reported.

Each year Asian I held an annual holiday celebration. In 2011, Asian I used the newly remodeled Price Fitness Center gymnasium, which offered a large stage. This new venue facilitated the program’s success with more performers and a much larger audience than in past years. Colonel Pick, who attended the event, noted that the school’s student achievements and graduation rates had improved during 2011, which was indeed a cause to celebrate. Staff reported that the new venue in particular provided enough space for the famous Chinese Dragon Dancers, who were able to maneuver their beast with plenty of room to turn, twist, jump, and even to become deliberately entangled. In 2011, the Department’s Tagalog, Japanese, and Thai students also joined in the performances. Similar celebrations were held at the fitness center in 2012 and 2013.

In March 2012, three military instructors from Tajikistan observed three class sections from Chinese Department C and then worked one-on-one with an instructor to design a lesson plan. Afterwards, Tajikistan military instructors co-taught three classes with Asian I instructors, giving students a chance to ask Tajikistan military instructors questions about their countries, culture, languages, and experiences.

In August 2012, Asian I sent its first students to participate in an overseas immersion trip to Taiwan. Seventeen students and one Military Language Instructor (MLI) spent four weeks at Tamkang University and the National Taiwan Normal University studying Chinese. The need to secure an alternate location outside of China was driven by program growth and Chinese bureaucratic obstacles.

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313 2011 Asian I, 2nd quarter. The Philippine people celebrate independence on 12 June, the date in 1898 that Emilio Aguinaldo declared the first Philippine Republic amidst the Spanish-American War. However, following that war, the United States annexed the Philippines and so de facto independence must be marked from 4 July 1946 when the United States granted the Philippines full independence.
314 2011 Asian I, 2nd quarter.
315 2011 Asian I, 4th quarter.
316 2012 Asian I, 1st Quarter.
317 2012 Asian I, 3rd Quarter.
The Chinese program started various initiatives in 2012 to help students gain higher proficiency, such as Awesome Chinese, Awesome Students, and Awesome Teachers. In August, the Chinese program’s academic attrition rate was lower than the average rate for DLIFLC (7.2 percent vs. 10.1 percent) and its DLPT success rate for the number of students graduating at 2/2/1+ was also higher than the average rate for all of DLIFLC (84.7 percent vs. 74.7 percent). The Chinese Lower Range DLPT Form D was rolled out on 2 April 2012.

The DLIFLC Commandant, Colonel Pick, spoke to Asian I in August 2012 to address the fiscal year 2014 restructuring plan. He explained that he “approved a plan to begin an institutional realignment of structure to meet the challenges in fiscal year 2014 by realigning responsibility with mission, reducing redundancy, and increasing manning of those functions whose requirements are increasing.” Pick answered questions from faculty and staff during the Town Hall meeting, who were undoubtedly worried about the USAMAA-driven review and its potential impact on school personnel. In October 2012, despite diminishing hope due to austerity measures and Army Directive 2011-20, the school initiated a conference approval package to allow some staff to attend the 2012 Annual Convention and World Languages Expo of the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Language.

In late October and early November 2012, Asian I supported an interesting military-to-military exchange involving the U.S. Army and the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese Military Band offered to host the U.S. Army Band for reciprocal performances in China. Due to the language barrier, the U.S. Army Band requested interpretation assistance from DLIFLC. Three interpreters from Asian I, Marn-Ling Wang, Ximin Fang, and Sfc. Shan C. Wu, were then assigned to provide the U.S. Army Band interpretation service whenever needed. Several concerts to support the mission: “Friendship and Cooperation through Music” were held in Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing during the visit of the U.S. Army Band, which all went well.

Dr. Jennifer Liu, Professor/Director of Chinese program from Harvard University visited Asian School I 29-30 November 2012 to participate in DLIFLC’s external academic review. Dr. Liu observed a Chinese class taught by Dr. Peijie Mao from Chinese Department C, conducted sessions with students and teachers, and was briefed on the school’s program by Dean Luba Grant.

Early in 2013, Asian I, and all of DLIFLC, was impacted by the news that one of the school’s senior enlisted cadre, Sfc. Shan C. Wu, noted above, had committed suicide. Wu had served as a Chinese Military Language Instructor in Asian School I since August 2010 and as a platoon sergeant for DLIFLC’s Headquarters Company from May 2012. On Monday, 4 February 2013, DLIFLC held a Memorial Service to honor Wu while Colonel Pick and Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Allan Pendergast met with family members and expressed their condolences. Later, in June 2013, Colonel Pick traveled...
to New York to meet with the Wu’s family where he shared in person with the family the findings of the Army’s “15-6/Line of Duty investigation.”

*Figure 15 Sfc. Shan C. Wu (l), a Chinese Military Language Instructor in Asian School I, committed suicide while serving at DLIFLC in early 2013.*

In September 2013, Asian I also marked the passing of retired Professor Daniel Ching Chou Lu, who began teaching Chinese at DLIFLC in 1967, served as Chair of the Cantonese Department, and guided development of the Cantonese curriculum.

*Figure 16 Daniel Ching Chou Lu (r), former head of DLIFLC Cantonese Department, passed in 2013.*

Another type of passage occurred on 30 September 2013 when DLIFLC transferred responsibility for the basic Thai course taught in Monterey to DLI-Washington for instruction for all classes scheduled after that date. Training requirements for the course had fallen to a minimal level and included no Initial Entry Students, thus the commandant determined that it was less expensive to meet the remaining requirements by employing contracted language services. The venerable Japanese program remained, but its requirements were not much greater than the Thai program. Certainly, there were not enough slots in the Japanese program for Spec. Emily Sugimoto, a bright young DLIFLC student of Japanese-American ancestry. Sugimoto arrived at DLIFLC hoping to study Japanese as had had her grandfather, Sam Sugimoto a graduate of the first DLIFLC class founded at the Presidio of San Francisco 1941. Fortunately, Spec. Sugimoto, who was assigned to the difficult Korean program, already held a BA degree in linguistics and had previously studied French and German. Despite

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324 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130208; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130621; 2013 Asian I, 1st Quarter; All-POM email, Memorial Ceremony for SFC Wu, 4 February 2013, in DLIFLC Command History Office files. An earlier soldier suicide occurred at DLIFLC in early 2011. Suicide prevention remained a high priority for senior Army leaders and required Army commanders to provide the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Senior Suicide Review Group with personal briefings. For more on this account, see SITREP_DLIFLC_20130208; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130621; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120608.

325 2013 Asian I, 4th Quarter.

not getting her first choice language, Sugimoto expressed great enthusiasm and did successfully graduate as a Korean linguist in August 2014.\textsuperscript{327}

Asian got some good news in October when Petty Officer Douglas Rankosky, a Military Language Instructor of Mandarin Chinese, earned a distinguished award from the Kiwanis Club of Monterey for best military instructor of the year. According to Dr. Christine Campbell, a long-time member of the Kiwanis Club, the club held a Military Recognition Day every year to award outstanding instructors from DLIFLC.\textsuperscript{328}

On December 11, Asian I hosted a faculty forum entitled “How We Can Work Together as a Team to Strive for Our Goal,” presented by Chinese Department E Team 3. This team’s students recently achieved excellent DLPT results and the team shared how that was accomplished. Fairness in managing faculty was one reason, but motivating students was another key. Prof. Sin-Huei Wang, a team member, noted, for example, that even in the third semester students in Special Assistance classes, with diligent one-on-one tutoring, could improve enough to pass the their DLPT exams.\textsuperscript{329}

\textit{Mandarin Speech Contests}

Each April, students of DLIFLC’s Chinese department attended the Mandarin Speech Contest sponsored by the Chinese Language Teachers Association of California at Lowell High School in San Francisco. The event had gradually become one of the largest speech contests of its kind in the United States. Each event included numerous speeches delivered by students in Chinese. The speeches, as described by one observer, ranged widely “from nervous and reluctant to confident and dynamic,” but audiences were also entertained by acts of music, dancing, martial arts, and, in 2011, an inspiring performance of a traditional Chinese folk song performed by Yun Zhang, an instructor at DLIFLC, and one of her Mandarin Chinese students, Petty Officer 2d Class Alexander Stewart. Each year DLIFLC students placed at most of the college level categories, including in 2011, when they took 5 first place trophies, 6 second place, 6 third place, and 25 honorable mentions. In 2012, the contest attracted 632 contestants from major universities, colleges, high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools in northern California. From that, 261 students competed at the university and college level with 117 being DLIFLC students. DLIFLC students won more awards than in 2011. Indeed, with 10 first place awards, 10 second place, 10 third place, and 25 honorable mentions, DLIFLC beat competitors from such top flight programs as Stanford and Berkeley. Of course, the fact that close to one-half of all participating college-level students were from DLIFLC likely helped to ensure outstanding results. However, DLIFLC’s 2012 performance at the Mandarin Speech Contest was hard to surpass. Student competitors achieved more modest results in 2013 with 27 awards, including just 10 students placing in the top three categories. Instructors attributed the spectacular 2012 performance to three factors: the Chinese faculty’s dedication, students’ motivation, and school management’s strong support. Normally, all nine Chinese departments participated in the contest and used the event as a motivational tool.


\textsuperscript{329} 2013 Asian I, 4th Quarter.
to enhance students’ language proficiency. Approximately one hundred Chinese teachers, including instructors from DLIFLC’s School of Continuing Education and Course Development Division, participated in the speech contest by serving as tutors, judges, and helpers.330

Asian II School

Asian School II was the home of DLIFLC’s Korean Basic Program, which consisted of six and sometimes seven Korean language departments. The school was housed in Munakata Hall.

In 2011, Dean Clive Roberts continued the process of integrating the former Asian School III into Asian II, thus forming a single Korean school with a more integrated teaching program. At the same time, Asian II continued to pilot a new Korean basic course curriculum that was implemented in February 2011. The North Korean Dialect curriculum development projects begun earlier were also completed and Asian I introduced that curriculum into its second and third semester classes.331

On 28 January 2011, Asian II bade farewell to Dr. Natalie Fryberger, Assistant Dean, as she retired after more than thirty years at DLIFLC. In March 2011, Asian I also said goodbye to three departing contract MLIs. Despite recognized dedication and lengthy service, their contracts expired on 1 April 2011 and were not renewed due to the government hiring freeze. Each received a certificate of appreciation and an engraved plaque. They were not replaced.332

In early January 2011, Kyu-hyung Cho, Director, Korean Language and Culture Center, Institute of Foreign Language Studies, of the Korea University, and other officials visited the school to discuss immersion activities.333 In June 2011, Dr. Roberts and Janie Lee, Immersion Coordinator, and Dr. Howard, Director of the Immersion Office, flew to South Korea in a quest to secure additional universities able to support the school’s Korean immersion program.334

During this period, both Asian schools migrated to the new DLIFLC academic network. The Chief Technology Office completed the migration of Asian II in March 2013. At the same time, more than nine hundred mobile computing devices were distributed to Korean language faculty and staff. In April 2013, CTO began to migrate the faculty and staff of Asian I School to the network. The migration for both schools required about three weeks apiece.335

Throughout the period, Asian II continued to supplement its Korean course with authentic listening materials for all levels while simultaneously integrating North Korean dialect materials and tests

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331 2011 Asian II, 1st quarter.

332 Ibid.

333 Ibid.

334 2011 Asian II, 2nd quarter.

335 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130322 and SITREP_DLIFLC_20130419.
into its curriculum. In early 2013, the North Korean dialect curriculum development projects were completed and that curriculum was introduced into third semester classes.

In late 2013, Asian II completed a major project to relocate faculty and staff to consolidate its departments, develop a centralized academic hub, and also provide work space for incoming specialists. By this time, the full integration of the two one separate Korean schools into a single school and program was complete.

Korean Speech Contests

In 2012, Asian II participated in the 6th Yonsei University/DLIFLC writing contest and the 2012 annual video contest on 4 October 2012. Every year, however, a highlight of the Korean Program was participation in the Annual Korean Speech Contest, normally held in June. The first contest during this period, which was actually the event’s ninth iteration, took place on 24 June 2011. Faculty believed that the contest continued to provide students with an opportunity to express their understanding of the military, political, economic, and social background of the Korean Peninsula in the Korean language. Because many DLIFLC Korean course graduates eventually served in Korea the contest also helped solidify the U.S.-Korean relationship through heightened cultural awareness. The tenth speech contest took place on 22 June 2012 while the eleventh was held on 27 June 2013 and coincided with activities to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice. Twelve students participated while attendees at this speech contest included DLIFLC Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Allan Pendergast, who was a 1988 graduate of the Korean Basic Course, Dr. Roberts, Dean of Asian II, who offered welcoming remarks and his own take on the importance of the contest, and Sahie Kang, former Dean of Asian II, who praised the students for exploring topics that were “so much more serious than years prior. It really shows a level of interest the students have in…the language they’re learning.” The contest is a product of the Korean language program and not a requirement imposed on other schools. According to Dr. Roberts, “Korean is one of the most difficult languages to master, and that is why we like to show off the students’ hard work.”

In October 2012, DLIFLC Korean students made a big splash at an annual contest focused upon making a video. The students created their own version of the Korean “Oppan Gangnam Style,” by creating a short video about student life at DLIFLC. Students and Korean instructors volunteered during off-duty hours to dance and edit the video, which was called “Homework Korean Style.” The video was produced and edited by Air Force Maj. Marcos Baca, the performers being Baca’s classmates, instructors and even the school dean. By mid-October 2012, the video

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336 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130208; various period quarterly reports.
337 2013 Asian II, 1st Quarter.
338 Dec2013_MonthlyReport_UAB.
339 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121012.
had received nearly ten thousand hits on YouTube. The Pentagon Channel and the Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System also reposted the video.342

Figure 17 Korean students participate in the 11th annual Korean Speech Contest held at DLIFLC on 27 June 2013.

**European and Latin American School**

The European and Latin American School (ELS) was located in the historical cavalry era buildings near Soldier Field on the Lower Presidio. In 2011, these buildings included 204 through 207, 210, 211, 212 through 216, 218, and the Larkin school, which was rented by DLIFLC from the Monterey Peninsula School District and was located immediately across the creek from the school. In early 2011, ELS consisted of four Russian Departments, two Spanish Departments, two Multi-Language Departments, and one Hebrew Department. Dr. Deanna Tovar was the dean of ELS.343

At the end of 2013, ELS consisted of four Russian Departments, two Spanish Departments, two Multi-Language Departments, and one French Department. The requirements for French grew slightly while Hebrew was a longer course with slightly fewer instructors and many fewer students. The decision to elevate French to a department and to reduce Hebrew to a program within a department may have resulted from the administrative need for one department chair to manage the right number of subordinate instructors. However, there was also a shortage of French instructors during this period, so finding an adequate number may have been a challenge preventing expansion of the French program. One French instructor was temporarily assigned to ELS from another directorate throughout the period. DLIFLC officials explained the French faculty shortage as stemming from the high demand for French teachers among many institutions. French instructors were not driven to DLIFLC as were instructors for other languages not commonly taught in American universities. ELS managed the problem by hiring contract instructors and borrowing instructors from other areas, like Evaluation and Standards, although such personnel were, of course, also needed in those programs.344

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343 2011 UEL 1st quarter.
344 Cameron Binkley, Historians Notes for Command and Staff Meeting, 28 August 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
There were other problems in the French program during this period. According to Associate Provost Dr. Zhao, the French Department Chair resigned his Chair due to its negative impact upon family life and perhaps dissatisfaction with the work and his ability to work effectively within the school. Zhao used this example to set the stage for the Undergraduate Offsite discussions held in March 2013 (discussed above) that addressed issues with the school deans regarding leadership expectations, the balance between micromanaging and effective managers, and strategies to achieve successful outcomes.345

At any rate, Russian was the largest ELS program in terms of instructors and remained steady at approximately ninety instructors. The Spanish program, on the other hand, produced about the same if not more graduates, due to a much shorter course length. The school maintained small Portuguese, Italian, and Serbian Croatian departments throughout the period.346 In August 2013, however, due to reduced requirements, DLIFLC directed cancelation of the Italian program in Monterey. Italian was one of the first languages taught by the Army Language School after its creation in 1947, but due to declining training requirements, the Commandant directed the program’s transfer to DLI-Washington. Ironically, that same month, DLIFLC issued new Italian as well as Spanish language survival kits oriented for military police use.347

ELS continued to participate in DLIFLC’s overseas immersion training program. In late April 2011, ELS sent ten Russian program students on a four-week immersion trip to Kiev in Ukraine.348 Other languages in the program were less challenged to find suitable training venues.

Notable visitors to ELS this period included Secretary of the Army John McHugh who toured the school in May 2012, observed class demonstrations, and participated in a cultural discussion and the use of educational technology.349 In November 2012, Dr. Michael G. Vickers, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, also toured ELS. Vickers, a DLIFLC graduate, was the senior DOD official on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. He was thrilled to meet one of his former instructors—Dr. Deanna Tovar—while observing a Spanish language class. Now dean of ELS, Dr. Tovar began her DLIFLC career in the late 1970s. “She was a great instructor and I am not surprised to see her as the dean,” Vickers told Natela Cutter, DLIFLC’s PAO chief. Vickers had used the cultural knowledge he gained from two courses at DLIFLC throughout his career and was recognized for his role planning, locating, and killing Osama bin Laden.350

During his visit to ELS, Vickers spoke more widely about the importance of foreign language and culture training. “As we come out of a decade of wars,” he noted, “the world is getting more complicated and there is more volatility, for example across the Middle East. Having people with

346 2011 UEL 1st quarter; 2012 UEL, 1st quarter; 2013 UEL, 2nd Qtr; and various other quarterly reports.
348 2011 UEL 2nd quarter.
349 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120525.
these [language] skills is tremendously valuable. If you are not going to have a lot there, you ought to have your best there. …Our new defense strategy focuses on Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East region and these skills will be paramount to that strategy.” In fact, he emphasized that “higher level skill is critical.” “I have seen a number of times over the course of my career,” he explained, “where even [ILR] 3 Level Russian didn’t cut it on an important national security problem. You needed to be at the 4 Level to really exploit the intelligence that we need.” Nevertheless, Vickers recognized that DLIFLC had made many changes over the past three decades and expressed his admiration for DLIFLC’s strategic outreach and breadth of responsibility for conducting language training at 29 locations around the world including sustainment and pre-deployment training.351

Figure 18  Dr. Donald C. Fischer shown awarding the Provost Team Excellence Award to a DLIFLC instructor in 2011.

In October 2013, ELS earned kudos when one of its instructors, Dr. Johnathan Gajdos, Assistant Professor of German, received a distinguished award from the Kiwanis Club of Monterey for best civilian instructor.352

Multi Language School

The Multi-Language School (MLS) was composed of a variety of languages not tied to the major regions associated with DLIFLC’s other schools. It was also an “incubator” school where instructors taught while they created new curriculum, prepared quizzes and tests, and conducted oral proficiency interviews, all the things necessary to launch a new language program. Once an MLS language “matured,” and if its requirements continued to grow, then that language would be transferred to one of the larger schools.353  Dr. Jack E. Franke headed MLS.

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351 Natela Cutter, “Top defense intelligence official says language central to new defense strategy,” www.dliflc.edu/news, 6 November 2012; and Natela Cutter, “Top intelligence officer says foreign language critical to national security,” Globe, Vol. 35, No. 3 (October 2012): 39-40. In a congressional hearing held May 21, titled “A National Security Crisis: Foreign Language Capabilities in the Federal Government,” Vickers testified about DOD foreign language deficiencies. “It’s an area (foreign language proficiency), frankly, we still need to improve - both as an intelligence community and in the Special Operations field. It’s very hard to maintain high levels of proficiency in languages if you're not using it all the time,” explained Vickers, who served as a level 3/3 linguist in Spanish and Czech. One solution was to offer incentives to those who maintained high proficiency scores. Vickers noted how CIA Director Leon Panetta ordered foreign language proficiency to be a requirement for all upper managers seeking promotion, which increased the number of personnel working on foreign language credentials.


353 Sameera Sharif, Urdu Instructor profile on www.dliflc.edu website, 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files. Originally, MLS was known as the Emerging Languages Task Force until reorganized in 2010 to
MLS taught such languages as Dari, Hindi, Indonesian, Pashto, Punjabi, Turkish, Uzbek, and Urdu, and Tagalog after it was transferred from Asian School I. In 2011, the school participated in five recruiting trips to interview more than two hundred applicants for Pashto, Dari, Urdu and Punjabi instructor positions. From those personnel, DLIFLC hired more than seventy personnel, which doubled the school’s faculty. In early 2012, MLS had 37 administrative staff and 182 instructors, but this grew to 28 administration personnel and 201 teachers as a result of two recruiting trips that successfully increased the faculty by 22 instructors in Pashto and Urdu.\(^{354}\) The Pashto Department, a language associated with Afghanistan, continued to grow.

An important change in 2012, was that the school ended its Sorani language program. Sorani, a Kurdish language spoken mainly in Iraqi Kurdistan, faced declining requirements with the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq. In December 2012, the small Uzbek program was also phased out with future requirements managed by DLI-Washington.\(^{355}\)

In April 2012, MLS relocated to Corpuz Hall. Corpuz Hall was the newly completed general educational building funded in fiscal year 2009.\(^{356}\) This event marked a major upgrade for the school to the most modern facility on the Presidio of Monterey. In September twelve MLS faculty members traveled to University of Maryland to participate in a LEARN workshop for Middle Eastern-AFPAK Hands languages where they all made academic presentations based upon a variety of language learning perspectives.\(^{357}\)

Also of note, MLS gained new technological capabilities during this period implemented as the school transferred to DLIIFLC’s new academic network. Most personnel were satisfied with the upgrades and excited about the increase in internet speed and available programs. There were some difficulties, however, with older computers that were unable to handle the upgrade and increased processing required. These systems had to be exchanged for newer systems. Other changes included upgrades to an Apple suite of systems and programs. The biggest headache was probably the fact that the school’s military language teachers required access to both the existing military and academic networks mainly because of the lag time created to get Provost Office databases and student tracking mechanisms onto the academic network. Therefore, MLS staff had to maintain access to both networks using their old desktops to access the military network and their wireless devices to access the academic network. In conjunction with this problem, senior MLS staff and select administrative personnel were issued an additional desk top to have maximum access and capabilities on both the military and academic networks. Throughout the spring of 2012, all remaining MLS buildings and facilities migrated to the academic network. MLS thus became the only school fully operational on the academic network.\(^{358}\) The following is a summary of activities by MLS departments during the period:

\(^{354}\) Multi-Language School (MLS) Quarterly Historical Report, 2nd Quarter, CY12.
\(^{355}\) SITREP_DLIFLC_20120420.
\(^{356}\) SITREP_DLIFLC_20120427; 2012 MLS 1Qtr_CY12.
\(^{357}\) 2012 MLS 3Qtr_CY12.
\(^{358}\) Multi-Language School (MLS) Quarterly Historical Report, 2nd Quarter, CY12. It took many more months to move the rest of DLIIFLC to the new network.
Dari Department

MLS transferred its Dari Department to the new academic network in 2011 as part of a trial to compare the benefits of utilizing that network or remaining on the existing dot.mil network. According to Dean Franke, the trial demonstrated that the educational network increased connectivity while decreasing requirements for program accreditation, which therefore allowed new and developing software to be utilized for language acquisition. Following the Dari trial run, the command directed all of DLIFLC to migrate to the academic network. As part of the trial, MLS identified one class of Dari students to receive iPads. The class used the products for instruction and evaluated the ability of the technology to support language learning. Following the completion of the test phase, DLIFLC decided to upgrade all issued tablet PCs to Macbooks and iPads. Although faculty and staff of the Persian Farsi School were the first to receive the full suite of Apple products, MLS quickly followed in mid-December 2012. After that, MLS transferred its excess Tablet PCs and iPods to schools not yet using the Apple systems.

Hindi Department

In April 2011, Dr. Franke reported that homework and test results both indicated that new first and second semester textbooks developed by the Hindi Department were performing well. The department had also completed the first draft of a new third semester textbook that used only authentic materials. However, minor copyright issues had to be ironed out.

Pashto Department

As noted above, the Pashto Department continued to grow during this period. In 2012, the number of Pashto instructors increased from 58 to 74 due to continued recruiting efforts. Another program highlight was celebrated in March 2011 when Sgt. Janiece Marques graduated from the Pashto basic course with a phenomenal 2+/2+/2, which was the graduation criteria for the Pashto intermediate course. Marquez reenlisted after already serving a tour in Afghanistan specifically so that she could attend DLIFLC to study Pashto. Marques next successfully competed for a slot in the “Female Engagement Team (FET) Assessment and Selection Course.” The Army deployed FETs to help it better operate in the cultural environment of Afghanistan. Marques completed the demanding training along with 29 other women also selected for the special all-female teams. Each team, composed of two soldiers and an interpreter, deployed to a remote region of Afghanistan for seven-months to serve as the Army’s primary means of communicating with local women and children, who otherwise went unseen and unheard, but comprised about 70 percent of the Afghan population. According to Marques, her ability to speak Pashto allowed her to gain the trust and rapport of local village women much more so than previous U.S. forces. “I think some of our biggest successes were gaining rapport with the locals … We were the first elements in

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359 2011 MLS Annual_CY11.
360 2012 MLS 4Qtr_CY12.
361 DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011.
362 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120427; 2012 MLS 1Qtr_CY12.
Kunar province to actually be able to go into the homes, sit, and drink tea with the women,” said Marquez.363

Between September and November 2012, the Faculty Development Division conducted a tailored training for the Pashto and Dari faculty, many of whom were employed at the Institute under a waiver for their lack of English language proficiency. For them, Faculty Development created a new proficiency development course for English as a Second Language, which required thirty-six hours and nine weeks.364

Urdu Department

Following an assessment in late 2012 that included a white paper, DLIFLC decided to let the Urdu Department conduct a pilot Urdu basic course lasting sixty-three weeks. The pilot was designed to assess the success rates and improved throughput of the language course by extending its length. Due to its intricacies, MLS hoped an assessment of the course results would help to justify revising the language’s difficulty rating to a Category IV. The pilot Urdu course began in October 2012 and was scheduled to conclude in January 2014.365

Middle East Schools

There were three Middle East Schools (known as MEI, MEII, and MEIII), each headed by a Dean. Dr. Hiam N. Kanbar directed MEI throughout the period. MEI consisted of six Arabic departments, which included Iraqi and Levantine dialects courses. Dr. Sahie Kang continued as dean of MEII until December 2012 when the Provost Office selected Montaz Gabriel to succeed him. In turn, Dr. Janette Edwards replaced Gabriel in March 2013. MEII consisted of six Arabic departments and, in 2011, a special course for Levantine, and the Iraqi pilot dialect course. Dr.

363 DLIFLC POM Update 11 March 11; “Pashto Linguist Deploys with Cultural Team,” DLIFLC website news item posted on 6 September 2012.
364 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120928.
365 2012 MLS 4Qtr_CY12.
George El-Hage was the dean of MEIII until he retired on 30 November 2012. Issam Tnaimou, who was pursuing a doctorate in education, was appointed the interim dean. Dr. Marina Cobb succeeded Tnaimou in April 2013. Cobb transferred as the former director of the Student Learning Center, which was phased out of existence due to the USAMAA findings. MEIII consisted of five Arabic departments and grew to six during the period.366

**Middle East Schools Deans 2003-2016**

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<tr>
<th>MEI</th>
<th>MEII</th>
<th>MEIII</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Christina Campbell</td>
<td>Dr. Sahie Kang</td>
<td>Dr. John Shannon</td>
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<td>Dr. Raul Cucalon, acting dean</td>
<td>Montaz Gabriel</td>
<td>Madlain Michael acting dean</td>
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<td>Dr. Clive Roberts</td>
<td>Dr. Janette Edwards</td>
<td>Dr. George El-Hage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Hiam Kanbar</td>
<td>Dr. Deanna Tovar</td>
<td>Mr. Issam Tnaimou, interim dean</td>
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<td>Dr. Shen Zhu</td>
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<td>Dr. Marina Cobb</td>
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<td>(Jan 2015-current)</td>
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<td>(Based upon information compiled by Dr. Stephen M. Payne)</td>
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<td>Dr. Viktoriya Shevchenko</td>
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On 4 March 2011, DLIFLC dedicated Building 417, Khalil Hall, to Alfie Tawfik Khalil. Khalil Hall was the new home of Middle East School I. After the ceremony, school MLIs and department chairs held a reception in the Khalil Hall atrium and conducted guided tours of the new facility. The dedication ceremony was well attended by Khalil’s family, several of whom came from Egypt to attend the event, and DLIFLC faculty.367 In conjunction with its relocation, MEI also turned in its two lab facilities to the Multi-Language School. As of May 1st 2011, MEI no longer used labs,

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366 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121221; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130301; 2012 ME III, 4th Qtr, and various MEI, MEII, and MEIII quarterly reports.
367 2011 ME I, 1Qtr.
but had to explore alternative such as using “Blackboard” and “Sanako” for the purpose of administering ICPT tests.\textsuperscript{368}

During this period, the National Security Agency and the military services lobbied to cut back training in Modern Standard Arabic in lieu of enhanced training in Arabic dialects. DLIFLC’s customers were mainly interested in Iraqi/Syrian, Egyptian, Sudanese, and Lebanese, the last being the most difficult language for which to recruit instructors. The intelligence services disliked MSA because study of it did not directly help crypto linguists to interpret communications intercepts that were heavily inflected by dialect. Many DLIFLC graduates later had to take a sixteen-week follow-up course in a dialect prior to placement in a unit.\textsuperscript{369}

This shift impacted DLIFLC. Traditionally, the Middle East Schools focused upon teaching MSA with some instruction in the major Arabic dialects, mainly Iraqi, Levantine, and Egyptian. Now, they were asked to do the reverse with the new program focused mainly on developing listening and speaking skills. The Arabic program was already hard to staff because of security checks and the fact that new hires needed U.S. residence for three years or else a special hiring waiver. Despite phasing in the program over three years, and requiring new Arabic language instructors to possess a sought after dialect, the changes inevitably meant a surplus of teachers in some languages and not enough in others. Unfortunately, DLIFLC had many Jordanian-born instructors, but few from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{370}

The topic created anxiety within the Middle East Schools. After DCSOPs requested the schools to convert future MSA classes to dialect classes, faculty began to ask if DLIFLC was phasing out MSA entirely. Dr. Leaver asserted that although the NSA was pushing hard for dialect courses, DLIFLC would not phase out MSA entirely, but this was not reassuring to the many instructors whose MSA dialect was not in demand.\textsuperscript{371} For career linguists, the need to specialize in a dialect was also problematic in that it limited the range of available assignments.

Although not connected to dialect unease, Dean Kanbar directed an “Academic Intervention” in April 2011 that brought in the Department C chair and academic specialists and halted Class AD00411 for two weeks to review and re-teach the MSA fundamentals to improve upon the class’s foundation.\textsuperscript{372} Arabic was not easy to learn for English-speakers.

\textsl{Iraqi Dialect}

In 2009, as requested by its end-users, DLIFLC began three pilot courses to teach the Arabic Iraqi dialect without first teaching students MSA. Graduates of these pilot courses soon began working at field sites, such as Fort Gordon. By March 2011, the National Security Agency had sufficient experience with the capability of these former DLIFLC students to estimate that the dialect initiative

\textsuperscript{368} 2011 ME I, 1Qtr.
\textsuperscript{369} Cameron Binkley, “Historian Notes from Staff Meeting,” 23 August 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
\textsuperscript{370} Binkley, “Historian Notes from Staff Meeting,” 23 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{371} Memorandum, “Notes from 15 March 2013 UGE Offsite,” 19 March 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
\textsuperscript{372} 2011 ME I, 2Qtr.
had cut nine obligatory months of on-the-job training. According to the commandant, DLIFLC achieved this improved capability with no increase to course length by creating a dialect-focused curriculum and through good teaching. In some respects, however, this success had as much or more to do with the students than DLIFLC methods. On 17 March 2011, DLIFLC held the first graduation for the first non-pilot, Iraqi dialect course that was sixty-four weeks long. For Seaman Kenneth Wilkerson, a high achiever interviewed after his graduation, “it wasn’t entirely clear to me how we would learn, literally, two different spoken languages.” Wilkerson apparently accomplished the feat by diligently structuring his time and dedicated non-classroom study. The course was a challenge: Students had to learn a written script based upon MSA and the Iraqi Arabic dialect, which instructors taught from the first day of class, six hours a day, five days a week, with homework and/or study hall normally lasting two to three hours per night. Because the methods to achieve results relied to great extent on the student, DLIFLC became more interested in student motivation, recognized, according to Provost Donald Fischer, “as a determining factor in the success of our students.” For that reason, DLIFLC began conducting research and attrition reduction studies to determine what motivated or de-motivated students and what could be changed to keep student motivation high.

In March 2012, to address a shortage of instructors, the Provost Office temporarily re-assigned Continuing Education and Language Science and Technology faculty to supplement the Arabic classroom teaching pool and increased the teaching hours for non-classroom faculty personnel.

In June 2012, MEI began cooperating with the Proficiency Standards Division to develop a cadre of Oral Proficiency Interview testers for the Iraqi and Levantine dialects.

U.S. Ambassador Alberto Fernandez, in charge of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications and a graduate of DLIFLC’s Arabic program, visited the Middle East School I on 17 April 2013. The State Department created CSCC to counter the online influence of violent extremists and terrorist organizations using skilled linguists, intelligence analysis, academic input, and coordination with other organizations helping to counter extremist ideologies. Fernandez met DLIFLC students who were studying Arabic-Levantine. His advice to them was to “love it” and “have patience.”

Late in 2013, the commandant selected the Arabic program to serve as the pilot program to implementing the USAMAA-driven reorganization of DLIFLC’s language departments. Every two teaching teams were thus combined beneath a branch chief, which reduced the need for one department chair to rate 25 teachers.

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373 DLIFLC Sitrep 25 March 2011.
375 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120302.
376 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120615.
Figure 20 Ambassador Alberto Fernandez visits Middle East School I to observe DLIFLC Arabic Levantine students in class at Khalil Hall in 2013.

In July, Colonel Pick told a reporter that what he saw from the dialect initiative “was really incredible.” Graduates of the dialect course had a much better ability to speak comfortably. Although he foresaw the eventual decline of some currently taught languages at DLIFLC, he believed that DOD demand for Arabic dialect courses would remain steady and the Middle East Schools were planning to implement an Egyptian and Sudanese dialect course within the next two years.379

Persian Farsi School

The Persian Farsi School (known also as UPF) was located in Nicholson Hall at the very top of the Presidio of Monterey. Dr. Shensheng Zhu was the dean of the school. The school was created in April 2010 after the commandant approved moving the Dari, Pashto, and Turkish programs from the Multi-Language School to another program known as the Emerging Languages Task Force, which then became the new Multi-Language School. This decision left only the Persian Farsi program in Nicholson Hall, which thereafter was known as the Persian Farsi School.380

In February 2011, DLIFLC began an eighteen-month evaluation of five Persian Farsi basic courses to help DLIFLC leaders better understand student attrition and to pinpoint and implement specific remedies. The study included video diaries for students to record daily progress, interviews, questionnaires, sensing sessions, and classroom observation.381

Growth in the size of the Persian Farsi School continued in 2011. Three classes were added in early 2011 for a net gain of forty-two students or six sections. Thirteen new faculty members were also hired, but fourteen were needed to sustain continued growth. By the end of 2011, the school employed 146 faculty members but needed 168 to meet teaching needs through 2013, which meant it was 15 percent understaffed. The problem persisted into 2013, although DCSPL was able to hired five new Persian Farsi instructors in April 2012. Despite an instructor shortage, program growth required the school to accommodate increases in both faculty and students by asking staff

to move to cubicles set up in a former language laboratory to free up rooms on every floor for additional classroom sections.\textsuperscript{382}

In 2011, the school engaged several faculty members to rewrite the Persian-Farsi Basic Course textbooks, including seven volumes with seventy-nine chapters.\textsuperscript{383} In 2012, it issued this new material to its teaching teams as well as a revised version of the Advanced Listening Comprehension textbooks and the Farsi Book II after the faculty were oriented to its use.\textsuperscript{384}

In mid-2011, a class of students accompanied by Dr. Jamal Hosseini, Persian Department C Chair, traveled to Dushanbe, Tajikistan for immersion training. A second group repeated the trip in October and was deemed even more successful so future trips were planned. DLIFLC Evaluation and Standards Directorate also began an attrition study focused upon Persian Farsi students during this period of time.\textsuperscript{385}

The 2012 calendar year began well for the Persian Farsi School, which hosted a visit by the Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., Lt. Gen. David Perkins, who dropped into DLIFLC on 10 January 2012. The CAC commander remained committed to DLIFLC’s language and cultural training for deploying service members as well as specialized programs that called for higher language proficiency levels. At the Persian Farsi School, Perkins sat in on a Persian Farsi language course where students briefed him on how they used computer programs and other technology to speed up their language learning.\textsuperscript{386}

In May 2012, the Persian Farsi School participated in providing class demos, including cultural discussion and technology demo, for the Secretary of the Army’s visit to DLIFLC.\textsuperscript{387} That same month, the school also hosted Vice Admiral Robert Harward, Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command, who spoke with Persian Farsi School students and faculty in Farsi during a classroom observation and discussion. Harward spoke Farsi because he attended high school in Iran in the early 1970s while his family was assigned there. Central Command was responsible for an area covering twenty nations throughout the Middle East and Central Asia and Harward emphasized the force multiplying impact of linguist skills for his area of operations. In fact, he noted how vital organic foreign language abilities were for deployed forces because contract linguists often shaded how they interpret material, something he knew from personal experience. According to Harward, “I think that skill set, (and) our ability to generate from within, will pay big dividends in a critical part of the overall equation and force we will need as we go forward.”\textsuperscript{388} Another visitor of note to the school was Ambassador Rick Barton, Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and

\textsuperscript{382} 2011 UPF_School_History_Apr-Jun2011; 2011 UPF_School_History_Oct-Dec2011; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120420.
\textsuperscript{383} 2011 UPF_School_History_Oct-Dec2011.
\textsuperscript{384} 2012 UPF 2nd quarter; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120914.
\textsuperscript{387} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120525.
Stabilization Operations and the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, who the school on 30 May.  

In July 2012, Caroline Spencer, Chair of the AFPAK Hands Department at the Associate Directorate for Education and Training, Georgia, visited the Persian-Farsi School to initiate a curriculum development working group. In August 2012, the Farsi program conducted best practice workshops for the faculty such as Teaching Listening Skills, Use of Authentic Materials, Better Speaking Practice, and Grammar Instructions. In December, DLIFLC CTO staff completed the migration of five hundred Persian Farsi students and faculty members to the new dliflc.edu network, which included issuing them new Apple technology. The Persian Farsi School thus became the first DLIFLC school to be issued the complete Apple product suite to the entire staff and faculty.

In late February 2013, Ron Carrier, a senior NSA language official, visited DLIFLC to review ongoing Arabic dialect classes in Iraqi and Levantine and to receive updates on curriculum development for Egyptian, Sudanese, and Persian Farsi. His team praised in particular progress by the Persian Farsi program.

In March 2013, the DLIFLC Immersion Language Office began assessing the feasibility of sending immersion trips to Ankara, Turkey, for the Persian Farsi School. Despite the recent immersion trips to Tajikistan, finding suitable venues for Persian Farsi immersions remained a real impediment to the program’s progress in improving graduate proficiency. Later that month, the school held a celebration for Nowruz or “new day,” a ritual celebrated by several cultures including Albania, Turkey, many former Soviet republics, as well as Iran that recognized the birth of spring and officially marked the Iranian New Year, which was essentially the vernal equinox. Finally, in September 2013, the Provost Office reported that progress continued in developing curriculum for the Persian Farsi basic course and was reaching its goals.

Danish Students

In February and again in August 2012, Lt. Col. Steen Bornholdt Andersen, Commanding Officer of the Institute for Foreign Languages at the Royal Danish Defence College, visited DLIFLC to meet with the DLIFLC staff, including FAO Director, Lt. Col. Paddock, observe his organization’s activities.

389 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 31 May 2013.
390 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 20 July 2012.
391 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120817.
392 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121207; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121130.
393 2012 MLS 4Qtr_CY12.
394 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 1 March 2013.
395 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130118.
397 SITREP DLIFLC 27SEP2013.
Danish students who were receiving Pashto training in DLIFLC Multi-Language School, and to meet with the provost and commandant.398

On 29 January 2013, DLIFLC hosted Lt. Col. Nicolas T. Veicherts, who succeeded Lt. Col. Andersen as Commandant of the Institute for Foreign Languages, Royal Danish Defence College, along with his aide, Maj. Astrid Bjerregaard. They visited Danish students studying Dari and Pashto at DLIFLC, who would later be deployed to Afghanistan. They also presented the Danish Armed Forces Medal for Special Meritorious Service to Colonel Pick, an award typically given to civilians or military personnel for meritorious service that improves the Danish Defence Forces. Pick earned the award in part due to efforts he made in 2007 while serving at DLIFLC as director of the Foreign Area Officer Program. According to Veicherts, Pick was instrumental in developing the collaborative arrangement that made it possible for about twenty-four Danish forces students to graduate from DLIFLC’s Dari and Pashto courses.399

In June 2013, DLIFLC graduated twenty professional linguists from three different language basic courses, which included the Institutes only international students – four Royal Danish Army officers who graduated with honors in Dari.400

Special Training Programs

Proficiency Enhancement Program

DLIFLC’s long-running effort to raise graduation scores of its students, the Proficiency Enhancement Program, continued on track during this period. Budgetary uncertainty did represent a major threat to the program, as discussed in other sections of this report, largely due to skeptical manpower analysts who took a dim view of DLIFLC’s low student-to-teacher ratio, which was at the heart of PEP efforts to raise proficiency. Fortunately, strong evidence supported maintaining the low ratio and DLIFLC’s stakeholders remained committed to PEP’s aim to generate 2+/2+/2 graduates for work that ultimately required 3/3/3 graduates. According to Colonel Pick, the state of PEP at DLIFLC had never been stronger. “If you assess PEP by production,” he stated as he left command, “DLI has never produced at a higher rate.” Moreover, Pick believed that PEP’s achievements were accelerating due to further efforts, such as the new academic network, buy-in from DLIFLC service units, willingness to recycle more students through post-DLPT programs when they failed to pass the graduation exam on the first round, and finally the services holding the line on waivers to attend DLIFLC.401 According to Pick, PEP had clearly taken root at DLIFLC since the mid-2000s. DOD was seeing the benefits from reduced class size and from investments in technology, improved curriculum, and more robust tests, even though these were much harder and accurate than they once were.

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398 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 10 February 12; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 3 August 2012 [?].
400 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 21 June 2013. Eight professional linguists in Chinese also graduate from the DLIFLC Advanced Course.
401 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, p. 19.
Overseas Immersion Program

DLIFLC’s Immersion Language Office (ILO) continued to manage and coordinate an extensive program of overseas foreign language immersion training experiences for selected basic course program students. By November 2011, DLIFLC had sponsored 146 overseas immersion trips since the program began in August 2005. This was equal to a total of 1,241 students and cadre with about 70 percent focused upon Arabic, Chinese, and Korean students.402 The office continued under the direction of Dr. Jiaying Howard until July 2013 when Dr. Howard moved to Academic Journals. Her assistant, Jelena Teague then became the Acting Dean.403

During this period, DLIFLC dedicated Building 4399, the immersion facility at the Ord Military Community, to the memory of Sgt. Cari Anne Gasiewicz, a graduate of the Institute’s Arabic Basic Course. Gasiewicz was killed in action while serving as an interpreter in Iraq in December 2004. DLIFLC’s Commandant, Col. Danial D. Pick, and the retired Dean of the Immersion Program, Andrei Pashin, unveiled and dedicated a bronze plaque to honor Gasiewicz on 9 March 2012. “When I first started working at the Presidio of Monterey,” recalled Pashin, “all of the buildings were named after men.” However, continued Pashin referring to the wars that began after 2001, “women were dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I believed they should get the recognition they deserve. I wanted this building named after a woman.” Pashin said that he was “proud to call this building Gasiewicz Hall.”404 Gasiewicz Hall became the first Army building on the Central Coast named after a female service member.

Important DOD recognition for the specific value of DLIFLC’s immersive learning programs came when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates signed Resource Management Decision (RMD) 700 in December 2009. RMD 700 provided funding and authority for DLIFLC “to institutionalize and expand the DLIFLC immersion program” by adding 215 students per year from fiscal year 2011 until a sustained level of 860 students per year was achieved in fiscal year 2014.405 The impact of this decision was evident upon the program during this period. It brought to DLIFLC an additional $1.1 million in funding to conduct overseas immersions. Military authorities also recognized that important proficiency gains were obtained by allowing two extra weeks for

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403 2011 ILO 1-2Q CY11; 2013 ILO 3Q.
overseas immersions for the most difficult Category IV languages. In fiscal year 2011, all Chinese and Korean immersion programs were thus lengthened to six weeks.

Despite secure funding and recognition of the immersion program’s contributions to enhanced foreign language proficiency among DLIFLC students, the program experienced major bumps due to the program’s logistical complexity. To begin with, twelve planned Arabic immersion trips were suspended in January 2011 after the beginning of unrest in Egypt and Tunisia, the so-called “Arab Spring” uprisings. On group of students had to be recalled after having gotten half way to Egypt. ILO shifted the funds for these cancelled training events to support immersions for other languages.406

In March 2012, ILO restarted Arabic immersions by sending students on four-week immersions to Morocco where they lived with host families and attended a language institute in the capital, Rabat. On weekends the students visited prominent Moroccan cities such as Marrakesh, Fes, or Casablanca to enrich their cultural understanding and for further informal language practice. The first group was headed by a Military Language Instructor, S. Sgt. Jennifer Tweedy, who ensured the students spoke Arabic at all times and encouraged them to overcome barriers, including unfamiliar dialect, the use of French, or just the fear of speaking up.407 Colonel Pick visited the Arabic immersion in Morocco and found it working well.408 However, by fall a worsening security situation in North Africa generated concern about the safety of two groups of ten students deployed on Morocco-based immersion trips. DLIFLC staff had to maintain close contact with the U.S. Embassy to account for these personnel and to prepare their evacuation, which did not become necessary.409

To cope with the difficulties to find suitable immersion locations for Arabic students, DLIFLC began discussions to reestablish an immersion program in Jordan. The U.S. Embassy team in Jordan supported this effort and ILO began working with it to hash out the program’s specific requirements.410 Although U.S. relations with Egypt were problematic following social unrest in that country, some Egyptian military leaders hoped to restore lost ties with DLIFLC. Egyptian military officials visited DLIFLC both in 2012 and 2013. In 2013, Brig. Gen. Mohammed Moustafa Kamel Ibrahim Fahmy, Commandant of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense Language Institute, came to DLIFLC for an update on new DLIFLC methods of instruction and on the application of technology and multimedia resources.411

408 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120420.
409 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120914.
410 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120420.
411 Sgt. 1st Class Rebecca Doucette, “Egyptian commandant shares language learning insight,” Globe, Vol. 35, No. 3 (October 2012): 28; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 1 June 2012. Fahmy replaced the previous long-time MODLI chief, Maj. Gen. Adel El Sherif, who himself had visited DLIFLC on several occasions, including in May 2012. Sherif was also interested in ways to collaborate with DLIFLC.
Afterwards, Fahmy asked for assistance with faculty development and offered in exchange that DLIFLC use his Institute for overseas immersions. Unfortunately, the ability of the Institute to resume immersions in Egypt was based on the security situation.412


DLIFLC’s Persian Farsi School also wanted to participate in an immersion program but finding a Persian Farsi population in a friendly or neutral host country was challenging. Nevertheless, in early 2011, DLIFLC was able to establish an immersion site in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The first Persian immersion was conducted from 30 August to 29 September 2011 and included language instruction, lectures, historical and culture site visits, and quarters with local Tajik families. The location was also suitable for Dari immersions.413 Unfortunately, due to security concerns, Colonel Pick later cancelled the arrangement.414 In 2013, DLIFLC began assessing the feasibility of developing an immersion site in Ankara, Turkey, which bordered Iran and where Persian Farsi was understood by a segment of the population.415

In March 2012, DLIFLC had to cancel its immersion program conducted in Beijing, China. Blame was cast on the Chinese Ministry of Education for increased complications regarding scheduling and capacity. As a result, ILO planned two pilot immersion sites for Asian School I Chinese students who began to use Taiwan as an alternate immersion site during August and September 2012 while ILO continued to coordinate trips to China.416 The decision to lengthen the Chinese and Korean immersions to six weeks also absorbed the maximum capacity of the cooperating host schools in these countries.

Spanish immersions also proved difficult to arrange, but in this case the issue was mainly the short six-month length of the Spanish basic course. The U.S. Army required all students traveling to

415 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130118.
416 2012 ILO 3Q CY12; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120302.
South or Central America to use official passports and these took more than eight weeks to obtain while getting Country Clearance took another seven weeks. ILO thus resolved to send Spanish students to a Spanish-speaking site without such complications—San Juan, Puerto Rico. Five groups of students began typical immersion trips to the U.S. territory during 2011. The pre- and post-immersion Diagnostic Assessment showed most of these students noticeably improved their language proficiency.417

In November 2013, DLIFLC had eight immersions underway in four countries, with 73 students participating. In December 2013, it had eleven immersions underway with 105 students in seven countries. According to the commandant, these immersion events greatly helped students to raise their language proficiency, greatly increased their confidence, and gave them true insight into the culture of their area of focus.418 With secure funding and knowledge of the proficiency gains from overseas immersion experiences, ILO continued to dodge logistical and political obstacles, sought out additional host training venues, and basked in the recognition the program had earned for its unique and effective training regime.419

Joint Language Training Exercises

Not all DLIFLC students could be sent on overseas immersion trips. Thus, ILO continued to facilitate Field Training Exercises (FTX), which provided immersive experiences at ILO’s Isolation Immersion Facility, Gasiewicz Hall, or through other in-school arrangements. In fiscal year 2013, there were sixty overseas programs involving about six hundred students while the Institute supported some two hundred in-house FTX immersions for more than four thousand students.420

FTX immersions were implemented in the largest language programs, namely the Arabic, Korean, Chinese, Russian, Spanish, and Persian-Farsi. The most difficult languages sent students once per semester on one-, two-, and three-day immersions respectively while other languages conducted one- and two-day immersions. Many one-day immersion events took place at the Weckerling Center at the Presidio of Monterey whereas the multi-day events included an overnight at Gasiewicz Hall until the overnight programs were cancelled in fiscal year 2012 due to logistical problems, overtime compensation, government rules regarding the provision of meals, and the desire by military authorities to maintain strict control over enlisted students still classified as Initial Entry Trainees.421

418 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 15 November 2013; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 22 November 2013
419 For FY2012, ILO was evaluating a proposed new site for Russian immersions located in Kharkov, Ukraine, an arrangement with the American Councils for International Education and Kharkov State University.
420 2013 ILO 1Q.
421 Clare Bugary, Conversation with author, 29 September 2016; DLIFLC Info Paper, “Immersions in FY11/FY12,” 29 November 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files. In addition, some schools have shortened the semester two and three immersions to a one-day immersion training events.
Occasionally, the immersion program included joint training with combat units. In April 2011, DLIFLC deployed a team of 11 Arabic instructors and 23 Arabic students to facilitate bilateral negotiations for the Joint Language Training Exercise (JLTX) portion of a training rotation involving elements from the 1st Armored Division training at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. In May, DLIFLC provided 38 personnel for a similar JLTX, including 24 Pashto/Dari language students, 11 Pashto/Dari instructors, 2 Military Language Instructors, and 2 support administrative personnel who on this occasion supported a unit of the Arkansas National Guard. Exercises such as these began in 2004.

Language Day

Every year, DLIFLC normally hosts an annual event called Language Day whose purpose is to inform local educators and high school language students about DLIFLC’s mission and activities. Students and Faculty host classroom cultural demonstrations, stage cultural exhibits and outdoor entertainment, and lecture on various language education-related topics. The event provides an opportunity to expose high school foreign language students to the potential of military service using foreign language and exposes educators to the Institute’s teaching practices. In addition, a number of DLIFLC instructional buildings are opened to the public while vendors are welcomed onto the post to sell various cultural foods and souvenirs.

The 2011 Language Day was held on 13 May in area between Rifle Range Road and Lawton Avenue in the central campus area of the upper Presidio of Monterey with performance and vendors squeezed between classroom buildings 619, 620, 623 and 624, which framed the main campus quad surrounding the Berlin Wall Memorial. The chosen venue allowed visitors to experience some of DLIFLC’s best equipped and modern classroom facilities, but the number of visitors may have exceeded the area’s capacity as thousands of high school students and their chaperones from across California and neighboring states descended upon the upper Presidio. It was notably difficult to move between locations due to the size of the crowds.

On 11 May 2012, DLIFLC again hosted several thousand high school students and teachers from a wide region. In 2012, however, the event was staged at a new location—Soldier Field, the main parade grounds located on the Lower Presidio. The new venue provided a more expansive and less crowded area for guests and offered better crowd control measures for military organizers. Concurrently, the Army authorized DLIFLC to open the event to the general public for the first time in ten years. As a result approximately six thousand middle and high school students, educators, and an estimated 1,200 local citizens arrived to learn about the Institute’s mission and activities. Visitors were able to access the welcoming and staging areas, entertainment and

422 DLIFLC_POM Update 15 April 11.
423 DLIFLC Update 13 May 2011.
424 Steve Collins, Chief of Staff, draft DLIFLC Command History 2011-13 comments, 5 May 2017.
vendor sites, and cultural displays set up on Soldier Field, as well as nine barracks lining 15th Infantry Street. Even with more visitors, the new venue proved far more conducive to managing large crowds than the main campus area while the picturesque character of the old post appealed to visitors with an interest in military history.427

Despite the success of Language Day in 2012, DLIFLC failed to hold a Language Day event in 2013. Unfortunately, the Commandant, Col. Danial Pick, canceled Language Day due to federal sequestration budget cuts that year.428 The announcement was in striking contrast to the celebrations in 2012 that had opened the event to the public for the first time since the post was closed to the general public for security concerns in mid-2001. The amount of money saved by the cancellation was not great and was driven mainly by the need to avoid costs associated with supplemental security and contractor support.

Memory Conference

DLIFLC hosted “The Working Memory Conference” in Monterey, 20-21 December 2011. The conference consisted of presentations, question/answer sessions with leaders in the field of cognitive neuroscience, and discussion sessions outlining subsequent steps for this line of research and training. Attendees included individuals from a variety of defense and intelligence organizations that had previously funded research into the cognitive science specialty known as

working memory. The conference allowed these groups to present and compare findings to help make decisions about future research directions. As a result of the conference, DLIFLC evaluated the possibility of a pilot working memory training program.429

Military Language Instructors

Military Language Instructors or MLIs provided DLIFLC supplemental foreign language training and served as role models for DLIFLC students. MLIs were non-commissioned linguists, who had served at least one prior tour as working linguists in their languages. Occasionally, DLIFLC was able to supplement its limited number of MLIs using contractors with similar military experience. A chronology charting the history of MLS and various issues appears in Appendix L.

DLIFLC had a problem with its MLI contract in 2011. When the deadline expired in April, the contractor was short two Dari and three Pashto MLI personnel. DLIFLC allowed the contractor additional time to fill the personnel gap, but faced the prospect of having to terminate part of the contract and to explore other options.430 That was a difficult challenge in 2011. At the same time, DOD had imposed a hiring freeze. As a result, some of DLIFLC’s schools had to bid farewell to their existing contract MLIs when their contracts expired. Asian I, for example, lost three contract MLIs when the contract they were hired under expired on 1 April 2011. Despite recognized dedication and lengthy service, the hiring freeze forbid these MLIs from being retained. Each received a certificate of appreciation and an engraved plaque, but they were not replaced.431

In late 2011, DLIFLC academic staff discussed the role of MLIs and their proper reporting relationships in view of a proposal by the 229th MI Battalion to assume control over all assistant deans and MLIs within DLIFLC’s schools. Numerous staff from the Provost Office and the schools objected to the proposal on several grounds. A study conducted by DLIFLC’s Research and Analysis Division on attrition discovered that structural relationships could impact attrition. Differences in how the individual services and commanders handled counseling also mattered as did the importance of maintaining the independence of MLIs. Something as bureaucratic as to whom the MLIs reported, their school or their respective service unit, impacted MLI loyalty and affected an MLI’s ability to head off attrition. The schools strongly argued that MLIs should continue to report to the Provost Office and not to their respective service units, which would divide their loyalties and their time with non-school duties.432 The proposal was not adopted.

Military Service Units

229th Military Intelligence Battalion

Lt. Col. Kent L. Webber served as Commander of the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion from August 2010 until he relinquished command to Lt. Col. Frank A. Smith during a ceremony at

429 DLIFLC SITREP week ending 16 December 11 and DLIFLC SITREP week ending 6 January 12.
430 DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011.
431 2011 Asian II, 1st quarter.
432 Donald Fischer, email “Hot Decision Brief,” 9 November 2011, in DLIFLC Command History Office files. The service unit was concerned about the length of time it took schools to report problem students and thought the answer was to take charge of Army staff within the schools.
Soldier Field on 24 August 2012. Webber had previously served at DLIFLC both as a Foreign Area Officer trainee and student of Portuguese and later as 229th MI Battalion S-3 and executive officer. The Command Sergeant Major of the 229th MI Battalion was Pedro Ayala until he relinquished responsibility on 13 July 2012 to Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Raymond Ramsey.\(^{433}\)

Between the time when Webber left DLIFLC as 229th executive officer and returned as its commander, the Army’s student population had gone through a big change. The battalion’s strength, that is, its student load, went from around about nineteen hundred soldiers down to around seven hundred before rebounding back to the same number by 2012. After the Iraq War began, Webber believed, the Army stopped sending as many careerists to Monterey, which meant that most students were in their Initial Entry Training (IET) phase. The number of these students also declined as the Army shunted trainees into shorter-term pipelines to support operational requirements.\(^{434}\) The Army eventually remembered that linguists were useful for conducting successful counterinsurgency operations, and the population ramped up again.

Most issues in managing the battalion were routine, but Webber occasionally faced problems that required the DLIFLC commandant’s help to resolve. Such was the case with the transfer of IET soldiers to follow-on assignments. The Army had decided to send IET soldiers from DLIFLC to their follow-on assignments in a TDY status, which had always done for careerists but never for IET students, and while it was directed by Army G-3/5/7, TDY funds were not financed and became an urgent problem after restrictions imposed due to budgetary uncertainty. Webber had to ask Colonel Pick to help him overcome the bureaucratic roadblocks to moving students. Fortunately, Pick was able “to get the system to cough up the funds” and the problem was resolved in July 2012.\(^{435}\) The number of “MOS-T” soldiers in the 229th MI Battalion population dropped to forty-nine by early September, reducing pressure on barracks housing space, and stabilized at thirty-two by the end of the month.\(^{436}\)

Webber did try to reduce the academic attrition rate within the battalion during his tenure. He launched a couple of initiatives in coordination with the commandant. One issue he raised was concern about the accuracy of information, statistically, supplied by Academic Affairs office. If a soldier was recycled, for example, it was considered an attrition hit. But if that soldier was later able to make it through a language class and passed on to the operational Army, Webber counted it as a success. He was not sure that DLIFLC accurately accounted for this situation in its attrition reports.\(^{437}\)

Webber recommended new statistical methods to count attrition and Colonel Pick assigned the assistant commandant to look at the issue. Webber realized that changing the way numbers were tracked could derail the ability to track historical trends, but if there was a better way to do


\(^{434}\) Lt. Col. Kent Webber, Interview with Dr. Stephen M. Payne, 15 August 2012, transcript in DLIFLC Command History Office files.

\(^{435}\) Ibid., 15 August 2012; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 27 July 2012.

\(^{436}\) SITREP_DLIFLC_20120907; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120921.

\(^{437}\) Lt. Col. Kent Webber, Interview with Dr. Payne, 15 August 2012.
something, then he wanted it to be considered. He also faced too many Defense Language Aptitude Battery or DLAB waivers. He found that too many soldiers were arriving at the 229th MI Battalion whose aptitude scores for language training did not justify placing them into higher category language courses, which frequently happened at DLIFLC. According to Webber, DLIFLC’s own studies showed that DLAB results accurately predicted how well students would do, particularly in the Category III and IV languages.\(^{438}\) Lt. Col. Smith followed up on Webber and on 29 October 2013, the 229th MI Battalion held a Soldier Conference to continue the focus on reducing student attrition.\(^{439}\)

Waivers were an issue on the other side of attrition. When Webber arrived, soldiers who failed to meet graduation standards on the DLPT but managed to achieve at least 1+ in the three modalities of listening, reading, speaking were waived onto their next assignment by the Army Human Resources Command (HRC) and the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence despite not reaching the DLIFLC graduation standard of 2/2/1+. It had become normal practice and Webber knew that if soldiers had no motivation to do better than that then many would not.\(^{440}\)

With Colonel Pick’s backing, Webber was able to re-establish the graduation policy for waivers. “In fact,” he states “it’s harder than it ever was to get a waiver.” As of 2012, if a soldier failed to make the standard, the first option was to consider putting that person into a post-DLPT course. That option was also re-energized by holding the line on waivers. If the soldier was not eligible for a post-DLTP course, based upon board concurrence, only then was the question of a waiver raised. Webber only recommended one soldier for such a waiver since this new policy went into effect. That waiver had to go to HRC and then to the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence for concurrence. In the case of any disagreement with HRC, the actual Chief of Military Intelligence had to weigh in, which meant the case had to be compelling, which is what Webber wanted. He wanted to stop automatic waivers. The one case that he recommended for a waiver involved a Spanish native-speaker who tested low on the DLPT for French. The consensus was that the soldier spoke French fine, but had gotten into trouble with the English part of the test, making the result, in effect, a false negative. The student had tested at a 2 level in listening, a 1+ level in reading, and a 2 level in speaking, the latter score almost never being higher for any student than the reading score, so the argument was compelling in this single case for a waiver.\(^{441}\)

In 2011, Webber also changed a battalion level policy that caused some consternation within his command. After the Provost, Dr. Fisher, noted to Webber that Army participation in study hall was not very strong, Webber decided to make study hall mandatory for any student who did not have a 3.0 GPA. The consensus among the schools (Arabic being the exception) was that a 3.0 GPA indicated a student was on the right academic track to graduate. Webber thus made study hall mandatory for four nights a week for any student not making that cut-off. He got a lot of push back and relented a little bit and said, “Okay, 2.8 and above, you could self-study on Tuesdays,’ to ease up a little bit.” Neither his company commanders nor his students liked the policy, but

\(^{438}\) Ibid.

\(^{439}\) SITREP_DLIFLC_20131101.

\(^{440}\) Lt. Col. Kent Webber, Interview with Dr. Payne, 15 August 2012.

\(^{441}\) Ibid.
Webber felt it helped to increase graduation rates and to decrease attrition, and as a bonus disciplinary actions resulting from downtown disturbances during mid-week declined after the policy went into effect.442

Webber also looked at the amount of physical training his companies were doing in August 2010. Training in the afternoon had fallen off, which meant in effect, that a soldier’s day ran from 05:30 until after study hall ended at 20:30, a very long day. With mandatory study hall for many, the idea of doing afternoon physical training made sense especially because it broke up periods of academic work and allowed soldiers a bit more free time. With Colonel Pick’s strong concurrence, Webber moved the training to the afternoons. There were many complaints, but the policy shortened the length of the soldier’s day. Eventually, with turnover of staff and students, the policy became more accepted and he made some adjustments, as in the case of Company E, whose officers insisted upon early morning physical training in the Army tradition.443 An additional benefit of this effort to shift physical training to the afternoon was that it lessened the impact of noise by military formations in the early morning hours that disturbed the civilian population residing immediately adjacent to the Presidio. Indeed, Colonel Pick had issued a policy in July 2010 imposing restrictions of on calling cadences prior to 06:00 and requiring military units to reserve use of the Lower Presidio by coordinating with DCSOPs.444

June also brought sad news to the Army’s junior enlisted students at DLIFLC. Without much warning, the Army imposed a nightly curfew of 21:00 and restricted alcohol consumption. The curfew applied to all students living on and off campus for the duration of their course. According to Army spokesperson Dan Carpenter, the new policy resulted from Army concern about sexual assaults, but did not reflect any particular problem at DLIFLC. Career soldiers were not affected by the policy, nor were students from other Services housed in separate barracks. According to Carpenter, “hopefully, if we can prove they are good students and doing fine, we can get some relief” from the policy, which no doubt impacted student morale.445

On a happier note, one 229th MI Battalion student, S. Sgt. Eric J. Meas, earned the Soldier’s Medal for his actions in rescuing a fellow diver after at an accident near a Monterey area beach on 8 September 2012. Meas noticed that the diver had lost consciousness at the depth of 50 feet. Meas was able to bring the diver to the surface where he administered CPR until help arrived. More than four thousand service members stood in formation on Soldier Field on 18 October 2012 to witness the award ceremony during DLIFLC’s Organization Day.446

442 Ibid.
443 Ibid.
Every year, the 229th MI Battalion hosted DLIFLC’s Army Ball. In 2013, that event took place on a Saturday evening in June at the Hyatt Regency in Monterey.\textsuperscript{447} The event was preceded by a “Zombie Run” in May sponsored by Bravo Company, Soldier Support, Family Readiness Group, and MWR. Prizes were awarded to the Fastest Runners, Best Zombie Costume, and the Best Zombie. Participants of the three-kilometer run had to pass through various check-points and “Zombie infested” areas on the Presidio as a Runner, Zombie, or Zombie Hunter between the starting point at Soldier Field and the destination at the Hobson Student Center, where entertainment and zombie movies were played.\textsuperscript{448} No doubt the event was inspired by some of the students who had been turned into zombies by long hours of foreign language study.

517th Training Group

The U.S. Air Force 517th Training Group (TRG) was responsible for more than thirty permanent party staff and more than 3,100 Air Force students at DLIFLC. The 517th TRG was composed of two subordinate training squadrons, 311th Training Squadron and the 314th Training Squadron. During this period, three U.S. Air Force officers held responsibility for the 517th TRG. In June 2011, 517 TRG Commander Col. Terry Bare retired. Col. Thomas Geary, Commander, 17th Training Wing, Goodfellow Air Force Base, which oversaw the 517th TRG, officiated the 517th TRG change of command that marked the transition between Colonel Bare and incoming commander, Col. (select) Laura Ryan.\textsuperscript{449}

![Figure 23 The Change of Command ceremony for the Assistant Commandant of DLIFLC, Col. Laura Ryan, was held at Soldier Field on 26 June 2013.]

The commander of the 517th Training Group was also the DLIFLC assistant commandant, which meant the position entailed a significant workload. Fortunately, the Air Force mitigated that situation by providing the 517th commander with two squadron commanders and staffs that were capable of doing most of the routine work. But to some degree, the extent to which the responsibility of the 517th commander to do both the work of managing a Training Group while also fulfilling the assistant commandant’s responsibility to DLIFLC was largely dependent upon the ability of the DLIFLC commandant and the wing commander above the 517th TRG to develop a shared understanding of the workload required of the assistant commandant and to not over-burden him or her. Unfortunately, according to Colonel Pick, that was not the case under Colonel Ryan. Her wing commander at Goodfellow AFB was

\textsuperscript{447} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 14 June 2013.

\textsuperscript{448} Zombie Run 2013 flyer in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

\textsuperscript{449} DLIFLC_POM Update 10 June 11.
not collaborative in parsing workload and understanding the assistant commandant responsibilities.\(^{450}\)

The assistant commandant’s workload improved under the next wing commander. Col. Kimberlee Joos, Commander, 17th Training Wing and Goodfellow AFB, officiated the unit change of command for Colonel Ryan on 26 June 2013.\(^{451}\) Colonel Joos had served with Ryan at McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, at the beginning of their careers and “knew she was destined for great things.” During the ceremony, Joos awarded Ryan the Legion of Merit for her “work on linguist reclassification and discharge processes [that] assured the retention of the best Airmen and saved the Air Force over $24 million dollars.” Joos credited Ryan with driving graduation rates 15 percent higher than the DLIFLC average. Ryan’s next assignment was at the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.\(^{452}\)

Colonel Joos handed the 517th TRG over to Col. Ginger L. Wallace, who had arrived at the Presidio in early June 2013 to begin the transition with Colonel Ryan.\(^{453}\) Colonel Wallace transferred to DLIFLC from Afghanistan after spending a year there as an AFPAK Hand, part of a program requiring language and culture training designed to build partnerships and strengthen ties between the International Security Force Afghanistan and Afghan nationals. At DLIFLC, Wallace was responsible for twenty-four academic foreign language programs, thirty-one training sites worldwide, testing development and administration, and more than 2,600 faculty and staff.\(^{454}\)

The subordinate units of the 517th TRG were the 311th and 314th Training Wings. Lt. Col. Donna L. O’Harren commanded the 311th Training Wing until 30 Jun 2011 and was succeeded by Lt. Col. Michaels D. Pryor who held the position until 27 June 2013 when he was succeeded by Lt. Col. Coakley. Lt. Col. Thomas Barnett commanded the 314th Training Wing until 20 July 2012 when Lt. Col. Mark Mitchem assumed command. According to Colonel Pick, Colonel Barnett completed “an extraordinarily successful command tour at DLIFLC.” A long-time Scottish piper, Barnett also hosted a memorable and rousing Burns Night supper at the Presidio of Monterey’s Weckerling Center prior to his departure.\(^{455}\)

During this period, the 517th TRG continued to grapple with the problem of managing student load increases. In March, student load in the dorms exceeded the capacity of two personnel per room, as established by Army policy. The squadron drew up plans for utilizing excess hotel space in the community but DLIFLC was able to obtain waiver from IMCOM for three years to house three students per room. The group thus began to triple-bunk all available rooms and brought the capacity from 909

\(^{450}\) Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Steven Payne and Cameron Binkley, 7 April 2014, p. 5, transcript in DLIFLC Command History Office files. The 17th Training Wing commander oversaw four or five training groups, all of which were located at Goodfellow Air Force Base except for the one at the Presidio of Monterey. None of the other commanders had significant additional responsibilities.

\(^{451}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 28 June 2013.


\(^{453}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 21 June 2013.

\(^{454}\) Cutter, “Presidio bids farewell to Air Force assistant commandant.”

\(^{455}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 27 July 2012; Lt Col Barnett Farwell Invitation and 311th Change of Command 27JUN2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
beds to 1,245 beds in March/April. The U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey, used the 314 TRS room layout plan as the benchmark for all other services at the Presidio of Monterey.

![311th Training Squadron Structure](image)

Figure 24 311 TRS Squadron Structure, 2011-2013.

Highlights for 2011 included 314th Training Wing staff linguists tested Air Force ISR Agency-funded iPads to determine their feasibility as language maintenance tools in a test that ran about six months. HQ Marine Corps was so impressed by the program that they adopted it as a benchmark for their Service’s iPad/iPod programs. In late 2011, the 17th Training Wing reorganized the 517th TRG “to intensify focus on military standards.” In November, the Air Force met with all schoolhouse leadership teams to explain the reorganization, provide updated contact information, and discuss teaming between schools and squadron on Airman issues. On 29 January 2012, Col. Mark Damiano, Commanding the 17th Training Wing, visited DLIFLC to advise the command about the 517th TRG reorganization, to discuss the availability of barracks space for Air Force students, and the movement of students from DLIFLC to Goodfellow Air Force Base.

During the summer of 2012, stemming from budgetary uncertainty and travel restrictions, DLIFLC found itself with insufficient funds to move students to follow-on assignments. The situation created a serious problem that prevented the timely sequencing of students in the training pipeline and once again contributed to a lack of near-term housing on the Presidio for Air Force students. As discussed elsewhere, DLIFLC and its chain of command scrambled and did resolve the budget impasse, but as important, in July 2012, the Air Education and Training Command (AETC), located at Randolph Air Force Base, approved policy changes to allow the 517 TRG to better manage trainees and barracks space. The policy changes allowed the 517th to influence the arrival of trainees from Basic Military Training, place IET personnel off-post on a case by case basis, and better sequence their movement to follow-on training. Colonel Pick credited policy decisions by both the Army and AETC for freeing up barracks space at DLIFLC.

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457 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 3 February 12. Such as the impact of students on TDY status.
458 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 27 July 2012.
In early May 2012, Edward A. Rice, AETC Commanding General, visited DLIFLC, dined and spoke to Air Force students, visited their barracks, and met with leaders of the 311th and 314th Training Squadrons. Rice was impressed with the Institute’s faculty and classroom technology. “What you have brought to the classroom,” he told PAO Officer Natela Cutter, “is exactly what we are trying to do across the Air Education and Training Command because it is the way of the future.”

On 26 August 2012, members of the 517th TRG gathered to witness the presentation of a Silver Star to one of their officers, Maj. Joshua M. Hallada, who earned the award for bravery during combat while on a previous assignment in Afghanistan as a helicopter pilot flying a dangerous rescue mission. Hallada, who was at DLIFLC to study Urdu, planned to become an Air Force Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS) officer. “The reason I want to be a RAS or a FAO (Foreign Area Officer),” Halada told those assembled, was “from my years of experience deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq, I’ve seen the importance of cultural awareness (and) language understanding on the battlefield and in the embassies. And, my perception is that the way to win these wars and … the way to prevent further conflicts is through these paths.”

The 17th Training Wing Inspector general paid a visit, 27-31 August 2012 to inspect the 517th Training Group and to conduct a command climate assessment regarding morale and quality of life issues of the unit, including medical, housing, dining, transportation, unit support, and training. Other Air Force visitors to the 517th TRG included Colonel Damiano, Commander, 17th Training Wing, followed up on his earlier visit and accompanied Maj. Gen. Robert Otto, Commander, Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Agency to the 517th Training Group to observe training and tour Air Force barracks. Lt. Gen. Larry James, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR, and Teresa Sanchez, Air Force ISR Language Activities and Air Force Deputy Senior Language Authority, also visited the 517th TRG. Finally, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (ret.) Robert D. Gaylor visited DLIFLC to attend the Air Force Ball as the guest speaker.

The 311th Training Squadron drill team beat their competitors, the 314th Air Force Training Squadron team, in a quarterly competition at Soldier Field on 12 September 2013. The 311th drill team conducted a free style routine with members able to toss and catch rifles more than twenty feet into the air or use them to help construct a human pyramid. Requirements to join the elite group were rigorous drill team because participants had to maintain a 3.0 GPA in their foreign language studies.

461 2012 IG 3rd Qtr CY12.
462 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 7 September 2012.
463 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120914.
On 17 October 2013, during a 517th TRG event called “Wingman Day” Group Commander Ginger Wallace awarded a DLIFLC student the Distinguished Flying Cross for actions in Afghanistan. Air Force Capt. Charles C. Napier saved three wounded U.S. Soldiers in an Afghan village west of Kandahar in December 2012 by maneuvering his rescue helicopter between enemy fire and friendly forces enabling a successful evacuation. At the time of his award, Napier was attending DLIFLC’s intensive French course to facilitate his next assignment as an exchange pilot with a search and rescue helicopter team in France.465

Figure 25 The 311th Training Squadron drill team at Soldier Field on 12 Sept. 2013.

In November 2013, the Air Force conducted an Air Force Consolidated Unit Inspection of the 517 TRG, the highest level compliance inspection that Air Force units undergo. The inspection found the unit in compliance.466

Center for Information Dominance Unit Monterey

The Center for Information Dominance Unit was responsible for U.S. Navy personnel at the Presidio of Monterey. Lt. Cmdr. Thor Martinsen served as commander of the unit’s student sailors at DLIFLC until 26 October 2012. On that date, Capt. Susan Cerovsky, Commanding Officer of the Center for Information Dominance, located at Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida, presided over the change of command for Martinsen, who was succeeded by Cmdr. Michael Sean Cooney for the remainder of the period.467 Cooney was returning to Monterey for his third assignment, having completed the DLIFLC Russian Basic course in 1994 and the Naval Postgraduate School master’s program in Information Warfare in 2004.468

On 4 October 2011, the Navy changed the unit’s designation to the Center for Information Dominance Unit, Monterey (CIDUM).469 It was previously known as the Center for Information Dominance Detachment. Rear Admiral (ret.) Andrew Michael Singer, Senior Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, attended a ceremony on that date to mark establishment of the unit.470 The new command was matched by the establishment of the

466 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 15 November 2013.
467 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 26 October 2012; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121026; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121019.
470 CIDUM Commissioning Program on 4OCT2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
Center for Information Dominance Unit (CIDU) Corry Station and was approved by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus and announced by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert. According to Greenert, the purpose of the new commands was due to the “expanded size of the detachment and assigned cyber training mission.” This action disestablished the two previous detachments at each base. CIDU Corry Station remained responsible for training some nine thousand Navy and Joint Cryptologists, Information Systems Technicians and Information Warfare and Information Professional officers per year while CIDUM continued to support training for about 1,200 Cryptologic Technicians (Interpretive) and Foreign Language Officers.471

*Figure 26 Cmdr. Michael Cooney, Center for Information Dominance Unit, Monterey, 2012.*

In 2011, CIDUM oversaw 536 Sailors in DLIFLC’s foreign language program with 45 percent enrolled in the difficult languages of Arabic, Chinese and Korean. CIDUM dis-enrolled 111 students during fiscal year 2010, 46 for academic performance and 65 for administrative reasons, primarily medical. During 2011, CIDUM’s end-of-course DLPT success rate was 92 percent, a record high. The Unit also pursued additional short-term training for 15 students who failed to pass their end of course test. Because the majority of these students later qualified in their languages, the Navy recovered $4.04 million of the Navy’s original $5.28 million investment.472

In April 2011, CIDUM reported that several of its students had had liaisons with foreign nationals from the nearby Monterey Institute of International Studies. This occurred, as it happened, close to a visit to DLIFLC by Lt. Gen. Robert Caslen, Commandant of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Caslen had also served as the head of the investigation into Pfc. Bradley Manning, who was charged and later convicted of downloading hundreds of thousands of sensitive reports and diplomatic cables that ended up on the WikiLeaks website in one of worst single security breaches in U.S. history.

During his visit, Caslen told Assistant Commandant Col. Terry Bare that there were several points along the way that leaders could have intervened to better manage the soldier. In turn, given news about CIDUM contacts with possible foreign intelligence agents, Bare re-emphasized to all staff the importance of awareness and vigilance and early intervention. He also reminded staff that DLIFLC was a target rich environment for foreign intelligence services and prevent espionage was


the biggest security problem faced by the Institute. He said it was good that the Navy students reported the contacts and the situations were being investigated.473

Figure 27 Petty Officer 3rd Class Sonie Lasker (4th from r), with DLIFLC students attending martial arts training session with her at the Price Fitness Center.

In 2012, CIDUM basked in the glory of one of its students, Electronics Technician 3rd Class Sonie Lasker. Lasker brought something with her to DLIFLC besides an aptitude for foreign language learning—she was the reigning women’s world martial arts champion! Lasker was the team captain of the U.S. Martial Arts Team before she joined the Navy in 2010, and competed in more than five hundred tournaments worldwide. She had won fourteen world champion events. At DLIFLC, Lasker volunteered to teach martial arts at the Presidio’s Price Fitness Center to interested service members five days a week. She even led a team of her students to the 2012 U.S. Open Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu Tournament, held in San Jose, California, in October 2012. Beside martial arts, Lasker also maintained a 4.0 GPA in her foreign language class and spent after hours tutoring other students throughout the week.474

Staffing and student load management were issues faced by the Navy at DLIFLC. The Army had 1,900 students, the Air Force group had around 1,400 or 1,500. The Navy’s student load during this period ranged from 466 to 642 students. Only the Marine Corps Detachment was smaller with about 200-300 students. CIDUM only had only three officers and about 40 enlisted cadre plus a handful of civilians. As a result, it was difficult for the Navy to supply staff to the Institute, for example, for installation staff duty, or to participate in the various ceremonies and events at DLIFLC. The Naval troop commander did not report to the commandant, like the Army troop unit, or to the assistant commandant, like the Air Force troop unit, so CIDUM avoided some auxiliary activities, a fact noticed by other Service unit commanders.475

In 2011, the unit had to manage a large number of students reporting for instruction without training seats available, a situation called a “bubble.” CIDUM detected the problem early and mitigated it by working to find extra seats, which CIDUM claimed saved about $300,000. It

473 Cameron Binkley, CUB Notes, 20 April 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
475 Lt. Col. Kent Webber, Interview with Dr. Payne, 15 August 2012.
assigned other students to college level classes to help prepare them for their eventual military coursework (which also benefitted the students in credits applicable to an AA degree).476

On 6 September 2012, CIDUM hosted a visit by Naval Education and Training Command Force Master Chief, April D. Beldo. Master Chief Beldo conducted an all-hands call with CIDUM sailors and also met with command leadership and its chief petty officers. Vice Admiral Michael Rogers also paid a visit to CIDUM during the period.477

Commander Cooney reorganized CIDUM after his 90-day assessment of the command’s training support to sailors. Cooney believed that CIDUM had no operational components, did not even provide language training in any official capacity, and that the command’s roles and responsibilities aligned with the Training Support Center concept used in Fleet Concentration Areas. (Cmdr. Cooney’s organizational chart for CIDUM is shown in the figure below.)

![Figure 28 Chart for Center for Information Dominance Detachment, December 2012.](image)

Cooney’s reorganization reflected use of full-time Department of the Navy civilian employees to supervise four of the five new departments, an arrangement intended to provide better continuity of CIDUM training support given a high military staff turnover rate. He kept military personnel in charge of his “N9 department as this department has the majority of the Navy Students and Staff assigned to it.” The reorganization eliminated some positions described as redundant and put civilians in charge in Departments N4, N5 and N6. Personnel in these positions worked extensively with civilians in both the Navy and DLIFLC programs and these employees held the existing corporate knowledge. His use of civilian personnel for continuity purposes was also consistent with the civilian supplement granted by the Navy between 2006 and 2009 for that same reason.478

477 COR (CIDUM Command Operations Report) FY12 QTR4. Photos of both Beldo and Rogers were posted to the U.S. Army Garrison Flickr site as of 2017.
478 Center for Information Dominance Unit Monterey Command Operations Report, 1 March 2014, in DLIFLC
Marine Corps Detachment

Lt Col. Kenneth E. Enney, Jr. was in charge of the DLIFLC Marine Corps Detachment in Monterey until 3 November 2011. Lt. Col. Edward R. Sullivan served briefly in command until June 2012 when Lt. Col. Patrick E. Simon assumed command. Simon was previously the Director of the Foreign Area Officer and International Affairs Language Program at Marine Corps Headquarters.

Throughout the period, the Detachment faced many of the same challenges as it had in years past, namely a high turnover and staff manpower shortages. According the Detachment, increases in the student load had not translated into permanent party staff increases going as far back as 1974. To cope with this situation, the Detachment maintained a program of assigning student officers to Company Command billets to ensure basic Marine leadership at the student company level. Similarly, the Detachment placed student noncommissioned officers in squad leader and platoon sergeant billets, which helped to mitigate the absence of company first sergeants, independent duty corpsman, and a chaplain. Nevertheless, the Detachment reported the lowest attrition rate of any service at DLIFLC and its Marines continued to win academic awards and to engage in community service throughout the period, such as the annual Toys for Tots campaign. A minor mishap occurred in July 2012 when a Marine totaled one of the Detachment’s duty vehicles in a single-car accident where no one was injured, but the vehicle was a total loss.

In December 2012, Col. Gregory Breazile and Sgt. Maj. Insu Paek, Command Team for the Marine Corps Communication and Electronics School at Twentynine Palms, California, conducted an orientation visit to DLIFLC. They served as the new higher headquarters for the DLIFLC Marine Detachment as the Marine Corps reorganized its schools for better command and control.

In February 2012, the Detachment welcomed Sgt. Zachary Coates, who came to DLIFLC to attend an advanced Modern Standard Arabic course. In 2011, Sgt. Coates, a previous DLIFLC graduate and Middle East Cryptologic Linguist from Kansas City, Kansas, was named as the 2011 Marine Corps Language Professional of the Year. Soon thereafter, DOD chose him as the 2011 DOD Language Professional of the Year. To earn Marine Corps recognition, Coates impressed a panel of senior language professionals who found him to the most competitive nominee from all Marine units. According to the Marine Corps, Coates’ “sustained and rigorous personal language training program enabled him to achieve 2+/3 in Modern Standard Arabic; 3 in Levantine Arabic; 3 in Iraqi Arabic; and 1+ in Egyptian Arabic.”

Command History 2011-2013 files.

479 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 22 June 2012.
480 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120608; 2011 MCD Chronology; 2012 MCD Chronology.
481 2011 MCD Chronology; 2012 MCD Chronology.
482 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 14 December 2012.
Headquarters Headquarters Company

In addition to the student service units described above, DLIFLC also continued to maintain a unique administrative unit called Headquarters Headquarters Company, whose mission was to provide military training, language support, and sustainment for all military staff cadre. Organizationally, the Company consisted of various entities including the Installation and Garrison staffs; Military Language Instructors; Offices of the Staff Judge Advocate, Inspector General, Installation Retention NCO, and Installation Equal Opportunity Advisor; and the Unit Ministry Team. In 2012 and 2013, company commanders included Capt. Patrick D. Hanson and Capt. Jeffery D. Hance, whose next assignment was “resident ILE” at the Institute. On 1 April 2013, 1st Sgt. Lisa Myhers relinquished responsibility to 1st Sgt. John Lee.

DLI-Washington

DLIFLC’s Washington Office, known as DLI-W, continued its core missions to provide foreign language training supplementing what was not available in Monterey by relying mainly on contracted language services in the national capital region. Through such means, DLI-Washington provided language training for a student load that fluctuated between 250 and 400 students at any one time. DLI-W also represented the command in Washington, DC, and provided Russian language training support for the Joint Staff’s Washington-Moscow Direct Communication Link (hotline). Lt. Col. Robert Webster managed DLI-Washington until his retirement in June 2013. Webster was replaced by Lt. Col. Mark Faber.

Based on a review of the Thai and Italian basic courses taught in Monterey, the DLIFLC Commandant directed the transfer of these two programs to DLI-Washington for instruction beginning for all classes scheduled after September 2013. The training requirements for both courses had fallen to a minimal level and included no Initial Entry Students. It was deemed less expensive to meet the remaining requirements by contracting through DLI-Washington.

Starting in 2010 and throughout 2013, DLI-Washington increased its support to DLIFLC by providing instructors through its commercial contracts for mobile training teams. These teams were managed by the Continuing Education Directorate using RMD 700 funds, but DLI-Washington had to hire a program specialist to help manage paperwork for teams that could reach twenty-five instructors in size at a single site. The complexity of this process grew with the number of mobile teams and by 2013, DLI-Washington needed help. Continuing Education agreed

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484 2013 HHC 1st Quarter Historical Report.
486 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130405.
to train several of its staff members to assist in producing the contract documents required to bid and award contracts.\footnote{2013 DLI-W 4th Qtr.}

In 2011, DLI-Washington began to teach advanced Russian and sight translation to translator operators of the U.S.-Russian hotline (MOLINK) in response to a request by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.\footnote{2011 DLI-W Annual Rpt.} In 2012, a similar program was developed by similar request from the National Maritime Intelligence Center, an office of Naval Intelligence. In 2012, Dr Jason Galie became responsible for the sustainment training for the hotline translators and set out to redesign the MOLINK curriculum in a joint endeavor with the National Cryptologic School. This resulted in a web-delivered digitized curriculum that was easier to update with the latest current events needed for the MOLINK mission.\footnote{2012 DLI-W Annual Rpt.}

In April 2012, DLI-Washington office relocated to the Hoffman Town Center in Alexandria, VA, formerly occupied by the Army Human Resources Command. After about five months in temporary space at the 10th floor, the office moved again to a more permanent location on a 4th floor of the same complex. After settling in, DLI-Washington found the new space more appropriate to the size and staffing of the office, and noted especially that it included enough dedicated space for student testing, but neither venue was probably as comfortable as the previous location in Crystal City, vacated due to its higher rent and the difficulty that the Army had to find and lease space for DLI-Washington’s offices, which were not high on the priority list given the variety of numerous other DOD organizations in the Washington, DC, area.\footnote{2012 DLI-W Annual Rpt.; Margarita Valentin and Sandro Alisic Interview by Cameron Binkley, 14 March 2016, in DLIFLC Command History Office files.}

AFPAK Hands

In September 2009, the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs established the Afghanistan/Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands to provide a cadre of experts with knowledge of Afghanistan-Pakistan languages and culture to focus on regional issues for an extended period of time. In a memorandum on Counterinsurgency (COIN) to support the President’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, confirmed the importance of the AFPAK Hands program by commenting that DOD needed to “institutionalize and provide sufficient resources to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program to develop and deploy a cadre of regionally aligned, language-qualified experts who are proficient in COIN doctrine.”\footnote{David Edwards, “DOD Improves Personnel Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities,” \textit{Globe} (Winter 2011): 2-3; Robert Gates, Memorandum “Implementing Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance to Support Execution of the President’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy,” 24 May 2010, in \textit{DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013} files.} In December 2009, Gates approved counterinsurgency funds for the program under RMD 700. The Pentagon then established the Afghanistan/Pakistan Coordination Cell (PACC) to manage the program.\footnote{Natela Cutter, “Growth of the DLIFLC Language Training Detachments,” \textit{Globe}, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2011): 38-39.} The
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander, General David Petraeus, also strongly supported the program.\textsuperscript{497}

The AFPAK Hands program was designed to train military and civilian personnel from all services in a program focused mostly upon, mid-career officers, whose purpose was to foster better relations between the U.S. military and local populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Highly visible, program volunteers were required to make a commitment of forty-five months, including two deployments of and ten months respectively. DLIFLC became responsible for a key part of the AFPAK Hands Program – extensive language training in Dari, Pashto, or Urdu.

To stand the program up fast, DLIFLC assigned DLI-Washington to manage DLIFLC’s responsibility in the program. Lt. Col. Wayne Morris was the first officer in charge of the AFPAK Hands program. Morris retired in June 2011 and was followed by Lt. Col. Susan Wajda until her retirement in 2012. Inna Sabia worked with both from the start as an academic advisor and assumed responsibility for the program once DLIFLC determined it could be run smoothly without direct oversight by a uniformed officer. Nikolina Kulidzán joined the program in 2011 by transferring from DLIFLC.\textsuperscript{498}

The AFPAK Hands mission came to DLI-Washington on short notice with little lead time. It was designed around courses planned to run sixteen weeks unlike normal DLIFLC language courses running six to eighteen months. Those courses had to be pre-scheduled far in advance, which is why DLI-Washington got the mission. It quickly contracted with Defense Languages Services (DLS), a private firm that placed a winning bid and continued to conduct the course using some thirty or forty full-time instructors. DLIFLC’s Curriculum Development, part of the Continuing Education (CE) Directorate, provided quality control in reviewing DLS curriculum.\textsuperscript{499} CE later assumed responsibility for sustainment phases of the program. Training was provided both at the vendor’s facility in Rosslyn, Virginia, and at CE-managed “hubs” in Tampa, Florida, and Norfolk, Virginia, until the latter closed in 2012 for funding reasons.\textsuperscript{500}

**DLI-Washington and AFPAK Hands, 2011-2013**

As the period began the AFPAK Hands program continued with 39 personnel in training, including 102 Dari, 26 Pashto, and 11 Urdu. Another 143 were enrolled. By early 2011, 228 AFPAK Hands personnel had completed training with a language breakdown of 153 Dari, 55 Pashto, and 20 Urdu. In January 2011, at the direction of PACC, ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan J-7 (Training)

\textsuperscript{497} Brian Lamar, “Gen. Petraeus meets with AFPAK Hands to discuss way ahead, \textit{Globe} (Winter 2011): 8-9. At a conference in Afghanistan in October 2010 focused upon issues found during the first rotation of AFPAK Hands, Petraeus remarked: ‘The AFPAK Hands are the ‘Armies of One’ right here. Every single person in this program has enormous intrinsic value. … “I see AFPAK Hands the same way as I see Army Rangers in that you can never have enough of them and you can never have too many.” To highlight the importance of the AFPAK program, both Petraeus and Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, ISAF’s chief military intelligence officer, spent several hours discussing how the Hands fit into counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{498} Inna Sabia Interview, 14 March 2016, by Cameron Binkley, in DLIFLC Command History Office files; 2011 DLI-W Annual Rpt.

\textsuperscript{499} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{500} 2012 DLI-W Annual Report.
hosted a “foreign language Shura” whose objective was to identify language training requirements and determine how to establish a Theater Language Office. DLIFLC’s CE and DCSOPS sent representatives to brief how DLIFLC could support such an office, which was called Afghanistan Management Element Forward.\textsuperscript{501} In March 2011, Navy Capt. James Muir became the director of this office with responsibility for training Hands in theater and designing a language maintenance plan for them.\textsuperscript{502}

On 19 April 2011, the first AFPAK Hands contingent returned from a deployment to Afghanistan that began on 24 April 2010. Before deployment, the group completed the sixteen-week DLIFLC course in Dari, Pashto, or Urdu. Their coursework included culture and counterinsurgency training and each AFPAK Hand was recruited based on expertise in topics, such as governance, engineering, intelligence, finance, and force protection. After their return, these first AFPAK Hands were assigned to one of the three different AFPAK Hands hubs.\textsuperscript{503}

As these Hands returned to the states, DLI-Washington worked with Dr. Betty Lou Leaver and her CE team to construct a plan for the Phase III training of the first cohort that began in June as developed by DLS.\textsuperscript{504} DLI-Washington also coordinated with Evaluation and Standards to plan for Oral Proficiency Interview testing for those Hands redeploying from Afghanistan, a significant new testing requirement calling for between 150 and 180 tests annually. Finally, DLI-Washington staff devised a plan to conduct professional development training for DLS’s instructors.\textsuperscript{505}

The next AFPAK Hands class to report to DLI-Washington for Phase I was unexpectedly small. PACC only sent eleven students because it was having trouble getting the Services to fill available seats. With many unexpected no-shows, PACC had to do more to improve coordination with the Services.\textsuperscript{506} Another PACC problem was simply getting AFPAK Hands to Afghanistan. U.S. military personnel traveling through Pakistani territory required visas that could take several months (which PACC officials eventually managed to reduce to about one month). In response, CE devised a plan to provide supplemental training after Phase I using CE distance-learning methods for those Urdu students awaiting visas. This amounted to about ten students who needed two-hour weekly sessions of online training at any given time.\textsuperscript{507}

Certainly, the AFPAK Hands was complex to program. For example, Naval AFPAK Hands officers, following four months at DLIFLC, were sent to Camp McCready where they had to complete pre-deployment training at the Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center. At Camp

\textsuperscript{501} DLIFLC Sitrep 21 Jan 2011. During this period, DLI-W and PACC revised the original MOA between DLIFLC and PACC outlining responsibilities for the AFPAK Hands program.\textsuperscript{502} DLIFLC Sitrep 01 April 2011.\textsuperscript{503} Julia Gitis, “First Group of AFPAK Hands Return from Afghanistan,” \textit{Globe} (Spring 2011): 23.\textsuperscript{504} DLIFLC Sitrep 11 MAR 2011; DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011; DLIFLC Sitrep 25 March 2011. Nikolina Kulidzán oversaw the Phase III curriculum and implementation, which DLS developed from scratch. She also worked with National Defense University to ensure that this curriculum met specifications for degree credit so that those AFPAK Hands working in its master’s program could receive credit for their DLIFLC language training.\textsuperscript{505} DLIFLC Sitrep 22 April 2011.\textsuperscript{506} DLIFLC Sitrep 11 MAR 2011; DLIFLC POM Update 27 May 2011.\textsuperscript{507} DLIFLC POM Update 27 May 2011.
McCready, Army drill sergeants provided combat skills refresher training to these officers, whose backgrounds varied from Submarine Warfare to Public Affairs, to ensure that they were prepared for working on the ground in the region. The AFPAK Hands program had to remain flexible to meet operational needs. DLI-Washington, for example, tested and out-processed one Dari student who departed early due to deployment requirements. Fortunately, after only eight weeks of training, he was able to achieve 1+/1+ on the Oral Proficiency Interview. In May, the Institute also deployed four of its own instructors to Camp Phoenix, Afghanistan, to support AFPAK Hands training for 27 Dari and 2 Pashto students.

During a hub assignment, AFPAK Hands were expected to further their education by earning a master’s degree at the National Defense University (NDU). Such training allowed the Hands to leverage their knowledge and bring “a fresh-from-the-field perspective to higher-level headquarters.” By design, the Joint Chiefs wanted the Hands to return to the Afghanistan/Pakistan area to be placed into strategic positions, including as advisors to senior government and military officials, where they could use their specialized skills to make an impact.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen went out of his way to welcome back the first cohort of AFPAK Hands. Pointedly, he stated that “I look forward to learning from them ways in which we can further strengthen and improve this important program.” Program partners were expected to study the lessons learned from the first deployment to identify ways in which to improve the program for subsequent participants.

As the program garnered attention, other foreign language providers ponied up to offer their own services for the program. In early April 2011, Senator Jon Tester of Montana sent staffers and a retired Air Force major general from Montana, Donald E. Loranger, to discuss the possibility of AFPAK Hands participating in the University of Montana’s Afghan Studies Program. PACC officers explained that it would not be feasible to move the language training from their present locations due to favorable cost factors and other benefits which came with having the training conducted in Tampa, Norfolk, or near Washington, DC.

During this period, DLIFLC completed Phase III modules 25-28 in Dari and Pashto as well as the first two Dari units for the Phase IV curriculum. After evaluation by CE for quality control, 60 percent of the Phase III curriculum was complete and on schedule. Meanwhile, Dr. Elena Allison and others from Curriculum Development, worked with DLS and DLI-Washington staff to refine the Phase IV curriculum development working plan. Allison also provided DLS a Phase IV workshop on course development for resident language training.

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509 DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011.
510 DLIFLC_POM Update 6 May 11.
512 Gitis, “First group of AFPAK Hands,” 23.
513 DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011.
514 DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011; DLIFLC_POM Update 3 June 11.
On 27 April 2011, the AFPAK Hands program suffered its first combat fatality. Lt. Col. Frank Bryant was killed along with eight other U.S. personnel when an Afghan military pilot opened fire during a meeting at the Kabul Airport. Bryant had completed his DLIFLC-sponsored language training in 2010. According to his teachers, he was one of the best Dari students in the program and did superb work in Afghanistan. Bryant left behind a wife and one-year-old son. DLIFLC staff attended Bryant’s funeral services at the Memorial Chapel of Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall on 20 May prior to his burial at Arlington Cemetery.515

In May, the AFPAK Kabul Training Mission at Camp Phoenix consisted of four deployed personnel: a U.S. Army officer and three DLIFLC instructors training twenty-seven personnel in Dari and two in Pashto. The team provided 106 hours of instruction and then returned to DLIFLC.516

On 6 June 2011, thirty-nine students began the next AFPAK Hands Phase I language training at DLI-Washington. In late June DLIFLC registered the first cohort of AFPAK Hands, redeployed from assignments in Afghanistan, into Distance Learning (Phase III) courses intended to sustain and enhance their language skills. By this time, 356 Hands had completed training, including 249 in Dari, 76 in Pashto, and 31 in Urdu. Meanwhile, DLI-Washington and CE staff continued coordination with ES Evaluation and ES Research Analysis to build survey instruments to support all Hands language training phases.517

On 22 May 2012, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a memorandum to the chiefs of the military services emphasizing his expectation that they continue to support the AFPAK Hands program and the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell. Apparently, some urging was needed. Dempsey reminded the chiefs not to disadvantage the career progression of AFPAK Hands for time spent in the program and indicated his intent to borrow the best practices of the programs as a model in creating an Asia-Pacific Hands Program, should such a requirement materialize.518

General Dempsey and Lt. Gen. Terry Wolff, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J5, provided remarks and answered questions from AFPAK Hands during a two-day “out-of-theater Shura” held on 23 and 24 August 2012 at NDU, Fort McNair. All DLI-Washington AFPAK staff, as well Dr. Betty Leaver and Maj. Hatem Abdine participated, as did the PACC Director, Maj. Gen. Steve Townsend.519

In September, Phase III AFPAK Hands attending NDU to earn a Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies became eligible to receive two transfer credits per semester for their weekly two-hour sustainment language classes in Dari or Pashto, thanks to the efforts of DLI-Washington’s academic specialists. At the same time, DLIFLC faculty extensively edited forty-eight modules

515 DLIFLC POM Update 6 May 2011; DLIFLC POM Update 20 May 2011.
516 DLIFLC Update 13 May 2011.
517 DLIFLC POM Update 27 May 2011; DLIFLC POM Update 6 May 2011; DLIFLC_POM Update 3 June 11;
518 General Martin E. Dempsey, Memorandum “Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell and Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program,” 22 May 2012, in DLIFLC Command History Office files.
519 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120831.
in each language of the phase III curriculum. The project edited English usage in the course and standardized learning activities across the various modules to emphasize meaningful listening and speaking activities, which assisted in earning credit approval. The twenty-three students attending the Master of Arts program had to maintain a 90 percent attendance rate to earn academic credit, but attendance remained high.\textsuperscript{520}

Sharing what they had learned from involvement in AFPAK Hands training, Kulidzán and Sabia presented “Building Blocks of Immersion: Vella’s 12 Adult Learning Principles” at the University of Texas, Austin, as part of a LEARN workshop that focused upon the methodology, technology and resources for training and empowering adult learners. The AFPAK presentation focused on Dari and Pashto immersion successes.\textsuperscript{521}

In November 2012, as the number of Phase III and IV students increased, DLI-Washington requested a two-day orientation on Oral Proficiency Interview speaking levels 2, 2+ and 3 for some twenty instructors to enable more-focused language-speaking instruction prior to the students’ second deployment.\textsuperscript{522} By early 2013, 760 students had completed the first phase of the AFPAK Hands program, including 486 in Dari, 216 in Pashto, and 58 in Urdu. Another 106 students were enrolled in Phase III student training Training/e-Mentoring, and 42 had begun Phase IV including 33 in Dari, 8 in Pashto, and 1 in Urdu.\textsuperscript{523} By the end of 2013, the AFPAK Hands program stood at 69 students in Phase I and IV (51 Dari, 15 Pashto, 3 Urdu) at locations in Washington, DC, and Tampa, Florida, while another 83 students were enrolled in Phase III “e-Mentoring” through either DLI-Washington or DLIFLC’s Continuing Education Directorate.\textsuperscript{524}

**Assessing and Managing the AFPAK Hands Program**

DLIFLC overcame the early problems of starting up a new language program for the students it could directly teach in the first phase of the AFPAK Hands program. Sustainment, however, was more challenging.

Efforts to improve sustainment included a conference held on 3 June between PACC, representatives from U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A), and DLI-Washington to discuss AFPAK Hands Phase II language training issues. PACC decided to reinstate immersions for AFPAK Hands as soon as possible while USFOR-A intended to establish an in-theater language maintenance program for both AFPAK Hands and General Purpose Force personnel. However, due to funding problems, no specific timeline was developed.\textsuperscript{525}

At some point, a DLIFLC team had to go to Afghanistan to explore how Continuing Education could provide long-distance sustainment during the program’s second phase. Special curriculum was developed for Phase II, but it turned out that the technical connectivity in theater was

\textsuperscript{520} SITREP\_DLIFLC\_20120914; SITREP\_DLIFLC\_20120921; Inna Sabia Interview, 14 March 2016, by Binkley.

\textsuperscript{521} SITREP\_DLIFLC\_20120928.

\textsuperscript{522} SITREP\_DLIFLC\_20121109.

\textsuperscript{523} SITREP\_DLIFLC\_20130201.

\textsuperscript{524} SITREP\_DLIFLC\_20131211.

\textsuperscript{525} DLIFLC POM Update 10 June 2011.
problematic while the movement and scheduling of AFPAK Hands enrollees in a war zone made it difficult for them to do sustainment training according to any kind of schedule. Eventually, the only way for DLIFLC to support the sustainment phase was for CE to send mobile language training teams to Kabul.\textsuperscript{526} The first team sent to Kabul consisted of an Army Major and three instructors who trained 1 Pashto student and 20 Dari students over a period of 81 hours in June 2011.\textsuperscript{527} Another in-theater training was for “Cohort 3G” in the late 2012. These instructors requested that a military representative accompany them to Kabul to help ensure their safety and security, which DLI-Washington arranged.\textsuperscript{528} Once the students departed for their in-country assignments, the MTT returned to DLIFLC. CE still attempted to set up long-distance training. Joseph Embler at DLIFLC in Monterey was able to establish training for a small number of students, but technical and scheduling issues continued to limit the success of this effort.\textsuperscript{529}

To address this and other concerns, DLIFLC’s Commandant, Col. Danial D. Pick, spent a week in September 2011 examining DLIFLC’s language mission in Afghanistan. “I wanted to take a look at how effective our language training had been down range, and to be able to take those lessons learned back to the Institute to help improve our programs,” stated Pick. He met AFPAK Hands doing work in Afghan ministries, including directly liaising between International Security Assistance Force leadership and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and others working at the provincial level on reconstruction and development. There were then 190 Hands in Afghanistan managed by U.S. Navy Capt. James Muir. Pick also traveled to a Forward Operating Base in Nangarhar Province to meet translators/interpreters in the 09L program who had also graduated from DLIFLC-sponsored language training. The 09L program recruited individuals with language skills into the Army and deployed them to conflict regions. Pick wanted to learn how these soldiers felt about the effectiveness of their training in relation to the mission they were actually given. He was pleased to learn from two soldiers he met that they were actually using their skills and glad to have had the training. “What I am concerned about is the tracking of all these individuals with language skills and providing them with the follow-on training they need, to ensure that their knowledge does not atrophy and diminish,” said Pick. “We are investing a lot of money into this training and I want to make sure that we reap the benefits of our investment.”\textsuperscript{530}

Muir emphasized to Pick that he was clear with organizations receiving AFPAK Hands that these personnel had to be placed in suitable positions and not used merely as interpreters, intelligence officers, or staff action officers. “An AFPAK,” said Muir, “must have direct contact with Afghans in critical roles nearly every day. They need to establish and maintain enduring relationships with the Afghan population and government.” When an organization failed to appreciate the role that AFPAK Hands were to play, Muir reassigned them and it could happen overnight. He had the support of Marine General John Allen, ISAF Commander, who remarked to the Hands on 27 August 2011 his firm intention as ISAF commander “to do all I can to support the program.” Indeed, just three days after Allen’s address, he issued a new AFPAK Hands implementation

\textsuperscript{526} Inna Sabia Interview, 14 March 2016, by Binkley.
\textsuperscript{527} DLIFLC POM Update 17 June 2011(rev). The team earned the NATO service medal for its ISAF support.
\textsuperscript{528} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120928.
\textsuperscript{529} Inna Sabia Interview, 14 March 2016, by Binkley.
directive to ensure the proper assignment and employment of Hands in theater.\textsuperscript{531} It was apparently needed. The stress, poor communications, war zone schedules, and the fact that many AFPAK Hands were “volunteered” by their units for the mission and thus lacked motivation did impede the early program. Moreover, once in country, many AFPAK Hands were simply not well utilized by their in-country commanders.\textsuperscript{532}

\textbf{Figure 29} Col. Danial D. Pick (r) and Navy Capt. James Muir in Afghanistan at Camp Julian on 12 September 2011.

Colonel Pick gained a better understanding by his trip to Afghanistan about how difficult it truly was for the military services to employ their best organic regional expertise on the country. It clearly took efforts by Captain Muir, General Allan, PACC and others to “crack the whip” to get AFPAK Hands properly placed in skill-related assignments so that the expertise they had developed was put to good use in-country in liaison or advisory positions.

The central role AFPAK Hands have played in the Afghan War is illustrated by how they helped create the Presidential Information Coordination Center, or PICC” during the ISAF command of General David Petraeus. The PICC was the first full-time ISAF presence in the Afghan Presidential Palace and was similar to the White House Situation Room. As such, it was a vehicle to coordinate and share sensitive information developed respectively by ISAF or the Afghan Government. Because of the many sensitivities associated with foreigners working inside the Palace, Petraeus picked an AFPAK Hand to build and lead it—Navy Capt. Edward Zellem. Zellem ran PICC alongside an Afghan Brigadier General other senior Afghan officials from the Palace and the key security ministries, and hand-picked additional highly qualified Hands. According to Zellem, “The PICC helped stabilize the often-contentious information environment between ISAF and the government of Afghanistan, smoothing the way at the strategic level so operations in the field could continue unimpeded.” U.S. leaders strongly supported PICC as their best way to communicate with the Palace, including on such controversial topics as night operations, detainees, and civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{533}

As the number of Hands increased, PACC had to expand the capacity of training facilities that could support Hands assignments within the United States. It leased a new Hands facility in Tampa and established another in 2012 at Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Center. DLIFLC experts


\textsuperscript{532} Inna Sabia Interview, 14 March 2016, by Binkley.

advised on planning for these new training sites. By the end of 2011, DLIFLC was conducting some phase of AFPAK Hands training for more than five hundred Hands at DLI-Washington; Norfolk, Virginia; Carlyle Barracks, Pennsylvania; Hurlburt AFB, Florida; Tampa, Florida; Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and U.S. Army Europe. In 2012, the TRADOC deputy commanding general approved an updated Memorandum of Agreement between DLIFLC and PACC. The accord limited class size to three students, but removed restrictions on student Defense Language Aptitude Battery scores.
Chapter IV – DLIFLC Non-Basic Programs

The programs discussed in this chapter undergird or extent the mission capabilities of DLIFLC’s basic language training programs.

Evaluation and Standards

The Evaluation and Standards Directorate was responsible for test development. The directorate was headed by Deniz Bilgin, one of DLIFLC’s most stalwart faculty members, who was appointed Associate Provost for Evaluation and Standards in June of 2011. Bilgin retired as DLIFLC’s testing director at the end of 2013 after a ceremony on 13 November 2013. Bilgin spent thirty-one years at DLIFLC, beginning his career in 1982 as a Turkish language instructor. According to Commandant, Col. Danial Pick, Bilgin was “tremendously impactful, and he will be sorely missed.”

Evaluation and Standards consisted of six major divisions, each managed by a dean. These included Test Development managed by Dr. Mika Hoffman, Testing Proficiency Standards managed by Dr. Thomas Parry, Test Management managed by Brent Eickolt, Review and Education Division managed by James Dirgin, Program Evaluation Group, and the Research and Analysis Division managed by Dr. John Lett until he retired after 28 years of service in September 2012.

A major portion of Bilgin’s work involved oversight of DLIFLC efforts to create and update test items for use in various versions of the Defense Language Proficiency Test. Test development required continuous review of many test items for many different foreign languages and the tempo of work was fast due to the high volume of test item generation and because the Institute only accepted one test item for every 2.8 items developed, stemming from the fact that many more test items had to be created than could eventually be certified for test use. In general, the test development cycle, lasting from eighteen to twenty-four months, required both contractors and in-house DLIFLC test developers, all of whom required advanced skills and a thorough understanding of Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) language skill levels. Contractors actually developed the majority of test items and helped DLIFLC to create tests in languages where the Institute had more limited expertise. According to Bilgin, the process in 2012 was a vast improvement over test development methods from previous years. By comparison, the cost per test item in 2005 was above $6,000 per item while in 2012 it had fallen to $1,000 per item. According to Bilgin, every year DOD administered 125,000 DLPTs worldwide.

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538 Based on scattered quarterly reports for the period in the DLIFLC Command History Office files; Note: the manager of Program Evaluation Group was not reported. Dr. Richard Brecht, Ellen Walsh, and Renee Meyers visited DLIFLC to attend Dr. Lett’s retirement ceremony. See DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 28 September 2012. Lett’s replacement was not chosen until 2014.
539 DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012.
The process of using contractors, however, was not always smooth. One contractor filed suit against DLIFLC during this period. In fact, due to pending litigation the entire issue will be addressed in a future command history.\textsuperscript{540}

Colonel Pick and his assistant commandants managed the volume of testing contracts by chairing bi-weekly meetings. Pick felt that this strategy brought more focus and made such contracts easier to track and manage. Budget cuts also reduced the number of contracts, which naturally made managing the remaining contracts easier.\textsuperscript{541}

Once test items were compiled for a test, DLIFLC had to establish cut scores for that test, a process called standard setting. Test Development conducted studies to ensure that cut-off score decisions were based on high-quality data, employed a systematic approach with reproducible results using objective standards and defensible statistical procedures. Stake-holder input was also important. In fact, DLIFLC had learned from past controversies that it was better for the process of test development to be as transparent as possible to stakeholders to avoid future complaints about new tests being “too difficult.” This was the reason, in fact, for the Defense Language Testing Working Group, which met quarterly with stakeholders interested in testing. In 2012, DLIFLC completed successful standard-setting studies for Iraqi, Egyptian, Korean, Russian, Spanish, Levantine, Modern Standard Arabic, Persian-Farsi, Turkish, Pashto, Hebrew, Serbian-Croatian and Chinese-Mandarin, Dari, and French.\textsuperscript{542} Pick also sought to hire more psychometricians, experts who devise and can objectively interpret test results.

**DLPT Test Compromises and Issues**

In 2011, there were two military justice Article 15-6 investigations concerning compromises of the Defense Language Proficiency Test. In February, an investigation began to determine if there had been a possible compromise of the Chinese Mandarin DLPT5. As a result, DLIFLC pulled from use both versions of the listening component and one version of the reading component. A new listening test became available world-wide in March, however, just in time for the Institute’s next graduating class, so there was minimal impact at DLIFLC. Until that test was issued, field

\textsuperscript{540} Public information about the suit by Avant Assessment, LLC, is available from several sources.

\textsuperscript{541} Col. Daniel D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 31 March 2014, pp. 16-18.

\textsuperscript{542} DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012. Dari Standard Setting was a constructed response test.
use of the Chinese DLPT was impacted. Had the investigation results found no compromise, the
pulled test versions could have been re-instated, but DLIFLC also expected to have an additional
version of the Chinese Mandarin DLPT5 available by 1 April so the potential compromise
reportedly had minimal impact.543

The second compromise involved the Dari DLPT and the investigation concerning it concluded a
breach had occurred. As a result, DLIFLC’s Evaluations and Standards Division fielded a
replacement Dari test world-wide on 9 December, five weeks ahead of schedule.544 Again the
rapid updating of the test appeared to mitigate any significant impact on field linguists.

Another important testing problem also developed in 2011 that required DLIFLC to modify the
way it evaluated students in residence. Since authorized by Col. Sue Ann Sandusky in May 2010,
all second semester DLIFLC students took the DLPT5 to gage their proficiency and to help prepare
them to take the DLPT5 at the end of their course, passage of which was required to graduate.
Effective 28 September 2011, however, Col. Danial Pick suspended second semester DPLT-
testing at DLIFLC due to his concern about security compromises and the overexposure of
linguists to the DLPT5.545

In part due to test compromises as well as general perceptions about the integrity of testing at
DLIFLC, Colonel Pick took a hard look at the reporting relationships of the Evaluation and
Standards Directorate. After the arrival of new Assistant Commandant Col. Laura Ryan in June
2011, Pick decided to separate testing functions from the Provost Office. Under Ryan, the
Evaluations and Standards Directorate reported directly to the assistant commandant rather than
to the provost. DLIFLC “had concentrated tremendous responsibilities in the provost under Dr.
Fischer. And quite frankly,” said Pick, “it was an unmanageable span of control.” Pick was
uncomfortable with Fischer’s workload—he was responsible for all undergraduate education,
continuing education, technology integration, and test development. Merely the appearance,
however, of the test development organization reporting to the same official responsible for the
basic course program that such tests measured was enough reason to avoid that arrangement. It
gave the appearance that test integrity could be compromised by bureaucratic incentive. Pick also
felt that putting Evaluations and Standards under the assistant commandant allowed the testing
mission to receive more direct senior oversight that it needed.546

Due to the long war in Afghanistan, the services were building a greater language capability among
non-linguist personnel. To accurately measure lower level language capability, DLIFLC began
field trials of a foreign language proficiency test that could measure lower level performance.
DLIFLC called these new instruments Very Low Range or VLR tests and modeled them upon
existing higher range DLPT5s. These tests were used to assess the language capabilities of General

543 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 10 February 12.
544 DLIFLC SITREP week ending 16 December 11; SITREP_DLIFLC_2011-12-16.
545 Col. Danila D. Pick, Memorandum “Suspension of Second Semester Test of DLPT5,” 26 October 2011, in DLIFLC
Command History 2011-2013 files.
546 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 3-4.
Field testing for the Pashto VLR test began at Fort Carson in May 2011 with 113 participants. Negotiations were underway to schedule field testing for the similar Spanish and French VLR Tests at Fort Bragg in July. Meanwhile, field test data for the Korean, Chinese and Persian-Farsi VLR Tests required additional analysis and quality control. An issue that plagued development of these tests, typically using a multiple choice mode, was the difficulty of securing sufficient populations of field test examinees to validate a test using statistical analysis and the use of “Item Response Theory.” According to Item Response Theory, a minimum number of examinees for DLPT5 multiple-choice field testing was two hundred, but insufficient examinees were available for Pashto and Urdu. As a result it was likely that anyone taking a DLPT at the low range in these tests would get an inaccurate test result. To inform stakeholders of the programmatic risks of rolling out multiple-choice tests with significantly fewer than the required two hundred field-test examinees, DLIFLC issued an information paper 1 January 2011, so that that managers and policy makers could make informed decisions about the validation and use of the tests. DLIFLC rolled out its first Pashto VLR DLPT on 15 December 2012.

DLIFLC also piloted and collected online audio and written data for a low level testing system and piloted an automatic or Constructed Response Test for that systems involving students from Middle East Schools I and II. In August 2012, DLIFLC delivered the Dari Constructed Response Test Form C to the Defense Manpower Data Center.

Defense Language Testing Advisory Board

During this period, DLIFLC hosted occasional meetings of the Defense Language Testing Advisory Board (DLTAB), chaired by Iris Bulls of DLNSEO. The DLTAB was comprised of members of Defense Language Office, Center for the Advanced Study of Language at the University of Maryland, and leading academics from the field of testing. These assisted DLIFLC by reviewing its test development efforts. DLTAB also addressed DLIFLC’s efforts to promote transparency and standards setting based upon input from two subordinate working groups known as the Defense Language Testing Working Group (DLTWG) and the Defense Language Curriculum Working Group (DLCWG). In addition the board discussed the validation process for very low range tests.

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548 DLIFLC POM Update 6 May 2011.
550 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130111.
551 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120817.
552 Note: the DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 19 July 2013 indicated that DLTAB generated reports of its meetings but as of 2016 none have been archived by the DLIFLC Command History Office.
553 DLIFLC Sitrep 4 MAR 2011/DLIFLC_POM Update 4 March 11.
DLTWG met on a bi-monthly basis to discuss a number of issues impacting test development. The meetings were normally chaired by Colonel Pick and generally covered the same issues. The issues included VLR requirements and item pool replenishment, establishing new DLPT cut scores for Iraqi and Pashto, and addressing reliability issues regarding Chinese Form C. DLIFLC also sought to develop low range test requirements based upon stakeholder input that required DLPT standard setting for Hindi, Dari, Indonesian, Japanese, and Kurmanji. Other issues included progress on DLPTs and new roll out dates, research on Computer Adaptive Tests, Oral Proficiency Interviews, FAO courses, Defense Language Aptitude Battery waivers, an update on Defense Manpower Data Center test delivery, and a call for support to validate the Hindi “Think Aloud” protocol, and DLPT contracts solicitation.554

DLIFLC officials found the meetings to be “extremely useful venues to discuss testing and curriculum issues with all DOD stakeholders.” When needed issues raised in the working groups could be elevated to a higher level panel, such as a DOD testing summit held in May 2013. Suggestions during the meetings may also have influenced the Institute. The National Security Agency, for example, praised DLIFLC for resubordinating testing under the assistant commandant, thus putting distance between the Provost Office responsible for educational achievement and tests being developed to measure the same. At the same meeting, DLNSEO praised efforts by DLIFLC in standard setting and termination of in-course use of the DLPT5. The working group fostered greater communication and transparency between DLIFLC and its stakeholders, which was important for maintaining confidence in assessment instruments.555

During this period, the DLCWG focused upon revisions to the FAO course; the APFAK hands Program; the APFAK General Purposes Forces curriculum; language requirements and training for Punjabi, Urdu (including a sixty-three-week Urdu pilot course), the Tausug conversion basic course, and the Spanish extension course; a plan for external curriculum review; certification of the Global Language Online Support System program and other online products; and most especially development of dialect basic courses. On the latter issue, the DLCWG needed to organize a curriculum working group to study which dialects were most mutually intelligible and most commonly understood by native speakers so that the Institute could identify which dialects it should teach.556 The NSA helped by urging that Curriculum Development create, and DLIFLC teach as soon as possible, Egyptian and Sudanese dialect basic courses. By mid-2013, DLCWG attention turned to the impact of sequestration/budget reductions on DLIFLC distance learning products, such as Headstart2, and the fate of its General Purpose Force LTDs given potential loss of all civilian term employees.557

554 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 17 February 12; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120420; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120824; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121019.
555 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 19 April 2013; Situation report for period ending 23 August 2013.
556 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 17 February 12; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120420; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120824; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121019.
557 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120302; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 19 April 2013.
Defense Language Aptitude Battery and CASL

During the period, DLIFLC continued to work with the Center for the Advanced Study of Language (CASL), located at the University of Maryland. CASL was involved in a range of unclassified and classified research on projects pertaining to language education and national security topics. In May 2012 it sponsored a conference, attended by senior DLIFLC leaders, focused upon cognitive neuroscience, research breakthroughs and operational perspectives.558

CASL director Dr. Richard Brecht, as well as other CASL staff, including Ellen Walsh and Renee Meyer, visited DLIFLC early in 2011 to update the leadership on contract projects influencing the Institute’s academic programs.559 A major initiative was CASL’s work to revise and improve the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB), used by DOD to identify individuals likely to succeed in foreign language learning. In April, DLIFLC conducted an interim technical review of the DLAB II research and development initiative. During the review, CASL researchers presented results from their study of some 1,600 DLIFLC students who voluntarily participated in experiments intended to improve the predictive utility of the DLAB. DLIFLC officials believed the process was a milestone in developing a better assessment tool. The results essentially informed which parts of the current DLAB to retain and which new components to add.560 Work on the project continued into 2013 with good progress reported. By May 2013, the DLAB 2 implementation plan was ready for operational validation and review by a team from the Defense Manpower Data Center in Monterey.561 CASL was also involved in supporting DLIFLC’s Distance Learning Division.562

Think Aloud Validation and Other Testing Issues

In 2012 and 2013, DLIFLC conducted multiple iterations of the so-called “Think Aloud” protocol,” a method used to gather data regarding the usability of a test or product design and common to a range of social science, including reading, writing, translation and foreign language research. The Think Aloud protocol was especially applied to the Dari multiple choice DLPT 5 validation. Beginning in October 2012, test validation took place at several locations, including Fort Gordon in December 2012 and February 2013, and in April 2013 at Offutt Air Force Base, Fort Irwin, Indiana University, and at DLIFLC itself.563 DLIFLC also validated other tests using this method, including the Punjabi Form C Think, which occurred at NSA headquarters in January 2013, the Indonesian DLPT 5, which occurred in Monterey in April 2013, and the Hindi DLPT 5, which took place in June and again at NSA headquarters.564

558 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 18 May 2012.
559 DLIFLC Sitrep 22 April 2011; DLIFLC Situation Report 9 March 2012.
560 DLIFLC Update 13 May 2011; DLIFLC_POM Update 13 May 11.
561 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 10 May 2013 and SITREP_DLIFLC_20130510.
562 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130628. CASL conducted a “4th Group Cognition Session” for DL on 27 June 2013.
563 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121019; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121214; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130208; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130405; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130412; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130419.
564 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130118; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130412; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130621.
In April 2013, the ACTFL conducted a quality control review of the Uighur DLPT at the Defense Manpower Data Center Lab. In June 2013, DLIFLC loaded its Iraqi “ICPT 101” and Iraqi 201 tests onto the data center’s server for web delivery and final quality control. DLIFLC used a number of contracts to help it develop tests. In June 2013, the Provost Office reported that 84 percent of the items developed using seven testing contracts were accepted. In August, the Provost Office reported that from the same seven contracts 86.5 percent of the items developed were accepted. In September 2013, DLIFLC began the solicitation process for a post-DLPT contract.

Miscellaneous ES Issues

Evaluation and Standards Research and Analysis Division, under Dr. John Lett, attempted to reduce attrition by studying some of its causes rooted in the structural relationships at DLIFLC in 2011. The division found that attrition could be reduced by better communication between the DLIFLC schools and the corresponding service units. Too often there was a bureaucratic lag from when schools first became aware of a problem and when a student’s unit found out. The study included information about how best to utilize MLIs, which is discussed under that section.

Continuing Education

Since 2009, Continuing Education consisted of two schools, Resident Education and Distance Learning, and three divisions, Extension Programs, Field Support, and Educational Support Services. It was responsible for classroom instruction outside the DLIFLC basic program, both upper level foreign language training mainly in Monterey and lower level training conducted in the field or mediated through technology. The Associate Provost for Continuing Education was Dr. Betty Lou Leaver until she was selected in May 2013 to serve as the new DLIFLC Provost. At Continuing Education, Leaver was responsible for all DLIFLC resident and non-resident, post-basic foreign language instruction. Specifically, Leaver oversaw all intermediate and advanced language instruction, distance teaching programs, coordination and support of the world-wide Command Language Program (until it was transferred to DCSOPs in 2012), Diagnostic Assessment services, translation and interpretation instruction and services, delivery of online courses, special projects and Language Teaching Detachments at field sites worldwide. Maj. Hatem Abdine, Assistant Provost and Dean of Students, assumed Leaver’s responsibilities after she became acting provost. Abdine stood down during the final quarter of 2013 after Dr. Christine Campbell was appointed the new Associate Provost for Continuing Education. Campbell

565 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130419.
566 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130628.
567 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130628.
568 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130816.
569 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130913.
570 Donald Fischer, email “Hot Decision Brief,” 9 November 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
571 Dr. Betty Lou Leaver, AP Continuing Education, faculty profile on www.dliflc.edu, 20 February 2013, in DLIFLC Command History Office files.
transferred as the former chief of the Language, Science and Technology Directorate, which was disestablished in late 2013 due to the DLIFLC-wide reorganization.\textsuperscript{572}

**School of Resident Education**

The School of Resident Education provided individualized post-basic instruction to DOD language professionals, that is, students who were already professional linguists with operational experience wanting to upgrade their existing foreign language skills. The school offered courses in ten language programs that included both advance language training as well as area studies material for the regions and countries where program languages were spoken.\textsuperscript{573} Dean Dr. Sahie Kang led the school until Dr. Andrew Corin became dean on 18 February 2013.\textsuperscript{574}

In 2012, the Resident Advanced Program received official American Council on Education accreditation for upper level college course retroactive to 1 November 2011. As a result former and current students were thereafter able to receive college credit for advanced coursework completed at DLIFLC when applying to any other college. This accreditation had to be renewed but valid through 31 October 2015.\textsuperscript{575} The credit for DLIFLC’s upper division courses being approved to count for college credit went to DLIFLC Provost Donald Fischer, Associate Provost Betty Lou Leaver, and Laurent Paget, Director of DLIFLC’s Academic Support Center, who together submitted a “substantive change proposal” to the Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges.\textsuperscript{576}

**Russian Arms Control Speaking Course**

The School of Resident Education was also responsible for administering the Russian Arms Control Speaking Proficiency Course (RACSPC). The course was conducted specifically to support activities of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Course graduates typically assumed duties as interpreters involved with compliance monitoring for U.S.-Russian strategic arms control and arms reduction treaty obligations.

Hunter Lutinski, DTRA On-Site Inspections Director, visited DLIFLC to deliver a speech for the DTRA RACSPC class that graduated on 20 June 2012. This particular class saw an amazing 100 percent success rate including four students who measured at Level 3+ and four who obtained Level 4 on the ILR scale.\textsuperscript{577}

In September 2012, four students from DLIFLC’s DTRA Russian language program interpreted between Russian and U.S. service members during a Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, the largest international maritime warfare exercise. Their involvement marked the first time that

\textsuperscript{572} 2013 CE_Command History _4th_Quarter.
\textsuperscript{573} 2012 CE_1st Qtr CY12.
\textsuperscript{574} 2012 CE_1st Qtr CY12; 2012 CE_4th Qtr_CY12; 2013 CE Command History_1st_Quarter; 2013 CE Command History_4th_Quarter.
\textsuperscript{575} SITREP_DLIFLC_20121012.
\textsuperscript{577} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120622 and DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 22 June 2012.
Russian naval forces participated in the five-week biennial event, which included warships of twenty foreign navies who maneuvered off the coast of Hawaii. Mainly, the interpreters facilitated and monitored radio communication between the Russian and U.S. ships to prevent mishaps due to differing procedures. Two or three Americans were also posted onboard the Russian Destroyer *Panteleyev* while a similar Russian crew was escorted by the DTRA team on a U.S. warship. The Russian interest in the exercise was to learn and practice procedures for stopping and boarding vessels, such as suspected pirate ships.578

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**Figure 31 Russian linguist Petty Officer 1st Class Caleb Moore (2nd on left), two other seamen and, their Russian escort aboard the Panteleyev, a Russian warship participating in international naval training exercises near Hawaii in July 2012.**

On 3 November 2012, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Dr. Michael G. Vickers, visited DLIFLC and spent time with students attending the Russian Arms Control Speaking Proficiency Course. The upper division Russian course, which was forty-seven weeks long, was designed to prepare students to work for DTRA. Tim Clayton, Human Capital Management Director and Defense Intelligence Senior Language Authority, accompanied Vickers.579

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**Figure 32 Right to left: Gregory Mittal, Viktor Romanov, John White, Ryan Doyle, Semion Glebov, and Joshua Seaton who graduated from DTRA RACSPC Class #21571RU00113 on 13 October 2013.**

In February 2013, two students from the DTRA course participated in the 14th Annual American Council of Teachers of Russian (ACTR) National Russian Essay Contest and earned top honors. The contest gave students of any post-secondary school a chance to demonstrate their proficiency in communicating in Russian on a topic of their interest chosen from a provided list. The 2012 contest included 946 essays from fifty-five U.S. institutions of higher learning that were evaluated by three judges in Russia. S.Sgt. Nathan Evans, U.S. Air Force, a DTRA RACSPC student, was the first-place winner in the category of Non-Heritage Learners, Level 2 (equivalent to second-year Russian). Sgt. Ruslan Lobov, U.S. Army, also a DTRA RACSPC student, was the

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third-place winner in the category for Heritage Learners (defined as those who grew up speaking Russian with their families or attended school in a Russian-speaking country). In March 2013, DLIFLC graduated five more professional linguists from its DTRA Russian course, all of whom exceeded the course’s high standards. According to Colonel Pick, that was due to their hard work and the program’s superb faculty. In May 2013, two DTRA students obtained special recognition by winning first and third place during the Fourteenth Annual ACTR National Post-Secondary Russian Essay Contest, an event that has been sponsored by the American Council of Teachers of Russian since 1999. Contest judges evaluated 946 essays submitted from fifty-seven universities, colleges, and institutions across the nation, with Harvard University taking the most awards (eleven). DLIFLC students Nathan Evans won first place in the Non-Heritage Learners, Level 2 category while Ruslan Lobov won third place in the Heritage Learners, Level 2 category.

School of Distance Learning

Michael Vezilich continued as dean of the School of Distance Learning responsible for coordinating the performance of refresher, sustainment, enhancement and familiarization language instruction using mobile training teams, online learning, which included video tele-training, and the Broadband Language Training System, as well as Phase II and III of the AFPAK Hands program, the Joint FAO program, and the Language Enabled Airmen program (LEAP), discussed further below.

Mobile Language Training Detachments

In June 2011, DLIFLC had a total of sixteen mobile training teams or MTTs deployed. These teams included 8 language instructors from Monterey, 4 from DLI-Washington, and 4 from Professional Military Education Support at Fort Leavenworth. They were supporting 15 language classes, including 7 to support counter insurgency efforts [GWOT] and 8 to support enhancement and/or sustainment training at ten different training sites involving service components within the Defense Department. By example, Distance learning sent an MTT Support team consisting of three instructors and a military representative to Camp Phoenix in Kabul, Afghanistan, from 13-25 December 2012. Another MTT was training three hundred soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade at Grafenwoehr/Vilseck on a four-week assignment prior to that unit’s deployment to Afghanistan. A year later, in November 2012, DLIFLC was supporting 35 deployed MTT instructors, including 27 instructors from DLIFLC in Monterey and 8 from DLI-Washington.

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582 DLIFLC POM Update 10 June 2011.
583 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130118.
584 DLIFLC_POM Update 3 June 11.
They were teaching thirty-five language classes at eleven different training sites again involving a variety of service components. By the fall of 2013, Distance Learning supported 27 MTTs in 12 languages at 13 locations and was also conducting 123 weekly hours of BLTS/VTT classes in 13 languages. Thus, although DLIFLC had to navigate the around the constraints imposed by budgetary uncertainty, thanks to RMD 700 the pace of MTT activity did not diminish during this period and actually increased.

**Language Enabled Airman Program**

In 2010, the Air Force Culture and Language Center, part of Air University’s Spaatz Center at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, established a new Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP). The program sought to identify Airmen with foreign language abilities and to provide Airmen volunteers with initial intensive language training at DLIFLC and thereafter a career-long sustainment plan. Jay Warwick, Director of the Culture and Language Center characterized the program as “a great partnership” with DLIFLC. It arose from other professional military education programs already involving DLIFLC at Maxwell, where the Institute established an LTD in 2006 consisting of a program manager with six instructors, to support some 750 students with Arabic, Chinese Mandarin, French, German, Russian, and Spanish language instruction.

In September 2010, the Air Force’s Culture and Language Center conducted its second LEAP selection board for 2010. Approximately 260 volunteers were selected from more than four hundred candidates, which included representation from the Academy and ROTC cadets graduating in 2011 as well as active-duty officers. Program officials hoped to select four hundred volunteer officer participants each year while planning to develop a similar program for enlisted members and Air Force civilian employees. In the interim, Air Force officers continued to apply for the LEAP program on the basis of their foreign language aptitude scores and academic grade point averages. One of the first five Air Force lieutenants accepted into the LEAP program was 1st Lt. Ryan Castonian, who arrived at DLIFLC to study Arabic in LEAP after graduating as the U.S. Air Force Academy’s Airman of the Year in 2009. Service members that achieved a certain level of proficiency were entitled to receive incentive pay for their language, while LEAP required them to maintain that proficiency in addition to the daily duties.

Barbara Barger, the Air Force’s Senior Language Authority, visited DLIFLC in January 2011 and met with Air Force students participating in LEAP. Barger commented that visiting DLIFLC had given her a better perspective about how language and culture should be taught and also how American education neglected such teaching. “We can’t just wait until people get to the Air Force,” she remarked. “We have to reach out and work with schools, try to help society have a better approach to education in terms of acquiring language and culture throughout their process.”

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585 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121109.
586 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130913.
Barger stated that “we can no longer say that a cryptolinguist, or people who work in international affairs, only need language, but that language and culture is important to every career field.”

A key feature of the LEAP program was participation in “Language Intensive Training Events,” or LITEs. The Air Force had fifteen locations where such LITEs took place, including at Maxwell Air Force Base. Other LITEs were set up overseas, for example, in Budapest, Hungary, where 1st Lt. Alejandro Bihar spent a month attending classes to sustain, enhance and apply his existing Hungarian language skills while also living with a host family. At Maxwell Language and Cultural Center, resident DLIFLC instructors conducted the language training over the span of four weeks. Classroom training included Russian, Chinese, French, German, Modern Standard Arabic, and Spanish. The training was available to LEAP volunteers to take advantage of the time between participants’ commissioning and their arrival at initial career skills training. The program built upon the language abilities Airmen gained as either through ROTC or while at the U.S. Air Force Academy. According to program officials, 75 percent of participants registered an increased performance on the DPLT after taking LITE.

By fall 2012, LEAP was accepting applications from active duty officer candidates, commissioned officers and enlisted Airmen from select career fields who met specific DLPT standards, among other qualifications. All received continuous weekly online language training to keep and a four- to six-week Language Intensive Training Event every three to four years. The program had grown to include a thousand Airmen representing sixty-six total languages.

Extension Programs and Field Support Division

The Extension Programs Division was led during this period by Richard Monreal, Dr. Melody Wall, and Hassane Bouhaja. Field Support Division was led by Steve Collins. The main function of these divisions was to administer multiple language training detachments or LTDs. The first LTDs were organized in 2003 to support professional linguists needing on-going sustainment and enhancement training combining classroom and directed study learning. A few LTDs emphasized instruction in translation and interpretation while others evolved to empower the AFPAK Hands program and/or to support general and special purpose forces. During the period, the two divisions operated between twenty-three and twenty-six LTDs, supporting different types of language training missions worldwide.

LTDs provided on-site tailored instruction in the target languages through a mixture of formal courses and “just-in-time” training for units on a year-round basis. LTD instructors served on

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590 Cutter, “New Air Force Senior Language Authority Tours DLIFLC,” 19.
594 2011 CE 3rd Qtr_CY11; 2012 CE 4th Qtr_CY12; 2013 CE Command History_1st_Quarter; 2013 CE Command History_4th_Quarter.
595 Useful background to DLIFLC’s LTDs is contained in Steve Collins, Interview by Suzanne Kubota, Federal News Radio, 4 March 2010, transcript in DLIFLC Command History Office files.
three-year assignments conducting a variety of courses, including proficiency-oriented refresher, maintenance, and enhancement courses, as well as intermediate and advanced language instruction in the four language skills. Curriculum development was integrated within the program and was the responsibility of the teaching staff.596

A major expansion of DLIFLC LTDs took place in 2010 after the Institute received important new funding from Resource Management Decision 700 in December 2009. RMD 700 established baselines for the fiscal year 2011 budget request to Congress and mandated that the Services maintain the newly funded programs going forward in their future funding requests. RMD 700 permanently funded ten new LTDs at key U.S. installations supporting major deployment operations. The expansion allowed DLIFLC to hire fifty-six instructors using $32.7 million in added funds doled out in annual increases between fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2015.597 DLIFLC’s Concept of Operations for the expansion defined the main purpose of the new LTDs as being to support the AFPAK Hands program, Army forces deploying to Afghanistan, and DOD multipurpose language requirements, but the main emphasis was on preparing troops to operation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater.598

RMD 700 provided funding and authority for the Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency to hire 221 civilian employees so that DIA could establish an AFPAK Intelligence Center of Excellence. The directive funded DLIFLC to support four LTDs for AFPAK Hands personnel and augmented DLIFLC’s ability to support General Purpose Forces with language instruction specific to Afghanistan and Pakistan supporting a November 2009 directive by the International Security Assistance Force—Afghanistan commander that every platoon of a deployed Brigade Combat Team sent to Afghanistan contain at least on member who spoke survival-level Dari. RMD 700 also provided funding to create ten new multipurpose LTDs.599

By early 2013, Extension Programs consisted of nine LTDs at eight different locations permanently staffed by DLIFLC employees. Extension Programs focused on intermediate and advanced level post-basic language training for professional linguists at each of its LTDs.600 Field Support organized its LTDs into a Northeastern, a Southcentral, a Western, and a European Region.601

596 2012 CE_1st Qtr CY12.
600 2013 CE Command History_1st_Quarter; 2013 CE Command History_4th_Quarter.
It focused upon providing language instruction for deploying forces, mainly the Army, the major force deployed to Afghanistan, but DLIFLC supported the other services’ language needs as required. At some venues, the two types of LTDs were co-located. Major activities of the combined divisions for this period, although not exhaustive, are reported below.  

**LTDs for Sustainment**

The purpose of the LTD was to provide language sustainment and enhancement for students and cadre and to enable better trained linguists to arrive at duty stations. DLIFLC created the first sustainment LTDs after the NSA’s director stated for the record in April 2002 that the NSA requirement to perform cryptologic language work was Level 3 or higher on the ILR scale. Eventually, to raise the performance of DLIFLC graduates, the NSA secured more than $362 million in funding (PBD 753) for a five year program between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2010 known as the Proficiency Enhancement Program (PEP). Continued NSA support during this period allowed DLIFLC to sustain several LTDs focused on maintaining and furthering the proficiency of cryptologic technicians.

One of the more recently created LTDs was established at Goodfellow Air Force Base where most DLIFLC linguists were sent for follow-on training after graduation. DLIFLC and Goodfellow commanders realized that skills acquired at DLIFLC tended to atrophy during the time students spent to qualify in their military occupational specialties and having an LTD on site provided an opportunity for some of them to sustain their language abilities. In July 2013, the sustainment LTD at San Antonio finalized development of two advanced Spanish courses and an advanced Serbian-Croatian course and even submitted this material for an American Council on Education Accreditation Review.

One of Extension Programs oldest LTDs was the Fort Meade Language Learning Center and one of that LTD’s longest serving instructors was Ms. Jin Lan, a Chinese language instructor. Lan had served at the LTD since 2004, but she suddenly passed in June 2013 after a serious illness. Jin Lan was a well-regarded post-basic instructor, who enhanced students’ linguistic skills and abilities; created several courses on Chinese area studies, language and culture; and developed other curricula and materials to meet the needs of the Language Learning Center.

During the same period, the Fort Meade LTD completed development of an Urdu Intermediate Course, which it began to pilot in July. In August, the Fort Meade LTD graduated ten classes.

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602 Records give no clear reason for why LTDs were divided between Extension Programs and Field Support. With overlapping missions and functions, another model might be presupposed.


604 DLIFLC_POM Update 25 Feb 11.

605 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130712.


607 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130531.
while the Fort Gordon LTD launched its first eight-week Arabic/Tunisian course, which was funded by the NSA.608

DLIFLC stood up another sustainment-type LTD at Patch Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, that provided follow-on training for military linguists based in Europe. This LTD provided “substantive and direct support” to U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command linguists assigned to their subordinate elements. Prior to the announcement, these linguists had to rely upon distance learning or occasional visits by DLIFLC Mobile Language Training teams. The detachment, overseen by veteran Army linguist Dan Rugelbrugge, was set up on the same model as other LTDs operated by DLIFLC at military sites within the United States that provided operational units recurrent language familiarization and cultural awareness training.609

Figure 33 This chart shows locations and purpose of DLIFLC Language Training Detachments in 2012.

**LTDs to support General Purpose Forces**

During this period the number of new DLIFLC LTDs continued to grow. A major reason was the Institute’s success in providing commanders with ancillary language support. The U.S. Southern Command, for example, gave credit to the Institute for helping it to create a foreign language program for non-linguists intended to allow 60 percent of the entire command to achieve up to a 1/1 level in one of the languages within the Southern Command area of responsibility. According to the command, DLIFLC’s support for this initiative through MTTs, language and culture products, as well as testing and FAO support were key. The Southern Command used one Haitian Creole linguist per platoon during recent humanitarian relief operations in Haiti and found the

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608 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130802; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130816.
language capability critical to mission success. Stemming from such success, formal requests grew from major commands, including U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Forces Command, for DLIFLC to deploy permanent LTDs, not just occasional MTTs.

DLIFLC was planning an LTD for the U.S. Southern Command, whose deputy commander, Vice Admiral Joseph D. Kernan, visited the Institute in February 2012 to learn more about it. After his tour, which included visiting Spanish classes where he spoke in Spanish with the students, Kernan expressed enthusiasm for the LTD that DLIFLC planned to establish for U.S. Southern Command, and offered to assist with the embassy staffs coordination efforts for potential immersions sites in his Area of Responsibility.

In September 2012, Hwa-Young “Hanna” Chung, a foreign language training manager for the Defense Intelligence Agency, visited DLIFLC to discuss creating a potential LTD. The same month DLIFLC also decided to send a team to Fort Benning’s Maneuver Center of Excellence to discuss the potential for adding language and culture training for its officers’ courses. The rapid growth of DLIFLC’s LTD support may have generated a few hiccups. The commandant noted, for example, that DLIFLC was getting “great support from HQDA G-2 to improve vetting processes for our contract language instructors supporting General Purpose Force (GPF) Language Training requirements” at domestic military bases, indicating problems in assuring the quality of LTD instructors.

After eleven DLIFLC instructors conducted a highly successful MTT to teach basic Pashto to infantry soldiers in Germany in 2011, the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) requested DLIFLC establish permanent LTDs in Grafenwöhr and Vilseck for use by units rotating through as part of their pre-deployment sequence. In May 2012, USAREUR and Combined Arms Training Center published a language training task order that institutionalized a language training requirement for all USAREUR subordinate elements through fiscal year 2015.

Despite the success and growth of the GPF LTDs, by the fall of 2013 DLIFLC was recommending the closure of four LTDs. Requirements were declining with the draw downs in deployed forces and the Provost sought further command guidance on future Army GPF LTD resourcing. Some LTDs, for example, at Fort Polk, LA, continued to need as much language training as they had before because although their GPF requirements were lessening, their linguist sustainment efforts were continuing or strengthening. While it was convenient for Fort Polk’s general force population to be able to access the Institute’s AFPAK Hands LTDs, if local commanders did not pay for the training, it meant DLIFLC might have to cut the effort.

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610 DLIFLC_POM Update 25 Feb 11.
611 DLIFLC Update 13 May 2011.
612 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 2 March 12. U.S. Southern Command also supported efforts to extend the DLIFLC Basic Spanish Course by ten weeks.
613 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 28 September 2012.
614 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 26 October 2012.
616 Cameron Binkley, “Historian’s Notes on Command Plan Update,” 6 September 2013, in DLIFLC Command
The success of DLIFLC in providing language support for the AFPAK Hands program, along with growing recognition of the military need, inspired Army interest in promoting some language expertise for every deployed platoon in Afghanistan. The Army thus tasked DLIFLC to establish AFPAK Hands-style pre-deployment LTDs at sites throughout the nation. Unlike AFPAK Hands program or LTDs dedicated to sustainment training for professional linguists, these new LTDs were intended for the General Purpose Forces and to provide pre-deployment language and culture familiarization in a sixteen-week course in Dari or Pashto. The goal was to have at least one member of every platoon able to use enough language to enable rapport-building with the local population.617

Army headquarters issued orders on 22 June 2010 to establish an AFPAK Hands-style language training program for General Purpose Forces with initial pilot programs utilizing DLIFLC LTDs established at Forts Campbell, Carson, and Drum.618 Eventually, Program Manager Sam Garzaniti oversaw LTDs at Ft. Campbell, Ft. Carson, Ft. Drum, Schofield Barracks, Camp Lejeune, and Camp Pendleton. Several more would be added to focus upon instruction in Dari and Pashto. When near-at-hand, these LTDs also supported sustainment language training for professional linguists. By the end of 2011, more than five hundred soldiers had participated in GPF language training. Feedback from the program was very positive. DLIFLC’s Public Affairs Office reported on Spc. Kevin Chalkley, a scout with the 7-10 Cavalry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, who completed Dari pre-deployment language training sponsored by DLIFLC at Fort Carson, Colorado. According to Chalkley, those classes helped him to create an enduring bond between his platoon, the local Afghan population, and peers in the Afghan National Army. His skills not only helped his unit to bridge the cultural divide, but proved critical in responding to an IED attack where several Afghan soldiers were injured but no contract interpreters were available to assist. Chalkley’s superior credited him with saving two soldiers lives as a result.619

Feedback from soldier graduates of the program continued to be positive. Comments included: “The level of trust and friendship that speaking Pashto has allowed me to achieve with the locals, especially the Afghan security guards and Afghan National Army that I work with on the gates has really been a blessing.” Another Soldier stated, “They have more and instant respect for me when I speak in [their] language.”620

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During this period, DLIFLC continued to operate several LTDs for the General Purpose Forces at Bragg in North Carolina, Fort Campbell in Kentucky, Fort Carson in Colorado, and Fort Drum in New York. Some of their activities:

Fort Bragg. Sixty-two 4th Brigade Combat Team soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division attended a special sixteen-week Afghan language course taught by DLIFLC that began in January 2011. The special “AFPAK Hands” style course was designed to prepare the unit for an upcoming deployment to Afghanistan. The January course marked the first time DLIFLC had conducted Dari language and culture training at Fort Bragg, although similar courses had already been taught at Forts Drum, Carson, and Campbell. DLIFLC organized and oversaw the course, said Traci Dunn, a DLIFLC program manager, but the fifteen Dari and Pashto language instructors were sub-contracted, although all were native Afghans.  

At Fort Bragg, DLIFLC also supported the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). DLIFLC provided academic specialists to mentor SWCS-hired foreign language instructors to ensure high academic standards. Nineteen DLIFLC employees were at SWCS. As a result of this partnership, DLIFLC helped train about two thousand Special Forces soldiers per year in language and culture. According to Army Col. (P) Ferdinand Irizarry, Deputy Commanding General of SWCS, “It only makes sense to work with DLIFLC.” Irizarry visited in March 2011 to meet with DLIFLC’s Curriculum Development Division staff to discuss such issues as course length, required skills, and testing programs for use by SOF.

In May 2011, SWCS established provisions for Special Forces soldiers to obtain a two-year Associate of Arts degree while in language instruction. This allowed soldiers to coordinate and combine their SWCS curriculum with courses from Fayetteville Technical Community College. The project was a priority of the SWCS command general, who followed the precedent set by DLIFLC in 2002 when it began to offer similar degrees.  In June 2012, Maj. Gen. Bennett Sacolick, Commanding General of SWCS, visited DLIFLC to discuss further Institute support for SOF language instruction.  In September 2013, Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, Commanding the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, visited Monterey to explore how soldiers within the Special Forces Military Occupational Specialties (18 Series) could attend DLIFLC basic courses or at least how 18 Series personnel attending NPS could take DLIFLC language courses. The same month, Colonel Pick visited DLIFLC’s LTDs at Fort Bragg to review that training and also how to sustain the existing capability in light of reduced resources and manpower. He was not too worried, however, “thanks to good collaboration with U.S. Army Special Warfare Education Group and the Special Operations Task Force.” DLIFLC’s LTD at SWCS consisted of thirteen personnel in 2011. These taught workshops, conducted curriculum review and development,

622 Natela Cutter, “SWCS Deputy Commanding General Visits DLIFLC,” Globe (Spring 2011): 5; DLIFLC POM Update 1 April 11.
623 DLIFLC POM Update 20 May 2011.
624 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120622.
625 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 5 Sep 2013; SITREP DLIFLC 27SEP2013.
626 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 5 Sep 2013.
performed student diagnostic assessment, assisted in course design, and promoted best practices.627

**Fort Campbell.** The LTD at Fort Campbell taught both Dari and Pashto. In late 2011, seventy-five soldiers were attending one of these two LTD courses, which included participation by several senior officers, including a brigadier general. DLIFLC reported exceptional results from course participants in Pashtu and Dari speaking proficiency due in large part to command emphasis on the training.628

**Fort Carson.** In 2010, DLIFLC opened a permanent LTD at Fort Carson and had already taught several hundred soldiers basic Dari and Pashto language and culture. Between 2011 and 2013, DLIFLC continued to support combat brigades and engineer battalions of the 4th Infantry Division and other local units scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan. The LTD’s main effort was to teach a thirteen-week-long Pashto course.629 Sixty-four 4th Infantry Division soldiers graduated from the course in February 2012. Their brigade’s commander, Col. James Mingus, expressed confidence that this training would better equip his unit to accomplish its mission while deployed to Afghanistan.630

During the spring 2011, the Continuing Education Directorate began a special forty-hour course for some of the 4th Division’s senior leaders. This course brought unit leaders to Monterey, who were so impressed with the results of language training for their troops that they sought a shorter course in Dari and Pashto familiarization designed to prepare themselves for concurrent work in theater but at a more senior level. “The Familiarization Course here in Monterey compliments what our junior leaders are already learning back in Fort Carson,” said Col. John Kolasheski, brigade commander. The course was immersive in style and was conducted by native DLIFLC instructors. Moreover, the course involved scenario training, which Kolasheski thought just as important as military hardware and money as tools to use in Afghanistan. “The FTX allows the soldiers to immerse themselves in a simulated situation which they may actually encounter killed or hurt,” said Kolasheski. “It is a complex environment and anything we can do to give ourselves an advantage is a step in the right direction and is worth the investment. I believe that this training is the right kind of investment,” said Kolasheski.631 In early February 2012, DLIFLC hosted another small group from the 4th Infantry Division, this time a few of its senior leaders, including Col. Mingus, for a week-long special Pashto Familiarization Course. Again, the purpose of the course was to familiarize these personnel with basic Pashto and the Afghan culture. According to Mowafiq Alanazi, Associate Dean, Field Support Division, “the goal by the end of the course [was] to get commanders acquainted and comfortable with the socializing aspect of dealing with Afghan leaders such as greetings and introductions.” The unit in training, the 4th Brigade Combat


628 DLIFLC SITREP week ending 16 December 11.

629 DLIFLC_POM Update 6 May 11.

630 DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 10 February 12; DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 17 February 12.

Team, had a difficult mission to manage more than thirty Security Force Assistant Teams and several Female Engagement Teams along the eastern border of Afghanistan, and realized the importance of language and culture training.\textsuperscript{632}

**Fort Polk.** DLIFLC provided sixteen-week AFPAK GPF courses for combat troops stationed at Fort Polk, shorter-term familiarization courses for Security Force Assistance Team training mission, and as needed training for the 52nd Translator Interpreter Company, whose 09L interpreters and translators as heritage speakers occasionally needed enhancement and sustainment of translation and interpretation skills. In July 2012, DLIFLC Field Support began looking to provide permanent party employees instead of contract instructors hired by DLI-Washington.\textsuperscript{633}

**Other LTDs.** On 8 February 2011, Maj. Gen. Raymond Carpenter, acting director of the Army National Guard, visited DLIFLC with an interest to establish an LTD in the Clay National Guard Center at the former Naval Air Station Atlanta and also sending deploying Guard units to Forts Carson, Campbell and Drum to participate there in pre-deployment language training.\textsuperscript{634} In early 2012, DLIFLC began planning to establish a new LTD at Fort Knox in Kentucky using DLI-Washington instructors.\textsuperscript{635}

**LTD Site Course and Summits.**

By 2011, the LTD program had grown to such a scale that DLIFLC created a training course for directors of its training detachments. These managers were the Institute’s interface with senior leadership at various U.S. military organizations around the world. The purpose of the LTD Site Director course was to provide site managers with best practices of managing daily operations and connecting them to various DLIFLC resources to support distributed foreign language education. The topics of training were geared toward enhancing their academic, administrative, and logistical leadership skills.\textsuperscript{636} The course also gave DLIFLC an opportunity to discuss resource challenges with its staff while apprising them of recent activities and guidance across the Institute.\textsuperscript{637}

DLIFLC also held annual LTD summits during this period. These summits brought together DLIFLC senior leaders, military service units, and language education professionals to discuss language training. Topics for the event in March 2011 included how to meet GPF training requirements and development of GPF language learning strategies. AFPAK Hands successes and language enabled service members were also a focus of discussion. A similar LTD summit was held at Ft. Meade in September 2012.\textsuperscript{638}


\textsuperscript{634} 1st Lt. Scott Ghiringhelli, “Army National Guard Director Visits DLIFLC,” *Globe* (Spring 2011): 15.

\textsuperscript{635} DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 17 February 12.

\textsuperscript{636} DLIFLC Sitrep 01 April 2011.

\textsuperscript{637} DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 22 November 2013.

\textsuperscript{638} DLIFLC Sitrep 11 MAR 2011; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120907.
TRADOC Interest in General Purpose Force LTDs

The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Institute’s higher command, remained responsible during this period for thirty-two Army schools and the training of more than half a million soldiers each year. TRADOC was also vitally involved in Army plans to implement the new concept of regionally aligned forces. This force restructuring sought to ensure that combat commands had forces explicitly designed and prepared to engage in missions within the geographic scope of that command, namely, Europe, the Pacific, Africa, South America, and the Middle East. The realignment was intended to be responsive to the changing geopolitical and strategic environment. Service members assigned to regionally aligned forces would require foreign language and culture familiarization training organized by specific combatant command. For many years prior to the Army’s adoption of this organization, DLIFLC had actively supported field units on the cusp of deployment by sending out LTDs, up to thirty at a time. Originally intended to support the continuing education needs of professional linguists, LTDs had also proven to be successful for providing short duration language courses needed for successful missions abroad.

Figure 34 Lt. Gen. David Halverson observes an Arabic immersion class at DLIFLC while on a day-long tour of the Institute in February 2013.

Lt. Gen. David Halverson, TRADOC’s Deputy Commanding General, who visited DLIFLC in February 2013 to familiarize himself with the Institute’s work, clearly saw a role for DLIFLC. “I think it is an exciting time, Halverson said, “and I think that DLI obviously can help us with [defining the requirements for regionally aligned forces] so that our Soldiers at all levels are much more effective when they go into an area and have both the culture and language skills.” The general added that acquiring these skill sets would “ensure that we have the best trained force possible.”

CGSS Classes

DLIFLC also maintained an LTD at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 2012, approximately 316 CGSC students were enrolled in language instruction provided by DLIFLC, a significant increase from the previous high of 163 from a class in 2011. The 2012 total included 130 students participating in the lower level Headstart programs and 186 undergoing resident instruction. In early 2012, Steve Collins conducted a site visit to observe ongoing classes, to meet with the LTD instructors, and to discuss the program’s status and funding with Marv Nickels, Deputy Director CGSS, and Jim Thomas, Deputy Director DCL.

According to DLIFLC, the college was pleased with the quality of instruction and the continued improvement of the program.\textsuperscript{640}

**Educational Support Services Division**

The Educational Support Services Division was headed by Dean Dr. Andrew Corin until succeeded by Dean Dr. Sahie Kang in February 2013. It was comprised of three subordinate units: the Academic Specialist Center, previously known as the Academic Support Center, the Diagnostic Assessment Center, and Command Language Program Support Office. The division was created during a reorganization in 2006.\textsuperscript{641}

The Academic Specialist Center provided academic support to all Continuing Education faculty and students at its location at the DOD Center, Monterey Bay. It provided solutions in the areas of language learning, faculty professional development, language assessment, and curriculum assistance. The Diagnostic Assessment Center conducted Diagnostic Assessment training for all DLIFLC faculty and provided a range of related academic support. The CLP Support Office provided support to Command Language Programs from all services, both active and reserve components, worldwide. CLP Support Office activities included outreach to Command Language Program managers (CLPM), including distributing pre-deployment and refresher language training materials to units and individual linguists worldwide; making field assistance visits; conducting an annual CLPM Course; and organizing and hosting the annual CLPM Seminar and CLP competition.\textsuperscript{642}

Highlights of the Academic Specialist Center included hosting the CLPM Seminar at DLIFLC in late April 2011. The program featured several influential speakers with foreign language community expertise. CLPMs from all various service branches and other government agencies were able to interact and get questions answered regarding their programs. More than three hundred CLP managers attended the conference to discuss foreign language education and training issues and share best practices. Included in the participants were general officers and Senior Executive Service members from the Army, Navy, NSA and OSD.\textsuperscript{643}

Maj. Gen. Gregory Schumacher, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army, was the featured speaker. The general stressed that budget cuts would be felt in all aspects of military operations and that “only the best programs will remain.” He stressed the need to “do a better job of prioritizing” programs, but that CLPMs did have the opportunity to “help frame what is working well and what we can get rid of.” Attention at the meeting also focused upon Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus pay and the merits of providing such pay for lower level linguists. Schumacher argued against giving bonus pay to service members at ILR Level 1/1 of proficiency because it was it was intended for higher levels of language proficiency, but others argued in favor. “The Navy will continue to pay at the 1/1 level, because we have determined that basic conversation is needed in Special Operations and for anyone in the Fleet Marine Forces and Navy Expeditionary

\textsuperscript{640} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120217.  
\textsuperscript{641} 2013 CE Command History_1st_Quarter.  
\textsuperscript{642} 2012 CE_1st Qtr CY12.  
\textsuperscript{643} Weekly SITREP from DLIFLC 29 APR 11.
Combat Commands. Because we have a focused list of nine languages, we want to encourage them and will pay the GPF for their capability,” said National Lee Johnson, the Navy’s Senior Language Authority. Schumacher acknowledged that he would “support the Special Operation’s Command idea to pay (1/1 proficiency pay) so we can find out if it pays off,” but also made clear that “resources will be less, so at the end of the day, we will have to prioritize.”

At the same event, DLIFLC announced the winners of the 2010 Command Language Program of the Year. One winner was chosen from each service. These were the Army’s 500th Military Intelligence Brigade, the Marine Corps 3rd Radio Battalion, and the 316th Training Squadron.

In fiscal year 2012, the Institute had to postpone the CLPM Conference to fiscal year 2013. The exact reason is unknown but was apparently due to technical programming errors. The failure to hold the conference invoked risk to the Command Language Program that could only be mitigated by more extensive outreach until the event could be rescheduled and repogrammed using the Army’s Resource and Requirements System. DLIFLC believed that at least one annual seminar per year was needed to sustain the linguist corps due to the high turnover of field CLP managers. The solution for the problem involved removing responsibility for the CLPM conference from Continuing Education. Beginning in fiscal year 2013, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations assumed CLPM oversight.

DLIFLC received a request late one Friday afternoon from FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to help translate emergency messages into different languages to ensure they could be understood by the victims of hurricane Sandy. DLIFLC employees reacted quickly and provided FEMA with written translations, as well as digital audio translations, in seven languages within five hours.

Language Science and Technology

Dr. Christine Campbell continued to serve as the Associate Provost for Language Science and Technology (LS&T), which post she had held since 2009. LS&T was responsible Curriculum Development, Faculty Development, the Student Learning Center, Technology Integration, and the DLIFLC Libraries. During this period LS&T relocated from its offices housed in the former Monte Vista Elementary School to a commercial complex called Ryan Ranch. In 2013, LS&T was disestablished, as previously discussed in other sections of this report, and the functions of its organizations were integrated into existing DLIFLC schools or else eliminated. The chart below describes in general how the elements of LS&T were transitioned to other directorates.

645 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 1 June 2012.
646 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 9 November 2012.
647 Biographical profile of Dr. Christine M. Campbell from www.DLIFLC.edu website, copy in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
648 1QCY11 Cover Memo (DCSRM quarterly report), in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
Curriculum Development

Headed by Kiril P. Boyadjieff, Curriculum Development produced multimedia instructional material for the DLIFLC Resident Basic course as well as for the Intermediate or Advanced programs. The Division relocated to Ryan Ranch, a commercial office park near Monterey, in June 2011. The division spent almost 90 percent of its effort, however, on Basic Program curriculum. Curriculum Development was also responsible for online diagnostic assessment that, by late 2012, included eight languages and some four hundred modules in development. Usage of the online diagnostic assessment system had grown 30 percent from 2011 with more than six thousand registered users by the end of 2012. Curriculum Development also maintained DLIFLC’s Global Language Online Support System (GLOSS) that encompassed thirty-eight languages and helped to sustain the language capabilities of 418,720 users in fiscal year 2012. Both systems were freely accessible to anyone inside and outside DLIFLC. Finally, during this period, Curriculum Development also worked to create a new product called the Post Basic Delivery System, which was intended provide teachers and students online access to post basic course modules with topical content.649

In March 2012, the division had to postpone development of the Egyptian dialect course curriculum due to the shortage of instructors during the hiring freeze. It hoped the Institute would be able to release faculty from the school by September.650 In April 2012, Curriculum Development began coordinating with Undergraduate Education and other directorates to reacquire a sufficient number of Egyptian and Sudanese faculty. Four faculty members from each dialect were identified for transfer to Curriculum Development while CD planned to re-assign other Arabic instructors back to UGE.651

In October 2012, Ron Carrier, SES, Associate Language Authority; John Sharp, Senior language Analyst; Felipe Aguilar, Deputy Director; Dr. Khosrow Keshani, Senior NCS Instructor; and Ben Mericli, Turkish Curriculum Reviewer; from ADET Georgia visited DLIFLC to conduct Iraqi/Levantine/Turkish/Uzbek curriculum reviews.652

Although the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency noted that Curriculum Development’s processes were well structured, designed, and flexible, its 2013 review determined that the mission of the division was inconsistent with the main purpose of DLIFLC to teach foreign language. USAMAA did not therefore authorize the division to be included on the organizational TDA, which caused DLIFLC to discontinue the division. At the end of 2013, the Provost began moving Curriculum Development staff into the various schools with the hope that course developers would improve their material with direct feedback from instructors using that material.653

649 DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012.
650 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120302.
651 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120406.
652 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121012.
Faculty Development

The Faculty Development Division consisted of forty personnel who provided services and training to support the professional development needs of more than two thousand DLIFLC faculty. DLIFLC required all new civilian and military faculty members to take its four-week Instructor Certification Course within three months of arrival at DLIFLC.654

Faculty Development continued its annual tradition of holding a special Faculty Professional Development Holiday Program each year during the Institute’s annual block leave event, when all military students were granted leave for the holidays. These programs typically offered a wide spectrum of themes and events. In 2011, the holiday program featured a technology fair showing the most effective ways of integrating technology into foreign language teaching and it started with a plenary presentation by Dr. Yong Zhao, “Computer Gaming for Language Learning.”655 The DLIFLC Academic Senate, under the leadership of Academic President Dr. Mahera Harouny, also continued to support faculty development training. In 2012, it organized the 14th annual DLIFLC Faculty Professional Development Day, essentially an in-house conference for DLIFLC faculty to attend and make presentations. The theme was “Teaching Speaking to High Proficiency Level in the Classroom and One-on-One.” The goal of the Academic Senate and the Institute’s Faculty Advisory Boards was to uphold the highest standards for academic excellence amongst the faculty of DLIFLC. The plenary speaker for the 2012 event was Dr. Chantal P. Thompson of Brigham Young University.656

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655 DLIFLC SITREP week ending 6 January 12.
Faculty Development activities spanned a broad range of activities during this period. In April 2011, the department provided twenty-six hours of ESL instruction to the Monterey Coast Guard, focusing on listening and speaking skills for effective radio communication. In December 2012, the department coordinated iPad and MacBook training with the Multi-Language and Persian Farsi Schools for their teachers with newly issued equipment. It also conducted an eLearning Certification Program from which 48 faculty graduated in November 2012. In July 2013, the department conducted the first iteration of the Diagnostic Assessment Certification Course. During the same month, staff also participated in DLIFLC’s Kazakhstan Faculty Exchange project. Faculty Development conducted two weeks of teacher training seminars for English, Chinese, and German instructors in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and worked with Kazakh students on language learning strategies and speaking skills.

In November 2012, the DLIFLC Board of Visitors discussed the operations and practices of the Faculty Development Division and found that the program’s sophistication superseded that of many civilian and military academic institutions due to a cultural process that emphasized the process of teaching how to make students learn and how to help faculty develop their teaching abilities. The Board found the program vital to the institute because of its need to employ native speakers, many of whom came to DLIFLC without any formal background in teaching.

As with Curriculum Development, USAMAA determined that the Faculty Development Division was not required to administer DLIFLC and was not authorized for placement on DLIFLC’s official TDA. Thus, the commandant directed the division to be discontinued. The challenge, however, was that cutting the Faculty Development Division meant canceling nearly 50 percent of critical workshops that supported improved teaching. Pick’s response was to move this first-line training into schools, characterized as using Faculty Development leadership to mentor, train teachers, and conduct quality control and teacher certification.

Technology Integration

Through its Technology Integration Division, headed by Dean Pamela Combacau, LS&T adapted to the ever changing world of technology and security. Key technology products included Rapport, Headstart, and language survival kits.
**Rapport**

The Rapport program provided online basic language and cultural awareness training in Dari, Pashto, and Iraqi Arabic. DOD made training in either Dari or Pashto mandatory for all service members and civilians deploying to Afghanistan and for soldiers deploying to Iraq. All three languages were accessible online from October 2010.\(^{664}\) The program consisted of six to eight hours of training introducing culture, religion and way of life of a specific linguistic group and region with ten military survival tasks.

DLIFLC introduced an updated version of its Headstart program in 2011 to support those service members assigned to learn a language at the platoon level but who were not able to attend a course at a DLIFLC language training detachment. Headstart2 was self-paced program provided 80 to 100 hours of basic language instruction online or via cd emphasizing language to carry out military survival skills.\(^{665}\)

During its November 2012 meeting, the DLIFLC Board of Visitors discussed the products produced by Technology Integration. Notably, Technology Integration had the ability to program content, once acquired, into other platforms thereby allowing the content to span across a range of products. The ability to adapt content to various types of changing technological platforms produced powerful efficiencies that the Board embraced. The Board was also impressed by the potential to repurpose or adapt online assessment, but noted an important deficiency in how the division was unable to track DOD and other agency use of its products.\(^{666}\)

**Headstart2.**

In September 2012, Technology Integration assisted the U.S. Air Force by providing Headstart2 CDs in ten languages to Air Force students at Goodfellow Air Force Base who were awaiting language training at DLIFLC.\(^{667}\) As the United States shifted more focus to the African continent, LS&T began to offer RAPPORT products to support U.S. Africa Command language requirements, which it made available through use of the dliflc.edu web page. In 2012, it supported the languages of Hausa, European Portuguese (Angola), Swahili, and French (Ivory Coast).\(^{668}\)

Technology Integration fielded the Arabic Levantine Headstart2 in August 2013, bringing online twenty languages for the hundred-hour self-paced product.\(^{669}\) That month the Provost reported

\(^{664}\) STAND-TO!, “The Rapport Program,” US Army online newsletter, 9 November 2010. DLIFLC developed Rapport in response to International Security Assistance Force needs and Army counterinsurgency training guidance that required deployed personnel to greet locals in their own language (USFOR-A FRAGO 10-371 and HQDA EXORD 273-10).

\(^{665}\) See STAND-TO!, “TRADOC’s Defense Language Institute Introduces HeadStart2,” U.S. Army online newsletter, 4 November 2011.

\(^{666}\) DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012.

\(^{667}\) SITREP_DLIFLC_20120914.

\(^{668}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 7 December 2012.

\(^{669}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 17 August 2012.
that 5,545 service members completed online Rapport or Headstart language training and received certificates. The highest enrollment was for Spanish, which had a drop rate of only 1 percent.670

Another initiative relating to Headstart2 arose after the Chief Technology Office negotiated an agreement with Apple that allowed DLIFLC products to be published on the company’s iTunes App Store.671 The Technology Integration Division then went to work. In April 2012, the Provost announced that Dari and Farsi Headstart2s were available on a mobile device application from Apple’s iTunes store. Students, linguists, troops in the field, or anyone, could now directly download language learning material at any time and from anywhere without technical or security restrictions as long as they had a clear connection. Gradually, the catalogue of available languages grew. In June 2012, Apple approved the release of DLIFLC’s Swahili Headstart2. By early 2013, DLIFLC Apple store Headstart2 apps included Swahili, Spanish, Pashto, Levantine, Iraqi, Hausa, German, French, Farsi, Portuguese, Dari, Arabic MSA, and Chinese. In August 2013, Korean Headstart2 App became available. NATO also contacted the Technology Integration Division to upload the Pasto and Dari Headstart2 apps to its own Learning Management System as did DOD’s JKO system. By October 2013, Headstart2 was available in seventeen languages in the iTunes Store. Technology Integration also produced language survival kits for the iTunes store with six languages available by the end of 2013.672

Emergency LSKs for Japan

On 11 March 2011, a 9.0 earthquake occurred off the northeast coast of Japan. The earthquake caused much damage, but it also generated a massive tsunami that pummeled the coastline and caused a series of nuclear crises that claimed the lives of more than fourteen thousand people and left nearly 1,200 missing.

The United States provided immediate assistance by launching a relief mission called Operation Tomodachi. Instantly, numerous graduates of DLIFLC’s Japanese language program were called to action to facilitate U.S. aid efforts by using their language and cultural skills. Many of these service members were Foreign Affairs Officers, including soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines trained at DLIFLC, who were pulled from their normal duties from all over Japan. One such officer was Marine Maj. Giuseppe Stavale, a FAO stationed in Japan at the time of the disaster. He worked at the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) Joint Operations Center at Yokota Air Base, set up to support bilateral U.S.-Japanese operations. Stavale noted how important U.S. aid meant: “There’s no doubt, that we took a quantum leap from a day-to-day type of friendship to a very close and trusted partnership. Something that I think will go beyond the veneer surface of the government officials, but really into the population, that they’ll see that we Americans, not just the U.S. armed services, but America in general, is truly a friend to Japan.”673

670 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121019.
671 DLIFLC SITREP week ending 9 December 11.
672 SITREP DLIFLC 20120406; SITREP DLIFLC 20120629; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 15 March 2013; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130322; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130816; SITREP_DLIFLC_20131101; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130510. Similar kits were available in four languages in Google Play Android Market. Overall, DLIFLC reported that it made twenty-six languages available free online in Headstart2. See DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 11 October 2013.
Three days after the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, DLIFLC provided direct aid to the relief effort after preparing and sending Japanese language survival kits, small pocket sized survival guides with basic vocabulary and audio recordings for use by U.S. military and other aid workers. The kits covered three topics: Japanese Basic, Aircrew, and Medical. The Institute’s Technology Integration Dean, Pamela Combacau, took charge early Friday morning Pacific Time on the day of the earthquake and began planning. “I waited for a few hours before waking people, but by 6 am, I called a colleague to have Japanese instructors made available for the audio recording that I knew was necessary to complete the product,” Combacau explained. Instructor Tatsuya Akano and his supervisor Takashi Kato were involved in producing the audio portions of the kits.\(^{674}\) The U.S.S. *Ronald Reagan* was the first to use these new Japanese language aids, which the ship’s crew downloaded from DLIFLC’s product webpage. In 2010, DLIFLC had similarly responded to the Haitian earthquake by distributing several thousand similar kits for Haitian Creole.\(^{675}\)

To document linguist support during the crisis, DLIFLC dispatched 1st Lt. Scott Ghiringhelli to Sendai, Japan, to interview DLIFLC alumni participating in Operation Tomodachi. Ghiringhelli conducted several interviews and produced photographs and video footage of alumni in action.\(^{676}\)

In March 2012, the Japanese Consul General in San Francisco recognized DLIFLC’s rapid development of its Japanese language survival kits in support of tsunami relief operations during a reception to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the tragedy.\(^{677}\)

Language Technology Application and Evaluation

During this period, the Language Technology Evaluation and Application (LTEA) Division of LS&T explored a range of new language technology products under the direction of Dr. Tamás Marius. The first was called the Automatic Pronunciation Feedback System and it helped students correctly pronounce words down to the syllable level. After “listening” to a user, the system tried to provide feedback on how the student was mispronouncing any sound in the system. In 2013, this system was ready for use with MSA, Pashto and Dari.\(^{678}\) A second product was called the Automatic ILR Leveling System because it used Interagency Language Roundtable standards. LTEA had completed working versions for English, Arabic, Pashto, and Dari.\(^{679}\) LTEA created this system by obtaining recordings from hundreds of students at various levels of the language learning process. Instructors then evaluated hundreds of hours of data to help the system measure word length, word complexity, sentence complexity and some grammatical features. A related initiative was the Automatic Low Range Online Testing System, which also sought to use automatic speech recognition to score spoken responses at a very low range of ILR proficiency ratings (Levels 0+, 1, 1+). The system scored pronunciation and had potential to be integrated into adaptive testing. Yet another automated foreign language product being developed was the


\(^{675}\) DLIFLC Sitrep 25 March 2011.

\(^{676}\) DLIFLC Sitrep 22 April 2011.


\(^{678}\) SITREP_DLIFLC_20130308.

\(^{679}\) SITREP_DLIFLC_20120907.
“Document Rating Interactive System.” This project was a collaboration between DLIFLC and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and hoped to be able to automatically rate the ILR level of written documents.  

LS&T was also developing prototypes for a new program called DLiLEARN that became available in French, Spanish, Japanese, and Tagalog in 2013.

Student Learning Center

The Student Learning Center (SLC) was located in the Presidio of Monterey’s historic Building 220, formerly known as the Edge Club. The main mission of the Student Learning Center was to provide a week-long course for incoming students to help prepare them for the rigors of learning a foreign language. SLC reviewed English grammar, taught the best approaches to learning, including learning styles, and taught general culture and area studies. Halfway through his or her course at DLIFLC, a student received a review of their learning successes and failures and how to revise their learning strategy based upon their experience. Upon graduation, SLC provided each student with a final course on how to sustain their language. SLC placed an emphasis upon learning how to learn. Dr. Leah Graham served as Dean of the Student Learning Center until October 2011 when she accepted a position at DLIELC at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. CW2 Anand Bokde, Associate Dean, and Dr. Hye-Yeon Lim worked as Acting Dean during the vacancy from 7 November 2011 to 26 March 2012 when Dr. Hyekyung Sung-Frear, the former Associate Dean for Operations, was chosen to be the new Dean of the Student Learning Center. Dr. Sung-Frear continued to serve as SLC Dean through 2013.

SLC was comprised of five divisions: Introduction to Language Studies Department, Mobile Training Program, Individual Study Management Program, Workshops and Seminars Program, and Autonomous Language Sustainment Program. SLC also actively engaged in professional development, curriculum development, outreach efforts, and research.

In late 2010, Army Sgt. Joshua Seymour, a student at DLIFLC to study French, received an ILR proficiency level of 3/3/2+ on the French language DLPT 5, an outstanding score for a basic course student having attended a six-month course. Seymour credited his high scores both to hard work and to access to services of the Student Learning Center.

SLC held an open house at their building, the former Edge Club, on 3 January 2013. More than 250 people from the schools attended the SLC event. SLC staff conducted demonstration lessons and set up display for various SLC programs.

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680 DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012.
681 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130111; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130118.
683 2013 LST_Quarterly_Report_3rd Quarter.
685 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130111.
In April 2013, the DLIFLC Command Group approved sending teaching materials developed by SLC to the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). FSI wanted to use Grammar Jumpstart, materials SLC created for its Introduction to Language Studies class. By 2013, SLC had created Grammar Jumpstarts for twenty-two languages by coordinating their development with the various DLIFLC schools teaching those languages. DLIFLC’s permission allowed FSI to make SLC’s Grammar Jumpstart materials available on their intranet for access by FSI students studying foreign languages in Arlington, Va.686

Between 24 May and 30 August 2013, DLIFLC and the Center for the Advanced Study of Language conducted pilot tests for a new Defense Language Aptitude Battery known as DLAB II using 800 students enrolled in SLC’s “Introduction to Language Studies” course.687 In August 2013, the Provost Office reported that SLC had completed a new ILS module.688

The DLIFLC Board of Visitors found that SLC faculty was dedicated and positive and in their teaching linked the concept of culture as being important to understanding the a foreign language. In addition, SLC provided support to students experiencing difficulties in learning throughout their course at DLIFLC, provided special tutoring, and helped staff determine whether problems were due to a lack of effort or a lack of ability. 689 Although the function of SLC likely helped the Institute to lower attrition and supported higher proficiencies, the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency found SLC’s mission ineligible to include on DLIFLC’s organizational chart and Colonel Pick directed the program to be closed down in 2013. However, the commandant continued to believe that SLC’s Introduction to Language Studies program was important. That program could not be accomplished by existing teaching staff without short-staffing teaching teams. Therefore, he directed that thirteen SLC specialists move into schools with the remaining 8 specialists deployed for leadership, train-the-trainer, mentoring, and quality control within the teaching directorates.690

DLIFLC Libraries

DLIFLC began this period with two libraries, an academic library called Aiso at the Presidio of Monterey and a community library known as the Chamberlin Library at the Ord Military Community in Seaside, California. Margaret Groner was the chief librarian until she retired on 30 June 2011. Groner first came to DLIFLC in 1991 as a systems librarian. Since becoming the chief librarian in 1994, Groner implemented the libraries’ first electronic integrated library system and developed its web site. Groner spent thirty-four years serving in military libraries including the Defense Information Systems Agency, the National Defense University, the 53rd ASG Library, Bad Kreuznach, Germany, and the Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.691 DLIFLC chose Kathleen Hanselmann to succeed Groner. Under the Language Science and Technology

686 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130412.
687 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120601.
688 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130830.
689 DLIFLC Board of Visitors Minutes, 31 October 2012 and 1 November 1, 2012.
690 DLIFLC Re-Alignment VTC Brief_13 DEC 13 (Final) and DLIFLC Re-Organziation VTC Brief_13 DEC (Collins Comments - 11 Dec), digital slides prepared to brief Headquarters, TRADOC, on USAMAA’s findings, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
691 “Chief Librarian Retires,” All DLIFLC email, 14 June 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
director, Hanselmann continued to operate both the Aiso and Chamberlain libraries. Asio held some 110,000 volumes and hundreds of periodicals and journals. It provided reference services, internet access, and study space for DLIFLC students. Aiso supported approximately 1,500 faculty, staff, and students per week using study rooms, computers and wireless access and individual study. The Chamberlin Library was also home to the DLIFLC archives maintained and run separately by the DLIFLC Command History Office.

Figure 36 The Chamberlin Library’s summer children’s library programs were last held during the summer of 2013.

During this period, the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency review impacted both libraries by reducing staffing at Aiso to eight personnel and worse by directing the closure of the Chamberlin library. Unfortunately, for its Aiso library analysis, USAMAA used a Moral, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) library, that is, a post library, as the model for determining staffing levels. Staff tried unsuccessfully to rebut this argument by noting that Aiso should have been compared to academic libraries supporting other military schools, for example the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. According to Chief Librarian Hanselmann, because the study used a base library model to determine Aiso staffing, it was not possible to refute the determination after DLIFLC leadership chose to focus its attention on saving resources in other departments. USAMAA also determined that the Chamberlin Library was a MWR activity not eligible for inclusion on DLIFLC’s TDA.\(^{692}\) The commandant requested to transfer the responsibility for the library to the U.S. Army Garrison, but Garrison leaders declined to accept the responsibility on the basis of limited resources and the presence of nearby libraries operated by local municipalities providing similar services.

In 2013, Chamberlin Librarian Debbie Collins accepted early retirement and DLIFLC’s Aiso Library began overseeing the process to close the library after decades of support to Fort Ord and the military communities of the Monterey region. The library was permanently closed on 1 May 2014. Some of the library’s collections were transferred to other Army or local organizations, including the Porter Youth Center, the military chapel, and the nearby Chartwell School. The DLIFLC Command History Office also absorbed several hundred military history volumes and remained operational in the facility eventually creating a perplexing situation for Army staff concerned about space utilization. The remainder of the library’s fifty thousand volume collection was dispersed to other government libraries. The Chamberlin building was dedicated in 1970 to honor Brig. Gen. Harry D. Chamberlin, an Olympic cavalryman and early Fort Ord commander.

Government and military offices include specialized staff who help guide and coordinate the commander in managing the organization. Those supporting DLIFLC are discussed below.

**DLIFLC Chief of Staff**

The DLIFLC chief of staff position was designed to synchronize and oversee all personnel working in special staff, mainly headquarters, functions, such as logistics, operations, and resource management. The chief of staff ensured that these staff communicated with one another and understood the overall mission. It was a complicated job, requiring many hats. The first chief of staff during this period was Lt. Col. Michael Frenchick, who served until his retirement in early April 2012. Col. Danial Pick, DLIFLC Commandant, presided over Frenchick’s retirement ceremony, which was attended by Tom Greco, TRADOC G-2, Brig. Gen. Sylvia Crockett, Strategic Communications Director for the California National Guard, and retired Col. Harvey Crockett. In mid-May 2012, the DLIFLC welcomed Lt. Col. Ross V. Gagliano as the new DLIFLC Chief of Staff. Gagliano arrived after being reassigned from Afghanistan. He held the position for less than a year until the commandant detailed him to help craft the transitional TDA the Institute was developing to address the USAMAA reorganization.

In April 2013, Colonel Pick appointed Clare Bugary, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, as Interim DLIFLC Chief of Staff. Bugary served as the Interim Chief of Staff until 31 July 2013 when Colonel Pick appointed Brian D. Perry, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Logistics, as Acting Chief of Staff. This move was necessary because, in August 2013, DLIFLC posted a notice to hire a GS-15 level civilian chief of staff. Bugary herself applied for that position and thus could no longer hold the acting position.

Why did DLIFLC seek a civilian chief of staff for the first time in its history? According to Colonel Pick, DLIFLC lacked essential continuity of leadership that it required at the senior level. Although the provost was a civilian, this position did not have the broad overview needed to manage and drive institutional change from a continuity perspective. Above the provost was DLIFLC’s command group consisting of a commandant, an assistant commandant, a command sergeant major, and a chief of staff who were all required as military personnel to rotate often and not on the same schedules—a constant revolving door. Faced with budgetary uncertainty and constant mission change, DLIFLC needed a leader who understood how to structure the Institute by analyzing and prioritizing its missions and who could implement the policies necessary—from rank advancement and merit pay to how to assess whom to keep among temporary employees as

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693 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 27 April 2012.
694 Scolaighe Goebert, “DLIFLC Welcomes New Chief of Staff,” DLIFLC online news brief, 3 August 2012.
695 Personal recollection of the author.
696 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130405.
mission requirements fluctuated by language. Pick knew those policies had to be sound, transparent, and fair. Unfortunately, the turbulence created by constant command group turnover was untenable. He chose, therefore, to civilianize the chief of staff position to provide the continuity that the command group needed. Without question, the Institute was a complex organization to master in the short time available to most military officers chosen to lead it.698

Pick also hoped that a permanent civilian chief of staff would help better manage the Institute’s key special staff functions. The new civilian chief of staff reported to the DLIFLC assistant commandant. Pick believed this arrangement helped fuse the special staff with the Institute’s broader operations by empowering the assistant commandant to task the staff through the chief to support various requests from DLIFLC organizations. The decision was also intended to make it possible for the commandant to focus more attention on interacting with senior leaders in the Pentagon, at NSA, in the services so that these could more readily understand the scope of foreign language training within DOD, the role played by DLIFLC, the resources required, and how best to optimize the use of those resources.699

On 25 September 2013, the commandant welcomed Steve Collins as the final selection to become DLIFLC’s first civilian chief of staff.700 Collins was a retired Army lieutenant colonel who had already served in multiple civilian leadership positions in different DLIFLC departments prior to his selection. On 5 November 2013, Collins issued a memorandum outlining his philosophy as the chief of staff—a novel departure from the management style of past chiefs—in which he emphasized his goals: Increase cohesion and teamwork, reduce uncertainty, tolerate honest mistakes while adhering to high standards, and promote training, personal self-improvement, and getting things done.701

Resource Management

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management remained Richard Chastain. Resource Management included a Budget Division, led by Barbara Javis, a Manpower and Force Analysis Division, led by Maj. Robert Orsi, and an accounting section under Mark Pool, which also included responsibility for all official travel funding oversight.702 Pool, previously the Presidio of Monterey auditor, was re-hired as Chief, Accounting Division, during the first quarter of 2011.703 The office and its many budget analysts were responsible to manage and program all funding for DLIFLC. They participated in the Working Program and Budget Advisory Committee. During this period, the office was especially involved in activities related to the USAMAA manpower review as discussed elsewhere in this report. For example, in late 2012, it spent time preparing for the initial USAMAA study team visits.704 Then, in September 2013, the office prepared a description of

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698 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 6-7.
699 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 4-5.
700 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 27 Sep 2013; Commandant, All POM email, 25 September 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
701 DLIFLC Chief of Staff Philosophy memo, 5 November 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
702 1QCY11 DRM Staff, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
703 1QCY11 Cover Memo (DCSRM quarterly report), in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
704 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121012.
mission impacts that would result from implementing the USAMAA study findings. Routine activities included conducting fiscal year-end close-out procedures in accordance with TRADOC standards, preparing for or conducting routine audits, and monitoring contract spending. A notable headache during this period involved a contract dispute between DLIFLC and the testing company Avant, which successfully sued the Institute for breach of contract. A sad note in June 2012 was the passing of Barbara Jarvis, Chief of the Budget Division. Jarvis had thirty-seven years of government service at the time of her death. Her memorial service was held at the OMC Chapel and was well attended by many family members and Institute staff.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations was divided into four sections, including Operations, Strategic Plans, Scheduling, and Mission Support all under the direction of Clare Bugary. Strategic Communications was under DCSOPs until established as a separate Chief of Staff Office during the second quarter of 2012.

DCSOPs maintained responsibility for numerous activities, such as coordinating the annual Command Language Program Managers conferences or the Annual Program Review. It received and distributed language survival kits and translation requests, coordinated DLIFLC’s Language Day, ceremonies (including memorializations) and parades, volunteer opportunities, and blood drives. It managed strategic planning and the writing of specific operations orders, and scheduled students for seats within Institute training programs using the Training Resources Arbitration Panel (TRAP) process. Adjustments made through this process created a master schedule for the Institute that determined the maximum number of DLIFLC students and associated funding. Using the related Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) annual process the Army identified joint-service training requirements at DLIFLC for the out-years. DLIFLC worked with the Department of the Army G-3/5/7 to hold the annual SMDR and the quarterly TRAP. The goal of DCSOPs was to make progress to manage the training requirements more effectively by inculcating improved rigor by the military service representatives.

The SMDR process used validated training requirements to set student load and associated funding for all DLIFLC proponent schools. School “Code 215” requirements were analyzed following the meeting in relation to a draft program memorandum that outlined student load distributions and a resource ceiling load of 4,300. As long as the requirements captured during the SMDR process were within the program memorandum resource limits, they were not supposed to face further constraints. The process that determined DLIFLC’s student load and funding for its resident program fluctuated but not dramatically during the period. For example, for fiscal year 2013, the Army sought to pick up additional basic course seats for future soldiers of the 35M specialty to attend classes in Monterey, deciding to place an increased emphasis in maintaining

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705 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 20 Sep 2013.
706 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121004; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121207.
707 “Services for Barbara Jarvis,” All-POM email, 9 July 2012, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
708 2012 DCSOPS 2d Qtr Historical Report.
709 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 9 August 2013.
710 2012 DCSOPS 3d Qtr Historical Report.
proficiencies.\textsuperscript{711} In 2012, the basic program load was about 3,850. An agreement between DLIFLC and the services allowed the latter to shift the load between the basic and post-basic programs as long as the services adhered to the quality management rules. The DLIFLC non-resident program load, set to about 450 in 2012, was reserved for language professional non-resident training taught using language training detachments, mobile teams, or through other distributed learning training methods.\textsuperscript{712}

Among many routine activities, of note in 2011, DCSOPS organized DLIFLC’s sponsorship of the Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC) professional conference held at Khalil Hall in October 2011. Some sixty guests attended BILC to discuss current and future language issues relating to the Defense Foreign Language Program. Staff also provided assistance for DLIFLC’s 5 November 2011 70th Anniversary events and an Alumni Association-hosted ball held at the Hyatt Regency Monterey. Lynn C. Simpson, Chief of Staff, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, was the guest speaker heard by approximately 435 guests.\textsuperscript{713}

In fiscal year 2013, a noteworthy organizational change took place when DCSOPs took responsibility to manage all DLIFLC Command Language Program (CLP) support, formerly the responsibility of Continuing Education. Because of problems that forced DLIFLC to cancel the 2012 CLP Managers Conference, the commandant reassigned the oversight of the program to DCSOPs. The CLP Support Office assisted CLP managers from all services, both active and reserve component, by conducting a CLP manager’s course along with resident and mobile training, providing guidance and program information to the global CLP community, and by organizing and hosting an annual CLP manager’s seminar. After taking over the mission, DCSOPs endeavored to complete a comprehensive courseware review, update various training blocks, and provide more service-specific information.\textsuperscript{714}

In 2013, DCSOPs focused upon DLIFLC’s fiscal year 2013-17 Campaign Plan and USAMAA-related activities, especially developing a plan and operational orders to implement the restructuring of the Provost Office and subordinate organizations.\textsuperscript{715}

Chief of Information Technology

During this period, DLIFLC established its own information technology office, initially called Educational and Information Technology Services, whose first chief was Jonathan Russell. Later, the office was known as CTO for Chief Technology Office/r. DLIFLC hired Russell and the first

\textsuperscript{711} SITREP_DLIFLC_20121214. In November 2010, DLIFLC submitted a proposal outlining three options for DLIFLC to conduct 35M (Human Intelligence Collector) foreign language training for 150-occupation qualified linguists (needing less oversight than traditional DLIFLC students). Three options were proposed: (1) Draw funding from crypto linguist training, (2) build the program into the FY2014 DLIFLC budget, or (3) establish an LTD at a nearby location such as Camp Parks. See 35M Info Paper, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

\textsuperscript{712} 2012 DCSOPS 3d Qtr Historical Report.

\textsuperscript{713} 2011 DCSOPS Quarterly Historical Report (Oct-Dec 11).

\textsuperscript{714} 2012 DCSOPS 4th Qtr Historical Report.

\textsuperscript{715} 2013 DCSOPS 4th Qtr.
members of the new staff organization in late 2010. Much of CTO’s activity was to establish the DLIFLC academic network as extensively reported in Chapter II and not repeated here. During the period, the office was involved in numerous other technical matters. In June 2011, CTO helped implement DLIFLC’s transition to a new Army email system called “Enterprise Email” (mail.mil). Later in the year, CTO worked with the Center for the Advanced Study of Language and the DLIFLC Provost Office to help enable the development of a mobile Brain Fitness application. CTO also sought to promote collaborative opportunities by working with Monterey County Chief Information Officers to further develop and use Monterey’s fiber optic ring.

During the summer of 2012, CTO migrated all DLIFLC employees using military network computers to an updated Windows 7 operating system. At the same time, CTO awarded a contract for the delivery and support of 169 high capacity copier devices, thirty-nine of which went to support the Presidio of Monterey garrison and other non-DLIFLC commands and units. The new copiers were a significant improvement over older models. After staffing review, CTO identified a site to distribute its new Apple products, which were already arriving, and worked with DLIFLC personnel office to finalize an Institute space plan.

In August CTO began to migrate Army users to the Enterprise Email system. DLIFLC had to host this system, which led to some technical and policy issues. Military email access was provided by each service, but once DLIFLC became the host, it would be an Army-only network, which meant non-Army students and staff would not be able to access the system using the normal procedures. To work around this problem, CTO arranged for non-Army students to use their official military email addresses in lieu of obtaining Army Knowledge Online sponsorship accounts. This required coordinating an “exception to policy” through the Network Communications Command (NETCOM). The problem was partially resolved locally for Air Force and Navy students who were able to use their official branch of service email addresses. Marine students, however, remained a problem because these did not receive official email addresses until their first duty assignment and permanent party non-Army military staff required Army sponsorship. Similarly, CTO had to get a waiver from the TRADOC Capability Manager to allow the Army Distributed Learning Program to operate outside the approved Army systems for delivering distributed learning content. DLIFLC was using the Sakai Collaboration and Learning environment to support both its resident and distance learning activities.

After successfully migrating 40 percent of DLIFLC’s computers to the new Windows 7 operating systems, nine faculty members suddenly lost all their user data. This incident led to a slowdown that prompted CTO to request a waiver from the 106th Signal Brigade, part of NETCOM, that allowed it to stop migrating computers until the problem was fixed. CTO identified several

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716 Weekly SITREP from DLIFLC 29 APR 11; DLIFLC_POM Update 3 June 11, DLIFLC POM Update 10 June 2011, DLIFLC Update 24 June 2011; DLI Sitrep 22 JUL 11.
718 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120713, SITREP_DLIFLC_20120817, and SITREP_DLIFLC_20120824.
719 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130328 and SITREP_DLIFLC_20130405.
720 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130328.
vulnerabilities on the military network that the 106th Signal Brigade had to resolve.\textsuperscript{721} Later, CTO resumed the Windows 7 migration and by early December 2012, Russell reported that 97 percent of faculty and staff were using the new operating system with only forty-five systems left to migrate by the 106th Signal Brigade deadline of 28 December.\textsuperscript{722}

**Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Logistics**

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Logistics (DCSPL) provided administrative and logistical support for DLIFLC, which included control of personnel files for the Faculty Personnel System employees, education file management, immigration and work authorization documentation, recruitment, faculty promotions, merit pay actions, and records review and appeals. DCSPL was also responsible for the management of military personnel actions, civilian and military awards and award ceremonies, advised the command on civilian employee actions, and functioned as the installation’s chief negotiator for labor contracts. DCSPL’s second major function was space management and space utilization on the Presidio and the Ord Military Community for academic buildings. Finally, the Deputy Chief of Personnel and Logistics was also the DLIFLC Records Management Officer.\textsuperscript{723} Possibly for that reason, the commandant transferred the Office of Academic Affairs, which was responsible for academic records, to DCSPL, where it remained until December 2012.\textsuperscript{724} Coincidentally, Provost Dr. Donald Fischer retired in December 2012, but this was concurrent to the return of Academic Affairs to the Provost Office. Warehouse Services were also under the purview of DCSPL until transferred to CTO. That decision likely resulted from CTO’s responsibility to manage the disposition of a high volume of controlled technology products to employees and students.

*Figure 37 Brian D. Perry, DLIFLC Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Logistics, 2013.*

In early 2012, Doug McCloud, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Logistics, resigned. Chief of Staff Michael Frenchick launched a search for a new GS-14-level employee to fill the position and assigned Lt. Col. Christopher Watrud as Acting DCSPL. Unfortunately, the hiring action slowed down significantly due to required input from DLIFLC’s higher headquarters, the Combined Arms Center. According to staff, without an experienced manager at the helm, DLIFLC personnel and administrative actions began suffering; Colonel Pick had to ask CAC to expedite the hiring action.\textsuperscript{725} Finally, in early 2013, DLIFLC selected Brian D. Perry to replace McCloud. In an

\textsuperscript{721} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120914; SITREP_DLIFLC_20121130.

\textsuperscript{722} SITREP_DLIFLC_20121221.

\textsuperscript{723} 2012 DCSPL Qtr 1-2.

\textsuperscript{724} 2012 DCSPL Qtr 3-4.

\textsuperscript{725} DLIFLC Situation Report week ending 3 February 12.
interview, Perry said he was prepared to work at DLIFLC because he lived for years in Saudi Arabia and Germany, was commissioned in Field Artillery and then Logistics, and also studied law.\textsuperscript{726}

Hiring was a critical function of DCSPL and it was deeply involved in obtaining various hiring waivers imposed to grapple with Budgetary Uncertainty. In May 2011, DCSPL was tracking 106 new hire authorizations as a result of the 12 March and 4 May TRADOC waivers with a total of 33 onboard (8 Arabic, 17 Pashto, 5 Farsi, 1 Punjabi, 1 Turkish and 1 GS).\textsuperscript{727} To recruit new faculty, DCSPL made several off-site recruiting trips during this period. Staff traveled to Vancouver, Los Angeles and Salt Lake City in March 2012 and made thirty-two Pashto and Punjabi contacts with at least fifteen very strong candidates. DCSPL conducted a recruiting trip to find Pashto and Arabic instructors in Detroit and Toronto, Canada, in April 2012. A very successful trip to Alexandria, Atlanta, Phoenix and San Diego in September 2012 brought recruitment leads for several dozen potential instructors in Dari, Pashto, and Persian Farsi.\textsuperscript{728} During the summer of 2012, DCSPL oversaw the hiring of some forty students, who worked for various staff offices through a special summer hiring program.\textsuperscript{729}

In September 2012, the Army National Guard Bureau suddenly mandated that all soldiers who had served more than three years on active duty had to take a one-year break to avoid their status counting against the end strength of the Army, which Congress had limited. DLIFLC had several employees serving on active duty from National Guard units, a few who had been in such status for six years or more. DCSPL worked to extend five such soldiers an additional 180 days and then sought replacements for them to avoid having to extend them again.\textsuperscript{730}

In January 2013, DCSPL began to grapple with the DOD-wide civilian hiring freeze, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 1. Except for mission-critical positions, most hiring actions within the Department of Defense were halted. Later, fear that Congress would fail to pass a budget and/or a continuing resolution in 2013, let DCSPL to begin planning to implement potential employee furloughs.\textsuperscript{731} In late May 2013, DCSPL sent out official furlough notifications to all DLIFLC staff and faculty.\textsuperscript{732} In response forty-three employees replied with rebuttals to their furlough notices.\textsuperscript{733} On 14 June 2013, DCSPL mailed the final furlough decision letters to all DLIFLC staff members. The 2013 Federal furlough required staff to stand down from work one day each pay period, but was eventually mitigated by DOD to just six days. During the same month, DCSPL began reviewing those language programs with reduced sections in fiscal year

\textsuperscript{726} “Brian Perry,” DLIFLC interview, unpublished, September 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

\textsuperscript{727} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120525.

\textsuperscript{728} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120323; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120329; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120420; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120914; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120921.

\textsuperscript{729} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120601; SITREP_DLIFLC_20120615.

\textsuperscript{730} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120928.

\textsuperscript{731} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130208; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130301.

\textsuperscript{732} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130531.

\textsuperscript{733} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130614.
2014 to develop faculty reduction glide paths.\textsuperscript{734} In September, DCSPL met with all major DLIFLC organizations to review and place current manpower on-hand into the working TDA.\textsuperscript{735} In October 2013, DCSPL coordinated with all DLIFLC supervisors regarding furlough letters and the government shutdown and with the SJA Office regarding all furlough appeals processed through the Merit Systems Protection Board.\textsuperscript{736}

Space management was a DCSPL job. As the period began, DLIFLC had inadequate space to meet the number of classrooms required by its teaching program, as indicated in the figure below. Fortunately, the construction of two new general education facilities during the period would substantially alleviate this problem.\textsuperscript{737}

\textit{Figure 38 The chart here projects insufficient capacity based upon the number of classrooms required by DLIFLC schools, ca. 2011.}

In 2011, DCSPL had to arrange the move of several DLIFLC offices from their off-site location at the Monte Vista School after the city of Monterey chose not to renew the lease. The timing of the city’s decision was unfortunate, given that DLIFLC expected to bring two new classroom buildings online within months. The Army located a new venue at Ryan Ranch, but by then DCSPL had to meet with the Monterey Peninsula Unified School District representative Dan Albert and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers lease managers Jon Weinberg and Raul Perez to discuss a one month lease extension at the Monte Vista School to allow enough time for DLIFLC to install the required technology infrastructure at Ryan Ranch.\textsuperscript{738} But progress in reducing the installation’s space shortage also moved forward during this period. DCSPL developed an installation-wide Area Development Plan, but more importantly, the need to lease off-post space diminished significantly with completion of a new educational building funded in

\textsuperscript{734} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130621; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130816; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130823 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130830.
\textsuperscript{735} SITREP_DLIFLC_20130913.
\textsuperscript{736} SITREP_DLIFLC_20131004; SITREP_DLIFLC_20131018.
\textsuperscript{737} Briefing slides, “GIBs photos (417-607-614),” ca. 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files. These were known as GIB FY2009 and GIB FY2011.
\textsuperscript{738} DLIFLC POM Update 20 May 2011.
the fiscal year 2009 budget. In April 2012, DCSPL oversaw staff moves to the new facility and insured that its TEC-II installations were completed.\footnote{SITREP_DLIFLC_20120427.}

Contractors also began work on an even larger educational building funded in the fiscal year 2011 budget. These construction projects eventually provided DLIFLC an additional 157,000 square feet, including 136 classrooms and ended the practice of leasing non-Federal property to house DLIFLC operations. To attenuate the loss of parking due to the construction of these facilities on the upper Presidio, the U.S. Army Garrison supervised construction of two new parking lots off Pvt. Bolio Road between the Tin Barn (Building 517) and the Child Development Center (Building 566), which created two hundred parking spaces.\footnote{2012 DCSPL Qtr 1-2. The lots replaced old quarters that were demolished.} These lots opened in November 2011 on the site of the old married student housing apartments that were torn down for this purpose.

In June 2013, negotiations over a draft collective bargaining agreement between DLIFLC/POM and the government employee union, AFGE Local 1263, broke down. While a draft agreement was reached, the Civilian Personnel Advisory Service rejected the agreement. On 30 October 2013, AFGE Local 1263 filed an Unfair Labor Practice suit with the Federal Labor Relations Authority alleging bad faith failure to negotiate on the part of management. Following a thorough internal review of the draft accord by senior DLIFLC leaders, including the DCSPL and JAG offices, to identify provisions not compliant with applicable law, rule or regulation, and subject to re-negotiation, DLIFLC agreed to restart negotiations with the Union in mid-January 2014, which authorities expected would obviate the union’s pending legal suit.\footnote{2013 OSJA 4th Qtr Report.}

An especially uplifting project DCSPL began this period involved the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, which contacted DLIFLC to establish and program local naturalization ceremonies for faculty and military members who had earned U.S. Citizenship. The first U.S. citizen Naturalization Ceremony was held at the Presidio of Monterey on 3 April 2012 for two DLIFLC instructors. Subsequently, quarterly naturalization ceremonies, were jointly organized and became routine because of the large number foreign instructors employed by the Institute. As an example, 10 new citizens were sworn in on 7 February 2013, 15 received their citizenship in
June 2013, and another 10 became naturalized citizens on 5 September 2013. All the ceremonies were carried out at the Presidio of Monterey.\footnote{DLIFLC POM Update 3 June 2011; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 6 April 2012; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130614, Natela Cutter, “DLIFLC Instructors Become New Citizens,” www.dliflc.edu/new, items posted 5 September 2013; Dusan Tatomirovic, “New U.S. Citizens Sworn In,” www.dliflc.edu/new, item posted on 7 February 2013.}

It should also be noted, unfortunately, that two former DLIFLC instructors plead guilty in 2012 to allegations they lied to obtain U.S. citizenship granted to them in 2008. Adeba Sultana and her husband Mohammad Ali Rabbani acknowledged falsifying various immigration and asylum applications after they were indicted by a grand jury in San Diego and charged by a federal court in San Jose.\footnote{“Former DLI Instructors Lied to Gain U.S. Citizenship,” Monterey Herald, 11 July 2012. They faced up to ten years imprisonment, but the court placed them on probation and delayed sentencing until late in 2013. The ultimate disposition of their case is uncertain based upon readily available information.}

\textbf{JAG/SJA}

The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate provided consolidated legal support to both DLIFLC and the U.S. Army Garrison at the Presidio of Monterey. The JAG office provided such support with the help of ten military and nineteen civilian employees. Its mission was to provide the commanders and personnel of both organizations with accurate legal advice on all issues impacting DLIFLC’s mission as well as Garrison base-support services. The office also provided legal services to service members, retirees, and their family members. The office was divided into five sections consisting of an executive branch (whose function was both to administer the office and also to serve as the personal legal advisor to the DLIFLC commandant and the garrison commander), criminal law, administrative and civil law, litigation and claims, and legal assistance. Col. David Crawford was the Staff Judge Advocate until fall 2011 when Lt. Col. William Schmittel took over. John Jakubowski was the Deputy SJA and Senior Attorney-Advisor throughout the period, although Jakubowski, an Army Reserve officer, was called to duty in Afghanistan for more than one year during which time both Lannette Moutos and Capt. Autumn Porter served as the acting DSJA. Jakubowski survived his deployment to Camp Stone near Herat and returned on 3 June 2013.\footnote{2011 SJA 1Q history Report 2011; 2011 SJA 3Q History Report; 2013 OSJA 2Q Historical Report; OSJA Personnel Changes 2012, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.} In early July 2013, Lt. Col. Tiernan Dolan became the Staff Judge Advocate.\footnote{2013 OSJA 3rd QTR.}

During the winter of 2012, the Legal Assistance Office and the Installation Tax Center were relocated from Building 275 following extensive remodeling of Building 358 that consolidated the unit tax advisors in one large room and provided better internet capabilities.\footnote{2012 SJA 4th Report.}

In early 2013, the office began to grapple with Sequestration and resource reductions. After the DOD hiring freeze took hold, Young Park, Administrative Law attorney, accepted another position
and his job had to remain unfilled. The office began planning for a grand opening of the Installation Tax Center and a visit by the senior leadership of the Judge Advocate Corps.  

In April 2013, Maj. Gen. Clyde Butch Tate, the U.S. Army Deputy Judge Advocate General, accompanied by Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Troy Tyler, the Regimental Command Sergeant Major, visited Colonel Pick to discuss legal issues of interest to the command. Tate then visited DLIFLC’s JAG offices to provide a “State of the Corps” briefing. The visit was required by Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which specified that JAG Corps general officers had to make regular inspections of subordinate commands authorized to conduct a general court martial. “Maj. Gen. Tate and his Command Sgt. Maj. Troy Tyler came to the Installation to visit with my staff to ensure that our law practice is providing excellent service which the multi-service commanders and their service members deserve,” said Lt. Col. Schmittel. “Within the Army and Department of Defense, it is important for us to have senior leadership in the JAG Corps visit and talk with us about the state of our Corps and significant legal issues concerning sequestration, furloughs, and the force in general,” explained Schmittel.  

Figure 40 Maj. Gen. Clyde Butch Tate, the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Army, with Donald Yee, the Presidio’s Legal Administrator-Administrative Officer in 2013.

During the third 3rd Quarter of 2013, JAG reduced its legal support to the command to just three days a week due to the furlough imposed after Congress failed to provide sufficient funding for the federal government. The office also became involved in the legal review of furlough appeals, an employee right, which, however, resulted in no decisions against the government.  

Inspector General

The Presidio of Monterey Inspector General or IG provided routine inspections and assistance for the DLIFLC commandant as well as some twelve thousand active duty service (Army, Navy, Air

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748 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130419.
750 2013 OSJA 3rd QTR.
During this period, the IG had four authorized positions and one permanent civilian position funded by the command. However, from May 2010 until August 2012, the office had only four personnel because the Command IG position remained vacant. During this period, Billy “Skip” Johnson served as the command’s acting IG. Apparently, there was no qualified military officer of sufficient rank to assume the position. Finally, on 12 August 2012, Lt. Col. Christopher Watrud, former DLIFLC Chief of Staff, was sworn in as the Command Inspector General after he successfully completed Inspector General School on 27 July 2012.

In 2012, major inspections included U.S. Army IG inspection of Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) at the Presidio of Monterey to assess the effectiveness of exchange’s ability to provide quality merchandise and services at competitive prices and to generate earnings to support Morale, Welfare and Recreation Programs. Another important inspection was part of an overarching DOD IG Inspection of U.S. military cemeteries mandated by the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. The assessment included a review of the military cemeteries at the Presidio of Monterey and at the Bay Area’s Benicia Arsenal. The inspection sought to determine whether there was adequate oversight and regulatory adherence to the relevant policies and laws (following an embarrassing national scandal at Arlington National Cemetery). In August, the IG office looked into the DLIFLC ethnic food program. The commandant had concerns about problems and complaints involving efforts to expose students to the food culture of the languages they were studying, which was tricky because the government is not allow to provide meals for employees, although sampling food examples for educational purposes was allowed, which is a tricky balance, especially regarding its use within DLIFLC’s immersion training program. The IG Office sought to evaluate compliance of the ethnic food program with correct use of government card purchases.

Lt. Col. Watrud attended the language training detachment summit at Fort Meade, Maryland, during the third quarter of 2012. His purpose was to establish a working relationship with various directors in preparation for a later inspection of all them and to gain a perspective on systemic issues and the differences between the two main LTD types. Thereafter, the IG Office inspected LTDs at Goodfellow Air Force base and Medina, Texas, 8-12 July 2013; LTDs at Stuttgart, Grafenwoehr, and Garmisch, Germany, 22-26 July 2013; LTDs at Kunia and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, 5-9 August 2013; and LTDs at Fort Bragg and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Fort Gordon, Georgia, and Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 19-30 August 2013. The purpose for all of these inspections was to determine whether the units had adequate oversight and to made recommendations for improvement.

751 2011 IG 1st Qtr CY11.
752 2012 IG 2nd Qtr CY12; 2012 IG 3rd Qtr CY12.
753 2012 IG 3rd Qtr CY12.
754 2012 IG 3rd Qtr CY12.
755 2013 IG 3rd Qtr History.
Other inspections in 2013, included the DLIFLC Headquarters and Headquarters Company; DLIFLC Contract Management Office; an expedited assessment regarding the adequacy of criminal background checks and determinations about employee suitability in the Army’s Child, Youth and School Services program driven by secretary of the Army concern across all Army garrisons; and a command climate assessment of the morale, efficiency, economy, discipline, training, and readiness of the Directorate of Public Works. In June 2013, TRADOC directed its own IG to conduct inspections at all TRADOC installations to assess SHARP reporting and program management. The TRADOC IG conducted an inspection of DLIFLC’s SHARP program in June 2013. According to the commandant, “the team’s feedback was very positive.” He also thought the visit productive for the TRADOC team to see DLIFLC’s multi-service academic environment and to “capture best practices.”

The federal furloughs from July and into October set back the schedule of IG inspections and somewhat reduced the ability of the IG to provide full situational awareness for the Commander. Finally, the IG paid an assistance visit to the DLI-Washington to assess appropriate management control processes, conduct a command climate assessment of detachment personnel, and conduct sensing sessions with assigned language students.

Public Relations Activities

DLIFLC interacted with the broad public and its own graduates through a variety of fora, but most especially through its Public Affairs Office, and the news and website maintained by that office, which reported to the DLIFLC chief of staff, and also through two non-profit and independent alumni support organizations as discussed further below.

The mission of DLIFLC’s PAO, originally called the Strategic Communications Office, was to foster better understanding of the role of DLIFLC and its mission through the coordinated publication of information and themes about the plans and programs of the Institute, including through multimedia visual and audio communication. The head of office was Natela Cutter until the arrival of Capt. Scott M. Messare, who served as the Director of Communications from January 2012 into December 2012. Ed Boring served as the Chief Knowledge Officer. StratComm’s team was augmented by one person, Lt. Scott Ghiringelli, a U.S. Army National Guardsman in early 2011. He served as a writer/editor performing such duties as writing, photography, videotaping, escort, and conference attendance.

Upon arrival, Captain Messare began to overhaul DLIFLC processes. He implemented a branding strategy that expanded and changed the look of all Stratcomm products. He intended the change to help establish a more robust fiscal year 2014 TDA model incorporating more personnel and a

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757 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 28 June 2013.
758 2013 IG 3rd Qtr History.
759 FY13 Inspection Plan, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
760 2012 SC 1st Qtr CY12; 2012 SC 4th Qtr CY12.
761 2011 SC 1st Qrt Report.
larger mission. Importantly, he moved the mission to a stand-alone organization reporting directly to the Chief of Staff with organizational support from DCSOPS.\footnote{2012 SC 1st Qtr CY12.}

In March 2012, Messare also began to develop an Alumni Relations Office housed within StratComm, an entity distinct from either the non-profit DLI Alumni Association or the DLI Foundation. The purpose of the DLIFLC Alumni Relations Office, according to Messare, was “to fill the official information and communication gap between DLIFLC as a training institute and its most valuable resource: language proficient alumni.”\footnote{Scott Messare, “The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Alumni Relations Office,” \textit{Globe}, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May 2012): 4.} The office, which represented DLIFLC to more than 230,000 alumni scattered around the world, soon began an alumni enrollment effort with the goal to connect with 8,000 former students by spring 2013. By October 2012, however, it had only created a database of some 2,100 members. Most alumni, unfortunately, probably remained unaware that the office existed.\footnote{“Alumni Relations Office,” \textit{Globe}, Vol. 35, No. 3 (October 2012): 4-8.} Stratcomm worked to develop an alumni database for more than a year. In August 2013, it purchased an expensive database software program called the Raiser’s Edge, a product of Blackbaud, Inc. Staff then traveled to the company’s headquarters in Charleston, South Carolina, in September for a week of training.\footnote{2013 SC 2d and 3d Qtr CY13.} Messare hoped to facilitate communications between DLIFLC and its global network of graduates and supporters, to promote DLIFLC outreach and reach back, and to aid in the sustainment of lifelong language learning. Institute alumni were encouraged to contact the Institute using email, social media, and to attend occasional events such as balls, language conferences, or Language Day.

In May 2012, the DLIFLC PAO introduced the first digital issue of its \textit{Globe} magazine. The move reflected the Institute’s emphasis on advanced educational technology and allowed users to link directly to various electronic resources referred to by the magazine, a definite bonus to digital publication. However, the decision was also driven by cost-cutting measures as it eliminated the need to publish hardcopies of the magazine, which were still preferred by many. Without a suitable hardcopy, issues could not be circulated easily in government offices while the digital version was not well adapted to printing or non-digital presentation, could not be mailed to interested graduates, or placed on file in libraries or archives.\footnote{See \textit{Globe} (May 2012).} With the transition of Captain Messare, Natela Cutter resumed responsibility for Stratcomm.\footnote{2012 SC 4th Qtr CY12.}

In mid-2013, StratComm changed its name to Mission Public Affairs due to the USAMAA manpower study, which validated four of nine military and civilian positions listed on the old TDA (some being over hires or never staffed). The authorized positions included a webmaster and graphic designer plus one active duty position. Four never-filled military positions were removed from the TDA. With its official TDA reduced and three authorized positions vacant, the office
prioritized its mission and focused upon its Alumni Relations and Web/General Content Management/Review functions for the rest of 2013. 768

DLI Foundation
In 2011, concurrent to the creation of an Alumni Relation Office, Institute supporters established a new 501(c) non-profit called the DLI Foundation “to bring together alumni and friends with the common goal to advance foreign language education and remain connected to the language community.” The inaugural meeting for the DLIFLC Foundation was held 26 April 2011. Several potential members initially considered to sit on the first DLIFLC Foundation Board later had to withdraw from participation after staff realized their official positions as government employees prevented them from serving. 769

It took time to sort through some of this issues involved in setting up a foundation. It was not until September 2012 that the DLI Foundation conducted an orientation and its first Board meeting at the Presidio of Monterey. Participants received a command brief, technology brief, Presidio tour, and conducted classroom visits. According to Kenneth Nilsson, President and Chairman of the Board of the DLI Foundation, the new organization hoped to attract members and volunteers to help it support the mission of DLIFLC, promote national awareness about the need for foreign language study, and grow a larger pool of future DLIFLC students already familiar with a foreign language. “We want to reach out to K-12 educators and re-energize the concept and awareness of Monterey being the “Language Capital of the World” with DLIFLC as its centerpiece,” said Nilsson, who was a DLIFLC graduate himself. 770 The reason, according to Nilsson, was that the Institute’s ability to achieve its mission depended in large part on the availability of a pipeline of motivated students with appropriate aptitudes. “We hope that the Foundation will be able to raise public awareness not only about the need to improve language skills nation-wide, but about DLI’s role in contributing to solving this need,” explained Nilsson. 771 “As a DLI graduate myself,” he said, “I know how profoundly this School contributed to the path I eventually took in life.” According to Nilsson, “young people with language skills are better equipped to lead, contribute and benefit in today’s society, whether in military or civilian life.” Certainly, with a deeper pool of potential recruits already possessing a foreign language ability, DLIFLC could generate its own more proficient graduates. 772

A second important objective of the new DLI Foundation was to help the Institute remain connected to its graduates. Colonel Pick, conveying his own experience as a graduate, noted that he had no connection with DLIFLC after completing his language training. It was only a name on his old textbooks. And yet, DLIFLC had evolved significant new online language support capabilities in the years since he had left, including online diagnostic abilities that he wished he had known about much earlier. He did not even realize DLIFLC produced his annual language

768 2013 SC 2d and 3d Qtr CY13.
qualification test until the painful DLPT5 release suddenly dropped his and many other linguists’ test scores. Connecting to linguists in the field was a PAO mission, and the Institute’s new academic network enhanced connectivity to graduates, but the DLI Foundation could conduct outreach in ways unavailable to DLIFLC. For example, in conjunction with the DLI Alumni Association, it co-sponsored the DLIFLC 71st Anniversary Ball (see below).

In late 2012, an issue arose at another institution that cause DLIFLC leaders to review their relationship to the DLI Foundation. Following a Navy IG investigation, both the president and provost of the nearby Naval Postgraduate School were summarily removed from their positions due to failings to observe government rules and regulations. These problems were widely reported. One issue brought up by the IG was the use of the NPS Foundation to purchase equipment for the school. Following a careful review, DLIFLC leaders found no outstanding problems relating to their own relationship to the new DLI Foundation, which continued with its mission to promote better foreign language education and to support DLIFLC alumni. The relationship between the DLI Foundation and the DLI Alumni Association during this period was that each remained a discreet entity, although Benjamin De La Selva, as president of the DLI Alumni Association, began discussions to merge the two organizations to include the transfer of the Association’s mailing list and responsibility for the alumni newsletter.

DLIFLC Anniversary Balls

DLIFLC celebrated the 70th and 71st anniversaries of the Defense Language Institute with November balls in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The sponsor of the ball was the DLI Alumni Association, which raised funds and helped to organize the get-together. These events were well attended by Institute faculty, staff, and alumni. Several hundred guests attended the 70th anniversary while more than 350 guests attended the smaller 2012 event held at the Naval Postgraduate School’s historic Herrmann Hall Ballroom. Indeed, according to the association’s president, Benjamin De La Selva, “we were pleased that so many of DLIFLC’s faculty and staff attended.” De La Selva believed it was “a unique opportunity for instructors [to interact] with the Institute’s leadership, and have fun.” Dr. Michael Vickers, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Tim Clayton, Senior Language Authority for the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence also attended the 2012 ball. Vickers served as the guest speaker, being a dual graduate of DLIFLC courses in Czech (1977) and Spanish (1979).

In 2013, the annual DLIFLC ball was canceled without explanation. Prior to the arrival of Col. Sue Ann Sandusky as Commandant, the ball had been an exceptional event held every few years. She made it an annual occurrence, beginning in 2008. However, event managers had to confront financial and legal constraints because the Army could not officially sponsor or even co-sponsor

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774 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121221. In December 2012, Juan Garcia III, Undersecretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, held a meeting with leaders from the Monterey Peninsula to discuss the Navy IG report, the reasons for high profile staff changes at the Naval Postgraduate School, the school’s future, and the impact on the Monterey Peninsula. Local commanders, mayors, city managers and other community leaders attended the meeting.
775 Cameron Binkley, DLI Foundation/Stratcom Notes, Sept. 2012, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
the ball. Because organization and financing the ball were cumbersome, the DLI Alumni Association put the ball schedule to a five-year cycle, with the next ball to be held in conjunction with DLIFLC’s 75th anniversary celebration in 2016. The NPS scandal noted above probably weighed on DLIFLC officials intent to adhere to all rules governing interaction with support foundations. Moreover, the onset of Sequestration furloughs that began in August 2013 generated faculty anxiety while the USAMAA manpower study threatened layoffs for others. While a ball might have lifted morale, low turnout was likely.777

Command History Office

Dr. Stephen Payne remained the Command Historian and Cameron Binkley remained the Deputy Command Historian. In 2012, Archivist Lisa Crunk assumed a new position with the Navy Heritage Command. Due to the Federal hiring freeze, Binkley assumed Crunk’s responsibilities for nearly two years, which slowed the pace of work, especially archival processing, but did not eliminate office support for research projects or requests, as the commandant initially feared.778

During this period, Binkley completed DLIFLC’s Command History for 2006-2007, a special publication to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of DLIFLC called The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center: A Pictorial History, and an article about the cavalry in Monterey.779 The historians conducted routine exit interviews with key staff, including Provost Dr. Donald Fischer, before he retired in early 2013.

The History Office supported preparations to renovate the Weckerling Center during this period by obtaining expert TRADOC museum and Center for Military History advice to manage the proper disposition of several historic painting and images.780 Dr. Payne also worked with the Veteran Administration planners developing the nearby joint VA/DOD medical clinic in Marina on an architect plan to incorporate the massive Lehman Carlton mural from Stilwell Hall into the construction plan for the building.781 Binkley gave various historic talks, such as a Veterans Day ceremony in Marina in 2011, helped to train Presidio of Monterey docents, and delivered the 2013 Kernan Lecture before a joint meeting of the Presidio Historical Association and the Presidio Trust at the Presidio of San Francisco. He also developed the Institute’s archival holdings by liaising with various historical organizations and the public to encourage donations. As archivist, he assisted the U.S. Army Garrison by scanning the Presidio of Monterey’s Cemetery Logbooks, creating a finding aid, and drafting an historical analysis.782

777 Various author discussions with ball organizer, Benjamin De La Selva.

778 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130118. Note: The History Office does not produce quarterly historical reports.


780 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121026.

781 The office curates several surviving WPA-era artworks from the decommissioned former Fort Ord service club.

782 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121214. This work was driven by the need to record the records prior to their shipment to Washington for use by contractors supporting a national reorganization of the Army National Cemetery Program following a scandal at Arlington National Cemetery.
In 2012, Dr. Payne attended USAMAA training and drafted a “reclama” or appeal regarding USAMAA views regarding DLIFLC class size.\textsuperscript{783} In November 2013, Dr. Payne attended the grand opening of the new Military Intelligence Service Museum at Crissy Field, Presidio of San Francisco.\textsuperscript{784} The building housing the museum was the original home of DLIFLC’s first classroom and was used from November 1941 until June 1942 to train second generation Japanese-Americans (Nisei) in military interpretation and translation skills during the first months of WWII. It was established as a museum after twenty years of dedicated efforts by the National Japanese American Historical Society with support from the Military Intelligence Service Association of Northern California, the National Park Service, and many others, especially retired Col. Thomas Sakamoto, who graduated from the first class and led the effort to create the museum. Sadly, Sakamoto did not live to see the museum, having passed away shortly before its opening ceremony.\textsuperscript{785}

\textbf{Figure 41 Archivist Lisa Crunk shows visitors from the Porter Youth Center how an archives works in 2012.}

In 2013, the History Office inadvertently became involved in managing the Chamberlin Library building at the Ord Military Community. In May, the Army closed the Chamberlin Library activity, as discussed in Chapter IV, due to budget cuts and findings of the USAMAA review.\textsuperscript{786} However, the building also hosted the Historical Records Collection, commonly known as the DLIFLC archives, and so the Army kept the facility operational. The History Office thereafter engaged with DLIFLC staff and officials of California State University Monterey Bay in discussions over the university’s potential interest to establish its Museum Studies Program and a museum highlighting Fort Ord history in the Chamberlin Library.\textsuperscript{787}

\textsuperscript{783} SITREP_DLIFLC_20121116.
\textsuperscript{784} SITREP_DLIFLC_20131115; DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 15 November 2013;
\textsuperscript{786} Cameron Binkley, “Historian Notes from Staff Meeting,” 23 August 2013, in \textit{DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013} files.
\textsuperscript{787} SITREP_DLIFLC_20131122; SITREP_DLIFLC_20131220.
Smaller Offices

**The Protocol Office** processed and coordinated hundreds of official visits to DLIFLC. The office continued to be overseen by Mystery Chastain, who assumed the position in late 2005. Chastain was assisted by Ingrid Vanspeed. An example of one visit coordinated by Protocol was on 14 March 2011 when DLIFLC hosted the former Governor of Maine, John Baldacci, who was then serving with Dr. Clifford Stanley, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Baldacci received an orientation on DLIFLC’s language programs and a windshield tour of the Presidio by Historian Cameron Binkley.\(^{788}\)

**The Installation Equal Opportunity Office**, assisted the commandant and subordinate unit commanders with equal opportunity training, command climate surveys, planning of ethnic observances and evaluation of human relations within the command. Initially, the office was staffed only by Sfc. Couretta M. Johnson. On 10 Jun 2011, two EOAs were authorized and a second Equal Opportunity Advisor, Jason King, arrived later in the year.\(^{789}\)

**The Sexual Harassment and Assault Response Program Office** was responsible for mandated sexual harassment and assault prevention training for all personnel. Sfc Stephanie R. Schafer led the SHARP Office from 1 December 2012 to 31 September 2013 and SFC Saffron M. Fletcher took responsibility from 1 October 2013.\(^{790}\) In addition to mandatory training, the SHARP Office planned various voluntary training activities, such as personal self-defense or seminars on “How to Avoid Falling in Love with A Jerk.” For example, the office hosted a multi-service “hard targets” class on 21 September 2013 to discuss predatory behavior and boundary setting. The class had a self-defense component. The following week DLIFLC held a “Dating 101” evening with service members to discuss proper courtship. Several hundred service members attended the event at the post theater, performed in skits, and participated in a dialogue with the speaker. The office later refined the program of instruction of both courses for use at other military bases.\(^{791}\)

**The DLIFLC Chaplain’s Office** provided interfaith services and counseling to all military branches. Normally, five to seven military chaplains staffed the Chaplain’s Office. In June 2011, Command Chaplain Jonathan Shaw visited the command. He conducted classroom observations, met the commandant, and received a command brief from installation Chaplains.\(^{792}\) During this period, the Chaplain’s Office planned an energetic world religions course focused upon presenting a curriculum specific to the language and future assignments of DLIFLC students. Completed curriculums included Dari-Pashto, Urdu, Tagalog and Japanese while the office updated its Russian, Turkish, and Punjabi lectures. It also began Arabic language bible study. According to the Chaplain’s Office, these lectures let to a dramatic increase in students and classes taught.\(^{793}\)

\(^{788}\) DLIFLC Sitrep 18 March 2011/DLIFLC_POM Update 18 March 11.

\(^{789}\) 2011 EO 1st Quarter; 2011 EO 4th Quarter.

\(^{790}\) DLIFLC SHARP Program Annual History Report; No information about the SHARP Office was reported prior to 2012.

\(^{791}\) DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 20 Sep 2013 and for period ending 3 October 2013.

\(^{792}\) DLIFLC Update 24 June 11; Chapel Services Information flyer in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

\(^{793}\) Oct-Dec 2011 Historical Report.
The DLIFLC Safety Office oversaw safety programs and inspections for DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey and was managed by John Rice. The office coordinated quarterly meetings of the Installation Safety and Occupational Health Advisory Council as co-chaired by the DLIFLC commandant and the U.S. Army Garrison commander. Typical Safety Office programs included an annual “101 Critical Days of Summer Safety” training in May in 2011 during which Kelly Narowski gave talks to all of the service units about accident and DUI prevention. According to the commandant, this resulted in “powerful, honest conversation about choices and their consequences.” Students, faculty and family members at this event, and others like it during the period, also participated in safety focused activities and observed demonstrations on motorcycle safety, home firearm safety, hearing conservation, and workplace safety. The Safety Office also took to the road in 2011 to conduct safety inspections at DLIFLC LTDs.

Foreign Area Officer Program

DLIFLC’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program continued to focus on the training needed by officers posted to overseas assignments where regionally focused expertise in political-military operations and foreign language training was of vital importance. Such positions included defense attachés and security assistance officers in U.S. Embassies around the world as well as political military planners in various DOD agencies. FAOs worked as advisors to senior leaders concerning political-military operations and relations with other nations. They provided cultural expertise to forward-deployed commands conducting military operations, often facilitating military-to-military activities and assistance programs. U.S. Army Lt. Col. Jason Wecce served as the FAO director.

In 2011, the FAO program began to pilot classes for an advanced FAO course that it held on 14 April (Spanish) and 20 April (French). The course was twelve weeks in length, with six job-specific modules being taught for two weeks each. Follow-on classes had the same instructional pattern and began later in the year.

Lt. Gen. Kenneth P. Keen, Military Deputy Commander of U.S. Southern Command, and a graduate of DLIFLC’s Portuguese language program, spoke to a gathering of FAOs on 24 February 2011. Keen had commanded U.S. forces during the recent earthquake relief effort in Haiti. He told the FAOs that “cultivating relationships with people” was a key FAO responsibility and used by example how he improved coordination with Brazilian forces involved in Haiti peacekeeping because he personally knew the Brazilian general in charge of those forces. Apparently, they had attended a military school together as some point in Keen’s career. “Had we not know each other, it would have been more difficult, but we worked closely together,” said Keen. “And it will happen to you. You will someday know a colonel or general, and you will pick up the phone. It will make a huge difference – this is the key value of our FAOs.”

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794 2011 1stQtrISOHAC_FY12.
795 DLIFLC POM Update 27 May 2011.
796 USAG POM IPB Brief 1 Feb 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
798 DLIFLC Sitrep 15 April 2011.
Between 6 and 8 December 2011, Claudio Biltoč, a research analyst, and his team from the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) came to DLIFLC to conduct research for the “FAO Values Study” under a contract awarded by OSD. They met with the FAO Director, several FAOs, and Colonel Pick.  

In February 2012, the FAO program announced an important change impacting FAOs at DLIFLC. The FAO graduation requirement was raised to 2/2/2 vice 2/2/1+ for all basic course officers, basically increasing their speaking proficiency requirement by half a level.

From 11-15 June 2012, DLIFLC hosted the first ever Joint Foreign Area Officer Orientation Course (JFAOOC). More than 150 FAOs from all four services attended the training event, which included a visit by Ambassador James Moriarty, retired, who presented a class. According to Col. Heino Klinck, the Army’s general staff division chief for the Strategic Leadership Division, the inaugural week-long familiarization course provided foundational information for new FAOs and included advice on what others would expect of them as FAOs further along during their careers. With 35 years of experience in the State Department, Moriarty recount numerous and often humorous stories illustrating the importance of foreign language and cultural awareness as well as the need for military and civilian staff to work as a team, given that most FAOs will serve on embassy staffs during their careers.


From 14 to 18 January 2013, DLIFLC hosted the second iteration of the JFAOOC, although the course was apparently revamped from its first iteration. Over 150 FAO/RAS/PAS officers from all services attended the course. Maj. Gen. Charles W. Hooper, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Programs, U.S. Africa Command, attended and gave the keynote address. U.S. Africa Command was organized to protect American interests on the African continent by assisting local nations in their own defense. Hooper was himself a graduate in May 1987 from DLIFLC’s Chinese Mandarin Basic Course and a U.S. military attaché stationed in Beijing. One of his bits of advice to the conference attendees was therefore “to be agile, flexible and responsive…and have a broad skill set because you may get an offer that requires universal skills.” Regardless of assignment, he asserted, “You have to stay current and connected.” Referring to his “Rule number 62,” Hooper also humorously noted the wisdom to “always be nice to interns because you may end up working for one” later when they become an assistant secretary. The JFAOOC course was designed to build cohesion and share methodologies between FAOs from all services. DLIFLC believed the
course an “extremely beneficial opportunity for the FAOs, thanks in large part to the caliber of speakers that our FAO Director, Lt. Col. Jason Weece, has persuaded to attend.” The course was also rewarding for the briefers, many, said Colonel Pick, conveyed how much they enjoyed the opportunity to share their knowledge and experience.  

To help support the FAO program, in March 2013, Continuing Education’s Distance Learning began conducting advanced FAO online courses in Chinese, French, and Russian, and later began additional classes in Korean and Chinese. In April, Col. J. B. Vowell, a National Security Affairs Fellow at Stanford University, visited DLIFLC to present a FAO professional development briefing and to discuss General Purpose Forces language training support.

Between 10 and 13 June 2013, DLIFLC again conducted the JFAOOC for several hundred multi-service FAOs and their spouses. As it did before, the course provided FAOs the opportunity to learn about their future roles in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, or multinational environment. VIPs who attended included the course and who toured classrooms and received technology demonstrations were Lt. Gen. Mary Legere (Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2), Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Snow (Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7), Joseph Donovan (Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), and Rear Admiral Douglas Venlet (Director of International Engagement, USN).

Major General Snow told the JFAOOC that FAOs would have an important future role as regional language and culture experts. They would be key to helping implement the new DOD Regional Alignment concept intended to organize military missions into five geographic regions. According to Snow, a FAO “will be the individual who will be translating ideas between the support command, theater objectives, and building partnership capacity.”

In June 2013, former DLIFLC Russian instructor Olga Vieglia and her husband, retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Jim Kuhlman, who served as a FAO and met his future wife while attending DLIFLC in the mid-1970s, returned to witness their son, U.S. Army Capt. Matthew Kuhlman, graduate from the French language program. After seven years in Artillery, Capt. Kuhlman chose to become a FAO. He was assigned to U.S. Africa Command.

Commemorative Activities

A number of important commemorative ceremonies, dedications, and other similar events took place during this period and resulted from the collaborative efforts of numerous offices, generally

806 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130328; SITREP_DLIFLC_20130503.
807 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 26 April 2013.
808 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 14 June 2013229.
809 Natela Cutter, “Regional Expertise More Important in New Army Construct,” www.dliflc.edu/new, item posted on 11 June 2013. Regionally Aligned Force units directly support regional combatant commanders. They participate in joint exercises, partnership training, quick reaction forces, and humanitarian assistance.
under the DLIFLC chief of staff, and often facilitated by the U.S. Army Garrison at the Presidio of Monterey. Some of the main activities are detailed below.

**DLIFLC Building Dedications**

Nearly 150 people turned out for the dedication of Khalil Hall, DLIFLC’s new general instructional building, on 4 March 2011. The Institute chose to name the building in memory of Alfie Tawfik Khalil, who had been a DLIFLC faculty member for twenty-seven years, seventeen of which were spent as union President. Khalil made a huge impact in that latter role as attested to by Col. Danial D. Pick, DLIFLC Commandant, and U.S. Rep. Sam Farr, who worked with Khalil closely on several important issues. Together, they detailed how Khalil fostered better understanding about the important role the Institute and its faculty played in the community and more importantly, how damaging the closure or realignment of DLIFLC would be to the nation. The closure of Fort Ord in 1994 had raised the real possibility that DOD would move the Institute to Fort Huachuca. Khalil helped to communicate what it meant to close the Presidio of Monterey and move DLIFLC, Farr said, by explaining why the military could not replicate the school’s quality or specialized learning elsewhere. Khalil was also credited with helping to create DLIFLC’s Faculty Personnel System, which provides a merit-based pay systems for Institute instructors in line with industry practices. Also in attendance at the event were local civic representatives, school and garrison leaders and staff, and more than twenty members of Khalil’s family traveled to Monterey from Egypt, Southern California, and Colorado.811

On 22 June 2012, DLIFLC dedicated another academic facility, Building 607, as Corpuz Hall. Corpuz Hall commemorates the life of, and professional example set by, Cpl. Bernard P. Corpuz, a 2005 DLIFLC graduate. Corpuz died on 11 June 2006 when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle during convoy operations in Ghanzi Province, Afghanistan. Rep. Sam Farr, Col. Danial D. Pick, and Peggy Wilson Corpuz, Cpl. Corpuz’s mother, unveiled and dedicated a bronze plaque in his honor. Farr noted how much he felt it a privilege to participate in recognizing a fallen soldier with such an impressive state-of-the-art building. “I am so proud to be able to dedicate this building to a local soldier,” he stated. Corpuz was born and raised in Monterey County. In 2012, Corpuz Hall became home to DLIFLC’s Multi-Language School, which taught Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Hindi, Turkish, Punjabi, Uzbek and Indonesian.812

**Hall of Fame**

In 2011, DLIFLC honored six former graduates or influential faculty who had made significant contributions to DLIFLC’s work by inducting them into its Hall of Fame. The six 2011 inductees were Marine Corps Major Jose Anzaldua, who used his training in Vietnamese as a POW for three years to aid fellow prisoners during the Vietnam conflict; Dr. Ray Clifford, who came to DLIFLC in 1981 as academic dean or provost and is well remembered for introducing proficiency oriented instruction and for the subsequent 128 percent improvement in student results; Dr. Martha Herzog who retired in 2005 after a distinguished career at DLIFLC and who like Clifford was a key player in establishing proficiency as the organizing principle for instruction; Renée Meyer who served with the NSA’s Central Security Service and developed instructional programs that reflected real-

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life, task-based learning for cryptologic language personnel. Meyer later adapted this approach from classroom to computer as Cryptologic Training Manager and NSA Associate Director for Education and Training. As the first NSA Senior Language Authority, she articulated operational language standards for the entire cryptologic cadre and created the mechanisms throughout DOD and the Intelligence Community to support their implementation for the long term; Robert Tharp, who was one of DLIFLC’s most inspiring teachers of basic, intermediate, and advanced spoken Chinese from 1965 to the early 1980s; and finally, Everette Jordan who served in a variety of high profile positions that aided DLIFLC’s mission between his graduation from DLIFLC in 1977 (Russian basic course and advanced Russian Le Fox program) and founded the National Virtual Translation Center.813

Memorial Day Events

In observance of Memorial Day, DLIFLC conducted a ceremonies at Soldier Field on the Presidio of Monterey to honor graduates of the Institute killed in action. In May 2011, DLIFLC recognized Sgt. Andrew Creighton, a Korean Linguist who gave his life in Afghanistan in July 2010.814 On Memorial Day, 24 May 2012, Marine Lt. Col. Matthew Rau, former Battalion Commander of a DLIFLC graduate killed in combat, was the guest speaker.815 Three other DLIFLC graduates were honored at the Memorial Day ceremony on 23 May 2013. These were Cpl. Lucas T. Pyeatt, killed in Afghanistan in 2011, SRA Julian S. Scholten, killed in Africa in 2012, and Lt. Col. John D. Lofts, killed in Afghanistan in 2012.816

Congressional Gold Medal

In 2010, Congress authorized the Congressional Gold Medal to be awarded to each Japanese American who served in the 100th Infantry Battalion, the 442d Regimental Combat Team, or the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) during World War II. The Congressional Gold Medal, the highest civilian award in the United States, reflected national appreciation for distinguished achievements or contributions. The first presentations occurred in 2011 in Washington, D.C., with

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814 DLIFLC POM Update 3 June 2011.
815 SITREP_DLIFLC_20120525.
816 Individuals listed on the DLIFLC Memorial Plaque for those killed during the war on terror as of May 2013.
subsequent presentations around the country, including one held at the Presidio of Monterey on 4 March 2012, for those veterans who could not travel to the capital.817

Samurai Sword

On 17 December 2012, DLIFLC accepted a symbolic gift donated to the Institute by the family of Lt. Col. Richard Sakakida, a Military Intelligence Service officer and Japanese-English interpreter who served in the Philippines during WWII. Brian Shiroyama, a friend of the Sakakida family, presented the Samurai sword Lt. Col. Sakakida to Col. Danial D. Pick, Commandant of DLIFLC, which was then mounted in the foyer of the DLIFLC headquarters building to recognize Sakakida’s service behind enemy lines during WWII.818

Figure 43 Brian Shiroyama presents the Samurai sword of Richard Sakakida, a celebrated Military Intelligence Service officer and interpreter of WWII, to DLIFLC, which Col. Danial Pick accepted on the Institute’s behalf in December 2012.

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The U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM) continued to manage and operate the historic Presidio of Monterey (POM) as a U.S. Army garrison. Garrison command was bestowed upon Col. Darcy Brewer as the period began and was followed by Col. Joel J. Clark, a Special Forces officer, on 19 July 2011. IMCOM West Region Director Randall Robinson officiated over Clark’s ceremony that included garrison staff, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center personnel, and local community guests. Clark held the job until he in turn was replaced by Col. Paul W. Fellinger, an Infantry officer, on 10 July 2013. Pamela von Ness remained the Deputy Garrison Commander throughout the period. U.S. Army Garrison Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Olga B. Martinez served as the Garrison Command Sergeant Major from 2008 until she retired from active duty service during a change of responsibility ceremony at Soldier Field on 6 June 2013.819 Martinez was followed by Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Wynn.820 Colonel Brewer and Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Mark Moore from IMCOM Central Region visited Monterey to attend this change of responsibility ceremony.821 IMCOM was commanded in 2012 by Lt. Gen. Michael Ferriter.822

Another notable transition during this period occurred on 31 March 2011 when Jack Riso retired as Chief of Fire and Emergency Services for the Presidio of Monterey after spending forty years

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820 SITREP_DLIFLC_20130301.

821 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 1 March 2013.

working for the military on the Monterey Peninsula, nine as Fire Chief. Assistant Fire Chief Scott Hudock assumed Riso’s immediate responsibilities. The Presidio Federal Firefighters F166 held a retirement dinner and roast for Riso at the Stilwell Community Center a week before his last day on duty.  

Despite a variety of issues and concerns facing the U.S. Army Garrison during this period, the Presidio of Monterey remained a premier assignment for personnel stationed at the historic post. If any proof was needed, it arrived early in 2011 when the Secretary of the Army bestowed his “Superior Quality of Life Award” for small installations to the POM Garrison.

**Installation Commander**

In August 2013, Colonel Danial D. Pick, DLIFLC Commandant, made an effort to resolve a long-running issue over who served as the post “installation commander.” Garrison activities at the Presidio of Monterey were once under the command of Fort Ord. After the closure of Fort Ord in 1994, however, the DLIFLC commandant became responsible for the Presidio of Monterey. Then, in 20016, the Army created the Installation Management Command, an unprecedented decision that set base management apart from mission management and left in its wake a legacy of continuing tension between mission and base commanders at virtually all levels of the Army. Once IMCOM took control over the Presidio, it created an entirely separate reporting chain for staff belonging to the U.S. Army Garrison, Presidio of Monterey. As it did in many other places, this decision immediately generated friction between the DLIFLC commander and the POM garrison commander, both of whom were colonels. Problems mainly resulted from differing priorities and unequal resourcing for the separate organizations, which meant their goals were not always in sync and personality could either moderate or exacerbate the situation. Over time, various arrangements evolved to mitigate tensions and to clarify authority between the responsibilities of the DLIFLC commandant and the POM garrison commander. During this period, TRADOC, IMCOM, and a revision of AR 600-20 allowed the general officer in charge of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to assume responsibility as the POM installation commander.

The problem then became that the CAC commander was too far away and had a span of control too great to be effective, which is why Colonel Pick revisited the issue. Pick was apparently successful in getting the CAC commander to agree to delegate his authority as the installation commander for the Presidio to the DLIFLC commandant, who in turn was empowered to subdelegate most of the garrison-related functions to the POM Garrison commander, who continued reporting to IMCOM, however. It was, Pick thought, “an ugly fix to the problem, but it’s a fix.” The cleaner solution might have been to designate the commandant as the senior commander, but such designation required both the Army chief of staff and secretary of the Army approval. The commander at Fort Leavenworth agreed to this, but the IMCOM commanding general did not

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823 All-POM email, “Farewell Message from Chief Riso,” 31 March 2011; Riso Retirement Dinner Flyer, in DLIFLC Command History Office files.
824 DLIFLC POM Update 1 April 11.
825 Cameron Binkley, “Historian Notes from Staff Meeting,” 23 August 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files. AR 600-20 governs the subject of Installation Command.
826 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 7-10.
concur, underlining how tensions between Army mission and garrison sides persisted at the highest levels. 827

The practical effect of having a distant installation commander or not having senior command authority locally was that the DLIFLC commandant had to spend more time and energy on persuading, cajoling, and sometimes shameing personnel whose work was important to the Institute’s mission, but who did not report to him, to do what he needed them to do. That is what not having direct command authority meant. Colonel Pick clearly saw it as one of the more difficult tasks he faced as commandant. 828

Budgetary Uncertainly

In 2011, the U.S. Army Garrison began to face fiscal handicaps due to the need to operate on fiscal year 2010 funding levels because Congress did not pass a fiscal year 2011 budget. Near the end of 2011, Congress passed, and the president had signed into law, a “continuing resolution” that funded only normal operating activities at a minimum level. The continuing resolution ran from 1 October 2011 through 23 December 2011. All of this meant that no new projects could be started, efforts to align the POM Garrison’s functions to a standardized model (called Common Levels of Support) had to pause, a selective hiring freeze was implemented, and little could be done to overcome a $41 million maintenance backlog. Funding was mainly available for life, health, safety, Army community services, and utilities. The outlook for fiscal year 2012 was no better. At the same time, the Garrison’s primary tenant, DLIFLC, was continuing to expand and was almost alone in DOD in do so, which essentially meant fewer resources to support a growing mission. Indeed, the Garrison anticipated some 172 new teachers and more than nine hundred students to support with no new funding to do so. 829 In addition to these problems, Sequestration also cut funds used by the Army to support its cooperative cost-sharing arrangement with the cities of Monterey and Seaside whose public works departments provided routine maintenance through contracts with the Army for facilities at the Presidio, Camp Roberts, and the Ord Military Community. Those contracts were cut by 30 percent in March 2013, a setback that resulted in layoffs for eight employees of the two cities. 830

As 2012 began, Civilian Manpower Authorizations were at 80 percent of the Garrison’s documented required strength. There were 359 required civilian positions documented as necessary but only 286 were authorized. Facing serious resource shortfalls meant reduced mission support and the potential mission failure. Funding was needed for the congressionally mandated “First Sergeants Barracks” program and for additional access control positions (gate guards). Garrison officials claimed that all of the fiscal year 2013 Provisional TDA Requirements needed to be resourced to at least 85 percent of required strength, meaning an additional nineteen authorizations were needed to provide 85 percent of the required civilian positions. In terms of installation access control, support dropped from fifty-two authorizations to thirty-two, which

827 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 7-10.
828 He had a productive relationship with two of three garrison commanders during his command.
829 USAG POM IPB Brief 1 Feb 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
essentially meant that the post could not properly staff its entrances. Gate closings and reduced
entrance hours became a routine practice during this period at the Presidio of Monterey.831

Indeed, from August 2011, the Presidio of Monterey reduced access to the post by restricting the
hours of operation to all but one of the four post gates and requiring all visitors to enter at Bolio
Road, the only 24/7 entry point. The Franklin Gate visitor center was permanently closed and
while the gate remained open during daylight hours, the High and Taylor Street entrances were
limited to the peak hours of use to reduce congestion. The restrictions were attributed directly to
budgets cuts.832

In part to mitigate costs associated with access control, the Garrison began emplacing pedestrian
turnstiles at post access gates. The first turnstiles appeared at the Presidio’s Taylor and High Street
Gates and allowed access by those holding a valid government identification card, relieving
security guards from the need to check the identification of those using the turnstiles.833

On 29 January, IMCOM commander, Lt. Gen. Michael Ferriter announced that Army installations
would continue to hire critical positions, such as firefighters, gate guards, and child-care
specialists. His statement came on the heels of guidance from the Department of the Army about
a department-wide hiring freeze and the release or non-renewal of term appointments. Basically,
Ferriter was emphasizing his authority to hire in exception to that policy. To make sure the
message was clear, Ferriter spoke to every garrison commander or deputy.834 Nevertheless, in
March 2013, the POM Garrison had to shut down all non-emergency support for the Presidio and
the Ord Military Community due to severe installation budget cuts. Emergency service orders and
work requests were defined as only those conditions posing a threat to life, safety/fire, health,
security, and significant damages to government property or infrastructure, which included gas
leaks, overflowing drains, or faulty electrical connections that could cause shock. In effect, all
repairs and routine maintenance came to a halt. The Monterey Municipal Services Agency Service
Order Desk had to place all other service requests on a hold/differed status until funding levels
were restored.835 In April, further Sequestration guidance arrived at the Presidio in the form of
more stringent conservation and energy saving regulations, which incentivized switching out
inefficient lighting systems but also mandated cooler (POM)in winter and warmer ones in
summer. 836

831 DES History 4th QTR CY 11.
832 All-POM email, “New Gate Hours for the Presidio of Monterey Effective 6 Sept. 2011,” 39 August 2011, in
DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
833 USAG POM IPB Brief 1 Feb 2011 - Updated 31 Jan 2011; Memo, “Building 629 Partial Demolition,” 20 May
2014, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files. The rear of Building 629, originally constructed as a dining
hall, was eliminated to make more room for the new dining facility.
835 All-POM email, “Reduction of Facility Maintenance and Repair Services for POM and OMC,” 11 March 2013, in
DLIFLC Command History Office files.
April 2013, p. 3.
New Construction and Space Issues

As 2011 began, the Presidio of Monterey was facing a major shortage of space due to the growth of DLIFLC, which added 350 new students plus two hundred staff for fiscal year 2011. This meant there was more pressure on classrooms, parking, barracks, and dining. Fortunately, and despite having to cope with the problems of budgetary uncertainty, Congress had previously funded several important military construction projects for the Presidio, including new classroom buildings, new barracks or barracks upgrades, and funds for major renovation and restoration of existing structures.

This construction was based upon a real property master plan designed to centralize the Institute’s academic mission at the Presidio of Monterey. Completion of two new general instructional buildings would and did eventually allow DLIFLC to eliminate all leased properties. Unfortunately, the Institute would still need to maintain offices at the heavily guarded and difficult to access DOD Center Monterey Bay as well as Gasiewicz Hall, DLIFLC’s isolation immersion facility, and in the Chamberlin Library building, which continued to house the Command History Office archives even after closure of the library (recounted in Chapter V). However, these new structures significantly consolidated academic functions.837

Planned construction would ease some problems, but as the commandant noted in late 2010, it had to get worse before it could get better. DLIFLC officials emphasized the need to maximize efficiency in using space and coordinating actions with Garrison officials. Colonel Pick expected the problem to peak by 2012 and then drop off.838

In March 2011, with major construction ongoing, U.S. Army Garrison and Corps of Engineers officers signed an agreement with the McGraw-Hill Corporation to lease space at a Monterey office park called Ryan Ranch. The lease helped overcome space limitations at the Presidio but was needed to off-set cancellation of an existing off-post leasing arrangement with local municipal authorities who had allowed the Army to use the vacant Monte Vista elementary school for several years.839 The move and new leasing arrangement would cost the Army about $3 million.840

Barracks Space shortage

In May 2011, in response to the barracks shortage, the Army authorized military officials in Monterey to house a maximum of three service members per barracks room. This waiver of existing regulations made 3,266 beds available at the Presidio of Monterey, which relieved billeting pressure well into fiscal year 2012. The waiver came in part due to the support of DLIFLC higher headquarters and Lt. Gen. Caslen, who took up the issue of filling empty billets, solving dorm problems, and staff-manning, all of which related to “the care and feeding of students.” Caslen had expressed concern, as well, about the need to enforce military standards, which he felt declined in the absence of the right leader to led ratios. Based on projected student growth,

837 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, pp. 10-11.
838 Cameron Binkley, Historian’s Notes for DLIFLC Commander’s Update, 3 November 2010, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
839 DLIFLC Sitrep 18 March 2011.
840 USAG POM IPB Brief 1 Feb 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.
however, staff continued efforts to locate alternative living spaces for service members at the Ord Military Community and service funding for housing allowances or contract housing in the local communities.\textsuperscript{841}

The Army programmed $63 million in fiscal year 2011 of multi-phased projects to upgrade and construct new barracks facilities on the Presidio of Monterey. Design for a new barracks, to be located on the Upper Presidio near the Post Exchange facility, began in 2011. It would provide housing for 320 personnel, greatly helping to alleviate barracks overcrowding. The Garrison also planned to build a new dining facility (to start in May 2014). That project would eventually require partial demolition of Building 629, used as barracks for naval personnel. Near the new dining facility, the Garrison also began to plan to build another new barracks for four hundred personnel. The project was programmed with funding of $70 million and scheduled for fiscal year 2015.\textsuperscript{842}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure45.png}
\caption{Plan of sites of future barracks and a new dining facility to be built on the Upper Presidio of Monterey, 2011.}
\end{figure}

\textbf{General Instructional Facilities}

During this period, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers awarded several major construction contracts on behalf of the Presidio of Monterey. The most important of these involved the completion of two new general instruction buildings, the first funded in fiscal year 2009 and the second in fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year 2009 building cost $15 million and was completed in August 2011. The facility provided an additional 47,000 square feet on two stories with thirty-six classrooms.\textsuperscript{843} Final inspections the structure were completed in February 2012 while smartboards, network installations, and furniture placements were coordinated for March.\textsuperscript{844} DLIFLC staff began moving in soon thereafter. RQ Construction of Carlsbad, California, began work on the fiscal year 2011 building in 2011. DLIFLC staff occupied this structure in mid-2013. Once completed this building provided DLIFLC with another 110,000 square feet on four stories with a hundred new classrooms. Because of space limitations, however, the building had to be constructed in the center

\textsuperscript{841} DLIFLC_POM Update 6 May 11; Binkley, Historian’s Notes for DLIFLC Commander’s Update, 20 April 2011.

\textsuperscript{842} USAG POM IPB Brief 1 Feb 2011 - Updated 31 Jan 2011; Memo, “Building 629 Partial Demolition,” 20 May 2014, in DLIFLC Command History Office files. The rear of Building 629, originally constructed as a dining hall, was eliminated to make more room for the new dining facility.

\textsuperscript{843} USAG POM IPB Brief 1 Feb 2011 - Updated 31 Jan 2011; DLIFLC POM Update 20 May 2011.

\textsuperscript{844} SITREP_DLIFLC_20120210.
of the existing academic complex on the Upper Presidio, crowding in between two existing older class buildings and removing several parking spaces.845

Figure 46 These buildings eliminated much parking, but resolved major classroom space shortage issues once completed by 2013.

The limited and diminishing availability of parking at the Presidio of Monterey remained a sore point with employees. In 2011, a federal judge ruled against the U.S. Army Garrison in a complaint brought to court over insufficient number of parking spots available for handicapped employees. Apparently, the reason there were fewer than the number of handicap parking spaces required by law had to do with friction between differing commanders over the limited parking situation. To comply with court orders, the Garrison increased the number of handicap spaces.846 The Garrison would also later demolish existing peripheral structures along the northwest boundary of the post off Private Bolio Road to provide more parking, although these spaces were somewhat distant from the work locations of most employees. In fiscal year 2012, a major project to remodel the historic post officers’ club, known as the Weckerling Center (Building 326), began. The project was bid about $3 million, but the contractor ran into unexpected difficulties and lost money on the contract. The restoration included abatement of hazardous material, a full kitchen upgrade, disabilities compliance upgrades, and foundation wall repair. After restoration began, the building was unavailable for use for more than four hundred days.847 Then, following project completion, an interior designer smartly decorated the interior with new furniture and large framed wall-mounted photographic images depicting the post’s history, which were obtained from the Command History Office archives.

Few renovations occurred off the Presidio during this period, although the Army programmed $38 million in fiscal year 2011 to allow the Garrison to upgrade the Satellite Earth Terminal Station at

Camp Roberts, and in February 2013, to demolish Building 4243 at the Ord Military Community in Seaside where most of the Presidio’s military family housing was located. The building was known as the Boy Scout Hut. The demolition project included the abatement of lead-based paint found in portions of the building interior.  

DOD/VA Health Clinic

Veterans Affairs Secretary Eric Shinseki announced in March 2012 that a site had been selected in Marina, California, to construct a new joint VA and DOD medical clinic to serve the needs of Monterey Bay area veterans and active duty personnel. The site chosen was on former Fort Ord land near several ongoing construction projects and total about fourteen acres. One reason the site was chosen, said Marina Mayor Bruce Delgado, was that the land had already been through the time-consuming environmental review process so construction could begin within one year. It actually took about nineteen months for contractors to be let, but on Veterans Day, 11 November 2013, DLIFLC leadership and staff attended a groundbreaking ceremony for the planned clinic. Local military officials were not responsible for the project, but the planned clinic would provide vastly improved medical support for the region’s active duty military personnel and their families as well as veterans once the facility was operational.

Brig. Gen. John Cho, Deputy Commanding General, Medical Command, visited the area as part of the groundbreaking and discussed support issues with the commander of the local medical clinic. The new planned medical facility was important in that it was the first of only two such facilities trying to integrate Department of Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense healthcare under one roof. “This clinic will do much more than provide the expanded space we need to deliver more-and more efficient services; we are also strengthening our bond with our DOD partners,” said Lisa Freeman, VA Palo Alto Health Care System director. The clinic was to have 146,000 square feet and would serve both military members, their families, and veterans. Since the closure of Fort Ord in 1994, the Presidio of Monterey has had limited medical facilities to treat its beneficiaries, forcing most active duty-families to rely upon contracted care support that was not popular with the civilian medical community. Moreover, the VA and DOD both currently operated separate clinics in the Monterey Bay area, neither of which collaborated or shared resources. According to U.S. Rep. Sam Farr, “this new facility will be a model for how our country cares for individuals who serve our country throughout their entire life.” Clinical services were to include VA outpatient services, including primary care, specialty care, mental health, ancillary and diagnostic services.

Cultural Resources Management and Future Construction Constraints

In 2011, the Garrison’s Directorate of Public Works, retained PAST Consultants, LLC, to conduct an architectural inventory and evaluation of a set of structures in the main campus area of Presidio bordering Rifle Range Road. These structures, consisting of Buildings 631 through 637, were know originally as “the Russian Village.” The study was driven by the Presidio’s 2010 Real
Property Master Plan, which had identified the Russian Village as a future potential building site for construction of new instruction buildings. The Russian Village, however, was nearly fifty years old, had earned an a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers architectural award, and was potentially eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. Historic structures eligible for listing on the National Park Service-maintained register are governed by national preservation legislation, which meant that the Army had to consider any potential negative effects demolition of the structures might cause as well as mitigating measures. The special study sought to provide Presidio planners information regarding the potential for the Russian Village to be eligible for inclusion and a broad range of alternatives to consider, including how to avoid, minimize or mitigate any future undertaking that might impact the complex. The report concluded by finding the Russian Village eligible for listing, mainly under National Register Criterion A “for its association with the development of the Russian strategic defense language program and National Register Criterion C: Design/Construction because the complex embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction.” Past Consultants found the structures of “exceptional importance as they represented a unified complex designed and constructed to teach the Russian language to military personnel to enhance United States national security effort during the Cold War.” Basically, the buildings were deemed historically significant making them eligible for safeguards under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (as amended) and requiring the Army to consult with state officials if exterior renovations or demolition of the Russian Village was proposed. Garrison planners probably had hoped for another conclusion, given the space constraints on the upper Presidio, but the determination of eligibility did not mean the structures could not be ultimately be demolished, only that many additional steps would first be required.

Figure 47 Graphic showing location of “the Russian Village,” which was evaluated for historic significance in 2012.

Another constraint on new construction on the Monterey Peninsula was water. In August 2011, a draft Garrison environmental planning document indicated a potential shortage of water for new development at the Presidio. This issue caused Garrison officials to begin considering two expansion alternatives, one focused upon the Presidio and the other upon development within the Ord Military Community in nearby Seaside, California. The option DLIFLC preferred, of course, was to focus development on the Presidio, but that would leave a shortfall of 6.7 acre-feet for long-range development. To address the problem, officials proposed transferring water rights at Fort Ord to the Presidio. While the Army had overcome space problems and could continue to manage vehicle parking constraints by using various strategies, Colonel Pick acknowledged in 2014 that water conservation would be an “enduring issue” that could limit on post renovations.

Cemetery Administration

In early October 2012, Kathryn A. Condon, Executive Director, Army National Cemeteries Program, visited the Presidio of Monterey to meet with the Garrison Commander, Colonel Clark, and other U.S. Army Garrison officials, and to discuss cemetery operations.

Condon’s visit was part of a broader effort to inspect Army-operated cemeteries in the wake of a national scandal at the nation’s most famous Army-operated cemetery, Arlington. At Arlington National Cemetery, the Army had lost tract of some of its burials, generating a lot of negative media attention after the Army admitted to misidentifying or misplacing human remains and other problems in 2010. Condon’s job was to make sure the entire system was under a firm hand. Fortunately, she found no significant issues at the two cemeteries administered by the Presidio, one at the Presidio of Monterey, the other near Benicia in the San Francisco Bay Area. In gaining control over the system, Condon had directed that all Army-owned cemeteries participate in a national level program to make gravestone information easily available to the public through a newly developed web application called ANC Explorer launched in 2012. Garrison staff, led by

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854 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, p. 11.
855 SITREP_DLIFLC_20121012.
Byron Tatsch, survey the cemetery, photographed gravestones and entered the information. The goal of the program was to make all of the graves in the Army cemetery system accessible online. The project was both a public relations effort and a benefit for families and researchers seeking information about those interred in an Army cemetery.\footnote{Phillip Molnar, “Tracking Those Who Have Served,” \textit{Monterey Herald}, 12 May 2013, pp. 1, 9; Itinerary for Ms. Kathryn A. Condon, 8-10 October 2012, and associated materials, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.} Unfortunately, despite much work and good intentions, a series of issues at the national level have to date prevented this potentially useful service from being made available.

**Monterey Model**

The City of Monterey continued throughout the period to provide contracted public works services to the Army at the Presidio of Monterey as did the City of Seaside for the Ord Military Community. Originated after the closure of Fort Ord and known as “the Monterey Model,” this unusual business model has gained increasing credit for saving money for both the city and the Army by allowing cooperation and innovative base support agreements.

One aspect of the Monterey Model was Army cooperation with the city of Monterey to allow public access to the Presidio’s Soldier Field on weekends to support the city’s need for suitable venues for organized athletic events, mainly soccer. Another aspect of the cooperation was the city’s continued leasing of the Lower Presidio as a historical park under terms of a 1996 agreement. Regarding both, there were no major issues to report during the period. The former Army museum on the Lower Presidio thus continued to be open and operated by docents trained under city auspices (with some support from DLIFLC Command History Office) while the grounds were maintained to required standards under terms of the lease. The major difficulty continued to be unwillingness of the Monterey City Council to approve funds to implement improvements for such items as trails and signage in accordance with an approved master development plan.\footnote{City of Monterey, 14th Annual Report to the U.S. Army for the Leased Property, Lower Presidio Historic Park, 30 April 2011, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.}

In August 2012, the city of Monterey, continuing to foster good conditions for the Monterey Model, hosted the Association of Defense Communities Conference. This event brought out Katherine Hammack, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment, and IMCOM Commander Lt. Gen. Michael Ferriter.\footnote{DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 3 August 2012.}

In December 2013, Fred Meurer, Monterey’s city manager for more than twenty-two years and a former Army colonel, retired. Well regarded, Meurer had helped to develop the Monterey Model.\footnote{Daniel Carpenter, “Visionary Fred Meurer Retires, City Leader Worked Closely with Military,” \textit{Monterey Military News}, 6 December 2013, pp. 1, 6.} Meurer’s decision to retire impacted DLIFLC directly because Colonel Pick, himself planning to retire from the Army, but still serving as DLIFLC commandant, chose to apply for Meurer’s open position in 2013. It took the city a year to search for and review candidates. Pick emerged as the favored applicant for the job, and this became public in February 2014 after a city
council meeting discussed the issue. Unfortunately, Pick’s application soon became entangled in council politics as a debate broke out amongst council members over the contract salary to be offered the successful applicant. Mayor Chuck Della Sala and Councilman Frank Sollecito objected that the salary offer was too high (a base salary higher than $200,000). Colonel Pick’s name was thereafter featured in a number of local headlines, which brought unwanted publicity to himself, the Army, and distraction for local military employees, and he withdrew his application in March. The city of Monterey selected its own Acting City Manager, Mike McCarthy, for the position. McCarthy, the Deputy City Manager, was willing to accept a lower salary and this maneuver ended the dispute on the council. On 18 April 2014, Colonel Pick retired from the Army during a well-attended ceremony on Soldier Field at the Presidio of Monterey. McCarthy’s selection as city manager opened his former position and he quickly recommended council approval of the now civilian Danial Pick, who without the salary issue attached was hired without further controversy. Said McCarthy, “I got to know him through [the hiring] process and saw the value he would bring to the city in some capacity.

Safety and Security

Perhaps the most serious incident reported on post during this period resulted from the accidental discharge of a privately-owned weapon by a permanent party military staff member inside building 623 on 19 January 2011. Fortunately, no one was harmed. The command issued a bulletin to all personnel reminding them that weapons on the military installation are required to be registered with POM Police Department and under no circumstances were loaded weapons authorized on the installation except by security forces.

In late 2001, information about an old criminal case involving a military family came to light. The ex-girlfriend of Charles Holifeld, who investigators suspected for the murder of thirteen-year-old Christina Marie Williams, recanted her previous statement that Holifeld had been with her on the night that Williams was abducted while walking her dog in the Presidio of Monterey family housing complex on the former Fort Ord in 1998. Her body was later discovered nearby. Lisa Johnson, the ex-girlfriend, claimed that Holifeld had threatened to kill her if she ever did anything to help send him to prison. By recanting her claim, investigators gained new hope that they could finally close the case. Holifeld was already in prison serving consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for other sexual assault crimes.

In September 2012, DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey conducted a full scale exercise that tested the POM Installation Operations Center and mission and garrison procedures in response to a mass casualty event. The exercise included local municipal authorities and local civilian medical

facilities. California first responders also conducted a major joint exercise on the former Fort Ord on 15 May 2013. This event was designed to test the Presidio’s installation protection and emergency management plans and the reaction of various staff components and the ability to cooperate and work with local community emergency workers. Called Golden Guardian, the training helped to ensure continued readiness to respond to natural disasters, for example, by conducting search and rescue operations, and force protection incidents while ensuring mission continuity.

On a less than serious note, the Price Fitness Center tackled the light-hearted, albeit still unfortunate, issue of an impending towel shortage in February 2011. Patrons were apparently being negligent in returning towels belonging to the facility. Towels were being lost when patrons forgot to turn them or else they were being “intentionally stolen.” Price Fitness Center reminded patrons that the Army did not provide funding to sustain such loss and complete elimination of towel service was a potential result unless behavior changed. Apparently, this warning was sufficient to improve behavior as the topic did not come up again. On a more serious note, in August 2013, Colonel Fellinger, the Garrison Commander, had to issue a plea to military personnel about maintaining accountability of government-issued military identification cards following an unusually high number of lost or stolen cards in previous weeks.

Finally, following revelations about domestic spying by the National Security Agency and information about that spying that was reported by the Guardian newspaper, employees of DLIFLC and the Presidio of Monterey lost access to those webpages of the Guardian’s website involving NSA stories or information. DLIFLC faculty routinely accessed foreign media for classroom purposes, so this became a subject of concern in the schools. Alerted to this situation, media inquiries quickly descended on the Presidio’s Public Affairs Officer Dan Carpenter about why the Army was preventing its employees from learning about the spying scandal. Carpenter explained that Army employees could face disciplinary consequences because the revelations about NSA spying had included the release of classified documents. Even though these documents were now widely available for downloading, they were still classified until officially declassified by the U.S. Government. The problem was less about employees reading such material, therefore, and more about them downloading still classified information onto their unclassified systems thus creating security headaches for managers that could also require costly fixes (such as “reimaging” employee’s unclassified computers to recertify them after exposure to classified information). However, the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command could not explain why the sites were being blocked. The incident at the Presidio led a Florida congressman, Rep. Alan Grayson, to offer legislation that to amend the next Defense Appropriations bill to stop the military from blocking access to such websites as the Guardian’s. A decision by the Republican leadership of

866 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 14 September 2012.
868 DLIFLC Situation report for period ending 17 May 2013.
the House Rules Committee prevented the measure from going forward.\textsuperscript{872} In June 2013, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense issued guidance to all DOD personnel on how to handle classified information found online while accessing the internet with unclassified government computer systems to try and stem the problem of so much classified material suddenly being available.\textsuperscript{873}

**Transportation Issues**

In late 2011, Congress decided not to raise the amount it paid to subsidize local mass transit authorities. To offset this monetary loss, the Board of Directors of the Monterey-Salinas Transit (MST) system chose temporarily to cancel local MST Line 78, which traveled through Pacific Grove to the Presidio of Monterey. Line 78 was chosen because it consistently had the lowest number of daily Presidio riders.\textsuperscript{874} In December 2012, the MST Board directed that Lines 79 and 73 also be cancelled, effective from January 2013. While other MST routes to the Presidio of Monterey remained operational, continued service was contingent upon the Presidio being able to increase the number of bus passes purchased by 31 January 2013. If Presidio riders failed to purchase at least 620 bus passes by that time, the MST Board basically threatened to terminate the entire Presidio of Monterey bus program.\textsuperscript{875}

A minor transportation matter was the decision DOD made in early 2012 to no longer require vehicles of employees on military bases to be registered and show a decal. Employees and visitors still had to show proper identification, but DOD determined that gate security officers tended to waive vehicles with valid security stickers even though such stickers were often left on vehicles after a sale so that there was no necessary correlation between drivers and their vehicles.\textsuperscript{876}

**Base Realignment and Closure**

After the closure of Fort Ord in 1994, the Army remained responsible for extensive mandated cleanup activities on the former installation under the general oversight of the Presidio of Monterey. The Fort Ord Base Realignment and Closure or BRAC Office, part of the Army’s BRAC-Division, managed cleanup activities using contracts bid through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento District. Most of the remaining land under BRAC control will eventually transfer to the Bureau of Land Management.


\textsuperscript{873} Timothy A. Davis, Director of Security, OSD, Memo “Notice to DoD Employees and Contractors on Protecting Classified Information and the Integrity of Unclassified Government Information Technology Systems,” 7 June 2013, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

\textsuperscript{874} All-POM email, “Discontinuation of Line 78 (Effective 09 Jan 12),” 5 January 2012, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

\textsuperscript{875} All-POM email, “MST Bus Program Update and Line Cancellations,” 18 December 2012, in DLIFLC Command History 2011-2013 files.

The continuing importance of the Army’s mission to clean up its former training base was highlighted after President Barak Obama used his authority under the 1906 Antiquities Act to designate Fort Ord National Monument on the part of the former Fort Ord controlled by BLM. Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar flew to Monterey and dedicated the new monument at a special ceremony on 20 April 2012. Presidio of Monterey Garrison Commander Joel Clark officially represented the Army, but unofficially local veteran Sfc. (ret.) Allan MacDonald, wearing his original-issue 1930s-era U.S. cavalryman’s uniform, stole the show.

During this period, the BRAC Office continued cleanup measures mainly relating to water treatment, unexploded munitions removal, and planning and executing the prescribed burns required to clear land of vegetation to provide access for munitions removal. Nearly 4,000 acres of the Fort Ord Impact Area remained where the Army needed to remove vegetation. Each annual burn cleared 400 or 500 acres so the process would continue for another eight to ten years if it remained on track. Unfortunately, planning and executing planned burns also continued to be a challenging task that was influenced by any number of key factors, typically weather conditions. In June 2011, however, the BRAC Office issued a press release announcing that it had cancelled the planned 2011 Fort Ord prescribed burn, but the reason was not typical.

As the Army prepared two areas for the 2011 prescribed burns, it began carving out fuel breaks. During that process, it uncovered two large artillery projectiles simply laying upon the surface. Normally, such ordnance was only found buried several feet beneath the ground. The BRAC Office deemed the area thus too dangerous for groups cutting fire breaks. But pushing the safety setback distance out farther made it too difficult to conduct a safe prescribed burn. Thus, the vegetation would have to be cut mechanically and any found surface ordnance removed. Then, those areas would also have to be burned so that crews could scan beneath the surface for unexploded munitions. That, however, meant allowing sufficient vegetation to grow back to carry a fire. As a result of the unexpected discovery of large artillery projectiles on the surface, the BRAC Office cancelled the 2011 prescribed burn, an exception to the Army’s program for clearing vegetation.878

878 Fort Ord BRAC Field Office historical report 2Q11.
During the period, the BRAC Office continued groundwater cleanup, soil cleanup, and munitions clearance due to past prescribed burns. It operated three groundwater treatment facilities and conducted soil excavations in the Site 39 area. In October 2012, the office began the process to prepare the third Fort Ord Five-Year Review report, which included publication of a fact sheet, initiation of interviews with citizens and local officials, and various site visits.879

![Unexploded surface ordnance](image)

**Figure 50 Unexploded surface ordnance found by crews preparing a firebreak for a prescribed burn in 2011.**

In March 2012, the BRAC Office notified the public of a potential prescribed burn later in the year. There were several planning discussions about the selection of the proposed 2012 units. Two areas were selected, unit 7 (216 acres) and unit 10 (240 acres). While developing the burn and work plans for these units, the Presidio of Monterey Fire Department raised concerns about the proximity of the proposed burn to residential areas and the need for additional mechanical clearing of vegetation as a precautionary measure. This additional work caused the BRAC Office to focus on preparing only Unit 10 for a prescribed burn in 2012.880 Ultimately, however, the desired optimal weather conditions for a burn did not occur and the Army therefore conducted no prescribed burns in 2012.881

The conditions required for controlled burns were better in 2013. In mid-October, the Army conducted two prescribed burns on the former Fort Ord in the two parcels (Units 7 and 10), that were identified but left unburned in 2012 and in two separate operations. The first burn on 14 October was immediately considered a success. The burn covered about 280 acres and was completed without incident. The second burn on 15 October, on the other hand, expanded beyond the planned area and ended up burning more than one hundred additional acres, about 700 acres in total. Initially, Army environmental scientist Lyle Shurtleff believed the fire had jumped when standing vegetation caught fire in the containment line. An after action report was less clear, stating only that “based on visual evidence from a subsequent investigation, it appears that firebrands from Unit 7 were transported south causing the spot fires in Unit 33.”882

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879 Fort Ord BRAC Field Office historical report 1Q12.
880 Fort Ord BRAC Field Office historical report 1Q12.
882 Philip Molnar, “Army's Fort Ord Prescribed Burn Report Says Goals Met,” *Monterey Herald*, 1 July 2014. The action report offered several suggestions to avoid the type of problems encountered during the 2013 burns, including pre-treating areas behind containment lines with water or fire foam; increasing mastication, or buffer, areas; removing organic matter from land that is crushed into masticated areas; and converting radios used during the fire to VHF, or very high frequency, units to improve communications.
The fire did not pass beyond the boundaries of the fire containment area, however, and officials never felt any risk that the fire would spread beyond the Fort Ord area. Of course, by burning more acres than anticipated, the fire did generate more unwanted smoke, which caused distress to some residents in the Monterey-Salinas Highway corridor and required the Army to evacuate the nearby York School as a precautionary measure. After the burns, work crews quickly began removing unexploded ordnance from these areas. Combining some acreage cleared using mechanical means with the larger 2013 prescribed burns and burns from previous years meant that less than three thousand acres of vegetation in the Fort Ord Impact Area remained to be cleared. However, the BRAC Office still estimated eight to ten years to complete all required prescribed burns.883

Figure 51 Map (l) showing Units 7 and 10 on the former Fort Ord designated by BRAC for prescribed burns; Smoke (r) rises from a prescribed burn that cleared about 700 acres for munitions cleanup on 15 Oct. 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Dates of Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC Jan Karcz, Acting GC</td>
<td>3 August 1994 – 14 October 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Peter G. Dausen</td>
<td>8 July 1998 – 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. William M. Dietrick</td>
<td>2002 – April 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. W.C. Garrison</td>
<td>May 2003 – 9 July 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Darcy A. Brewer</td>
<td>30 September 2008 – 19 July 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Lawrence T. Brown</td>
<td>23 June 2016 – current</td>
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</tbody>
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Conclusion

History is always about change. As described in this report, at the broadest level, change occurred during this period as the United States sought to conclude its involvement in two wars while attempting an historic U.S. pivot away from the Middle East and toward Asia. At the same time, military leaders worked to reposition the global force structure of the Department of Defense toward a regional alignment that maximized efficiency in logistics, tactics, training, and experience. At a more narrow level, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center also experienced change, change that during this period was both turbulent and disruptive.

Institutionally, measured in dollars, the change DLIFLC experienced amounted to substantially diminished resources. As Col. Danial D. Pick assumed command of DLIFLC in late 2010, the Institute’s budget was cresting at a high water mark of $345 million. From there it declined to around $272 million, which represented a 22 percent reduction in funding. Measured in personnel, DLIFLC reached a high water mark of approximately 2,400 employees and then declined under Pick to less than 2,090.884 In between these points, Pick led DLIFLC through a tough period of congressionally induced budgetary confusion, an across-the-board Department of Defense hiring freeze, and personnel cap set back to fiscal year 2010. He did so by successfully obtaining a manpower waiver that authorized 767 additional staff and bought time to execute a rational and programmed decline without jeopardizing the Institute’s mission. With virtually no other DOD organization bucking the freeze, Pick demonstrated a rare privilege tied to a widely esteemed institution with an important mission that DOD leaders understood after more than a decade conducting counterinsurgency operations. There was, however, a penalty for success that came in the form of a close-up review of the Institute’s manning authorities.

DOD directed the U.S. Army Manpower and Analysis Agency to conduct a thorough manpower review of DLIFLC. The findings of USAMAA’s study led to a major institutional realignment in two phases, the first being the commandant’s reorganization in preparation for the USAMAA review with the second being the required reorganization that followed it. DLIFLC suffered the loss of its independent Curriculum and Faculty Development Departments, its Student Learning Center, its entire Language Science and Technology Directorate, and the closure of its non-academic library. Despite the elimination of these organizations, many of their functions were absorbed into the individual schools of the Institute, and the commandant made the best of the situation by refocusing the teaching staff on the teaching mission. Nevertheless, many staff were dislocated and transitioned to new assignments while others lost work entirely. Importantly, DLIFLC successfully shielded one its key educational pillars—its low faculty-to-student ratio—from a direct USAMAA challenge. Victory here saved hundreds of faculty positions and safeguarded the Institute’s strategic aim to sustain and increase student proficiency.

Simultaneous to the events above, Pick and the newly established DLIFLC Chief Technology Office completed and implemented plans to transition the Institute away from the military computing network and onto a new non-military high-capacity educational computing network. The academic network effectively optimized the use of language learning technology while

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884 Col. Danial D. Pick, Exit Interview by Payne and Binkley, 7 April 2014, p. 21.
enhancing security of the Army’s military network by removing the need for teaching faculty to have to use it.

The role of organizational leaders is to manage change, whether it be good, bad or ugly, and to keep their eyes on the essential continuities of mission and enduring requirements while maintaining the care and morale of their personnel. At DLIFLC, despite the turmoil of change, its core mission remained decidedly unchanged—producing professional military linguists for the national defense requirements of the United States while ensuring a robust regime to test and measure foreign language proficiency. Personnel furloughs, dislocations, and cuts were painful, but the Institute as a whole managed well its own realignment and transition, at least as well as any institution under downward pressure, by focusing on mission essentials, sensitivity to staff and employee concerns, and capitalizing upon the advantages of a unique faculty personnel system. Despite a painful realignment, the record indicates that DLIFLC emerged more resilient than ever to face the future.

Figure 52 Col. Danial D. Pick, 26th Commandant of DLIFLC, accepts a certificate of appreciation signed by President Barak Obama from Brig. Gen. (ret.) Russell D. Howard who officiated Pick’s retirement ceremony on 18 April 2014 at Soldier Field on the Presidio of Monterey.
Appendices

A. Academic Waiver

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND
READINESS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL
SECURITY SERVICE

SUBJECT: Civilian Waiver Request for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center

This memorandum authorizes the Secretary of the Army to permit the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center to employ up to 767 additional civilian employees to provide training to meet intelligence, service, U.S. Special Operations Command, and Defense Agency needs for personnel with high levels of foreign language skills.

This authorization constitutes a waiver from the civilian manpower restrictions of Resource Management Decision 703A2. The Army will provide the funding for the 767 personnel from existing resources. This waiver will expire two years from the date of this memorandum.

I remain concerned about the larger issue of managing civilian manpower growth, given tight budgets and competing priorities. For this reason, I direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to work with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, and the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, to develop options for a corresponding reduction to civilian manpower to account for the 767 civilians that are being hired. These options will be delivered to me no later than August 15, 2012, in time to support the FY 2014 Program Budget Review.

[Signature]
B. Manpower Request

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Training Directorate (G-37)
450 Army Pentagon – Room 20630
Washington, DC 20310-0450

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency (USAMAA),
Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower & Reserve Affairs, 5915 16th Street,
Building 238, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5514

SUBJECT: Request for Manpower Study

1. As the Director of Training (G-37/TR), the Executive Agent for the Defense
Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) and Army Senior Language
Authority, I request a man-power study for DLIFLC. DLIFLC is responsible for providing
language training across the Services and DoD agencies such as the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA).

2. DLIFLC’s current TDA represents only two thirds of the faculty required to train the
validated Joint requirements in FY12 through FY14. DLIFLC mission requirements
have significantly increased over the past several years as OSD has directed funding
initiatives such as RMD-700 to resource mission growth without providing additional
manpower authorizations. Manpower shortfalls have impacted training for all Services
as well as other governmental agencies such as NSA and DIA.

3. DLIFLC and TRADOC are currently working a TDA realignment to better reflect the
implementation of additional missions and resources directed in RMD-700. The current
0512 TDA (W1ECAA) for DLIFLC has:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Desired</th>
<th>Current</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>185 Req / 165 Auth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Pers</td>
<td>94 Req / 87 Auth</td>
<td>94 Req / 87 Auth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3076 Req / 2198 Auth</td>
<td>2046 Req / 1716 Auth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Additional information will be required to determine the full scope of the study. We
will coordinate details with TRADOC G-8 and DLIFLC to provide a more detailed focus
for your review. This study should take place in late FY13 or FY14 to validate the
manpower requirements and associated resources provided in multiple programmatic
decisions through FY15. This will allow the realignment of current manpower and
enable the workload analysis.

5. Direct Coordination with DLIFLC is encouraged and approved. DLIFLC POC is Ms.
Clare Bugary, acting Chief of Staff, DLIFLC, (831) 242-7471,
care.bugary@us.army.mil.
DAMO-TR
SUBJECT: Request for Manpower Study

6. G-3/5/7 point of contact (POC) is Mr. Gerard Landry, TRL Language Team, (703) 614-9850, gerard.landry3.ctr@mail.mil.

TODD B. McCAFFREY
COL (P), GS
Director of Training

CF:
DLNSEO
ASA (M&RA)
Army DCS G-2
Army DCS G-8
TRADOC DCS G-3/5/7
TRADOC CAC LD&E
DLI/FC
MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Academic Review of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center

Last year, Deputy Secretary of Defense granted the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) a waiver that allowed the institute to hire an additional 767 instructors to meet student throughput demands. The waiver lasts through the end of FY 2014. Since then, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence have been considering mechanisms to provide advanced language capability more efficiently. A natural extension of this effort focused on DLIFLC operations.

In order to provide a qualified, independent review of DLIFLC, OUSD(P&R) commissioned an academic review team consisting of five academic experts with extensive experience in teaching and research pertaining to the achievement of advanced foreign language proficiency. The review examined the foreign language teaching and learning practices in select basic courses and provided an assessment of these practices. Their analysis confirmed that DLIFLC is a unique institution and is excellent at providing advanced language instruction. That said, the review team did recommend some changes that would make the institute even more successful.

Their review and recommendations are attached.

Laura J. Junor
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Readiness
DoD Senior Language Authority

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
See Distribution List
DISTRIBUTION:
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Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering)
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U.S. Central Command Senior Language Authority
Deputy Commander (Joint Force Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
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Command
Director of Strategy, Plans and Programs, U.S. Africa Command
Deputy Commander for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Southern Command
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy)
U.S. Army Senior Language Authority and Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff, G-3/5/7, Headquarters, Department of the Army
U.S. Army Deputy Senior Language Authority and Assistant Deputy G-2, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Department of the Army
Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13), U.S. Navy
U.S. Air Force Senior Language Authority and Director, Air Force Language, Region and
Culture Program Office
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Senior Technical
Advisor of Language Activities (A2D), U.S. Air Force
Director of Intelligence, U.S. Marine Corps
Defense Intelligence Agency Senior Language Authority
Director, On-Site Inspection Directorate, J30S, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Senior Language Authority
Defense Security Cooperation Agency Senior Language Authority
National Security Agency/Central Security Services Senior Language Authority
Executive Summary

Over the last decade, the foreign language training needs for intelligence, special operations, and general purpose forces have grown dramatically in terms of numbers and the level of required language proficiency. This growth in requirements has notably been in languages more difficult to learn than those previously taught at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). The growth has driven significant changes in structure and resource needs at DLIFLC, which in turn has resulted in increased scrutiny of how DLIFLC approaches their mission of meeting the foreign language training requirements of the Department of Defense. This report is one such examination of the DLIFLC programs.

The academic programs of the DLIFLC were reviewed by a panel of internationally recognized experts with decades of experience in foreign language teaching and the design and management of language learning programs prior to and during a site visit to the DLIFLC on 29 and 30 November 2012.1

Although some reviewers visited intermediate & advanced classes and provided feedback to faculty, this academic review report focuses chiefly on the DLIFLC Basic Course, examining pedagogical goals, curricula, teaching approaches and methods, teacher preparation, faculty development, and student achievement.

The findings and recommendations of the panel are detailed in overall terms in Section 2 of this report and, for specific language programs, in Appendix 2. The general recommendations from Section 2 are detailed below:

Main Recommendations and Conclusion

The members of the academic review team have been impressed with the considerable efforts expended on the part of DLIFLC leadership and staff to develop curricula that reflect the latest trends in language pedagogy, to recruit, train, and retain highly proficient teachers and to integrate technology to enhance teaching and learning. To reinforce these efforts the review team makes the following recommendations:

- Maintain the current class size and student-teacher ratios for greater student-teacher interaction.
- Improve the quality of incoming students by limiting the number of waivers granted and placing more emphasis on aptitude and preparing the students for intensive language study.

1 Names and titles of panel members are in Appendix 1.
• Further integrate the various units within DLIFLC (Technology Division, Faculty Education and Training, Student Learning, and Assessment) and enhance collaboration, cross training and cross communication with the different units.

• Place more emphasis on the teaching of the productive skills, especially speaking. Doing so will have positive impact on the students’ proficiency in listening and reading.

• Maximize participation in the classroom by placing more emphasis on group work, skits, briefings, role plays, presentations, and debates.

• Develop more opportunities for students to interact in the target language using structured speaking activities in an immersion setting.

• Integrate more writing activities in the curriculum to provide students with opportunities to work at their own pace to internalize vocabulary and grammar and enhance accuracy.

• Minimize the use of English in the classroom.

• Develop a more effective and strategic use of technology in order to integrate it into the curriculum to enhance language acquisition.

• Coordinate the development and use of technology with curriculum and instructional teams.

• Place emphasis, within the teacher development course sequences, on the judicious integration of technology into language teaching and how teachers can help fulfill this goal.

• Align the extensive teacher development course offerings with national and state-wide credit bearing teacher training institutes to further the formal education of DLIFLC instructors, creating a clear career ladder for talented language instructors.

• Place more emphasis on providing corrective feedback to students both inside the classroom and on out-of-class assignments.

• Institutionalize the formal and informal teacher mentoring program and make provisions for union-approved faculty exchanges with like-minded military and government-funded institutions of higher learning, in order to maximize the professional training opportunities of both DLIFLC and cooperating universities.

• Cultivate cooperation among faculty members both within and across schools. Require a certain amount of training (e.g., one day per month) observing other classes. Build an open house/exchange into the calendar where teachers can observe their colleagues in other schools.

• Partner with other academic institutions to maximize teaching opportunities and the cross-sharing of best practices from other language departments.
MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Secretary of Defense, ATTN: Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (Dr. Jerome Pannullo)


1. References:
   b. Email from Dr. Brandeanna Sanders (OSD CAPE) to COL Ilean Keltz (Army G-8 PA&E), 21 June 2013 at 1010, subject: RE: 90 Day Extension for RMD 700A1 Directive.

2. The US Army Manpower Analysis Agency (USAMAA) completed a Single Scope manpower study of DLIFLC to determine the minimum essential staffing and instructor requirements. Additionally, process improvements to garner efficiencies, reduce student entry waivers, and refine instruction techniques were implemented and yielded a reduction to the overall DLIFLC manpower requirement. As such, the Army is reducing its request from 767 to 400 additional authorizations.

3. Army recommends the resourcing of the additional authorizations be prorated among the Services based on FY14 DLIFLC training seat allocation utilizations: USA- 38%; USAF- 35%; USN- 15%; and USMC-12%. This shared approach equitably balances growth in total DoD requirements, and incentivizes Services to more accurately assess language training demand signals to collectively improve course completion rates.

4. However, at BCA levels of funding, the Army will be required to re-evaluate all DLIFLC requirements and authorizations in order to preserve DLIFLC’s ability to provide an acceptable level of language training.

5. Points of contact for this action are MAJ Erik Wright (G-8 PA&E) at (703) 697-9780, and Mr. Frank Demith (G-37/TR) at (703) 614-9850.

MICHAEL T. HARRISON, SR.
Major General, US Army
Director

CF: Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), ATTN: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness (Dr. Junor)
E. Projected Decline in DLIFLC Workforce from Peak to 2,090 CAP by July 2014
2.3 Any restructure plan proposed by the Provost's organization can be implemented within the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2014.

3.0 Proposed Re-structure

3.1 Overall Concept
In order to successfully support more effectively and efficiently the foreign language education and training missions within an increasingly resource constrained environment, DLIFLC's Provost organization will re-structure within 60-90 days of this CONOPS approval.

3.2 Proposed Provost Organization
I. DLIFLC Organizational Chart (Post Restructure), Fiscal Year 2015
DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE
FOREIGN LANGUAGE CENTER
FACT SHEET FOR
SECOND QUARTER FY12

As of 31 March 2012

Mission

DLIFLC provides culturally-based foreign language education, training, evaluation, research, and sustainment for DoD personnel in order to ensure the success of the Defense Language Program and enhance the security of the Nation.

1. Training and Education:
   a. More than 3,500 students from all four services, both active and reserve both in Monterey and Washington DC campuses
   b. More than 1,588 full-time teaching faculty and more than 450 non-teaching administrators, researchers, curriculum and testing developers
   c. DLIFLC teaches 24 languages and dialects in Monterey
   d. DLIFLC-Washington Office teaches approximately 65 languages annually
   e. Language courses run from 1 to 64 weeks in length
   f. The Student Learning Center trained 2,346 resident and 425 non-resident students. SLC provides preparatory training, study skill workshops, and advising services to linguists

2. Sustainment and Support:
   a. Distance Learning. Taught 270 students
      i. 5,391 instructional hours in more than 24 languages
      ii. 339 hours Video Tele-Training (VTT) in 14 languages, 71 students
      iii. 1,180 hours Broadband Language Training System (BLTS), 24 students
      iv. 3,872 hours Mobile Training Team (MTT) instruction conducted through 24 missions
   b. GLOSS (Global Language Online Support System) web-delivered instruction in 34 languages with 4,500 learning objects
   c. Field Support and Special Programs:
      i. Support more than 260 Command Language Programs (CLPs) worldwide
      ii. Taught 2 CLP Managers' (CLPM) course, (80 hours) to 22 students
      iii. Completed 2,484 instructional hours for over 2,943 students through 35 Familiarization Mobile Training Teams in support of OEF/OIF deployments
   d. Language Training Detachments (LTDs) – 32 activities/29 locations

3. Assessment and Testing:
   a. Language Proficiency Tests:
      1) DLPTs (DLIFLC) – 2,146
      2) DLPTs (Worldwide) – 15,900
      3) Oral Proficiency Interviews – 4,303
      4) Performance Final Learning Objectives – 2,355
      5) DLPT5 CRT Grading (Worldwide) – 3,469
      6) DLAB (Worldwide) – 3,371
   b. Quality of Linguists:
      1) Associate of Arts Degree in Foreign Languages: awarded 960 AA degrees in FY11
      2) Associate of Arts Degree in Foreign Languages: awarded 601 AA degrees in FY12 YTD
      3) Associate of Arts Degree in Foreign Languages: awarded 265 AA degrees in FY12 2Q
      4) Since May 2002, DLIFLC has awarded 7,100+ AA degrees
      5) 71% of basic course graduates in FY12 2Q met or exceeded DoD proficiency standards (2/2/1+)
      6) 23% of basic course graduates in FY12 2Q met proficiency standards of 2+/2+/2

Vision

Delivering the world’s best culturally-based foreign language training and education—at the point of need.
DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE
FOREIGN LANGUAGE CENTER
FACT SHEET FOR
FOURTH QUARTER FY13

As of 30 September 2013

Mission

DLIFLC provides culturally-based foreign language education, training, evaluation, research, and sustainment for DoD personnel in order to ensure the success of the Defense Language Program and enhance the security of the Nation.

1. Training and Education:
   a. More than 3,150 Basic and 150 Post Basic students from all four services, both active and reserve both in Monterey and Washington DC and 8 Language Training Detachment campuses.
   b. More than 1,260 full-time teaching faculty and more than 450 non-teaching administrators, researchers, curriculum and testing developers
   c. DLIFLC teaches 24 languages and dialects in Monterey
   d. DLI-Washington Office teaches approximately 65 languages annually
   e. Language courses run from 2 to 64 weeks in length

2. Sustainment and Support:
   a. Distance Learning: Taught 6,550 students
      i. 39,453 instructional hours in 22 languages
      ii. 843 hours Video Tele-Training (VTT) in 9 languages, 98 students
      iii. 4,625 hours Broadband Language Training System (BLTS), 16 languages, 188 students
      iv. 33,985 hours Mobile Training Team (MTT) courses, which included 24,963 of post-basic MTIs, and 9,022 of Familiarization MTT courses, totaling 20 languages, 6,212 students and provided through 274 training missions
   b. GLOSS (Global Language Online Support System) web-delivered instruction in 40 languages with 6,638 learning objects
   c. Field Support:
      i. Support for 325 Command Language Programs (CLPs) worldwide
      ii. Taught 19 CLP Manager (CLPM) courses, totaling 285 students
      iii. Completed 7,773 instructional hours for 3,809 students through 119 Familiarization Mobile Training Teams in support of unit pre-deployment training
   d. Language Training Detachments (LTDs) – 34 activities/31 locations

3. Assessment and Testing:
   a. Language Proficiency Tests:
      1) DLPs (DLIFLC) – 8,348
      2) Oral Proficiency Interviews – 3,862
      3) American Council on Testing Foreign Languages OPI Tests – 16,102
      4) DLPs (Worldwide) – 123,708
      5) In-Course Proficiency Test – 6,998
      6) DLAB (Worldwide) – 15,006
   b. Quality of Language:
      1) Associate of Arts Degree in Foreign Languages: Awarded 1,317 AA degrees in FY12
      2) Associate of Arts Degree in Foreign Languages: Awarded 1,381 AA degrees in FY13
      3) Since May 2002, DLIFLC has awarded 9,000 + AA degrees
      4) 86% of basic course graduates in FY13 met or exceeded DoD proficiency standards (2/2/2+)
      5) 77% of basic course graduates in FY13 met proficiency standards of 2/2/2+

Vision

Delivering the world’s best culturally-based foreign language training and education—at the point of need.
1967 Military Language Instructors (MLIs) first appear at DLI West Coast Branch under the Army Security Agency. The cryptologic agencies of other services later contribute their own MLIs. In the 1980s, MLIs are formally established as billets on DLIFLC’s TDA. MLIs are first known as Foreign Language Training NCOs/Petty Officers. Their functions depend upon the diverse departments to which they are assigned. MLIs serve as teachers, coaches, and role models while duty at DLIFLC allows them to take refresher courses. They have always generally functioned in a role analogous to graduate teaching assistants in universities.885

MLIs provide supplemental foreign language training and role model example for DLIFLC students, but there have been internal disagreements over how best to manage and use MLIs. Issues included MLIs serving as managers in the program as opposed to teachers, nature of role in student status changes, level of collateral duty, level of experience of MLIs (inappropriateness of assigning junior enlisted MLIs vs. NCOs), degree that service program managers need to be involved in internal MLI program changes not in conflict with existing MOUs, decentralization or lessoning of military oversight and management of MLIs in the schools, lack of service clarity in determining MLI responsibilities, restrictions on MLIs qualified to teach Category 4 languages or at 3/3 level thus limiting the pool of potential MLIs (favored by school), insufficient number of MLIs (or resistance of services to assign sufficient numbers), and removal of MLIs from teaching time for their own language proficiency development thus undermining junior enlisted student opportunities to learn from their example or the removal of MLIs from military skills training in lieu of classroom teaching or language proficiency training thus jeopardizing military training needs.886 In addition, reporting relationships are a particular concern, as noted through the chronology.

1981 Creation of the Defense Foreign Language Professional Development Program (formalizes assignment of MLIs by the services to DLIFLC and defines the MLI program as a developmental assignment for military linguists for the benefit of improved proficiency and lower attrition of DLIFLC students).887 The program is regulated according to DLIFLC Memo 600-2.888

1982 Linguist Proponency Office (LPO) established at DLIFLC with several responsibilities, including management of MLIs.

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885 Comments on Colonel Martines’ MFR of 9 January 1987 subject “Revision of the Defense Language Institute Memoranda as Pertaining to the Role of FLTN/P at DLI,” 1987, in FF 12, RG 25.531-02; DLIFLC Annual Command History, 1986, pg. 31. There are few records before the 1980s on this topic, but a healthy number from then on. Note, the very first MLIs were, enlisted Nisei instructors of the WWII-era Military Intelligence Service Language School who exhibited considerable competence in Japanese as heritage speakers. Fluent foreign language instruction by uniformed members continued into the Army Language School period until the faculty was fully civilianized for various reasons. See Cameron Binkley, “From World War to Cold War: Creating the Army’s “Multilanguage School at Monterey,” www.history.army.mil/events/ahts2015. Thanks to 1SG. Caryn Yruegas, B Company, 229th MI Battalion.

886 Various memos ca. 1987 mostly relating to changes in policies/MOU for MLIs, in FF 12, RG 25.531-02.


888 Date of the first iteration of DLIFLC Memo 600-2 is unknown.
1983 Col. David McNerny, DLIFLC Commandant, signs MOU with Air Force and Navy on “Assignment and Utilization of Air Force and Navy Cryptologic Language Technicians at DLIFLC.” Agreement spells out participation of “service cryptologic language technicians” as enlisted instructors and role model for junior linguists and prescribes clear responsibilities to various parties. DLIFLC has full authority to assign linguists for academic functions. The Navy, however, also clearly specifies that in transferring personnel to HHC DLIFLC the Navy preserves the authority of its service unit commanders to be able to draw upon these personnel “to perform collateral Navy duties as necessary but on a not-to-interfere basis with the academic schedule and workload assigned by DLIFLC Director of Training.”889 MOU also makes clear that MLIs are participants in a development program to enhance their own skills and experience. A similar document is not found for the Army, which may not be needed because the Army service unit reports to the DLIFLC commandant.

1986 GOSC endorses LPO as the “action arm in support of DLI’s mission to provide technical oversight of the Defense Foreign Language Program.” Again, included among its several responsibilities is for the DLIFLC MLI program IAW DLI Memo 600-2.890

1985-87 Under Col. Monte Bullard, DLIFLC management seeks to increase to 3/3 qualifications for MLIs to instruct, which generates resistance from services.

A research study explains that since the program began in the late 1960s, MLI instruction was focused upon assisting native-speaking faculty to teach students better listening comprehension skills. This practice was based upon the aural approach to second-language acquisition that theorized that oral production was reinforced if a foundation in the listening skills was established in the beginning stages of second-language learning. Studies seemed to show that restricting active language use until later in training increased listening comprehension and MLIs spent much time assisting students in language lab work focused upon listening skill development. Because military linguists seldom obtained a 3/3 level during their first tour, very few MLIs were qualified by the proposed new teaching requirements, which they had never needed before under the existing theoretical regime. Moreover, the success of the MLI program was not based solely on their own language proficiency but on many other benefits to students and teachers including that their value in the program as role models and ability to relate to students, the continuity they provided, their availability as counselors and tutors, better connecting the schools to the service units, etc. Raising the requirement of MLIs to teach to 3/3, therefore, essentially meant reducing the number of MLIs available for the MLI program.891 There is no evidence that this difficult to meet requirement was adopted. See 1999 revision of 600-2.

1986 Controversies related to MLIs included MLI qualifications as well as civilian faculty resentment over intrusion of their former students into the classroom. General concerns focused

890 Fact Sheet, 7 January 1988, in FF 8, RG 25.531-02.
891 Joseph R.F. Betty, “The Study Phase I” [regarding relationship between language proficiency and MLI instructional qualifications], conducted for the Chief, Foreign Language Training Advisory Division [DLIFLC], 30 June 1986, pg. 1-13, in FF 13, RG 25.531-02. The study compared MLI DLPT scores to student evaluations of MLI effectiveness and determined that while language proficiency level was a factor in MLI effectiveness it was not possible to determine what that level was or should be.

Page | 216
upon MLI classroom hours, additional duties, office space, and their use as platoon sergeants. DLIFLC sought to require level three qualifications for MLIs, which did result in efforts to provide MLIs more refresher training. Colonel Bullard seeks to revamp the MLI program and pushes to assign MLIs directly to department chairs.892

1987 DLIFLC LPO remains responsible for MLI Program Office. Staffed by a Lt. Col. who serves as a special assistant to the provost and is the senior enlisted military linguist on the DLIFLC staff IAW DLIFLC Memo 600-2. The office “monitors the DLIFLC program concerning utilization of NCOs and Petty Officers and its relationship with the service language requirements.” LPO is POC for all matters relating to MLI Program and is proponent for DLIFLC Memo 600-2.893 This office also interviews, selects, and coordinates assignments of MLIs to DLIFLC. The senior enlisted member of this office coordinates with CSMs at DLIFLC HQ and with the CSMs of the service troop commands and is delegated to sit in for them as necessary. This person has oversight authority for all enlisted student actions at DLIFLC; determines MLI assignments in areas of teaching, course development, and as platoon sergeant; and assists and reviews all MLI personnel actions.

1987 (July) DLIFLC memo 600-2 governing MLIs revised. Memo 600-2 specifies that “Any military member may be tasked by his or her parent service or unit to perform collateral duties as directed by the Commander. To the extent possible, prior coordination will be effected between representatives of the parent service or unit and the LPO-ML [Language Proponency Office-Military Linguists] for any collateral duty which will absent the MLI from the language department.”894 The rating chain reports to the senior MLI in each school.

1988 LPO becomes Language Coordination Office under Provost with responsibility for MLI Program.

1988 (May) DLIFLC creates Deputy Associate Dean who is senior enlisted person for each school and who is responsible for oversight, discipline, proper utilization of MLI involvement in the instructional process and/or curricular process in that school. This person also rates or provides letter of evaluation for all subordinate MLIs assigned to school and recommends awards.895 Apparently, this results from Bullard’s effort to drive MLI management lower down.

1991 (September) Hand-written note entitled “MLIP Today”896:

- Decentralized. Deans have authority and control of assets [as opposed to LPO, service units].
- Service role expanding. Navy, USMC model being followed by USA and USAF.
- Training day expansion. Extension of training support to students. Etc.

1994-95 The Air Force Element at DLIFLC, which was separate from the 311th Training Squadron responsible for Air Force students at DLIFLC, supports the assistant commandant and represents

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893 SCHED-1987, in FF 8, RG 25.531-02.
894 DLIFLC Memo 600-2, 1 July 1987, in FF 12, RG 25.531-02.
895 Memo, 17 May 1988, in FF 10, RG 25.531-02. 600-2 slightly revised to account for this change. See DLIFLC Memo 600-2, 1 February 1988 in FF 9, RG 21.12-08.
Air Force personnel on the installation who are not students. AFELM has 60-70 personnel, including MLIs.897

1999 (1 January) DLIFLC publishes revised 600-2 (superseding DLIFLC 600-2, 1 June 1994). Establishes MLI Management Office (MLIMO). MLIs are to teach, monitor, and mentor students in the basic language program focused upon IETs. MLI professional development is accomplished through the MLI 3Plus program, which provides training in teaching skills, military leadership and management, and language proficiency plus other linguist activities that support the DFLP. Regarding leadership: “Assignment to military leadership positions outside the classroom will be at the discretion of the Service units, as coordinated with the MLIMO, and should be considered an integral part of the MLI program. This is related to the MLI mission to model.” The purpose of the MLIMO, consisting of DLIFLC MLI Program Sergeant Major, Air Force Chief, DLIFLC MLI Program and Air Force Element Superintendent, Navy Chief, MLI Operations and Senior Navy MLI, and Marine Corps Detachment NCOIC, is to “Advise the Commandant, Tenant Unit Commanders and the Provost on MLI manpower, personnel, and professional development as outlined in this regulation.” The office also assigns MLIs by coordinating “with the appropriate Senior Enlisted Service Representative and organization within DLIFLC” and coordinates with Operations, Plans and Programs [DCSOPs] and Service units for use of MLIs in support of DFLP activities. The regulation requires the Senior Enlisted Service Representatives to “resolve, through coordination with the OD [Dean’s Office], conflicts between MLI instructional duties and Service unit requirements.” And “provide guidance to the MLIMO and OPP on the level and nature of individual Service unit support for the internal and external training and operational support activities involving MLIs.” Under the Office of the Dean, amongst many responsibilities is included the requirement to “notify the MLIMO of conflicts between MLI performance of instructional duties and collateral military duties that cannot be resolved with the respective Service unit.” [Or, also if similar use of MLIs for DFLP duties hampers the language training program.]898 Among the significant changes to the 1994 600-2 version was the addition of a range of three progressive certification levels for the MLI Badge Award based upon levels of skill, education, and proficiency: Instructor (DLPT 2/2/2), Senior Instructor (DLPT 2+/2+/2+), and Master Instructor (DLPT 3/3/3).

2001 By order of the commandant, some casual students and some MLIs had to be assigned as gate guards after the Army directed the closure of all bases and until DLIFLC secured funds by pointing out to an angry TRADOC general that the Presidio lacked an MP platoon or any active combat units. A National Guard unit was called to duty as a stop gap and private contractors were eventually hired.899

2003 Lt. Col. Kent Webber, 229th Military Intelligence Battalion Commander, 2010-2012, reported that the focus of the unit when he served as XO around 2003-2004 was completely on military training for soldiers, i.e., a battle drills emphasis. Col. Danial Pick, the DLIFLC Commandant to whom Webber reported in 2010, emphasized to him that “I had to absolutely make sure that language training was my number one focus. And that took a little bit of getting used to, took a little bit of self-correction on my part and a tendency to – in 2003, 2004, there was almost this attitude that had developed, right or wrong, that language training was the responsibility of

897 DLIFLC ACH 1994-95, pg. 49.
898 DLIFLC 600-2, a January 1999, in FF 9, RG 20.10-05.
the Institute, and we would make sure soldiers were in class and went to class, and all that kind of stuff. But the military training was [our priority], and it was almost kind of like never the twain shall meet. So I had to get myself re-oriented to the current thinking or the prevailing winds, which I think is the right way. These comments illustrate why DLIFLC prefers as much control over MLIs as it can have.

2004 Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Eugene Patton ends practice of using junior enlisted personnel (E-4s/E-5s) to overcome MLI shortages. MLIs could not serve as role models unless they themselves had experience doing the work they were supposed to be modeling.

2006 Col. Tucker Mansager requests DA, through TRADOC increase MLIs for DLIFLC and a reallocation of MLIs by service based upon student load as correlated to reduce attrition. DLIFLC’s fiscal year 2007 TDA specified 106 MLIs, but the required load strength should have been 121. Moreover, the Army picked up the largest share 58 while the proportion of its students meant it should supply only 46. The Air Force supplied 21 MLIs, but its load indicated it should supply 46. DLIFLC was not a joint service organization but taught students from the joint services. The services’ Manning documents, therefore specified different allocations that did not reflect the appropriate allocations, which he sought the Army as Executive Agent to correct.

2007 Colonel Mansager, in commandant’s exit interview, complains about Air Force and Navy not providing their share of MLIs to support DLIFLC due to lack of the Institute not having a joint manning document as well as the tendency of these services to also assign their MLIs as “part-time platoon sergeants.” Without a joint manning document, DLIFLC had to hire contract MLIs using its own funding, but could only find a percentage of qualified candidates.

2008 Col. Scott, DLIFLC Assistant Commandant, in an effort to reduce attrition, discovered a lack of military leadership in the schools during his tenure, 2004-2008. The few officers and MLIs that were in the schools were being tasked with extraneous duties that detracted from their focus on educational outcomes. Here is what he said in his 2008 exit interview:

I realized there was a battle between the faculty and the service units about attrition. It wasn’t a battle about not attriting; it was a battle about who would get the blame for attriting, as if anyone had been fired because of attrition. The unit commander’s job is made easier if the teachers go ahead and fail the student out right. It takes two to three months of a series of test failures to make that happen. They would prefer that the teachers failed the student. The faculty, because they believe strongly, and incorrectly, that their merit pay is tied directly to student outcomes, they would rather the student be administratively attrited. Administrative attrition doesn’t count against the faculty. Only academic attrition does. It’s in the faculty interest to get the units to do the attrition. All the battles were over this, but I didn’t really care who got the blame. I just wanted to stop the attrition. My approach was really who was going to get the credit for the save instead. I found some structural issues that I began to address immediately. I saw that there was a lack of military leadership in the schools and what leadership there was, it was full of additional duties and a lack of student focus. I moved officers out of the staffs and into the schools. I then

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901 DLIFLC ACH 2004-5, pg. 94.
902 Col. Tucker Mansager, Memo, 29 November 2006, in FF 26, RG 51.01.09.
903 Col. Tucker Mansager, Exit Interview, 1 October 2007, pg. 1; DLIFLC ACH 2006-7. Pg. 92. The Navy assigned its MLIs to serve as unit cadre for 50 percent of their time.
insisted that additional duties be taken from the officers and military language instructors (MLIs), who had been given everything from safety officer to building lock-up duty, property accounts custodian and computer information technology officer. That had all fallen on the MLIs and the officers. I removed all that over a period of time and told the military that their job was to focus on student performance. The associate deans, operations officers, the chief MLI and MLIs were freed up from all those burdensome duties and told to focus on the students. I gave them clear guidance that they had to communicate with me and that it was my expectation that every student would be counseled every week and that the units would be notified if a student was having an issue. In essence, the platoon sergeant or the training leader from the unit should become the MLI’s best friend. For the officer, he should get to know the ops officer or executive officer in the units as well as he knows the guy down the hall. The idea is to communicate problems and identify them early. We had a program called catastrophic failure. Teachers would identify students early on who seemed to be having problems, basically predicted they would fail, and then they insisted they be dis-enrolled administratively. I thought this was a horrible concept. The student didn’t even get the chance to fail out right. People just felt you weren’t going to do well so they dis-enrolled you. I banned that practice. I didn’t want to allow catastrophic failures. My intent was to afford every student who got in here a fair chance to graduate. I focused initially on the military leadership and removed all those additional duties, then I focused on getting routine meetings with the squadrons, battalions and detachments for the Marines and Navy, to ensure the communication took place in a structured fashion. If the school had to have a meeting, the units needed to attend and they needed to walk through the students one by one. The faculty members were present as were the department chair, team leaders, MLIs and the unit reps. Most schools did that right away and some struggled with it. In the end, in one year, we went from 30 percent attrition down to 22 percent attrition. That’s a tremendous gain in one year.904

2009 A study by the DLIFLC Research and Evaluation Division interviewed 24 MLIs and found that they often did not receive enough teaching hours, which all wanted to maintain their proficiency, and highly valued serving as mentors. MLIs also reported finding themselves caught in between the schools and the service units, trying to keep up with a constantly rotating roster of unit contacts, dealing with DLIFLC and service unit bureaucracy on student disciplinary issues, etc., and were sometimes at odds within teaching teams or spread too thinly between several. While MLIs wanted more time in classrooms, some teachers ironically did not want them to teach when deemed insufficiently proficient. The report recommended enhancing the role of MLIs in developing, promoting, and implementing military mission-specific activities in the classroom while better balancing their administrative functions.905

2009 (May) The Air Force stands up 517th Training Group at DLIFLC and deactivates its existing Air Force Element staff that support the DLIFLC assistant commandant position, an Air Force officer. However, this results in the transfer of all Air Force MLIs and DLIFLC Associate Deans to the new 517th TRG. The MTOE [manning document] of the group is not revised, however, and the Air Force later fails to supply ADs to the schools, which positions are then filled by Army officers. Air Force MLIs are also absorbed into the service units, although their squadron

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commanders continued to report to the assistant commandant who is also the 517th TRG commander. Unclear if the MLIs changed raters from school to unit.906

A proposed change to MLIs includes a request to adjust the formula used to determine MLI requirements/authorizations at DLIFLC. The purpose is to ensure MLIs are available in sufficient numbers to instruct, counselors and serve as role models to initial entry trainees in particular. The change is directly and proportionally related to the change in the student to instructor classroom ratios associated with DLIFLC’s Proficiency Enhancement Plan (PEP), which calls for changes in student-to-instructor classroom ratios.907

2011 (late) The Army’s service unit at DLIFLC, the 229th MI Battalion, proposes to assume control over all Army personnel in the schools, meaning all associate deans (Army officers) and all Army CMLIs and MLIs. This is driven by concerns and differences between the service unit and the schools over attrition and reporting procedures used to inform the service unit about problems with students. Dr. Jielu Zhao, Associate Provost for Undergraduate Education, reports unanimous opposition to this proposal from his staff [the Dean of Students, Lt. Col. Gregory Christiansen, reports independently and his report is unavailable]. According to Zhao: “We believe that AIDs and CMLIs have been an integral part of the Dean’s Office in UGE and they need to continue to stay in the UGE chain of command through the Dean of Students. The AIDs and CMLIs are leader of MLIs and the student body in every school. They are responsible for student performance, play a role in bringing a military perspective to school leadership, and function to promote communication between schools and all Service Units. Currently, the AIDs and CMLIs in school houses are doing a great job following 350-10 to take student actions and to negotiate with the Service Units about necessary actions. We can always improve, but reassigning Army AIDs and MLIs to the 229th MI Battalion is not in the interest of the overall DLIFLC mission.” In addition, “If AIDs and CMLIs are reassigned to the Service Units, their chain of command will change and their loyalty to the schools will change. Therefore, the unbiased military representation in the school houses will be greatly weakened. It is likely that the Service Units will then make unilateral decisions on student actions regardless of the academic nature of many such actions. As an example, Army MLIs would feel pressure to help Army students more in joint classes than focusing upon the most in need in the entire class.908

And “Currently, the higher attrition rates in some Services have been mainly caused by the ineffective and lengthy process of student actions. We understand that the slow process was possibly due to the understaffed situation in the units. We believe the basic solution to change the current situation is for the Service Units to improve the manning status and to improve their work effectiveness by using and training their existing resources.”909

In conjunction with the above discussion, Dr. John Lett noted a recent study conducted by the Evaluation and Standards Research and Analysis Division on attrition discovered that structural

906 Jeremey Shelton, an experience CMLI reported this information to Dean of Students Lt. Col. Gregory Christiansen, in Donald Fischer, email chain entitled “Hot Decision Brief,” 9 November 2011, in DLIFLC Command History Office files (2011-2013).
907 FF 6 and 9 RG 51.02.11-09. See also Ff26, RG 51.01.09.
909 Ibid.
relationships could impact attrition. Differences in how the individual services and commanders handled counseling also mattered as did the importance of maintaining the independence of MLIs. Something as bureaucratic as to whom the MLIs reported, their school or their respective service unit, impacted MLI loyalty and affected an MLI’s ability to head off attrition.\(^{910}\)

In effect, DLIFLC academic staff and lead MLIs strongly argue for MLIs to continue to report to the Provost Office and not to their respective service units, which might divide their loyalties and allocate too much time to non-school duties.

\(^{910}\) Dr. Lett discusses the study in Fischer, email chain entitled “Hot Decision Brief,” 9 November 2011.
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